Colombia: Paramilitary successor groups and criminal bands (bandas criminales, BACRIM), areas of operation and criminal activities, including the Clan del Golfo (also known as Urabeños or Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia); state response, including reintregation of, and assistance to, combatants (May 2016-March 2017)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

According to a 2017 article on the Colombia Peace blog of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) [1],

[w]hile the [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)] accord has significantly reduced overall violence in the country, the demobilization of these fighters has created vacuums throughout the country, which are in turn being occupied by paramilitary successor organizations that are making their presence known through selective killings and death threats. (WOLA 15 Feb. 2017)

According to a 2017 article by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación) [2], illegal armed groups are arriving in FARC-vacated areas before the Colombian Armed Forces (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017). A 2017 article regarding extortion of La Silla Vacia, a news website based in Bogotá (La Silla Vacia n.d.), indicates that according to data from the Colombian police's Anti-Kidnapping and Anti-Extortion Directorate, the 10 municipalities where cases of extortion increased the most, were in places where vacuums, left by the FARC's absence, are being filled by [translation] "groups of criminals and prisoners," who engage in extortion from prisons, including in places such as in La Picota and La Modela in Bogotá, Picaleña de Ibagué in Tolima and Palogordo in San Gil, Santander (La Silla Vacia 24 Jan. 2017).

The United States (US) Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 states that the "Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group [Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos][3] and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) considered organized criminal bands to be a continuation of former paramilitary groups" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 5). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an Amnesty International (AI) campaigner for Colombia stated that "[m]any of [the] new groups are led by individuals who were middle-ranking commanders in the pre-demobilization paramilitary groups (since most of the top leaders were extradited to the US to face drugs trafficking charges)" (AI 24 Mar. 2017).

According to the US Country Reports 2016,

[t]he government acknowledged that some former paramilitary members were active in organized criminal gangs but noted the gangs lacked the national, unified command structure and explicit ideological agenda that defined past paramilitary groups, including the disbanded United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC]. (US 3 Mar. 2017, 5)

In response to an Amnesty International report that indicates that paramilitary groups continue to operate in Colombia, Colombian radio station W Radio cites Colombia's Minister of Defence as stating that Colombia [translation] "has been able to overcome the sad history of paramilitaries" (W Radio 22 Feb. 2017). According to the same source, Colombia's Minister of Defence stated that there are organized criminal gangs, which do not have [translation] "a doctrine or political agenda for society," and that the amount of criminal bands is half of what it was six years ago (W Radio 22 Feb. 2017).

2. Active Paramilitary Successor Groups and Criminal Bands

According to a 2017 paper on paramilitarism in Colombia by Sandra Wienand and Stiven Tremaria, two researchers of Osnabrück University in Germany, published in the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (ERLACS)[4], Colombia is "still challenged" by "armed non-state actors: the paramilitary successor groups" (Wienand and Tremaria Jan.-June 2017, 26). According to the same source, the "paramilitary successor groups known as bandas criminales [criminal gangs] - BACRIM, grupos emergentes [emerging groups], or combos pursue functions of territorial, social, and economic control exerted by violent means" (Wienand and Tremaria Jan.-June 2017, 26). According to an opinion article by Ariel Ávila, subdirector of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación n.d.b.), published in Semana, a Colombian weekly magazine, [translation] "the government seems to be discarding the old concept of 'Bandas Criminales' or 'BACRIM' and instead chooses to use the term 'organized crime'," while "some study centres" use the term "post-demobilization paramilitary groups" (Semana 31 Mar. 2016).

An April 2016 Directive from the Ministry of National Defence (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional) that establishes guidelines to counter organized crime by the military, states that [translation] "it has become clear" that groups previously designated as BACRIM, in some cases, have reached levels of hostility and organization that meet the characteristics of Organized Armed Groups" (Grupos Armados Organizados, GAO) (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 4). The same source defines a GAO as follows: [translation] "group that, under the direction of a unified command, exercises control over a part of the territory that allows them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations" (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 5). The source indicates that a GAO can be identified by the following combination of elements:

• It uses armed violence against the Armed Forces or other state institutions, civilians, public goods, or against other armed groups;
• It has the capacity to generate a level of armed violence that exceeds violence from internal disturbances and tensions;
• It is organized and has a command structure that effectively controls its members which allows the use of violence against civilians, civilian property or the Armed Forces. (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 5)

