Kenya: The Kalenjin Raiders, including extent of control and influence, particularly in Nairobi; treatment of members of the Kalenjin ethnic group that did not support the Raiders between 2006 and 2008; availability of state protection (2013-November 2014)

1. Overview

Sources state that Kenya experienced post-election violence in 2007-2008 following the inauguration of President Mwai Kibaki for a second term in office, despite claims by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), an opposition party led by candidate Raila Odinga, that the election result had been rigged (BBC 8 Oct. 2014; International Crisis Group 21 Feb. 2008, i). Mwai Kibaki was the leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU) (Open Society Justice Initiative n.d.; International Crisis Group 21 Feb. 2008, i).

A 21 February 2008 report by the International Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis, describes the ODM and PNU parties as follows:

Both coalitions, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU), include leaders from the largest communities of the country but are supported by ethnically-rooted political constituencies that include fanatical followers. For PNU they are the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, who originate from the Central and Eastern Provinces and are strongly represented in the Nairobi Area, Coast Province and the Rift Valley as a result of migration. ODM's ethnic constituencies are Luo, Luhya and Kalenhin, who originate from Nyanza and Western Provinces and the Rift Valley and are equally strongly represented in the major towns. (ibid.)

According to the International Crisis Group report, the 2007-2008 violence began when ODM supporters "took to the streets in violent protest" against the presidency of Kibaki and security forces reacted with force against them and ODM supporters were targeted by Kibaki supporters (ibid., 1). A Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) [1] report, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence, indicates that the 2007 post-election violence was

characterised by widespread or systematic ethnically-targeted killings of people, and looting and destruction of property belonging to communities aligned with PNU by ODM[-]aligned supporters; ... counter-attacks similarly intent on killing people and destroying property owned by ODM[-]aligned communities. (Aug. 2008, 7)

CBC similarly reported that members of the Kikuyu tribe were targeted by groups accusing Mwai Kibaki of "stealing" the elections (26 Jan. 2008).

The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007 states that

[f]rom October through December, interethnic violence between Kalenjin (including among Kalenjin subtribes), Kikuyu, and Kisii communities in Kuresoi and Molo resulted in the deaths of at least 20 persons. There was increased interethnic violence after the December 30 announcement of the presidential election results. Mobs and groups of traditional warriors in opposition strongholds violently targeted ethnic Kikuyu and others suspected of supporting the incumbent president. In Nairobi[,] Kikuyu gangs targeted Luo or Luhya in retaliation. (11 Mar. 2008)

Two sources report that some Kalenjin targeted members of their own ethnic group who supported or were perceived to support the PNU in the 2007 election (KNHCR Aug. 2008, 64; Daily Nation 20 Jan. 2014). The KNCHR report adds that the targeted Kalenjin had their property destroyed and that some were asked to give money or food to the "Kalenjin raiders" (Aug. 2008, 64).

Sources report that the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya resulted in the displacement of approximately 600,000 to 650,000 people (The New York Times 15 Feb. 2008; BBC 8 Oct. 2014; Daily Nation 16 Aug. 2014) and in at least 1,000 deaths (ibid.; BBC 8 Oct. 2014).

2. Kalenjin Raiders

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor of African history at the University of Warwick who specializes in political violence in Eastern Africa stated that "[t]here is no actual group or organization known as the 'Kalenjin Raiders'. [The term] is merely used to describe gangs of Kalenjin who attacked non-Kalenjin groups in the Rift Valley during ethnic violence in 2008, and before that in 1997 and 1992-93" (24 Oct. 2014). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an associate professor of politics and international studies at the University of Warwick who specializes in contemporary Kenyan politics, including inter-communal violence, stated that the International Criminal Court's Office of the Prosecutor "has argued there was a Kalenjin network during the 2007/8 post-election violence, which linked politicians, media etc. with groups of Kalenjin youth or 'warriors' at the local level" (24 Oct. 2014). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes at Amnesty International (AI) similarly stated that a militia group associated with the Kalenjin community and its business and political leaders committed violence in the Rift Valley between 2007 and 2008 and that the name often cited for this group is "Kalenjin Warriors" (29 Oct. 2014). Moreover, a January 2008 New York Times article about the post-election violence states that "[t]hose who have taken part in the killings [including members of the Kalenjin ethnic group] say the attacks were community efforts, sanctioned by elders and guided by traditions that celebrate a warrior culture" (21 Jan. 2008).

The 2008 KNCHR report lists accounts of Kalenjin "raiders being mostly young men around the ages of 18-25 years" and that the weapons used by them are "traditional Kalenjin weapons that every male child is trained to use upon circumcision," including bows and sharpened sticks (Aug. 2008, 65). The International Crisis Group's report states that the Kalenjin warriors are "cattle herders, farmers and traders, who lead a routine existence and are only mobilised when the community is believed to be in danger. Warrior units are autonomous, non-hierarchical and without central command" (International Crisis Group 21 Feb. 2008, 11). Meanwhile, the same report explains that Kalenjin warriors "usually took orders from the elders of their settlements, who still wield considerable influence over some sectors or rural communities" (ibid.).

