



Home Office

Country Information and Guidance

Somalia: Security and humanitarian situation in south and central Somalia

Version 2.0

July 2016

Preface

This document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained within this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country Information

The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the [Common EU \[European Union\] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information \(COI\)](#), dated April 2008, and the [European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology](#), dated July 2012.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email [the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at <http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/>

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Guidance

Updated: 14 July 2016

1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of Claim

1.1.1 That the general humanitarian or security situation in Somalia is so severe as to make removal a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

and/or

1.1.2 That the security situation in Somalia presents a real risk which threatens life or person such that removal would be in breach of Article 15(c) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 ('the Qualification Directive').

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2. Consideration of Issues

2.1 Credibility

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the [Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants](#)).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the [Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis](#)).

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2.2 Exclusion

2.2.1 All sides of the conflict including Al Shabaab, government security forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have reportedly committed human rights violations and abuses (see [Protagonists](#) in the country information section).

2.2.2 If there are serious reasons for considering that a person was involved in or associated with such acts, or with the groups concerned, decision makers must consider whether one of the exclusion clauses is applicable, seeking advice from a Senior Caseworker if necessary.

2.2.3 Where a person is excluded from protection under the Refugee Convention they are also excluded from Humanitarian protection but if there is a real risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive they may be entitled to Discretionary leave or Restricted leave.

2.2.4 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses, discretionary leave and restricted leave, see the [Asylum Instruction on Exclusion: Article 1F of the Refugee Convention](#), the [Asylum Instruction on Discretionary Leave](#) and the [Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave](#).

2.3 Assessment of risk

2.3.1 At present it is only possible to remove nationals of Somalia to Mogadishu; or in some cases to Puntland or Somaliland for those formerly resident and having clan connections in those areas. Therefore, unless the person can be removed to Somaliland or Puntland, the first consideration is whether the person would be at risk on return to Mogadishu and, if so, whether they can reasonably be expected to relocate to another area in Somalia. That will, in part, depend on whether the person can get to that area safely and, if so, the general security and humanitarian situation in that area.

i. Refugee convention

2.3.2 Where a person would be at risk of serious harm on return due to direct or targeted actions by the parties to the conflict, it may be because of a Refugee Convention defined reason.

2.3.3 It is only if the person does not qualify under the Refugee Convention that decision makers need to make an assessment of the need for protection firstly under Article 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

2.3.4 For information about risk posed to a person by Al-Shabaab, see the country information and guidance on [Somalia: fear of Al-Shabaab](#).

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ii. Humanitarian situation

a. Mogadishu

2.3.5 The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of [K.A.B. v. Sweden - 886/11 - Chamber Judgment \[2013\] ECHR 814 \(05 September 2013\)](#), found that there is no general Article 3 risk in Mogadishu. The situation in Mogadishu has continued to improve since 2013.

2.3.6 With regard to the humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, in the country guidance case of [MOJ & Ors \(Return to Mogadishu\) Somalia CG \[2014\] UKUT 00442 \(IAC\)](#), the Upper Tribunal held that a person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer [Headnote (vii)].

2.3.7 The Tribunal also held that the significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assist with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members [Headnote (viii)]. (See also the country information and guidance on [Somalia: majority clans and minority groups](#)).

- 2.3.8 If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. [MOJ and Others](#) [Headnote (ix)] stated that these considerations will include, but are not limited to:
- circumstances in Mogadishu before departure
 - length of absence from Mogadishu
 - family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu
 - access to financial resources
 - prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment
 - availability of remittances from abroad
 - means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom
 - why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return
- 2.3.9 Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the economic boom, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away. [Headnote (x)]. It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will also not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms [Headnote (xi)].
- 2.3.10 For guidance on consideration of Article 3 ECHR, see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).
- b. [Outside Mogadishu](#)
- 2.3.11 The country guidance case of [AMM and others \(conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM\) Somalia CG \[2011\] UKUT 445 \(IAC\) \(28 November 2011\)](#) – which continues to have effect – found that there is no generalised risk of Article 3 harm as a result of armed conflict (paragraph 597).
- 2.3.12 In general, return to an area under the control of Al Shabaab is not feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area and is in general unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history. [[AMM and others](#) headnote 10]. Such persons may be at real risk of persecution by Al Shabaab because of actual or imputed religious or political opinion and such a case would need to be considered as a refugee convention defined reason. See the country information and guidance on [Somalia: fear of Al-Shabaab](#).
- 2.3.13 For information on areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, see country information – [nature and level of violence – by region](#).
- 2.3.14 Family and/or clan connections will have an important part to play when assessing whether return to an area of south and central Somalia (outside of Mogadishu) which are not under the control of Al Shabaab would breach Article 3 on account of the humanitarian conditions.

- 2.3.15 Decision makers must make a careful assessment of all of the circumstances and have regard to the person's ability to cater for his or her most basic needs, his or her vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable time-frame.
- 2.3.16 In general those with no close family connections who are able to provide support, or if those connections are in an area which the person could not safely reach, there is a likelihood that the person would have to have recourse to an IDP camp.
- 2.3.17 Where it is reasonably likely that the person would find himself or herself in an IDP camp, there would be a real risk that he or she would be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 on account of the humanitarian conditions there.
- 2.3.18 For guidance on consideration of Article 3 see [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

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iii. Security situation

- 2.3.19 Unlike Article 3 ECHR, Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive applies only to civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants and not those who are party to the conflict. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

a. Mogadishu

- 2.3.20 In the country guidance case of [MOJ & Ors \(Return to Mogadishu\) Somalia CG \[2014\] UKUT 00442 \(IAC\)](#) (3 October 2014), the Tribunal held that 'Generally, a person who is "an ordinary civilian" (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive' (Headnote ii); and that 'there has been significant and durable change in the security situation in Mogadishu following Al-Shabaab's withdrawal from the city in August 2011 and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city'. (Headnote iii).
- 2.3.21 The situation has continued to improve since 2014 and therefore there is no reason to depart from existing country guidance (see [Nature and level of violence 2015/16](#)).
- 2.3.22 Even where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, the decision maker must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person's individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.
- 2.3.23 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).
- b. Outside Mogadishu
- 2.3.24 [AMM and others](#) also found that fighting in southern and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu is both sporadic and localised and is not such as to

place every person in that part of the country at real risk of harm that breaches Article 15(c) (paragraph 597).

- 2.3.25 The situation has continued to improve so and therefore there is no reason to depart from existing country guidance (see [Nature and level of violence 2015/16](#)).
- 2.3.26 Large parts of the countryside in southern and central Somalia, including small towns in the Jubba river valley and villages along major coastal routes, remain under the effective control of Al Shabaab. They appear able to threaten local populations and target, in reclaimed areas, those associated with the security forces, any aspect of government or official administration, or any NGO or international organisation.
- 2.3.27 However, during 2014, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) and AMISOM launched a military offensive which has driven Al Shabaab out of most of the main urban areas in south and central Somalia. During 2015 and 2016 the Somali Federal Government and AMISOM remained in control of Mogadishu and expanded areas under their control by establishing federal administrations in the Galmudug, South-West and Jubbaland States. A joint offensive by AMISOM and SNAF pushed al-Shabaab out of towns in the Hiraan, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower Shabelle regions.
- 2.3.28 Decision makers must establish where a person comes from and what the country information indicates is the present security situation in that place in order to determine whether Article 15(c) is applicable (see [nature and level of violence – by region](#) and [maps and current resources](#)).
- 2.3.29 Even where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, the decision maker must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person's individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.
- 2.3.30 Decision makers must consider carefully whether the existence of such factors means that the harm they fear is not in fact indiscriminate, but targeted, if not at them personally, at a Refugee Convention defined population to which they belong.
- 2.3.31 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the [Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection](#).

