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**RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
THE SITUATION OF IDPs FROM CHECHNYA**

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1 Introduction

Recent developments within the Russian autonomous republic of Ingushetia suggest that the imminent return of many of the Chechen IDPs currently residing in that republic to Chechnya has now become likely. The election of a completely pro-Moscow man, retired FSB general Murat Zyazikov, as the new President of Ingushetia on 28 April means that Chechen IDPs no longer have a protector in that republic. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has made it clear that he wants the IDPs returned to Chechnya with all due speed.

The pro-Moscow civilian administration of the Chechen Republic under Akhmad Kadyrov, an official appointed by Moscow, is manifestly unprepared to receive thousands of new IDPs coming from Ingushetia and has in fact been doing a woefully inadequate job of caring for the estimated 140,000 so-called inner IDPs already present on Chechen soil. These inner IDPs are already overstraining the fragile republican infrastructure at a time when the Russian government seems de facto to have halted all funding for reconstruction in the republic. Unemployment among the population of Chechnya is very high, while the danger to that population represented by “cleansing” and “filtration” operations conducted by the Russian federal forces remains great. The future prospects for the UN and other international organizations which seek to provide humanitarian aid to the Chechen people are not good. Much of the *gumanitarka* (humanitarian assistance) which they attempt to distribute is likely to be appropriated by Russian Ministry of Interior or Defence Ministry personnel as well as by pro-Moscow Chechen officials. It is even a possibility that at some time in the foreseeable future the international IGOs and NGOs may be forced to quit the republic.

2 The Current Political Situation in Ingushetia

The period from late April to mid-May of 2002 witnessed major developments which impacted the fate of Chechen IDPs residing in Ingushetia in significant ways. On 29 April, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and his team effectively took political control of Ingushetia, when it was announced that the retired FSB general, Murat Zyazikov, had won the second round of the Ingush presidential elections held the previous day. Zyazikov, an ethnic Ingush, is a graduate of the Higher KGB School in Minsk. He was employed in the administration of the Committee for State Security in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and then in the FSB administration for Ingushetia. From 1996 until January 2002, he occupied the post of deputy head of the FSB for Astrakhan’ Oblast’, in southern Russia. At the beginning of this year, he was appointed a deputy plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal District, reporting to a key Putin aide, retired military general Viktor Kazantsev.¹

Leonid Smirnyagin, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, and a former advisor on regional affairs to President Yeltsin, has recently commented that Ingushetia’s proximity to Chechnya and “the fact that it has absorbed the bulk of the Chechen refugees” represented the chief reasons for Moscow’s decision to install one of its protégés as republican head. “It is impossible to wage the war in Chechnya farther or to do illegal business in Chechnya without having a grasp [on] Ingushetia”, Smirnyagin underlined.²

¹ For a short biography, see *Moskovskie Novosti*, 1 May 2002

² Cited in *Moscow Times*, 8 April 2002

The second round of the Ingush presidential elections held on 28 April appears to have been largely rigged. “The entire republic”, one major Russian newspaper, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, reported, “was hung with photographs of Zyazikov meeting with Putin”. “The law enforcement organs of the FSB”, the newspaper continued, “took all of the precincts without exception, including distant mountain villages, under strict control”,³ “The fact that 60,000 ballots were given out but that 80,000 votes were cast says a great deal”, the “defeated” candidate, Russian State Duma deputy Alikhan Amirkhanov, observed sarcastically.⁴ Another leading Russian daily, *Kommersant*, confirmed Amirkhanov’s claim, writing that “by the morning [of Monday, 29 April], according to the Ingush Election Commission, the number of voters had indeed grown by 20,000”.⁵ “Twenty thousand ballots were stuffed into the ballot boxes”, Amirkhanov’s campaign manager, Khamzat Kodzoev, complained, adding: “It would have been better if they had appointed [Zyazikov] president and had not tortured the much-suffering Ingush people.”⁶

As one who served as an international election observer for the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995 and 1996 and for the Azerbaijani presidential elections in 1998, I believe that it is indeed likely that the just-held Ingush presidential elections were directly stolen. Be that as it may, the new reality on the ground is that a retired FSB general and Moscow protégé has been given political control over the Republic of Ingushetia. Murat Zyazikov’s dubious victory signals the apparent end of the influence of the group around former president Ruslan Aushev, which had run the republic and dominated its economic life over the past decade. As is well known, Aushev strongly opposed the forced return of the estimated 140,000-160,000 Chechen IDPs located in Ingushetia back to Chechnya, even though their presence in his republic resulted in significant economic and social hardships for the Ingush population.

