Tajikistan hurries to strengthen border protections

Roger N McDermott 10/07/02

In early October, Russian border guards reportedly seized 21 kilograms of heroin on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. Though Russian forces have helped prevent drug traffickers from overwhelming Tajikistan, the Tajik government is racing to build a stable border control system of its own.

Opium that originates in Afghanistan often travels through Tajikistan, whose modest armed forces have struggled to contain drug trafficking. Tajik authorities claim to have stopped about 10-12 percent of narcotics at the border with Afghanistan, though the UN Drug Control Program has put the figure at 3-6 percent. The October third Russian seizure is another sign that President Emomali Rahmonov still needs help from other nations. Tajikistan joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace program in spring 2002, later than many other former Soviet republics and after the United States-led military campaign in Afghanistan had raised the idea of American and allied soldiers basing themselves in Central Asia. On September 26, Tass reported that Russia had stepped up its border collaboration with Tajikistan; on October 5, Central Asian presidents promised to cooperate on drug interdiction and border control. It remains unclear, though, whether Tajikistan's weak internal security will reward these efforts.

The country's poor military discipline and training have plagued its antidrug efforts for years. The Tajik Civil War, which ended in 1997, challenged Rahmonov to integrate opposition fighters into official security structures. This challenge has sapped the border patrol of its strength. The most important force protecting the Tajik border is the Russian Federal Border Service (FPS), which operates under a nine-year-old deal intended as an interim measure. The Russian involvement has lasted long enough to take on a unique complexion. Nearly half its warrant officers and nearly all its conscripts are Tajik citizens. Colonel General Konstantin Totskiy, Director of the FPS, says some 11,000 FPS personnel currently work the Tajik-Afghan border, and they enjoy a reputation as the best operational subunit in the FPS. But its odd dual-national character compromises its role as a tool of Tajik policy. And with Russian President Vladimir Putin calling on September 24 to increase Russia's protection of its own border, Tajik authorities need a coherent, self-contained border protection plan.

In Tajikistan, border security responsibility lies with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Security. Tajikistan's border guard force, the Committee for the Protection of the State Border – which number at least 1,200 and are expanding their ranks – come from a national conscription law. The growth of internal security capacity complicates the Russians' role. The Russian group is the key supporting structure, working closely with its Tajik counterpart. Tajik soldiers cover the risk of armed incursions across the border, while Russian intelligence maintains links within the security structure. Tajikistan's security service works closely with the Russians and it handles counterintelligence, monitoring all uniformed personnel. As brisk as this sounds, the drug runners maintain a more sophisticated network.

Operators who work the Tajik-Afghan border are part of a lucrative, well-organized business. According to General Andrei Nikolayev, former Director of the FPS, heroin increases 10 times in value when it crosses the River Panj into the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan, increases tenfold again when it reaches southern Kyrgyzstan and tenfold again in Europe. This markup is one of the main sources of funding for terrorism. Totskiy believes the problem shows no sign of abating. Drug trafficking routes in Tajikistan are located in the Kharog area, the towns of Panj and Moskovskiy. Tajiks often cross the River Panj in Kharog, a common route for smuggling gangs. Drug traffickers are willing to test the strength of the Tajik border guards in the Kalay-Khumb region, where four detachments suffer from poor training and low morale.

Against this foe, the Tajik border force is trying aggressively to expand. Lieutenant General Abdurahmon Azimov, who runs the state Border Protection Committee, notes that his troops seized 120 kilograms of drugs, including 77 kilograms of heroin, in 2002's first quarter. The fact that Azimov's charges cover 36 kilometers of a 1,200 kilometer border indicates how fast drugs flow. In that light, Azimov has sought training and equipment from the United States, NATO and the European Union. The United States has expressed interest in supplying communication and transport as well as training "skilled specialists." Azimov also says he hopes to expand in coming years to take over more of the Russians' duties. Tajikistan has replaced the Russians in protecting the 430-kilometer border between Tajikistan and China; Azimov hopes to triple his manpower over the next two years on the strength of layoffs in other agencies.

Rahmonov continues to struggle with corruption inside his security structures, though he reportedly has prioritized its elimination and turned over nearly all the Border Protection Committee's leadership in January. At the same time, Rahmonov has only recently acknowledged the link between the volume of drug traffic and corruption among border guards. Any guard who accepts a bribe can thwart the security system. According to observers, a trafficker can buy a pass across the border for about $50, a pittance to the drug syndicates. With corruption so rampant in his own ranks, Rahmonov relies heavily on the United Nations-sponsored Drug Control Agency (AKN) and its director, Rustan Nazarov. Nazarov is not answerable to the Ministry of the Interior; he reports directly to the president. Since its creation in 1999, the AKN has worked under UN oversight to build a database of drug smugglers containing 19,000 individuals and cooperate in joint operations against drug smuggling. In 2001, joint operations trapped some 153 kilograms of heroin; in the first three months of 2002, agents seized 113 kilograms of heroin. While these results are fruitful, it is premature to speculate about the AKN's impact and future role.

While the AKN rarely gives interviews, its infrequent press releases suggest that the scale of the problem is continuing to escalate. Avaz Yuldashev, head of AKN public relations, said in February that the agency believes that 417 facilities produce heroin in Afghanistan and that roughly ten metric tons of it sit along the Tajik-Afghan border. In this context, Rahmonov can look to models from other countries that have tapped outside help to strengthen internal border protections. Kyrgyzstan developed its border guard service, with Russian assistance, and eventually supplanted the Russians. Rahmonov faces a closer and more ravenous foe. And despite reaching out to other partners and seeking internal reform, he will probably rely on Russian aid for the next decade.

Editor's Note: Roger N. McDermott is a Political Consultant at the Scottish Center for International Security of the University of Aberdeen.

Posted October 7, 2002 © Eurasianet