

**MOVING MACEDONIA TOWARD
SELF-SUFFICIENCY: A NEW SECURITY
APPROACH FOR NATO AND THE EU**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Macedonia's 15 September 2002 election suggests the country may have turned a corner on the road to stability. Widely anticipated fraud and violence mostly did not materialise. Unlike in neighbouring Kosovo a few weeks later, a cross section of voters from all ethnicities streamed to the polls. They elected a government that has embraced the Framework Agreement brokered by the European Union (EU), the U.S. and NATO at Ohrid in August 2001 to end the incipient civil war and that has pledged to manage inter-ethnic issues through consensus, not simply division of spoils, to overhaul the scandal-plagued "Lions" security unit, and fight massive, endemic corruption.

While one should be wary of post-campaign euphoria, a certain optimism seems justified. Ali Ahmeti, the ex-rebel leader turned Albanian party leader, has shown cooperation. Prime Minister Crvenkovski has long accepted the political risks of backing the controversial package of concessions to Albanians in the Framework Agreement. In an astonishingly smooth negotiation, the Social Democrat-led Macedonian coalition concluded a power-sharing arrangement with an Albanian party previously labelled terrorists and with whom contact had been forbidden.

However, causes for serious concern remain. Large swathes of territory in ethnic Albanian dominated areas remain beyond the control of law enforcement. Not only are the population as a whole vulnerable, but police also fear for their own safety. Organised crime and a profusion of weapons, especially in weakly controlled border areas, have left significant parts of the country at risk. Mistrust between ethnic

communities remains palpable. Killings in Tetovo in October dramatised the lingering danger of spiralling ethnic violence.

Macedonia's indigenous security institutions – both police and army – are weak and largely unreformed, relying on outmoded tactics that reinforce mistrust while undercutting effectiveness. International organisations are likely to have broad cooperation from the new government but many of the security programs they have introduced will take months (in some cases years) to complete. Meanwhile, the threat lingers that Macedonia could be destabilised by organised crime, Kosovo-based Albanian extremists, or election losers.

The real progress toward political stability and internal security that has been made has largely been possible because of unprecedented cooperation between NATO, the U.S. and the EU from the early days of the crisis in 2001. That cooperation remains essential for the transition period that Macedonia has now entered. Specifically, a military presence such as NATO's Task Force Fox currently provides is still indispensable. Largely manned and led by Europeans, Fox is less than one-thirtieth the size of the NATO force in Kosovo. It has contributed mightily toward establishing a "secure atmosphere" that has seen more than 90 per cent of those displaced by the conflict return home while enhancing the effectiveness of other international actors in Macedonia, including the EU itself and its Monitoring Mission (EUMM), the U.S., and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It intervened critically at least three times

over the past year to prevent inter-ethnic incidents from escalating out of control.

Macedonia's leaders have recognised both NATO's contribution and their own security limitations. They say clearly that they seek neither permanent dependence nor creeping protectorate but rather continued interim assistance until full control and law and order can be established throughout the country. The U.S. has been cool to extending the NATO mission, though only a handful of U.S. forces are on the ground and heavy U.S. engagement would only be necessary in the most extreme case.

The EU wishes to maintain the international security presence and to assume that responsibility at the earliest possible time. This would represent important and welcome further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – a convincing demonstration that Brussels is serious about playing a larger security role while integrating not only Macedonia but also all the Western Balkans into European institutions. The target has been 15 December, when the present Fox mandate expires. However, while much progress has been made in overcoming the obstacles (mainly a Greece-Turkey dispute that has delayed necessary agreement on an EU force's access to NATO assets), the 15 December deadline is probably too close.

Whether through NATO or the EU, the international community needs to continue to help Macedonia during the transition period. NATO should, therefore, remain for six months or until such time as the EU is ready to assume the security functions, whichever period is shorter. This would give NATO a set departure date while ensuring a proper hand-over. As NATO draws down and the EU prepares to take over, the latter should also focus on complementary tasks to demonstrate its increased commitment to Macedonia. In particular, the EU and NATO should act now in tandem to address the gap in border control – probably the most vital remaining security issue – by deploying and protecting a sizeable EUMM contingent along the vulnerable Kosovo, Serbia and Albania borders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the international community (NATO and the EU):

1. Continue to provide Macedonia interim security assistance, in particular by maintaining a small

military force in the country until it can assume full and effective control and ensure law and order throughout its territory.

To NATO:

2. Keep Task Force Fox or a similar force in Macedonia for six months or until the EU is able to assume the responsibility (whichever period is shorter) in order to continue its confidence-building and trouble-shooting roles.
3. Ensure that its highly effective Military Liaison Teams continue to be backed by extraction companies with adequate, visible firepower sufficient to maintain their effectiveness and invulnerability to challenge.
4. During the remaining short period of its mission, concentrate also on the following tasks:
 - (a) orienting the mission to support weapons collection, special police reform and other security-related and rule of law programs that lessen the likelihood of ethnic violence;
 - (b) linking the mission to reform and accession programs by training Macedonian forces and then transferring appropriate tasks to them;
 - (c) assuming responsibility for the Military Adviser function now provided by a senior UK military officer;
 - (d) working jointly with the EU or alone to develop Macedonia as a centre for Regional Security Cooperation, in particular, to develop the Krivolak military training facility as a centre for joint exercises among NATO members and, especially, candidate countries such as Macedonia, Croatia and Albania that are unlikely to gain membership at the Prague Summit; and
 - (e) working jointly with the EU or alone to expand its concept for a regional border conference by establishing a Regional Security Cooperation Institute in Macedonia.

To the European Union:

5. Continue preparations to take over security responsibilities from NATO at the earliest possible time but no later than 15 June 2003.
6. Expand immediately EU contributions to Macedonia's security by the following means:

- (a) increasing sizeably the number of EUMM monitors deployed along Macedonia's borders;
- (b) improving coordination between the European Commission and OSCE on police reform projects;
- (c) working jointly with NATO or alone to develop Macedonia as a centre for Regional Security Cooperation, in particular, to develop the Krivolak site as a centre for joint exercises among regional states, especially NATO candidate countries such as Macedonia, Croatia, and Albania that are unlikely to gain membership at the Prague NATO Summit.
- (d) working jointly with NATO or alone, to expand the NATO concept for a regional border conference by establishing a Regional Security Cooperation Institute in Macedonia.
- (e) following up, through the EU Special Representative in Macedonia, the groundbreaking Wahlund Commission report and pressing the new government to resolve swiftly the twenty missing persons cases from the conflict.

Skopje/Brussels, 15 November 2002



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I. INTRODUCTION

On 15 September 2002 Macedonian citizens went to the polls. Unlike their neighbours in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, citizens turned out in high numbers, with over 73 per cent of them casting ballots. Indeed, many polling stations reported that half of their designated voters had arrived before noon, with some understandably eager to get safely home before dusk. The most welcome and unexpected element in the ballot was the relative lack of violence.

The election results broadly reflected opinion polls in the run-up to the contest and surprised few, except senior leaders in both the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and their supporters that had failed to recognise the groundswell of public disdain with the ruling parties. Following the electoral rout, a senior member of the ruling (Macedonian) VMRO-DPMNE party acknowledged that voters had “punished” the party for both corruption and its bellicose approach to domestic ethnic tensions. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that the results reflected more a protest vote *against* VMRO, than a vote *for* the return of the Social Democrats and their coalition partners.¹

The situation was mirrored to some degree on the ethnic Albanian side of the election, with the DPA losing a great deal of support because of continuing

charges of corruption and criminality. The fight against corruption and organised crime featured prominently in the rhetoric of both challengers, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia-Liberal Democratic Party coalition (SDSM-LDP) and the Democratic Union for Integration, or DUI.² However, in contrast to the SDSM victory, the Ahmeti-DUI landslide also reflected strong support for the former rebel leader, who has evolved into something of an icon in the Albanian community.

On the Macedonian side, antipathy to VMRO was so great that Macedonian voters squeezed out almost completely all other parties, concerned that a vote for a third-party would essentially rebound to benefit the VMRO in post-election bargaining. This brought the SDSM-LDP coalition to 60 seats, almost an outright majority in the 120-seat parliament, leaving Ahmeti’s DUI at a considerable disadvantage in the post-election negotiations.³ Negotiations after 15 September between the DUI and the Macedonian coalition were surprisingly smooth. The atmospherics were positive, both inside the room and in the media, and the parties quickly agreed to a DUI-proposed platform that pledged consensus on issues of “vital national interest” and full

¹ Interview with senior VMRO-DPMNE official closely involved in electoral planning and analysis.

² The SDSM-LDP coalition in fact included ten parties altogether, including some representing ethnic constituencies such as Macedonian Muslims, Vlachs and Roma.