Aushev’s successor, Zyazikov, has emphasized, by contrast, that he intends to carry out the will of the Russian federal centre. “The federal centre”, he has declared, “is the federal centre. There can be no question of any contradictions or insufficient understandings.” The problem of Chechen and other IDPs on Ingush soil, he has emphasized, “must be resolved with all due speed.” “How Zyazikov intends to interest the Chechens in returning [to Chechnya]”, the online Russian daily *Gazeta.ru* remarked on 3 May, “he did not elaborate. Evidently, they will cease to provide them with bread. Possibly, they will even deport them.”⁷ In this regard, the well-known Russian human rights organization Memorial reported on 7 May that, “For already a month now, the giving out of bread [to Chechen refugees residing in Ingushetia] has been halted by the Migration Service [attached to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs]. The reason for this is the debt owed by the federal centre to the bakers of Ingushetia.”⁸ The debt to the bakers had not been paid for the past eight months.

The coming year, thus, is likely to see General Zyazikov and his team strengthening their political and economic control over the Republic of Ingushetia. While they will probably

³ In *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 April 2002

⁴ Cited in *Kommersant*, 29 April 2002

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ In *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 30 April 2002

⁷ In *Gazeta.ru*, 3 May 2002, <http://www.gazeta.ru> [accessed June 2002]

⁸ From the web-site of Memorial, 7 May 2002, <http://www.memo.ru> [accessed June 2002]

succeed at this, they may nonetheless encounter serious difficulties. In an article appearing in the pro-democracy Russian weekly *Obshchaya Gazeta*, journalist Irina Dementeva recently drew attention to the “dangerously high level of unemployment” obtaining in Ingushetia and wondered who was going to invest in the republic now that the Ruslan Aushev group was out of power. It was also not clear, she went on, that the Russian military and police as well as hawkish Russian politicians would be able to restrain themselves with regard to the greatly disliked Ingush ethnic group: “There are hawks not only among the Russian generals”, she wrote, “but also among [Russian] politicians who dream of ‘cleansing’ Ingushetia, of passing through it with fire and sword.”⁹

3 The Likely Return of Chechen IDPs from Ingushetia to Chechnya

Whatever the internal dynamics within Ingushetia over the next year, it seems almost certain that Zyazikov and his team will seek to rid themselves of the heavy economic and social burden represented by Chechen IDPs residing in the republic. Such a return, moreover, would seem to be in conformity with the will of the Russian President and of plenipotentiary presidential representative Viktor Kazantsev. On 16 May, the official online publication of the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration based in Grozny, *Chechenskaya Respublika*, carried an article entitled “All the Chechen Refugees Will Return to the Republic before the End of Summer”.¹⁰

This lengthy article summarized the results of a meeting which had occurred on 15 May between Stanislav Ilyasov, an ethnic Russian serving as head of government of the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, and a representation of the UN High Commission on Refugees, led by UN senior security officer Terence Burke.¹¹ The pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, Ilyasov emphasized to his UN guests, intended to do everything in its power to assist a process under which “humanitarian aid to Chechen refugees will be transferred from adjacent regions directly to the territory of the Chechen Republic”.¹² The headquarters of the UN High Commission in Grozny, Ilyasov pledged, would shortly be equipped with normal telephone communications. Currently, Ilyasov complained, only 30% of the humanitarian aid (*gumanitarka*) intended for Chechen IDPs comes to Chechnya; the rest languishes in Ingushetia, with much of it ending up at the market place or even “in the caves” in the hands of Chechen militants. Ilyasov pledged that “comfortable” dwellings would be provided in Chechnya for the IDPs, equipped with “water, electricity, gas and a medical point with the appropriate personnel and the necessary equipment”. As we shall see, none of these promises appeared to have any basis in reality.

