Lebanon: General information on women, Syrian presence, Hezbollah party and conflict in southern Lebanon

The following information was obtained during an interview in Beirut on 3 May 1996 with a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lebanon who specializes in the status of women in the Arab world and in Lebanon, and in Islamic groups in Lebanon.

Violence Against Women

        The Koran gives men an implicit right to beat their wives if they disobey. This right goes as far as sexual abstinence, i.e. the man has the right first to scorn and then to beat his wife. The literal expression is: "to shun the marriage bed". Thus, if a woman is beaten and she goes before a Muslim judge, she does not have the right to request a divorce. In Lebanon, personal status is governed by religious courts (Christians call it ecclesiastical court). The term " religious court" thus applies to both Christians and Muslims, covering both religions.

In the eastern tradition, whether Muslim or Christian, customs often have greater impact on society than do laws. Thus, beating a woman because she has disobeyed, by leaving the house without her husband's authorization for example, is a right prescribed by customs in Muslim doctrine which applies to Christians and Muslims alike.

One solution would be to introduce civil marriage. With this type of marriage, women could request a divorce if they were victims of spousal abuse. Current legislation is for the most part controlled by men and by Muslim clergy who draw their inspiration from the Koran and give men the right to beat their wives. This idea of civil marriage, which may appear very specific and very ad hoc, must be expanded to include all aspects of the Lebanese situation, including social structure, dominance of the clergy and confessionalism within the Lebanese system.

There is no shortage of battered women in Lebanon. When a woman is beaten, she has already internalized her husband's right to beat her. She therefore sees it as a right, her husband's right. Recourse to the courts is almost completely ruled out. What can the courts do? Christians do not believe in divorce; Muslim women do not have the right to request a divorce when they are beaten. A woman has the right to divorce her husband in only  one situation, when the Muslim marriage contract contains what is called the Atma, i.e. the woman's right to ask a man for a divorce. However, it is mainly big-name performers and prominent women who make use of this measure.

The source pointed out that no exhaustive study has been done on the relationship between divorce and violence against women in Lebanon. In general, the battered wife who returns to her family could represent an extra expense if she continues to rebel against her husband. Close family members of battered women usually encourage them to reconcile with their husbands, to accept the situation.

Last year, there was a program on battered women in Lebanon with Tina Nakash, the author of an article on spousal abuse. Programs like this, pseudo-media campaigns, are, in my opinion, harmful to battered women, because there is a kind of implicit appeal made to these women to resort only to conciliatory solutions. The women who have written articles on wife abuse tend not to write what they really think. What they try to do is relieve the suffering of battered women by playing the game and accepting this situation, talking out against it but not really rejecting it. I thus believe that battered women are in a state of total confusion. Tunisian women who are victims of spousal abuse are much farther ahead because they have an NGO which focuses solely on women's issues. This association has its own office. Despite the repressive situation in Tunisia — since the Tunisian regime is a repressive police state — the organization has a place where workers take in battered women, register their complaints and history, attempt to work through the situation somewhat and sometimes even recommend a divorce. This is the only association of its kind in the Arab world. Thus far, all articles written on battered women in the Middle East are descriptions of victimization in which the women do nothing more than complain about their misfortunes.

Battered women in Lebanon and in the Arab world are thus at an impasse.  There are no basic principles that can help these women organize themselves properly or devise a plan on how to react. 

A victim of wife abuse in Lebanon has two choices: she can remain silent and accept the situation or become a social outcast and lose her children. Women  would rather be beaten than lose their children. 

Syrian Presence in Lebanon

        The question of the Syrian presence in Lebanon must be viewed from a long-term perspective. Syria has been in Lebanon since 1976. When the Syrians first came to Lebanon, it was to fight the Palestinian Progressive Alliance and to support the Christian militia. In time, the situation turned around. Now, the pseudo Islamic-Progressives are theoretically Syrian allies.

Generally speaking, when one state dominates another, there are indisputably restrictions on civil liberties. Arriving in Lebanon just one year after the civil war broke out in Lebanon, Syria imposed its presence during the conflict. Today, the Lebanese no longer feel as free as they were before the Syrian presence in Lebanon. People no longer have the right to demonstrate or complete freedom of expression. There are implicit laws that must be understood to know how to write an article that can be published in a newspaper, magazine, etc.  Imagine the situation of a person who has known both periods and who is gradually losing the habits of the previous period. How would this person react on a day-to-day basis to any situation?  With almost unconscious self-censorship! It has become part of the psyche.

