



2014年6月26日安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议所设中非共和国问题
专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议所设中非共和国问题专家小组成员，
随信附上专家小组按照上述决议第59(c)段编写的临时报告。

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安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议
所设专家小组

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安全理事会第 2127(2013) 号决议所设中非共和国问题专家小组的报告

摘要

继 2013 年 3 月 24 日总统弗朗索瓦·博齐泽被推翻和 2014 年 1 月 10 日继任总统米歇尔·乔托迪亚被迫辞职之后，中非共和国政府仍需克服重大障碍，以实现政治过渡的第二阶段，这应导致 2015 年举行自由和公正的民主选举。

完全有罪不罚现象仍然是政治过渡道路上的主要绊脚石，使个人得以从事或支持破坏中非共和国和平、安全和领土完整的行为。不追究责任助长了该国暴力行为周而复始的情况，为该国反叛和犯罪活动提供了沃土。专家小组注意到，安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会于 2014 年 5 月 9 日决定对博齐泽先生、Lévy Yakité 和 Nourredine Adam 实施定向制裁，这项措施有助于结束该国有关有罪不罚现象。专家小组打算监测针对被列名个人执行资产冻结和旅行禁令的情况。

专家小组一直能够确定其他一些中部非洲政治人物正在利用该国的安全真空资助、组建或操纵武装团体，如新“塞雷卡”一些部分或自称的“反砍刀”组织民兵(见附件 5 和 6)等，以便在全国过渡进程中占据适当位置或促进国家分裂。专家小组指出，中非共和国武装部队人员和宪兵仍在一些主要的“反砍刀”组织民兵团体中担任指挥职务。

专家小组在其数据库中记录了 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 30 日期间发生的 444 起事件，这些事件导致 2 424 平民死亡。然而，专家小组承认许多事件漏报。

在选举过渡国家元首四个多月后，这种情况持续存在，并破坏恢复该国的和平与安全，使人怀疑过渡当局针对一般武装团体、特别是“反砍刀”组织团体执行的战略。一些国际社会成员对过渡当局未强烈谴责“反砍刀”组织民兵施虐行为表示失望。

武装团体一直参与自然资源(即黄金和钻石)的非法贸易和开采。在中非共和国西部，“反砍刀”组织成员正在 Boda 村(洛巴耶省)和 Guen 村(曼贝雷-卡代省)等偏远村庄挖掘和买卖钻石。在东部地区，塞雷卡部队仍然牢牢控制 Ndassima(瓦卡省)等手工开采金矿。国家矿务局正在逐步恢复对 Bria 和 Sam-Ouandja(上科托省)周边钻石产区的控制，对班吉的一些官方贸易正在恢复。然而，塞雷卡个别指挥官夺取部分钻石，将其转运至苏丹。

2013 年 5 月中非共和国被暂停参加金伯利进程证书制度，禁止官方钻石出口。然而，班吉商行继续正式购买和储存来自所有产区的钻石，同时贸易欺诈增

多，无论是途径班吉或邻国。2013 年底发生“反砍刀”组织派别暴力和宗教暴力之后，许多钻石收购商逃离中非共和国西部，目前在喀麦隆继续开展业务。

自 2013 年 12 月 5 日实施武器禁运以来，除了非法进口猎枪弹药，专家组没有记录任何重大的武器、弹药或军事装备转让。武装团体主要使用发生危机前在该国流通的小武器，或在政府国防和安全部队瓦解之后及塞雷卡在班吉实行统治之初从政府库存获得的小武器。

依照安全理事会第 2127(2013)、2134(2014)和 2149(2014)号决议编写了专家小组临时报告，其依据是 2014 年 3 月至 5 月在中非共和国(包括班吉及洛巴耶省、曼贝雷-卡代省、纳纳-曼贝雷省、瓦姆省、瓦卡省、上科托省和巴明吉-班戈兰省)和邻国(喀麦隆和刚果)进行的调查，以及中非共和国过渡当局、会员国及国际、区域和次区域组织及私人实体提供的资料。

专家小组注意到，中非共和国危机的区域特性是武装团体成员来自不同地方，而且利用邻国领土。小组还承认该区域各国为执行安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议采取了各种措施。

专家小组在本临时报告概述了中非共和国政治和安全局势的发展变化，并介绍了案例研究，还包括向安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会提出的若干建议。

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一. 背景

A. 任务和任命

1. 安全理事会根据其 2013 年 12 月 5 日第 2127(2013)号决议对中非共和国实施一项制裁制度,并设立了制裁委员会(安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会)和监测其执行情况的专家小组(中非共和国问题专家小组)。继 2014 年 1 月 28 日通过第 2134(2014)号决议之后,委员会任务范围有所扩大,包括能够定向制裁(旅行禁令和资产冻结)应对该决议第 36 和第 37 段所列的行为负责的个人和实体。

2. 2014 年 2 月 13 日,秘书长与委员会协商,任命小组五名成员(S/2014/98),包括区域专家(Paul-Simon Handy)、武器专家(Ahmed Himmiche)、金融和自然资源专家(Ruben de Koning)、武装团体专家和小组协调(Aurélien Lorca)及人道主义专家(Carolina Reyes Aragón)。

3. 专家小组原地办公,但 2014 年 3 月至 5 月几乎一直在班吉办公。此外,还派团经公路前往多个省份(Bambari、Batalimo、Beloko、Boda、Bossangoa、Bouar、Cantonner、Carnot、Gadzi、Guen 和 Mba ki),或乘飞机前往(Ndélé和 Bria)。专家小组还前往喀麦隆(雅温得)、加蓬(利伯维尔)、刚果(布拉柴维尔)和法国(巴黎),介绍其任务并与政府官员会晤。

4. 3 月,专家小组前往联合国总部,与制裁委员会讨论其第一次更新的资料,这些资料已于 2014 年 3 月 5 日转交安全理事会主席。专家小组与委员会成员、中非共和国邻国外交官、建设和平委员会主席及其中非共和国特使和联合国实体进行了双边会晤。

B. 方法

5. 专家小组努力确保遵守安全理事会关于制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组在其 2006 年 12 月报告(S/2006/997,附件)中提出的标准。这些标准要求尽可能依靠经核实的真实文件、具体证据和专家的现场观察,包括拍照。如无法亲临现场,专家小组则试图用多个独立的消息来源证实信息,适当地达到尽可能高的标准,并较为重视主要行为人和事件第一手证人的陈述。

6. 专家小组打算尽可能以透明方式行事,但如果指明消息来源会使小组成员或其他人面临不可接受的安全风险,专家小组则不会披露身份信息,并将相关证据保存在联合国档案中。

7. 专家小组同样致力于最大限度做到公平，酌情并尽可能地努力向有关各方提供报告中可能提到的涉及他们的任何信息，供他们在规定的时限内审阅、发表意见和作出反应。

8. 专家小组维护其工作的独立性，抵制任何削弱其公允立场或使其被视为持有偏见的尝试。小组根据协调员将本报告转交安全理事会主席之前达到的共识，核准本报告文本、结论和建议。

9. 根据大会关于控制文件和限制字数的各项决议，尤其是第 52/214、53/208 号和第 59/265 号决议，专家小组决定将其部分调查结果和意见纳入本报告附件，避免翻译许多内容。

C. 与利益攸关方和各组织的合作

10. 专家小组强调指出，与中非共和国过渡当局、尤其是与过渡时期国家元首凯凯瑟琳·桑巴-潘沙内阁进行了良好合作。向该国政府有关成员，包括总理和几位部长，介绍了制裁委员会和专家小组的任务，而且小组按照其任务规定并应要求，获取主管机构和官员提供的现有资料。小组还向在中非共和国的主要利益攸关方，包括国际部队和国际社会成员，解释了其任务规定和安全理事会有关决议。

11. 专家小组在各省能够依靠由非洲主导的中非共和国国际支助团(中非支助团)提供护卫，获得在行动中缴获的武器和弹药，并在保密的基础上交流与其任务有关的资料。在实地进行有效部署前，小组期待与驻中非共和国欧洲联盟部队合作。法国驻中非共和国部队(“红蝴蝶”行动)准许小组充分获得收缴的武器和弹药。然而，迄今交流信息受限，即使在国际部队受到袭击的情况下。

12. 最后，专家小组获得了联合国中非共和国建设和平综合办事处(中非建和办)提供的宝贵后勤支援，以执行其任务。目前，小组正与联合国中非共和国多层面综合稳定团(中非稳定团)共同努力使信息交流正式化，并确保长期提供后勤支援。

13. 专家小组向 18 个国家、组织和私人实体发出 23 封正式信函，迄今收到九份答复，其中提供了所要求的资料(另见附件 1)。

二. 和平与安全受到的威胁

A. 政治与区域背景

1. 概述：了解冲突

14. 中非共和国的冲突于 2012 年爆发，导致由各个叛乱团体结成的机会主义联盟“塞雷卡”于 2013 年 3 月 24 日推翻弗朗索瓦·博齐泽总统，这是该国在近 40 年来经历的一系列危机中最近的一次冲突升级。几十年来，历届政府的薄弱权力

都集中在首都，而武装团体(叛乱分子和土匪)则控制着中非共和国领土的大片地区。

15. 自 1960 年从法国独立以来，中非共和国连续经历了四次政变和多次政变企图，这一常态创造出了以暴力和经济掠夺为特点的政治文化。发展和支持武装团体已经成为获取政治权力和经济财富的普遍途径(见附件 2)。

16. 反复的政治危机已陷入恶性循环，严重削弱了中非共和国的经济。作为一个以不稳定为常态的内陆贫穷国家，中非共和国一直无法成功利用其丰富的经济资源，大部分人口处于普遍的贫困状况。¹

17. 同时，政治精英和武装团体非法垄断并控制了该国矿产资源(尤其是钻石和黄金)。因此，对小型矿业的控制已成为一项重要工具，能够让国家机构中的庇护者网络从中受益，同时为叛乱团体的活动提供部分资金(见下文关于自然资源的 C 节)。

18. 中非共和国地处诸多边缘化贫穷地区和邻国的交汇处，其中乍得、刚果民主共和国、刚果、南苏丹和苏丹近几年也经历了重大武装冲突。

19. 中非共和国的暴力冲突在许多方面是邻国动荡的结果，同时也造成了邻国局势不稳定。例如，在席卷苏丹、乍得和中非共和国的冲突中，邻国的叛乱团体将中非共和国用作后方基地。² 声称信仰基督教原教旨主义意识形态的乌干达叛乱团体上帝抵抗军为逃避乌干达人民国防军的军事打击，进入中非共和国的国土避难，偶尔会对该国东部的村庄实施袭击(见下文 B 节)。

20. 中非共和国本身也将安全问题输出到邻国。20 世纪 90 年代期间，被称为拦路抢劫者的当地土匪主要在喀麦隆的公路上破坏安全。此外，中非共和国历次安全危机也造成大批难民滞留邻国，其中一些难民还是武装分子。

21. 这种情况和其他因素促使在社区一级成立自卫民兵组织，其中一些是“反砍刀”组织前身(见附件 5)。

22. 因此，该区域各国对中非共和国的政治事态发展有着一定影响，其影响方式要么是通过向一个或多个政治团体提供支持，³ 要么是向该国派出维持和平部队或支持开展政治斡旋。

¹ 联合国开发计划署：《2013 年人类发展报告——南方的崛起：多元化世界中的人类进步》(2013 年，纽约)。

² 2006 年，来自苏丹的乍得叛军利用中非共和国领土发起对恩贾梅纳的决定性袭击。在 20 世纪 80 年代，南苏丹的苏丹人民解放军广泛利用中非共和国领土作为后方基地。

³ 2003 年，弗朗索瓦·博齐泽总统通过一次受乍得和法国支持的政变上台。在与博齐泽发生分歧后，乍得和法国也容许塞雷卡于 2013 年 3 月推翻博齐泽先生的统治。

23. 然而，邻国的参与有时也会造成摩擦，当地人认为乍得涉嫌卷入塞雷卡叛军的看法就反映出这种摩擦。这种看法促使乍得于 2014 年 4 月 3 日宣布退出非洲中非支助团。该支助团是非洲联盟于 2013 年 12 月 19 日建立的区域力量，用以取代中部非洲国家经济共同体驻中非共和国巩固和平特派团。

排外和反乍得言论的形成

24. 中非共和国当前危机的最显著特点之一是在政治和安全重组的背景下出现了强烈的、带有宗教意味的排外和反乍得言论，其原因既在于当地人的民族性观念，也在于近年来发生的事件：即外国战斗人员开始在国家机构和叛军控制的地区中占据重要职位。在塞雷卡的短暂统治期间发生了大量的侵犯人权行为，包括大规模抢劫、强奸和骚扰等，这使排外言论进入了政坛主流。⁴

25. 历史上，中非共和国的东北部地区人烟稀少，主要居民是与喀麦隆、乍得、南苏丹和苏丹的类似族群在文化和经济上有着密切联系的少数族裔群体(古拉人、阿拉伯人、颇尔族和龙古人)。东北部地区是该国最受忽视的一部分，几乎没有通向首都的公路，社会基础设施也很少。该区域的大多数居民为穆斯林(穆斯林约占中非共和国总人口的 15%左右)。因此，东北部地区在经济上和文化上都更倾向于乍得和苏丹，而不是班吉或中非共和国的其他地区。

26. 该国其他地区的人们对于东北部地区居民的普遍印象是：就其种族、宗教和生活而言，他们算是外国人。相反，北方人特别是东北部地区居民经常会产生遭受边缘化的情绪。⁵

27. 中非共和国最近爆发出带有强烈反穆斯林意味的排外和反乍得情绪，其触发原因要在前塞雷卡 2013 年夺权并统治 10 个月的背景下才能理解。由于塞雷卡队伍内部有乍得和苏丹士兵，中非共和国大多数民众都认为叛军联盟是一个正在征服大多数本国人民的境外集团。塞雷卡主要骚扰非穆斯林社区的做法加剧了人们内心的怨恨，而“反砍刀”组织则出于政治目的不失时机地引导这种情绪。

28. 2013 年下半年，这个最初以保护平民和社区免受在国家支持下对非穆斯林的有组织迫害为宗旨的自卫团体重新抬头，形成了一个更广泛、更结构化和更有组织的反塞雷卡运动。这也给了前中非武装部队一个机会，针对 2013 年 3 月政变期间击败他们的势力实施期待已久的报复。

⁴ 2014 年 5 月 21 日和 24 日在班吉与过渡全国委员会一名成员以及乔托迪亚过渡政府的一名前部长举行多次会谈。

⁵ 2014 年 5 月 24 日在班吉与某政党主席举行会晤：这种边缘化的明显表现之一是，东北部地区人民在国家行政和军队上层的任职人数非常少。例如，除了自称为将军的塞雷卡将领之外，东北地区从未出过任何将军。

29. “反砍刀”组织之所以享有当地人民的坚定支持，主要是植根于一种观念：是他们把国家从外国侵略中解放出来。⁶ 许多政界人士、特别是但不完全是前总统博齐泽先生身边的人士积极活动，大力促成了这种言论的形成，最终鼓动在班吉和“反砍刀”组织控制的其他地区有针对性地杀戮穆斯林。此时，已将穆斯林社区成员与塞雷卡分子——外国人——乍得人——圣战分子划等号。

当前的过渡及其挑战

30. 法律上，目前的过渡期植根于 2013 年 1 月在利伯维尔签署的协议和《恩贾梅纳宣言》（见 S/2014/319，第 38 段）。若干行为体和观察人士认为《利伯维尔协议》无效，因为其主要签署方（博齐泽先生和乔托迪亚先生）已不再执政。⁷ 但是，《恩贾梅纳宣言》的构建者认为该协定是《利伯维尔协议》的延续，后者的精神在不同的状况下得到了延续，只是具有不同的行为体。

31. 据报道，乍得总统伊德里斯·代比曾经许诺塞雷卡将在中非共和国新政府中担任总理一职。但这一承诺并没有兑现对塞雷卡造成了伤害。⁸ 相反，“反砍刀”组织成员认为《恩贾梅纳停火协定》签署方错过了一个宝贵的机会，因为该协定未对乔托迪亚先生任命的过渡全国委员会进行改革。⁹

32. 围绕当前过渡期合法性的问题可能会分裂现政府，特别是因为涉及到代表权这一敏感问题。中非共和国有着过渡失败与和平协定软弱的悠久历史。自博齐泽先生 2003 年夺权以来，中非共和国的叛乱如雨后春笋般爆发，随后达成的一系列协议都没有得到认真落实。博齐泽先生倒台的原因可以归咎于诸多原因，其中之一就是他缺乏落实政治协议并认真开展解除武装、复员和重返社会（复员方案）的政治意愿（见附件 2）。

33. 由于中非武装部队在 2013 年 3 月的政变中军事失利，法国干预后塞雷卡进驻并于稍后被驱逐，以及乔托迪亚政府倒台，中非共和国的国家军队完全不存在。由于在民兵重组的当前背景下局势脆弱，再加上关于该国可能分治的报告互相矛盾，这个问题更加复杂（见下文关于武装团体的 B 节）。国际行为体所面

⁶ 中非共和国人民广泛持有的这种看法是与事实不符的，因为法国于 2013 年 12 月 6 日派出的红蝴蝶部队制止了塞雷卡的杀戮，但自卫民兵组织却借机扩大了对穆斯林的袭击。

⁷ 2014 年 3 月 20 日在班吉会晤让-雅克·德马富特（目前在总统府任公使衔参赞，负责安全及与“红蝴蝶”行动和中非支助团的关系。班吉和利伯维尔的一些行为体也表达了同样的看法。

⁸ 2014 年 3 月 14 日，民主过渡力量联盟发表声明，批评乍得总统代比坚持将向塞雷卡领导人作出的承诺作为 2014 年 1 月 10 日将其免职的条件。声明敦促所有各方遵守《恩贾梅纳停火协定》和当前的过渡期。见民主过渡力量联盟第 007/014 号宣言。

⁹ 2014 年 5 月 3 日在班吉与 Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona 会晤。

面临的挑战是如何在缺乏国家军队的情况下确保安全，同时帮助过渡当局建立一支军队。

2. 区域背景

34. 中非共和国冲突植根于区域动态的网络之中，与诸多邻国的局势发展有关系。中非共和国的不稳定状况至少在部分程度上与邻国(乍得、刚果民主共和国、南苏丹和苏丹)的不稳定状况联系在一起。中非共和国危机的区域背景体现为一系列的重要因素：大量外国战斗人员和武装团体(叛乱团体、拦路抢劫者和偷猎者)；小武器和轻武器在该区域大量流通；一些邻国与在中非共和国拥有战略利益；区域组织众多(中部非洲经济和货币共同体和非洲联盟)。此外，该地区大多数国家都将“博科哈拉姆”团体所带来的宗教极端主义威胁视为主要安全威胁，安全理事会于2014年5月22日将该团体列入基地组织制裁名单。


35. 中非共和国最近的不稳定状况对邻国构成了不同程度的影响。喀麦隆、乍得和刚果民主共和国在安全、人道主义和经济方面受到了直接影响，而其他国家(例如刚果，特别是南苏丹和苏丹)受到的影响较小。因此，该地区各国认为中非共和国的不稳定状况对本国的稳定构成了威胁，已采取一系列的措施应对中非共和国的危机。

36. 专家小组2014年2月13日开始行使职责之后，先后访问了喀麦隆、刚果和加蓬，获得这些国家为执行安理会第2127(2013)号和第2134(2014)号决议而采取的各种措施的第一手资料(见附件3)。

B. 武装团体

37. 目前，武装团体几乎对中非共和国所有有人居住的地区都施加着影响力，只有班吉的几个街区以及姆博穆省和上姆博穆省的大部分地区除外。该国事实上已被分割成两个部分，其分界线目前位于瓦姆-彭代省北部、瓦姆省和凯莫省的北部和东部以及瓦卡省的西部和南部，所谓的“反砍刀”组织民兵主要活跃于前线西部，“新的”塞雷卡则活跃于前线以东(见下图)。

2014 年 5 月 25 日中非共和国武装团体的控制区和影响区



38. 外国武装团体也在相对较轻的程度上利用中非共和国领土作为后方基地，掠夺平民的财产，征收苛捐杂税。更具体而言，上帝抵抗军自 2007 年以来一直活跃在中非共和国东部，经常发生孤立事件(其他武装团体的详情见附件 4)。