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2.4 Internal relocation

- 2.4.1 The Upper Tribunal in [MOJ and Others](#) held that 'the evidence indicates clearly that it is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution. On the other hand, relocation in Mogadishu for a person of a minority clan with no former links to the city, no access to funds and no other form of clan, family or social support is unlikely to be realistic as, in the absence of means to establish a home and some form of ongoing financial support, there will be a real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards'. [Headnote (xii)]

- 2.4.2 If in individual cases the person cannot remain in Mogadishu, the decision maker must establish whether that person could safely and reasonably return elsewhere in Somalia. In general, internal relocation to an area under the control of Al Shabaab is not a viable alternative. In [AMM and others](#), the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation to an area controlled by Al Shabaab is not feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area and is in general unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history. (paragraphs 598-601). (See [nature and level of violence – by region](#))
- 2.4.3 For areas of south and central Somalia which are not under the control of Al Shabaab, in [AMM and others](#) the Upper Tribunal held that family and/or clan connections may have an important part to play in determining the reasonableness of a proposed place of relocation. Travel by land across southern and central Somalia to a home area or proposed place of relocation may well, in general, pose real risks of serious harm, not only from Al Shabaab checkpoints but also as a result of the present famine conditions. Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence (paragraphs 604-605). (See [freedom of movement](#)).
- 2.4.4 Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person, referring to the country information (see [nature and level of violence – by region](#) and [maps and current resources](#)).
- 2.4.5 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and the factors to be taken into account see the [Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](#).

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2.5 Certification

- 2.5.1 Where a claim falls to be refused on the basis that the person will be returned to and remain in Mogadishu, it may be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
- 2.5.2 For further guidance on certification, see the [Appeals Instruction on Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 \(clearly unfounded claims\)](#).

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3. Policy Summary

- 3.1.1 Ordinary civilians returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will in general face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.
- 3.1.2 It is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution.

- 3.1.3 The situation might be otherwise for a person of a minority clan who has no clan or family support, not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who has no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood in Mogadishu. Such people would be at real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards.
- 3.1.4 In areas of south and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu the general conditions do not present a general risk of a breach of Article 3 or from indiscriminate violence such that removal would be a breach of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. Particular factors relevant to the person's individual circumstances might, nevertheless, place them at risk
- 3.1.5 Travel by land across southern and central Somalia to a home area or proposed place of relocation may well, in general, pose real risks of serious harm particularly from Al Shabaab checkpoints. Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence.

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Country Information

Updated: 12 July 2016

4. Background

- 4.1.1 The background to the current situation in Somalia is described in the [BBC Country Profile of Somalia](#)¹ and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)'s [Country of Origin Information report. South and Central Somalia Country overview](#)², dated August 2014.

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5. Protagonists

5.1 State armed groups (army and police)

- 5.1.1 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Somalia last updated 1 March 2016 stated:

'Until recently, the army was not a traditional army per se, but a collection of forces loyal to the individual clan and warlord leaders participating in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, since the end of the official tenure of the TFG and the inauguration of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Somali National Army (SNA) is has become increasingly being accepted as the sole legitimate force fighting on behalf of the Mogadishu government, albeit with localised help from allied militias.

'Despite training efforts from regional and Western partners, discipline is generally low and membership fluid. The FGS has not provided a clear outline of the composition and strength of the SNA, including allied militia, according to the UNMG [UN Major Groups] report, which says the SNA leadership has sought to inflate the number of serving troops in order to secure greater funding for salaries and rations.³

'The Somali armed forces are the poorest in the region in terms of training and equipment. They are currently in no position to secure all of Somalia from the Shabab militants, let alone defend the borders of the country.

'The SNA continues to rely on forces deployed with the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), numbering approximately 21,500 (after a UN resolution in November 2013 raised the troop ceiling to approximately 23,000). (...) As military advances continue, the SNA and AMISOM forces are stretched thin, with their bases increasingly vulnerable to attacks, as it could be seen with the recent attacks on the bases in El Adde and Janale.'

¹ BBC News, Somalia Country Profile, 21 October 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503> Date accessed: 19 November 2014

² European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information report. South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/542e8b9d4.html> Date accessed: 12 July 2016

³ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Somalia: Armed Forces, Posted: 1 March 2016. Subscription source. Date accessed: 20 April 2016

'While Somalia's navy and air force are all but non-existent, the army has benefited from foreign training and is now actively engaged alongside AMISOM in operations to find and eliminate pockets of insurgent resistance.'

'However, professionalism and morale concerns remain, due in part to concerns over adequate infrastructure and funding. In September 2011, AMISOM took up the responsibility of monitoring the payment of salaries to the SNA, therefore increasing the number of soldiers receiving their salary on time. This has had a positive impact on overall morale. (...) The issue of soldiers defecting or setting up illegal checkpoints because they had not been paid in months resurfaced in October 2015. Moreover, the outgoing head of the EU training mission, EUTM-Somalia, said in March 2015 that without basic housing and equipment for Somalia's soldiers, it would fail to achieve its long-term objectives.'⁴

5.1.2 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights, covering 2015, and published 13 April 2016 (USSD 2015 report) noted:

'The provisional federal constitution states the armed forces are responsible for assuring the country's sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity and that the national federal and state police are responsible for protecting lives and property and peace and security.

'Police were generally ineffective. AMISOM and the SNA worked to maintain order in areas of the southern and central regions. The federal government regularly relied on NISA forces to perform police work, often calling on them to arrest and detain civilians without warrants. Some towns and rural areas in the southern and central regions remained under the control of al-Shabaab and affiliated militias. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for controlling the armed forces. Police forces fall under a mix of local and regional administrations and the government. The national police force remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Security, while regional authorities maintained police forces falling under their areas' interior or security ministries.

'Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control of security forces. Security forces abused civilians and often failed to prevent or respond to societal violence. Authorities rarely investigated abuse by police, army, or militia members, and a culture of impunity was widespread. Authorities sometimes used military courts to try individuals believed to be responsible for abuses. The official ad hoc commissions to investigate abuses by federal military forces and allied militias in the Lower Shabelle Region did not release information regarding the investigation.

'The Ministry of Defense's control over the army remained tenuous, but improved somewhat with the support of international partners. At year's end the army consisted of approximately 23,000 soldiers with the bulk of the forces located in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle as well as Bay,

⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 'Somalia: Armed Forces', Posted: 1 March 2016. Subscription source. Date accessed: 20 April 2016

Bakool, and Gedo Regions. Ministry of Defense exerted greater control over forces located in the greater Mogadishu area, extending as far south as Merca, Lower Shabelle Region, and west to Baidoa, Bay Region, and north to Jowhar, Middle Shabelle Region. Somali National Army forces consisted of 17 independent brigades. Army forces and progovernment militia operated alongside AMISOM in the areas where AMISOM deployed.'

'Two separate police forces operated in Mogadishu, one under the control of the central government and the other under the Benadir regional administration. The federal police force maintained its presence in all 17 districts of the capital. Police officers in Mogadishu often owed their positions to clan and familial links rather than to government authorities. AMISOM formed police units complemented Benadir and federal government policing efforts in Mogadishu. These police officers provided mentoring and advisory support on basic police duties, respect for human rights, crime prevention strategies, community policing, and search procedures. More than 300 AMISOM police officers worked alongside the formed units to provide training to the national police.'⁵

5.1.3 According to Col Gebrehaweria Fitwi, the Ethiopian force civil-military coordinator in Sector 3 of the Somali National Army (SNA), quoted in May 2014 'Clan loyalty is a big problem. SNA [operations] are restricted by clan influence. The police is especially clan-based, although the army is a little better. The SNA leadership is also very weak.' He added that 'There is the problem of SNA doing private security work [because of low pay] and they are asking us all the time for ammunition. The soldiers come from clans and almost all the army is newly recruited. There are no tactical skills, and there is no command and control'.⁶

5.1.4 In his September 2015 report, the UN Secretary-General reported on security sector assistance and reform:

'International support for the Guulwade (Victory) Plan to develop the capacity of the Somali national army has been limited to date. An implementation team for the plan, comprising technical representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Somali national army, AMISOM, UNSOM [United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia], the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), the European Union Training Mission, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America was established in May and is working on the execution of the plan.

