Nepal: The Nepal Congress Party (NC) and Nepal Tarun Dal (Youth wing of NC), including treatment of their members by their political opponents; incidents of extortion by the Youth Communist League (YCL), including incidents involving their political opponents; state protection offered to victims of extortion (2013-June 2014)

1. Overview of NC and Its Political Opponents

Sources indicate that the NC party has periodically been the ruling party since the 1990s (NC n.d.; Post-doctoral Researcher 2 June 2014; ODI Aug. 2010, 5). Al Jazeera describes the NC as Nepal's "largest and oldest surviving political party" (7 Mar. 2014, 2). Sources report that the NC is a "centrist" party (BBC 28 Nov. 2013; NC n.d.) that was formed in 1946 (ibid.). However, according to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a UK-based independent think tank on international development issues (ODI n.d.), the NC was "pushed more to the right" with the entry of the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) into the political system (ODI Aug. 2010, 6). Al Jazeera indicates that Nepal has been governed by coalition governments since 2008 (7 Mar. 2014, 3). ODI reports that in 2008, the NC was the opposition to a coalition government made up of the UCPN-M and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML or UML) (ODI Aug. 2010, 4). Nine months later, the NC formed a coalition government with 22 other parties led by the UML, in opposition to the UCPN-M (ibid.). The UCPN-M party, often referred to as "the Maoists" and following a far-left ideology, emerged from the "People's War" of 1996-2006; however, it gave up armed insurgency in 2003 and joined the multi-party system after the war (ibid., 6). In June 2012, the UCPN-M split, and a "hard-line" faction was formed under Mohan Baidya and named the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M or NCP-M) (PHW 2013, 1020; The Carter Center 16 May 2014, 23).

In November of 2013, Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were held in Nepal with the NC becoming the largest party elected to the CA, followed by the UML, and lastly the UCPN-M (ibid., 5; The Hindu 3 Dec. 2013). Sources report that the NC won approximately 200 seats, the UML 175 seats, and the UCPN-M 80 seats (BBC 28 Nov. 2013; The Carter Center 16 May 2014, 5). The Carter Center, a nonpartisan organization (The Carter Center n.d.) that has maintained election observers in Nepal since 2007 (ibid. 16 May 2014, 4), stated that the UCPN-M thus "lost its position as the largest party in the previous Constituent Assembly" (ibid.). Sources report that more than 74 percent voters participated in the election (INSEC 2014, 6; US 27 Feb. 2014, 17). According to the US Department of State's 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, this was the "highest figure in Nepal's history" and election observers deemed the election "essentially free and fair" (ibid.).

In February 2014, Nepal swore in a new coalition government made up of the NC and UML, after disagreements between the two parties over a power-sharing deal (AFP 25 Feb. 2014; Al Jazeera 7 Mar. 2014, 3). The disputes also involved control over the Home Ministry (ibid.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Nepal Country Manager for Saferworld, an international non-profit organization that conducts research in Nepal on public perceptions about security (Saferworld n.d.a; ibid. n.d.b), stated that the NC has been "struggling" to form a government with coalition support and to move forward with drafting a new constitution (ibid. 10 June 2014). NC leader Sushil Koirala was elected to lead the new government in February 2014 (AFP 25 Feb. 2014; Al Jazeera 7 Mar. 2014, 2). Sources report that in June 2014, the ruling NC/UML coalition and opposition parties [including UCPN-M] agreed to form a committee to assist with drafting the new constitution, following stalled discussions (Republica 11 June 2014; The Hindu 11 June 2014).