The same Directive states that these groups do not have a political ideology (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 4). The source defines an Organized Crime Group (Grupos Delictivos Organizados, GDO) as a [translation]

structured group of three or more persons that exists for a certain time and acts in a concerted way in order to commit one or more serious crimes or crimes under the Palermo Convention[5] with a view of obtaining, directly or indirectly, an economic or other material benefit. (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 7)

A report on [translation] "narcoparamilitary structures" in Colombia in 2016 from the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz, INDEPAZ) [6], states that the 2016 Directive [translation] "replaced the name 'BACRIM'" with GAO and GDO (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The same source cites a ministerial directive as classifying the GAO as follows:

[translation] Class A: Clan del Golfo [Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC], Los Puntilleros, Los Pelusos. These groups have an armed capacity, an organizational structure, capacity to act against the Armed Forces.

Class B: La Constru, Cordillera, Botalones, La Empresa, among others. These groups have a regional character and maintain alliances with the structures of [Class] A;

Class C: Criminal groups that act with a specific goal and in a set location. (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017)

According to the INDEPAZ report, there are thirteen narcoparamilitary structures that can be classified into two types (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The first type are those that are linked to the former AUC, who [translation] "interfere at the national level," which include: Clan del Golfo, Los Rastrojos, Las Águilas Negras and Los Puntilleros, the latter being a merger between El Bloque Meta and Libertadores del Vichada (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The second type are those that act at the regional and local level, that have not been able to consolidate or that appeared for the first time in 2016, which include, among others: La Constru, Los Pachenca, La Oficina, La Empresa, Cordillera, Los Paisas, Nuevo Orden, Nuevo Renacer AUC, and AUC (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017).

The Amnesty International campaigner for Colombia stated that although the main paramilitary successor group is the Clan del Golfo, "there are other groups operating in a number of municipalities and departments in the country, such as the Rastrojos and the Águilas Negras" (AI 24 Mar. 2017). INDEPAZ indicates that the Rastrojos were mired in internal disputes and conflict with the Clan del Golfo, which weakened them considerably over the past three years and, according to the Ministry of Defense, they have been dismantled (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). However, according to the same source, the National Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) and INDEPAZ recorded activities from the Rastrojos in 2016 (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The INDEPAZ report further indicates that in 2016, Los Paisas reappeared [translation] "allegedly with support of the Clan del Golfo"; Cordillera and La Oficina maintained a presence in relation to other large structures; and the presence of Nuevo Renacer and the AUC was characterized by threats against social leaders, human rights defenders and citizens in general, similar to the Águilas Negras (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Presence and Areas of Operation

The INDEPAZ report states that in 2016 there was [translation] "narcoparamilitary activity" in 344 municipalities in 31 departments in Colombia, which is a slight decrease from previous years (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). A copy of a map (Map 1) on narcoparamilitary presence across Colombia between 2008 and 2016 and a table (Table 1) produced by INDEPAZ that includes the departments and number of municipalities affected by the presence of narcoparamilitary groups between 2008 and 2016, in a low, medium or high intensity [7], is attached to this Response (Attachment 1). A copy of a table (Table 2) produced by INDEPAZ, containing the names of the departments and municipalities affected by the presence of narcoparamilitary groups, in a low, medium or high intensity (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017), is attached to this Response (Attachment 2). According to the INDEPAZ report, this table includes 101 municipalities, in italics, that do not appear in the 2016 INDEPAZ report, but that appeared consistently in the reports of the nine previous years (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). A copy of a table (Table 7) produced by INDEPAZ containing the names of the departments and municipalities affected by the presence of narcoparamilitary groups in 2016 is also attached to this Response (Attachment 3).

According to INDEPAZ, in 2016:

• Clan del Golfo had a presence in 279 municipalities in 27 departments and has consolidated its presence in the departments of Meta and Guaviare, and in the city of Buenaventura after conflicts with Los Rastrojos and La Empresa;
• The presence of Los Rastrojos was less significant than in previous years and they [translation] "continue on a track to disappear"; they were active in 59 municipalities in 18 departments, primarily in the border municipalities of the Norte de Santander department and the Atlantic coast;
• Las Águilas Negras doubled the amount of municipalities in which it had a presence from the previous year; they had a presence in 41 municipalities in 19 departments; their presence was disjointed and did not show control over a particular zone;
• Los Puntilleros maintained control over [translation] "the Eastern Plains" [los llanos orientales] zone and had a presence in 21 municipalities in 5 departments;
• La Constru and Los Pachenga appeared as new entities with a presence concentrated in Putumayo and Magdalena-Guajira respectively; La Constru was identified in six municipalities in Putumayo; Los Pachenga is allied to the Clan del Golfo and is primarily present in Santa Marta;
• Nuevo Orden was present in Nariño, particularly in Tumaco, with intentions of co-opting territory abandoned by the FARC;
• La Empresa, allied with Los Rastrojos, seemed to be disappearing with the arrival of Clan del Golfo in Buenaventura;
• An unidentified paramilitary presence in Cravo Norte in Arauca, Suárez in Cauca and in El Castillo in Meta. (INDEPAZ Jan 2017)