'The National Integration Commission, inaugurated on 12 May, reached agreement with the Federal Government and the Interim Juba Administration on the numbers of personnel to be integrated into the Somali national army in Jubaland (340 from Gedo, 1,000 from Juba Dhexe and 1,540 from Juba

⁵ US Department of State, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Somalia' (Section 1d - Role of the Police and Security Apparatus), 13 April 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper> Date accessed: 20 April 2016.

⁶ IRIN, Shortages, clan rivalries weaken Somalia's new army, 28 May 2014 <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100141/shortages-clan-rivalries-weaken-somalia-s-new-army>. Date accessed: 2 December 2014

Hoose). The Commission developed a timeline for integration of personnel in 2015 and 2016 on a regional basis. On 26 July, 1,350 personnel were officially integrated into the Somali national army; military training is ongoing. UNSOM and UNSOA continue to provide technical and logistical support to the Commission.

‘A total of 16,780 members of the Somali national army and 5,200 personnel of the Somali police force were biometrically registered in the human resources system by the end of August. The Security Sector Expenditure Task Force held its first meeting on 17 August. The Task Force is formulating recommendations on the payment of salaries and stipends, recognizing the need for sustainable arrangements for swift disbursement and the importance of a harmonized payroll system for security forces.’⁷

5.1.5 The UN Secretary General also reported on the police:

‘Following the signing in May of memorandums of understanding between the Federal Government and the Interim Juba Administration and the Interim South-West Administration, respectively, on the establishment of a regional police, UNSOM assisted with the screening and vetting of 200 prospective police officers in Baidoa. A three-month training course for those officers commenced in August. Also in August, vetting and screening of 200 officers took place in Kismaayo. UNSOM and AMISOM provided technical advice to the Federal Government and the interim regional administrations on a model for a federal structure of policing in Somalia and are facilitating a comprehensive dialogue with regional and federal stakeholders to agree on adequate structures within a federal security sector architecture.

‘UNSOM provided a two-week training course on close protection to prepare the police forces in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, to protect judicial personnel. With support from the Government of Japan, the United Nations completed the installation of a digital radio communication network that enables full coverage for police operations in Mogadishu. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provided operational and financial support and training to the police explosive ordnance disposal units in Baidoa, Beledweyne and Mogadishu.

‘As at August, the Federal Ministry of Internal Security, with support from United Nations and AMISOM police teams, had undertaken training for 151 officers of the Somali police force to be deployed to newly recovered areas. The intent is to deploy basic civilian law enforcement capacity comprising 10 officers of the Somali police force (two commanders and eight field officers) and 35 locally recruited community security officers in each of the 13 districts recovered from Al-Shabaab.’⁸

⁷ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 11 September 2015 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2015_702.pdf Date accessed: 20 April 2016

⁸ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 11 September 2015 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2015_702.pdf Date accessed: 20 April 2016

5.1.6 AMISOM reported on 23 May 2016 about newly trained recruits:

‘A total of 198 Somali police graduated in Kismaayo on Monday, after a three-month intensive course, organized by the police component of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The new police officers will be deployed in Kismaayo to maintain law and order.

‘They are the first batch of 600 officers from Jubbaland, who will be trained with funding from UK’s Department For International Development (DFID).

‘The police officers received training on basic principles of policing, arrest of suspects and public order management. They were also taught aspects of human rights law...

“These police officers were not trained to guard ministers and Members of Parliament. They were trained to safe guard the interests of the nationals. They have to protect communities from criminals and help the vulnerable members of society,” [The Interim Jubba Administration President Ahmed Mohamed Islam] emphasized.⁹

5.1.7 The October 2014 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea notes that ‘the central State apparatus was unable to exercise effective control over the use of armed force. Clans and political and business figures maintained their own armed militias. In areas in which Al-Shabaab was not in territorial control, it continued to operate, with attacks on civilians often increasing after the Federal Government had assumed control over one place or another. Territorial gains by the Federal Government rarely translated into increased capacity of the State to protect its civilians from attack’.¹⁰

5.1.8 An October 2015 report added:

‘The partial lifting of the arms embargo introduced through Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) was prompted, inter alia, by the need to strengthen the capacity of Somali domestic forces to confront the military threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The Monitoring Group continues to receive reports that such forces remain ill-equipped to do so. While the Group can now more effectively monitor volume of military material entering Somalia legitimately, it remains unable to accurately assess whether such military material is being distributed appropriately or, indeed, how much is still required.’¹¹

⁹ AMISOM News, A Total of 198 Somali Police Officers Graduate in Kismaayo, 23 May 2016, <http://amisom-au.org/2016/05/a-total-of-198-somali-police-officers-graduate-in-kismaayo/>. Date accessed: 25 May 2016

¹⁰ UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia, 13 October 2014 Para 111 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BF9F9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/S_2014_726.pdf. Date accessed: 1 December 2014

¹¹ Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9F9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2015_702.pdf Date accessed: 20 April 2016

5.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

5.2.1 The UN Security Council announced on 7 July 2016 that it had extended its authorization of AMISOM in Somalia until 31 May 2017.¹²

5.2.2 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Somalia, posted 6 April 2016, stated:

'AMISOM's anti-AI-Shabaab offensive made territorial gains, but is unlikely to completely eradicate the group from southern Somalia, where it has gained recruits from Kenya

'The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) officially has over 22,000 troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Ethiopia joined the unified AMISOM command in January 2014, having previously deployed its forces inside Somalia independently of the multinational regional force. With Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda as the largest troop contributors, the force is now likely to serve as a vehicle for Somalia's neighbours to push their own visions for the country's development, particularly the federalisation process. This is likely to be most apparent in the border regions of Jubaland and the South West Administration, where Kenya and Ethiopia respectively, have used their military presence to influence which political leaders control the states.'¹³

5.2.3 The current military component of AMISOM is deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia:

- Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle.
- Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba.
- Sector 3 comprising Bay and Bakool as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3) comes under Ethiopian command.
- Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud
- Burundian forces are in charge of Sector 5 which covers the Middle Shabelle region.

5.2.4 On 8 September 2014, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting the sexual exploitation and abuse of Somali women and girls on two AMISOM bases in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, since 2013. The AU soldiers, relying on Somali intermediaries, have used a range of tactics, including humanitarian aid, to coerce vulnerable women and girls into sexual

¹² UN Press, Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2297 (2016), 7 July 2016 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12436.doc.htm>
Date accessed: 12 July 2016.

¹³ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Somalia. Security, Posted: 6 April 2016. Subscription source.
[Date accessed: 26 April 2016]

activity. They have also raped or otherwise sexually assaulted women who were seeking medical assistance or water at AMISOM bases. Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 women and girls who described being raped or sexually exploited by Ugandan or Burundian military personnel serving with the AU forces.¹⁴ When releasing the results of its internal investigation on April 22 2015 into the alleged abuses, the chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, qualified most of the allegations in the report as false and exaggerated, claiming only two of the 21 rape cases reported were potentially true. The report concluded that sex abuse by AMISOM troops did not appear to be widespread.¹⁵

5.2.5 The Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182(2014): Somalia, noted that 'With respect to AMISOM, extrajudicial killings and killing of and injury to civilians in the context of response to improvised explosive device and grenade attacks were reported.' The report also quoted draft conflict analysis from the Somalia, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, August 2015, which said, '...although AMISOM was reportedly involved in only 10 incidents of anti-civilian violence, the ratio of reported fatalities to events was the highest of all forces.'¹⁶

5.2.6 The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, speaking at a workshop on Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) held in Mogadishu on 26 April 2016, said a board of inquiry had been set up to handle all incidents involving AMISOM troops, police and the Somali population.¹⁷

5.3 United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).

On 9 November 2015 the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM announced: 'UNSOS replaces the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia, UNSOA established in 2009, has been providing critical logistic and life support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali National Army (SNA), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group.'¹⁸

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, "The Power These Men Have Over Us". Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia, 8 September 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us> [Date accessed: 19 November 2014]

¹⁵ US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, Somalia, 13 April 2016, Section 1d_Role of the Police and Security Apparatus.