In a 20 January 2014 article, the Daily Nation quoted a prosecution witness in an ICC case related to 2007-2008 post-election violence as saying that armed Kalenjin youths "erected roadblocks" and took part in the violence. Additionally, on 21 February 2008, the Irish Times reported that "Kalenjin youths used bows, arrows and machetes to drive out members of the Kikuyu tribe believed to be loyal to President Mwai Kibaki".

3. Treatment of Members of the Kalenjin Ethnic Group Who Did Not Support the Kalenjin Warriors (2006-2008)

Information about the treatment of members of the Kalenjin ethnic group who did not support the Kalenjin warriors could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. However, the following information may be useful.

An article published in July 2008 in the Journal of Eastern African Studies indicates that "Kalenjin gangs" had committed violence against Kikuyu in the Eldoret region of Rift Valley and in other parts of the country (Mueller 1 July 2008, 203). The article states that "[w]hole families of Kikuyu were burned alive in a church" and that properties were torched (ibid.). A Reuters article similarly reports on over 30 Kikuyus who were burned to death by a Kalenjin gang in a church near the city of Eldoret (8 Sept. 2013).

The 2008 International Crisis Group report indicates that sources interviewed in the Eldoret region said that "Kalenjin warriors" are being funded by "wealthy athletes" who have invested in rural farmland and other real estate, and use Kalenjin to control property (International Crisis Group 21 Feb. 2008, 12). The report points out that some of these athletes have military backgrounds and are "reportedly also training and sometimes commanding the raiders" (ibid.). Additionally, the Irish Times article quotes the Africa director of the International Crisis Group as saying, "[w]e are very confident that [Kalenjin athletes] are part of the equation. They are a rising elite who see their leadership potential and economic prospects being curtailed by the fact that they are politically marginalised nationally" (Irish Times 21 Feb. 2008). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Information on the extent of control and influence of Kalenji Raiders, particularly in Nairobi, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Availability of State Protection in General

4.1 Assistance to People Displaced by 2007-2008 Violence

A BBC article published in September 2013 states that according to a representative of Kenya's National IDPs Network [2], "there are still 46 [Internally Displaced Persons] camps dotted around the country, with as many as 200,000 residents" (10 Sept. 2013). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 similarly states that according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), in 2012, an estimated 200,000 of the 350,000 people displaced by the 2007-2008 post-election violence had not returned home (27 Feb. 2014, 27).

According to a Human Rights Watch report titled Kenya: Discrimination Against Rift Valley Displaced that was released in January 2013, the Ministry for Special Programmes, the organization responsible for assisting displaced people in Kenya, has not registered or given any government support to a "vast majority" of "roughly 300,000" Kalenjins displaced during the 2007-2008 post-election violence (Human Rights Watch 17 Jan. 2013). Moreover, the report states that while the government says "it is providing equal assistance to internally displaced people from all communities," it is favouring the Kikuyu ethnic group by giving them priority when allotting new houses, land or money (ibid.). The government reportedly refuses to collect data on the ethnic breakdown of those who benefited from government assistance (ibid.). The report also points out that the "government's failure to arrest and prosecute those responsible for the 2007-2008 election-related violence has heightened tensions by leaving the people responsible for past violence free to repeat their actions" (ibid.). Human Rights Watch indicates that "[o]nly three people" have been convicted for the "arson, killings and rapes from that time" (ibid.).

4.2 Witness Protection Programs Related to 2007-2008 Violence

Kenya's Witness Protection Agency was established in 2011 (US 27 Feb. 2014, 13). The US Country Reports 2013 states that the Witness Protection Agency has dealt with cases related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence (ibid.). The same source notes that the Witness Protection Agency was "funded inadequately, and doubts about its independence were common," adding that the agency reported "it could assist a maximum of only 30 witnesses, due to limited funding" (ibid.).

The ICC launched an investigation on the 2007-2008 post-election violence in 2010 (ibid., 5). Government officials and members of security forces were summoned (ibid.). According to the US Country Reports 2013, there have been "numerous reports of tampering and interference with witnesses in the ICC proceedings" (ibid.). A Journal of Eastern African Studies article on Kenya and the ICC cases, published in January 2014, also indicates that there are ICC witnesses being "intimidat[ed], brib[ed], and kill[ed]" (Mueller 22 Jan. 2014, 9). The article adds that the government is not protecting witnesses or victims (ibid.). Similarly, the US Country Reports 2013 indicates that the Witness Protection Agency "was not protecting any witnesses involved in the ICC trials" related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence (27 Feb. 2014, 13). The AI Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes also indicated that "many" victims of the 2007-2008 violence are reluctant to turn to witness protection services offered by the state because of the risk they face; he added that those at risk are the persons who demand accountability for the violence (29 Oct. 2014).