According to a 2016 article published in Jane's Intelligence Review and written by Annette Idler [8], borderlands are "attractive spaces for violent non-state groups including right-wing groups and criminals" (Jane's Intelligence Review 7 Oct. 2016). According to the same source,

[v]iolent non-state groups collaborate with each other in Colombia's borderlands, especially along the borders with Ecuador and Venezuela. These groups include the two remaining leftist groups - [ELN] and a small remaining faction of the [EPL] - as well as right-wing groups that emerged after the 2006 demobilisation of the paramilitary umbrella group [AUC], and criminal groups including the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel. (Jane's Intelligence Review 7 Oct. 2016)

Idler further indicates that "in regions such as Colombia's southern department of Putumayo new groups such as Mexican cartels have arrived to fill power vacuums" and "in Alta Guajira,… in the north of Colombia at the border with Venezuela, criminal groups are thriving" (Jane's Intelligence Review 7 Oct. 2016).

In October 2016, Amnesty International reported that "[o]ver the last few months," "scores of paramilitaries, some in military fatigues and identifying themselves as members of the [Clan del Golfo] have been intermittently camped in various parts of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó" in north-Western Colombia (AI 17 Oct. 2016). Amnesty International states in February 2017 that "[r]esidents in several hamlets in or near the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó … continue to report the presence of paramilitaries" (AI 3 Feb. 2017). Amnesty International further states that there are "reports of increasing paramilitary activity in regions such as Urabá, in the north-west" (AI 7 Feb. 2017).

Media sources cite the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Representative in Colombia as saying that post-paramilitary groups like the Clan del Golfo are [translation] "actively" murdering people in Chocó and Antioquia (CM& 16 Mar. 2017; RCN Radio 16 Mar. 2017) and that in Tumaco [translation] "'there are other groups that are killing and are influenced by these post-demobilization groups" (RCN Radio 16 Mar. 2017). CM&, a news network based in Colombia, cites the Minister of Interior as saying that [translation] "there are some zones in Colombia such as Cauca, Chocó, the Catatumbo region, and Bajo Cauca and the Pacific where the [paramilitary] threats are concentrated" (CM& 16 Mar. 2017). The source further reports that these areas were formerly dominated by FARC and that assassinations have occurred there (CM& 16 Mar. 2017). The same source further cites the Minister of Interior as saying that the Clan del Golfo in particular is linked to activities in these areas (CM& 16 Mar. 2017).

4. Activities

INDEPAZ reports that in 2016, activities carried out by narcoparamilitary groups included: trafficking of narcotics (including control of cultivation areas and strategic points like airports and seaports, drug trafficking routes; production); control of mining areas; human trafficking; money laundering; smuggling; prostitution networks; extortion; contract killings; confrontations with public security forces and assassinations of police officers; actions against the civilian population, including threats against and murders of social leaders and human rights defenders, murders, child recruitment and displacement; and provision of employment and control of activities of civilians in some municipalities (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017).

The US Country Reports 2016 states the following regarding activities of organized criminal groups:

