Guatemala : situation actuelle des droits de la personne

L'information suivante s'ajoute à celle fournie dans GTM40963.EF du 17 juin 2003 et GTM40950.EF du 13 juin 2003 (réponse de la police au crime et aux plaintes), dans GTM41803.F du 14 août 2003 (menaces contre les paysans et enlèvements), dans GTM41861.F du 14 août 2003 (protection offerte à une femme harcelée par un agent de police) et dans GTM42194.EF du 14 novembre 2003 (situation des homosexuels).

Vous trouverez en annexe un résumé d'un rapport du 7 mai 2003 sur la situation au Guatemala, préparé par la Mission de vérification des Nations Unies pour les droits de l'homme au Guatemala (MINUGUA), ainsi que des extraits d'un rapport du 8 octobre 2003 sur le processus électoral actuel au Guatemala, préparé par une coalition d'organisations étrangères de défense des droits de la personne. Les deux documents exposent la situation des droits de la personne, une importance particulière étant accordée à la violence politique, aux attaques contre des secteurs de la société civile, à la criminalité et à l'impunité.

En août 2003, MINUGUA a présenté à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies son huitième rapport sur la vérification des accords de paix, qui porte sur la situation générale au Guatemala du 1er mai 2002 au 15 juillet 2003 (Nations Unies 11 août 2003). Selon le rapport, durant la période en question, la mise en œuvre des accords de paix a progressé en deçà des attentes et la Mission y décrit le processus de paix comme stagnant depuis les dernières années (ibid.). MINUGUA ajoute que la polarisation politique persiste, que la sécurité publique s'est encore détériorée, que des cas de violation des droits de la personne retenant l'attention du public ont subi un recul et que des menaces sont toujours proférées à l'encontre de défenseurs des droits de la personne, de fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice, d'avocats, de témoins, d'anthropologues légistes, de syndicalistes et de journalistes (ibid., 3-4, 6). La Mission des Nations Unies ajoute que les milieux du crime et du trafic de stupéfiants ont encore été accusés d'influencer des ministères durant la période couverte (ibid., 4). Le rapport intégral se trouve sur le site Internet de MINUGUA, dont l'adresse figure dans la liste des références ci-dessous.

MINUGUA a aussi récemment publié son troisième rapport sur la Police nationale civile (Policia Nacional Civil – PNC). Ce rapport mentionne qu'il existe un besoin accru d'un service de police solide durant une période où les attaques contre les militants politiques, les défenseurs des droits de la personne et les journalistes se multiplient (Nations Unies 1er juill. 2003). Le rapport fait allusion aux faiblesses institutionnelles chroniques de la PNC, notamment à ses lacunes sur le plan du financement et du matériel, ainsi qu'aux déficiences de l'académie de police, y compris aux problèmes avec son programme d'études et son processus de recrutement (ibid.). Le rapport mentionne que le Service des enquêtes criminelles (Servicio de Investigacion Criminal – SIC) de la PNC n'a déployé que la moitié des effectifs nécessaires dans 15 des 22 États du pays et le rapport ajoute que le SIC est inefficace, lent à répondre et qu'il se fie sur des bases de données désuètes (ibid.). Le rapport intégral se trouve sur le site Internet de MINUGUA, mais n'est actuellement qu'en espagnol.

Le plus récent « Conseil aux voyageurs » (Travel Report) sur le Guatemala émis par le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI) signale

[traduction du gouvernement du Canada]

[qu'au] cours des derniers mois, la situation en matière de sécurité s'est considérablement dégradée au Guatemala. Le taux de crimes violents ne devrait diminuer qu'une fois les élections présidentielles et législatives [du 9 novembre 2003] [...] loin derrière [...].

[...] La plupart des manifestations sont pacifiques, mais certaines ont tourné à la violence [...] Comme les anciens membres des patrouilles de protection civile considèrent que les propositions mises de l'avant par le gouvernement guatémaltèque sont insatisfaisantes, ils pourraient provoquer des émeutes et ériger des barrages routiers.