³ Ahmeti’s advisors reject speculation that the DPA persuaded him against forming a coalition with either of the other two Albanian parties: they say that the demands of the NDP were too high, and they were not interested in diluting the identity of the party with the PDP.

implementation of the Ohrid, or Framework, Agreement.⁴

However, negotiations were almost brought to a halt by DUI demands for broader and more senior Albanian representation in government by obtaining the post of Defence, Interior or Foreign Minister. A senior DUI official called this, “a fundamental test of SDSM trust in us”. International mediators led by the EU’s Alain LeRoy and U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Butler once again found a solution, suggesting to DUI that its aims were too ambitious, given its sixteen-seat take of the 120-seat parliament and the SDSM’s strong position. Instead, the DUI accepted a new position of Deputy Prime Minister with the responsibility for increasing Albanian representation in government, along with four other ministries.⁵

Early on 1 November 2002, parliament approved the so-called “Guns and Roses” government (Ahmeti’s NLA “guns” with Crvenkovski’s Social Democrat “roses”), ending a six-week period of lame-duck government. Parliament, with DUI support, had earlier elected an SDSM representative, Nikola Popovski, as President of Parliament.

As for the losing VMRO-DPMNE, its aim has been to maximise the political cost to SDSM-LDP for forming a coalition with those it continues to label as “terrorists”. While outgoing Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski had initially accepted the results with a gracious statement on election night, two days later

Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski sent forces into the ballot paper printing house and then stormed into the office of the State Election Chair, alleging fraud and complicity.⁶ In speeches before parliament, Georgievski and Boskovski have attacked the representation of DUI ministers in the government, and appear unlikely to settle into the role of a loyal opposition. On the Albanian side, DPA President Arben Xhaferi resigned his seat in parliament. His deputy, Menduh Thaci, continues as party vice-president, and will have an even more prominent public role with Xhaferi’s departure.

With the relatively smooth inclusion of former insurrectionists into government, it may well be that Macedonia has turned a corner, particularly given that Ahmeti and the DUI seem to have genuinely embraced the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement and have not been coerced or intimidated into cooperation. The DUI has consistently rejected the attempts of other Albanian parties to escalate demands for more ambitious, territorial solutions. Moreover, Ahmeti has a demonstrable record of post-conflict cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other international officials who have worked closely with Ahmeti portray him as generally reliable in following through on commitments (such as withdrawal of the National Liberation Army, exerting a restraining influence during crises and calling off Albanian resistance to police redeployment.) And unlike other post-conflict situations, Ahmeti’s campaign rhetoric – including the very name of his party – stress the unity and integration of the country into Europe, although some ethnic Macedonians have been discomfited by his heavy usage of Albanian national symbols and frequent paeans to fallen National Liberation Army fighters.

At the same time, the incoming SDSM-LDP coalition and its leader Branko Crvenkovski, have repeatedly emphasised fidelity to the Ohrid agreement.⁷ The victorious coalition also promises

⁴ Signed on 13 August 2001, the Framework Agreement represents a pact between the majority Macedonians and the largest national minority, the Albanians, on fundamental power-sharing arrangements. The Agreement dramatically scales down Macedonian administrative authority (ceding central power to local municipalities) and legislative power (granting Albanians a quasi-veto over the choice of judges, laws on local government, culture, use of language, education, documentation and use of symbols.) In addition, the Agreement gives up Macedonian advantages in state hiring and admissions practices. Finally, the supremacy of Macedonian symbols is reduced by granting free use of Albanian (and other symbols), such as the Albanian flag.

Taken as a whole, the Framework Agreement requires the Macedonian majority to cede its monopoly on the character of the state without obtaining any reciprocal opportunity to shore up its identity in ways that other Balkan peoples take for granted, or to advance the cause of its own outlying minorities. The outrage among Macedonians at the Agreement was not so much at the gains by Albanians in the Agreement, as at the losses to Macedonian identity.

⁵ These were the health, education, justice, and transportation & communication ministries.

⁶ As for allegations of fraud made by the losing VMRO-DPMNE party, a senior official in that party with election responsibilities told ICG that in his view the amount of fraud even theoretically committed by the winning SDSM-LDP coalition was not of a significant magnitude. ICG meeting with senior VMRO-DPMNE official on 15 October 2002

⁷ While some members of the winning coalition, notably independent MP Trifun Kostovski and former presidential candidate Tito Petkovski, had expressed reservations about concessions to Albanians, they have moderated or muted their views since the election. By contrast, former Prime

to reverse the erratic and provocative approach to policing that that was the hallmark of the Interior Ministry under the leadership of former Minister Boskovski.

Both electoral winners, SDSM-LDP and DUI, have also stressed their commitment to fighting corruption, an increasingly central problem in Macedonia. Many observers, however, are understandably sceptical that the new government will be substantially different from their predecessors, given the SDSM's miserable record on the issue when it was formerly in power, and the popular wisdom that drug smuggling financed Kosovo Liberation Army-National Liberation Army operations. And even with good will, the legal loopholes and a weak justice system will mean that corruption will remain a low-risk, high reward activity for some time. It is nevertheless encouraging that the terms of the coalition negotiations appear to have been focussed on political influence rather than potential for graft in the new government.

It is against this backdrop of political opportunity and continuing security threats that NATO will need to decide whether or not to extend its presence in the country under the guise of either a prolonged mandate for Task Force Fox,⁸ or a new mission. The current Task Force Fox is slated to terminate by 15 December 2002, and it is clear that despite the welcome developments of the recent election, a continued international security presence would be of tremendous utility.

II. THE CONTINUING SECURITY DEFICIT: CAUSE FOR CONCERN

While there are grounds for optimism, the success and even survival of the current government is not a foregone conclusion. Continuing or accelerated implementation of the Ohrid Agreement will require not only a positive attitude by the coalition partners, but relative calm, especially in the so-called "former crisis areas" where Albanians are dominant and ethnic Macedonians remain vulnerable.⁹ Should such minorities, or the police themselves, become the object of attack, then political pressures will mount on the government to take "decisive" action against "Albanian criminals"; the level of violence between differing Albanian factions is already alarmingly high. The police are currently incapable of a well-managed response, and any vigorous action by the security forces would risk sparking a political crisis with the DUI members of the coalition government.

In other words, the government's ability to meet Albanian expectations regarding the Ohrid Agreement depends in large part on Ahmeti's ability to exert control over the "vacuum" that exists in former crisis areas where adequate policing will not be restored for some time. Despite his generally cooperative track record, Ali Ahmeti has yet to prove that he can bring his will to bear on the lawlessness that poses a special threat to vulnerable Macedonian local minorities. Ahmeti has also been unable or unwilling to resolve the matter of thirteen missing Macedonians from last year's conflict, a deeply emotional issue that remains a major obstacle to reconciliation.¹⁰

Despite the apparent good will in government and political circles, Macedonia still faces looming security challenges. This was tragically las

Minister Ljubco Georgievski, who actually signed the Ohrid Agreement, has frequently expressed his scepticism about it.

⁸ Officially designated by NATO as Operation Amber Fox.

⁹ ICG calculations, based on the 1994 census, give 31,179 ethnic Macedonians living in former crisis areas where they are in a local demographic minority.

¹⁰ An international, EU-sponsored commission headed by Swedish diplomat Lars Wahlund issued a report stating that former NLA commander Daut Rexhepi, generally known as "Leka", almost certainly has information about the fate of thirteen Macedonians who have been missing since 2001's conflict. Thus far, Ahmeti has been unable or unwilling to pry answers from "Leka" who left Ahmeti to join the DPA party led by Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci. When pressed on the subject, Ahmeti mentions one of his relatives is among the six missing Albanians (most of whom disappeared in the vicinity of police checkpoints).

demonstrated on 18 October 2002, when a car sped past Macedonian police officers on patrol in Tetovo, ignoring their signal to stop. The police officers claim that the occupants fired upon them. Whether true or not, the police fired into the vehicle killing a twenty-year old Albanian. The tradition of excessive use of force, indiscriminate arrests, and the low representation of Albanians in the police force is responsible for much of the hostility that police face in the former crisis areas. The 18 October incident polarised Macedonia's ethnic communities, with Albanians complaining about excessive use of force and insisting that the youths were simply afraid of the police. Angered by recent arrests, including that of an amnestied former National Liberation Army commander, many Albanians in Tetovo asked, "Where will this lead?"

