Nigeria: The capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such as Lagos (2013-March 2016)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

Sources indicate that Boko Haram [Jamaat Ahl al-Sunna il-Dawa wal-Jihad (Group of the Followers of the Prophet for Propagation and Jihad), Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah (West Africa Province) [1]] is an Islamist militant group that is primarily active in northern Nigeria (Jane's Intelligence Review 25 Nov. 2015; US 10 June 2014, 6; ISS Oct. 2015, 17). For an overview of Boko Haram and their activities in northern Nigeria, see Response to Information Request NGA105320.

Sources describe Abubakar Shekau as the leader of Boko Haram (START Jan. 2015, 15; US June 2015, 341) or the leader of the "largest faction" of Boko Haram (International Crisis Group 3 Apr. 2014, 22). Sources describe Boko Haram as having multiple factions (ibid.; ISS Oct. 2015, 19; Jane's Intelligence Review 25 Nov. 2015). According to Jane's Intelligence Review, "[s]ince at least 2013, Boko Haram has operated as three or four geographically separate autonomous factions with the loosest of operational ties, under a variety of leaders of whom ... Shekau is by far the best known" (ibid.). The Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an organization that aims "to advance human security in Africa through evidence-based policy advice" (ISS n.d.), reports that "[r]ather than a single hierarchical structure, Boko Harem is a complex of factions, cells and groups that owe limited allegiance to Abubakar Shekau and his core group of followers" (ISS Oct. 2015, 19). In a report on Boko Haram, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), a group that provides "non-partisan, objective and authoritative analysis to the US Congress" (US 1 Mar. 2016), reports that Boko Haram's organizational structure is "often described as diffuse" and that some analysts suggest that the group is "susceptible to fracturing" (ibid. 10 June 2014, 3).

Sources indicate that Boko Haram has a Shura Council (International Crisis Group 3 Apr. 2014, 18; Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016; START Jan. 2015, 15), whose members have responsibility for specific geographic or functional cells of Boko Haram (ibid., 15-16). According to a report on Boko Haram by the US-based National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) [2], individual cell commanders of Boko Haram "have some ability to act unilaterally in an opportunistic manner, without direct orders from Shekau" (ibid., 16). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of law at Syracuse University, who is also an associate researcher at the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, stated that Shura members have "limited" face-to-face contact with one another, "which allows local actors greater maneuverability" (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). Sources estimate Boko Haram's membership to be several thousand fighters (US June 2015, 342; The Globe and Mail 28 Feb. 2015).

2. Capacity of Boko Haram to Track Individuals

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Research Director of START, who has conducted desk and field research on Boko Haram, stated that the capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to other areas of Nigeria is the greatest in the northeast region (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe), with "diminishing capacity" moving away from this region (START 2 Mar. 2016). The same source stated that, in her opinion, the ability of Boko Haram to track down an "average citizen," such as someone who fled one of the cities that Boko Haram captured in 2014 or 2015, is "doubtful, even in the northeast" (ibid.). She explained that "while they have intelligence capabilities, they are not that advanced nor are they likely to use them for this purpose" (ibid.). Furthermore, the Research Director stated that Boko Haram does not have "the cyber sophistication to track individuals through hacking electronic systems," and their ability to track average citizens "would depend largely on word of mouth" (ibid.).

Regarding the types of individuals Boko Haram might pursue and target, the Research Director said that

[t]hey are most likely to track and target relatively high-status individuals, such as local government area officials (many of whom have fled either to Maiduguri or Abuja) or religious elites. These individuals have a public profile that makes it harder for them to blend in with local populations, and the nature of their activities (such as meeting with constituents, leading religious services) also creates vulnerabilities for them. (ibid.)

She noted that Boko Haram has targeted elites as far away as Abuja (ibid.).

The Assistant Professor stated that Boko Haram's tracking capabilities are "hard to assess," as the group "appears to be going through some sort of rebuilding process" (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). The same source noted that Boko Haram has greater reach in northern states, from Maiduguri to Plateau State to Kano State (ibid.). He stated that the types of individuals Boko Haram targets include senior military and police officers, school teachers, "especially ones that deem to promote an education system that the group rejects," and community activists (ibid.).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior fellow at the New York-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), who specializes in Nigeria, stated that Boko Haram is "decentralized and local" and "does not appear to have the interest or capacity to go after an individual outside the northeast-except for former Boko Haram operatives who crossed the current … leadership" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016). The senior fellow stated that the other types of individuals Boko Haram targets include government officials, police, military, and religious leaders, "particularly Muslim leaders who oppose Boko Haram" (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). However, he indicated that there is no evidence of Boko Haram tracking down people beyond their area of operation in the northeast and north-central region of Nigeria (ibid.).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a specialist in African affairs at the CRS said that Boko Haram has cells that operate across North and Central Nigeria (US 1 Mar. 2016). The same source stated that, in 2013, Boko Haram "appeared to conduct a purge" of people who aligned with the splinter faction Ansaru, which demonstrated the ability of Boko Haram to reach across areas of northern Nigeria (ibid.). However, she also noted that she was not in a position to say to what degree Boko Haram operatives might pursue someone beyond the area in which their cell operates (ibid.).

The CRS specialist said that there have been "widespread reports of retributive violence against fighters who have defected from Boko Haram" (ibid.). ISS reports that, in March 2015, Boko Haram released a video showing the "apparent beheading" of two men who were allegedly hired by the government to spy on them (ISS 8 May 2015). According to the same source, the "authenticity of the video has not been confirmed, but its message is chilling: anyone who is seen to assist the authorities [against Boko Haram] will be severely punished" (ibid.). START reports that Shekau "has ordered the 'death penalty' for anyone who did not follow his orders and has killed defectors" (START Jan. 2015, 16).