[...]

Le Guatemala compte l'un des taux de criminalité les plus élevés de l'Amérique centrale. La criminalité, notamment les meurtres, les vols, les enlèvements et les viols, est en hausse (Canada 8 sept. 2003).

Le nombre de femmes assassinées et la brutalité avec laquelle les assassinats sont commis ont récemment alarmé les médias du Guatemala (AFP 22 oct. 2003). La coordonnatrice de la condition féminine du groupe Union d'action syndicale et populaire (Unidad de Accion Sindical y Popular – UASP) a signalé qu'environ 250 femmes avaient été assassinées au Guatemala entre le mois de janvier et la mi-octobre 2003 (ibid.). L'article cite une étude du Bureau du procureur général (Procuraduria General de la Nacion) qui signale, entre autres, parmi les causes ou conséquences de ces meurtres : problèmes de drogue, liens aux organisations criminelles, prostitution, éclatement de la famille, jalousie, pauvreté, violence conjugale et agressions sexuelles avec violence (ibid.).

La Commission des droits de la personne du Guatemala (Guatemala Human Rights Commission – GHRC), organisation non gouvernementale établie à Washington, faisait état dans son bulletin mensuel d'août 2003 du [traduction] « phénomène [étendu] d'intimidation et de harcèlement des dirigeants de groupes environnementaux » (GHRC 15 août 2003, 1). Le bulletin faisait aussi part d'incidents de violence, allant des menaces et de l'intimidation aux assassinats, notamment : surveillance de la dirigeante de l'organisation pour lesbiennes LESBERADAS, attaques contre des membres du Bureau de l'ombudsman des droits de la personne et intimidation de membres de la fondation Menchu, organisation des droits de la personne (ibid., 2-11). Le bulletin cite aussi une autre organisation de défense des droits de la personne, le Groupe de soutien mutuel (Mutual Support Group), qui a signalé 2 542 violations des droits de la personne durant la première moitié de 2003 (ibid., 3). Ces violations vont des menaces et des enlèvements à l'exploitation des enfants et au meurtre (ibid.).

Depuis mai 2003, moment où la date des élections générales a été annoncée, la violence politique ne cesse d'augmenter (EFE 29 sept. 2003). Les observateurs de l'Organisation des États américains (OEA) au Guatemala, envoyés sur place afin de surveiller les élections devant se tenir le 9 novembre 2003, ont récemment exprimé de graves préoccupations relativement à l'augmentation de la violence et au fait que les auteurs de cette violence n'avaient fait l'objet d'aucune sanction, ni mise en accusation (ibid.). Des observateurs locaux et étrangers ont mentionné que cette période électorale était la plus violente des dernières années : au moins 19 militants de l'opposition ont été assassinés de la mi-mai à la mi‑octobre 2003 (ibid. 15 oct. 2003).

La « Demande d'action immédiate » (Requests for Immediate Action) la plus récente de la GHRC mentionne qu'au Guatemala, les membres du Centre d'action en justice pour les droits de l'homme (Centro de Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos – CALDH) (GHRC 23 sept. 2003) et du « Conseil des communautés ethniques "Nous sommes tous égaux" » (Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junam – CERJ) ont fait l'objet de menaces de mort, ont été assassinés ou craignent pour leur vie (ibid. 2 oct. 2003). Des articles mensuels sur des incidents et des problèmes particuliers liés aux droits de la personne au Guatemala se trouvent dans les Guatemala Human Rights Update de la GHRC, consultables dans les Centres de documentation régionaux ou sur support électronique à l'adresse .

Cette réponse a été préparée par la Direction des recherches à l'aide de renseignements puisés dans les sources qui sont à la disposition du public, et auxquelles la Direction des recherches a pu avoir accès dans les délais prescrits. Cette réponse n'apporte pas, ni ne prétend apporter, de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d'une demande d'asile ou de statut de réfugié.