2. Youth Wings of Political Parties

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Nepal Country Representative with the Asia Foundation, a non-profit international development organization (The Asia Foundation n.d.), indicated that the NC and "Maoists" have a "cordial" relationship at the "top level," but that there is "intense competition regarding use of public resources and financial opportunities at the ground level," where the relationship is "not cordial" (ibid. 1 June 2014). Similarly, a representative of Alliance for Peace Nepal (AfP Nepal), an independent non-profit NGO "working on political party reforms though democratization of student and youth wings of political parties in Nepal" (AfP Nepal n.d.), indicated in correspondence with the Research Directorate that youth wings may work together at times when there is a "common interest, agenda or revolution," but that relations normally involve "intense competition or conflict" between the youth organizations (ibid. 5 June 2014). The same source added that these relations among youth organizations reflect party relations (ibid.). Sources report that each of the political parties employ their youth wings as political "muscle" at the local level (AHRC 9 June 2014; The Carter Center 28 Feb. 2011, 1, 8). According to the Carter Center, this is particularly true of the UCPN-M, and it has "pressure[d]" other parties to form similar organizations (ibid., 15). A 2011 Carter Center report that collected information on youth wing activity from 30 districts in Nepal states that most youth wing violence has occurred between the UCPN-M-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) and the UML youth force cadres (ibid., 4). The report indicates that "the most direct sources of tension and conflicts involving youth wings" are due to "efforts to influence contract tender processes," as well as "escalations of minor political disputes, personal disputes, or conflicts between student unions" and attempts by parties to control "political space" (ibid.). Two sources report that political youth wings inflate their membership numbers to appear stronger (AfP Nepal 5 June 2014; Post-doctoral Researcher 2 June 2014).

2.1 Tarun Dal

The youth wing of the NC is the Nepal Tarun Dal, which, according to the Carter Center, reportedly has an estimated membership of 120,000 members (28 Feb. 2011, 26). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Nepal Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a Kathmandu-based organization that maintains human rights reporters in all 75 districts of Nepal (INSEC n.d.), estimated that Tarun Dal may have 100,000 members, organized in a "nationwide network" (ibid. 10 June 2014). According to the Carter Center, "Tarun Dal has a presence in all districts, but is mostly inactive" (28 Feb. 2011, 2, 3). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 Young Communist League (YCL)

According to the 2011 Carter Center report, the UCPN-M-affiliated YCL self-reported "'approximately 1,000,000 cadres'" in 2011 and coordination between the youth wing and the party itself is generally "strong" (ibid., 25). The same source reports that the YCL "appears to be the largest and most active political party youth wing at the local level" (ibid., 3). According to INSEC, YCL is estimated to have 700,000 members and a "nationwide network" (10 June 2014). Sources report that the UCPN-M claims to have "disbanded" the YCL (AfP Nepal 5 June 2014; Saferworld 10 June 2014). However, sources also report that because of the factional split within the UCPN-M party in 2012, there are now also two youth groups operating: the mainstream UCPN-M YCL, and the Baidya CPN-M faction of the YCL (Post-doctoral Researcher 2 June 2014; AfP Nepal 5 June 2014). According to the Saferworld Nepal Country Manager, "the general perception is that most of [the YCL] are still with the Maoist party and some of them have joined the CPN-M Baidya faction" (10 June 2014).

2.3 Youth Federation Nepal (YFN) or Youth Force (YF)

Sources indicate that he CPN-UML youth wing was created to oppose the activities of the YCL (The Asia Foundation Feb. 2014, 82; The Carter Center 28 Feb. 2011, 25). According to the 2011 Carter Centre report, the youth wing, known as the Youth Federation Nepal (YFN) or Youth Force (YF), was created in 2008 and has "unverified" membership numbers at approximately 500,000 (ibid.).The same source reports that the YFN appears to be the second largest and most active political party youth wing, behind the YCL (ibid., 3, 25). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Treatment of NC and Tarun Dal Members by Political Opponents

Sources report that since 2013, there have been fewer reported incidents of violence and conflict between party youth wings than in previous years (The Asia Foundation 1 June 2014; INSEC 2014, 10; Saferworld 10 June 2014), and that violent activity by youth wings has "gone down significantly" over recent years (ibid.). In January 2013, an anti-government demonstration in Banepa [east of Kathmandu] involving NC and UML members and other protesters was attacked by members of YCL, leading to injuries (SATP n.d.a; Republica 29 Jan. 2013). In April 2014, a judge in Chitwan sentenced 14 UML members to prison, with sentences ranging from 5 years to life, for the 2011 murder of Tarun Dal Chitwan president Shiva Poudel; 13 others were acquitted (ibid. 3 Apr. 2014; Ekantipur 3 Apr. 2014). According to the Kathmandu-based newspaper Republica, a conflict had occurred between UML and Tarun Dal gangs over both groups' involvement in "flexing their muscles in acquiring public contracts and sometimes even extortion," and Poudel was killed while in jail awaiting trial for murder himself (3 Apr. 2014).

