Iraq: Space for Change in the KRG
| Publisher | Jamestown Foundation |
| Author | Alexander Sehmer |
| Publication Date | 10 November 2017 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 21 |
| Cite as | Jamestown Foundation, Iraq: Space for Change in the KRG, 10 November 2017, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 21, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a0d68984.html [accessed 19 May 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
The fallout from the Iraqi Kurds' ill-judged independence referendum has seen the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) humbled and its Peshmerga fighters pushed out of territory they had captured from Islamic State (IS) in 2014. Having overplayed his hand, Masoud Barzani has stepped down as KRG president (Kurdistan 24, October 29). Coming not long after the death of Barzani's longtime political rival, Jalal Talabani, there is the intriguing possibility of political change in northern Iraq.
In October, several weeks after Kurds turned out to vote overwhelmingly in favor of independence, Iraqi troops backed by Shia militia moved to re-take Kirkuk from the Kurds, recapturing the disputed city and taking back large areas of territory in Kirkuk and Nineveh provinces (TRT World, October 19). Some clashes were reported, but overall the Iraqi forces advance met little resistance (al-Jazeera, October 16). In many cases the Peshmerga had already withdrawn, the result of a deal with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the traditional rival to Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
The deal likely came about as a result of Iranian intervention. Ahead of the advance, Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani was reportedly in the PUK stronghold of Sulaimaniyah (The National, October 16; al-Monitor, October 17). Barzani later seized on this and the role of the Shia militia, complaining that the offensive on Kirkuk was "led by Iranians," and that the Kurds' U.S. and British allies were well aware of the fact (al-Jazeera, November 8).
That Barzani misread the situation going into the referendum suggests he was poorly advised. The United States and the United Kingdom have both been clear that while they are willing to back the KRG financially and the Peshmerga forces militarily in the fight against IS, they do not support the KRG's quest for independence.
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The PUK will have been pleased to see Barzani chastened over this. They had been only lukewarm to the idea of the referendum, while a third faction in Kurdish politics, the Gorran Movement, openly opposed it (Rudaw, September 24). The question now is how the Kurds move forward and whether a new set of leaders can mend the fractures in their political landscape.
However, wholesale change seems unlikely. Barzani himself will maintain a political role as part of the High Political Council, a body he established ahead of the referendum (Rudaw, October 29). For the KRG leadership he is thought to favor his son Masrour, the KDP's spy chief. Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, his nephew, is another contender. Meanwhile, in the PUK, Talabani's son Bafel is becoming more prominent (Rudaw, October 12). There seems to be a need for "new blood" in Kurdish politics, but where it will come from is unclear.