Références

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 22 octobre 2003. « Alarma cifra de mujeres asesinadas en Guatemala durante el 2003 ». (Dialog)

Canada. 8 septembre 2003. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, Ottawa. « Travel Report: Guatemala ». [Date de consultation : 22 oct. 2003]

EFE. 15 octobre 2003. « Guatemalan Opposition Activists Murdered ». (Dialog)
_____. 29 septembre 2003. « Curb Election Violence, OAS Tells Guatemala ». (Dialog)

Guatemala Human Rights Commission (GHRC), Washington, DC. 2 octobre 2003. « Request for Immediate Action: Indigenous Leader Killed, Another Threatened ». [Date de consultation : 22 oct. 2003]
_____. 23 septembre 2003. « Request for Immediate Action: Legal Director Threatened ». [Date de consultation : 22 oct. 2003]
_____. 15 août 2003. Guatemala Human Rights Update. Vol. 15, nos 15-16. « Death Threats » et « Fundamental Violations ». [Date de consultation : 20 oct. 2003]

Nations Unies. 11 août 2003. Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala: Report of the Secretary-General. [Date de consultation : 21 oct. 2003]
_____. 1er juillet 2003. Mission de vérification des Nations Unies pour les droits de l'homme au Guatemala (MINUGUA). « MINUGUA Issues Third Report on the National Civil Police ». [Date de consultation : 21 oct. 2003]

Document annexé

Nations Unies. 7 mai 2003. Mission de vérification des Nations Unies pour les droits de l'homme au Guatemala (MINUGUA). Executive Summary: MINUGUA Report to the Consultative Group Meeting for Guatemala. [Date de consultation : 21 oct. 2003], 5 p.

Document électronique annexé

Electoral Process in Guatemala: Civil Society Confronts Fraud and Impunity. 8 octobre 2003. Washington, DC : Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA (GHRC/USA), Guatemala Peace and Development Network (GPDN) et Foundation for Human Rights in Guatemala (FHRG), p. 4-14 (extraits).

3. The political context.

The present political situation is very tense and uneasy as a result of the intense confrontation between the party in government, Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), and sectors of Guatemalan society, including most political parties in the opposition.

...Soon after its inauguration on January 14, 2000, Portillo's government showed its negative characteristics: lack of commitment with the Peace Accords that had been signed on December 29, 1996; flagrant abuses of power by FRG members and high-ranking governmental officials; widespread corruption; and increasing confrontation, not only with the private sector but also with other sectors of civil society, especially the media. Some mafia-like sectors within the State and society, active in illicit businesses, such as drug-trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and trafficking of migrants, women and children, have been on the rise. President Portillo was incapable or unwilling to confront them, and soon they became a significant factor of intimidation and instability. Violations of human rights increased and human rights defenders, judges, journalists and media directors, and members of the social movement became the main targets for violent actions.

In such a politicized climate, the specific situation of human rights has been profoundly affected. Portillo's term has meant a significant step backwards regarding human rights, as the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and the international community in general have acknowledged, with deaths and other forms of violence on the rise.

...The current electoral process is then taking place within a previously created atmosphere of intimidation. According to statements of people we interviewed in Guatemala during our mission, 20 persons directly involved with the electoral process had been killed since the beginning of the process last May. None of these persons belonged to the FRG, and most victims were working with Unión Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), led by Alvaro Colom. On September 14, the leftist party Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), denounced the forced disappearance of one of its candidates for Mayor and a physical attack against one of its organizers. Other parties, as well as common citizens, have reported acts of harassment by members of the FRG. Clearly, this process is, so far, significantly different from the elections in 1995 and 1999, when a higher level of tolerance existed.

...

4. Participants in the Electoral Process.

4.1 Voters. According to the TSE, up to June 30th, 4,710,713 persons were eligible to vote on November 9: 2,036,488 women and 2,674,225 men. They will be electing a President and a Vice-President, 158 members of Congress, municipal governments in 331 municipalities, and 20 main members and 20 substitute members of the Central American Parliament.