Following the 2013 elections, the Himalayan Times reported that, in December of that year, the chairman of the YCL [UCPN-M] threatened to retaliate against the government for arresting leaders and members of the UCPN-M, such as one member charged with the murder of a Hindu Youth Association, claiming that the NC and UML are taking "political revenge" since winning the CA elections (Himalayan Times 17 Dec. 2013). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.1 Election-Related Violence

Prior to the elections, both the YCL and Tarun Dal had announced that they would deploy their members to polling stations during the election in 2013 (AHRC 9 June 2014; The Kathmandu Post 25 Sept. 2013). Violence and clashes between youth wings and political parties was reported surrounding the November 2013 Constituent Assembly elections (AHRC 9 June 2014; AfP Nepal 5 June 2013; The Carter Center 16 May 2014, 44). However, according to the Carter Center, there was less violence than in the previous 2008 election (ibid.). Sources report that, at times, the CPN-M [Baidya] faction used violence to boycott the electoral process in November 2013 (ibid., 4; INSEC 2014, 6; UN 31 Oct. 2013). However, without providing details, the INSEC representative said that both YCL and Tarun Dal have engaged in "human rights abuses and other unlawful acts" in 2013-2014 (INSEC 10 June 2014). Similarly, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) indicated that both youth organizations engaged in violence in 2013-2014 (AHRC 9 June 2014). Sources report on the following incidents:

The YCL attacked a policeman deployed to provide security to an NC leader in August 2013 (SATP n.d.a).

The YCL attacked the vehicle of NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba in October 2013 (AHRC 9 June 2014).

In October 2013, two NC members were injured and two went missing in Gaonkharka after being attacked by UCPN-M YCL members, though the party denied involvement (Republica 28 Oct. 2013).

Clashes between the UCPN-M and the NC in October 2013 in Rukum district left several injured (The Carter Center 16 May 2014, 44; SATP n.d.a), as did clashes in Doti District (ibid.).

The UCPN-M-affiliated YCL set up camps in Kathmandu and Gorkha to allegedly "obstruct the NC's election campaign" in November 2013, according to the Himalayan Times (6 Nov. 2013a).

On 13 November 2013, a bomb exploded in Makawanpur injuring four NC members (The Carter Center 16 May 2014, 45). The UN reported one explosion in Makawanpur during electoral violence and 5 to 6 explosions in the Kathmandu district, which was listed by the UN as one of the districts with the "most incidents of campaign violence" (UN 5 Dec. 2013).

In November 2013, the Himalayan Times reported that Tarun Dal member Nabin Rana Magar was murdered in Dailekh province and four members of the UML were arrested by police (6 Nov. 2013b). Similarly, the Carter Center reports that the body of a "Nepali Congress youth wing member in Dailekh district was found" and "four supporters of a rival party" were arrested in connection with his death (16 May 2014, 45).

A bus carrying NC supporters was attacked with petrol bombs, injuring nine in Surkhet district in November 2013 (ibid., 46; INSEC 17 Nov. 2013).

The Himalayan Times reports that NC workers were attacked in Tanahun, Dang, Gorkha, Nuwakot, Dhankuta, Jajarkot, Myagdi, Kathmandu, Banke, Sindhuli, Baglung, Dhading, Rukum, and Panchthar during election-related violence (6 Nov. 2013a).

