Kurdish Militants Increase Attacks In Iran

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The last few weeks have seen a significant increase in attacks in Iran by the secular-leftist Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê-PJAK), the most significant Kurdish militant group in Iran, which is an affiliate of the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê-PKK) and is based alongside the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the most notable incident, on August 6, PJAK attacked military installations in the Iranian town of Marivan, near the Iraqi border, claiming to have killed 20 Iranian troops in the operation (Rudaw, August 7). The Iranian government confirmed the attack, but did not provide details on the casualties (IRNA, August 10). A statement issued by PJAK, which particularly referenced Iran's recent execution of a young Kurdish man for allegedly supporting the group, said that "the Kurdish people do no more accept the occupation and cruelty imposed on them, nor do they leave the attacks of the enemies unanswered" (ANF News, August 26). In response to this and other attacks, Iran has stepped up its own operations in the region. For instance, on August 31, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander said that his forces had attacked PJAK forces, "killing a number" of fighters near the Kurdish-majority town of Javanrud, with one Iranian soldier being killed in the fighting (Rudaw, September 1).

The PJAK attacks occur in the context of rising Kurdish national consciousness across the region, evidenced by the creation of an effectively autonomous Kurdish zone in Syria and by an ongoing wave of Kurdish protests and militant violence in Turkey. Kurds make up around ten percent of Iran's population, and to head off this threat of rising Kurdish nationalism, the Iranian government has in recent weeks begun pursued a carrot and stick policy towards its Kurdish minority; cracking down on Kurdish militants, while offering social and economic incentives to the broader Kurdish population.

As part of the "carrot" approach, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani made his first official visit to Iran's Kurdistan region in July, visiting the region's capital of Sanandaj. In a series of speeches there, Rouhani promised economic and infrastructural development (specifically the building of new dams and roads). He also stressed Iran's alleged emphasis on religious equality ("Sunni and Shiite are all brothers, we are all equal") and flattered the locals, paying tribute to "the importance of Kurdistan and its people during the Islamic Revolution and their role in protecting Iran" (Rudaw, July 26). Also in July, Tehran lifted a ban on the teaching of the Kurdish language at Iranian universities and the use of Kurdish in the media, two standing demands of many Iranian Kurds (PressTV, July 27). In a further apparent nod to Kurdish feelings, Iran also appointed a Kurdish scholar, Dr. Saleh Adebi, as ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam; he is reportedly Iran's first Sunni Kurdish ambassador (Shafaq, September 3). While many of these gestures are driven by a desire to placate Kurdish feelings, they are also driven by conventional politics: Rouhani received a large number of Kurdish votes in the 2013 presidential election.

At the same time as making such concessions, however, Iran has continued to crack down heavily on Kurdish separatism and militancy. For instance, Behrouz Alkhani, an imprisoned Kurdish activist, was executed by the authorities on August 26, for "effective collaboration" with PJAK and for "enmity against God" (a.k.a. the Iranian government) (Kurdistan Press Agency, August 26). This followed the execution of another Kurdish political prisoner, Sirwan Nejavi, on August 9 (RojiKurd, August 14).

PJAK activism and militancy in Iran is likely to be temporarily constrained by the involvement of the PKK, its much larger and more powerful partner organization, in ongoing fighting in Syria, Turkey and Iraq, and by PJAK's relative weakness in Iran; Iraqi Kurdish authorities also disprove as they do not want to see their good relations with Iran jeopardized by PJAK attacks on it. Moreover, Iran's recent concessions to Kurdish feelings, combined with its crackdown on Kurdish militants, may help to partly quell insurrectionary sentiments among Kurds in the short term. In the longer term, however, it seems highly unlikely that Iran will be able to entirely ride out the ongoing wave of Kurdish nationalism, confidence and self-assertiveness that is washing over the region, whether this is expressed through PJAK itself or through other groups that may yet emerge.