39. 在首都和准许专家小组进入的各省，专家小组采访了“反砍刀”组织运动的大部分主要政治和军事领导人以及前塞雷卡的不同派别。

40. 如上文所述(见 A 节)，当前的权力真空为中非共和国滋生政治军事集团的长期传统提供了肥沃的土壤。事实上，政治人物争相成为武装团体的代言人，以便通过谈判获得政府内部的职位，促进自己的政治生涯。他们倾向于夸大自己的代表程度(在影响区和民兵实力方面)及其有效监督和控制自身活动的的能力。

41. 此外，专家小组获得的情报和实地观察表明，自称“反砍刀”组织的团体以及“新的”塞雷卡对商品和乘客的流动以及在其影响区内运营的当地企业非法征税，从中谋取利益(参见 C 节)，从而加强了自身的政治和军事存在及其长期持续直接控制和影响该国大部分地区(包括首都)的能力。

42. 最后，专家小组认为，无论是与“反砍刀”组织还是与前塞雷卡相关联的武装团体都受到政治破坏者的操纵和煽动，犯下了针对平民和国际部队的暴力行为，其目的在于加强这些领导人的影响力，破坏过渡进程或推动国家分治。

43. 专家小组认为，这种局面破坏了过渡当局恢复和维护公众安全和法治的信誉和能力，从而对过渡协议和政治过渡进程(包括定于 2015 年举行的自由和公正的民主选举)构成了威胁。

44. 因此，制裁委员会应考虑对专家小组确定的从事或支持安全理事会第 2134(2014)号决议第 36 和 37 段所列此类行为的个人和实体实施有针对性的制裁，包括推动国家分治的个人和实体，因为这对中非共和国和本区域当前的稳定构成了主要威胁。

安全事件

“反砍刀”组织

45. “反砍刀”组织并不是一个采用集权式架构、能够有效指挥和控制其成员的武装集团。相反，专家小组将“反砍刀”组织界定为由不同民兵组成的混合体，他们要么认为自身是“反砍刀”组织运动的一部分，要么默认在当前或过去与该组织有关联。

46. 根据专家小组数据库中的信息，2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 30 日期间，被视为属于“反砍刀”组织的团体杀害了 670 名平民和 3 名人道主义援助人员。根据专家小组的记录，“反砍刀”组织在博桑戈阿和博大袭击平民，破坏财产，阻碍人道主义援助。附件 5.5 和 23 对“反砍刀”组织的状况作出了案例分析。

47. 在班吉，专家小组根据对“反砍刀”组织内部线报和其他行为体的约谈，认为与 Patrice-Edouard Nga ïsona 领导的派别有关联的“反砍刀”组织团体应对袭击国际部队负责。例如，2014 年 3 月 22 日，根据中非支助团向专家小组提供的官方报告，当时“反砍刀”组织分子在班吉的 Combattant 和 Fou 社区重伤中非支助团的几名刚果和卢旺达籍士兵；2014 年 3 月 25 日，专家小组目睹了法国军队在机场附近遭受重大袭击(见附件 5.6)。

48. 专家小组证实，来自机场以及 Boeing 和 Castors 社区的境内流离失所者营地的“反砍刀”组织团体是袭击班吉 PK5 社区的罪魁祸首，当地教派和宗教暴力的大多数受害者仍然健在。但是，具体的“反砍刀”组织指挥官是否对此直接责任还有待确定。然而，Nga ïsona 在与专家小组会谈时表示，在这些社区的“反砍刀”组织团体受他的组织控制。¹⁰

49. 附件 5 介绍了“反砍刀”组织运动的不同组成部分及其目前动态。

¹⁰ 2014 年 5 月 3 日在班吉与 Patrice-Edouard Nga ïsona 会晤。

塞雷卡

50. 根据专家小组数据库中的信息,前塞雷卡应对 2013 年 12 月 5 日和 2014 年 4 月 30 日之间杀害 453 名平民和 7 名人道主义援助工作者负责。

51. 专家小组通过多个情报来源证实,前塞雷卡伊萨上校¹¹ (Alkhatim 准将手下的一名高级军官¹²)部下涉嫌于 2014 年 4 月 26 日在 Boguila 杀害了 3 名人道主义援助工作者以及 15 名平民和社区领袖。

52. Alkhatim 准将的部队还参与了 2014 年 5 月 5 日在瓦姆-彭代省 Bémal 镇与法国军队发生的暴力冲突(见附件 7)。专家小组通过多个秘密情报来源再次证实伊萨上校直接参与其中。

53. 此外,专家小组还获得了一份证词,¹³ 指控“新的”塞雷卡在瓦姆省 Batangafo 区的指挥官 Saleh Zabadi 上校和 Alkhatim 准将于 2014 年 4 月 16 日绑架了抵达 Batangafo 庆祝复活节假期的博桑戈阿主教和其他 3 名牧师。国际社会和其他行为体为此在班吉发起了强有力的动员,次日,这 4 名牧师在卡博获释,¹⁴ 但随身财物被洗劫一空。

54. 最后,军方情报来源告诉专家小组,忠于 Ali Daras 准将的部队参与了 2014 年 5 月 24 日猛烈袭击在班巴里执行“建立信任措施”的国际部队,包括使用火箭弹和轻机枪。

55. 尽管塞雷卡在政治上表现得仍很薄弱,但分治的支持者对“新”塞雷卡的命运及进程施加影响,其影响力不容小觑,这是中非共和国稳定和领土完整面临的真正风险。

56. 塞雷卡的新军事构架及其临时政治协调的详情见附件 6。

C. 开采自然资源

1. 钻石

57. 2013 年 5 月 23 日,中非共和国被暂时中止参加金伯利进程证书制度。依照 2000 年 12 月 1 日大会第 55/56 号决议,非洲产钻石国发起金伯利进程,涉及各国政府、钻石业和民间社会,以阻止反叛运动利用毛坯钻石的流通来资助反对合法政府的军事活动。在中止中非共和国参加前的两个月,在金伯利网站上发布了

¹¹ 2014 年 4 月和 5 月在博桑戈阿和班吉与秘密情报来源和机构联系人会晤。

¹² 2014 年 5 月 20 日与 Alkhatim Mahamat 准将的电话会谈。

¹³ 证词在联合国存档。

¹⁴ 参与营救牧师会谈的外交官向专家小组确认, Alkhatim 准将直接卷入这起绑架事件。

一份地图，说明塞雷卡反叛运动在该国东部钻石富饶地区的推进和阵地情况，即布里亚、萨姆万贾(上科托省)和巴明吉(巴明吉-班戈兰省)(见附件 8)。2013 年 4 月 18 日，金伯利进程主席呼吁金伯利参与方警惕反叛团体可能将毛坯钻石非法带入供应链。当时，塞雷卡反叛联盟已经在班吉夺权。

58. 据中非共和国金伯利进程常务秘书 2013 年年度报告称，该国在 2013 年第一季度期间出口 43 929 克拉，价值超过 900 万美元。该国在第二季度期间又出口 75 017 克拉，价值超过 1 100 万美元。主要的出口目的地是欧洲联盟(67%)和阿拉伯联合酋长国(31%)。相比之下，2012 年该国出口 371 917 克拉，价值超过 6 200 万美元。¹⁵

59. 虽然已暂停出口毛坯钻石，但合法的钻石采购一直得以持续。2014 年 3 月，矿业和地质总局及特别反欺诈股对班吉的主要钻石采购商行库存进行了联合核查。Sodiam 公司(中央钻石公司)的库存为 40 576 克拉，价值 830 万美元，主要来自中非共和国西部。矿产和地质总局的采购记录显示，Sodiam 公司的绝大多数库存是在中止中非共和国参加金伯利进程后购买的(90%)。¹⁶ 来自西部的曼贝雷卡代省和洛巴耶省 Carnot、Guen 及博达的钻石收购商告诉专家小组，Sodiam 公司仍在购买他们的钻石。¹⁷

60. 3 月，Badica 公司(中非共和国钻石采购办事处)的库存为 760 克拉。¹⁸ Badica 公司的总监告诉专家小组，由于中止中非共和国参加金伯利进程证书制度以及如 2014 年 2 月在贝拉蒂蒂发生的外地办事处遭劫等风险，该公司已停止采购。¹⁹ 然而，2014 年 4 月对 Badica 公司进行的第二次清点工作发现，该公司又从布里亚和萨姆万贾购买了 1 698 克拉，价值 292 917 美元。²⁰ Badica 公司的库存钻石并未遵守中非共和国当局 2013 年 6 月为重新加入金伯利进程提出的路线图的要求，尚未由负责的采矿当局对包裹进行密封并注明日期。²¹

¹⁵ https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/public_statistics/2012/2012GlobalSummary.pdf，2014 年 5 月 1 日查阅。

¹⁶ 报告全文在联合国存档。

¹⁷ 与 Carnot、Guen 和博达的钻石收购商的多次约谈，2014 年 4 月 24 日至 27 日。

¹⁸ Badica 公司是安特卫普的阿伯杜卡里姆集团的组成部分，该集团是安特卫普钻石交易所成员。该公司还包括 Minair 航空公司和索非亚公路运输公司。所有三家公司都在中非共和国注册。见 <http://www.groupeabdoukarim.com/>，2014 年 5 月 22 日查阅。

¹⁹ 与班吉的 BADICA 公司总监的约谈，2014 年 4 月 28 日。

²⁰ 关于核查 Badica 公司储存情况的报告在联合国存档。

²¹ 金伯利进程路线图，2013 年 6 月，在联合国存档。

61. 未在 Sud Azur 和 Socadiam 公司发现库存。Sud Azur 公司的总裁告诉专家小组，该公司已对该国西部和东部的采矿作业进行预先投资，但由于不安全状况，公司未能对其投资采取后续行动。
62. 尽管在中非共和国境内有少量合法销售以及在班吉有毛坯钻石库存外，毛坯钻石还在首都进行切割，以便在当地出售并可能被运往国外，不论是否以珠宝产品形式交易。例如，Bijouterie Guinot 公司持有购买、切割和打磨钻石的执照。该公司每月加工量最多为 100 克拉。在班吉出售的切割钻石通常供自用而非用于转售。金伯利进程证书制度不涉及切割钻石的贸易。
63. 2014 年 4 月，专家小组访问了该国西部的手工开采钻石地区。根据当地矿主称，博达-Guen-Carnot 轴线上的钻石产量比 2013 年减少了 50% 至 70%。产量下降在很大程度上是由于 2014 年 1 月底塞雷卡部队撤离及“反砍刀”组织民兵发动叛乱后，几乎所有穆斯林收购商纷纷离开。这些收购商曾对采矿作业进行预先投资，从矿主手中购买钻石并出售给班吉的采购商行或将钻石走私到国外。有些收购商返回了母国，如乍得、马里和塞内加尔；有些搬到仍处于塞雷卡控制下的东部钻石地区或在喀麦隆边界城镇 Kenzou 和加鲁阿布赖定居。留在西部钻石生产地区的收购商通常是基督徒或穆斯林-基督徒混种。Guen 的 Leonard Bakongo 及 Sasele 的格雷瓜尔·穆萨等人还兼任当地“反砍刀”组织指挥官。
64. 除担任矿主或收购商，“反砍刀”组织还设法向城市中心的钻石贸易商收取保护费。在 Carnot，“反砍刀”组织成员向专家小组承认，他们的科长 Aime Blaise Zoworo 已联系现在或曾经与采购商行有关联的收购商，以便就保护安排进行谈判；此后，专家小组见到一张纸上写有目标人员的名字(见附件 9)。Zoworo 及其手下是 Nga ãsona 指挥结构的一部分(见附件 5)，佩戴标准的“反砍刀”组织身份徽章(见附件 5.3)。
65. 与塞雷卡此前的做法相似，Carnot 的“反砍刀”组织设法向经济从业者收取保护费。据驻 Carnot 特别反欺诈股称，塞雷卡曾要求购买商行每月支付 400 美元保护费，Carnot 的收购商每月支付 100 美元。
66. 2014 年 5 月，专家小组访问了布里亚的钻石贸易中心。据当地的采矿当局称，塞雷卡分子在通向北部的道路干线上巡逻，但未在矿区部署人员。收购商告诉专家小组，矿区有塞雷卡人员，但他们未征收任何税款。在 4 月 7 日中非支助团和“红蝴蝶”行动抵达前，塞雷卡曾想向 Sodiam 和 Badica 公司为加快将钻石运至班吉而租用的私营航空公司收取 75 美元着陆税。
67. 班吉、Guen 和布里亚的主要钻石收购商声称其钻石被合法出售给班吉的采购商行，并指责其他收购商和钻石贩运者将钻石走私到喀麦隆、乍得或苏丹等国家。实际上，许多收购商将一部分钻石合法出售以满足采矿当局的要求，并采用

欺诈手段将另一部分钻石运离该国，这主要是因为班吉的采购商行购买力极低。据中非共和国武装部队军官、班吉和布里亚的钻石收购商和专家称，塞雷卡的 Omar Younous “将军” (别名 “Oumar Sodiam”) 将钻石从布里亚和萨姆万贾贩运到苏丹。专家小组继续根据关于在喀麦隆和乍得活动的钻石贩运者的初步资料进行调查。

2. 黄金

68. 中非共和国的手工黄金产量估计为每年 2 吨，价值与其钻石部门相似。²² 黄金储藏区域大致与钻石矿床地区相同。2013 年期间，中非共和国官方出口 11 公斤黄金，而经矿业和地质部局标注后在当地珠宝店出售的黄金仅不到 1 公斤(联合国档案)。²³ 几乎所有黄金被贩运到邻国。例如，2013 和 2014 年，喀麦隆海关当局在杜阿拉机场截获了来自班吉的过境旅行者携带的共 7.5 公斤黄金，上述人员为 1 名喀麦隆人和 2 名中国国民。²⁴

69. 2012 年 12 月，由于持续不断的反叛活动，仅有的一家工业黄金探矿公司，加拿大 Axmin 有限公司停止了在班吉东北约 400 公里的 Ndassima(瓦卡省)的活动。据该公司报告，从北部攻占班巴里镇的反叛分子占领其采矿营地并扣留粮食、医疗用品和车辆。²⁵ Axmin 在 Ndassima 的作业是其 Passendro 项目的组成部分，Passendro 矿一旦投产，预计将年产约 6 400 公斤黄金。²⁶

70. 2014 年 5 月，专家小组访问了 Ndassima 金矿，数百名手工采矿者目前在 Axmin 的特许矿区工作，每月产量估计为 15 公斤(见附件 10)。Ali Daras 将军领导的瓦卡地区第 5 军区塞雷卡武装占领了 Axmin 公司的采矿营地并在通向金矿的矿工村入口处部署人员(见附件 11)。据手工采矿者和当地贸易商以及一名塞雷卡指挥官称，士兵们被指示不要从事商业活动也不要征税。²⁷ 在处理盗窃等事件时，他们的确会收到民众缴款。在 Ndassima 生产的大多数黄金的交易路径是通过空中和陆路经班吉贩运至喀麦隆。

²² Tieguhong Julius Chupezi, Verina Ingram and Jolien Schure, *Impacts of Artisanal Gold and Diamond Mining on Livelihoods and the Environment in the Sangha Tri-national Park Landscape* (Bogor, Indonesia, Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009), 可查阅 www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BChupezi0901.pdf (2014 年 5 月 3 日查阅)。

²³ 2013 年 1 月至 12 月黄金开采和海关出口情况，在联合国存档。

²⁴ 在联合国存档的文件。

²⁵ 见 <http://www.axmininc.com/site/Newsnbs/News2012/PRDecember242012.aspx>, 2014 年 5 月 3 日查阅。

²⁶ Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo, “The mineral industries of Central African Republic and Togo”, 2012 年矿物年鉴(美国地质调查局, 2013 年 12 月)。

²⁷ 2014 年 5 月 22 日与 Ndassima 的手工采矿者、黄金交易商及塞雷卡指挥官的约谈。

3. 野生动物

71. 偷猎和贩运野生动物是该国东北部塞雷卡叛乱的一项核心要素，塞雷卡 2013 年 3 月在班吉掌权后，这种做法蔓延到东南部。2012 年 12 月，60 名“生态卫士”（即欧洲联盟资助的“生态动物项目”招募在巴明吉-班戈兰省北部及 Manovo-Gounda-Saint-Floris 国家公园巡逻的人员）中的 22 人加入塞雷卡并抢掠位于 Sangba 的林警哨所。²⁸ 据称他们在 2013 年 2 月参与了对该地区 12 头大象的屠杀。²⁹

72. 虽然据信该地区残留的大象数目甚少，但捕猎德氏大羚羊和紫羚等大型羚羊类物种以及出售羚羊肉仍为当地塞雷卡武装提供了收入。塞雷卡武装通过自行捕猎或向偷猎者提供武器和弹药来控制这些活动。丛林野味的贸易路线通往班吉以及乍得和苏丹。来自恩代莱(巴明吉-班戈兰省)的地方当局和自然保护主义者提到，卡车车主 Aroun Assane(别名“Tigane”)与塞雷卡勾结，是主要的丛林野味运输商贩。³⁰

73. 在生态卫士叛逃并抢掠 Sangba 哨所前，“生态动物项目”已将包括 62 支 AK-47 突击步枪在内的大部分武器移交班吉的水利和林业部，以避免这些武器被塞雷卡收缴。³¹ 2013 年 3 月 24 日，塞雷卡控制班吉后抢掠了该部的仓库。被盗物品包括 135 支 AK-47 步枪，以及林业和野生动物当局在过去 20 年收缴的 124 根象牙(见附件 12)。

74. 2013 年 5 月 6 日，一伙全副武装的偷猎者进入桑加-姆巴埃雷省(该国西南部)的 Dzanga-Ndoki 国家公园，屠杀 26 头大象并摘下和取走象牙。³² 班吉的塞雷卡当局——水利和森林部及国防部——批准了上述乘坐马车和骆驼车队的偷猎者的活动。³³

75. 随着塞雷卡武装在 2014 年 1 月底撤离中非共和国西南部，此前活跃在这一地区的偷猎者纷纷返回。2014 年 2 月 17 日，Bayanga 的宪兵和野生动物当局在

²⁸ 2014 年 3 月 20 日与班吉的自然保护主义者的约谈。

²⁹ Kasper Agger, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic* (Enough Project, May 2014)。可查阅 www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf(2014 年 5 月 17 日查阅)。

³⁰ 3 月 20 日、3 月 22 日和 4 月 8 日与恩代莱和班吉的自然保护主义者及地方行政长官的约谈。

³¹ 确认“生态动物项目”向该部移交武器的信件，在联合国存档。

³² Wildlife News, “Elephant death toll at Dzanga Bai starts to come in”, 2013 年 5 月 10 日，可查阅 <http://wildlifeneews.co.uk/2013/elephant-death-toll-at-dzanga-bai-start-to-come-in> (2013 年 5 月 17 日查阅)。

³³ 2014 年 3 月 20 日和 4 月 21 日与班吉的自然保护主义者和森林警卫的约谈。

Dzanga Sangha 国家公园内逮捕了长期偷猎者 René Sangha Zéle，罪名是非法持有一支.375 口径毛瑟枪，而这种步枪主要被用来猎杀大型猎物(在中非共和国，大型猎物主要指水牛和大象等保护物种)。³⁴ 2007 年，中非当局曾以屠杀大象的罪名逮捕了 René Sangha Zéle，但此人随后越狱，并于 2013 年 8 月在喀麦隆 Lobeke 国家公园因持有两根象牙和一支大型猎用来复枪而再次被捕。2013 年 9 月，Yokadouma 法院判处 René Sangha 入狱两个月，而其孪生兄弟 Symphorien Sangha 被判处最高的三年徒刑，因为法院裁定他的罪行不仅是屠杀大象，还包括袭击林警。³⁵ 兄弟二人被控在桑加三国公园保护区共屠杀了 100 头大象。³⁶

76. 专家小组继续调查 René Sangha 的偷猎网络，据自然保护主义者和野生动物当局称，该网络包括 Salo 的一名警察，此人可能违反武器禁运，将猎枪和弹药带入中非共和国。

77. 对木材、牲畜和石油的进一步分析载于附件 13。

三. 违反武器禁运行为

A. 中非共和国武器弹药状况

78. 随着安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议授权在 2013 年 12 月加强法国部队和中非支助团，塞雷卡垮台，完全丧失对过去由政府保管的武器弹药的控制。

79. 专家小组已制定一个在中非共和国流通的军火、武器弹药基线，用作评估武器禁运执行情况和效果的数据基准。为此，专家小组已利用各种指标和来源，对该国各种武库进行数量和质量估计。