Although Ilyasov affirmed that all Chechen IDPs would be transferred from Ingushetia to Chechnya by the end of the summer of 2002, at one point in his remarks he referred only to IDPs living in “tent camps” in Ingushetia. According to an 18 March 2002 report by the Human Rights Watch, approximately 30,000 Chechen IDPs live in tent camps in Ingushetia, while more than 40,000 “squat in spontaneous settlements in abandoned farms, vacant

⁹ In *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 16 May 2002

¹⁰ In *Chechenskaya Respublika*, 16 May 2002, <http://www.Kavkaz.strana.ru> [accessed June 2002]

¹¹ Interfax, 15 May 2002, provided other details concerning this meeting, <http://www.interfax.ru> [accessed June 2002]

¹² *Chechenskaya Respublika*, 16 May 2002, <http://www.Kavkaz.strana.ru> [accessed June 2002]

schools, cellars and the like. Conditions in such settlements are particularly appalling”.¹³ The remainder of the IDPs live with Ingush host families. Presumably, the 70,000 IDPs living in tents and spontaneous settlements would be the first to be returned to their home republic.

The web-site of separatists who look to President Aslan Maskhadov for leadership, *Chechenpress*, on 16 May interpreted Ilyasov’s comments to the UN representatives as evidence of a planned mass deportation. “By the end of the present summer”, the web-site wrote, “150,000 Chechens [residing in Ingushetia] are to be deported. True, this will be a deportation in reverse. They intend to forcibly return to the Homeland Chechen refugees in Ingushetia who have been located there for about three years. They will be forcibly returned to Chechnya where they, as before, are threatened with ‘cleansing operations’ and extra-judicial executions.”¹⁴

The beginning of a deportation process may already be underway. An article entitled “Chechen Refugees in Ingushetia Afraid of Forced Repatriation”, appearing in the *Prague Watchdog* of 8 May, reported that men in plainclothes had come to one of the Chechen IDP camps in Ingushetia and loudly shouted, “Go home!” to those in the camp. The Ingush police on duty had done nothing to stop them.¹⁵

On 20 May Stanislav Ilyasov, announced that “a first organized group of migrants”, 70 persons in all, had just returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia.¹⁶ They had been settled in four districts of the Chechen capital. “The homes of some of them have till now not been restored”, Ilyasov admitted, “but their desire to return was so great that they will live for a certain period of time with their relatives.” Their arrival, he noted, “was only the beginning of a large-scale effort at resettlement”. The next group of IDPs from Ingushetia was scheduled to arrive in three days’ time. Ilyasov’s admission that no accommodations had been prepared for some of the new arrivals was noteworthy.

Comments made by Colonel General Andrei Chernenko, head of the Federal Migration Service attached to the Russian Ministry of the Interior, during a meeting with President Putin and other Russian leaders held in Sochi on 16 May - a part of which was made open to the press - provided a useful window on the views of top Russian officials concerning the return of the IDPs. Chernenko noted that

between 1999 and 2001, 147,000 persons had moved from Chechnya to Ingushetia. They are being provided with food and drink from the [federal] budget. Now many of the forced migrants want to return to Chechnya. They, knowing the laws, address the Migration Service asking for material support. But they know the laws poorly. As soon as these people announce that they want to return, they cease being migrants and are deprived of all benefits.

¹³ Human Rights Watch, *Memorandum to the United Nations Commission on the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya*, New York, 18 March 2002, citing report by Médecins sans Frontières

¹⁴ See *Chechenpress SIA*, 16 May 2002, <http://www.chechenpress.com> [accessed June 2002]

¹⁵ Chechen Refugees in Ingushetia Afraid of Forced Repatriation, *Prague Watchdog*, 8 May 2002, <http://www.Ichkeria.org> [accessed June 2002]

¹⁶ *Chechenskaya Respublika*, 20 May 2002, <http://www.Kavkaz.strana.ru> [accessed June 2002]

Chernenko added that “possibly next year budget financing will be extended to those who have expressed a desire to return”. Then the state will help them with their move and the construction of new housing.¹⁷

It is difficult to know what to make of this extraordinary statement by General Chernenko. His comments, made in the presence of the Russian President, contained obvious untruths. It has not, of course, been the Russian federal budget which has been underwriting the lion’s share of the food and drink consumed by the IDPs. Rather international IGOs and NGOs have been primarily responsible for keeping the IDPs alive. Chernenko maintained that any IDP located in Ingushetia who expressed a desire to return to Chechnya would immediately be “deprived of all benefits”. However, according to Russian and Western journalists, few Chechen IDPs residing in Ingushetia have in fact expressed a desire to return home, so Chernenko seemed to be misrepresenting their views. Chernenko added that “possibly next year” (but possibly not) the IDPs might be provided with some aid from the Russian government once they had returned to Chechnya. It seems likely that Chernenko’s service - and indeed the Russian government as a whole - intends to wash its hands of the Chechen IDPs presently located in Ingushetia. Those IDPs will therefore be required to cope on their own.