4.2 Political parties, coalitions and civic committees. According to the data provided by the TSE, 22 political parties are participating in the electoral process. Only political parties or coalitions of parties are allowed to present candidates for President and Vice-President, Congress and Central American Parliament. Twelve sets of candidates for President and Vice-President (binomios presidenciales) were able to register, before the deadline established by law.

...4.3 Special interests.

...a) The military. There are two significant ways in which the military continues to affect the electoral process and, more importantly, the future government. First, the institutional armed forces continue to be an important actor, although no one believes that they could launch a coup d'etat without a green light form the U.S. Embassy. One of the concrete failures of the implementation of the Peace Accords regards demilitarizing the country.

...There have been denunciations that the army has been supporting Ríos Montt and the FRG, and commanding positions have been taken over by supporters of General Ríos Sosa, Ríos Montt's son, during the last three years. It has been documented that military personnel and resources were used in the violent actions of Black Thursday (July 24th). Nevertheless, one of the consequences of those violent actions was the early retirement of Ríos Sosa, who, instead of becoming Minister of Defense as announced, was recently forced to retire. This indicates internal struggles within the armed forces, which Ríos Montt did not welcome.

...b) The paramilitary. Analysts of the Guatemalan internal armed conflict indicate that there were two kinds of paramilitary groups during the internal armed conflict: those who willfully served the army, such as comisionados militares and repressive PAC; and the regular PAC, who were basically peasants forced by the army to provide intelligence and security duties. The first group is present in several parties, but it is essentially a basis of support for the FRG for legal and illegal actions. The second group would be a significant component of rural Guatemala, given that the PAC system was imposed on practically all rural communities in the Western highlands and other zones of conflict (at one point in the 1980's there were one million males involved with the PAC system).

...One particular party, the DSP, is based entirely on former members of PAC, who reject the FRG's manipulation of their movement.

...c) Religious organizations. In the past, Christian fundamentalist sects were seen as a hard vote in favor of Ríos Montt. The support they provided to him when he was head of state, and later to President Jorge Serrano, has given the impression that Ríos Montt would now count on their full endorsement. However, a different picture emerged when the delegation met with the Ecumenical Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. It is estimated that 58% of the population is Catholic, 3% is fundamentalist Christian, 25% is non-Catholic traditional Christian and 14% is not affiliated to any religion. Moreover, fundamentalist Christians have clearly expressed that they do not presently favor Ríos Montt or any other candidate. In general, the religious sector is actively promoting participation and rejects any form of violence for achieving political objectives.

d) The private sector. We were told that, as in the past, CACIF, the main body representing the private sector, has directly given economic support to all parties having a real chance of winning the elections, except to the FRG. ...On the other hand, the emerging new economic power based mainly on illicit activity, which has gained in importance in the last three years, is solidly behind the FRG. In a way, the definition of this election will determine which sub sector of the private sector will have hegemony during the next four years or more.

...5.1 Candidacy of Ríos Montt for President.

It is clear that the FRG is making every conceivable effort to elect General Ríos Montt as President, and to maintain control of Congress in the next government. ...[Rios Montt] is at risk of losing his immunity as a member of Congress. If he is not elected President, he could finally be within the reach of the judicial system to face charges of genocide and serious violations of human rights both in Guatemala and abroad. For almost four years he has been President of Congress, which has been under the total control of the FRG....It is also widely known that many members of the FRG, or persons with close ties to this party, are hard-line defenders of impunity for violations of human rights perpetrated during the internal armed conflict. Many of them were or are high-ranking officers of the army or leaders of paramilitary organizations.

...There are numerous allegations of corruption against government officials, as well as denunciations of members of the government and persons close to the FRG, for acts of intimidation and terror. From President Portillo to rank-and-file FRG members no one in this party wants any investigation of these deeds.