80. 中非支助团和法国部队自 2013 年 12 月以来开展了解除武装行动，在此期间对收集的武器弹药进行了质量分析，使得专家小组能够清楚地了解在中非共和国流通的军事装备的类型和品牌。专家小组深信，国际部队所收集的武器库存明确反映出政府部队和塞雷卡以前拥有的武库。这些武库主要由小武器和轻武器组成，包括几套最大 120 毫米口径的迫击炮弹和其他武器系统，如多管火箭发射器、两架在班吉中非共和国空军基地停落的不能运作的 Mil Mi-24 型攻击直升机以及装甲运兵车(见附件 14)。除了斯洛伐克在 2008 年出口的 3 辆装甲车外，联合国

³⁴ 自然保护主义组织提供的资料，班吉和雅温得，2014 年 4 月 1 日。

³⁵ 同上。

³⁶ Robbie Corey-Boulet, “Cameroon court judges twin brothers accused of killing 100 elephants”, 2013 年 9 月 24 日。可查阅 www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-court-judges-twin-brothers-accused-of-killing-100-elephants/1755919.html (2014 年 5 月 17 日查阅)。

常规武器登记册未提及对中非共和国的任何其他常规武器出口。武器弹药概况载于本报告附件 15 和 16。

81. 中非共和国境内流通的弹药有各种来源，最近的是苏丹在 2011 年至 2013 年制造的。专家小组编制的概况显示，在中非共和国流通的弹药是 1961 年至 2013 年的 52 年期间 16 个国家的 42 个制造商生产的。该概况包括 116 批弹药和不同制造商和生产年份信息。

B. 武器扩散

82. 由于无法获得记录和档案，专家小组难以估计各种武装团体和犯罪网络接管的武器弹药的数量和类型，因此也难以估计全国各地以及该次区域的武器弹药扩散程度。

83. 目前在中非共和国流通的大部分武器弹药被确定为来自以下来源：

- (a) 中非共和国武装部队武库；
- (b) 塞雷卡最初的持有；
- (c) 解除武装，复员和重返社会活动期间收集的存货分流；
- (d) 抢劫前总统博齐泽的库存；
- (e) 各种武装团体和犯罪网络跨界走私武器。

84. 前塞雷卡队伍的装备大多来自其统治班吉期间的政府库存。举例来说，联合国排雷行动处分别在 2012 年 12 月和 2013 年 12 月对班吉的三个解除武装、复员和重返社会弹药储存设施进行的两次评估显示，超过 82% 的过时弹药以及 98% 的小武器弹药下落不明，即丢失 9 600 个过时物件和 164 000 发子弹。此外，前塞雷卡领导下的中非共和国当局还收缴了以前解除武装工作期间收集的中部非洲多国部队武器。³⁷

85. 在包括宪兵在内的大约 8 000 名中非共和国武装部队士兵以及几百名塞雷卡战斗人员在夺取班吉之前持有的最初军事装备中，只有 122 支突击步枪被宣布目前由中非共和国正规部队保管(宪兵有 52 支、中非共和国武装部队有 70 支)。在班吉，国际部队收缴了大约 1 100 件小武器，以及驻扎在班吉的前塞雷卡部队持有的大部分轻武器和有关弹药，包括最大 14.5 毫米口径的轻型和重型机枪、60 毫米至 120 毫米口径的迫击身铝管以及各种火箭榴弹(见附件 14)。

³⁷ 中部非洲多国部队 1 名成员和 Issa Issaka 将军签署移交文件副本在联合国存档。

86. 专家小组获悉，由于武器扩散，小武器已流入当地市场。据报，前塞雷卡成员在一些地区以约 80 美元的价格出售 AK 型突击步枪，“反砍刀”组织以 1 至 2 美元的价格出售中国制造的 82-2 型手榴弹。据报，手榴弹是人道主义行为体在 2014 年第一季度面临的重大挑战，当时一些平民包括儿童被手榴弹炸伤或炸死。

87. 班吉的小武器能见度在过去两个月大大降低，但仍有一些地区夜间有时可以听到武器射击。在班吉以外，专家小组在实地考察中看到，各种“反砍刀”组织检查站由武装人员把守，其中一些人身着军装、手持冲锋枪，还有些人是穿平民服装、携带传统式狩猎步枪或大砍刀的地方战斗人员。

88. 专家小组有时还观察到小股“反砍刀”组织战士，他们装备良好，配备有突击步枪、轻型机枪和火箭榴弹，行动方式是两辆小卡车一组的车队。北方事件和安全报告也表明，小武器在武装团体内扩散，这些团体或者身份不明，或者与前塞雷卡分子有关联。不过，没有任何迹象表明使用了重型机关枪、无后座力步枪或迫击炮。

C. 非法转让武器弹药

89. 检查收缴的武器弹药使专家小组有机会开始调查违反军火禁运非法转让小武器和弹药的情况。在三起事件中，专家小组发现了小武器，以前不知道中非共和国武装部队和前塞雷卡的武库中有这些武器。

90. 第一起案件涉及利用打磨工具，故意去除许多 AKM 步枪上的标识和序列号（见附件 17）。消除标识当然是要掩盖武器来源，这些武器可能违反武器禁运走私到中非共和国。安全理事会授权设立的其他专家小组和专家组也报告了故意去除标识行为，这阻碍武器追查成为监测武器禁运工具的一个手段。³⁸ 专家小组目前还在调查另外两个案件。

91. 最后，专家小组正在调查一名妇女和一名儿童在与喀麦隆接壤的一个主要陆地过境点走私猎用弹药（口径：12 毫米）的案件。这些弹药已被中非共和国海关当局没收。专家小组获悉，以前在同一地点发生过走私相同弹药的类似情况。这些欧洲制造的子弹是运给在喀麦隆的一名经纪人的。最终用户认证说，弹药将不会被出售或再出口到任何其他国家。这一案件不仅显示，走私武器弹药不仅是边界管制松懈的结果，还显示中部非洲次区域各国应依照 2010 年 11 月《中部非洲管制小武器和轻武器及其弹药和一切制造、维修、组装此类零部件公约》，就非法武器弹药转让进行有效的信息交流。

³⁸ 科特迪瓦问题专家组在其几份报告中报告了对前新生力量使用的武器的这种做法（如见 S/2013/228）。

92. 专家小组深入调查了此案件，因为在实地考察和检查期间还观察到“”组织分子改造了为小猎物设计的猎枪子弹，以便可以更有效地对付较大猎物或人。该过程包括去除原始子弹上的较小铅头，代之以手工弹丸，或者通过插入 7.62 毫米军用子弹或手工射弹来模仿猎枪子弹。此过程仍不成熟，但随着时间的推移可能会改进，以取得预期效果(见附件 18)。

93. 武器禁运制度法律框架载于附件 19。不遵守案件以及国际社会支持中非共和国安全部门改革的情况分别详见附件 21 和 22。

四. 阻碍向中非共和国运送人道主义援助

94. 2014 年期间，人道主义组织继续应对中非共和国的人道主义危机。然而，安全局势不稳定导致无法进入该国的许多地方，再加上资助制约和其他问题，使中非共和国目前成为非洲大陆人道主义紧急局势最严重的国家之一。

95. 人道主义事务协调厅认为，³⁹ 该国有 560 050 名境内流离失所者；135 050 人在班吉的 43 个流离失所者营地以及与收容家庭在一起。几乎一半人口(在约 460 万的总人口中，约有 250 万人)需要人道主义援助。弱势群体的人道主义需要包括食品、水和卫生设施援助、紧急住所、非粮食物品、保健、教育和保护。

96. 联合国难民事务高级专员公署认为自 2013 年 12 月以来，除了已经流离失所的 244 783 名难民，邻国有 120 472 名中非共和国新难民，大多数中非共和国难民在喀麦隆，其次在乍得、刚果和刚果民主共和国(见附件 31)。⁴⁰

97. 专家小组进行的调查记录了 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 30 日期间 103 起中非共和国境内阻碍运送人道主义援助事件。根据安全理事会第 2134(2014)号决议第 36 段(e)项，这些行为应受制裁。这一数字并不包括在全国各地发生的所有事件。博达和恩代莱的案卷说明不稳定安全局势如何给人道主义组织及其行动造成负面影响，以及不稳定局势阻碍为弱势人口发放援助(见附件 22 和 23)。

98. 在上述期间，中非共和国有 14 名援助工作者被杀害(见附件 24)。杀人行为似乎没有特定模式或趋势可循(见附件 28)。在一些情况下，有人因其工作性质被杀害，其他事件似乎是任意的暴力行为(见附件 24)。

³⁹ 中非共和国情况报告，第 25 期(2014 年 5 月 14 日)。可查阅 <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info>，2014 年 5 月 21 日查阅。

⁴⁰ “中非共和国局势”，难民署外部区域最新情况 15，2014 年 5 月 9 日至 15 日。可查阅 <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20External%20Regional%20Update%20CAR%20Situation%20%2315.pdf>，2015 年 5 月 21 日查阅。

99. 根据专家小组从主要和次要来源收集的信息,大约 60%的记录在案事件的犯罪人已被查明身份。据称,“反砍刀”组织对约 30%的记录在案事件负责,前塞雷卡分子应对约 25%的记录在案事件负责,身份不明犯罪人或其他团体应对约 45%的事件负责(见附件 24)。

100. 根据专家小组收集的资料,报告所述期间发生 13 起装载人道主义援助的卡车车队遭到袭击、拦截或威胁的事件。车队遇袭给人道主义援助的运送和弱势群体的生计造成严重负面影响(见附件 24)。

101. 此外,出于安全原因逃离的穆斯林人的车队遭到袭击。根据记录,此类事件至少导致 10 名平民死亡。

102. 特别令人关切的是,数次阻挠运送人道主义援助的事件专门针对穆斯林援助工作者,或针对为大多数居民信仰穆斯林的地区运送的人道主义援助。据称,这些事件是“反砍刀”组织分子所为(关于具体事件,见附件 24)。

103. 在本报告所述期间,人道主义组织不断在各种武装团体和犯罪分子在该国各地设置的检查站遭到拦截、骚扰和阻挠,被勒索通行费或道路使用费。

五. 违反国际人道主义法行为⁴¹

104. 通过调查以及从主要和次要来源收集的信息,专家小组记录了冲突各方在 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 30 日犯下的约 2 424 起非法杀害平民事件(见附件 25);这个数字包括同一期间遇害的援助工作人员。虽然大多数屠杀是 2013 年 12 月暴力高峰期间在班吉发生的,但 2014 年前几个月,冲突各方在全国各地继续非法杀戮平民(见附件 27)。

105. 本报告所述期间记录的最严重事件之一是 2014 年 2 月 1 日至 5 日发生在 Guen 村(曼贝雷-卡代省)的大屠杀,专家小组 2014 年 4 月 25 日访问该地,“反砍刀”组织多个团体杀害了 43 名平民(见附件 29)。

106. 专家小组注意到,全国各地平民缺乏行动自由的情况日益令人关切。为此,机构间常设委员会保护群组制定了“有风险社区”的概念。⁴²在编写本报告时,该群组确定了全国 11 个有风险社区,主要是在西部地区,包括约 21 000 人。在 PK5(班吉)、博达(洛巴伊省)、卡诺特(曼贝雷-卡代省)和布阿尔(纳纳-曼贝雷省)的民众尤其令人担忧。⁴³虽然这些社区最近才被归类为有风险社区,但是博阿

⁴¹ 有关方法的评论见附件 28。

⁴² 保护群组使用三个指标确定社区是否有风险:缺乏行动自由、普遍存在暴力和不安全及无法得到人道主义援助。

⁴³ 专家小组通过约谈和访问上述地点证实了这一信息。

利、博森贝莱和雅洛科(翁贝拉-姆波科省)等社区已被如此归类多月。这些地点的一些人已逃往喀麦隆，从而减少了有风险的人数，但教派和宗教暴力导致中非共和国西部穆斯林社区空无一人。⁴⁴

107. 迄今为止，穆斯林居民进行了如下三次搬迁：博森贝莱，2014年1月17日(58人)；博桑戈阿(瓦姆省)，2014年4月14日(540人——主要是民众自发组织的)；PK12，2014年4月21日至30日(约1300人)。

108. 平民普遍缺乏基本服务(保健、教育、安全和其他方面)特别令人关切。

109. 在编写本报告时，联合国儿童基金会指出，本学年已经过去一半以上，中非共和国几乎三分之二的学校仍然关闭。³⁹ 据机构间常设委员会教育群组称，2013年3月1日至2014年4月30日，中非共和国已有111所学校遭到攻击。⁴⁵ 这111所学校占全国各地学校总数的33%。现在没有准确的攻击日期数据，主要是因为人道主义行为体无法进入该国许多地区，特别是农村地区。⁴⁶ 专家小组能够在实地访问恩代莱和博达期间核实学校关闭情况。

110. 在上述期间，专家小组记录了全国各地七所医院遭到武装分子攻击的案件。在所有案件中，武装团体攻击了医院，偷窃了设备，并阻碍为平民运送人道主义援助。据报道，在班吉、恩代莱、Boguila(瓦姆省)、布阿尔和Yongoro(纳纳-曼贝雷省)发生了多起事件，其中一个事件导致三名援助工作者2014年4月26日在Boguila被杀害(见附件24)。

111. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组利用中非共和国二手来源记录了六起性暴力事件(见上文第二.B章和附件30)。专家小组将在今后几个月里对性暴力事件进行调查。

112. 专家小组从二手来源登记了五起有关儿童兵的事件；所有这些事件都发生在东南地区，据称是上帝抵抗军部队所为。儿基会估计，中非共和国儿童兵大幅增加，冲突各方使用了6000名儿童(18岁以下或18岁)，不仅作为战斗人员，而且还履行支助功能。⁴⁷ 在迄今的实地访问中，专家小组未看到武装团体内有儿童兵，但专家小组打算进一步调查这个特别令人关切的问题。

⁴⁴ 与保护群组组长约谈，班吉，2014年5月22日。

⁴⁵ 教育群组认为，攻击的定义包括以下内容：武装团体和平民的掠夺、武装团体占领、故意纵火、用子弹击或其他任何类型弹药射击及房地内存在爆炸物。

⁴⁶ 见 <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/en/clusters/education>。

⁴⁷ 2014年5月27日与儿基会举行会议。

六. 建议

113. 专家小组建议：

(a) 委员会要求中非共和国邻国每年公布关于自然资源、包括钻石和黄金的进出口完整统计数据；

(b) 委员会敦促所有各方，包括中部非洲区域各国、国际刑警组织、区域和次区域组织，加强信息共享和联合行动，以调查和打击参与非法开采和交易自然资源，包括野生动物和野生动物产品的区域犯罪网络；

(c) 委员会敦促中非共和国过渡当局采取一切必要措施：

(一) 向委员会证实，已解除被查明是在中非共和国活动的武装团体成员的国防和安全人员在国防和安全部队中的职务；

(二) 向委员会报告过渡当局为确保安全管理武器弹药，包括武器弹药的登记、分配、使用和维护而采取的措施，并明确任何培训和基础设施需求。

Annex 1: Table of correspondences sent and received by the Panel to date

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
BINUCA/UNDP	1	1			
Cameroun	3		1	1	1
Central African Republic	2	2			
People's Republic of China	1				1
Republic of the Congo	1	1			
Gabon	1	1			
IWI	2		1		1
MAXAM	1	1			
MINUSCA	1	1			
Morocco	1		1		
SAMT	1	1			
SANGARIS	2		1		1
Senegal	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Togo	1			1	
Ukraine	1			1	
TOTAL	23	9	4	6	4

* Either the Member State or the entity indicated that a response is forthcoming, or the deadline has not expired at the time of drafting.

Annex 2: The political context of the Central African Republic

1. The current crisis is the culmination of several unresolved structural problems that have characterized the CAR for several decades. The permanence of *coups d'état* has deepened state fragility and deepened ethnic divisions in both the administration and the armed forces, which has impeded economic progress and triggered a proliferation of non-state armed groups and of light weapons throughout the region.
2. As a result the country's political landscape is deeply fragmented, militarised and saturated with political actors showing little interest in finding sustainable and peaceful solutions to the crises.

A weakly institutionalized state

3. The delay in state building in the CAR has resulted in successive governments' inability to project substantive presence beyond the capital Bangui. This is mostly visible from security and administrative points of view. In fact, the state has never had the monopoly on the use of force in the country.¹ Successive governments' security forces were not just insufficiently equipped to provide basic security, but they have, in many ways like non-state armed groups, also been drivers of insecurity against civilians.²
4. Physical infrastructure is poorly developed with northern provinces being more marginalised and neglected than the southern ones, a situation that also owes to colonial patterns of state formation. Most rebel groups in the northeast cite this as one of their central grievances.³ Weak deployment of state institutions throughout the country means limited access to basic education, healthcare and other social services for a majority of the population. However, the recent professionalization of armed groups and their ambition to control physical territories is pushing them towards forms of political and security rule that could pre-empt governance arrangements with the central government in Bangui.⁴

¹ The Central African Republic in: Bertelsman Transformation Index 2014, accessed at: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/caf/2014/index.nc> on 22 May 2014

² Several studies have well documented the very poor human rights record of the CAR security forces. For an overview, see: Sian Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan and Marielle Debos (2013), *State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?* Rapid literature review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

³ Cite where

⁴ The recent Seleka statements after the meeting in Ndélé on 10 May mentioning their ambition to partition the country and create a Republic of North Ubangui are the most visible manifestations of this trend so far. Although this secession claim is contested within Seleka ranks, it nevertheless indicates that stateless enclaves are not necessarily lacking political and security control. See: Emmanuel Chauvin, Christian Seignobos (2014), *L'Imbroglie Centrafricain. Etats, rebelles et bandits: La fusion des territoires*; To be published in: *Afrique Contemporaine*, in 2014

A profusion of politico-military groups

5. Since the early 2000s, a fundamental aspect of the CAR political landscape has been the presence and increased activities of a multitude of rebel groups (also referred to as politico-military groups) that have taken control of large swaths of the CAR's territory. While the reasons for their creation and expansion vary greatly, most rebel groups have understood the potential benefits linked to the maintenance of armed elements as a tool for political bargaining during peace negotiations. Because conflict resolution mechanisms in the CAR have favoured consensual exit strategies (inclusive political dialogue, power-sharing) with guaranteed impunity for grave human rights violations, the formation of a rebel group has become an additional tool for many political entrepreneurs with presidential ambitions.⁵
6. The systematic practice of impunity in the past has therefore increased militarisation tendencies and widespread human rights violations. In the last ten years state and non-state armed groups increasingly overlap. The distinction between rebels, bandits (*zarguinas*, poachers, illicit miners) and representatives of the state is not always clear. Not only do allegiances between actors fluctuate greatly, but also several fighters happen to be simultaneously rebels, bandits and representatives of the state. Many combatants follow the rebellion – reintegration – defection trajectory.⁶ It has come to the attention of the Panel in Bangui that several members of the former Seleka and anti-Balaka (currently the most important rebel groups) fall into this category, particularly those in government.

Decreased influence of political parties

7. In the last 20 years, the multiplication of politico-military groups has largely eclipsed political parties, which have struggled to exist in a context dominated by militarisation of social discontent.⁷ As a result of state capture by rebel groups, the space for political parties has been reduced and their capacity to mobilise social groups has suffered.
8. With the exception of independence, the last time a political party came to power without resorting to violence was in 1993 when Patassé's *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain* (MLPC) claimed victory and assumed power for 10 years. To date, there is no political party with nationwide representation and coverage.
9. The main political parties of the last 20 years (the MLPC and Bozizé's presidential coalition known as *Kwa na Kwa* (KNK)) hardly survived the ousting of their initiator, indicating their lack of ideological and social rooting. In fact, there are to date about 60 registered political parties in the CAR and it is rather unclear how representative

⁵ International Crisis Group (2007), RCA, Anatomie d'un état fantôme, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No 136, p.26

⁶ Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian combatants in the Central African Republic; African Affairs, Vol. 107, No 427, p.226. E. Chauvin, C. Seignobos (2014) *ibid*

⁷ Andreas Mehler (2009), Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR; Working Paper No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Accessed on 23rd April 2014 at: http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wpl16_mehler.pdf

they are at the moment, owing to the irregularity of elections under Bozizé. The result is a fragmentation of the party landscape and the persistence of personality-driven parties.⁶

Large presence of foreign combatants and implications

10. A recent development within politico-military groups is the increasingly large presence of foreign elements and particularly their direct involvement in political and military processes. Their presence in the CAR is the direct consequence of the decades long interconnection of local crises that have formed a regional conflict system between Chad, Sudan and the CAR characterised by historic transnational networks and cross-border activities in the tri-border zone.
11. The porous nature of borders, historical patterns of living (including nomadism and an increasingly violent pastoralism)⁹ and the existence of clan family links across borders have transformed the tri-border zone into a territory where civilians, traders, bandits and rebel groups are used to cross borders. The crisis in the CAR can therefore not be fully understood without taking into account the specific trajectory of mostly Chadian and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese combatants of various social provenance who have been roaming in the region for decades offering their skills to a multitude of clients across the borders of the tri-zone region.¹⁰
12. The composition of individual rebel groups forming the Seleka is representative of this trend without being unique in the Central African Republic's political history. In fact, the involvement of foreign elements in military-political battles started under

⁶ After the demise of Bozizé's regime in March 2013, political parties have attempted to build electoral groupings in order to maximise their chances in the post-transition elections. As a result, 3 main coalitions of political parties dominate the political scene. The first one is the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Transition* (AFDT) which is centered around the MLPC, the former ruling party under President Patassé now led by his former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé. In addition to the MLPC, the AFDT is composed of: the *Alliance pour la solidarité et le développement* (ASD), the *Convention républicaine pour le progrès social* (CRPS) and the *Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain* (RDC). The second coalition consists of the parties that formed the former presidential majority under President Bozizé. It is currently led by his former communication minister Cyriaque Ngonda and is organized around the *Kwa na Kwa*. The third grouping, the *Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (ACDP) is comprised of parties from both former opposition and presidential majorities. It mainly claims to stand for a democratic renewal in contrast to the AFDT and KNK, which are linked to the previous regimes of Patassé and Bozizé.