3.2 Extortion by the YCL

Information about extortion of NC and Tarun Dal members by the YCL could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. However, the following information may be useful. Sources report that the YCL engaged in extortion activities of 2013-2014 (US 27 Feb. 2014, 3; The Asia Foundation 1 June 2014; AHRC 9 June 2014; INSEC 10 June 2014). However, sources also report that this activity has decreased (AfP 5 June 2014; The Asia Foundation 1 June 2014; Saferworld 10 June 2014). The 2011 Carter Center report indicates that the YCL interferes with contract tendering processes (28 Feb. 2011, 11). According to the Saferworld Nepal Country Manager, all of the youth wings are "still seen as being strongly involved in manipulating bidding processes for contracts, [especially] larger infrastructure contracts" (10 June 2014). The Carter Center found that in 2011, the YCL was "most often cited as being behind money-making initiatives either for the mother party or for individual benefit" (The Carter Center 28 Feb. 2011, 16). According to the same source, YCL interference may involve "directing local government officials to issue contracts to party-supported contractors," or demanding percentages of the award, protection fees, or employment from contractors, as well as forced donations from and "unlawful taxation" of government officials, businessmen, and citizens (ibid., 11-12). Country Reports 2013 indicates that groups with connections to the UCPN-M, which headed the government until March 2013, and the CPN-M "reportedly committed acts of violence, extortion, and intimidation throughout the year" and "demanded money from schools, businesses, workers, private citizens, and NGOs" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 3, 18). The same source indicates that reports of this kind of behavior perpetrated by student and labor groups associated with political parties were "less frequent" (ibid., 18). According to the AfP representative, in addition to business people, teachers, doctors, government adminstrators and local officials, "people with different political thought and ideology" or "other parties' supporters" are also targets of YCL "donations" (AfP 17 June 2014). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources report that in 2013, NC and YCL members clashed in Charikot [west of Kathmandu] (AfP Nepal 5 June 2014; AHRC 9 June 2014). According to the AHRC representative, the clash occurred when Tarun Dal intervened against the YCL who were asking for "donations" from a businessman (ibid.). The Himalayan Times reports that, according to the UCPN-M, Tarun Dal had attacked a YCL coordinator, while the Dolakha district [Nepali] Congress Party said that the YCL had interfered in the work of a Kathmandu construction entrepreneur, asked him for political donations, and attacked the Tarun Dal Youth Coordination Committee coordinator (The Himalayan Times 2 June 2013). The same source indicates that Tarun Dal called for a district-wide bandh [shutdown] until the YCL members were arrested (ibid.). Further information about this case could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to media sources, UCPN-M-affiliated YCL members were arrested in Chitwan for extortion of donations in July 2013; in response to the arrests, YCL enforced a bandh in the district calling for the release of their members (The Himalayan Times 31 July 2013; The Kathmandu Post 1 Aug. 2013; The Asia Foundation 1 June 2014). The YCL activists were arrested for extortion, but according to the Kathmandu Post, the suspects were released by police after leaders of the UCPN-M reportedly "exerted pressure on the local administration and police" to free them (The Kathmandu Post 2 Aug. 2013). The same source reports that police denied the claim that there was any "political pressure at play" (ibid.).

The representative of the Asia Foundation indicated that in 2013, incidents of "forced donation" by the YCL were reported, noting that such campaigns occurred mainly in Chitwan during the year (ibid. 1 June 2014). According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a website dedicated to security issues maintained by the Institute for Conflict Management, an NGO based in India (SATP n.d.b), the UCPN-M reportedly also launched "donation drives" in Bara, Parsa, and Rautahat districts, sending "letters seeking donation" to government offices and business establishments in June 2013 (ibid. n.d.a). A Saferworld research survey published in March 2013 about public perceptions on security in 9 districts, including Kathmandu and Makwanpur, indicates that political youth wings in those areas were found to be "significant actors" in causing insecurity related to "demands for donations from local authorities and the private sector," as well as interfering in tender-bidding processes (Saferworld Mar. 2013, XII).

According to the AfP Nepal representative, victims of YCL extortion may hesitate in reporting incidents to the police due to the youth wing's past violent activities (AfP Nepal 5 June 2014). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Police Response to Extortion

Sources report that the effectiveness of police response to extortion by youth wings is reportedly impacted by the high levels of "political pressure" exerted by parties on police, and police may be pressured to drop cases and release suspects (AHRC 9 June 2014; AfP Nepal 5 June 2014). According to the AfP Nepal representative, "all political parties" may exert pressure to have their members released due to the "nexus" between police and political leaders (ibid.). The AfP representative explained that police may take action to investigate and arrest the perpetrator, but that the case may not proceed to court; however, he further indicated that in urban areas, police response may be faster and less susceptible to political influence than in rural regions (ibid.). According to the AHRC representative, in cases of extortion by youth wings, police "routinely" support politicians of the major political parties; politicians are corrupt, and make the police "brothers in their crime" (AHRC 9 June 2014). Transparency International Nepal (TIN), a civil society institution based in Kathmandu that is "dedicated to increasing public accountability and curbing corruption" (TIN n.d.), reports that, according to the 2014 National Integrity System Assessment for Nepal, law enforcement agencies "are not capable of serving the public in practice because they have to serve the interest of the political leadership" (TIN 2014, 67). The same source reports that the political leadership's pressure on law enforcers impacts the integrity of members of law enforcement agencies in practice (ibid., 70). According to TIN, "the arrest or detention of political party members is rare" and there are cases where "authorities have not been able to arrest party cadre accused of serious crimes," noting that "proper and impartial investigation is pledged by the state but seldom pursued" (ibid., 98).