• "[o]rganized criminal groups (some of which included former members of paramilitary groups) committed numerous political and unlawful killings, primarily in areas under dispute with guerrillas or without a strong government presence" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 5);
• "organized criminal gangs, and common criminals continued to kidnap persons, both for ransom and for political reasons" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 6). The same source cites Fundación Pais Libre, an NGO dedicated to fighting kidnapping that closed in March 2017 (El Colombiano 13 Mar. 2017), as stating that between 1 January 2015 and 30 June 2016, criminals and illegal armed groups kidnapped 320 persons, including 179 for extortion" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 19); and
• "[g]uerrilla groups and organized criminal groups prevented or limited the delivery of food and medicines to towns and regions in contested drug-trafficking corridors, including efforts of international relief and humanitarian organizations" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 22);
• "[o]rganized criminal groups… continued to displace civilians residing along key drug and weapon transit corridors" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 23);
• "[o]rganized criminal gangs, as well as illegal armed groups … forcibly entered private homes, monitored private communications, and engaged in forced displacement" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 23);
• "[o]rganized criminal gangs and ELN guerrillas continued to establish illegal checkpoints on rural roads, particularly in the departments of Putumayo, Arauca, Antioquia, and Norte de Santander" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 27-28);
• "[o]rganized criminal gangs and guerrilla groups killed, threatened, and displaced educators and their families for political and financial reasons, often because teachers represented the only government presence in the remote areas where the killings occurred" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 26);
• "[m]embers of illegal groups, including former paramilitary members, and guerrillas also continued to rape and [sexually] abuse women and children " (US 3 Mar. 2017, 37);
• "[t]here were some reports that … organized criminal gangs used forced labor, including forced child labor, in coca cultivation and illegal mining in areas outside government control …, as well as forced criminal activity in urban areas" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 52).

A BBC article cites the UN representative in Colombia as saying that "illegal armed groups" "were often involved in drug trafficking and illegal gold mining and see activists as a threat" (BBC 16 Mar. 2017). The Amnesty International campaigner stated that

[t]hese groups are engaged in a wide variety of illegal economic and political activities, in many ways similar to the pre-demobilization paramilitaries, including drugs-trafficking, extortion, some limited counter-insurgency activities, the corruption of public and elected officials, and illegal mining and agro-industry to name but a few. …

The use of threats, killings and other forms of violence is a common tool to achieve their objectives. Many of their targets are also similar to those targeted by pre-demobilization paramilitary groups, including community leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, land and environmental activists, left-wing political and peace activists, and indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant farmer leaders and communities, many of whom live in areas rich in natural resources and which are therefore of political and economic interests to such groups. (AI 24 Mar. 2017).

5. Urabeños, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia or Clan del Golfo

According to sources, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) are also known as "Los Urabeños," the "Clan del Golfo" (AI 24 Mar. 2017; INDEPAZ 17 Jan. 2017), or as the Clan Úsuga (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017).

According to a 2017 BBC article, although there is a peace deal with the FARC, other armed groups, including the Clan del Golfo, are "still engaged in armed struggle against Colombian forces" (BBC 9 Mar. 2017). According to Amnesty International, the "[AGC are] remnants of the paramilitary groups that demobilized a decade ago" (AI 7 Mar. 2017). Similarly, according to Colombia Reports [9], the Clan del Golfo is a "paramilitary successor group that took control of criminal enterprises left by the formally demobilized paramilitary AUC" (Colombia Reports 12 Feb. 2017).

According to the 2017 INDEPAZ report, since 2014, the Clan del Golfo has become the [translation] "structure with the biggest presence" in Colombia (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The same source indicates that the group uses a strategy of patronage of local gangs, micro-trafficking, hired killings, and extortion, among others, to consolidate its presence (INDEPAZ Jan 2017). According to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, the Clan del Golfo does not [translation] "behave like the former cartels or like the guerrillas, which are solid and vertical organizations" but functions like a "flexible and mutating network of franchises of mostly urban crime" (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017). An April 2016 article in El Colombiano, a Medellín-based newspaper, reported that figures from the Attorney General's Office [Fiscal General de la Nación] as indicating that the Clan del Golfo [translation] "fosters 2500 gangs in Colombia" (El Colombiano 7 Apr. 2016).

According to the Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, the Clan del Golfo is [translation] "strong in Antioquia, in the Llanos and in the Pacific" (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017). According to Amnesty International, since 2014 the Clan del Golfo has "initiated an operation to take control of Alto Baudó, a territory populated by indigenous and Afro-descendant communities near the Pacific and other important municipalities of the region" (AI 7 Mar. 2017). According to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, in February 2013, communities reported that at least 300 men of the Clan del Golfo arrived at the Cacarica river basin (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017). Similarly, Amnesty International reports in February 2017 that "[w]itnesses claim that an indeterminate number of paramilitaries are … present in the vicinity of the Humanitarian Zone" of Nueva Esperanza in Dios in Riosucio Muncipality [in the Cacarica river basin], Chocó Department and that the paramilitaries "apparently belong to the [Clan del Golfo]" (AI 13 Feb. 2017). A copy of a map (Map 3) produced by INDEPAZ showing the presence of the Clan del Golfo across Colombia and a copy of a table (Table 8) produced by INDEPAZ containing the names of the departments and municipalities affected by the presence of the Clan del Golfo in 2016 is attached to this Response (Attachment 4).