⁹ The Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures have always been very popular among Chadian and Sudanese herders who come to the CAR to pasture their herds. In recent decades, these foreign herders have acquired firearms, which they often use against local populations. In addition to being illegal, this activity is potentially detrimental to the CAR's ecosystem in the region. For some government members, Chad openly ignores existing bilateral arrangements that regulate this transhumance sphere. Panel's interview with a current Transition Government member who previously served in former governments. Bangui, March 2014.

¹⁰ The conflict system between Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR also involves to a lesser extent the DRC and Uganda. It is however not unique in Africa where a similar 'nomadism of combatants' was observed in the Mano river conflicts in West Africa. See Marielle Debos (2008), *Fluid Loyalties*, op.cit.

Patassé who resorted to Libyan troops in 2001 to protect his power, which had been threatened by a series of army mutinies and rebellions.

13. These rebellions, particularly the one led by the then former chief of staff Bozizé, were also comprised of substantial amounts of foreign fighters, mostly from Chad.¹¹ However, the negative memory of Patassé's militarised response to mutinies and rebellions is rather linked to the support he got from foreign fighters from the DRC's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) led by the former warlord turned vice-president and subsequently ICC defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba.¹²
14. President Patassé was eventually ousted on 13th March 2003 and François Bozizé assumed power inaugurating a new era of rebel groups mostly composed and supported by foreign elements. President Bozizé subsequently relied heavily on both elements of the *Armée Nationale du Tchad* (ANT) and some former Chadian 'Liberators'¹³ to rebuild his Presidential Guard and the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), the CAR armed forces. This strongly contributed to the widespread perception that Chad was the main mentor and patron of Bozizé's regime and by extension of the CAR as a country.¹⁴
15. Bozizé himself lost his power to a rebel coalition that displays a number of similar features like the one that had helped him to conquer the presidency ten years earlier: a rebel coalition comprised of several Chadian and Sudanese fighters, as well as support from Chad and other countries in the region despite the presence of a regional stabilization force. Because of this and other political developments, the CAR crisis cannot be understood without its regional dimension.¹⁵

The current transition

16. The incapacity of the Seleka to enforce a semblance of order and security in the country, including the capital, exposed the group's lack of governance capacity and ultimately prompted its downfall. In a combined diplomatic effort, France and ECCAS countries (particularly Chad and Congo) obtained the demise of the Seleka

¹¹ ICG (2007), *ibid.* p. 16.

¹² The brutal intervention of Bemba's forces alongside Patassé's Presidential Guard in 2002-2003 did not prevent Patassé's fall in 2003.

¹³ Chadian Liberators are former unemployed Chadian soldiers that were recruited to fight alongside Bozizé's successful campaign to topple President Patassé in 2003. Many of them fell out with him and joined other rebel movements that later formed the Seleka and ousted Bozizé.

¹⁴ Michel Lunrumbue et Simon Massock, 'Afrique Centrale, Risques et enjeux de la pax-tchadienne', Note d'Analyse du Groupe de Recherches et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP), 2014, pp 2-4.

¹⁵ Roland Marchal, 'Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI No. 153-154', accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/cepi/sites/cepi/sciencespo.fr/cepi/files/etude153_154.pdf. See also: Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert 'Mapping conflict motives: The Central African Republic', Antwerpen: IPIS, 2009.

leadership on 10 January 2014 at an extraordinary summit of the regional organisation held in N'Djamena.

17. The removal of President Djotodia by ECCAS is an unprecedented move that reflects both the regional organisation's involvement in the crisis and the CAR's dependence on its neighbours. This paved the way to a new transition led by Catherine Samba-Panza who was elected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) on 20th January 2014.
18. Initial hopes of a new beginning did increase security for the population. On the contrary, fighting between the former Seleka and the anti-Balaka continued in several parts of the country as did targeted inter-communal killings that contributed to the misleading framing of the crisis in CAR as a religious conflict. The deployment of MISCA troops alongside the French forces (under operation SANGARIS) prevented worse from happening but did not stop the killing of civilians. The interim government was facing a number of structural problems that needed immediate attention: state coffers were empty, civil servants had not been paid for several months, the administration was not functioning because of internal displacement and the slow deployment of international troops¹⁶.

Political agreements

19. Contestations around the legitimacy of the current transition have the potential to derail the Transitional Government as they touch upon the sensitive issue of representation in a context of increased identity politics. The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Bozizé's seizure of power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the CAR followed by a series of agreements that, according to several actors, have not seriously been implemented. Bozizé's fall can among others be blamed on his lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in DDR.

Four main agreements were signed between Bozizé's government and different rebel groups.

- The first one was signed in Sirte (Libye) with the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) on 2 February 2007;
- The second one was signed on 13 Avril 2007 with *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR);
- The 3rd accord was signed with the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie* (APRD) on 9 May 2007.

¹⁶ It took the European Union about 3 months between the decision to deploy and the actual deployment of 800 soldiers to the CAR (EUFOR-CAR). The first soldiers only arrived in April 2014 and took control of the Bangui airport in order to allow the French troops to deploy elsewhere within the country.

- In order to harmonise all these agreements a 4th one was signed in Libreville in June 2008 between the government and the 3 rebel groups¹⁷.

¹⁷ For a good analysis of peace agreements signed between 2007 and 2008, see Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta (2013), *Gouvernance, rebellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA. Comprendre les crises centrafricaines*. Note d'Analyse du GRIP, pp. 2-5

Annex 3: Neighbouring countries' contributions to the implementation of resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014)

A. Cameroon

1. The CAR shares a 800 km long land border with Cameroon that culminates in a tri-border zone with Chad in the North and another one with the Republic of Congo in the south. This western border is vital for the CAR as it is the passing point for all goods entering and exiting the country.¹

2. Since the renewed outbreak of violence in December 2013, Cameroon has received 80,004 refugees from the CAR bringing the total number of CAR refugees in Cameroon to about 191,265 people.² Cameroon is the country with the highest amount of refugees from CAR.

3. Among those fleeing the violence since March 2013 has also been a minority of ex-FACA who were duly disarmed and cantoned in various sites in Bertoua and Douala. Around 150 ex-FACA were concerned.³ These soldiers remain in Cameroon in expectation of a return to the CAR once conditions for the reform of the army have been put in place. Before being asked to leave Cameroon where he had sought refuge after leaving his country and where he had stayed for a couple of months President Bozizé was actively pursuing his objective of 'restoring the constitutional order' by attempting to stage a counter-coup. President Bozizé arrived in Cameroon on a helicopter of the CAR army that was seized by Cameroonian authorities in expectation of their retrocession to CAR.⁴

4. Cameroon has taken a number of measures to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014): It has tightened up controls in the border area with the CAR, a region already considered as a priority security area because of intense activities of *zarguin*s and other armed groups in the region. Having ratified the Kinshasa Convention, Cameroon has also undertaken additional steps to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons in the country. An Inter-ministerial Committee has been set up that is comprised of all departments affected by the crisis in the CAR.⁵ The aim of this Committee is to coordinate the Government's responses to the crisis and improve much-needed inter-departmental communication. Cameroon has also tightened up the screening of goods arriving at the Douala seaport and destined to the CAR.

¹ The Cameroonian port of Douala is the nearest access the CAR has to the sea.

² Since the 1990s Cameroon has received successive waves of refugees fleeing war, widespread insecurity and hunger in the CAR. See UNHCR, Central African Republic Situation; UNHCR external Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014.

³ Meetings with Cameroonian government authorities and diplomats, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁴ Meeting with a diplomat in Yaoundé, April 2014; meeting with Foreign Ministry officials in Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁵ Those are the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Territorial administration and decentralization (chair), Interior and finally Customs and the Presidency.

5. Through CEMAC and ECCAS Cameroon has also participated in regional diplomatic, security and financial efforts to settle the crisis and implement Security Council resolutions. In addition to providing 850 military and police troops to MISCA,⁶ Cameroon has also contributed its share of financial support to the Transitional Government⁷.

6. However, Cameroon faces several challenges in fulfilling its duty of implementing resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014): The difficulty to monitor movements across the long and porous CAR-Cameroon border is certainly one of the most important. The limited capacity of the police and the army in terms of vehicles to patrol, well-trained manpower and the chronic problem of lack of fuel make any systematic border control difficult. There are, however, some exceptions to this. The Brigade d'Intervention Rapide (BIR), a well equipped, trained and motivated elite corps within the army has often been called to the rescue of overwhelmed regular troops⁸. However the 10,000 strong BIR is currently very occupied on Cameroon's western border where Boko Haram has been abducting European and Chinese nationals from Cameroon, posing new challenges to Cameroonian security agents. In some instances, the BIR has also been deployed within national parks to confront increasingly armed poachers.

B. Gabon

7. The Republic of Gabon doesn't border the CAR and has not been affected by refugee flows like its northern neighbours⁹. No movements of arms have been recorded into or from the country as a consequence of the crisis in the CAR,¹⁰. Gabon has mediated successive crises in the CAR until it handed over to the RoC and has provided a substantial amount of diplomatic and financial resources in the past. Today, the country provides 850 military and police personnel to MISCA.

8. As poaching has intensified in Central African, Congolese and Cameroonian forests, the Republic of Gabon has increased its border monitoring activities because the forest that runs across the four countries is regarded as a common good.

C. The Republic of Congo (RoC)

9. The RoC has a common border with the CAR in the north. About 16,000 refugees have arrived from the CAR since December 2013. A small number of these refugees

⁶ MISCA's Military Commander, General Tumenta, is from Cameroon.

⁷ CEMAC and ECCAS countries have all contributed 5 billion CFA francs (about 10 million USD) to help paying salaries in the CAR and partly fund MISCA.

⁸ Meeting with an official from the National Police of Cameroon, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁹ According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, around 200 CAR refugees have been registered in Gabon; meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 24 April 2014.

¹⁰ Meeting with the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, Libreville, April 2014.

were armed and have subsequently been disarmed and cantoned in refugee camps in Impfundo, Betou, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville¹¹.

10. At the political and diplomatic level, the RoC has taken over the mediation of the crisis from Gabon and chairs the International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR). Congo also maintains the highest amount of military and police personnel (roughly 1000) within MISCA and provides the political head of the mission. Both at the regional and bilateral levels, the Government of Congo has often assisted the CAR authorities financially. The RoC was the first ECCAS' country to provide 10 million USD assistance, which helped paying the salaries of CAR civil servants in March 2014 at a time when social expectations about the new transitional Government were very high.

11. Similar to Cameroon, the RoC has put in place a ministerial concertation framework aimed at coordinating the country's actions regarding the crisis in the CAR. It is headed by the RoC Presidency.

12. For the RoC, the tri-border zone between Cameroon, Congo and the CAR is problematic because of increased poaching activities that deplete the country's forests of valuable resources. In general, the RoC's assessment of the crisis in the CAR is that it has the potential to spill across the border and sow divisions in a country that slowly recovers from its civil war of the late 1990s.

13. Measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) include increased monitoring of the border and the screening of all arms movements. However, due the fact that the border zones are covered with dense forest, the RoC struggles to monitor all movements and admits that there are multiple unknown footpads that could be used by violent entrepreneurs. Some officials also think that a better management of Congo's border with the CAR could start with the proper demarcation of the border, a step that is to be understood in the framework of long-term conflict prevention¹².

¹¹ Meetings with government officials, Brazzaville, May 2014.

¹² Meetings with officials at the Interior Ministry, Brazzaville, May 2014.

Annex 4: Other armed groups

1. The Panel received five reports of incidents in the region of Paoua (Ouham-Pendé province) from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 involving a group described as composed of armed elements formerly part of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR), formerly commanded by Chadian rebel Abdelkader Babba Laddé, with a total of 26 casualties, including civilians, and hundreds of incidents of destruction of properties.

2. In the same region, an armed group called *Révolution et Justice* (RJ), commanded by Armel Bedaya alias Armel Sayo,¹ with the rank of Captain in the FACA, and who is known as the son-in-law and bodyguard of former President Ange-Félix Patassé, is responsible for the killing of four civilians on 28 January 2014, an intrusion into a humanitarian compound on 4 March 2014, and an attack on MISCA troops in the district of Ngaoundaye, bordering Cameroon, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the destruction of one military truck.

3. According to the Panel's database, an armed group identified as part of the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) of Abdullaye Miskine,² formerly allied with Armel Bedaya,³ is allegedly responsible of the killing of one civilian during a clash with French forces in the vicinity of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambere province) on 2 April 2014, located twenty kilometres from Garoua-Boulai, and for one incident of looting of property committed on 14 April 2014 in the same area. During a mission to the region, the Panel was told that attacks on international forces by FDPC are happening on a regular basis, and were described as involving most of time around 20 fighters either by foot or on motorbikes.⁴

4. In the Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangora provinces, the presence of individuals bearing distinctive signs of Janjaweed from the Dafur region of Sudan was confirmed by multiple sources and institutional contacts of the Panel. Also, the Panel documented one incident of an attack against humanitarian aid workers in Ndele involving alleged Janjaweed militiamen.

5. Lastly, concerning the activity of small groups associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its presence was reported in the regions of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Haute and Basse-Kotto, the Panel documented in its database two killing of civilians, eight incidents of kidnapping of civilians (including 5 cases where the victims were released within approximately 48 hours), and three cases of looting and destruction of properties. The LRA has been moving during the past year deeper into the CAR territory, in reaction to increasing military pressure from African Union-Regional Task Force (AU/RTF).

¹ See annex 4.1.

² Abdullaye Miskine is included in the annex of US President Obama's executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

³ See annex 4.2.

⁴ Meeting with international forces, Bêloko, 26 April 2014.

Annex 4.1: Armel Bedaya Sayo and “Révolution et Justice”

*Armel Bedaya Sayo delivering a speech to “Révolution et Justice” troops
(screenshots of a video allegedly taken in January 2014)*



Armel Bedaya Sayo with youths belonging to "Révolution et Justice" during a joint humanitarian operation with MISC.A and UNHCR, on 31 March 2014



Annex 4.2: Abdullaye Miskine and Armel Bedaya Sayo

*Abdullaye Miskine (left) and Armel Bedaya Sayo
(picture allegedly taken in 2013)*



Annex 5: Anti-Balaka - Structure and dynamics

History

1. The appellation “anti-Balaka” first appeared in the district of Bossangoa (Ouham) in mid-September 2013, following coordinated attacks conducted in the outskirts of Bossangoa on 6 and 7 September 2013 by militia then described by media as “pro-Bozizé armed men”.¹ The armed insurgency against Seleka troops then spread to the districts of Bouca (Ouham), Boali, Bossembélé and Bessemtélé (Ombella-Mpoko).

2. As confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, including anti-Balaka, and institutional contacts, FACA and *Gendarmes* personnel loyal to former President François Bozizé² were then recruiting youths from local communities from the Baya area (Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko provinces), some of them already part of hunting groups or self-defence militias called “archers”, created mainly in the mid-2000s in response to the activities of “coupeurs de route” or “zaraguinas”³, but also in the region of Garoua Boulai (border town between Cameroon and the CAR) and Zongo (DRC), a city located opposite to Bangui, on the DRC side of the Oubangui river.⁴

3. On 5 December 2013, around a thousand militia men conducted a coordinated attack by foot on Bangui, coming from at least three directions (international airport, Boy-Rabe/Cité Jean XIII neighbourhoods and Zongo), while groups of youth from the 4th and 8th arrondissements of Bangui, strongholds of the “Coalition Citoyenne d’Opposition aux Rébellions Armées” (COCORA) and “Comité d’Organisation des Actions Citoyennes” (COAC) created by former President Bozizé in December 2012 to track down supporters of the Seleka in Bangui, were also erecting barricades and harassing former Seleka troops in the capital.

4. At the same time, the “Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National”, commanded by a nephew of Bozizé, Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’,⁵ and Mike Stève

¹ « Centrafrique: des villages autour de Bossangoa sous le contrôle d’hommes armés pro-Bozizé », RFI, 8 September 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/africque/20130908-centrafrique-villages-autour-bossangoa-sous-contrôle-hommes-armés-pro-bozizé/>, accessed on 15 April 2014 ; see also annex 5.5 on Bossangoa.

² François Bozizé was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

³ Armed banditry in the region of northern Cameroon, southern Chad and north-west of the CAR has been extensively documented by researchers, in particular Louisa Lombard and Marielle Debos, and human rights organisations, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

⁴ According to UN sources in DRC, anti-Balaka groups continue to pose a security threat in the region of Zongo.

⁵ Also brother of Maxime Mokom, military coordinator of the CLPC, Colonel “Rocco” was killed on 11 May 2014 while driving a motorbike together with Camille Lepage, a French photojournalist.

Yambété, founder of the COAC with the rank of Lieutenant in the FACA,⁶ based out of the region of Garoua Boulai, led its first military offensive on Cantonnier, on the other side of the border, and Bêloko,⁷ clashing with former Seleka troops commanded by General Saïd Souleymane, of Sudanese origin, based in Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), who was eventually killed on 21 January 2014 while former Seleka troops were withdrawing towards southern Chad and eastern CAR. According to a diplomatic source in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian territory has been used by former President François Bozizé and his supporters to prepare the offensive on Bangui.⁸

Current status

5. The Panel classifies the anti-Balakas in four different categories:

- The first group, named “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC), is based out of the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui and operates in the north of the city, up to the town of Damara,⁹ and is issuing identification badges to its members, including in Carnot.¹⁰ It is coordinated at the military level by Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’,¹¹ a former FACA, and at the political level by a businessman named Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona,¹² former Youth and Sports Minister of the last Bozizé’s government, founder of the COCORA and president of the CAR Football federation.¹³
- The second group, which representation has shifted from Joachim Kokaté, adviser to the Primer Minister of the Transition with the rank of Captain in the FACA,¹⁴ to Sébastien Wénézoui, a 33 years-old engineer related to François Bozizé’s daughter Joséphine Kéléfio. The group, known as the “group of the anti-Balakas from the south”, is headed by the Chief-Corporal of the FACA Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Rombhot’ and FACA Lieutenant Gilbert Kamezoulai, and operates mainly in the southwest of the capital, out of the neighbourhood of PK9, and the towns of Bimbo, Bérengo, Pissa and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), racketing transport of goods and passengers as observed by the Panel.¹⁵

⁶ Stève Yambété was according to several sources still jailed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the time of drafting, after being arrested on 17 January 2014 by Cameroonian authorities for attacking the Ecobank agency in Bêloko, alongside the *Gendarme Sabe* and Rochael Mokom.

⁷ See also annex 5.1.

⁸ Meeting with a diplomatic source, Yaoundé, 16 April 2014.

⁹ See annex 5.2.

¹⁰ See annex 5.3.

¹¹ Meeting with ‘Colonel 12 puissances’, 22 March 2014.

¹² Meeting and telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 and 20 May 2014.

¹³ <http://fr.cafonline.com/association/central-african/information>, accessed on 28 May 2014.

¹⁴ Meetings and telephone conversation with Joachim Kokaté, Bangui, 20 March, 26 April and 3 May 2014.