A post-doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford who specializes in Nepali politics and culture, and has conducted field research about youth activism in Nepal, said that regarding police response in general, "law enforcement in Nepal is variable, depending on a number of factors, including the seriousness of the crime and the social influence of both the claimant and the accused" (Post-doctoral Researcher 3 June 2014). The Post-doctoral Researcher expressed the view that, in Kathmandu and Makwanpur, the Baidya YCL faction may have "a lot less influence and connections to police" and that in her opinion, it is "less likely for the YCL to get away with serious crimes, particularly targeting the NC Tarun Dal, which has historical connections to the police and authorities due to [their] mother party's clout as ruling party" (3 June 2014). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. In contrast, according to the AfP representative, the YCL was "quite powerful in Makwanpur" during the previous election period of 2008, but he expressed the view that since the 2013 elections, this has "subsided," although he stated that the group reportedly remains "quite active in extremely rural areas (AfP 5 June 2014). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Saferworld Nepal Country Manager stated that

[t]he police are generally wary to take actions against politically affiliated individuals. If the accused is a member of the ruling party or belonging to the Home minister's party, they generally shy away from their responsibility and turn a deaf ear and blind eye to their transgressions, unless they are heinous crimes such as murder. In extortion cases, there is very little the police will do to help the victims, especially when it is linked to larger political parties. This is not limited to cases of political violence - political interference in security and justice provision is a big problem in general, and [a] serious obstacle to effective implementation of [rule of law]. ... The efforts and actions of the police and government [are] not uniform, as it is on a case-by-case basis. The police have turned a blind eye even when the Supreme Court has delivered a clear verdict against the accused. There are many other such cases. However, the response of police is still considered to have improved significantly in the past couple of years. Unlike the time period between 2006 [and] 2010, when the police was considered to be weak, the general perception is that the quality of policing has definitely improved. (Saferworld 10 June 2014)

According to the March 2013 Saferworld survey of 9 districts, including Makwanpur and Kathmandu, policing was perceived to have "improved" due to the re-establishment of local police posts, improved nighttime patrols, and better collaboration with communities (ibid. Mar. 2013, X). However, Saferworld also reports that in Makwanpur and Kathmandu districts, "political party interference in security processes" was identified by respondents, including security and justice agencies, as a "constant and key factor which continues to fuel insecurity and is closely linked to impunity" (ibid., IX). This interference in criminal investigations was noted as "a particular obstacle undermining effective security and justice provision" (ibid.). Further information on police response to extortion could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 25 February 2014. "Nepal's New Coalition Government Sworn in." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

Al Jazeera. 7 March 2014. Deepak Adhikari. "Tricky Challenges Await Nepal's New Leader." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

Alliance for Peace (AfP) Nepal. 17 June 2014. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

_____. 5 June 2014. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

_____. N.d. "Current Activities." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

The Asia Foundation. 1 June 2014. Correspondence from the Country Representative for Nepal to the Research Directorate.

