Mali: AQIM Exploits Ethnic Grievances

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) announced the death of one of its leaders in northern Mali. According to a July 17 statement posted by the group on Twitter, Abu Bakr al-Shinqiti, said to be Tunisian, was killed during a raid on a Malian army barracks near the border with Burkina Faso. His death, in truth, will likely have little impact on the situation in Mali, which is set to deteriorate further unless local grievances are addressed. It was unclear from the announcement in which engagement al-Shinqiti was killed, but Mali has faced a spike in attacks recently from various militant groups. The most significant recent attack occurred in central Mali, on July 19, when 17 soldiers were killed and 35 wounded in an attack on a base in Nampala, close to the border with Mauritania (Maliweb, July 20). Malian authorities described a coordinated attack, with at least two sets of attackers setting fires and using billowing smoke to cut the base off from its outposts (Maliweb, July 20). The militants appear to have briefly held the base before the Malian troops regrouped and recaptured it. The attack was claimed by Ansar Dine and the National Alliance for the Protection of the Peul Identity and the Restoration of Justice (ANSIPRJ), a newly formed group that is ethnically Fulani (Peul). A Malian military spokesman also included AQIM among the groups that staged the attack (al-Jazeera, July 20). Such coordination would not be unusual. Ansar Dine frequently operates as a liaison between AQIM and Fulani fighting groups, and several attacks have been jointly claimed (see Terrorism Monitor, March 3). However, ANSIPRJ, headed by a former schoolteacher named Omar al-Janah, only came into being on June 18 and casts itself as specifically political rather than jihadist (MaliActu, June 19). The Nampala attack, however, would suggest it has already been co-opted by the Islamists. That is not entirely surprising as the Malian military is a shared enemy for both groups, but the easy alliance between al-Qaeda-linked and Fulani groups is indicative of a wider problem that will ultimately threaten Mali's stability. June 20 marked the one-year anniversary of the signing of the Algiers Accord, which brought an end to the conflict in northern Mali between the government and separatist Tuareg rebels. Thus far, there is little evidence of the promised institutional reforms and economic development initiatives in the north. Furthermore, the agreement had virtually no input from the central region, and problems there will only increase. As they do, the situation in Mali will become more complex and the Algiers Accord more difficult to implement. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has shown itself adept at exploiting local grievances in Mali and it will be looking to do so again.