¹⁵ Meeting with ‘Rombhot’, Mbaiki, 21 April 2014; meeting with ‘Rombhot’ and Kamezoulai, Bimbo, 26 May 2014; see also annex 5.4.

- The third category regroups local armed militias, mainly located in the south-west of the country (Mambere-kadei, Sangha Mbaere and Lobaye provinces), like in Guen and Gadzi,¹⁶ but also in some neighbourhoods of Bangui where 72 anti-Balaka groups were identified.¹⁷ In Bangui, former *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* - APRD - commander Jean-Jacques Larma alias 'Larmassou', has reportedly control of a neighbourhood south of the airport, although the CLPC claimed that 'Larmassou' was a fake anti-Balaka. He was arrested on 28 February by 'Colonel 12 puissances',¹⁸ and freed under unclear circumstances.
- The fourth group, whose command structure is mainly composed of FACA and *Gendarmes* of Baya origin, is the backbone of the original military insurgency against Seleka, and does not have any political figurehead. It still controls directly the road from Cantonmier (border post with Cameroon) to Bangui, and more specifically the towns of Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), Bozoum (Ouham Pendé province), and Bossangoa (Ouham province), Bossembélé and all the checkpoints from Boali to the PK 12 neighbourhood of Bangui (Ombella-Mpoko province). The Panel obtained information that troops were gathering during the months of March and April 2014 in the area of Ben Zambé (Ouham province), place of origin of Bozizé's family located east of Bossangoa, where the presence in a training capacity of Teddy Bozizé, François Bozizé's adoptive son, with the rank of Captain in the FACA, was eyewitnessed by individuals interviewed by the Panel.¹⁹

6. The idiosyncratic complexity of the structure of the anti-Balaka is reinforced by the fluidity which characterizes the relationship between its different components. For example, Ngaïssona and Wénézoui claim to represent 'Rombhot', or to control the anti-Balaka groups in Boda and Bouar. Also, Minister Leopold Narcisse Bara, officially appointed by the Transitional Head of State as a representative of the anti-Balaka movement, but not recognised as such,²⁰ is perceived as being behind the initiative of the Reconciliation Minister, Antoinette Montaigne, that led to the election on 15 May 2014 of Sébastien Wenezoui, former CLPC deputy

¹⁶ See also annex 29.

¹⁷ Meeting with a transitional government official, Bangui, 27 May 2014.

¹⁸ Meeting with 'Colonel 12 Puissances', op. cit.; meeting with a confidential source member of the anti-Balaka, Bangui, 24 March 2014; see also Tweet from @lesamisdesiloe on 28 February 2014: #Centrafrique RNL - Thierry Libéré alias 12 puissances responsable Anti balaka a arrêté lieutenant Jean Jacques Larmassou après enquête, accessed at <https://twitter.com/lesamisdesiloe/status/439388030324191232> on 28 May 2014.

¹⁹ Meetings with local authorities, anti-Balaka representative, UN officials and international forces, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014; see also case study on Bossangoa, in annex 5.5.

²⁰ Meetings with anti-Balaka political and military leaders, March-May 2014.

spokesperson, as general coordinator of the anti-Balaka movement. The leader of the CLPC, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, has qualified this election as a “farce”.²¹

7. The initiative of the Government seems to have weakened Ngaïssona’s group, with a disparate coalition of groups henceforth under the banner of Wénézoui, which main common ground appears to be opposition to Ngaïssona and the Baya ethnic group. Several defections of senior commanders of the CLPC, including its former military coordinator and nephew of former President Bozizé, Maxime Mokom, brother of ‘Colonel Rocco’, were reported to the Panel on 27 May 2014, in connection with the election of Wénézoui as representative of the “anti-Balaka from the South”. At the same time, Yvon Konaté’s vehicle was targeted by a grenade attack in the neighbourhood of Cité Jean XIII in Bangui.

8. The Panel also documented the significant presence in the chain of command of the above-mentioned different groups of personnel from the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) – including from the Presidential Guard, e.g. Yvon Konaté – and the *Gendarmerie*, who are still in some cases on the pay-roll of the current Government, and of individuals who were closely connected to former President François Bozizé and his family. The CAR Transitional Authorities have identified 89 members of the FACA within the group commanded by ‘Rombhot’ only,²² and the Panel obtained independently information that the first and fourth group are largely commanded and trained by FACA officers and non-commissioned officers, *Gendarmes* and some police officers.

9. In addition, the Panel was able to confirm information that the fourth group was at the time of writing the one carrying out the military offensive on the front line in the area of Ben Zambé, in particular in the town of Bouca, under the command of Andilo Ngaïbona alias ‘Angelo’, and in the town Dékoa, with reinforcements coming from the towns of Bozoum and Bossembélé, clashing on a regular basis with the forces of Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat, appointed in Ndélé as deputy chief of staff of the “new” Seleka.

10. However, the Panel could not confirm the involvement of ‘Angelo’ in the region of Grimari, where troops of both Alkhatim and Brigadier-General Ali Daras (of Peulh origin) are regularly involved in clashes with groups of anti-Balaka, as observed by the Panel on 20 May 2014.²³ According to a military source, the groups of anti-Balaka attacking Grimari and Bambari would be partly coming from the district of Kouango (Ouaka province), at the border with DRC.

Relationship with Transitional Authorities

11. The Transitional Head of State, Ms. Samba-Panza, met for the first time at the end of January 2014 with representatives of the anti-Balaka, which was followed by a split between

²¹ Telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 20 May 2014; Press communiqué number 11, received on 18 May 2014.

²² Meeting with a Defence official, Bangui, 23 April 2014; see also annex 5.4.

²³ During its road mission to Bambari, the Panel could observe of group of 20 anti-Balakas coming out of the bush by foot on the road from Grimari to Bambari.

Ngaïssona, Kokaté and Bara. The first was accused of promoting the interest of the Baya ethnic group only, the second of switching affiliations too frequently²⁴ and the latter was denied any form of legitimacy over the anti-Balaka, and suspected of promoting Bozizé's return.

12. However, the Authorities then decided to exclude Ngaïssona's group from the political process, appointing Bara as Minister of Youth and Kokaté as an adviser to the Primer Minister, leading coincidentally to a peak of violence in Bangui in March 2014.²⁵ Similarly, the level of violence in the capital reduced drastically after the issuance of a press communiqué by Ngaïssona on 4 April 2014, calling for a cease-fire and restoration of peace.²⁶

13. On 17 April 2014, the Head of State of the Transitional Authorities met again with a dozen of representatives of anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, at the Presidency. Following the meeting, Ngaïssona was arrested by the MISCA, in accordance with an arrest warrant issued by CAR judicial authorities, then handed-over to the Gendarmerie, and subsequently placed under judicial supervision by the Prosecutor's office in Bangui. This indicates further that Transitional Authorities and the international community have difference of views with regard to the strategy towards anti-Balaka leadership, as outlined in the executive summary of this report.²⁷

14. Lastly, the Panel obtained information that a group of anti-Balaka represented at a reconciliation meeting organised by a Christian INGO was during the same week involved in violent clashes on 25 May 2014 with Muslim self-defence militias based in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

15. According to an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, the current Government is planning to implement with the anti-Balaka a strategy based on a memorandum of understanding, which would be signed by Ngaïssona and the CAR Defence Minister. This document, not yet signed at the time of writing, would include more specifically a process of registering, demobilization and reintegration of members of the anti-Balaka into their communities of origin.²⁸ However, this approach may change in light of recent events.

²⁴ For example, on 24 February 2010, Joachim Kokaté was appointed 'coordinator' of the "*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix*" (CPJP) of Abdoulaye Issène, now coordinator of the "new" Seleka; see annex 5.7.

²⁵ See annex 5.6.

²⁶ See annex 5.8.

²⁷ Meeting with judicial authorities, Bangui, 25 April 2014.

²⁸ Meeting with an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

Annex 5.1: Anti-Balakas in Cantonnier, Béloko and Bouar (Nana Mambéré province)

1. The Panel observed presence of anti-Balaka elements at the main Béloko-Garoua Boulai border crossing between the Central African Republic and Cameroon. From the village of Cantonnier, located at the border, these forces control an illegal border crossing just south of the official border. They were initially part of the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*” and composed mainly of former FACA officers who fled to Cameroon after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui.

‘Colonel’ Aron Wilibona (center, pointing his shotgun at the camera) and Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’ (right, with the cap), after taking over Cantonnier, in January 2014 (screenshot from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source)¹



2. This crossing is used to smuggle petrol and other merchandise, which is subjected to illegal taxes. The crossing is also used to smuggle ammunition (see also chapter III). In addition, forces also intervene whenever customs officers seize illegal imports of ammunition and drugs hidden in vehicles using the official border crossing, creating havoc to put pressure to release goods.

¹ Video archived at the UN.

Pick-up truck vehicle mounted with a light machine-gun, Cantonner, January 2014 (source: ibid.)




3. Anti-Balaka elements with FACA background in Bêloko told the Panel on 27 April 2014 that “Colonel” Aron Wilibona was still in command of the anti-Balaka from Cantonner/Bêloko to Bouar, capital of the province of Nana Mambéré.

Anti-Balaka in Cantonner in front of a vehicle with painted inscriptions mentioning “Hibou-Rouge” and “Balaka”, making reference to the “Patrouilles Hiboux” (‘owls patrols’), nicknames of the “Compagnies éclairs”, special units of the Police based in Bangui and accused of tracking opponents to former President Bozizé at night (source: ibid.)



Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry Lébéné, alias 'Colonel 12 Puissance', instructing a group of anti-Balaka to patrol the road from Damara (Ombella-Mpoko province) to Sibut (Kémo province)




Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)

*Badge of the anti-Balaka coordinator in Damara
(recto and verso – photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 23 March 2014)*



*Badge of a chief of post in Bangui
(copy provided by international force to the Panel on 2 May 2014)*



*Badge of an anti-Balaka fighter in Carnot (Mambere-Kadei)
(photograph taken by the Panel in Carnot on 26 April 2014)*



Annex 5.4: Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot'

1. Anti-Balaka forces operating under FACA Chief-Corporal Alfred Yekatom alias 'Colonel Rombhot' exercise a significant degree of control over road transport into Bangui from the southern transport axis linking the country with Cameroon. On the 107 kilometre stretch of road between Bangui and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), the Panel observed the presence of Rombhot's forces at seven different checkpoints, starting from PK 9, i.e. nine kilometres from Bangui city centre. In the towns of Cekia and Pissa, Rombhot's forces are in uniform, identify themselves as FACA, and operate alongside regular forestry, police and road maintenance agents. Rombhot personally perceives part of the taxes collected, which amounts to about 200 USD per barrier per week.

*'Colonel Rombhot' and his 'sister',
during a meeting with the Panel in Pissa, on 24 April 2014*



2. Rombhot's forces also tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot's elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives.

Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham province)

1. The Panel conducted a two-day road mission to Bossangoa between 30 April and 1 May 2014, to interview United Nations officials, a representative of a local anti-Balaka group, local authorities and international forces. The Panel also met with religious authorities from Bossangoa in Bangui on 23 April 2014.

2. Bossangoa has played a key role in the crisis. As the capital of the Baya's region, it represents a symbol of the former regime of François Bozizé, and the region is commonly depicted as his family's stronghold and the berth of his power.

3. The region of Bossangoa is where the first military operations against forces of the former Seleka coalition were planned and conducted in early September 2013, during which killings of scores of civilians were also reported. In retaliation, many villages perceived by the Seleka as supporting the insurgency were burnt down by Seleka forces based out of Bossangoa, causing also civilian casualties.¹

4. Seleka forces in Bossangoa were at that time commanded by Général Yaya, who was killed in Bangui on 5 December 2013, and his deputy, Colonel Saleh Zabadi, who is currently the zone commander in Batangafo under the authority of Brigadier-General Alkatim Mahamat based in Sido.

5. According to analysis of satellite imagery conducted by UNOSAT (see annex 5.5.1), 227 buildings were probably destroyed in Bossangoa before 5 December 2013, and 1,007 buildings were destroyed between 5 December 2013 and 28 February 2014. Testimonies obtained by the Panel in Bossangoa and Bangui from eyewitnesses and local authorities describe three different waves of destruction:

- Before 5 December 2013: most of the destruction and lootings of properties were conducted by forces of General Yaya, in retaliation of the attacks carried out by anti-Balakas in the outskirts of Bossangoa;
- Between 5 December 2013 and 22 January 2014: the destruction of buildings was related to the attack of anti-Balaka groups on Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 in retaliation of actions of Seleka fighters; and
- Between 22 January and 28 February 2014: almost all the destructions of buildings was committed by local groups associated with the anti-Balaka,

¹ Human Rights Watch reported extensively on atrocities and sectarian violence committed by both sides in the region of Bossangoa between September and November 2013: "They came to kill", 19 December 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill>; Amnesty International also reported on the events of September 2013: "Human Rights Crisis Spiralling Out of Control", 29 October 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR.19/003/2013/en>

targeting more specifically the neighbourhood of Boro that is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, which appears now almost completely destroyed (see photographs below, and also inset in annex 5.5.1 and more photographs taken by the Panel in annex 5.5.2).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



6. The anti-Balaka local group in Bossangoa is based in the neighbourhood of the Evêché and is commanded by 'Kéma', who was appointed in mid-April 2014 and coming from Ben Zambé. His deputies are reportedly 'Dorassio' and 'Dangba', and the spokesperson of the movement is called "André".² They do not carry identification badges and according to local authorities, the chain of command is loose and the leadership not in full control of the force.

7. According to local sources, the local anti-Balaka force in Bossangoa, which is approximately 250-strong, has a close relationship with the group in Ben Zambé, although it does not participate in the military operations currently conducted in Bouca and Dékoua. However, the adoptive son of former President Bozizé, Teddy Bozizé, has been spotted on a regular basis since mid-April on a motorbike coming back-and-forth to Bossangoa.

² The Panel could not meet with the main military leaders of the anti-Balaka in Bossangoa on 30 April 2014, as all of them were out of town and not reachable on their cellphones.

8. The interface between the anti-Balaka and international actors is handled by a community liaison officer, a Pastor named 'Bertin', based at the Liberté neighbourhood, and 'Rocky', a local businessman described as holding influence and money, who lives and operates a garage close by the main WFP warehouse located in front of the Evêché.

9. According to an anti-Balaka representative, there are actually no "anti-Balaka" in Bossangoa but only youths organised in self-defence groups without any identified leadership. As a representative, his role is to liaise between the youths and external actors. However, despite his claim, the Panel could observe the inscription "anti-Balaka" on destroyed houses owned by members of the Muslim community in the Boro neighbourhood (see photograph below).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



10. The group of anti-Balakas in Bossangoa is also reportedly responsible of several incidents targeting the humanitarian community, including an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 20 March 2014, an abduction of one humanitarian aid worker on 1 April 2014, and an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 27 April 2014.³


³ See also the Panel's database of incidents.

11. However, the Panel could not observe any checkpoint on the road between the towns of Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko province) and Bossangoa, and no armed elements were spotted in Bossangoa during the Panel's mission. According to locals, this was related to the successful implementation of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) since the arrival of the French forces on 6 April 2014.

Annex 5.5.1: Destruction in Bossangoa area, Ouham, CAR — UNOSAT

DESTRUCTION IN BOSSANGOA AREA, OUHAM, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Analysis with WorldView-2 Data Acquired 22 January 2014 and 8 December 2013 and WorldView-1 Data Acquired 28 February 2014



Complex Emergency
 Production Date: 14 Mar 14
 Version: 1.0
 Activation Code: CE20131212CAP




This map illustrates locations of destroyed structures in BOSSANGOA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. USGS satellite imagery acquired 28 February 2014 and compared to imagery from 22 January 2014 and 8 December 2013. UNOSAT assessed the town of Bossangoa and surrounding areas to locate signs of destroyed structures. A total of 1,234 destroyed structures were located in the area, though structures marked as destroyed on 8 December are classed as 'probable' due to the lack of a previous image for comparison. Some of the destruction detected in the 28 February 2014 image was likely a result of burning given the blackened structure remains visible in the imagery. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been validated in the field. Please send ground feedback to UNITAR / UNOSAT.

LEGEND

- Destroyed Building (as of 28 February 2014)
- Destroyed building (as of 22 January 2014)
- Destroyed Building (Probable; as of 8 December 2013)

Primary Road



Source Data (1): WorldView-2 Imagery (Date: 8 December 2013) Resolution: 60 cm Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, International Information and Review License Satellite Data (2): WorldView-2 Imagery (Date: 22 January 2014) Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, International Information and Review License Satellite Data (3): WorldView-1 Imagery (Date: 08 February 2014) Resolution: 60 cm Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, International Information and Review License
 Road Data - Google Map Maker / OSM / ESRI
 Other Data: USGS, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA
 Analysis - UNITAR / UNOSAT
 PRODUCTION: UNITAR / UNOSAT
 Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.1

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 32N
 Projection: Transverse Mercator
 Datum: WGS 1984
 Unit: Meter

The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown here are not warranted to be accurate nor do they imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. UNOSAT is a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN humanitarian and development agencies and their implementing partners.

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Annex 5.5.2: Photographs of the Boro neighbourhood taken by the Panel, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and UN convoy by anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)

Explosion of a grenade next to French forces armoured personnel carriers



Anti-Balakas attacking an UN convoy with stones and arrows






Anti-Balaka arming his bow with an arrow and targeting an UN convoy



Annex 5.7: Joachim Kokaté, 'coordinator' of the CPJP



Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)



ANTIBALAKA

COMITE DE DIRECTION

N° 022 /ATB/14.

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 9

Dans le cadre de la recherche des voies et moyens de sortie de crise en République centrafricaine, et tenant compte de l'urgente nécessité de la restauration de la paix et de la sécurité dans notre pays, le Coordonnateur Général du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka, Monsieur Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA, en attendant d'entrer en négociation avec les Autorités gouvernementales, prend l'engagement solennel en ce jour, 04 Avril 2013, de déclarer la fin de toutes hostilités sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

A cet effet, le Coordonnateur national du Mouvement des Antibalaka, demande impérativement à tous Chef des bataillons des Patriotes Antibalaka, de veiller à l'observation scrupuleuse de la présente décision. Ils doivent instruire tous les patriotes Antibalaka, afin que ceux-ci regagnent leur base respective.

Il s'agit ici de donner une chance à la paix et à la sécurité, seule condition sine qua none pour une relance des activités socio-économiques en vue du développement national.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Avril 2014

Le Coordonnateur Général



Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Annex 6: Seleka - Structure and dynamics

1. The Seleka coalition was dissolved by former President Michel Djotodia¹ on 13 September 2013, and subsequently 3,437 soldiers were integrated on 10 October 2013 into the Central African armed forces (FACA) by a decree of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour.²

2. In Ndélé and Bria, the Panel could meet with the zone commanders, known as Seleka, but presenting themselves as Colonel of the FACA appointed by Presidential decrees.³ In fact, most of the senior officers of the former Seleka wear the distinctive characteristics of the Central African Army, e.g. the red beret, the flag of the CAR as a badge or the “Forces centrafricaines” insigne.

3. It is the understanding of the Panel that the administrative situation of the soldiers integrated by decree on 10 October 2013, and of the senior officers appointed or promoted by Presidential decree under Djotodia’s regime, needs to be clarified by the Transitional Authorities.⁴

Current status

4. On 11 May 2014, military and political leaders of the former Seleka concluded a conclave in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran province), which led to the following two substantial outcomes:

- Formation of a new military structure, referred to by the Panel as the “new” Seleka, headed by Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (former UFDR Chief of Staff, from the Goula ethnic group), with two deputies (Brigadier-Generals Alkhatim Mahamat and Adam Kanton Yacoub) (see photograph in annex 6.2 and organogram in annex 6.3); and
- Establishment of a temporary political coordination structure, headed by Abdoulaye Issène (President of the CPJP, from the Rounga ethnic group), with Rizigala Ramadane as deputy coordinator (UFDR) (see chart in annex 6.4).

Dynamics

5. The Panel could obtain copy of the first version of the final recommendations distributed after the conclave, stating that the international community should “facilitate the process of

¹ Michel Djotodia is included in the annex of the executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014; .

² See annex 6.1.

³ Meeting with Seleka zone commanders, Ndele, 10 April 2014, and Bria, 15 May 2014.

⁴ Meeting with Defence official, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

partition of the country".⁵ According to participants and observers present at the conclave,⁶ the drafting of the recommendations was coordinated by General Zacharia Damane (UFDR, of the Goula ethnic group), who was heading the organisational committee of the conclave.