Semana reports that on 31 March 2016 the Clan del Golfo called for a [translation] "peaceful strike" in the Gran Urabá region (Semana 31 Mar. 2016). In contrast, El Espectador, a Colombian newspaper, reported that an [translation] "armed strike" that "terrorized the population in Antioquia, Córdoba, Cesar and Bolívar" was called for in response to an announcement by President Santos that the Clan del Golfo would be [translation] "hunted down" (El Espectador 31 Mar. 2016). According to the Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos, CERAC) [10], the call led to a suspension of activities in 36 municipalities in 8 departments (CERAC 1 Apr. 2016).

For more information on the Clan del Golfo/AGC/Urabeños see Response to Information Request COL105044 of March 2015.

6. State Response

The April 2016 Ministry of Defence Directive that establishes the legal framework to be applied when using force against GAOs states that the Armed Forces have the authority to deal with GAOs either by themselves or in coordination with other public security forces, while the National Police (Policía Nacional de Colombia, PNC) confronts criminal groups independently, unless they or a competent civil authority requests military support (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 2). The Directive further states that the PNC is responsible for coordinating and carrying out the investigations and operations against GDOs (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 2). Information on the implementation of the Directive, and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces or the PNC response to GAOs and GDOs could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Further information on the state response to paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6.1 Infiltration and Collusion

According to Country Reports 2016,

[h]uman rights organizations, victims, and government investigators accused some members of government security forces, including enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and officers, of collaborating with or tolerating the activities of organized criminal gangs, which included some former paramilitary members. (US 3 Mar. 2017, 4)

The same source adds that "in some cases [the Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group and other NGOs] accused elements of the government of collaborating with [organized criminal bands] to commit human rights violations" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 5). Similarly, the Amnesty International Campaigner stated that "[t]here continue to be reports of the collusion of state actors, including sectors of the security forces, with [paramilitary successor and new criminal] groups" (AI 24 Mar. 2017).

According to the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, the Clan del Golfo has [translation] "succeeded in infiltrating divisions of the armed forces and the justice system" (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017). Similarly, according to the 2017 INDEPAZ report, [translation] "narcoparamilitary" groups "infiltrated" official institutions and forged alliances with public servants, including:

• the Armed Forces and the police: the sale of arms and information, and the participation in other illicit economic activities;
• the Office of Attorney General: with attorneys on the payroll to obtain convenient judgments; and with
• local governments: the appropriation of resources, favourable political decisions and interference in electoral processes (INDEPAZ Jan 2017).

7. Recruitment

The US Country Reports 2016 states that "[o]rganized criminal gangs, as well as illegal armed groups … engaged in … conscription" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 23).

The 2017 Annual OHCHR report on Colombia states that

[a]t the end of 2016, the temporary pre-grouping zones for [FARC] members to undergo disarmament and reintegration had not been readied. This generated mistrust and vulnerability among [FARC] members and provided an incentive for desertion or joining criminal groups. (UN 14 Mar. 2017, para. 37)

El Heraldo, a Barranquilla-based newspaper, cites the Attorney General as saying that the Clan del Golfo is [translation] "trying to recruit dissidents from the FARC. They offer them salaries of 1.8 million Colombian pesos (COP) [approximately C$837], especially in the areas of Ituango and the north of Antioquia" (El Heraldo 25 Jan. 2017). Similarly, the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation states that the Clan del Golfo [translation] "are pursuing guerrillas who are demobilizing," offering COP 1.8 million a month to low-ranking combatants, while the government is offering a third of that amount for reintegration, and offering COP10million [approximately C$4650] per month to mid-level commanders in regions with high cocaine production (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 13 Feb. 2017).