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper> Date accessed: 20 April 2016

¹⁶ The Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182(2014): Somalia www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B.../s_2015_801.pdf Date accessed: 26 April 2016

¹⁷ AMISOM Forces Will Uphold Respect For Human Rights – SRCC, 26 April 2016. <http://amisom-au.org/2016/04/amisom-forces-will-uphold-respect-for-human-rights-srcc/> Date accessed: 27 April 2016

¹⁸ United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, 9 November 2016 <http://unsoa.unmissions.org/united-nations-launches-support-office-somalia-unsos> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

The FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report 2015, updated 25 April 2016 stated, 'In 2016 the UK will send up to 70 troops to Somalia (UNSOS).'¹⁹

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5.4 Al-Shabaab

- 5.4.1 Al-Shabaab is the principal threat to peace and security in Somalia.²⁰ The BBC describes Al-Shabaab has having emerged as the radical youth wing of Somalia's now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled Mogadishu in 2006, before being forced out by Ethiopian forces. There are numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help Al-Shabaab, from neighbouring countries, as well as the US and Europe. It is banned as a terrorist group by both the US and the UK and is believed to have between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.²¹

For full details of Al-Shabaab, including its formation, aims, current operation, areas of influence, tactics and targets see the [Country Information and Guidance South and Central Somalia Fear of Al-Shabaab](#).

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5.5 Other non-state armed groups

- 5.5.1 The [European Asylum Support Office, Country of Origin Information Report, Somalia Security Situation](#), February 2016 (page 22) reported the existence of small armed groups affiliated to Al-Shabaab who are based in the north east of the country and Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa which is a pro-government militia that has significantly contributed to the relative security in the areas under its control.²²

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6. Nature and level of violence 2015/16

6.1 Overview

- 6.1.1 The United States Institute of Peace, in fact sheet of 23 July 2015, noted: 'After decades of civil war and the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalis and international supporters have renewed efforts – and made progress – since 2012 in re-establishing state structures and bringing

¹⁹ The FCO Human Rights and Democracy Report 2015, updated 25 April 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

²⁰ UN, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (MGSE) pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), 12 July 2013, Summary, p7 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1336185.pdf>

[Date accessed: 19 November 2014]

²¹ BBC News, Who are Somalia's al-Shabab? 3 April 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689> Date accessed: 26 April 2016

²² European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Somalia Security Situation, February 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56e157934.html> Date accessed: 15 June 2016

stability to the country. The African Union and the United Nations, with U.S. assistance, support the Federal Government of Somalia in restoring institutions. Improving security and countering al-Shabab, a violent extremist group, continue to be first-order priorities. At the same time, consensus must be reached about the composition, boundaries, and powers of Somalia's constituent states.

'Efforts like Vision 2016, a strategic plan and framework established by the Somali government to implement legal, security, and institutional mechanisms, provides openings for both international partners and the Somali government for the future of the country.'²³

6.1.2 The Security Council's report of the Secretary General on Somalia, published 8 January 2016, reporting on the latter part of 2015, noted:

'In central and southern Somalia, the security situation remained volatile, with Al-Shabaab continuing to launch attacks on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali national army positions and civilian targets. On 1 September, the anniversary of the death of former Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters stormed an AMISOM base in Janale, Shabelle Hoose. More than 20 AMISOM soldiers were killed and 23 wounded, while others remain missing. Shortly afterwards, AMISOM began to realign its forces by vacating previously recovered areas in Shabelle Hoose, including Kurtunwarey, Ceel Saliini, Cambarey, Golweyne and Busley, on 4, 5 and 9 September. In the Hiraan region, AMISOM vacated Buq-Aqabla and Xarar-Lugoole on 6 and 26 September, respectively. On 13 November, AMISOM withdrew from Fidow, on the border between the Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe regions. All the locations were immediately seized by Al-Shabaab.

'In Mogadishu, a suicide vehicle laden with explosives detonated as a United Nations convoy was leaving Villa Somalia on 21 September. An escort vehicle was hit and 12 people were killed, including a Somali escort guard. On 1 November, a complex attack on the Sahafi Hotel resulted in at least 15 fatalities. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for both attacks. On 14 December, a staff member of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a non-governmental organization (NGO) worker were killed by unknown gunmen while travelling in a car. There is no evidence at this stage to suggest that the UNHCR staff member's affiliation with the United Nations was the reason for the attack.

'Asymmetrical attacks along main supply routes also intensified. On 13 September, a convoy escorting officials from the Interim South-West Administration was hit by three roadside bombs in the Bay region. On 16 September, Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed a convoy escorting the Beledweyne District Commissioner in the Hiraan region. On 11 November, the President of the Interim South-West Administration was targeted in an

²³ USIP, Fact Sheet, 23 July 2015. <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/07/23/the-current-situation-in-somalia> Date accessed: 27 April 2016

attempted suicide attack along the Afgooye corridor in the Shabelle Hoose region, for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.

'In the Hiraaan region, a United Nations third-party contractor was shot dead in Beledweyne on 14 November, allegedly by security guards of the Governor of the region, which sparked a stand-off between clan militias, increased tensions in the town and led to a restriction of United Nations movements. Normality has since been restored following the arrest of suspects and the institution of investigations against the Governor.'²⁴

- 6.1.3 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Somalia, posted 6 April 2016, reported:

'Al-Shabaab reversed some of AMISOM and the SNA's August 2014 gains by launching a bloody Ramadan offensive in June 2015. Over the past 12 months, Al-Shabaab have been successful in targeting isolated AMISOM forward operating such as in Gedo in January 2016, Janaale in September 2015, and Leego in June 2015, inflicting high casualties on AMISOM forces, and leading to demands from the Kenyan AMISOM contingent for a restructuring of the mission. On 5 March 2016 US forces carried out a series of UAV strikes, which the Pentagon claimed had killed more than 150 Al-Shabaab militants at a training camp in Raso, 193 kilometres north of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. These strikes represent an intensification of US efforts to combat Al-Shabaab, likely coming as a response to the growth of Al-Shabaab's combat effectiveness in the central regions of Somalia in the run-up to the September 2016 elections - as well as the group's novel tactic of threatening international aviation, as demonstrated in the Daallo Airlines bombing on 2 February 2016.'²⁵

- 6.1.4 'Expressing 'grave concern' at the fragility of the security situation in Somalia, the United Nations Security Council has called for progress on the constitutional review process in the country, and for the completion of the Federal State formation process to be accelerated.

'In a press statement issued following a briefing to the Council earlier this week by the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Michael Keating, the Council underlined that a "peaceful, transparent and inclusive" electoral process in 2016 will mark a "historic step forward" for all Somalis, and will be fundamental for the country's continued progress towards democracy and stability.'²⁶

- 6.1.5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 9 May 2016, gave details of recent security developments during the reporting period (1 Jan – 30 April 2016):

²⁴ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 8 January 2016. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_27.pdf Date accessed: 27 April 2016

²⁵ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment. Somalia. Army. Posted: 4 April 2014. Subscription source.

²⁶ UN News Service, Somalia: Security Council 'gravely concerned' over fragile security situation, 22 April 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/571f24fb40b.html> Date accessed: 27 April 2016

'The security situation worsened during the first half of the reporting period, as Al-Shabaab stepped up asymmetric and conventional attacks. At the same time, the Somali security forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other partners also inflicted heavy losses on the group, especially in March and April.