It should be noted, further, that the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration in Grozny has exhibited a suspicious attitude toward many of the IDPs presently in Ingushetia. As Akhmad Kadyrov, the temporary head of the republic, commented to the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in mid-April: “They [the law enforcement organs of Ingushetia] know that there are located adherents of Maskhadov in Ingushetia. I don’t want to call them rebels - a rebel must be one who fights and is on the field of battle. But the people who have taken up residence there are conducting work from there. We have said many times that such people are in Ingushetia, but that was not taken into consideration [by Ruslan Aushev].”¹⁸ It seemed clear that Kadyrov is highly suspicious of these IDPs and wants them to undergo a strict filtration process.

Left freely to their own devices, more Chechens would rather abandon their home republic for Ingushetia than to move back to Chechnya. In a report entitled “The Situation of the Forced Migrants in Ingushetia”, issued by the human rights organization Memorial on 7 May, one reads: “In January of 2002, 1,000 persons arrived from Chechnya to Ingushetia while 400 returned. In February, the figures were 750 to 500; in March 300 to 200.” These figures, moreover, Memorial added, do not reflect reality “since they are based only on cases which become known to humanitarian organizations. On the whole, one must remark that, on average, the flow of population into Ingushetia is comprised of people who had returned to Chechnya but, after the nth ‘cleansing operation’, fearing for their lives or those of their relatives, had once again left their home republic. For this reason in the camps there are many people who lack registration and thus do not receive humanitarian aid.”¹⁹

On 19 May, Agence France Presse reported that, during recent talks with the newly elected Ingush president Zyazikov, Russian President Putin had said that “the [Chechen] refugees

¹⁷ *Kommersant*, 17 May 2002

¹⁸ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 April 2002

¹⁹ Memorial, The Situation of the Forced Migrants in Ingushetia, 7 May 2002, <http://www.memo.ru> [accessed June 2002]

must return very soon [to Chechnya], and called for Ingush and Chechen authorities to spearhead repatriation efforts". A formal agreement on repatriation was in fact subsequently signed by Kadyrov and Zyazikov on 29 May.²⁰ Just three days after Putin's comments, however, Russian human rights ombudsman Oleg Mironov warned that one of the worst human rights disasters in Russian history would occur if 150,000 IDPs from Ingushetia were to come home too soon. "If Russian authorities force the refugees to go home, we will be participating in the worst violation of human rights in the history of Russia", Mironov, a Russian official who has frequently manifested a streak of independence, told the Interfax news agency.²¹ "For the moment", Mironov underlined, "security is not guaranteed in Chechnya. There is not enough housing, nor enough jobs." Whose opinion, one wonders, will prevail concerning this question, that of the Russian President or of human rights ombudsman Mironov?

4 The Current Political Situation in Chechnya

What will the political situation be like in Chechnya over the coming year? It is nearly impossible to predict developments in the Chechen Republic since there are so many political actors present there: the Kremlin, the FSB, the Russian military and MVD, the federal bureaucracies in Moscow responsible for various aspects of Chechen reconstruction, the office of the plenipotentiary presidential representative in the Southern Federal district, the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration located in Grozny, and, finally, the Chechen separatists. All of these groups are divided by rivalries and motivated by a desire to gain control of the oil and other economic resources of the republic. President Putin has recently been sending out mixed signals concerning Chechnya: on the one hand he has been pushing ahead with "Chechenization", turning over increasingly more power to Akhmad Kadyrov and to the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration; on the other hand, he recently announced that the official hand-over of the direction of the "counter-terrorist operation" from the FSB to the pro-Moscow Chechen MVD is to be delayed for yet another year, until the Spring of 2003. Presidential and parliamentary elections (which are likely to be heavily rigged) will probably not be held until 2004 at the earliest.