4.3 The 2013 Elections

Uhuru Kenyatta of the Jubilee Coalition was elected in March 2013 (27 Feb. 2014, 1; Reuters 8 Sept. 2013). A 2014 Human Rights Watch report notes that "[v]arious political divisions led to tensions ahead of elections" and that "the Jubilee Alliance brought together and reduced tensions between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin" (24 Apr. 2014, 10-11). However, a September 2013 Reuters article indicates that the victory of the Jubilee Alliance in 2013 "has done little to heal rifts on the ground between Kenyatta's Kikuyu and Ruto's Kalenjin clans" (8 Sept. 2013).

The 2014 article in the Journal of Eastern African Studies states that since the 2013 election, there has been an increase in the number of witnesses in ICC cases who withdrew, as well as "worries about witness elimination. Witnesses are aware of the massive and powerful security apparatus available to Kenya's executive branch" (Mueller 22 Jan. 2014, 11). Similarly, a 2013 BBC article indicates that "[w]itnesses have been disappearing, or withdrawing their testimony" and that according to prosecutors, "some have been threatened, others bribed" (10 Sept. 2013).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The KNCHR is an NGO (registered in 1994) (KNHCR n.d.b), and an autonomous national human rights institution established under article 59 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya (KNCHR n.d.a). Its mandate is to promote, monitor and protect human rights in Kenya (ibid.).

[2] The National IDPs Network was created in 2003 with support from the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru and the KHRC (Kamungi and Klopp July 2007, 52).

References

Associate Professor of politics and international studies, University of Warwick. 24 October 2014. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 8 October 2014. "Why Are Kenyan Leaders at the Hague?" [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014]

_____. 10 September 2013. Gabriel Gatehouse. "Kenya Violence: Survivors' Tales." [Accessed 24 Oct. 2014]

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). 26 January 2008. "'Impunity Cannot Be Allowed' in Kenya, Says Annan." [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014]

Daily Nation. 16 August 2014. "Gichangi's Role in ICC Case Against Top Leaders." [Accessed 27 Oct. 2014]

_____. 20 January 2014. "I Recognised Raiders, Says ICC Witness." [Accessed 27 Oct. 2014]

Human Rights Watch. 24 April 2014. "We Were Sent to Kill You": Gang Attacks in Western Kenya and the Government's Failed Response. [Accessed 27 Oct. 2014]

_____. 17 January 2013. "Kenya: Discrimination Against Rift Valley Displaced." [Accessed 31 Oct. 2014]

International Crisis Group. 21 February 2008. Kenya In Crisis. Africa Report No.137. [Accessed 27 Oct. 2014]

The Irish Times. 21 February 2008. Rob Crilly. "Kenya's Top Athletes Accused of Funding and Organising Violence." (Factiva)

Kamungi, Prisca, and Jacqueline M. Klopp. July 2007. "Failure to Protect: Lessons from Kenya's IDP Network." Forced Migration Review. Issue 28. [Accessed 17 Nov. 2014]

Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). August 2008. On The Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post-2007 Election Violence. [Accessed 4 Nov. 2014]

_____. N.d.a. "Establishment." [Accessed 12 Nov. 2014]

_____. N.d.b. "Who We Are." [Accessed 17 Nov. 2014]

Mueller, Susanne D. 22 January 2014. "Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law." Journal of Eastern African Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1.

_____. 1 July 2008. "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis." Journal of Eastern African Studies. Vol. 2, No. 2.

The New York Times. 15 February 2008. Jeffrey Gettleman. "Signs in Kenya of a Land Redrawn by Ethnicity." [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014]

_____. 21 January 2008. Jeffrey Gettleman. "Signs in Kenya that Killings Were Orchestrated." [Accessed 28 Oct. 2014]

Open Society Justice Initiative. N.d. International Justice Monitor. "Who's Who." [Accessed 17 Nov. 2014]

Professor of African history, University of Warwick. 24 October 2014. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes, Amnesty International (AI). 29 October 2014. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Reuters. 8 September 2013. James Macharia. "ICC Trials of Kenya's Leaders Threaten to Reopen Wounds." [Accessed 17 Nov. 2014]

United States (US). 27 February 2014. Department of State. "Kenya." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. [Accessed 25 Oct. 2014]

_____. 11 March 2008. Department of State. "Kenya." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007. [Accessed 1 Nov. 2014]

Additional Sources Consulted

Internet sites, including: Africa Confidential; Africa Research Bulletin; AllAfrica; Associated Press; Council on Foreign Relations; ecoi.net; Freedom House; Minority Rights Group International; Political Handbook of the World; Project Ploughshares; Reporters Without Borders; Reuters; United Nations - Integrated Regional Information Networks, ReliefWeb; United States - US Committee For Refugees and Immigrants, Overseas Security Advisory Council.