Turkey's top general encourages acceptance of reforms

Soli Ozel 9/30/04

A EurasiaNet Commentary

Turkey boosted its chances of joining the European Union by recently overhauling its criminal code. The Turkish parliament might never have gotten the opportunity to vote on the reform package, however, had it not been for quiet changes taking place within Turkey's military hierarchy.

The annual rotation of top officers in the Turkish Armed Forces occurs on August 30. The decisions as to who will be promoted, reassigned or retired are made by the Higher Military Council (HMC), which meets at the beginning of August for three days and reviews individual files. For the top appointments there is hardly ever any surprise since a pattern is established at least a few years in advance. Given the military's status as the guarantor of Turkey's secular tradition, the country's civilian leadership, including the prime minister who presides over the deliberations, has traditionally had little or no say in the HMC's decisions.

It is widely accepted that this year's HMC finally allowed incumbent Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Özkõk to install his own team. Özkõk, now in his third year in the post, has a reformist reputation, and has maneuvered the military into a politically less intrusive posture. As chief of staff, Özkõk has presented a different profile than his predecessors – punctuated by respect for civilian authority, by an emphasis on the need for institutional reform, and, lately, by his acknowledgement that the military does not have a monopoly on patriotism.

Özkõk's influence already is readily evident. Despite the misgivings of some top officers, he has supported the government's efforts to prepare Turkey for the EU accession process. He also discreetly has assented to the government's extraordinary diplomatic opening on the Cyprus issue, helping Turkey gain diplomatic good will.

The annual rotation of officers is subject to scrutiny in Turkey – and for good reason. The Turkish military retains a special and powerful position in Turkey's political order. The country is still governed, for instance, by a constitution written by and for the military in 1982. In the 1990s, amid a violent Kurdish separatist struggle, virtually all political issues were turned to security issues, thus creating a broad space for the military to intervene in politics. During that time, the military forced an Islamist-led government from power. It did so by mobilizing public opinion, and exerting great pressure on the government, including the threat of a real coup.

Since the removal of the Islamist government in 1997, Turkey's political climate has changed dramatically, as the correlation of power between the civilians and the military has shifted in favor of the former. The EU accession process has promoted constitutional amendments that have taken Turkey in a more democratic direction. Furthermore, the Turkish public has proved itself to be highly committed to the EU goal, expressing a desire for the military to stay on the sidelines of politics.

Over the last three years Turkey has enacted laws designed to civilianize and democratize its polity. These measures have helped Turkey qualify for starting accession negotiations with the EU. Some daring steps – such as permitting the use of Kurdish in broadcasting, and the founding of language schools in Kurdish or other ethnic-minority languages – were taken by the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP), which has an Islamist pedigree. The JDP had a vested interest in liberalizing the polity and furthering the democratization of Turkey. That was the only way for it to legitimize itself and be accepted by the secular public. The government enjoyed unprecedented support and very vocal encouragement from the public in its pursuit of the reform process.

Until very recently, the military dominated the National Security Council, which acted as a board of directors to set the parameters of policy making, particularly in security matters, for elected governments. The recent reforms have changed the character of the NSC: The body now has a civilian secretary-general, and military members are in the minority.

Özkõk has handled the transition with skill. The presence of the pro-EU Özkõk in the top military post helped the cause of reform substantially. Özkõk appears to understand the public's sentiments well. He also seems to recognize the need to change the military's posture so that EU membership – which his hard-line predecessor, Hùseyin Kivrikoglu, called a geo-strategic necessity – can be attained.

Özkõk's relatively more liberal approach is not widely shared, though, by some of his colleagues, and perhaps by some of his younger subordinates. In fact, in 2002, Kivrikoglu, the outgoing chief of staff, tried to extend his own term in an attempt to block Özkõk's ascent to the helm. Having failed in that, Kivrikoglu nonetheless used his discretionary power to name a hard-line colleague to the post of the ground forces commander instead of an Özkõk ally. Another hardliner served as commander of the gendarmes. Together, those two officers reportedly mounted stiff opposition to the EU reform process and to Cyprus initiatives. According to the intimations of two senior columnists for the liberal daily Radikal, at least one of the hard-line generals may even have entertained the idea of a coup at some point.

With Özkõk's team in place, the Turkish military is likely to continue its own modernization program. It is also safe to assume that the military will be a politically less overbearing institution. As this year's farewell and inaugural speeches on August 30 made clear, the armed forces are concerned with ethnic and micro nationalism, as well as the rise of anti-secular movements. Some commanders are unhappy with the pace as well as the content of reforms. Yet, Özkõk appears committed to Turkey's EU membership drive. At the same time, Özkõk and other top military leaders continue to make it clear that any attempt to dilute the principle of secularism by this or any other government is likely to trigger a sharp rebuke from the military.

Given the military's lingering suspicions about the JDP's motives, along with the possible repercussions of recent reforms, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government must continue to tread lightly to ensure that Turkey stays on the present political course. A gradual reform pace is needed to reassure Turkey's military leadership, and to encourage them not to meddle in politics. The EU will also exert considerable influence over Turkish developments in the near- and medium-term. Specifically, the EU's decision whether or not to begin accession negotiations, due by the end of the year, will have a bearing on the future course of Turkish reform, and the military's role in Turkish politics.

Editor's Note: Soli Ozel is a leading political commentator in Turkey.

Posted September 30, 2004 © Eurasianet