The separatists have recently shown that they still have a great deal of fight left in them, one reason cited by Putin for keeping the FSB in charge of operations in the republic for another year. The separatists may be expected to continue to target Akhmad Kadyrov (against whom there have been a number of assassination attempts) and other pro-Moscow Chechen leaders as well as attempting to strike at personnel of the Russian Defence Ministry and MVD. An influx of new Chechen IDPs from Ingushetia into this charged and dangerous environment will thus put them at significant risk.

5 The Position of Inner IDPs Residing in Chechnya

While the conditions of Chechen IDPs residing in Ingushetia are poor, those of so-called Chechen inner IDPs living in tent camps and other temporary facilities within Chechnya itself are worse, largely because of risks to their personal safety. According to the Danish Refugee

²⁰ *Kommersant*, 30 May 2002

²¹ Agence France Presse, Don't Rush Chechen Refugee Return: Russian Human Rights Chief, 19 May 2002, <http://www.reliefweb.int> [accessed June 2002]

Council, there were, as of 30 March 2002, 137,420 such inner IDPs.²² If one were to add unregistered persons, the actual figure could be as high as 160,000. The Russian authorities have already begun closing down some of the tent camps for inner IDPs. On 11 April 2002, Memorial reported that tent camp PVR-2, located in the village of Znamenskoe, Nadterechnyi District, home to 3,034 forced migrants, had been closed down, despite the fact that the tents in the camp were in “good condition”.²³ Before the camp had been closed, Memorial noted, the Migration Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had ceased providing food, even bread, to the migrants. The inner IDPs in this camp were to be moved to Grozny. “The forced migrants [in the camp]”, Memorial wrote, “are afraid to return to Grozny. The main reason for their lack of desire to leave the camp is security.” Presumably other tent camps and temporary housing facilities for inner IDPs are also in the process of being closed down. The forced migrants are being moved into Grozny and other towns where there is de facto no new housing available for them.

There exists fragmentary information concerning the conditions awaiting both inner IDPs transferred from tent camps and IDPs moved in from Ingushetia. The web-site of the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration on 4 April 2002 carried a detailed account of the situation of inner IDPs residing in the Chechen village of Novye Atagi.²⁴ According to the local head of administration, Abdulla Datsaev, 8,200 residents plus 2,000 “refugees” presently live in the village. “The problem of forced migrants”, Datsaev stipulated,

is the basic one, although they live in more or less decent accommodations. There are no tent camps here. About 250-300 refugees live in a school dormitory, while the remainder are quartered in private homes. Basically these are persons who lived previously in Grozny and Argun. The increase in population has led to the emergence of serious social problems. In the village there are a very limited number of jobs.

Only slightly more than 200 persons in the village, Datsaev said, had managed to find employment in a local enterprise or at the market place. The remaining adults were all unemployed. “The influx of refugees represents a heavy burden on the limited resources of the local organs and the overburdened administrative apparatus. It leads to a worsening in the communal servicing of the population. Unfortunately, the Novye Atagi refugees do not receive humanitarian aid.” The sole funds the inner IDPs receive, he said, are limited benefits paid out for the support of children and pensions for the elderly. There are at least 2,000 children studying in the village schools, and “there are problems with textbooks, heating and the conditions of the buildings”. The older children exhibit “apathy and alienation”. The local hospital is unable to provide much-needed medicines. Sanitation in the village is poor; there is no collection of garbage. The provision of running water is inadequate, while the condition of the local housing is poor. Most at risk are orphans among the children: there are 306 children who have lost both parents and 311 children who have lost one parent, in the village.

The 13 May issue of *Chechenskaya Respublika* reported on conditions obtaining in Gudermes District, which, according to the local head of administration, Akhmad Abastov, has a total

²² Danish Refugee Council and ASF/Danish People’s Aid, *North Caucasus Situation Report No. 47*, Stavropol, 31 March 2002, http://www.drc.ru/publications/DRC_Sitrep47.pdf [accessed June 2002]

²³ Memorial, 11 April 2002, <http://www.memo.ru> [accessed June 2002]

²⁴ *Chechenskaya Respublika*, 4 April 2002, <http://www.Kavkaz.strana.ru> [accessed June 2002]

population of 110,175 persons. “In the district 19,319 forced migrants are registered.” While 54,316 residents of the district are physically capable of working, only 8,855 are in fact employed. “In a word, unemployment comprises 70.1% of the total.”