'Mogadishu witnessed an increase in assassinations, especially in April, with Somali government personnel targeted the most. There were three complex attacks during the reporting period. Attacks at the Lido beach in Mogadishu on 21 January and on the Somali Youth League hotel and peace garden on 26 February killed more than 45 people, including a United Nations national staff member, and injured 80 others. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the incidents, as well as for a coordinated twin bombing in Baidoa, Bay region, on 28 February, which killed 30 people and injured 60. In another worrisome development, a pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) website reported on 25 April that ISIL fighters in Somalia had carried out their first attack in Somalia, hitting an AMISOM convoy with an improvised explosive device on the outskirts of Mogadishu. AMISOM acknowledged the explosion, but denied that the convoy had been hit .

'There was an increase in mortar attacks, including against the presidential compound, Villa Somalia, and airports co-located with AMISOM and United Nations offices. The AMISOM protected area of Mogadishu International Airport sustained mortar attacks on 1 January and 11 February, resulting in injuries to two AMISOM soldiers. Villa Somalia was similarly targeted on 7 January, 1 and 25 February and 3 and 7 April, leaving at least 12 people dead and 22 injured, including a member of Parliament. Kismaayo airport sustained mortar attacks on 14 and 27 February, while several rounds landed in the perimeter of the Baidoa airstrip on 21 February. There were no casualties from those attacks.'²⁷

6.1.6 The FCO report, Somalia - Human Rights Priority Country, published 21 April 2016, stated, '2015 was another year of serious concern for human rights in Somalia. Civilians continue to be killed, wounded and displaced by indiscriminate attacks and violations committed by various sides in the ongoing internal conflict.'²⁸

6.1.7 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) published a report on 11 May 2016, 'Somalia: Security Situation'. The section on the 'Security Situation in South and Central Somalia in 2015' is reproduced in full (the report is a composite of sources, the links to which can be accessed through the report):

"Civilians continued to be indiscriminately killed and wounded in crossfire during armed clashes, whether by suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or grenade attacks." (AI, 24 February 2016)[vii].

²⁷ UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 9 May 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/573abc624.html> Date accessed: 25 May 2016

²⁸ FCO, Somalia- Human Rights Priority Country, published 21 April 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/somalia-human-rights-priority-country/somalia-human-rights-priority-country> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

“The security situation remained volatile in government-controlled towns. Government forces failed to protect civilians, including journalists, clan elders, clerics and lawmakers and other officials from targeted killings by Al-Shabab as well as by unknown gunmen, primarily in Mogadishu, Baidoa, the capital of the Bay region, and Beletweyn, the capital of Hiraan.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)[viii].

‘Conflicts between clans

“Conflict between Biimaal and Habar Gedir militias in the Lower Shabelle Region continued, although reports of abductions and killings decreased.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 1g)[ix].

“Inter-clan fighting, reportedly involving government forces, in Hiraan also resulted in civilians deaths.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)

“Clashes throughout the south and central regions resulted in deaths and displacement. For example, on January 22, clashes between Dir and Hawadle clan militias over land in the towns of Burdhinle and Hada-Ogle in the Hiraan Region resulted in at least 23 deaths and numerous injuries.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 1g).

“ASWJ militias and federal forces skirmished throughout the year, causing internal displacement of persons. For example, on February 10, the ASWJ attacked SNA forces in Guri’el, Galguduud Region. According to local sources, fighting killed at least three civilians and injured many more.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 1g)

“In February, as a result of ongoing tensions regarding establishing an interim regional administration in central Somalia, fighting in Guri’el between government forces and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, a Sufi militia, resulted in civilian deaths and massive displacement. According to the United Nations, about 90 percent of the estimated population of over 65,000 temporarily fled.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)

‘Attacks by al-Shabaab

“In central and southern Somalia, the security situation remained volatile, with Al-Shabaab continuing to launch attacks on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali national army positions and civilian targets.” (UN Security Council, 8 January 2016, p.3)

“Al-Shabaab retained the ability to stage lethal attacks in the most heavily guarded parts of Mogadishu and other towns, killing or injuring hundreds of civilians. High-profile targets remained vulnerable to such attacks.” (AI, 24 February 2016)

“Al-Shabaab continued to kill civilians. This included politically motivated killings that targeted civilians affiliated with the government and attacks on humanitarian NGO employees, UN staff, and diplomatic missions. Al-Shabaab often used suicide attacks, mortar attacks, and improvised explosive devices. It also killed prominent peace activists, community leaders, clan elders, and their family members for their roles in peace building, and it beheaded persons accused of spying for and collaborating with Somali national forces and affiliated militias. There were numerous reported al-Shabaab attacks, including the February 20 vehicle-borne

improvised explosive device attack on the Central Hotel in Mogadishu that killed approximately 25 persons, including government officials.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 1g)

“On November 1, Al-Shabaab attacked the popular Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu, killing at least 15 people, including a journalist covering the attack, other civilians and officials.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)

“On 1 November, a complex attack on the Sahafi Hotel resulted in at least 15 fatalities. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for both attacks.” (UN Security Council, 8 January 2016, p.3)

“In September, a car explosion at the gate of the presidential palace killed at least six people. In February, al-Shabaab carried out a mortar attack on the presidential palace. In July, a suicide attack at the Jazeera Hotel, which houses several embassies, killed at least 10 people. The number of civilians killed in various attacks was difficult to establish due to the absence of a reliable civilian casualty tracking system.” (AI, 24 February 2016)

“On 1 September, the anniversary of the death of former Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters stormed an AMISOM base in Janale, Shabelle Hoose. More than 20 AMISOM soldiers were killed and 23 wounded, while others remain missing. Shortly afterwards, AMISOM began to realign its forces by vacating previously recovered areas in Shabelle Hoose, including Kurtunwarey, Ceel Saliini, Cambarey, Golweyne and Busley, on 4, 5 and 9 September. In the Hiraan region, AMISOM vacated Buq-Aqbla and Xarar-Lugoole on 6 and 26 September, respectively. On 13 November, AMISOM withdrew from Fidow, on the border between the Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe regions. All the locations were immediately seized by Al-Shabaab. (UN Security Council, 8 January 2016, p.3)

‘Killings by AMISOM troops and other foreign troops

“Reports increased of indiscriminate killings of civilians by AMISOM and other foreign forces, particularly at checkpoints, following attacks on AMISOM convoys and in airstrikes.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)

“Civilians remained at risk of being directly targeted in attacks. In July, reports indicated that AMISOM had directly targeted civilians and killed at least 10 people in Marka. In August, AMISOM revised the figure to seven people, issued an apology and announced that three soldiers had been charged with the killings.” (AI, 24 February 2016)

“Fighting between al-Shabaab and AMISOM and Somali forces resulted in civilian deaths. There were numerous reports that, on July 21, AMISOM Ugandan army troops killed at least 11 civilians, including a woman, two teenagers, and two elderly men, in separate incidents in the Jujuuma, Balle, and Rusiya neighborhoods of Merca, Lower Shabelle Region. Human Rights Watch also reported the alleged killing of six men on July 31 by AMISOM

Ugandan army troops at a wedding in Merca.” (USDOS, 13 April 2016, Section 1g).²⁹

- 6.1.8 Lifos, part of the Swedish Migration Agency, published a report on 4 May 2016 compiled during their fact finding mission to Nairobi in Kenya and Mogadishu and Gaalkacyo in Somalia from 9 to 18 March 2016. The report is in Swedish, but has an English summary from which the following is taken:

‘The lack of reliable statistics over casualties makes it difficult to assess the situation for civilians with any kind of certainty. It should be noted, that, up to October 2014, the security situation in general has improved for ordinary people. It has to be stressed, though, that it is a slight improvement from a level of high insecurity. Lifos notices that due to Al Shabaab’s increased capacity to perform attacks, and the prevalence of US and Kenyan airstrikes over rural areas controlled by Al Shabaab, the security situation for ordinary people has worsened somewhat from the summer of 2015 and onwards. In specific areas, the security situation might have worsened more, such as in Gaalkacyo where the situation is tense and there was heavy fighting in November 2015. Although Al Shabaab has never spared civilians, a new trend is the targeting of civilians, which was demonstrated at the attacks at Lido Beach in Mogadishu 21 January 2016 and the twin attacks in Baidoa 28 February 2016. Considering the heightened frequency, and intensity, in the Al Shabaab attacks, Lifos assesses that the situation for civilians has deteriorated somewhat.