They were soon answered. The following day on the very same Tetovo road, an eighteen-year old Macedonian youth playing basketball was shot dead from a passing car. The drive-by shooting was almost certainly perpetrated by Albanians in retribution for the previous evening's police shooting. The suspects, whose names were widely circulated, are still at large.¹¹ Three days later, outraged Macedonian youths took to the streets in Skopje, and beating up some Albanians who happened upon their route.¹² A letter threatening more retribution was sent to a Tetovo school. Macedonians and Albanians, long accustomed to the sound of gunfire in Tetovo, continue asking how soon before their town becomes "another Belfast or Gaza". The anecdotal impressions are backed up by statistics: unofficially, 64 Albanians and four Macedonians have been gunned down in the relatively small Tetovo region over the course of the year.¹³ Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski summed up the situation this way:

Who would invest, build and hire new persons in a country with constant shootings, where it is not recommended to travel after dark in one third of its territory. In a country where the

children are killed while playing basketball, and where other children instead of being at school, go out on the streets and beat old men. Does anyone have an illusion that economic progress and prosperity is possible in the country, where the peace is fragile, where instability and insecurity rule. There is no such example in Europe.¹⁴

The Tetovo incidents demonstrated the ease with which an inter-ethnic cycle of violence can be set off. Organised elements, linked to both crime and political extremism, have the capacity to instigate and escalate unrest. A detailed study prepared in the President's office states that "the biggest threat to security and stability in the Republic of Macedonia comes from criminal gangs which are located predominantly in northern border areas ... [The gangs] control profits from illegal activities and their tentacles reach parts of the administration and government, which provide for their ... protection".¹⁵

The sputtering economy and high unemployment also promise to increase social tensions and the allure of organised crime. The government will have a difficult task to implement IMF-mandated policies to shut down loss-making enterprises and trim employment in the bloated, Macedonian-dominated state sector.¹⁶

The political relationships between criminals and politicians raise disturbing questions. For example, one of the suspect shooters in the basketball court shooting is from the village of Poroj, a stronghold of Daut Rexhepi, the former National Liberation Army commander generally known as "Leka". Senior international officials suspect that the Poroj connection is no coincidence and, in fact, the gunman may be under the protection of Leka, who is now a DPA party member, although it is obviously difficult to determine the merit of such allegations.¹⁷

The possibility that the losers of the last election, DPA and VMRO-DPMNE, could collude to heighten tensions remains possible. According to

¹¹ One suspect whose name was published, Commander Dzimi, insists that he has an alibi. Police reports that he had fled the country were embarrassingly disproved when he appeared in Tetovo.

¹² Earlier, on 9 October 2002, Macedonian students had also taken to the streets to protest the change of the name of a school from a Macedonian to an Albanian folk hero in the village of Semsevo, a site of recent inter-ethnic tensions.

¹³ Unofficial information provided by government source, 6 November 2002.

¹⁴ "Governmental program is defined by requirements for peace", MIA, 31 October.

¹⁵ "Contributions to the National Security System", Stevo Pendarovski, National Security Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, August 2002, p. 13.

¹⁶ See for instance the ESI report, *Ahmeti's Village*, http://www.esiweb.org/pages/rep/rep_mac_02.htm.

¹⁷ See also footnote 12, above, for Leka's likely knowledge of the fate of the missing Macedonians.

three senior international officials, high-ranking elements in the two parties very likely collaborated in the dramatic kidnapping of five Macedonians on 29 August, two weeks before the elections.¹⁸ While both DPA and VMRO will be out of power for the next few years, each will likely maintain the ability to carry out violence. Another facet of the security problem was in evidence on 31 October; the day parliament was to vote on a new government, when a powerful bomb went off just outside of parliament. Two extremist groups of differing orientations have reportedly taken credit for the blast – on one side, the Albanian National Army, a shadowy group that rejects cooperation with Slavs, and on the other, the Macedonian National Front, another obscure, ultra-nationalist organization.

Macedonians have long considered Kosovo (and to a lesser degree, Albania) a haven for extremists like those in the Albanian National Army, and the perception is not without some foundation. In an interview with ICG, a senior DUI official confirmed that the group suspected of launching a fierce 25 March attack on Ahmeti's headquarters (in which three were killed) was bringing in weapons from Kosovo.¹⁹ The United States confirmed the seriousness and persistence of the threat of Albanian extremism by adding three prominent Albanian figures to its "Watch List" of persons responsible for destabilising the Balkans in July 2002.²⁰ Although the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) have recently taken steps to crack down on organised crime in Kosovo, the potential for exploitation of KFOR's security umbrella by extremists will continue – with

or without any collusion from elements associated with the former Macedonian government.²¹

A. LAGGING POLICE AND ARMY CAPABILITIES

Incoming Minister of Interior Hari Kostov, a successful banker without political experience, certainly promises to be a welcome change from his predecessor, Boskovski. But even granting Kostov's commitment to making a clean break from the past, there are good reasons to be cautious.

The OSCE-nurtured police redeployment process, as even some OSCE officials will admit, was a mostly cosmetic exercise. Unfortunately, "redeployment" has generally meant little more than brief police visits to villages (about 140 in total) where fighting took place last year.²² The redeployment plan itself featured a seventeen point series of tasks known as "The Matrix" which has been deemed to be complete by the OSCE, despite having achieved limited improvement in security. Police are limited in the time they spend on site and in their activities, and in some areas they fear for their safety. The fact that it is too dangerous for police to carry out even basic traffic duties speaks volumes about the extent of lawlessness in the area, and the threat to isolated Macedonian populations. The OSCE itself has noted that the continuing law enforcement vacuum has led to significant increase in crime and gang activity.

Following completion of "redeployment" in June, a new plan to move from a cosmetic, intermittent police presence to a more robust community-based policing arrangement was agreed with the Ministry of the Interior by the OSCE.²³ But erratic and occasionally provocative leadership within the Ministry prevailed, and OSCE refrained from pushing the plan hard during the election period.²⁴ Given mutual mistrust and the complete reorientation

¹⁸ ICG interviews with three senior international officials during and after recent elections. Under unclear circumstances and after international pressure, the hostages were released unharmed on 31 August. The event was preceded by the fatal shooting of two police officers (one Macedonian and one Serb) in Gostivar on 26 August. While internationals tell ICG they do not have evidence linking this event to political parties, a senior Macedonian party official has voiced his belief that such was the case. A third police officer, an Albanian, was also shot dead prior to the elections.

¹⁹ The 25 March attack on Ahmeti's headquarters indicated that he was not invulnerable to attack. The incident was followed on 2 April by an attack on a DPA-linked restaurant in Tetovo. Heavy firing and use of grenades inflicted much material destruction, but miraculously or mysteriously, no casualties.

²⁰ The three included a former leader of the PDP political party and Kastriot Haxhirexha, leader of the NDP.

²¹ See "KFOR AND UNMIK confiscated 260 tons of cigarettes in Pec", *Dnevnik*, October 25, 2002.

²² In a number of villages, the redeployment process actually was aimed at *introducing* the police to areas where they hadn't been present, even long before the conflict broke out in early 2001.

²³ OSCE likes to maintain that the plan "belongs" to the Ministry of Interior, when in fact internationals have been the primary source for its development.

²⁴ Unlike the rest of the international community, OSCE has maintained consistently that it enjoys outstanding cooperation from the Interior Ministry.

in attitudes required both of local citizenry and authorities for community policing to take hold,²⁵ it would be unrealistic to expect that the sensible and comprehensive nine-point OSCE “new policing” plan could achieve immediate results even if backed by good will.²⁶ In the interim, the security vacuum will allow criminals to operate freely and subject minorities to fear.

Winning the trust of Albanians of course goes hand in hand with increasing their numbers on the force – a major objective of the Ohrid Agreement. OSCE's Police Academy in Idrizovo has, as of July 2002, successfully trained its target of 500 new, mostly Albanian police officers. 500 more are to be trained by July 2003. To achieve mandated ethnic balance (assuming the overall police structure remains intact), international officials say that the number of Macedonian members of the force would have to be reduced by 2,300 and the number of Albanians upped by 1,700.²⁷

Second, Kostov will also be faced with the need to overhaul completely the notorious special police unit called the “Lions”. Ostensibly providing the Interior Ministry with a robust capability against armed threats inside the country, the aggressive, poorly disciplined Lions have functioned more as a provocative Praetorian Guard under command of former Minister Boskovski.²⁸ The total strength and

structure of the Lions is unclear, with a senior Macedonian security official providing a figure of up to 1,600 members, and the ranks of the group include significant numbers of criminals.²⁹ The Lions have proven themselves to be a net detriment to security – highly skilled at provoking extremist Albanian response and intimidating Macedonians, but virtually useless in conducting the rapid intervention or counter-terrorist operations that are its *raison d'être*.

The international community has long since demanded that the Lions be disbanded, and with a new government in power this has become a realistic possibility. Options being considered for the unit include returning the special intervention capacity to a shared function between the Army and police or placing it under the control of the President, as was proposed last year. There has also been discussion of developing a new intervention force outside both police and army structures, and whether to disband the Lions and reconstitute a special police capability within the Ministry of Interior. Whatever option is chosen (and the last option seems most likely), the process of vetting the old members of the Lions and constituting a new special police capability will take some time.

In addition to the glaring inadequacies in policing, Macedonia's army also must meet a number of challenges before it can be deemed to be effective:

- ❑ There are too many senior officers and too few Albanians overall (just 3 per cent of the total army corps);
- ❑ The army has too many tanks, and an orientation toward “heavy” operations with too little light counter-insurgency capability;³⁰ and,

²⁵ For example, before police can become accepted by the Albanian community they must be weaned from dependence on “informative talks” – a coercive means of extracting information that substitutes for normal investigative work and devastates the image of the police.