5.2 Climate of fear and intimidation due to FRG actions.

In general, the climate of fear and intimidation that has been escalating for the last three years was clearly perceived by the delegation. However, no smoking gun has been found regarding the direct responsibility of the FRG or governmental officials in the many violent actions that have led to this situation, particularly because the bodies in charge of investigating these actions have failed to comply with their duties. Death threats, harassment and attacks against human rights defenders, including assassinations, have been a constant in 2002 and 2003. A vast majority of human rights organizations have suffered break-ins, and only computers and files have been taken. Administrators of justice, journalists, campesino leaders and political activists have also been targeted for violence, as clearly indicated in reports by MINUGUA, Amnesty International and the U.S State Department. Additionally, "social cleansing" has continued to be a generalized practice, with the recurrence of the scourge of lynching by angry mobs, the assassination of "street children," and the recent trend of killing women, mostly young and poor (more than 200 in the first 6 months of 2003).

Combined with this selective violence, by all accounts there has been a sharp increase of organized crime and common delinquency. Although it is commonly accepted that Mr. Portillo's government has absolutely failed to improve security and safety --his government was decertified for almost a year by the Bush Administration for insufficient struggle against drug-trafficking-- it has not been possible to directly link violence to the government. People have preferred to refer to the sources of this violence as clandestine groups and parallel structures. However, in its most recent report on Guatemala's situation of human rights, the US State Department stated: "The obstruction of justice, threats, and intimidation also were traced to 'parallel forces' or 'clandestine groups' related to the Government."

Two recent actions have shed light on the FRG's responsibility in acts of violence. The first occurred at a moment when the registration of Ríos Montt as candidate for President, already authorized by the CC, was suspended, based on an appeal presented by opposition parties. That led to what Guatemalans call "Black Thursday" (July 24th) and "Mourning Friday" (July 25th), when thousands of supporters of Ríos Montt were brought from the countryside into the capital city and violently took over strategic points. We quote here what MINUGUA concluded about these two days of intense violence in Guatemala:

...The Mission indicates that these acts are violations of human rights, both because the State did not comply with its duty to guarantee security, physical integrity and tranquility to citizens, and because allegations were made that high-ranking State officials played a role in organizing and directing the demonstrations.

"MINUGUA's verification rejects the version that what took place was the product of a spontaneous reaction of citizens, with no institutional links with the party in government and its leaders."...

The second action was the break-in that took place at the Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos in August, which Guatemala's Ombudsman referred to as "the most serious action against human rights in the last months." Although no person has been so far formally accused for this violent act of intimidation, the Vice-President and other high-ranking governmental officials quickly suggested that the PDH had failed to have adequate security. The Minister of Interior moved to capture and question the PDH's security guards, suggesting their complicity with the break-in. This response is similar to the government's response during the internal armed conflict, when victims were forced to demonstrate that they were not responsible for, or had not deserved, attacks against them. In any case, it has been obvious that those responsible for this action acted with total impunity, and that the government has not investigated the action or erased doubts about the FRG's participation.

...6. Other concerns regarding the 2003 elections.

Diverse social and political actors presented to the delegation their views on other potential problems. We classify them in two groups: denunciations of formal fraud; and actions of violence and coercion.

6.1 Denunciations of formal fraud.

So far, there have been numerous denunciations of formal fraud. Representatives of the international community in Guatemala indicate, however, that many of those denunciations lack sufficient proof. Based on a long history in Guatemala where documenting crimes and abuses has always been extremely difficult --the cases of Myrna Mack, Bishop Juan Gerardi, the massacre of Xamán, and many others have faced the same obstacles-- we support the view expressed by representatives of civil society that denouncing is a responsibility that corresponds to civil society but investigation is the responsibility of the corresponding State institutions. A denunciation should not be dismissed before it is proven wrong.

...6.2 Violence and coercion.

Many political actors and even some international observers do believe that formal fraud, of the type we presented above, will be very difficult to carry out. Although they admit that fraudulent practices existed in the past, they consider that the weight of these practices in the overall process has been negligible, except for the two municipal elections that were nullified. Many assign significant importance to the presence of international monitors to prevent this type of fraud. However, there are two other factors, very much present in this electoral process that could impact the results of the elections: violence and coercion. Unfortunately, assigning responsibility for violence and coercion or verifying their existence is often very difficult.

a) Violence. There have been three main expressions of violence, within an atmosphere already deeply charged with intimidation and fear: attacks against militant of political parties; death threats against candidates, organizers and observers; and the massive violence on July 24th and 25th.