‘It is also important to consider that the security situation varies with the local conditions, especially in South and Central Somalia. Fighting between different actors in the conflict, affect civilians. In general, Al Shabaab performs more attacks and assassinations in big, strategic cities. Mogadishu is the city which endures most attacks.’³⁰

- 6.1.9 Lifos continued:

‘As Al Shabaab has strengthened its capacity to perform attacks, the security situation has worsened for those Al Shabaab perceive their enemies and who consequently are targeted. Al Shabaab targets persons connected to the SFG, the parliament, SNAF, the police, NGOs and the UN, but also persons, such as journalists, politicians, teachers, religious and local leaders and influential businessmen, who express an opinion that differs from Al Shabaab’s values. It is important to notice that these examples are not exhaustive. People considered Al Shabaab’s enemy is targeted. It is equally important to notice that officials connected to SFG on a lower level are targeted as well. Street vendors and other small-scale businessmen selling articles to SFG or AMISOM, are again reported to be vulnerable, although to a small extent. Lifos notices that Al Shabaab has begun to attack targets

²⁹ ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Somalia: Security Situation, 11 May 2016 (available at [ecoi.net](http://www.ecoi.net)) http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/323760/449718_en.html Date accessed: 18 May 2016

³⁰ Lifos Somalia - a summary analysis of the security situation, the judiciary and the situation of civilians, 4 May 2016 <http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=37292> Date accessed: 18 May 2016

where civilians tend to present, even if it is not clear whether it is the diaspora or rather civilians in general that are targeted. The trend is, that more groups than in the autumn 2014, must be seen as vulnerable to Al Shabaab's attacks. Combined with the fact that Al Shabaab has increased the frequency and intensity in the attacks, Lifos assesses that the situation for civilians has deteriorated a bit.³¹

6.1.10 The United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Terrorist Safe Havens: Africa, published 2 June 2016, noted, with reference to Somalia:

'In 2015, terrorists used many primarily rural sections of south-central Somalia as safe havens. Terrorists continued to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate with relative ease in these areas due to inadequate security, justice, and governance capacity at all levels.

'Al-Shabaab's capacity to rebound from counterterrorism operations is due in large part to its ability to maintain control of large swaths of rural areas and routes in parts of Somalia. In 2015, al-Shabaab lost a number of safe havens in south-central Somalia, many of which provided access to funds and other resources the group extorted from local communities. Despite the success of coordinated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operations that drove al-Shabaab from former strongholds in Baardheere and Dinsoor, the terrorist organization managed to establish new safe havens from where it planned and launched attacks against government officials, AMISOM bases, and soft targets in Kenya and other parts of the region. The Federal Government of Somalia and its regional administrations lacked the capacity and resources to fill security voids left in the wake of AMISOM's operations with civilian law enforcement. These gaps allowed al-Shabaab to retain the freedom of movement necessary to establish new safe havens and re-infiltrate areas that AMISOM cleared but could not hold.

'As seen in previous years, al-Shabaab used smaller towns in the Jubba River Valley such as Jilib and Saakow as bases for its operations. These areas allowed the group's operatives to continue exploiting the porous border regions between Kenya and Somalia and launch deadly cross-border attacks. Kenya suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in its history when in April, al-Shabaab operatives assaulted the Garissa University College using light arms and suicide vests and killed more than 145 Kenyans, most of whom were students. Al-Shabaab also used villages along major coastal routes in southern Somalia, namely Kunyo Barow and Tortorow, to facilitate access to areas just outside of major population centers in Mogadishu and Kismaayo. These and other routes throughout southern Somalia serve as lifelines for al-Shabaab as low-level fighters established illegal checkpoints to collect taxes and tolls from locals. Although the group continued to generate funds from the illicit trade of charcoal and

³¹ Lifos Somalia - a summary analysis of the security situation, the judiciary and the situation of civilians, 4 May 2016 <http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=37292> Date accessed: 18 May 2016

other commodities, al-Shabaab leveraged tax collection to compensate for declining revenues after losing access to the port in Baraawe in 2014.³²

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6.2 By region

- 6.2.1 [EASO Country of Origin Information Report, Somalia: Security Situation](#), published in February 2016, gave detailed information about the security situation by region. The information included: a short description of the region, violence, actors in the conflict, areas of control/influence and impact of the violence.

The regions covered were:

South Somalia:

- Lower Jubba
- Gedo
- Bay
- Bakool
- Middle Jubba
- Lower Shabelle
- Benadir-Mogadishu
- Middle Shabelle

Central Somalia:

- Hiiran
- Galgaduud
- Mudug³³

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6.3 Casualty statistics

- 6.3.1 The World Bank stated that battle-related deaths in Somalia for 2014 were 1103. This compares with 2013: 896; 2012: 2600 and 2011: 1937.

[The World Bank definition of battle-related deaths is: deaths in battle-related conflicts between warring parties in the conflict dyad (two conflict units that are parties to a conflict). Typically, battle-related deaths occur in warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities, and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities, and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths - military as well

³² United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Terrorist Safe Havens: Africa, 2 June 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/57518d3e13.html>
Date accessed: 15 June 2016

³³ European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Somalia Security Situation, February 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56e157934.html> Date accessed: 27 April 2016

as civilian - incurred in such situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.³⁴

6.3.2 Other sources of that provide regular updates include:

[UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)

[UN Security Council reports](#)

[The International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)

ACLED: <http://www.acleddata.com/data/>

6.3.3 NOTE: There are no reliable statistics available on the numbers of casualties from the conflict given the limits placed on human rights monitoring bodies to document incidents in the current security situation. Those figures that are available may under or over report the number of incidents and/or casualties, and may apply inconsistent definitions in identifying numbers of casualties.

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7. Humanitarian situation

7.1 Overview

7.1.1 The [UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(OCHA\)](#)³⁵ gives a general overview of the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

7.1.2 The UNICEF January 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report stated: 'The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Somalia was launched on 19 January 2016 in Mogadishu. The HRP is seeking to reach 3.5 million people with urgent life-saving assistance by the end of 2016. In line with the HRP, UNICEF is requesting US\$82 million to meet the humanitarian needs of children in 2016. Humanitarian needs remain acute in Somalia with some 4.9 million people in need of life-saving and livelihoods support, including 1.1 million people internally displaced. Some 308,000 children under- 5, or one in eight children, are estimated to be acutely malnourished, 58,300 of them severely. The lack of access to basic services continues to undermine the resilience of communities. The operating environment remains constrained with parties to conflict engaging in activities that increase protection concerns for women and children.'³⁶

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³⁴ World Bank, Data, Battle-related deaths (number of people)
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.BTL.DETH> Date accessed: 18 May 2016

³⁵ UNOCHA, Somalia 2015
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/2016_somalia_humanitarian_needs_overview_6.pdf Date accessed: 11 July 2016

³⁶ The UNICEF January 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report,
<http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/unicef-somalia-humanitarian-situation-report-1-january-2016> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

7.2 Food security

7.2.1 The Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia released a press release on 8 February 2016:

'The food security and malnutrition situation in Somalia is alarming, especially in parts of Puntland and Somaliland, which have been hard hit by drought exacerbated by El Niño and require urgent attention. This is according to the latest food security and nutrition assessment for Somalia, which was released today in Mogadishu by the FAO-managed Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) in collaboration with Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). The situation is critical and could get worse.

'This latest assessment confirms persistently high and alarming levels of food insecurity and malnutrition in Somalia, with an estimated 4.7 million people — nearly 40 per cent of the Somali population — in need of humanitarian assistance. Nearly 950,000 of these people are acutely food insecure and struggle every day to meet their food needs. Internally displaced people make up more than two thirds, or 68 per cent, of acutely food insecure people and are in dire need of assistance.