²⁶ The nine points are: 1. Flexible, regional and local command (decentralization); 2. Participation by police in informal forums like Citizen Advisory groups; 3. Phasing out of heavy-handed camouflage uniforms, in favour of police blues; 4. Phasing out poorly trained police reserves with professional cadre; 5. Gradual phase in of regular police activity in the former crisis areas; 6. Improved mechanism for handling police complaints at all levels; 7. Identify, refurbish or establish police stations and contact desks; 8. Establish a media strategy, including appointing media officers; 9. Remove all police checkpoints.

²⁷ Interview with OSCE police development officials on 25 October 2002. See Framework Agreement, Annex C, paragraph 5.2 which mandates that the “police services will by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia.” Note that the OSCE assumed the police training function from an earlier US Justice Department program that pre-dated Ohrid.

²⁸ The Macedonian army (ARM) is forbidden by law from operating other than in the narrow “border belt”, except in a state of emergency. Another less militarised and less

troublesome special police unit, the “Tigers”, also provides capabilities against heavily armed threats within the country.

²⁹ Crusading journalist Zoran Bozinovski, who was beaten just after the elections identified one of his assailants as a member of the “Lions”.

³⁰ NATO asks that the army scrap a number of its T-55 tank inventory in recognition of their age and unsuitability to threat. Macedonia acquired 32 Soviet-era T-72s tanks last year. It also has four SU-25 Sukoi attack jets that outsiders deem far too expensive for their limited utility. Macedonia has approximately 200 colonels and 74 general staff officers, again deemed far more than necessary for a force ideally structured at 3,000 officers and Non Commissioned Officers. Source: interviews with senior Macedonian security officials, 19 October. While the police have the “Lions” and

- The lack of both a National Security Strategy and a forward budgeting capability severely hampers the ability to plan for future threats and generate the resources to meet them.

The Ministry of Defence has responded to NATO and other international calls for reform, promising to scrap its older tanks, its fixed-wing attack aircraft, improve its budgeting system and produce both a comprehensive security review and national security strategy. International assistance, particularly the senior British officer who serves as the UK Special Defence Adviser, has been a powerful impetus to reform. Located inside the Ministry itself, the Adviser has been able to wield exceptional influence, galvanising military reform and gaining the confidence of both the top civilian leadership and the uniformed general staff.³¹ Equally, NATO's Membership Action Plan has also been useful as a catalyst toward reform of equipment and force structures along membership criteria.³² As welcome as they are, these steps can do nothing about the profligacy of the previous government that has left the Ministry short of funds for reservists' salaries and even for basic Army provisions.

The promised reforms also will not address the most immediate concern: limited counter-insurgency and border interdiction capabilities. Poor training, inexperience and the almost total lack of cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior have hampered counter-insurgency operations and stymied internationally offered training.

As for the critical border mission, experts say that the Border Brigade suffers from outdated doctrines and restrictions in addition to possessing weak tactical capabilities. Limited intelligence gathering capability and virtually no coordination with the

police has also render the Border Brigade even less effective. The army and police share responsibilities at the border, with the army responsible for the "border belt" which is normally only 100 metres, but has swelled to ten kilometres in certain sensitive areas along the Albania, Kosovo and Serbia borders. The police remain responsible for security at official border crossing points only in these areas. The Macedonian media has given wide play to assertions by the army that its border positions came under attack in the spring, once again raising anxiety and speculation about the threat from Kosovo.³³

The European Commission has allocated €3.3 million from its year 2001 budget for police reform, with about half the amount having been disbursed. Separately, the EC (through the European Agency for Reconstruction) is implementing a major program for "integrated border management" (involving customs and a to-be-established border police force) in the total amount (since budget year 2000) of Euro 14 million.

Both OSCE and the European Agency say that there is poor coordination on police reform issues between the two organizations, with each one blaming the other. Clearly, the two organizations are different, with OSCE having greater on-site presence and the EC/EAR having greater central management. Unless the two find ways to exploit their complementary strengths and improve communication, the large sums allocated for the police and border situation will not yield maximal results." In the meantime, a joint British and French team are working on a short-term project to upgrade the existing border patrol.

B. MACEDONIANS AND ALBANIANS VIEW THEIR SECURITY SITUATION AND THE NATO PRESENCE

NATO troops have been present in Macedonia as part of the support structure for the KFOR mission in Kosovo since 1999. Although NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson famously called the National Liberation Army "thugs" at the outset of the 2001 conflict, by the time the Ohrid Agreement was signed NATO had built up a good relationship

"Tigers", the Army has the "Scorpions" counter-insurgency unit and the "Wolves" Special Forces.

³¹ In part because of the success of the UK Military Adviser, ICG recommended that "watchdogs" be placed in critical areas of government like Customs and the Health Fund. See ICG Balkans Report N°133, *Macedonia's Public Secret: How corruption drags the country down*, 14 August, 2002.

³² The firm, Booz Allen Hamilton has succeeded the controversial MPRI as the new U.S. civilian defence contractor. Booz Allen will complement the MAP process by working on a five-year project to carry planning, personnel, training and logistics reforms to a further level of detail. Like other initiatives, this one too is in its developmental stage with discussions on-going over defining the project tasks.

³³ NATO confirmed one of these alleged attacks, but disputes the others.

with Ahmeti, and Alliance officials retain close contact with the former rebel leader. The Alliance had also coordinated the evacuation of National Liberation Army fighters from the Skopje suburb of Aracinovo during the height of the conflict.

Since the end of the conflict there have been two NATO missions in Macedonia. Operation Essential Harvest involved 3,500 troops and oversaw the collection of arms from the Albanian insurgents in August-September 2001. Since then Task Force Fox, a much smaller mission of only 750 personnel (with a reserve of 250) has been responsible for supporting Macedonian security. The surfeit of small arms in Macedonia, the continuing weakness of law enforcement and border control, the persistence of ethnic incidents and organised crime and the residual ability of the losers of the recent election to serve as violent spoilers have all combined to create a substantial “security deficit” in Macedonia.

Both President Trajkovski and incoming Prime Minister Crvenkovski understand this, and have indicated a willingness to host a continued international security presence, and Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva made a public statement to that effect on 2 November.³⁴ The Macedonian government, recognising that its security situation has not been fully stabilised, formally decided on 11 November that there is a need for “an international military presence” after 15 December. This is all rather remarkable. NATO came into the country burdened severely by its pro-Albanian image among Macedonians, tracing back to its controversial role during the 2001 conflict, and even going further back to the 1999 campaign against Yugoslavia which many Macedonians felt directly contributed to an extremist security threat operating out of Kosovo and targeting Macedonia.³⁵ Operation Essential Harvest was viewed with hostility by most Macedonians,

many of whom felt that the 4,000 rebel weapons rounded up by NATO fell far short of the strength of rebel stocks.³⁶ Obtaining Macedonian consent to the subsequent Amber Fox mission and its first extension was deeply controversial and required significant pressure on the Macedonian leadership.

However, due to the general progress on the security front first under German and then Dutch leadership, and the fact that over 90 per cent of refugees have returned home, the hostility towards NATO among Macedonians has ebbed substantially. Even leading hardliners in government reversed their views on NATO over the course of the year, with Prime Minister Georgievski vying with President Trajkovski for the honour of requesting an extension.³⁷ Surveys and the anecdotal experience of Task Force Fox mission members strongly suggest that NATO has managed to gain the confidence, if not the affection, of a large proportion of the ethnic Macedonian population.

Senior Macedonian officials remain acutely aware that having NATO remain deployed on a security mission within the country undercuts their immediate arguments for becoming a NATO member. In NATO terminology, Macedonia knows that it cannot be a “contributor” to the alliance when it is still a “consumer” of international security assistance. Yet, for Macedonians, the question of a continued international security presence is not a matter of avoiding responsibility or becoming permanently dependent on the international community, it is a gimlet-eyed assessment of their current limitations in maintaining security. They understand that however embarrassing their present, limited requirement for further assistance may be, the alternative – a slide back toward conflict – would be much worse.

As for Ali Ahmeti, his consent and that of his party for a continued NATO presence can be taken for

³⁴ “New Government demands NATO to stay in Macedonia”, *Dnevnik*, 3 November 2002.

³⁵ The Aracinovo operation, mentioned above, remains a touchstone for many ethnic Macedonians convinced that international duplicity and perfidy (on behalf of the Albanians) ultimately led to the bitterly resented Framework Agreement. There are continuing allegations that the U.S. military consultancy, MPRI, provided assistance to the rebels and were with them in Aracinovo. MPRI is also alleged to have provided, possibly deliberately, bad advice to the Macedonian military that limited its capability to respond to the NLA insurgency. Many Macedonians remain convinced that the United States has chosen the Albanians as a “strategic partner” in the region.

³⁶ A British soldier was killed in September 2000 by ethnic Macedonians in September 2001 in what appears to have been a deliberate attack.