6. General Damane admitted to the Panel that the first communiqué recommending the partition was not distributed "by mistake", as claimed by the political leaders of the coordination structure, but was the result of an agreement amongst the military leaders of the "new" Seleka. He also explained that the partition may happen in case the requirements outlined as "recommendations" by the "new" Seleka are not met.⁷

7. Another senior member of the coordination structure confirmed to the Panel⁸ that the political leaders of the former Seleka had to convince their military counterparts to reverse their position and issue a second communiqué reaffirming the commitment of the "new" Seleka to maintaining the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic and ensure its national unity. They also consider that some prominent military leaders, in particular affiliated with the UFDR or close with Nouredine Adam (former strongman of the Seleka, leader of the CPJP-Fondamentale, and listed by the Committee for targeted sanctions),⁹ are currently pushing for the partition of the CAR.¹⁰

8. Moreover, military leaders involved in the cantonment of Seleka forces following the imposition of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) by French forces in Bangui in December 2013, most notably General Issa Issaka, who signed as the representative of the former Seleka the memorandum of understanding with the Transitional Authorities regarding the relocation of cantoned fighters outside Bangui, and Colonel Abdulkarim Moussa, are absent from the structure of the "new" Seleka and considered now as "sidelined".

9. Therefore, the expected outcome of the conclave might not yet be forthcoming, neither from the perspective of the international community in terms of having a single partner for future discussions, nor from the perspective of most of the political leaders of the former Seleka who wanted to take over the leadership of the "new" Seleka permanently. Furthermore, the fact that Brigadier-General Alkhatim appears as the main winner of the restructuration of the former Seleka gives the impression once again that military activism leads to political gains.

10. In addition, the establishment of its military head-quarters in Bambari have modified a fragile balance of powers in a key town, where gold production generates significant incomes, and sparked great tension amongst troops loyal to Ali Daras and Damane.

⁵ See annex 6.5.

⁶ Meetings, Bangui, 14 and 16 May 2014.

⁷ Meeting with General Damane, Bambari, 22 May 2014.

⁸ Meeting, Bangui, 17 May 2014.

⁹ Nouredine Adam was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

¹⁰ Telephone conversation, Bangui, 20 May 2014.

Annex 6.1: Decree (last page) of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour integrating 3,437 Seleka into the FACA (original copy archived at the UN)

SN: 025 du
du 10/10/13

3420	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZONDORO	ETIENNE	N° Mle	201324438
3421	Soldat de 1 ^e Classe	ZONWA	JEAN-PIERRE	N° Mle	201324439
3422	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUA	GUY-ROGER	N° Mle	201324440
3423	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUABA	YOUSSEUF- MAX	N° Mle	201324441
3424	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUANGBA	FREDERIC-LE-PLY	N° Mle	201324442
3425	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUAROU	BREMI	N° Mle	201324443
3426	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUBINGUI	CHRISTELAIRE-DMU-RENI-COME	N° Mle	201324444
3427	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUKRA-ZAKARIA	DIAMNE	N° Mle	201324445
3428	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUMBEIDA	ADRIOT	N° Mle	201324446
3429	Soldat de 1 ^e Classe	ZOUNDECKO	SEVERIN	N° Mle	201324447
3430	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	JOSEPH	N° Mle	201324448
3431	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDEKO	DIOR	N° Mle	201324449
3432	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNDI	GILDAS RODRIGUE	N° Mle	201324450
3433	Soldat de 1 ^e Classe	ZOUNGUERE	BIEWEMU	N° Mle	201324451
3434	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNONGO	MAXIMEN	N° Mle	201324452
3435	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOUNOUA	LETICA	N° Mle	201324453
3436	Soldat de 2 ^e Classe	ZOYONDOKO	DEYA	N° Mle	201324454
3437	Soldat de 1 ^e Classe	ZOYONDOKO	SIDICK-NESTOR	N° Mle	201324455

Art 2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Art 3 : La présente Décision sera enregistrée, notifiée aux intéressés et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

DESTINATAIRES
 -Cabinet Militaire
 -I.G.A.N
 -D.G.I.A.N
 -D.G.R.H
 -Tous Corps et Sces FACA
 -Intéressés
 -Majc. de Garnison
 -Archives & Chrono

BANGUI, le 10 OCT 2013



Bertrand MAMOUR
 Général de Brigade

Annex 6.2: Photograph taken in Ndélé of the newly appointed senior leadership of the “new” Seleka


Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (Chief of Staff, left), Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat (First Deputy, center) and Brigadier-General Adam Kanton Yacoub (Second Deputy, right)




Annex 6.3: Organogram of the military leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.4: Organogram of the provisional political leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.5: First version of the final recommendations to the international community initially distributed in Ndélé by the military leaders of the “new” Seleka



Annex 7: French forces clashing with Seleka forces of General Alkhatim



Sangaris : attaque par un groupe lourdement armé au Nord-Ouest du pays

Mise à jour : 06/05/2014 12:24

Le 5 mai 2014, dans l'après-midi, en République Centrafricaine, à environ 450 km au Nord-Ouest de Bangui, la force Sangaris a été attaquée par un groupe lourdement armé, d'un volume d'une quarantaine d'individus qui étaient engagés dans un raid entre Bémal, au Nord du pays, et de Boguila. Une partie du groupe armé qui composait cette colonne adverse a été détruite, d'autres attaquants se sont repliés. Il n'y a pas de blessé parmi les soldats français.

Ces combats ont débuté alors qu'un détachement de la force Sangaris conduisait une mission de reconnaissance depuis Bossangoa vers Paoua, ville située dans l'extrémité Nord-Ouest de la RCA. Cette mission visait à reconnaître cette zone difficile d'accès, dans laquelle de nombreuses exactions étaient rapportées depuis une dizaine de jours, et à y rétablir la situation sécuritaire avec la MISC.




A moins d'une centaine de kilomètres au Sud de Paoua, au niveau de la localité de Boguila, les éléments de tête de la force Sangaris se sont déployés, sur renseignement, pour protéger le village de Boguila et barrer la route à une colonne de pick-ups et de motos transportant des individus lourdement armés.

Le groupe armé adverse a immédiatement engagé le combat manœuvrant avec agressivité semblant décidé à s'emparer de la position des éléments français.


Ces combats, ont duré plus de trois heures et ont cessé à la tombée de la nuit. Face à l'agressivité de l'adversaire, la force Sangaris a fait usage de son armement lourd, incluant missile anti-char et mortier. La décision a également été prise d'engager un appui aérien d'avions de chasse, en provenance de Ndjamena.

Les patrouilles ont repris ce matin autour du village de Boguila, il n'est pas encore possible de déterminer avec précision les pertes adverses. Néanmoins plusieurs véhicules ont été détruits et plusieurs individus armés tués. L'adversaire a rompu le contact et semble s'être exfiltré. L'identité et l'appartenance de cet adversaire est à ce stade difficile à déterminer avec précision. Il pourrait néanmoins s'agir des éléments de la bande armée qui est à l'origine des exactions rapportées dans la région depuis plusieurs jours. La force Sangaris maintient son dispositif de contrôle du village de Boguila.

Annex 8: Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the CAR as of 23 March 2013



**Annex 9: Names of collectors associated or formerly associated with buying offices in
Carnot with which the anti-Balaka want to negotiate protection arrangements**



Annex 10: Artisanal miners working in Axmin's Ndassima gold exploration concession (photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)



Annex 11: Seleka forces of General Ali Daras at Ndassima gold mining site



Annex 12: Stocks of arms, ammunition and trophies in the depot of the Ministry of Water and Forests prior to being looted

MINISTÈRE DES EAUX, FORÊTS,
CHASSE ET PÊCHE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES, DE LA
PLANIFICATION, D'APPUI JURIDIQUE
ET DES RESSOURCES
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES
ET DU CONTENTIEUX
SERVICE DU DÉPÔT ET DE LA POUDRIÈRE
N° _____

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

**SITUATION DES ARMES, MUNITIONS ET TROPHÉES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE
AVANT LE PILLAGE**

I – ARMES DE GUERRE DISPONIBLES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE

- > Cent trente cinq (135) AK 47 + 270 Chargeurs ;
- > Deux (02) MAS 36 Sans munitions ;
- > Un (01) G 3 sans munitions ;
- > Quatre (04) grenades en bon état ;
- > Une (01) grenade moisie ;

II – ARMES AK 47 MISE EN SERVICE

- > Résidence du Ministre 2
- > Service de garde au Ministère 2

- > Aide-Camp DU Ministre de l'Environnement 1
- > Coordonateur BMC 1

III- MUNITIONS DE GUERRE

- ❖ 6 000 (Six mille) munitions de 7,62 court
- ❖ 1 514 (Mille Cinq Cent Quatorze) de 7,62 long

IV- ARMES DE CHASSE

- ❖ Quinze (15) armes de chasse calibre confondus en état moyen
- ❖ Treize (13) armes de chasse complètement rouillées
- ❖ Vingt deux (22) armes de chasse (ancienne sarsie)
- ❖ Six (06) armes de chasse rayée (MOZER)

VI- ARMES DE CHASSE ARTISANALE

- ❖ Vingt (20) armes de chasse artisanale à détruire
- ❖ Six (06) crosse à bois
- ❖ Quatre Vingt Treize (93) munitions de chasse) détruire

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE ET DIVERS

7-1- POINTES D'IVOIRE

- ❖ Soixante trois (63) pointes d'ivoire
- ❖ Cinquante une (51) pointes d'ivoire (WWF)

- ❖ Cinquante Six (56) défenses de phacochères

7-2- **DIVERS**

- ❖ Trois tronçonneuse marque STIHL guide 120
- ❖ Sept (07) grumeliettes
- ❖ Deux (02) guides
- ❖ Cinq (05) peaux de crocodile
- ❖ Une (1) de panthère
- ❖ Une (1) de Bongo

Fait à Bangui, le

27 JAN 2013

Le Chef de Service de Dépôts et de
la Restauration

A circular stamp with the text "LE CHEF DE SERVICE" in the center. The stamp is partially obscured by a large, handwritten signature in black ink that extends across the right side of the page.

Lt Alfred Modeste SEPAMIO MBAT

Annex 13: Other natural resources

Timber

2. Industrial logging and timber exports have continued all through 2013 to date, although at a slightly lower pace compared to 2012. Log exports were down 2 per cent, while sawn wood exports declined by 23 per cent.¹ Timber is officially exported to European and Asian destinations through Cameroon, using the border crossings of Garoua-Boulai and Kenzou. Besides industrial logging, illegal artisanal exploitation surged while the Seleka were in power in non-attributed forest areas, as well as industrial concessions close to Bangui, some of which was exported illegally to Chad.²

3. Logging trucks operating between concession areas and Cameroon were systematically subjected to illegal tax levying during the Seleka's time in power.³ Illegal taxes levied by Seleka forces at checkpoints along transport routes within CAR amounted to about 70 USD per truck.⁴ Calculating from an average monthly export volume in 2013 of 15,000 m³ and an average load of 30-40 m³ per truck, per month Seleka would have fetched 30,000 USD of revenues per month from the timber industry.⁵ In addition some logging companies paid Seleka commanders protection money of up to 6,000 USD per month for their facilities in Bangui.⁶

4. Since the departure of Seleka forces from the southwest of the CAR at the end of January 2014, illegal taxation of logging trucks by armed forces reduced. However, anti-Balaka forces also demand payments haphazardly at checkpoints. The Panel confirmed the presence of anti-Balaka forces under commander Alfred Yekatom "Rombhot", alongside the *Gendarmerie*, at Pissa, Mbaiki and Boda in Lobaye province, where trucks to practically all forestry concessions pass coming from Bangui. Rombhot's soldiers levy up between 2 and 10 USD on each truck at the three checkpoints.⁷ In addition, a forester told the Panel that within his concessions local unidentified anti-Balaka youths occasionally steal chainsaws and petrol for sale.⁸

Cattle

5. With the departure of Seleka forces from the west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, Muslim and Peuhl cattle owners have come under siege of anti-Balaka forces and have either been killed or forced to flee. On the road between Guen and Carnot, the Panel observed anti-Balaka elements in the possession of cattle they claimed to have recuperated

¹ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 19 May 2014.

² Interview with forest guard and official in the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment in Bangui, 21 April 2014.

³ Multiple Interviews truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbaiki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁴ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 23 March, 2014.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Interview with forester in Bangui, 21 March 2014.

⁷ Interviews with truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbaiki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁸ Interview with forester op. cit.

from the forest.⁹ All along the road meat is smoked to be transported by motorbike to Carnot and onwards by truck to Bouar and Bangui.

Oil

6. On 7 March 2014, the Minister of Mines, Energy and Waterworks signed a ministerial order cutting-up non-attributed oil-blocks D-G into sub-blocks of 500 square kilometres, with the view to enable entry of more exploration companies.¹⁰

7. A map was attached to the ministerial order showing attribution of blocks A and B to Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), a Beijing-based company wholly owned by the Government of China (annex 13.1). Block B was attributed to PTI in joint venture with Doha based company IAS by a Presidential decree signed by Bozizé in 2007.¹¹ For block A the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted a prospecting licence in January 2011, which was never publicly announced.¹² CNPC carried out seismic tests in the area of Boromata in Bamingui-Bangoran province up until February 2013 when Seleka fighters forced its workers out.¹³ It is unclear when the CNPC licence was transferred to PTI. In March 2012 a third oil block C, in the southeast of the country, was awarded to the South African firm Dig-Oil (see annex 13.2).

⁹ Interview with anti-Balaka cattle herders and motorbike drivers on the road between Guen and Carnot, 26 April 2014.


¹⁰ Arrête no 005/14/MMEH/DIRCAB/DGP portant découpage du domaine pétrolier de la République Centrafricaine en blocs et sous-blocs surfaces, 7 March.

¹¹ <http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/ias-wins-exploration-bid->, accessed on 4 May 2014.


¹² <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1798133564&Country=Central+African+Republic&topic=Economy&subtopic=Current+policy&subsubtopic=Economic+policy.+Oil+exploration+is+to+resume+in+north-eastern+CAR>, accessed on 3 May 2014.

¹³ <http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/spotlight/2013/02/05/the-oil-stakes-in-an-armed-conflict.107943013-EVE>, accessed on 6 May 2014.

Annex 13.1: Oil blocks in northern Central African Republic as per 7 March 2014



Annex 13.2: Map of oil block in the Central African Republic before 7 March 2014



Annex 14: Arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR

1. The panel developed lists of arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR based on samples collected by international forces. The lists within this annex will serve as a baseline to monitor the implementation of arms embargo.

2. Currently, based on the Panel's observation and information collected, the typology of custody of weapons in CAR can be presented as follows:

Entity	Estimated holding
Government forces FACA, police and Gendarmerie	- about 110 rifles - 3 ammunition stores secured by MISCA
Cantoned elements of Ex Seleka in 3 sites in Bangui	individual arms kept by combatants under confidence building measures
Seleka not cantoned	Not known
FACA associated with anti Balaka	Individual arms and few light weapon
Anti balaka	Military arms and hunting rifles, grenades and machete
Other armed entities	Not known
Civilian for self-protection and hunting	Military arms and hunting rifles
Collected by impartial forces	Around 1100 small arms and a number of light weapon

Picture of containers of ammunition in Bosembele looted after the arrival of Seleka in March 2013.¹



¹ See "Centrafrique: à Bossembele, les fantômes du régime de Bozizé hantent encore la ville", RFI, 08 April 2013, accessed at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130408-centrafrique-bossembele-fantomes-regime-bozize-sont-encore-presents/>

Sangaris discovered, on 11 February after the cantonment of former Seleka, abandoned containers of ammunition north of Bangui that were looted (left)². Mortar shells 60 to 120 mm not useable without mortar tubes were left behind on the open, while small arms and grenades have probably been taken by anti Balaka (right)³.



² Screenshot from France 24 international news.

³ See "Sangaris : la force se déploie en province", Website Ministère de la défense, 11 February, accessed at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/sangaris-la-force-se-deploie-en-province>

List of arms and military equipment found in CAR

Rifles

AK type (see profile)
AR-15 A2 Cal 223
CS/LS 06
FAL 50.00
HK-G3 A3
HK MP-5 SD3
Galil AR
Lee-Enfield
MAS 36
MAT 49
Mauser
M-16 A1
R4 Vector
SAR 80
STEYR AUG
SVD
Type 85
UZI

Light Machine Gun

AA-52
Browning M1919 A4
MAG-58
Model 68
PKM
Type 56
Type 56-1
Type 67-2C
Type 80
Type 81
Vector MG 4
VZ 59

Medium Machine Gun

Type 54
Type 85
W-85

Heavy Machine Gun

KPVT
Type 58
ZPU-1
ZPU-2
ZPU-4
ZU-23/2

Grenade Launcher

AGS 17
ARSENAL UGBL
GP 25
HK-69 / GPZ-1
M 79
MILKOR MGL
QLZ 87
Zastava M-93

Multiple rocket launcher

AT-4 M136
BM 21
LAW M-72
RBR.64 M80
RPG-7
RPO-A
Type 63
Type 69

Mortars

60 mm WW90L
60 mm NIMIR
81 mm B 499
M 37
Type 67

Recoilless rifle

SPG-9
106 SR M40 A1

APC

FV 107 FERRET
BRD-2
BTR-152
OT-90
RATEL-90
VAB

Vehicles

RDLVS Gecko
SAFIR 106 mm M40A1
SAMIL-20 HUNTER
TOYOTA LC Serie 70

List of ammunition found in CAR

Mortar Shells

Mle 44
M48
M49A3
M61
M73
OF-D
O-832-DU
PP87
PP-93
Type 63
Type 832

Propelled Grenades

DZP1C
F-7
PG-7L
PG-7M
PG-7S
PG-7V
PG-9
Type 63
Type 69
Type 69-3
R-107

For Grenades launchers

Arsenal RHE-F
Arsenal RHV-HEF
DFS 87-35 HE
ENERGA
FI AP 34-52
HEAT 83
M 433 HEDP
M-60 AC
Super ENERGA

Hand Grenades

DF-37
F1
F1 V2
M-26 T
OF-37
RG-4
82-2

Mines

M-19
TC6

Cartridge

See Profile Annex 16

Annex 15: Profile of type of assault-rifles found in the CAR

1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of models of AK rifles found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of this type of arms in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.
3. The profile shows that there are 20 different models of AK-type rifles in circulation in CAR, which were produced in ten countries.

Profile of AK models found in CAR

















		
<p>AKM USSR 1973</p> 	<p>Zastava M-64 Yugoslavia</p> 	



Annex 16: Profile of arms cartridges found in the CAR

Background


1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of cartridges found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of ammunition in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.




Analysis


3. The profile shows that the ammunition found in the CAR was produced by 41 different manufacturers from 16 countries, over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013, and includes calibres from both former "Western"- and "Eastern"-bloc states. The profile includes 116 lots representing manufactures and year of production of which 29.3 per cent were produced in France up to the year 1990, 26.7 per cent in China up to 2011 and 9.5 per cent in Sudan up to 2013. It is to be noted that these percentage figures represent the diversity of the ammunition profile rather than its volume.