"We are deeply concerned that the proportion of severely food insecure people remains alarmingly high, especially people who are unable to meet their daily food needs. Some 3.7 million people will be acutely food insecure through mid-2016. With severe drought conditions intensifying in Puntland and Somaliland, many more people risk relapsing into crisis," said Peter de Clercq, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia.³⁷

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7.3 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

7.3.1 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Southern and Central Somalia (Update I), May 2016, noted:

'Armed conflict, military operations, clan and intercommunal violence, forced evictions and natural hazards continue to be major causes of internal displacement. While precise figures for the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are unavailable, estimates suggest that there are more than 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia, the majority in the southern and central regions. There are approximately 370,000 IDPs in Mogadishu. Approximately 70 to 80 per cent of Somalia's IDPs are women and children, who are reported to be disproportionately at risk of serious human rights violations. Living conditions in IDP settlements are reported to be deplorable and durable solutions are unattainable for most IDPs under current circumstances. IDPs are also reported to face serious food insecurity, with many being above the

³⁷ Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia. Somalia: Food security and malnutrition situation alarming Press Release, 8 February 2016
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/573de9fe4.html> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

emergency threshold for malnutrition; the situation is reportedly exacerbated by an ongoing drought.’³⁸

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7.4 Evictions

7.4.1 The same report also stated:

‘In 2015, there was reportedly a significant increase in forced evictions of IDPs from public and private lands and buildings in many cities and towns in Somalia, including Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Galkayo, Bosasso, Hargeisa or Luuq. Over 116,000 people were reported to have been forcibly evicted during the first eight months of 2015. The majority of these evictions were reported to be unlawful, notably due to lack of adherence to due process and the provision of adequate alternatives. Most evictees in Mogadishu were reportedly forced to move to the outskirts of the city where security is a serious concern, rights violations are pervasive, living conditions in settlements dire and access to basic services is very limited. Forced evictions have exacerbated the humanitarian and human rights situation for Somali IDPs. Both the authorities and private individuals are reported to instigate forced evictions. Forced evictions have also reportedly been used by “a multitude of actors” as “a tactic of warfare in order to obtain and exert control”.’³⁹

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8. Freedom of movement

8.1 Travel around Somalia

8.1.1 The US State Department report covering events in 2015 noted that there were checkpoints operated by government forces, allied groups, armed militias, clan factions, and al-Shabaab which inhibited movement and ‘exposed citizens to looting, extortion, harassment, and violence.’⁴⁰

8.1.2 Lifos, part of the Swedish Migration Agency, published a report on 4 May 2016 compiled during their fact finding mission to Nairobi in Kenya and Mogadishu and Gaalkacyo in Somalia from 9 to 18 March 2016. The report is in Swedish, but has an extensive English summary from which the following is taken:

‘To travel by road, in the rural areas is hazardous, particularly in South and Central Somalia. The travelers risk being abused at checkpoints, regardless of if it is Al Shabaab, SNAF or any other government friendly militia or

³⁸ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Southern and Central Somalia (Update I), May 2016 (para 11), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/573de9fe4.html> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

³⁹ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Returns to Southern and Central Somalia (Update I), May 2016 (para 13), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/573de9fe4.html> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

⁴⁰ US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practice 2013. Somalia. 13 April 2016, section 2d. <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> Date accessed: 25 May 2016

criminals manning the checkpoint. Lifos notices that someone who belongs to any of the groups vulnerable in the Somali society in general, also is at the biggest risk to be abused when travelling by road. Lifos observes that Somalis travel by road, but assesses, by the compiled information in talks in Somalia, that these are no pleasure trips. Before travelling by road, the risks are thoroughly balanced against the necessity of the trip.⁴¹

- 8.1.3 Amnesty International in its 2015/16 report, published 24 February 2016, noted:

‘The SFG and AMISOM remained in control of Mogadishu, the capital, and expanded areas under their control by establishing federal administrations in the Galmudug, South-West and Jubbaland States. A joint offensive by AMISOM and SNAF pushed al-Shabaab out of towns in the Hiraan, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower Shabelle regions, although the armed group maintained control of many rural areas. The offensive displaced more people, while armed clashes and al-Shabaab attacks against civilians continued, particularly in villages with changing control.’⁴²

- 8.1.4 Human Rights Watch, in the Somalia chapter of its 2016 World Report, published January 2016, stated that, ‘Reports increased of indiscriminate killings of civilians by AMISOM and other foreign forces, particularly at checkpoints, following attacks on AMISOM convoys and in airstrikes.’ And that ‘Al-Shabaab controls some supply routes and imposes blockades on towns captured by AMISOM and Somali government forces, notably Wajid, Bulo-Burte and Hudur, severely restricting movement of goods and assistance; on occasion Al-Shabaab killed civilians accused of breaking blockades.’⁴³

- 8.1.5 [EASO Country of Origin Information Report, Somalia: Security Situation](#), published February 2016, included a compilation of sources providing detailed information about freedom of movement across the country. The information is provided by region, for example for Lower Jubba:

‘Most of the roads leading to Kismayo, the epicentre of trade in the region, frequently experience problems as Al-Shabaab extorts an illegal tax from traders and transporters of goods. Access to the villages outside the town and adjacent districts is still limited as most parts are still under the control of Al-Shabaab. In Kismayo, curfews are imposed for a few hours when security operations are carried out. Al-Shabaab mans checkpoints on all roads out of Kismayo, with passing trucks charged a toll of about US\$ 1,000 each, which provides a financial lifeline and source of revenue for Al-Shabaab. For instance, there are 5 checkpoints between Kismayo and Dhobley, 2 of them

⁴¹ Lifos Somalia - a summary analysis of the security situation, the judiciary and the situation of civilians, 4 May 2016 <http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=37292> Date accessed: 18 May 2016

⁴² Amnesty International, Somalia 2015/16, 24 February 2016 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/> Date accessed: 25 May 2016

⁴³ HRW, World report 2015/16 Somalia, January 2016 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/somalia> Date accessed: 24 May 2016

are manned by Al-Shabaab, while 3 are operated by the SNAF. At Al-Shabaab's checkpoints its fighters conduct searches.'⁴⁴

- 8.1.6 According to representatives of an international agency, ordinary civilians (i.e. people not working for the SNG), are able to travel between Mogadishu and Kismayo, Baidoa, Jowhar and Afgoye. They mostly travel by bus and there are now fewer checkpoints along the Mogadishu–Kismayo road. There are no checkpoints between Mogadishu and Baidoa. However, there is no guarantee against ambushes along the road, carried out by al-Shabaab or by ordinary criminals. The representatives of an international agency, Mogadishu, confirmed that al-Shabaab will kill anyone it suspects is working for the SNG or the international community. It also noted that the road between Mogadishu and Kismayo is not safe all the way.⁴⁵
- 8.1.7 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported in October 2013 about the deliberate restriction of movement of IDPs by gatekeepers who exercise control over virtually everything in IDP camps across Somalia and who either belong to the displaced community, are landowners or businesspeople connected to local powerbrokers.⁴⁶ Amnesty International similarly highlighted the problem of these 'gatekeepers' and the control they exert over IDPs.⁴⁷

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8.2 Return of refugees

- 8.2.1 A UN press release of 21 October 2015 looked at efforts being made to help refugees return to Somalia:

'The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres today convened with the European Union a pledging conference to rally support for Somalia by creating conditions for the voluntary return of refugees to the east African nation faced with "one of the most complex crisis in recent history."