On 15 May, the human rights website *Prava cheloveka v Rossii* (Rights of Man in Russia) carried a lengthy report authored by Elena Sannikova concerning present conditions in the Chechen capital.²⁵ “Only a very small percent of Grozny has electricity”, she wrote, “10% of the total.... The only thing which works continuously in the apartments are the gas stoves... A large and serious problem concerns water. The wells which are dug in the courtyards become quickly polluted, and the water is not potable. A Polish organization is helping, transporting enormous tubs with pure good water about the city. But, unfortunately, the resources of this organization are far less than the needs of the inhabitants.... The collection of garbage has not been organized... The city is drowning in day-to-day garbage, in rubbish heaps.” There is also an acute danger of residents being shot. When shooting breaks out, the residents run to the corners of their homes and apartments. Children are highly traumatized by such incidents. “Every day in Grozny homes are being robbed, and it is now more dangerous to live in private homes than in apartments where one has neighbours.” The presence of large numbers of police and military in the city does nothing to affect this situation. “The average city-dweller”, Sannikova continued her report, “receives humanitarian aid very rarely. Now they receive a litre of butter which has to last a month, now a kilogram of flour. In schools they have begun to give out rolls to the children for breakfast, but there is not always enough for everyone.” Before the new year of 2002, hospitals and schools were being restored out of the state budget. “Now the work has ceased because there is no money.” Many children do not receive their child benefit payments.

Another report on the situation in Grozny, dated 19 April, noted that “about 80% of the able-bodied residents are unemployed and lack any means of subsistence”.²⁶ Humanitarian aid was said to be reaching “only 30-50% of the population of Grozny”.

As these reports indicate, little is being done to restore the infrastructure and the essential services of Chechnya. In addition, it appears that, for the current budget year of 2002, all funding by the Russian government has been halted. When a deputy head of the pro-Moscow Chechen Administration, Amnat Batyzheva, recently complained to Reuters that, “only 0.1% of the federal plan [for the restoration of Chechnya] has been implemented”, she may not have been exaggerating by that much.²⁷ “None of the 4.5 billion rubles budgeted for 2002 has yet been disbursed for investment projects [in Chechnya]”, a spokesman for the Construction Committee office that coordinates funding from several ministries with building projects, including Education, Health, Culture and Agriculture, told the *Moscow Times* in mid-May. The spokesman for the Construction Committee, Mikhail Kuznetsov, stated on 15 May that “his office has been expecting this money for two months now and there has been no money to pay workers since the beginning of the year”.²⁸ There will predictably be less Russian state funds available to help the projected mass influx of IDPs from Ingushetia than were allocated for the needs of inner IDPs and the remainder of the population of Chechnya in 2001.

²⁵ *Prava cheloveka v Rossii*, 15 May 2002, <http://www.hro.org> [accessed June 2002]

²⁶ Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, *Dispatches from Chechnya*, No. 23, 19 April 2002, <http://www.idea.ngo.pl> [accessed June 2002]

²⁷ Reuters, 30 April 2002

²⁸ *The Moscow Times*, 16 May 2002

One key factor affecting returning IDPs is, of course, the ubiquitous presence of mines. According to a rough estimate made by UNICEF, “there are up to 500,000 mines laid in Chechnya, and 7,000-10,000 mine victims, including 4,000 children and youths”.²⁹

On 27 March, the commander of the Russian Combined Group of Forces operating in Chechnya, Lieutenant General Vladimir Moltenskoi, signed special order No. 80 stipulating new rules for the conducting of special operations within population centres of the Chechen Republic. The putative aim of this order was to “lessen the [number of] unlawful acts committed against the local population and to increase the trust between the soldiers and the civilian authorities”. The order mandated that all special operations “be conducted not only in the presence of procurators but also of the local authorities and the organs of internal affairs”.³⁰

A month and a half after the issuing of Order No. 80, one is forced to conclude that it was largely an empty exercise in public relations. As Oleg Orlov, chairman of the human rights organization Memorial, commented: “A despairing [Chechen] population is beginning to support extremist forces, while Order No. 80 is not being carried out. We wrote a letter about this to Moltenskoi, but there has been no response.”³¹