Profile of cartridges found in CAR



Manufacturer: Belgium / FN				
Calibre	8x60mm	7.62x51		
1				
Markings	FN 8x60 S	FN 77		
Year manufactured	Not known	1977		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Bulgaria / 10				
Calibre	7.62x39			
2				
Marking	10 69			
Year manufactured	1969			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 41				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
3				
Marking	41 95	41 07		
Year manufactured	1995	2007		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
4				
Marking	61 74	61 87	61 95	61 97
Year manufactured	1974	1987	1995	1997
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
5				
Marking	61 71	61 80	61 90	
Year manufactured	1971	1980	1990	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 71				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
6				
Marking	71 73	71 90	71 98	71 01
Year manufactured	1973	1990	1998	2001
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: China / 71				
Calibre	7.62x39	9		
7				
Marking	71 98	71 11		
Year manufactured	1998	2011		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 81				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x39		
8				
Marking	81 90	81 97		
Year manufactured	1990	1997		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		










Manufacturer: China / 270				
Calibre	7.62x39			
9				
Marking	270 74			
Year manufactured	1974			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 351				
Calibre	7.62x54R	12.7x108		
10				
Marking	351 78	351 76		
Year manufactured	1978	1976		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 539				
Calibre	7.62x39			
11				
Marking	539 72			
Year manufactured	1972			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 811				
Calibre	7.62x39			
12				
Marking	811 08			
Year manufactured	2008			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			












Manufacturer: China / 911				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	
13				
Marking	911 76	911 77	911 78	
Year manufactured	1976	1977	1978	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China / 945				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
14				
Marking	945 07	945 09	945 10	
Year manufactured	2007	2009	2010	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 9121; 9611, 9631				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	
15				
Marking	9121 86	9611 77	9631 05	
Year manufactured	1986	1977	2005	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
16				
Marking	bxn 62	bxn 68	bxn 72	bxn 73
Year manufactured	1962	1968	1972	1973
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
17				
Marking	bxn 80	bxn 65	bxn 66	bxn 87
Year manufactured	1980	1965	1966	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / CZO				
Calibre	14.5x114			
18				
Marking	CZO 55			
Year manufactured	1955			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Egypt /10				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
19				
Marking	٨٠٤٢٤ ١٠			
Year manufactured	1980			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5 x54	7.5 x54	5.56x45	5.56x45
20				
Marking	LM 65	LM 77	LM 1.86	LM 90
Year manufactured	1965	1977	1986	1990
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
21				
Marking	LM 1-61	LM 1-67	LM 1-70	LM 3-71
Year manufactured	1961	1967	1970	1971
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54		
22				
Marking	LM 3-72	LM 4-74		
Year manufactured	1972	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: France TE				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	12.7x99
23				
Marking	TE 7.5 S	TE 9 F	S TE	TE S
Year manufactured	1971	1974	1983	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	9x51
24				
Marking	SF 84	SF 57	SF 81	SF 82
Year manufactured	1984	1957	1981	1982
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
25				
Marking	SS 2.70	SF 81	Sf 2.83	SF 84
Year manufactured	1970	1981	1983	1984
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	12.7x99
26				
Marking	SF 1 78	SF 83	SF 84	SF 4-87
Year manufactured	1978	1983	1984	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France FNM, VE				
Calibre	7.5x54	5.56x45	5.56x45	
27				
Marking	VE 2 40	FNM 83	FNM 89	
Year manufactured	TBC	1983	1989	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Iran				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	12.7x108	14.5x114
28				
Marking	7.62x51 97	7.62x54 01	12.7 03	14.5 81
Year manufactured	1997	2001	2003	1981
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Israel / IMI				
Calibre	5.56x45			
29				
Marking	IMI 07			
Year manufactured	2007			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Romania				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	14.5x114	14.5x114
30				
Marking	22 70	21 76	21 77	21 78
Year manufactured	1979	1976	1977	1978
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Saudia Arabia				
Calibre	7.62x51			
31				
Marking	7.62 1405			
Year manufactured	1985			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: South Africa				
Calibre	5.56x45	7.62x51	7.62x51	12.7x99
32				
Marking	86 13	90 12	90 22	92 14
Year manufactured	1986	1990	1990	1992
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Sudan / من (TBC)				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51		
33				
Marking	١٩٨٠ من	١٩٨٢ من		
Year manufactured	1980	1982		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre				
34				
H Marking	2 39 011	2 39 12	1 39 13	
Year manufactured	2011	2012	2013	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51	7.62x51	
35				
Marking	SUD 51 97	SUD 51 98	Su 1 51 01	
Year manufactured	1997	198	2001	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
36				
Marking	54 05	54 07	07 54	
Year manufactured	2005	2007	2007	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	

Manufacturer: Sweden /				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
37				
Marking	Mar 2014			
Year manufactured	Not Known			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: USA				
Calibre	.280			
38				
Marking	RP 280 REM	RP 20AUTO		
Year manufactured	Not Known	Not Known		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 60 and 711				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39		
39				
Marking	60 74	711 74		
Year manufactured	1974	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108
40				
Marking	188 72	188 74	188 73	188 79
Year manufactured	1972	1874	1973	1979
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188, 3				
Calibre	12.7x108	14.5x114		
41				
Marking	188 80	3 74		
Year manufactured	1980	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former Yugoslavia / ППТ				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
42				
Marking	ППТ 03	ППТ 1986	ППТ 1988	ППТ 1989
Year manufactured	2003	1986	1988	1989
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Zimbabwe / ZI				
Calibre	7.62x39			
43				
Marking	ZI 96			
Year manufactured	1996			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Not Known				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
44				
Marking	87 3.	9 52		
Year manufactured	1986	1952		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		

Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
FN	Belgium	1
10 NN	Bulgaria	2
41 NN	China	3
61 NN	China	4, 5
71 NN	China	6, 7
81 NN	China	8
270 NN	China	9
351 NN	China	10
539	China	11
811	China	12
911	China	13
945	China	14
9121 NN	China	15
9611 NN	China	15
9631 NN	China	15
Bxn NN	Former Czechoslovakia	16, 17
CZO NN	Former Czechoslovakia	18
ع م ج	Egypt	19
LM NN	France	20,21,22
TE NN	France	23
SF NN	France	24, 25, 26
VE NN	France	27
7.62x51 NN	Iran	28
12.7 NN	Iran	28
14.5 NN	Iran	28
IMI NN	Israel	29
22 NN	Romania	30
21 NN	Romania	30
Swords palm	Saudia Arabia	31
12/13/14 /22bottom	South Africa	32
س	Sudan	33
N 39 NN	Sudan	34
SUD 51 NN	Sudan	35
SU N 51 NN	Sudan	35
N 54 NN	Sudan	36
norma	Sweden	37
R.P	USA	38
60 NN	Former USSR	39
188 NN	Former USSR	40, 41
3 NN	Former USSR	41
ИИТV NN	Former Yugoslavia	42
ZI NN	Zimbabwe	43

Annex 17: Removal of markings and serial numbers from AKMs

1. The Panel observed four cases of removals of markings and serial numbers from one Soviet-made AKM model. These rifles were observed at three different locations in Bangui, within collected weapons by MISCA and Sangaris and with cantoned former Seleka.
2. Their markings were certainly removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which might have been smuggled to the CAR potentially in violation the arms embargo. The Panel is investigating these cases.



Marking erased on an AKM held by a cantoned former Seleka



Fire selector indication of Soviet origin



Marking erased on an AKM collected by MISCA



Marking erased on an AKM collected by SANGARIS



Annex 18: Smuggling of hunting ammunition in violation of the arms embargo

Background

1. On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs supported by a unit of MISCA seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the Central African Republic at its main land crossing point with Cameroon, (Garoua Boulay-Beloko). The Panel was conducting a field visit to this border crossing during the same day and was informed of this seizure and could therefore document this case and take photographs of the seized materials (See below).
2. The director of customs in Beloko informed the Panel that the box of cartridges was hidden inside a bag of onions carried by a woman and a child who managed to escape at the time of the seizure. The Panel learned from other sources of another seizure of 64 boxes of 25 hunting cartridges calibre 12, which occurred in mid-February 2014 and that alleged anti-Balaka elements threatened customs agents to release the seized boxes. MISCA intervened and confiscated the ammunition.
3. The Panel is aware of cases of original cartridges designed for smaller game being modified to allow more effectiveness against larger game or human beings. The process consists of removing the original smaller lead and replacing it with artisanal pellets made from lead made of battery electrodes or by inserting a single artisanal large projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary and might improve over time to achieve the expected effect (see pictures below).

Investigation

4. The cartridges were made in Spain by MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. In response to the Panel's letter dated 30 April 2014, MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. informed that the ammunition mentioned above were part of a lot of 528,000 cartridges of 12-00 Redstar and Rio 20 sold to SAMT (Armes Transports et Munitions SARL) in Yaoundé, Cameroun, and shipped on 9 January 2014. A bill of lading and an end user undertaking for exclusive use in Cameroun are below.
5. In a letter dated 9 May 2014, the Panel requested from SAMT, the list of entities and individuals that have bought large quantities of hunting cartridges from January 2014 to date. SAMT sent to the Panel a list of 26 clients who bought this type of cartridges. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations requesting a visit to discuss this case and other arms related issues and awaiting a response.

Bill of lading indicating the shipment of ammunition

		BILL OF LADING FOR OCEAN TRANSPORT OR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT	SCAI: MAFU BL No: 951253142
Shipper: MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A AV. PARTENON 16-18 28042 MADRID ESPANA		Booking No: 951253142	Export reference: E4779
Consignee (acceptable only if assigned to order, to order of named Person or to order of holder): ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN		Onward inland routing (that part of Carriage as defined in clause 1, for account and risk of Receiver): NBBY TURY (SEE CLAUSE 22) ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN	
Vessel (see clause 1, F 10): GLUECKEBURG	Voyage No: 1402	Place of Receipt, applicable only when document used as Bill of Lading for Transport (B/L) (see clause 1): Nanclares de Oca	
Port of Loading: Bilbao	Port of Discharge: Douala	Place of Delivery, Applicable only when document used as Multimodal Transport B/L (see clause 1)	
PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER			
Kind of Packages, Description of goods, Marks and Numbers, Container No./Seal No. 1 Container Said to Contain 2112 BOXES UN0012, CARTRIDGES FOR WEAPONS, INERT PROJECTILE, CLASS 1.4S NET EXPLOSIVE CONTENT: 845Kg 528.000 UNITS 2112 BOXES GROSS WEIGHT: 24.264 KGS NET WEIGHT: 22.903 KGS		GROSS WEIGHT: 24264.000 KGS	Measurement: 20.000 CBM
<p style="font-size: 2em; opacity: 0.5;">FREIGHTED COPY</p>			
MSKU4217896 ML-ES2342696 20 DRY 8'6 2112 BOXES 24264.000 KGS 20.000 CBM SHIPPER'S LOAD, STOW, WEIGHT AND COUNT FREIGHT PREPAID SD/CY Consignee Ref: ORDER E4779 First Notify Ref: null Inward Forwarders reference null			
(Drawn out/in line as declared by Shipper, but without responsibility of or representation by Carrier (see clause 14))			
Freight & Charges: Basic Ocean Freight Inland Haulage Export Export Intermodal Fuel Fee Examination Service Dangerous Cargo Service Documentation fee - Origin Terminal Handling Service- Orig	Intentionally masked		Total
Carrier's Receipt (see clause 1 and 14), total number of containers or packages received by Carrier: 1 container	Place of Issue of this Bill: Madrid	SHIPPER'S USE AS RECEIPT FOR RECEIVING GOODS OR PACKAGES: This receipt is not to be used as a receipt for the goods or packages unless it is countersigned by the carrier. It is not to be used as a receipt for the goods or packages unless it is countersigned by the carrier. It is not to be used as a receipt for the goods or packages unless it is countersigned by the carrier.	
Number & Sequence of Original Bills: THREE/3	Date of Issue of B/L: 2014-01-13	Date of Receipt of Goods: 2014-01-09	
Declared Value (See clause 7.3)	Shipped on Board Date (Local Time): 2014-01-09	This transport document has one or more numbered pages	
Signed for the Carrier: A.P. Hildebrand - Maersk A/S, Billing as Maersk Ltd.			
Maersk Spain, SLU As Agent for the Carrier			

End user undertaking certifying that the ammunition "will be used solely for civil use purposes" and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from Cameroon

S.A.M.T
Sarl ARMES ET MUNITIONS - TRANSPORTS
 Vente et Réparation Armes - Munitions et Articles de chasse

END - USER UNDERTAKING

DATE: 04 december 2013

We Armes et Munitions - Transport, certify that we are

- 1.- The end user
- 2.- The importer/Consignee of the goods: x
- to be supplied by MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A.

We further certify that the goods are sporting shotgun cartridges and will be used solely for civil use purposes and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from CAMEROUN.

We further certify that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Neither will the goods be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. Products will not be sold nor re-exported to a third party without previous consent from the Spanish Authorities.

Yours sincerely

NAME AND STAMP OF THE COMPANY

Armes et Munitions - Transport

NAME AND POSITION OF THE UNDERSIGNER

AUTIN Nicole - Directrice


 ARMES ET MUNITIONS
 Transport s.a. r.l.
 BP 147 YDE / Tél/Fax 23721523

SARL au Capital de 4 000 000 FCFA - RC : RH-810 - N° contribuable : M06760000030Y
 Yaoundé - B.P. : 147 - Tél./Fax : +237 22 22 15 23 • Douala : B.P. : 13174 - Tél./Fax : +237 33 43 11 39
 E-mail : armes_munitions@yahoo.fr

Photographs of seized ammunition



Box containing 250 cartridges



Label indicating manufacturing entity:

- Made in EU - Spain by MAXAM Outdoors
- Address: Avda. del Partenón, 16 bajo 28042 Madrid



Lot number: #C1312149#

Use of hunting ammunition by anti-Balaka combatants



Top:
Hunting cartridges modified by removing the original pellets (lead shots) and replacing them with bigger artisanal shots (seized from anti-Balaka in Carnot).

Bottom
Hunting cartridges modified by inserting machine gun cartridge 7.62x54R shown on the left (seized from anti-Balaka in Bouar)

Annex 19: Legal framework of the arms embargo regime

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, and by paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014, decided with regards to the arms embargo that initially from 5 December to 27 January 2015, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

- a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned;
- b) technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities;
- c) the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel; and
- d) the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

2. The Council established the following standing exemptions to the arms embargo in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014):

- a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MICOPAX, MISCA, BINUCA and its guard unit, the AU-RTF, and the French forces deployed in the CAR (paragraph 54 (a) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- b) protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only (paragraph 54 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- c) supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of CAR or CAR's international legal obligations (paragraph 54 (d) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- d) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union operation (paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 (2014); and
- e) supplies used by MISCA, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, the AU-RTF and the French forces operating in the CAR for the implementation of their mandates (paragraph 37 of resolution 2149 (2014).

3. Finally, the Council decided in its resolution 2127 (2013) that an advance approval by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of the same resolution is required for exemptions to the arms embargo for:

- a) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training (paragraph 54 (b) of resolution 2127 (2013);

- b) supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013); and
- c) other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel (paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013).

Annex 20: Support to the CAR Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A. Support approved by the Committee

1. Support to the CAR SSR process is currently limited to the Police and *Gendarmerie* for public order operations in Bangui. Since its establishment, the Security Council Committee on the CAR has approved the provision of eleven pick-up trucks, the provision of 48 rapid-response vehicles, equipment and materials for two projects in the CAR for a total of 730 CAR police officers. The Committee has also approved two in-country training modules, each for the duration of eight weeks that would benefit around 250 members of the CAR security forces.
2. The Committee has approved the transfer by French forces to the CAR internal security forces of 51 individual arms from the stockpile of weapons seized during the disarmament operations carried out by SANGARIS. However, the Panel observed that at least six assault-rifles were transferred in April by the *Gendarmerie* component of the French forces to local security forces in Bria (Hautte-Kotto) before the Committee's approval, in addition to the provision of training.

On 31 March 2014, UNDP and BINUCA handed over 11 pick up truck vehicles to Central African Police and Gendarmerie¹



3.

¹ See "L'ONU remet 11 véhicules aux policiers et gendarmes de Centrafrique", 31 March 2014, PNUD/CAR website accessed on 24 May 2014 at http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014-03/1_oum-remet-11-vehicules-aux-policiers-et-gendarmes-de-centrafr/

B. Stockpile management

1. The Panel noted that stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Bangui are secured by MISCA and French forces under the confidence-building measures (*mesures de confiance*) implemented by the international forces. MISCA is securing three ammunition sites originally belonging to Government forces in Bangui.
2. The Panel noted the absence of proper physical security and stockpile management as well as record keeping for FACA ammunition secured by MISCA. Moreover, the three sites where FACA ammunition is stored are located within population centres in Bangui and hence present risks especially due to the poor quality of storage and the presence of large quantities of obsolete ammunition. The Mine Action Section of MINUSCA and its partners have made contributions to improve stockpile management, safety and awareness and assisted to destroy 742 artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris.

*Cutting of artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris from 20 to 25 March 2014 in Bangui
(photographs taken by the Panel)*



Annex 21: Cases of non-compliance

1. The Panel noticed cases of non-compliance with the embargo regime, which were addressed with the concerned parties. It concerns provision of training, assistance and equipment to the CAR defence and security forces without prior approval of the Security Council Committee on the CAR.

2. On 31 March 2014, BINUCA and UNDP handed over to the police forces of the CAR eleven pick-up truck vehicles. The Panel sent a letter on the issue which prompted a *post facto* request for exemption from UNDP to the Committee, which was granted on 14 May 2014. On 1 May 2014, a large quantity of equipment and accessories including military-style uniforms, was donated by Togo to the Police and *Gendarmerie* of the CAR during a ceremony in Bangui. In this connection, the Panel sent a letter to the Government of Togo on 6 May 2014 to obtain further information, but to date no reply has been forthcoming.

3. With regard to assistance and training, Sudan provided basic infantry training to around 170 soldiers from the CAR in a Sudanese training centre north of Khartoum between 8 November 2013 and 5 March 2014. The Panel learned that sixty of these recruits returned to Bangui in April 2014 while the rest headed to Birao (Vakaga province) and presumably joined the former Seleka according to one General of that group. The Panel sent a letter requesting further information on this training to the Government of Sudan on 2 May 2014, but no reply has been forthcoming.

4. On 5 May 2014, the Panel sent two letters to the Governments of Morocco and Senegal, whose countries are the major providers of training for CAR defence and security personnel. Morocco confirmed that 34 military trainees who were in the country before 5 December 2013 (the imposition of the arms embargo) were still present in May 2014. Senegal, where about 20 FACA trainees are believed to be still present, has not yet replied to the Panel's letter. The Panel has also obtained information that small numbers of military trainees are also still present in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France and Niger. The Panel is in the process of informing those countries that exemption requests should be transmitted to the Committee in connection with these trainings.

5. With regards to support to the CAR SSR process, the Committee has approved so far all requests for the provision of equipment and training to the Police and *Gendarmerie*.¹ However, the Committee reiterated that the provision of training by international forces is exempted from the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) only in the context of support given by MISCA for its contribution to the reform of the security sector in coordination with MINUSCA.

¹ See annex 20.

Annex 22: Case Study I: Killing of an ICRC Staff in Ndélé

1. On 8 March 2014, three armed men killed an International Committee staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of Ndélé. At the time of the incident, the ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with three other ICRC staff members; the other three were unharmed. The incident happened in the context of civil unrest that was taking place in the town on the day of the incident, but clearly amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law.¹
2. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of the incident by contacting witnesses and by visiting the town of Ndélé on 10 April 2014.

Background

3. The town of Ndélé is located in the northeast of the CAR in the prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran. The town has approximately 51,000 inhabitants; 60 per cent are Christians and 40 per cent are Muslim². The grand majority of the population belongs to the Goula and Runda ethnic groups; a considerable percentage of the population is of Chadian origin.
4. Being close to the Chadian border, Ndélé is a town where commercial and migration routes intersect. Sudanese and Chadian individuals, armed and non-armed, pass through this town.
5. Ndélé has been under the control of the former Seleka since they took power in March 2013³. As per accounts from several sources consulted by the Panel, the security situation in Ndélé has always been volatile. Banditry has been common phenomenon in the area for decades. During the period when the former Seleka was in power (March – December 2013) the security situation improved according to several sources, there was a reduction of robberies, car hijackings and other crimes, but since December 2013 and during the past five months the situation has deteriorated.
6. Since December 2013 different factions of the former Seleka have been present and in control of the town. Mainly CPJP and UFDR, but none has absolute control of the town. These different factions have been cohabitating on relatively good terms for the past few months apart from isolated incidents. There is no clear and unique command and control in Ndélé and its surroundings.

¹ ICRC Press Release, 8 March 2014; <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-08-central-african-republic-icrc-staff-member-killed.htm>

Jeune Afrique, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20140308T221625Z20140308T221554Z/>; and Reuters, Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA270PV20140308>

² According to Government institutions and humanitarian organizations.

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel with a wide variety of sources as well as the field visit conducted by the Panel on 10 April 2014 confirm this statement.

7. There was no significant change of local authorities in Ndélé in December 2013 when former Seleka was pressured to give up power in Bangui. The Préfet, Sous-Préfet and COMZONE remained in place.
8. Nevertheless it is noteworthy to mention that the Chadian contingent of MISCA evacuated the Préfet, Mr. Bernard SENDEO OKAPE on 26 January 2014 due to security threats he had received from armed men based on accusations that he was supporting the anti-Balaka forces.