"We need to invest in Somalia so that some of the refugees who are currently stranded in refugee camps can go home and participate in

⁴⁴ European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Somalia Security Situation, February 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/56e157934.html> (Page 33) Date accessed: 25 May 2016

⁴⁵ Danish Immigration Service /Laindinfo, Security and protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia. Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service's and the Norwegian Landinfo's fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 16 April to 7 May 2013, May 2013, pages 49–50. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6F1A29C6-2F84-40D2-BDE4-42F69897EEC3/0/security_and_protection_in_somalia_may_2013.pdf [Date accessed: 21 November 2014]

⁴⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Somalia: Solutions for IDPs revealed as key for future peace and stability in Somalia. 1 October 2013. National and international Responses. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/somalia/2013/solutions-for-idps-revealed-as-key-for-future-peace-and-stability-in-somalia> Date accessed: 21 November 2014

⁴⁷ Amnesty International, Somalia: No place for the displaced: Forcible eviction of displaced communities, 13 September 2013 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/523801dd4.html> Date accessed: 21 November 2014

rebuilding their country,” Mr. Guterres said in a press statement ahead of the event, which took place in Brussels, Belgium.

“That would benefit not only Somalia and the Somali refugees, but the entire region.” ...

‘UNHCR and partners have helped some 5,300 refugees to voluntarily return to Somalia since December 2014; while a significant number have returned spontaneously, and the refugee agency is now getting ready to move into the enhanced phase of this operation, which will aim to assist 135,000 refugees to return to Somalia between January 2016 and December 2017.’⁴⁸

- 8.2.2 Kenya announced in May 2016 that it will close Dadaab camp, home to more than 300,000 Somalis by November 2016. The foreign minister said that Kenya would work closely with the UN and the Somali government to repatriate the refugees.⁴⁹

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8.3 Return of diaspora to Somalia

- 8.3.1 The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia reported in August 2013 that:

‘... The palpable improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu and in an increasing number of areas in the country is reflected in the return of an impressive number of people from the diaspora, including businessmen lured by the promises that have been made. Both international and United Nations flights to and from Mogadishu are full. Business activities and construction of buildings are on the rise. Though serious concerns remain about the security situation as a result, for example, of clan infighting in Kismayo and Jubaland, there are clear signs of hope in the air.’⁵⁰

- 8.3.2 Al Arabiya reported on 3 January 2016 about new housing developments in Mogadishu:

‘Somalia’s elegant colonial villas were left in ruins by two decades of street fighting among warlords, and the seaside capital Mogadishu was dubbed the most dangerous city in the world.

‘But now new housing estates are being built amid an economic boom as diaspora Somalis return and newly wealthy businessmen capitalize on the relative peace in the city.

⁴⁸ UN News Centre, 21 October 2015, UN agency and European Union kick-off pledging conference to support return of Somali refugees <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52330> Date accessed: 25 May 2016

⁴⁹ BBC News, Kenya announces Dadaab refugee camp will close by November, 31 May 2016. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36418604> Date accessed: 12 July 2016

⁵⁰ UN, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, 16 August 2013, section B, paragraph 93. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/522db1204.html> [Date accessed: 21 November 2014]

'Some seven kilometers (four miles) outside Mogadishu in a formerly largely rural area, new homes are springing up, with almost 50 houses now ready on an estate, builders say...

'Those returning to Somalia - including investors wanting to start new business in their homeland - say the Daru Salaam estate offers them a more secure place to live.

"I came back to this city to buy a new home in Daru Salaam neighborhood... the houses are well built," said Abdiqadar Jimale Roble, 34, who grew up in Sweden from the age of 12 after Somalia spiraled into civil war in the early 1990s.

"I have been out of Somalia for long time but I came back because everybody needs his country -and the country is making much progress," Roble added.

"I had to take part in that progress, and everybody should have a house in his country." ⁵¹

8.3.3 The UNHCR paper, January 2014, noted that:

'For Somalis in Mogadishu, it is very difficult to survive without a support network, and newcomers to the city, particularly when they do not belong to the clans or nuclear families established in the district in question, or when they originate from an area formerly or presently controlled by an insurgent group, face a precarious existence in the capital. Somalis from the diaspora who have returned to Mogadishu in the course of 2013 are reported to belong to the more affluent sectors of society, with resources and economic and political connections. Many are reported to have a residence status abroad to fall back on in case of need... Due in part to the return of wealthy Somalis from the diaspora, rents in Mogadishu have reached an all-time high, as a result of which some persons are being forced to move to overcrowded IDP camps because they cannot afford the new prices quoted by landlords.' ⁵²

8.3.4 UNHCR reports in June 2014 that 'Since December 2013, over 34,000 Somalis have been deported from different countries to Somalia, often in the context of efforts to address irregular migration and security concerns.' ⁵³

8.3.5 A policy brief by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, "Diaspora Return to Somalia, Perceptions and Implications", published June 2014, concluded,

⁵¹ Al Arabiya English, Somalia housing boom as Mogadishu emerges from ashes of war, 3 January 2016 <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/01/03/Somalia-housing-boom-as-Mogadishu-emerges-from-ashes-of-war.html> Date accessed: 25 May 2016

⁵² UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Protection Considerations with Regard to people fleeing Southern and Central Somalia, 17 January 2014, C. The Role of the Clan in Providing Traditional Forms of Protection in Mogadishu and Other Areas of Southern and Central Somalia p9, Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/52d7fc5f4.html> [Date accessed: 21 November 2014],

⁵³ UNHCR, UNHCR position on returns to South and Central Somalia, 17 June 2014 http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1403598415_53a04d044.pdf [Date accessed: 2 December 2014]

'Unless widespread conflict re-emerges in Somalia, the diaspora will continue to return to their country of origin. Indeed, with sustained peace throughout the country the rate of return would be expected to increase.'⁵⁴

8.3.6 A 2015 paper by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) looked at the return of the diaspora to Somalia. The paper was prefaced with a brief summary overview:

- 'Diaspora return for business is appreciated in Somalia, but constitutes a small portion of returns
- Those who return voluntarily from Norway and the USA, return with citizenship and resources, including education
- Many diaspora Somalis lead transnational lives compatible with business – with families working and living in multiple countries
- Some diaspora business brings new services and products to Somalia – including taxis, dry cleaners, gyms and law firms
- Support for diaspora businesses with investment funds is important; building on collaborations between local and diaspora entrepreneurs'⁵⁵

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9. Maps and current resources

9.1.1 The following sources contain current and regularly updated maps and resources on the conflict and humanitarian situation:

- For the UN Security Council's regular reports on developments in Somalia including maps and other information regarding territorial control within Somalia, see: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/>
- [UN Map of Somalia December 2011](#)
- The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also provides regular updates on the situation on the ground including maps showing territorial control. see: <http://amisom-au.org/>
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)'s [Reliefweb, Somalia country page](#) contains regularly updated maps and resources on the humanitarian and security situation in Somalia

For relevant background country of information about south and central Somalia see: EASO Country of Origin Information report. South and Central Somalia Country overview⁵⁶, August 2014 at <http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf>

⁵⁴ Policy brief by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, June 2014, Diaspora Return to Somalia, Perceptions and Implications.

⁵⁵ PRIO, Back in Business? Diaspora Return to Somalia, May 2015. http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/prio/Horst%20-%20Back%20in%20Business,%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%205-2015.pdf Date accessed: 12 July 2016

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⁵⁶ European Union: European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EASO Country of Origin Information report. South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014, ISBN 978-92-9243-262-1. <http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf> Date accessed: 3 December 2014

Version Control and Contacts

Contacts

If you have any questions about the guidance and your line manager or senior caseworker cannot help you or you think that the guidance has factual errors then email [the Country Policy and Information Team](#).

If you notice any formatting errors in this guidance (broken links, spelling mistakes and so on) or have any comments about the layout or navigability of the guidance then you can email [the Guidance, Rules and Forms Team](#).

Clearance

Below is information on when this version of the guidance was cleared:

- version **2.0**
- valid from **18 July 2016**

Changes from last version of this guidance

Updated country information and guidance.

Information about risk posed to individuals by Al-Shabaab is now included in separate country information and guidance on Somalia: Fear of Al-Shabaab.

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