³⁷ “Georgievski will personally ask for extension of NATO Amber Fox mission from Robertson”, *Utrinski Vesnik*, 2 July 2002. Georgievski’s position was especially noteworthy since much of his party’s campaign had centred on anti-West rhetoric. Even Interior Minister Boskovski was quoted as saying “extending Amber Fox is good until the return of interethnic life and trust between Macedonians and Albanians which is destroyed ... and a source of tension”. “Interview of Ljube Boskovski for Radio Free Europe: Alliance needs to be present in Macedonia”, *Dnevnik*, 12 January 2002.

granted. Like virtually all Albanians, Ahmeti and his party are fervently pro-NATO. Ahmeti's reaction to other security arrangements cannot be taken for granted. In interviews with ICG, Ahmeti has stated repeatedly that his forces surrendered their weapons to NATO – not to the Macedonian government or the wider “international community”. In the eyes of Ahmeti and many Albanians, it was NATO's assurances on amnesty and other issues during cease-fire talks that were decisive. For instance, the crucial question of whether war-crimes suspects could be tried in Macedonia or exclusively at The Hague war crimes tribunal, dogged passage of an amnesty law. It was NATO's vigorous political intervention that proved decisive, ensuring that Ahmeti's understanding - that only the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia could try war-crimes suspects, and not Macedonian courts - held sway. Indeed, the need for full respect of the amnesty law weighs heavily on the Albanian population, providing an ongoing source of anxiety, especially in the light of continuing arrests of NLA members.

Despite the transformation of the National Liberation Army into a political party with a commitment to working within political structures, it is too soon to discount the importance of NATO's commitments and representations to Ahmeti. Ahmeti's own legal status in Macedonia remains unclear. He and senior NLA colleagues are still charged with crimes that precede last year's amnesty, and they are, certainly in Macedonian eyes, potential subjects for a war-crimes trial.³⁸ Ahmeti's movements to Skopje and around the country are still severely constrained. Aside from the special role that NATO played with Ahmeti and the National Liberation Army, the alliance itself holds particular credibility with all Albanians.

There is no mystery to their affection: in Albanian eyes, NATO is virtually synonymous with the United States, the perceived patron of the Albanians and the leading force behind the “liberation” of Kosovo. The diplomatic structure of the Ohrid negotiations played on this image as U.S. envoy James Pardew “delivered” the Albanians while his EU counterpart, former French minister Francois Leotard, was

presented as envoy to the Macedonians.³⁹ Just as Albanians see their perceived allies in Washington as the real power behind NATO, so they are likely to see France or some other less favoured European country behind any possible EU force.⁴⁰ Ethnic Macedonians see some advantage from the unique credibility of NATO with the Albanians.⁴¹

C. EUROPEAN AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON MACEDONIA'S SECURITY

As outlined, there is still sufficient cause for concern about the security deficit in Macedonia. Unfortunately, the debate over a continuing NATO or EU role in Macedonia is being framed in terms of the policy needs of the Western capitals and not the security situation on the ground.

European leaders, keen to establish the EU's security credentials by heading the Macedonia operation, are eager to take over the security mission from NATO. The EU declared its limited military operational capability at the Laeken summit in December 2001, and both the Spanish government (which held the EU's rotating presidency for the first half of 2002) and, more recently, President Chirac of France have urged the Union to take over the mission in Macedonia. The conclusions of the EU's summit meeting in Brussels on 25 October 2002 explicitly commit EU member states to the goal of taking over the mission after the current NATO mandate expires on 15 December 2002.

It seems unlikely that this goal will be met. Several states who are members of both the EU and NATO will insist that any EU operation must utilise NATO planning and support assets to prevent unnecessary duplication. This seems particularly sensible in the

³⁸ Another such candidate is former Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski for possible involvement in killings of Albanians at the village of Ljuboten in August 2001. See the Human Rights Watch report on the incident, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/macedonia/>.

³⁹ Pardew's bulldog diplomacy did not make him popular with the Macedonian leadership. His successor James Holmes and the present Ambassador Lawrence Butler, have managed to avoid the same fate while continuing to press the Macedonian government.

⁴⁰ The superlative performance of Frenchman Alain LeRoy as the EU Special Representative has eased Albanian concerns to a certain extent, but not yet decisively.

⁴¹ See remarks of Presidential advisor Ljubomir Frckoski at the 2 November security conference held under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Skopje. “With NATO and U.S. presence we will have more effective influence over our Albanians, and we will have to retain this influence”, Frckoski is quoted as saying.

case of an EU operation in Macedonia, given the proximity of the much larger NATO mission in Kosovo. However, a global agreement between the EU and NATO on this issue, though supported in principle by all the major players, has been blocked so far by disputes between Greece and Turkey on the details.

Hopes are high in Brussels that the gap can be bridged soon, and indeed the 25 October 2002 EU summit welcomed a major advance in resolving this dispute, but it seems unlikely that any such agreement will be finalised before the NATO Prague summit on 21 and 22 November. The new Turkish government's approval will be necessary – at a time when Turkey is pressing its own case for EU membership negotiations to begin. It is probable that Turkish agreement to the EU-NATO military arrangements will be secured in tandem with some acceleration of Turkey's accession prospects at the EU's Copenhagen summit on 13 December. That will be far too late for the EU to take on a Macedonia mission on 15 December, though it should be possible some time in 2003.

Under the circumstances, a simple extension of the existing NATO mission would seem logical. There is however a desire among both Macedonian and international actors to bring Task Force Fox to an end. Macedonian leaders have an interest in closing a turbulent chapter in their history and obtaining an international expression of confidence in the country's progress. At the same time, in Washington there is a well-placed group of decision makers determined to "declare a victory" by terminating NATO's peacekeeping commitments in Macedonia. ICG does not take a view on whether extending Task Force Fox or inventing a new NATO mission is the better course; this report argues simply that an international security presence remains necessary, and that NATO is better placed than the EU to provide it in the period immediately after the present mission's mandate expires.

With its focus understandably on a broad range of global security issues, some in Washington have maintained that a new or extended NATO mission would only foster dependency and siphon assets from other pressing areas of operation. Yet it is also vital to underscore the facts that there are only a dozen or so U.S. troops at any one time attached to Task Force Fox, and that a heavier commitment of U.S. forces and assets would only likely be required in a worst case scenario of a large upsurge in violence or direct

attacks on peacekeepers.⁴² Yet, the United States has remained reluctant to embrace even the theoretical commitment to render U.S. assistance to a follow-on force. The fear is that if there is a NATO follow-on mission to Fox, U.S. troops could get drawn into "bailing out" the mission during a crisis. However, such reasoning poses an obvious and direct contradiction. If the security situation is indeed so settled that only a bare bones force is needed, then there should be little likelihood of being drawn into a broader crisis. In contrast, if the situation is not so benign, then there should be little objection to either a one-time transitional extension of Amber Fox for up to six months, or for a modest but effective successor mission to help avoid a conflagration. In sum, the cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the NATO presence appears to be a modest, but valuable, contribution to conflict prevention.

The almost allergic aversion of some U.S. policymakers to further commitment of *any* NATO peacekeeping troops (even if they are not American) in Macedonia means that even if a NATO follow-on force is grudgingly approved, they are likely to propose slashing its size and limiting its terms of reference and operations. But deploying too small a force or imposing severe restrictions on its operations would send a dangerous sign that NATO believes its presence to be merely cosmetic. Indeed, as Secretary-General Lord Robertson has noted in the past, "NATO's credibility comes from its capability"⁴³ A senior international security official in Macedonia echoed this point, explaining to ICG that Task Force Fox's effectiveness depends in large part on its ability to project capability by rolling out its tanks and armoured personnel carriers.⁴⁴ If these assets are removed from a follow-on force, this senior official believes, it could embolden hostile elements to challenge or at least ignore the lightly armed liaison officers who have proven to be such effective trouble-shooters over the past year. Overzealous cuts could trigger precisely the kinds of challenges to NATO credibility and force protection that Washington has been understandably eager to avoid.

⁴² There are only a dozen or so U.S. troops currently attached to Task Force Fox, and U.S. KFOR troops are only called upon in the event of an emergency, for example, requiring helicopter medevac. The U.S. maintains a KFOR support facility, Camp Able Sentry, in Macedonia, but this is not linked to the Task Force Fox mission.

⁴³ "NATO looking ahead to a mission makeover", *The Washington Post*, 5 November 2002, p. A18.

⁴⁴ ICG interview in Macedonia on 31 October.

With the 15 December 2002 end-date for Amber Fox looming, time is running out. With Washington growing inexorably less interested in the Balkans, it makes sense to foster a smooth handover from NATO in the spring, if security assistance is still required in Macedonia. In the interim, the EU could plan and execute a number of initiatives to complement both this final NATO mission and Macedonia's – and the region's – security needs. These interim EU initiatives, along with a follow-on NATO force, could continue to work towards Macedonia's strategic objectives – NATO and EU membership – and not take the country into a debilitating state of dependency.