Two sources indicate that Boko Haram has attacked internally displaced people (IDPs) (ibid. 2 Mar. 2016; CFR 9 Mar. 2016). According to the senior fellow, there have been Boko Haram attacks on IDP camps, but he noted, "I believe intended victims were anyone in the camps," rather than attacks targeting individuals (ibid.).

2.1 Capacity in Southern Nigeria, Including Lagos

The START Research Director was not aware of any targeted attacks by Boko Haram on individuals in the South, and that there have been "very few attacks in general" by Boko Haram south of the Middle Belt states [3] (START 2 Mar. 2016). Likewise, the CRS specialist in African affairs stated that Boko Haram's capacity in the South is "limited," and that there "seldom seems to be activity south of Abuja" (US 1 Mar. 2016).

Regarding Boko Haram's capacity to track individuals in the South, the Assistant Professor stated,

I suspect that the group's reach is probably weak in the Southern parts of the country mainly because (1) the South is predominately Christian; (2) the South is predominantly Igbo (the Hausa and Fulani, which are largely Muslim, dominate northern Nigeria); (3) it is not easy for one ethnic group to move to another region, as they would stick out (they would not speak the local languages, know the local customs, etc.). The princip[al] ethnic group in Lagos are Yaruba, and there are Christian and Muslim Yarubas. (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016)

The CFR representative stated that Boko Haram is "almost entirely inactive in Lagos" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016) and has "only carried out a single operation" there (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). The CRS specialist reported that recent Boko Haram activity in the South consisted of an attack on a fuel depot in Lagos in June 2014, and a "few isolated incidents" in 2015 between the police and alleged Boko Haram members in Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi (US 1 Mar. 2016).

IHS Global Insight reports that in 2014, Nigerian authorities arrested more than 1,000 suspected Boko Haram militants in in the southern states of Rivers, Imo, Bayelsa and Abia (IHS Global Insight 1 Aug. 2014). The Assistant Professor indicated that the Nigerian government introduced "expansive security measures" in Abuja and Lagos, making it harder for Boko Haram to operate there (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Targets of Assassinations

The START Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which contains open-source information on over 140,000 terrorist attacks throughout the world from 1970 to 2014 (START n.d.b), has information on 20 assassination attacks attributed to Boko Haram between 2013 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of approximately 78 individuals (ibid. n.d.a). Of these attacks, the majority occurred in Borno state, but there were also assassination attacks in Kaduna, Kano, Gombe, Nasarawa, and Sokoto states (ibid.). Targets of the assassination attacks include village heads, district leaders, the leader of the opposition party, an Islamic scholar, the Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria, government officials and leaders, emirs, members of the political parties All Progressives Congress (APC) and People's Democratic Party (PDP), and police officers (ibid.).

Reports of assassination attacks in Lagos or other southern states could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] According to Jane's Intelligence Review, Boko Haram was "rebranded" as Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah ("'West Africa Province'," or "Islamic State in West Africa") after the main faction of the group, led by Shekau, declared allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in March of 2015 (Jane's Intelligence Review 25 Nov. 2015).

[2] START is based at the University of Maryland and is supported, in part, by the US Department of Homeland Security (START Jan. 2015). START aims to "improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism" (ibid.).

[3] According to World Watch Monitor, a media site that "reports the story of Christians around the world under pressure for their faith" (World Watch Monitor n.d.), Nigeria's "'Middle Belt'" region is "the handful of states straddling the pre-colonial line dividing Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north from its Christian south" (ibid. 13 July 2015).

References

Assistant Professor of law, Syracuse University. 7 March 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 9 March 2016. Telephone interview with a senior fellow.

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 1 March 2016. Correspondence from a senior fellow to the Research Directorate.

The Globe and Mail. 28 February 2015. Geoffrey York. "How Not to Fight Extremism." (Factiva)

IHS Global Insight. 1 August 2014. "Boko Haram Militants' Evolving Strategy in Nigeria Opens Up New Fronts, as Risk of Suicide Bombings Rise." (Factiva)

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). October 2015. Jakkie Cilliers. Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa. [Accessed 1 Mar. 2016]

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 8 May 2015. Uyo Salifu. "Fighting Boko Haram - Why Nigeria Needs a Cohesive Witness Protection Programme." (Factiva)

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). N.d. "How We Work." [Accessed 1 Mar. 2016]

International Crisis Group. 3 April 2014. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. [Accessed 1 Mar. 2016]

Jane's Intelligence Review. 25 November 2015. Omar Mahmood. Rebranded Boko Haram Threatens West Africa. [Accessed 1 Mar. 2016]

START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. 2 March 2016. Correspondence from the Research Director to the Research Directorate.

START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. January 2015. Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options. [Accessed 1 Mar. 2016]

START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. N.d.a. "Search Results: 20 Incidents." (Global Terrorism Database) [Accessed 2 Mar. 2016]

START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. N.d.b. "Overview of the GTD." (Global Terrorism Database) [Accessed 4 Mar. 2016]

United States (US). 1 March 2016. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Correspondence from a specialist in African affairs to the Research Directorate.

United States (US). June 2015. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2014. [Accessed 29 Feb. 2016]

United States (US). 10 June 2014. Lauren Ploch Blanchard. Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions. [Accessed 29 Feb. 2016]

World Watch Monitor. 13 July 2015. "Are Nigeria's 'Middle Belt' Christians Victims of Ethnic Cleansing?" [Accessed 11 Mar. 2016]

World Watch Monitor. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 11 Mar. 2016]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Illinois Edwardsville; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; Jamestown Foundation.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point; ecoi.net; Factiva; Freedom House; Human Rights Watch; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; Jamestown Foundation; Perspectives on Terrorism; United Nations - Refworld.