Recent Gains Against The Islamic State in Iraq Point to Growing Coalition Capability

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Iraqi government forces, and their Iran-backed Shi'a allies, scored a significant victory in mid-October when, after a seven-month battle, they succeeded in recapturing Baiji, a strategic town and oil refinery on the main highway connecting the capital Baghdad with Islamic State-held Mosul, the country's third-largest city. The recapture of Baiji is a small but significant development in the Iraqi government's struggle against the jihadist organization, and is further evidence of government forces' slow progress north, through mainly Sunni areas, toward Mosul as well as of the Iraqi military's slowly increasing competence and abilities. Following its capture, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited the town and lauded the its recapture from the Islamic State, which he said "brought out the capacity of Iraqis and their persistence until they liberated their city," while he also praised the "martyrs" who had fallen in the fight (Rudaw, October 24; Prime Ministers' Office, October 23).

Striking a different note, however, Iranian media linked to that country's government and religious establishment, drew particular attention to the role of Iran-backed Shi'a militias in the battle, singling out for particular praise the Imam Ali Battalion, effectively the armed wing of Harakat al-Iraq al-Islamiyah (Movement of the Islamic Iraq), many of whose leaders are linked to the strongly anti-U.S. Sadr movement (Tasnim News, October 20). By contrast, various Sunni Islamist groups, both inside Iraq and globally, responded to the recapture of Baiji by launching their own counter-propaganda aimed at the Iraqi government and their Shi'a allies. For instance, the influential UK-based British Muslim Brotherhood-linked website Middle East Monitor, ran an alarmist article quoting Shaykh Abdul Razzaq al-Shammari, an Iraqi Sunni tribal Islamist leader, as accusing Shi'a-backed militias in Baiji of burning eight-presumably Sunni-mosques in the area and of committing a "genocide" (Middle East Monitor, October 26). These divided and starkly polarized responses to the Iraqi government's advances against the Islamic State highlight the risk that the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and particularly the upcoming battle for Mosul, will be used by hardliners on both sides to further stir up sectarian tensions across the region.

Meanwhile, the news of a joint U.S.-Kurdish raid on an Islamic State prison in Hawija, also in Islamic State-held Sunni areas of northern Iraq, drew attention to the ongoing role of special forces units in the conflict. The nighttime attack, launched by helicopter on the night of October 22, freed 70 prisoners, killed at least 15 Islamic State members and captured others; however, one experienced U.S. special forces soldier also died in the attack (Rudaw, October 22). Although the raid was unusually large in scale-and its publicization, including the release of helmet-camera footage of the raid, was also relatively novel-the action nonetheless drew attention to both the Kurds' increasingly effective special forces, and also the close relationship between them and their U.S. mentors. Such units can be expected to play an increasing role against the Islamic State in coming months, both in supporting ground offensives and in conducting further behind-the-lines operations, which may well begin to directly target the jihadist leadership with the aim of seriously damaging the group's military capacity and credibility.

Meanwhile, more conventionally, the U.S. military continues to conduct almost daily airstrikes against Islamic State forces in Iraq, providing both strategic and tactical-level support to Iraq forces on the ground. For instance, on October 27, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) said that its "bomber, fighter and attack aircraft" had conducted a total of 14 strikes on the day against Islamic State targets. Some of these near Mosul, likely in close support of Kurdish forces, "struck two separate tactical units and destroyed two fighting positions and an heavy machine gun" (CENTCOM, October 28). Similar attacks in Sinjar, where Kurdish forces are preparing an offensive against the militant organization, struck Islamic State "tactical units," "fighting positions" and a "mortar position." By contrast, other strikes on the day away from the front-lines targeted Islamic State rear-area facilities. For instance in Tal Afar, these hit a "weapons storage area, an [Islamic State] logistical facility, and an staging area." The day's activities give a reasonable representation of the U.S. military's daily aerial operations, which for now at least are focused on gradually degrading the organization's capabilities and morale, while also supporting localized engagements against the Islamic State by friendly forces, and particularly the Kurds. Taken together, these developments-the Iraqi military and Shi'a militias' growing ability to dislodge strongly held Islamic State positions in Sunni areas, the Kurds' growing special forces capability and the U.S. military's pin-point intelligence-driven airstrikes-point to the likely modus operandi to be followed by the coalition forces in the coming months as the critical battle for Mosul draws inexorably near.