The imminent Prague NATO summit on 21-22 November also imposes another sort of deadline, in that Macedonia's hopes for membership in the next round of enlargement will be frustrated. While Macedonian politicians are aware that they will not immediately gain membership, it would be a mistake to confuse realisation with equanimity. Rejection at Prague will be seen as a setback in Skopje. While all spurned applicants will obviously feel disappointment, Macedonia will also suffer a great deal of anxiety because of this decision.⁴⁵ Unlike Croatia and Albania, the two other candidate countries likely to be unsuccessful in Prague, only Macedonia appears to face imminent threats to its very survival as a nation state. Last year's conflict tore open a wide range of existential questions in Skopje, triggered not only by brutal attacks on its security forces and the flight of tens of thousands, but by the disturbing sight of the Prime Minister actively associating himself with a bid to divide the country. The unsettled status of Kosovo and considerable demographic pressures driven by the higher birth-rate of Albanians also weigh heavily on Macedonia.⁴⁶ A

census is presently being conducted amid bitter controversy over its expected outcome. One Albanian newspaper insisted that there are between 700,000-900,000 Albanians in the country, or 30-40 per cent of the total population and this estimate has been hotly disputed by Macedonians⁴⁷. The census results will be potentially quite divisive when they are released.

Ethnic Macedonians also suffer from other well-known challenges to their identity. Greece continues to block full international recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name, Bulgaria has maintained a related challenge to the country's language and people and Serbia has resurrected its challenge to the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church. The challenges are anything but academic; traditionally, they have concealed predatory aims toward the country, and only increase the sense for most Macedonians that their already fragile nation is besieged by hostile neighbours.⁴⁸ NATO, which also refuses to recognise Macedonia's name, thus carries additional meaning for Macedonia as an aspirant member. While all candidate countries see NATO membership as evidence that they belong in the West, Macedonia sees it as evidence that the country will survive. Finding a formula for the NATO Prague Statement and the post-Task Force Fox mission that reflect both confidence in and commitment to Macedonian stability is essential.

Such a modest insurance policy will help avoid further destabilisation that could have regional repercussions and would most assuredly protract the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops to

⁴⁵ See "USA forgot about Macedonia", *Dnevnik*, 1 November 2002.

⁴⁶ Both Serbia's inclusion of Kosovo in its Constitution; and the recent initiative by UN SRSG Michael Steiner's for greater Serb self-rule in Mitrovica, produced sharp Kosovar reactions – reflected among some Albanian quarters in Macedonia. In both cases, there are suggestions that moves unfavourable to Albanian interests in Kosovo would be "compensated" in Macedonia. DPA has made a show of warning the international community that any creeping partition of Kosovo would open up demands for the same (by the Albanian community) in Macedonia. See "DPA: Steiner's plan on Kosovo decentralization will destabilise Macedonia", *Makfax*, 24 October. The DPA statement predictably elicited sharp retort from SDSM which demanded that DPA President Arben Xhaferi refrain from making an

analogy between Macedonia and Kosovo. "SDSM orders Xhaferi to take care about Macedonia, not Kosovo", *Dnevnik*, 27 October.

⁴⁷ "What is the real number of Albanians in RM? Every Number That Falls Under 700.000 Shall be Considered A Forgery" by Emin Azemi, *Fakti* 29 October 2002. The World Macedonian Congress retorted that "If the census shows that the number of Albanians is bigger than 15 percent, than it means that the census has been forged" (see Macedonian press, 1 November 2002). Any reasonable analysis puts the likely results of the census between, and quite distant from, the calculations of both Azemi and the WMC.

⁴⁸ The challenges to identity, their origin, impact, and a possible solution are detailed in ICG Balkan Report N°122, *Macedonia's Name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it*, 10 December, 2001. Leading Albanian figures like PDP President Abdulrahman Aliti have recognised the link between the identity challenges to Macedonians and the lack of will to implement reforms for Albanians.

neighbouring Kosovo.⁴⁹ With Europe picking up the largest burden of this peacekeeping effort, a new or extended NATO mission will ultimately hasten – not delay – the day when U.S. and NATO commitments in the region can be further reduced.

III. DEFINING THE MISSION

Nominally in Macedonia for the purpose of extracting civilian monitors in the event of violence, NATO's Task Force Fox has performed an indispensable role over the past year.⁵⁰ This force is relatively light, with 750-800 soldiers, and 200 KFOR troops providing indirect support as needed. Task Force Fox has been European-led and dominated, and there are no more than six to eighteen U.S. troops directly engaged in the operation.⁵¹ Representing only a small fraction of the size of the KFOR peacekeeping presence in Kosovo, Task Force Fox has contributed mightily to creating the kind of "secure environment" that has permitted international monitors to work safely and helped nearly 90 per cent of those displaced by conflict to return to their homes.⁵²

In their most significant contribution, it has been Task Force Fox soldiers (Liaison Teams) – not those of OSCE or European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) – that have provided the critical intervention to prevent serious incidents from spiralling out of control. Three prominent incidents stand out in that regard: the confrontation between police and Albanians in Trebos on 11 November 2001; the confrontation at Zelino on 8 July 2002; and a hostage crisis in August 2002 when armed Albanian extremists were threatening to engage "Lions" that had deployed near Gostivar. In all three cases, NATO soldiers provided an indispensable trouble-shooting role by essentially talking potential combatants into avoiding confrontation. These

⁴⁹ As Serbian scholar Gordana Ilic has put it, the Western interest in the countries of South Eastern Europe lies in "the weakness of these countries and their destabilization potential that threatens Europe's security and economic growth". Gordana Ilic, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, cited in, "The European Union and its South East European Neighbours", in, *The European Union, NATO, and their South Eastern Neighbours*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Belgrade 2002, p. 8.

⁵⁰ In fact, Task Force Fox has four "levels" of tasks: providing information to OSCE, EUMM and other confidence building monitors; liaising with monitors and local figures at various levels; medevac and extraction.

⁵¹ Amber Fox's "lead nation" is presently the Netherlands, and formerly was Germany. Its predecessor "Operation Essential Harvest" was British-led. Americans have never formed a significant component of any of the mission's primary forces, although U.S. troops were deeply engaged in the controversial evacuation of the NLA from Aracinovo during the conflict in June 2001.

⁵² Although one can use the term "secure environment", in fact, violence and crime have persisted in both Kosovo and Macedonia. Still, in Macedonia nearly all of the 178,000 displaced during the conflict – Macedonians, Albanians and others – have returned home. Pockets near Kumanovo and Skopje (Aracinovo) are notable exceptions. According to UNHCR and ICRC, about 12,000 persons remain displaced from their homes after last year's conflict.

activities were wholly separate and superior to that provided by OSCE and EUMM international monitors. NATO's credibility and the availability of military force are the gravity which prevents shooting from breaking out in many cases. In the absence of the permanent deployment of multi-ethnic police into conflict areas, the likely limits of the new government's ability in its first months to quickly dampen ethnic tension will remain limited. The NATO structure is essential security glue for Macedonia during the next six months.

The current 32 four-soldier Field Liaison teams are based in the field, soaking up local information, and maintaining frequent contact with a wide range of individuals and organisations. The liaison teams are backed up by three extraction companies. It is these companies that operate the tanks (eight of them) and armoured personnel carriers (about a half dozen) providing the critical, visible "capability-credibility". The extraction companies have the mission to pull either the Liaison Teams or international civilian monitors out of trouble, and it is for that reason that their tanks and APCs are frequently – and prominently – in the field.

In sum, without assuming responsibility for Macedonia's security, this deft, small deployment has nevertheless made a major contribution to stability, in effect providing a security platform on which other organisations such as the OSCE, UNHCR and EUMM can operate – and for the Macedonians to improve their own capabilities. Diplomats themselves, including NATO's outspoken and proactive Civilian Liaison Office, also benefit from the platform.⁵³ NATO does not fill the security vacuum by doing police work, but by filling an ancillary role largely welcomed by both Albanians and Macedonians for liaison and crisis management. During this final six-month extension, NATO, the EU and the Macedonians must work on a transition strategy that maintains the security firewall against ethnic violence while the EU handoff is completed and while the Macedonians themselves take the steps required for future national security.

⁵³ NATO's Civilian Liaison Office has been a vigorous diplomatic adjunct, raising issues such as oppression of the media and the dubious killing by police of seven alleged "Islamic terrorists" that other organisations with mandates in these fields have shrunk from making.

A. PREPARING FOR THE EU HAND-OFF

Given both the encouraging political developments and steady undercurrent of persistent security threats in Macedonia, NATO and the EU should ground their security approach in six fundamental elements:

1. The Six-Month Task Force Fox Transition

NATO should either extend Task Force Fox, or develop a new mission, for a six-month period until an EU handoff can be completed. During this period, more weapons need to be collected from both sides, the paramilitary "Lion" forces need to be disbanded, multi-ethnic police should be permanently deployed into the areas of ex-conflict and Macedonian military force training should be accelerated. All of these steps will prove useful in paving the way for future NATO membership. During this transitional period, the NATO liaison and extraction capability remain essential to dampen any movement toward ethnic violence that could undermine these goals.