The Amnesty International Campaigner stated that Amnesty International continues "to receive reports of the recruitment of children" (AI 24 Mar. 2017). Similarly, the INDEPAZ report indicates that in 2016, narcoparamilitary groups recruited minors (INDEPAZ Jan. 2017). The 2017 Annual OHCHR report on Colombia states that

OHCHR observed the involvement and use of children by post-demobilisation groups linked to organised crime, including in Antioquia, Chocó and Valle del Cauca. Girls in particular were victims of sexual violence, commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking. Families fled their homes to avoid the use or recruitment of their children (UN 14 Mar. 2017, para. 99)

Further information on the recruitment by paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

8. Reintegration of Former Combatants

The Amnesty International Campaigner stated that

[a]s far as [Amnesty International is] aware, there are no concrete measures currently in place to reintegrate members of [paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands], although the issue has been mooted several times by the government. The government's reticence is explained by their reluctance to classify such groups as "armed groups" with the political status that this might confer, and which might be a pre-requisite to develop and implement such reintegration strategies. However, the peace agreement signed with the FARC guerrillas does include several measures which in theory are designed to combat such groups. However, many Colombian human rights NGOs have reported that few if any of these measures have yet been implemented. (AI 24 Mar. 2017)

Further and corroborating information on the reintegration of former combatants of paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

For more information on the paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands active in Colombia, see Response to Information Request COL105469 of June 2016. For more information on Las Águilas Negras, see Response to Information Requests COL105522 of May 2016 and COL105254 of July 2015.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] WOLA is a research and advocacy organization working to advance "human rights and social justice in the Americas" (WOLA n.d.). WOLA's Colombia Peace Blog is a resource for "journalists, policymakers, scholars, activists and others interested in understanding the peace process in Colombia" (WOLA n.d.).

[2] The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation is a Bogotá-based not-for-profit organization that aims to generate knowledge to contribute to public debates on issues of violence, politics, illegal activities and the rule of law (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación n.d.a).

[3] The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group, also known as the Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos, is a platform for international and national political advocacy and consists of 269 organizations (Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos n.d.).

[4] European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (ERLACS) is an open-access peer reviewed scientific journal (ERLACS n.d.).

[5] Sources indicate that the Palermo Convention is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Colombia 22 Apr. 2016, 7; IPI 4 Jan. 2011).

[6] INDEPAZ is a Bogotá-based organization focused on training, research, and dialogue on development and peace issues (INDEPAZ n.d.).

[7] "Low" includes municipalities that saw narcoparamilitary group activity in 2016 and/or in 2014-2016; "medium" includes municipalities that saw narcoparamilitary group activity in 2016 and that saw activitiy in the last year, and/or in four or five years between 2008 and 2016; and "high" includes municipalities that saw nacroparamilitary group activity in 2016 and for six to eight years between 2008 and 2016.

[8] Annette Idler is the the Director of Studies for the Changing Character of War Programme at the University of Oxford (University of Oxford n.d.).

[9] Colombia Reports is a Medellín-based English language news website (Colombia Reports n.d.).

[10] The Conflict Analysis Resource Centre is a Bogotá-based "private and independent research center specialized in the study of armed violence analysis and its social and economic impact" (CERAC n.d.).

References

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Conflict Analysis Resource Centre; Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos; Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris; Director of Studies, Changing Character of War Programme, University of Oxford; International Crisis Group; Fundación Paz y Reconcilación; Journalist at The Guardian specializing in Latin American Political Affairs; Professor of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; Professor of Political Science, Universidad del Rosario; Project Ploughshares; Two Researchers, Osnabrück University; UN - Mission in Colombia; Washington Office on Latin America.

Internet sites, including: Asociación Campesina de Colombia; Caracol TV; Colombia - Fiscalía General de la Nación; ecoi.net; El Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular Programa por la Paz; El Espectador; El Pais; El Tiempo; El Universal; Factiva; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; Insight Crime; International Crisis Group; La Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris; The New York Times; Organization of American States; Razon Publica; Russia Today; UN - Refworld.

Attachments

1. Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ). January 2017. "Mapa 1" and "Cuadro 1" (Map 1 and Table 1). XII Informe Sobre Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares 2016. Translated internally by the Research Directorate. [Accessed 21 Mar. 2017]
2. Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ). January 2017. "Cuadro 2" ("Table 2"). Translated internally by the Research Directorate. XII Informe Sobre Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares 2016. [Accessed 21 Mar. 2017]
3. Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ). January 2017. "Cuadro 7" ("Table 7"). XII Informe Sobre Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares 2016. Translated internally by the Research Directorate. [Accessed 21 Mar. 2017]
4. Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ). January 2017. "Mapa 3" and "Cuadro 8" ("Map 3" and "Table 8"). XII Informe Sobre Presencia de Grupos Narcoparamilitares 2016. Translated internally by the Research Directorate. [Accessed 21 Mar. 2017]