The Hezbollah and the South Lebanese Army (SLA)

        There is no fatwa (religious edict) against the members of the South Lebanese Army (SLA). SLA deserters go to the Lebanese army, which places them under house arrest for a time. If they are not criminals who have committed crimes within the liberated southern zone, they are placed under house arrest for a period of time and are then free to return to their villages. They sometimes take advantage of clan or family support from  relatives who have certain organizational or political ties with the Hezbollah, and therefore receive support, residence, hospitality and sometimes even job opportunities. It is a much calmer situation than one would ever imagine.

The daily Al-Safir published an article on the SLA. It talks about two categories. The first category is the officers, who are held accountable and whom General  Lahad, the leader of this army, is asking the State of Lebanon to incorporate either into the armed forces or into the police force. He is also calling for the officers be treated exactly like those of the other militia (Christian, Moslem, Druze, Shiite, etc.) who, in 1990, were integrated into the regular army. The second category consists of the enlisted men, mostly Shiite, who show great solidarity with members of the Hezbollah, a paradox considering they are occasionally attacked by the  Hezbollah. One fellow is asked:  "If you are in an Israeli convoy that is being attacked by the Hezbollah, what do you do?"  He answers: "If I am not being directly attacked, I don't do anything, I don't move."  Another is asked: "Why did you enlist in the southern army?"  He replies:  "They give me $800 a month and I have no other means of subsistence".  (Privates receive $400 and middle ranks receive $800.) It should be noted that there are many more enlisted men (some 4,000) than officers (about 250). 

The only members of the SLA who will be beaten up are criminals. These are people who committed murders inside the so-called security zone. Informers who collaborated with Israel and the SLA will not be beaten up because there were mitigating circumstances. Informers are much less dangerous than SLA soldiers as they are weak and under pressure. They can thus live in Lebanon.

The Hezbollah and the Lebanese

        There are very few armed people in Beirut although Hezbollah headquarters is guarded by one or two armed people. There are weapon caches in the southern suburbs which are directly supervised by the Syrians. The other weapons in the South are in the hands not only of the Hezbollah, but also of the Palestinian organizations allied with Syria, including the Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the ten Palestinian pro-Syrian organizations. However, since the resistance purports to be Lebanese, the operations are carried out by some of these Palestinian organizations under the cloak of the Hezbollah.

There is an implicit agreement which goes through the Lebanese government but which is, in fact, an agreement between Syrians and the Hezbollah on the possession of weapons. The agreement is complied with because the Syrians are running the country. It is an indisputable fact. Right in Beirut, there can be a dozen cases of people walking around armed in the southern suburbs, where there is no trouble. There is no danger. I was able to note this when I conducted my investigation on Hezbollah women. I stayed for two months in the Hezbollah district in Birhaba where the Hezbollah authorities had their house. No one stopped me. I saw plenty of weapons and armed people. And yet, it was easy to guess that I was a foreigner by the way I was dressed.

The Hezbollah is not in the north or in the Christian region of the Kesrouan. It is in the Bekaa region and in the south, and in the remote southwestern Bekaa region. In Baalbek, Hezbollah members may carry weapons for special ceremonies but not for combat. On occasions such as the Achoura, Jerusalem Day, the Death of Khomeini, etc., arms are carried for show. This is a symbolic act.

However, I cannot give you very specific information on weapons in southern Lebanon and even if I had this information, I would not disclose it.

Lebanese Government and Conflict in the South

        The Lebanese government is a lame-duck government. Recently, during the Israeli invasion in April 1996, it showed some gumption. It showed some visibility by travelling all over, holding mediation talks in France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco. It thereby demonstrated a certain degree of Lebanese will. Even at that, the agreement pertaining to the invasion was signed without the consent of the Lebanese army. Even though the Lebanese government is on the committee, those who really concluded it were Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Warren Christopher. These are the two people who decided the fate of this invasion. There used to be only Syrians and Israelis, but now there are Lebanese, Syrians and Israelis.

The army and the Lebanese government and, I dare say, the Syrians, do not control the Hezbollah. For the Lebanese, the Syrians make the decisions. However, for the Syrians, it is a combination of geopolitics, strategic interests and American hegemony. According to Syrian calculations, if they broke their ties with the Iranians, they would thereby lose a pressure tactic they can use on the Israelis; it is in their own interest to maintain a certain alliance with the Iranians. They thus treat them as allies, but in so doing, they must give the Hezbollah more freedom than anticipated. This means that Syrian calculations, like any political calculations, are not totally free. All the international and regional geostrategic data are taken into consideration in decisions. In deciding what happens in Lebanon, not in deciding what happens in  the Golan Heights; in other words, the Syrians decide for us, but decisions are made for the Syrians through a combination of multidi-mensional factors on various levels.

This response was prepared by the DIRB on the basis of publicly available information to which the DIRB was able to have access within the prescribed timeframe. This response does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the country under review or to be conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Reference

Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences, University of  Lebanon, Beirut. 3 May 1996. Interview.