As we mentioned before, militants of political parties have been killed in unclear circumstances, both before the electoral process was officially launched last May and during the process. Some political actors suggest that not all of these killings have been politically-motivated, arguing that some of the candidates may have had links to illicit business or personal quarrels that could induce violence. However, when actual killings are combined with death threats, it is clear that violence has become a specific political tool, particularly in the hands of FRG supporters.

A significant number of the 20 killings reported to us have targeted militants of UNE, which in the polls appears in second place, and above the FRG. This and numerous death threats led Alvaro Colom, UNE's presidential candidate, to modify his campaign strategy, in terms of places, routes and schedules. Many other candidates have been affected by death threats, not only in political parties but also in civic committees at the local level. Some of those candidates resigned, alleging threats from FRG militants.

Some death threats, harassment or "alleged attacks by delinquents" have been targeted against political organizers or people who observe the process, such as journalists and human rights organizations. A day after the delegation talked to a member of Congress in the opposition, she suffered an attack in broad daylight. An organizer of her party had been badly beaten in the capital city just hours before.

We must also acknowledge that Ríos Montt himself has been the victim of violent attacks, although in quite different circumstances. At the beginning of his campaign, he went to Rabinal, Baja Verapaz, precisely the same day that human remains --exhumed from massacres perpetrated by the army during his tenure as head of state-- were being buried at the cemetery. Relatives of the victims considered Ríos Montt's presence a provocation and reacted with anger. Many of them threw stones at Ríos Montt and acted with violence towards his followers. More recently, when Ríos Montt went to Huehuetenango by helicopter, former PAC who considered themselves cheated because the government has not compensated them angrily impeded his helicopter from landing. These actions seem to be spontaneous demonstrations against the party in government and no other party has been involved in them.

The most concrete case of violence has been, however, the taking over of Guatemala City by Ríos Montt supporters on July 24th and 25th, which we have already described. It is important to analyze this act. Obviously, the FRG knew that the political cost of such an action was going to be high, particularly among the middle and upper classes in the urban areas. Not only did many people reinforce their convictions to vote against the FRG, but many others decided to actively work against it and increase activities to monitor the elections. However, such a demonstration of force played differently in the rural areas. For Ríos Montt's supporters, who have been attracted by his strongman image, the show of force strengthened their determination to promote him even more in this campaign. On the other hand, large masses in the countryside received the message that the FRG was capable of instilling terror in the capital city and even more so in the rural poor and vulnerable communities. Those masses were deeply affected by genocide and scorched-earth tactics in the 1980's; the two days of fear in the capital city were a reminder of what communities in the countryside endured from Ríos Montt and others in the past, and a warning of what could be applied to them again. If this wave of intimidation pervades rural Guatemala, undoubtedly fraud will be fully accomplished.

b) Coercion. Hand in hand with terror goes coercion. If the party in government can convince a majority of Guatemalans that it is going to impose Ríos Montt as President by any means, coercion will have an impact, by leading people to either abstain or co-opt their votes or support. The delegation received reliable information about coercion exercised by members and supporters of the FRG vis-à-vis public employees and workers. With the vision that "those who are not with the FRG are against it" they have approached people working in state entities to demand full support. Dozens of teachers have been told that they would lose their jobs if they did not actively influenced parents in favor of the FRG. Whole communities have been told that no social projects will be financed in municipalities where the votes are cast against the FRG. The message is clear: those in favor will benefit and those against will be punished. So far, the punishment is presented in economic terms; however, in the near future it could also mean new waves of violence.

The most concerning aspect of violence and coercion is how difficult it becomes to prove or document all the actions carried on by people close to Portillo's government, from destroying other parties' propaganda to spreading rumors and sending personal messages. This may explain why institutions and embassies are so cautious about accusing the FRG of wrongdoing, and at the same time why the government refuses to properly investigate allegations and denunciations.