6 The Role of the UN and Other International IGOs and NGOs in Chechnya

What about the prospective role of the UN and other international IGOs and NGOs within Chechnya over the coming year? It seems clear that their role will be a delicate and potentially dangerous one. The Russian power ministries are ceasing to pay so-called “combat wages” to MVD forces and troops of the Defence Ministry. The soldiers are understandably in an embittered mood. On 15 May, the pro-Moscow Chechen premier, Stanislav Ilyasov, informed representatives of the UN that “for the carrying out of the tasks of ensuring the security of foreign delegations [working in Chechnya] - both of the employees themselves and their transport columns - personnel will be assigned from the soldiers attached to the commandants’ office, as well as weapons and armour”.³² These poorly-paid troops may well be tempted by the prospect of appropriating at least some of the valuable *gumanitarka* being brought into the republic. On 21 May, Akhmad Kadyrov singled out the commandants’ officers, who are to be assigned to protect UN workers, for sharp criticism, accusing of them of taking “insufficient care for the security of citizens”.³³

In late March of this year, it was reported that a new TV series had appeared on Russian state television during prime-time, entitled “Spetsnaz.” “On March 29”, Associated Press wrote, “the International Red Cross officially protested the portrayal of its insignia on Chechen rebel booby-traps shown in the new TV series ‘Spetsnaz.’”.³⁴ Chechen rebels were also shown

²⁹ UNICEF Humanitarian Action, *Northern Caucasus Donor Update*, 22 April 2002, <http://www.reliefweb.int> [accessed June 2002]

³⁰ See website of NTV Television station, 28 March 2002, <http://www.ntv.ru> [accessed June 2002]

³¹ In *Kommersant*, 15 May 2002

³² In *Chechenskaya Respublika*, 16 May 2002, <http://www.Kavkaz.strana.ru> [accessed June 2002]

³³ *Press Center.ru*, 21 May 2002, <http://www.presscenter.ru> [accessed June 2002]

³⁴ Associated Press, Red Cross Protests Russian TV Series, 31 March 2002

employing a Red Cross/Red Crescent van to travel about the war-torn republic distributing weapons. The appearance of this theme in a prime-time entertainment programme broadcast over Russian state television suggests that elements in the Russian leadership could seek to raise the ire of the population against international humanitarian organizations working in Chechnya in order to force them to withdraw from the republic, thus leaving the local population without humanitarian aid altogether.

7 Three Scenarios for the Future

For reasons which should be apparent, it is highly difficult to predict what is likely to happen in Ingushetia and, especially, in Chechnya over the coming year. Nonetheless it is possible to outline three possible scenarios of what might happen.

The best case, with perhaps a 40% likelihood: Some 50 % of Chechen IDPs (70,000 persons) are induced or coerced to return to their home republic by the end of the summer of 2002. They begin to overwhelm the republic's already fragile and inadequate infrastructure. Continuing corruption and intentional foot-dragging by the Russian bureaucracies result in few Russian state funds being made available for Chechen reconstruction or for the care of IDPs. International humanitarian organizations are permitted to carry out their activities in Chechnya, with some 20-30% of their *gumanitarka* being appropriated by the soldiers guarding them and by corrupt pro-Moscow Chechen officials.

Most likely case, with 50% probability. Most of the Chechen IDPs (140,000 persons) are induced/coerced to return to their home republic before the end of the summer of 2002. They overwhelm the republic's fragile infrastructure. Many do not survive harsh the "filtration" procedures instituted by the Russian MVD and military. Virtually no Russian government funds are made available for the IDPs or for Chechen reconstruction. Close to 50% of the *gumanitarka* provided by international humanitarian organizations is appropriated by Russian soldiers and by pro-Moscow Chechen officials. Major outbreaks of diseases and epidemics occur.

Worst case, with perhaps 10% likelihood. All Chechen IDPs are induced/coerced to return to Chechnya from Ingushetia by the end of the summer of 2002. Large numbers perish at "filtration" points organized by the personnel of the MVD and the Defence Ministry. Many die of epidemics and of malnutrition. International humanitarian organizations are forced to abandon the republic due to repeated pilfering of their supplies and credible threats made against their staff. Chechnya effectively disappears from the world's view.

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