A six-month time frame is needed for the newly elected Macedonian government, and international agencies like OSCE, to make headway on policing and other critical issues. Six months will allow both internationals and locals to concentrate on their tasks, without the worry that incidents could suddenly spin out of control. Spring 2003 looms as an important psychological threshold for the new government to cross. If the traditional period for Balkan conflict can be traversed, and if reforms continue, then this will be a tremendous boost of confidence in the new government.

2. Consolidating Under NATO-KFOR-SMR Headquarters

Both to economise and to send a clear signal that NATO is on a "down-and-out" trajectory, follow on forces can be consolidated under the two-star Senior Military Representative headquarters that also doubles as headquarters for KFOR rear support. It is wholly secondary whether the new mission's forces are dedicated or drawn from shared assets of KFOR rear – as long as they are able to complete their primary missions, and work in Macedonia does not suffer because of other commitments.

3. Maintain Sufficient and Credible Force

NATO field commanders believe the current force structure is essential to permit the mission to prevent

the outbreak of deadly conflict. By maintaining sufficient forces to regularly move APCs and tanks for “training purposes” to demonstrate the capability of extracting liaison units against any threat of attack, the risk of needing to use those forces is significantly reduced. The mission must in no way be deployed without sufficient assets, force, including visible firepower, to make it credible and effective. Doing so will only render it ineffective and invite challenges, possibly compromising force protection.

The temptation to trim the follow-on mission must be checked by perspective: the 750-800 soldiers of Task Force Fox represent a relatively tiny military commitment, and certainly are so in comparison to either KFOR or SFOR. Moreover, Macedonia’s NATO missions have gone progressively smaller – from 4,800 for Essential Harvest to a force less than fifteen per cent that size for Task Force Fox. Taking the next NATO mission even lower in size could be both risky and counter productive. Military planners found that 32 four-person liaison teams were a reasonable commitment to cover the sizable number of communities that needed such attention and an extraction force obviously needs to be sufficiently robust to carry out its mission if needed.

4. Transfer, Train and Reform

The next six months should be used to enhance Macedonian defence and security capabilities, with an overarching objective of making Macedonia fully capable of addressing its own security challenges. To help achieve this goal, the new mission should continue and intensify its work with the Macedonian army, bringing it in as a partner in operations. Where Macedonian capabilities improve and the situation permits, tasks should be transferred during the existing term and perhaps reducing the need for the same EU force to follow on. While there will naturally be limits, there is no reason that extraction teams could not further develop their relationship with their Macedonian counterparts. In the event of a tense, inter-ethnic situation, of course, a NATO-only deployment would make sense for the moment. However, for mine strikes or accidents, Macedonian units could be fully involved.

Sharing the liaison function is more problematic in that the Macedonian army ordinarily has no such internal security mission. By thinking creatively, appropriate areas could be identified where NATO Liaison Teams could stimulate much needed contact between the Macedonian Army and Albanians.

The most glaring need for training and assistance is with counter-insurgency units and the Border Brigade. The new NATO mission could very easily complement existing bilateral French and UK training missions, without assuming border monitoring duties. There is no reason why the Border Brigade could not accompany the new NATO mission on its periodic “recons” of areas where it might have to conduct extractions. The transfer and train role is fully consistent with NATO’s recent initiative for an “advisory body” of four NATO representatives to be based at the Ministry of Defence. According to an understanding between Defence Minister Buckovski and Allied Forces South Commander Admiral Johnson, the body will include liaison with NATO forces on the terrain, as well as a civil component supporting rule of law efforts.⁵⁴

It must be emphasised that while NATO’s image has improved among Macedonians, suspicions remain, particularly within quarters of the army put off by NATO’s close embrace of Ahmeti. By taking on this insider role and developing a closer relationship with the army and the Ministry of Defence, NATO will have a greater chance of influencing much needed reforms, like increasing the number of Albanian officers. Because helicopters were used with devastating effect during the conflict, and as such are a symbol of the division between Macedonian state power and “Albanian rebels”, it would make sense to focus intensively on training more Albanians for helicopter pilot positions; there are no attack helicopter pilots at present who are Albanian. The U.S. military recently conducted a Macedonian Defence Assessment and this document will likely help articulate reasonable targets for establishing baselines for the numbers of Albanians in the military forces, budget transparency and other issues.

5. Europeanise – and Get EUMM on the Border

There should also be a growing effort to hand over appropriate tasks to the EU. The concept is not to foster dependency but to cultivate an EU security role in areas such as border monitoring and Regional Security Cooperation, which will remain necessary for some time. The EU must not sit back and adopt an “all or nothing” attitude on becoming involved in Macedonia’s security. Brussels must recognise that

⁵⁴ “Minister Buckovski received NATO Admiral Johnson”, MakFax, 7 November 2002.

it faces legitimate scepticism in Washington and in the region about both its capabilities and will in the security field, making a successful first endeavour all the more important. Even if, as seems likely, the EU will not be able to assume the security role it wants now, it should look for ways to demonstrate its commitment to enhancing Macedonian security over the medium term. For example, instead of cutting back on its EUMM monitoring mission, the EU should increase its size and deploy the agile, proven mission to the border where it could be of the greatest use.⁵⁵ The EU could also steal a march on NATO by moving into the critical void of Regional Security Cooperation, as is discussed in more detail below.

Alain LeRoy, the remarkably successful former EU Special Representative for Macedonia, has demonstrated that size of staff is not necessarily related to effectiveness. Macedonia's needs are neither Bosnia's nor Kosovo's, and there is no credible prospect that an EU security presence in Macedonia would develop into any kind of protectorate.

It makes little sense to ignore Macedonia's yawning border vulnerabilities. As last year's conflict amply demonstrated, KFOR alone simply cannot seal the border with Macedonia. And KFOR can do nothing about the South Serbia or Albania borders. Macedonian capabilities in this sphere, as discussed above, are not and will not be for some time, adequate to the task. The EUMM is ideally suited to help fill the gap. Often composed of former or serving military members with excellent knowledge of the region, good logistics and communications, the mobile, agile EUMM could, as their name suggests, help monitor the key border areas. The EUMM would not assume responsibility for guarding the border or even observation of its full length, but it could, if given sufficient numbers, be an extra set of eyes and ears. The new NATO mission would have the responsibility to extract the monitors should they get into serious trouble.⁵⁶ The EUMM mission would also serve to complement the Macedonian aim of reasserting full and effective control over its borders. As senior Albanian officials recently noted to ICG,

there remains deep distrust with the Macedonian army as well as police. Incorporating EU monitors as part of the overall effort to strengthen Macedonia's ability to guard its borders will buy much needed good will and confidence on the part of Albanians.

By assuming this mission, the EU would demonstrate its commitment to Macedonian security and its commitment to assuming more of the security burden from NATO. The fact that the EUMM is presently in the process of cutting down its mission in Macedonia is no reason to reject this proposal. Personnel decisions should flow from policy determinations. If Macedonia is indeed a high security priority for Europe, then increasing the EUMM contingent for this purpose should also be a priority.

6. Turn Macedonia into a Centre for Regional Security Cooperation

In dealing with Macedonia's security deficit, attention must be placed not only on the immediate security threats, but the larger challenges to Macedonia's identity and its very existence as a country. Without such attention, the Ohrid Agreement and movement toward EU and NATO membership will be endangered. For example, NATO correctly insists that the army scrap its older tanks and expensive attack airplanes. But the General Staff clings to the tanks and aircraft as a show of force to both rebels and neighbours that Macedonia has power. The greater Macedonia's confidence, the less it needs crutches that it cannot afford, and the less it needs a NATO security assistance mission.

While Macedonia's constitutional name and other issues continue to be neglected, NATO and the EU can move in another direction to strengthen Macedonian confidence: developing the country as a centre for regional security cooperation. Instead of moving toward creeping protectorate and endless dependency – or premature withdrawal from the country – NATO and the EU should cultivate Macedonia's unique situation and develop the country as a centre for cooperation among feuding states of the region.

Macedonia's geographical location and traditionally benign relationship with all republics of former Yugoslavia make it ideal for this purpose. Macedonia is a place, for example, where Croatians and Serbs have equally good relations. And unlike Bulgarians or Romanians, most Macedonians can communicate with Serbs, Croats and Bosnians in their own

⁵⁵ The move is certain to be welcomed by Skopje, where President Trajkovski has repeatedly sought a reprise of the successful UNPREDEP border mission.

⁵⁶ Mines are indeed a risk for the EUMM. Three monitors were killed in 2001 when their vehicle struck a mine while on mission near Tetovo.

language, and have other bonds and more frequent contact with their former Yugoslav countrymen. Plus, with its sizeable Albanian minority and geography, Macedonia has a natural path to Tirana and Pristina. Geography and other factors pull it into natural contact with Bulgaria and Greece as well.