_____. February 2014. Aditya Adhikari and Bhaskar Gautam. Impunity and Political Accountability in Nepal. [Accessed 3 June 2014]

_____. N.d. "About the Asia Foundation." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). 9 June 2014. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 28 November 2013. "Nepali Congress Wins Most Votes in Elections." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

The Carter Center. 16 May 2014. Observing Nepal's 2013 Constituent Assembly Election. [Accessed 5 June 2014]

_____. 28 February 2011. Political Party Youth Wings in Nepal. [Accessed 5 June 2014]

_____. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 5 June 2014]

Ekantipur. 3 April 2014. "Shiva Poudel Murder: 8 Sentenced to Life in Prison." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

The Himalayan Times. 17 December 2013. "YCL to Retaliate if Arrests Continue." [Accessed 16 June 2014]

_____. 6 November 2013a. "Govt to Remove YCL Camps." (Factiva)

_____. 6 November 2013b. "Tarun Dal Cadre Found Dead." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. 31 July 2013. "Chitwan Bandh Hits Life Hard." [Accessed 11 June 2014]

_____. 2 June 2013. "Clash Leaves Charikot Tense." (Factiva)

The Hindu. 11 June 2014. Damakant Jayshi. "Nepal Parliament Resumes Following All-Party Deal." [Accessed 11 June 2014]

_____. 3 December 2013. "Nepali Congress Emerges Largest Party in Parliament." [Accessed 11 June 2014]

Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC). 10 June 2014. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

_____. 2014. Situation of Human Rights in 2013: Overall Assessment. [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. 17 November 2013. "Bomb Hurled at Bus, Nine Injured." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

The Kathmandu Post. 25 September 2013. "Congress to Decide Names by Saturday." (Factiva)

_____. 1 August 2013. Bimal Khatiwada. "YCL on Chitwan Extortion Spree." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

Nepali Congress Party (NC). N.d. "Introduction." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

Overseas Development Institute (ODI). August 2010. Leni Wild and Jiwan Subedi. Review of International Assistance to Political Party and Party System Development - Case Study Report: Nepal. [Accessed 8 June 2014]

_____. N.d. "About ODI." [Accessed 12 June 2014]

Political Handbook of the World 2013 (PHW). 2013. "Nepal." Edited by Tom Lansdorf. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Post-doctoral Researcher, University of Oxford. 3 June 2014. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

_____. 2 June 2014. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Republica. 11 June 2014. "House to Resume Shortly." [Accessed 11 June 2014]

_____. 3 April 2014. Ramesh Poudel. "Eight Get Life Sentence in Shiva Poudel Murder Case." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. 28 October 2013. "NC Cadres Assaulted in Nuwakot." (Factiva)

_____. 29 January 2013. "NC Condemns YCL Attack." (Factiva)

Saferworld. 10 June 2014. Correspondence from the Nepal Country Manager to the Research Directorate.

_____. March 2013. Snapshot of Local Security and Justice Perceptions in Selected Districts of Nepal. [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. N.d.a. "Nepal." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. N.d.b. "About Us." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). N.d.a. "Incidents Involving Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist 2013." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. N.d.b. "Support Us." [Accessed 12 June 2014]

Transparency International Nepal (TIN). 2014. National Integrity System Assessment Nepal 2014. [Accessed 6 June 2014]

_____. N.d. "TI-Nepal." [Accessed 6 June 2014]

United Nations (UN). 5 December 2013. Resident Coordinator's Office of Nepal (UNRCO). "Nepal - Districts With Most Incidents of Political and Electoral Violence (1 Oct - 19 Nov 2013)." [Accessed 10 June 2014]

_____. 31 October 2013. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). "Analysis: Tensions Mount as Nepal Contentious Election Nears." [Accessed 4 June 2014]

United States (US). 27 February 2014. "Nepal." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013." [Accessed 10 June 2014]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Attempts to contact the following organizations and individuals were unsuccessful within the time constraints of this Response: Advocacy Forum of Nepal; Institute of Human Rights Communication; National Democratic Institute of Nepal; Nepal - Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority, Constituent Assembly, Nepal Human Rights Commission, Nepal Police; Nepali Congress Party; professor of political science, University of Western Michigan; two lawyers in Kathmandu. The UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Nepal and a professor of Nepali studies at the University of London could not provide information for this Response.

Internet sites, including: Advocacy Forum Nepal; Amnesty International; ecoi.net; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; National Democratic Institute of Nepal; Nepal - Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority, Constituent Assembly, Makwanpur district, Nepal Human Rights Commission, Nepal Police, Supreme Court of Nepal; Nepali Congress Party; Nepalmonitor; Reporters Without Borders; South Asia Forum for Human Rights; United Nations - Nepal Information Platform, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Refworld.