There is already one interesting regional security initiative, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) currently headquartered in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. This includes Greece, Italy, Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania with the U.S. and Slovenia as observers. The force includes 5,000 soldiers and was declared operational in 2001. The SEEBRIG operational headquarters are supposed to be rotated between member countries every four years; the member countries should consider making Macedonia the next host state.

IV. CONCLUSION: COOPERATION AS MORE THAN LIP SERVICE

The international community has long lamented the lack of regional cooperation on south-eastern Europe. Now the international community has an important opportunity to help drive regional cooperation by building on its existing efforts and anointing Macedonia as the focal point for such efforts.⁵⁷ If NATO members balk at spending the funds, then EU should seize the opportunity to show its mettle by making an investment in this direction. A perfect opportunity lies in the Krivolak military training centre, one of the largest ranges and military facilities in former Yugoslavia. The facility needs improvements – for example, works must be done to bring the railhead closer - but even a modest investment could ready the facility for a number of training opportunities.

The focal point for the training centre would be joint exercises, under either NATO or EU European Security and Defence Policy tutelage. The idea that the Macedonian army could train at the Krivolak range, first with the new NATO mission for Macedonia, later with KFOR and finally with its SEEBRIG and other neighbours is not farfetched. Having a unit from Albania train together with their Macedonian counterparts could help stabilise Macedonia and open up opportunities for practical cooperation, such as joint Albanian-Macedonian patrols on their common border. The prospects for bringing together for training other neighbours would also be welcome, especially if NATO and the EU were to point out that cooperation on such exercises would boost their chances for eventual accession.

NATO's Crisis Management Centre has recognised the need for border cooperation with its proposal for a regional conference on border security, to be held at Ohrid. This welcome initiative could be made

⁵⁷ Under its Vienna headquarters, OSCE maintains a number of on-going military cooperation programs. Other regional initiatives include the so-called "Sofia process" or Balkan Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation; the Royaumont Process or the Process for Stability and Goodneighborliness in South-Eastern Europe; SECI, the South-East European Cooperative Initiative, the Southern Balkans Development Initiative or SBDI, a U.S.-government sponsored initiative; a special US-French initiative of February 1999 to increase cooperation on security matters; and, of course, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

sustainable by creating a Regional Security Cooperation Institute headquartered in Ohrid or Skopje. With a modest investment, active and retired military staff and experts from the region could coalesce in an on-going academic environment, maintaining dialogue and coming up with home-built solutions to security problems like border security.

The cost of such initiatives appears modest in terms of their potential benefit. In any event, it is here that the EU could be expected to demonstrate its commitment to playing a serious security role, not only in Macedonia but the region. Financing improvements at the Krivolak facility, for example, would give the EU the lead on fostering regional security cooperation – ensuring that EU forces under EU leadership would be at the forefront. Financing the regional security cooperation institute would be another way to demonstrate commitment and readiness to assume a security role. On-going, related initiatives in other countries could be consolidated or moved to Macedonia.

Flowing from these seven guiding elements, the new NATO force would have four mission categories, NATO itself one political mission, and the EU would assume three missions:

NATO Mission one: *liaison and extraction*

As described above, the new NATO mission would continue the vital roles of field liaison and an extraction capability for international monitors, including those deployed in the border region.

NATO Mission two: *Support weapons collection and other security related actions that lessen the likelihood of ethnic violence*

With the help of UNDP, Macedonia is planning on a voluntary weapons collection program beginning in March or April 2003. As presently conceived, the weapons collection program would be voluntary, with financial incentives provided, and apply to all citizens regardless of ethnicity. Unlike last year's Essential Harvest mission, the weapons collection program would not be symbolic – but NATO's involvement in it could be. The symbolism is important, however, to capitalize on Albanian trust in NATO. Senior Albanian officials have recently again told ICG of the importance of finding a NATO role in weapons collection. Without substantial Albanian participation in the program, it is unlikely that Macedonians would cooperate either, and the badly

needed program to diminish the amount of weapons in circulation would fail. The mission could also provide ancillary support for a weapons collection program to be implemented by the government, with guidance from UNDP and possibly OSCE. NATO's role would be strictly limited to providing supporting assistance, mainly serving as a presence at collection and possibly destruction sites. Its role would *not* be a reprise of the successful Essential Harvest mission.

NATO Mission three: *Provide training assistance and extend/expand cooperation with the Macedonian army; assist with the disbanding of the police special unit "the Lions"; assume responsibility for the Military Adviser function*

The new mission should intensify its cooperation with the Macedonian army so that, ultimately, NATO's mission one responsibilities would be unnecessary. The mission would examine ways to include the Macedonian army in mission one tasks, and as well, conduct separate training exercises with it. The selection of tasks and training would be done in consultation with existing bilateral U.S., French and British efforts. Special attention would be given to the Border Brigade and counter-insurgency units. The "value added" of the NATO mission is that its forces are present in Macedonia after bilateral training has been completed, and that its forces are actually conducting operations. NATO need not assume primary responsibility for getting Macedonia ready for membership, nor does it need to assume any border or counter-insurgency tasks, but it certainly can be asked to complement on-going efforts in this field.⁵⁸

The recent initiative from AFSOUTH to establish a NATO "advisory body" within the Ministry of Defence is a welcome development. Putting the highly effective UK Military Adviser function under a NATO hat is another sensible way of ensuring that the new NATO mission will also maximise and coordinate its operations and training opportunities. Finally, the new NATO mission should look for ways to support critical rule of law and institution building efforts related to security. The most important of these is the disbanding of the special police unit, the "Lions".

⁵⁸ Some would argue that NATO should take on a bigger role for much of the Membership Action Plan activities, but political and financial constraints suggest that this is not feasible.

NATO Mission four: *Encourage and facilitate development of Regional Security Cooperation.*

As discussed above, NATO and/or the EU could take the lead in developing Macedonia as a centre for regional security cooperation. Even before initiatives like the refurbishment of the Krivolak facility are accomplished, the new NATO mission – and KFOR as well – could plan and conduct some training exercises with the Macedonian army and its neighbours.

NATO political mission: *Prague Statement; Civilian Liaison Office*

NATO should express both appreciation for Macedonia's past contributions to NATO during the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis and its cooperation and progress with Essential Harvest and Amber Fox missions in its Prague Statement. Ideally, the statement would underscore NATO's commitment toward providing security assistance and training not aimed at dependency, but rather making Macedonia fully qualified to join the alliance in 2006. Mentioning the importance of Macedonia as a centre for regional security cooperation would also make sense. NATO should maintain the highly effective, outspoken Civilian Liaison Mission in Macedonia and Crisis Management Centre in Brussels.

EU Mission one: *Participate in border monitoring*

The EU should reverse its policy of downsizing the EUMM contingent in Macedonia, and deploy the monitors on the border. NATO's follow-on mission would have the responsibility of extracting the monitors if they got into trouble.

EU Mission two: *Develop and finance Regional Security Cooperation, with Macedonia as the centre.*

Ample opportunity exists in this sphere for both the EU and NATO. The EU could develop joint training exercises and planning with its embryonic military headquarters. Action in this area would also help

Macedonia along the path to NATO membership to improve capabilities and inter-operability.

EU Mission three: *Follow up on the Wahlund Report on Missing Persons*

EU member Sweden provided the chairman of the recent report on missing persons. The report names individuals who almost certainly know about the fate of some of the 20 missing. The new EU Special Representative Alexis Brouhns should take the lead (even alongside specialised missing persons organizations) in following up the report. The post-election goodwill must not be squandered by neglecting an issue that not only is of a humanitarian nature, but has enormous implications for finally putting last year's conflict to rest. While little progress has been made on Bosnia's 20,000 missing persons, the international community should move vigorously to see that the government and other sources provide answers for Macedonia's 20 cases.

The Final Statement from the forthcoming NATO Prague Summit should highlight this regional security role for Macedonia and also express formal appreciation for Macedonia's contribution during the 1999 NATO campaign, and during Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox.

In conclusion, the international community and Macedonia itself have come a long way in guiding the country through some very rocky shoals. The prospects for Macedonia, and the surrounding region, are far brighter today than anyone could have hoped. This makes it all the more imperative and sensible to maintain modest and effective international security measures toward conflict prevention in Macedonia. Few of those efforts will have a larger impact than maintaining a NATO presence for six more months until a proper transition to the EU can be successfully completed.

Skopje/Brussels, 15 November 2002

APPENDIX A

MAP OF MACEDONIA



Map No. 3789 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
 October 1995

Department of Public Information
 Cartographic Section

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians
DUI	Democratic Union for Integration
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
KFOR	Kosovo Protection Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NLA	National Liberation Army
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation
PDP	Party of Democratic Prosperity
SDSM-LDP	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia-Liberal Democratic Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 80 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven

field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Islamabad, Jakarta, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, Sierra Leone and Skopje) with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents.

In *Africa*, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, The Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace.

November 2002

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.

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