Humanitarian situation

9. Presence: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (WASH⁴), food security and protection); *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (health); *Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale* (PU-AMI) (health and food security); as well as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (education and protection), have on-going humanitarian operations in N'Dele and surrounding areas. The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) recently closed its operations in the area. Since November / December 2013 all organizations have decreased their operations and number of staff in Ndélé, mainly due to the volatile security situation. Various humanitarian actors have expressed their precautions of deploying either expatriates or national staff ('impats') who are white or non-Muslims to Ndélé as a mitigating measure to be able to operate in an insecure environment.
10. Needs: Potable water remains the main humanitarian need for the population of Ndélé.
11. IDPs: Approximately 5,000 IDPs mainly integrated within host community, no existing IDP sites. All IDPs belong to the Muslim community.
12. Previous incidents reported in 2014: Attacks against humanitarian organizations

In the course of 2014 humanitarian organizations have been victim of various security related incidents in Ndélé. On 29 January 2014, unknown armed men robbed the health centre that is run by an INGO; On 31 January, the vehicle of an INGO was hijacked in the road between Ndélé and Manovo; on 14 February, the base of an INGO in Ndélé was attacked, property and money was stolen; on 25 February, another INGO vehicle was attacked and their staff robbed on the road between N'Dele and Bamingui; On 28 February 2014, after mid-night, five unknown armed men unlawfully entered the Guest House of an INGO, verbally and physically threatened the staff present and damaged some equipment; On 30 April 2014, an INGO convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass

⁴ WASH stands for WAter, Sanitation and Hygiene services

through, but one was held behind. This truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.⁵ The incident was widely condemned by the international community.

13. All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February 2014 through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter (see below) was signed by a group that calls themselves *Groupe des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. According to several sources consulted and interviewed by the Panel in relation to the investigation of this incident the group is composed of few young men from Ndélé who are not directly related to the different former Seleka factions that are present in the town. However, after the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and former Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and to assure their security. There were no more threats issued by the group, according to various sources consulted by the Panel, the group of young men were identified and approached by one of the former Seleka commanders in the town and ordered them to discontinue this type of threats. The letter was the last time (until the writing of this report) where the existence of this group had been mentioned.

Description of Events

14. On 8 March 2014 at around 09:00 hours a SANGARIS patrol of one vehicle went to the Commissariat to arrest an former Seleka Colonel INUS and hand him over to MISCA⁶. Upon their return to the base, a vehicle coming from the Gendarmerie commanded by Colonel ISA and his armed men followed them. They shot at the SANGARIS vehicle from behind to which they reacted by shooting back. The exchange of fire took place at the roundabout that leads towards the airstrip, close to the church and the commercial part of the town.
15. The SANGARIS patrol left the scene and returned to its base. The clash left four former Seleka fighters dead and two others wounded. The corpses and wounded were left in the street. The Muslim population reacted a while after the exchange of fire had ended and went to take the dead to be buried and the injured to the hospital.
16. The clash caused fear within the civilian population of the town, mostly the Christian population, some of which took refuge in the catholic church of Ndélé.

⁵ <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/rca-apres-une-nouvelle-attaque-l-inquietude-grandit-au-sein-des-ong.html>; and

http://www.pu-ami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879&Itemid=28

⁶ The arrest was related to a verbal threat that Colonel Inus had made against SANGARIS in Ndélé. He had stated publicly on 7 March 2014 that if SANGARIS did not leave Ndélé within 48 hours they would be attacked. Information obtained by primary sources through interviews conducted by the Panel.

17. At around 10:00 hours, three armed men in military attire (beige camouflage) followed the crowd of civilians seeking refuge at the church. The men forced themselves into the house next to the church and fired at the ICRC staff who was residing at that house with the other three ICRC staff members and the cleaning lady.
18. According to several accounts of the incident, the three men just entered the premises and shot at the ICRC staff, no explanation was given in relation to why the other three were left un-harmed. Only one of the three-armed men fired at the moment of the incident, this is the same person who the local authorities have signalled as the perpetrator of the killing. There is no explanation of why the other two did not shoot.
19. The three armed men asked everyone inside the premises to gather at the garden in the back of the church, right after they went to the church and the other church residence premises (where three priests and a seminarist resided) and also requested everyone to gather at the garden in the back.
20. At this time, the three armed men asked the civilians who were present at the church: "*where are the men?*" question to which one of the priests responded that there were none left. After the armed men took the personal belongings and money from the people present and entered the priests residence to take some money, a computer and mobile phones.
21. The three armed men were not recognized by any of the individuals who were present at the moment of the incident, nor did they carry any insignia or indication to which armed group they belonged to. However all individuals interviewed and consulted in the course of the investigation indicated that these young men were related to former Seleka factions present in Ndélé.
22. After taking all the valuables they could find they left the church premises.
23. According to local authorities interviewed by the Panel in Bangui and in Ndélé, the perpetrator of the incident is a young man named Jamal AMAT. He left Ndélé the day of the incident and has been on the run since. The local authorities have been trying to arrest him for detention. The father of this individual has a money transfer business in the centre of town. There is no further information about the individual; however at the moment of writing of this report the Panel has obtained information from three confidential sources that clearly stated that the individual is closely related to the former Seleka in Ndélé.
24. The day after the incident representatives of the former Seleka present in town formally apologized to the ICRC for the incident and expressed their willingness and intention to apprehend the perpetrator, however at the moment of writing of this report this has not happened.⁷

⁷ Interview with confidential source on 10 April 2014.

25. The Panel conducted this investigation independently and did not receive any information from ICRC.

Annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organizations

1. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left Boda. On 29 January 2014, clashes between the Muslim and non-Muslim population erupted in town. As many as 61 civilians were killed, approximately 850 houses and shops were burned and destroyed and more than half of the population in Boda was displaced. The violence decreased upon the arrival of the SANGARIS forces on 5 February 2014 nevertheless the security situation remained fragile and unstable until the time of writing this report.
2. On 22 February 2014, a team from an INGO was forced to stop the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs) in the town of Boda due to threats made by anti-Balaka militias. This incident amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. It happened in the context of confrontations and high tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda. The Panel has decided not to disclose the name of the INGO that was victim in the incident investigated in this case file to protect humanitarian operations in the country as well as future investigations of similar incidents of the Panel.
3. The CAR Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of this incident, by interviewing sources and by visiting the town of Boda on 19 April 2014.

Background

4. Boda is located approximately 160 km south-west of Bangui in the Lobaye Prefecture. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants.¹ These figures include approximately 12,000 Muslims² and 30,000 non-Muslims, the remaining figure is the estimate number of people living outside the town; no reliable information is available in relation to which religious community they belong to. Since end of January 2014 most of the Muslim population is cantoned in the centre of town and the non-Muslims population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town but there is no information on this matter available.
5. During the last couple of decades the livelihoods of the inhabitants in Boda consisted mainly of trading diamonds and to a lesser extent of agricultural production. The latter mainly for local consumption. Traditionally, individuals belonging to the Muslim community in Boda and Mbaki managed most of the diamond trade, but since the end of

¹ Evaluation Report, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), February 2014; OCHA figures; the number of inhabitants was calculated by the RRM team based on the statistics from the health centre in Boda.

² According to information collected by humanitarian organizations, the Muslim community in Boda is composed not only of Central Africans but also individuals of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian origin.

January 2014 these individuals have not been able to access the mines due to a lack of freedom of movement. According to primary sources of the Panel the diamond trade has partially resumed under the control of the non-Muslim community.

6. Boda has one hospital and thirteen schools (twelve public schools and one private school), one kindergarten and two maternity centres, all were closed after the eruption of violence in late January 2014 and none were operational at the time of writing this report.
7. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left the town of Boda. Presence of local authorities was reduced to the Mayor, one gendarme, one policeman (both un-armed) and 15 teachers / educators, all others authorities left.³
8. According to numerous credible sources, during the time the former Seleka controlled Boda they were responsible for committing crimes against the non-Muslim population. The former Seleka having armed the Muslim population is one of the allegations received by the Panel during its investigations⁴. Nevertheless sources consulted were sound in stating that the security situation was calm during the period the former Seleka were in power. There were no reports of anti-Balaka militias in Boda before the end of January 2014.
9. On 29 January 2014, violence erupted between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the town. Houses and shops in and around the centre of town and the market were attacked and burned, as many as 61 civilians were killed during this event according to several sources⁵. Reports of humanitarian organizations stated that approximately 850 houses and businesses were burned between 28 January and the 5 February 2014. On 5 February 2014, SANGARIS Forces arrived in Boda.⁶
10. According to three reliable primary sources interviewed by the Panel, anti-Balaka militias arrived to Boda shortly after the eruption of violence. One or two days after 29 January

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel, Boda, 19 April 2014

⁴ It is important to note that more than one humanitarian organization has received testimony from the Muslim community that they were armed by the former Seleka and have a certain level of capability to defend themselves; which is one of the reasons why they haven't been "eliminated" or "expelled" from Boda.

⁵ Interviews conducted by the Panel in Boda on 19 April 2014; HRW <http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; Rapport d'Evaluation, RRM, Boda, Prefecture de la Lobaye, February 2014; Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-centralafrican-killings-idUSBREA121PF20140203>; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAWEB20140203152234_centrafrique-flambee-de-violence-entre-chretiens-et-musulmans-pres-de-bangui.html; HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; UN, <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-un-rights-office-warns-worsening-insecurity-bangui>; UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/hk/files/2014%20Emergency%20CAR/update%20Feb/Regional%20Update%20II%20-%20Central%20African%20Situation.pdf>

⁶ Confidential source of the Panel within a humanitarian organization.

2014, a group of about 50 young men from the non-Muslim community left Boda and went to be "trained" by an anti-Balaka commander with the nom de guerre "General 8-8" from the town of Pama (around 40 km north of Boda), they returned to Boda and partially took control of the town. The anti-Balaka militias of Boda are locals.

11. It remains unclear who exactly was responsible for the commencement of violence, the destruction of property and the killing of civilians. The Panel interviewed individuals from both communities who were present at the beginning of the violence between Christians and Muslims and each presented their own version of events. However, it is clear that both communities were armed at that time and the departure of the former Seleka left a vacuum of power that triggered the violence. Most of the crimes reported after 29 January 2014 seem to have been committed by anti-Balaka militias.
12. Since 29 January 2014, the Muslim community has been compelled to life in the centre of town with no freedom of movement, limited access to basic health and educational facilities, restricted livelihood activities and furthermore under continuous threats from anti-Balaka militias who surround the centre of town and partially control the town and its surroundings.
13. The non-Muslim population inhabits five IDP sites, they have access to the fields to cultivate and potable water, however due to their sudden forced displacement and the fragile security situation in the town they lack mainly NFIs and access to health and educational facilities.
14. The IDP sites are:⁷
 - St Michele Church: approximately 9,517 persons
 - *Sous-Préfecturale* School for girls: approximately 4,407 persons
 - Cotonaf School: approximately 3,000 persons
 - Samboli School: approximately 840 persons
 - *Préfecturale* School for boys: approximately 2,400 persons
15. After the eruption of violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda its market has been closed mainly due to the fact that shops were burned and destroyed and no reconstruction has taken place.

⁷ Names and figures were obtained by the Panel from OCHA and corroborated on the ground during a field visit.

16. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and OCHA reports show that until end of March 2014 no sexual violence cases had been reported or documented in Boda, however the lack of proper and functional health facilities as well as protection mechanisms in place could be the cause for the lack of reports.
17. Reports from various sources state consistently that the anti-Balaka militias present in Boda had not only been targeting the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim population. A confidential report from a mission to Boda conducted by various humanitarian organizations between 12 and 14 March 2014 stated that anti-Balaka militias had confiscated mobile phones from several people in the Saint Michele Church IDP site accusing them of being in touch with the Muslim community.
18. Some Muslims have expressed their willingness to be relocated outside of Boda others want to stay. The Muslims who have expressed their willingness to be relocated seem to be the ones who are not originally from Boda, but who fled to Boda seeking protection from violence.

Description of Events: Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance

19. On 22 February 2014, at around 1730 hours, a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) mission conducted by an INGO to distribute NFIs for the population in need arrived in Boda.
20. The first truck of NFIs arrived in Boda's Muslim neighbourhood and delivered part of the supplies, after the truck was emptied the driver decided to take the truck to the Catholic Church Saint Michele for security reasons.
21. Once at the Catholic mission, the RRM team encountered a group of anti-Balaka militias as well as a group of representatives from the non-Muslim community. The individuals expressed their disapproval of the distribution of NFIs to the Muslim community underlining that the NFIs given to the Muslim community were of better quality than those distributed among the non-Muslim communities.⁸
22. Individuals (both civilians and armed anti-Balaka) threatened to burn the vehicles and trucks of the RRM team and to throw grenades at them if they didn't leave the town immediately and to kill the INGO director (the "white" person) claiming that white people were the cause of all the problems in the CAR. Furthermore a very distressed anti-Balaka individual approached the RRM team with a machete crying out loud: "who are the people who came to help the Muslims?".

⁸ The Panel consulted and verified with several humanitarian sources that the NFI packages were the same for both communities, same items and same quality.

23. After this incident, the RRM team took their vehicles and went to the SANGARIS base to seek advice and protection leaving the trucks, drivers and some team members behind.
24. At around 1900 hours part of the team went back to the Catholic mission to join the remaining part of the team and the trucks. At that moment the individual who claimed to be the leader of the anti-Balaka militias in Boda, 'Général 8-8', spoke to the RRM team and assured their security, nevertheless anti-Balaka elements present at the meeting point said in Sango that they would still kill them and burn their trucks if they stayed in Boda. This comment was picked up by one of the national staff of the team. The entire team returned to the SANGARIS base to spend the night there.
25. At 0500 hours on 23 February 2014, the RRM team left the SANGARIS base and held a meeting with the representatives of the non-Muslim community (some of them being the Priests) and explained that the NFI distribution had to be suspended due to the security situation, the RRM team did the same with representatives of the Muslim community and then left Boda and returned to Bangui.
26. All NFIs that were not distributed remained in Boda together with paperwork for representatives of each community to continue the distribution. NFIs were distributed to both communities by each of their representatives.
27. None of the individuals that were part of the RRM team returned to Boda until the time of writing of this report.
28. The distribution of humanitarian aid was suspended in Boda until late March 2014 when another INGO took over the activities of the previous INGO. Even though the tensions in the town continue and the unstable security situation for the civilian population remains a major concern, humanitarian aid has resumed and no major incidents have been reported since then.

Perpetrators

29. According to the investigation conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka Commander 'Général 8-8' is responsible for threatening humanitarian organizations and hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians in need. Information collected until the time of writing of this report indicates that the 'Général 8-8' is still in Boda and commands and controls the anti-Balaka militias in the town.
30. According to investigations conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka in Boda seem to be one example of a community based militia that falls under the third category mentioned in the Armed Groups Section of the report.

Photographs taken by the Panel

Households destroyed in Boda during January violence



Market area destroyed during January violence



Annex 24: ATTACKS AGAINST HUMANITARIANS IN CAR from 1 DECEMBER 2013 to 30 APRIL 2014

Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LT	T	Summary	Source
1 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Eight (8) Ex-Seleka elements stole 16 mosquito nets on a non-violent form after six of them received treatment in a health centre run by an INGO	Panel Interview with INGO
2 December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 05 December 2014, Ex-Seleka armed elements attacked the neighbourhood where the house of an aid worker was located. They entered the house and looted the premises taking with them all valuables and a vehicle. They stated that the reason for the attack was because the aid worker and the neighbours did not like Muslims.	UN Report
3 December	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	International Medical Corps (IMC) confirms the death of one of its national staff members in CAR, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in his home during the violent clashes in the capital Bangui on 5 December 2013.	IMC News Release through their website
4 December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown armed men forced an aid worker to attend a patient on an aggressive manner. The staff joined them on the tent where he was and gave indications this served to ease the tension.	Panel Interview with INGO
5 December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 8 December 2013 at around 2100 hours a group of armed Ex-Seleka men stormed into the offices of an INGO, verbally threatened the guard and stole computers, the generator, money and destroyed documents and furniture. The perpetrators shouted to the guard that they did not want the presence of the INGO in the country and that all personnel should leave. After this, the group of armed men left. The office was then closed and activities were suspended for a few weeks. The organization was obliged to look for new premises due to the security situation.	Panel Interview with INGO
6 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO driver arrested by Ex-Seleka during an hour accused of conducting a survey in Moyen Sido against Ex-Seleka	Panel Interview with INGO
7 December	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men prosecuting Muslims in the hospital. They aggressively asked to expel the Muslims from the hospital. MISCA replied shooting in the air. Evacuation of Muslim patients was envisaged at the moment. INGO activities hampered due to general insecurity	Panel Interview with INGO
8 December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Armed men chased a Muslim individual who had requested refuge in the health centre run by an INGO. INGO reported the increasing difficulty of operating in such environment.	Panel Interview with INGO
9 December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka accused and INGO of collaborating with the Anti-Balaka and asked for their presence in the headquarters	Panel Interview with INGO
10 December	Bangui	Various	0	0	0	0	0	A Muslim civilian with his wife came to health centre run by INGO but was prevented from leaving by a crowd of civilians and armed men. They sought refuge in the INGO premises and later had to be relocated to a safer place.	Panel Interview with INGO

11	December	Ouham	Various	0	0	1	0	0	0	In the context of an Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka clash in a village, aid workers had to run to the jungle to seek refuge. Civilians and non-civilians wounded and killed. Burning of houses also reported. Rockets were fired.	Panel Interview with INGO
12	December	Ouham - Pendé	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	0	1	0	Anti-Balaka elements stole 50,000 XAF and a mobile phone from an aid worker after beating him.	Panel Interview with INGO
13	January	Bangu	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker, and looted the house. They stole inventory such as a fridge, television and clothes.	UN
14	January	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	0	Aid worker stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint who threatened him by shooting in the air. The INGO staff was held for some time and then released under the explanation that perpetrators thought it was another INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
15	January	Bangu	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	0	An unknown person threw a grenade that landed on a humanitarian agency truck parked nearby the airport IDP site after a tire problem. The truck was carrying food from the logistics base to the airport IDP site. The explosion of the grenade damaged two other tires of the truck, causing no casualties. The person suspected of throwing the grenade was reportedly arrested by Burundian soldiers.	UN
16	January	Bangu	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	Unidentified armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker. They threatened one of the family members and looted the house. The aid worker was at the office at the moment of the incident but neighbours called to inform about what was happening. Aid worker notified Burundian MISCA troops and they immediately went to the house. They succeeded in rescuing the family member from the house, but the entire inventory and all the valuable items including cars and motorcycles were stolen.	UN
17	January	Bangu	Unknown	0	1	0	0	0	0	Three grenades thrown in the IDP camp near Castor health centre run by INGO after Djotodia resignation. 15 wounded (1 aid worker) and 3 civilians dead.	Panel Interview with INGO
18	January	Bangu	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	INGO team on their way back to the office was stopped by Anti-Balaka members on the road. They were demanded to identify themselves and hand over their mobile phones. Apparently the anti-Balaka were searching for Muslim contacts in the phones of the drivers and the team members with the aim of identifying and prosecuting those Muslim contacts. The INGO staff was released after few hours. The INGO no longer deploys Muslim staff to the area and has advised the staff to be careful of the type of names registered on their mobile numbers as a mitigating measure.	Panel Interview with INGO
19	January	Bangu	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	0	On 14 January 2014, in Bangu in the Ebbale neighbourhood, the corpse of an aid worker was discovered floating in the canal that passed under the Jackson bridge. The employee was on his way to the airport, when he was allegedly stabbed to death by Muslims in the area of the Yakie neighbourhood. Young men marched with the body of the deceased on avenue Barthelemy Boganda to express their discontent.	UN

20	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	At 0200 hours three armed men forcibly entered the compound of an INGO. The guards claim to have recognized Ex-Seleka and ran for their lives. Motorbikes were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
21	January	Ouham - Pendé	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Between the 15th and 17th of February, following heavy fighting in Bocaranga, Anti-Balaka elements looted shops of Muslims and also looted one (1) INGO Compound.	UN
22	January	Ouham - Pendé	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In January, a staff member of an INGO who was living at the BINUCA regrouping location point, was on his way to distribute a health kit at the Prefectural Hospital when he was intercepted on two occasions by Anti-Balaka elements. After checking the inside of the car, they verbally threatened the aid worker by saying: "if you were carrying Muslims with you, we would kill you with them."	UN
23	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	At about 0930 hours unknown perpetrators hijacked a vehicle of an INGO in the PK12 area at the outskirts of Bangui.	UN
24	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	1	Anti-Balaka armed elements physically harmed and robbed an aid worker. Mobile telephone was stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
25	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January, unknown quantity of food items was stolen from UN humanitarian Agency-contracted truck in the area of Balaka, when it was on the way from Cameroon to CAR. It is not clear how and by whom the theft was committed.	UN
26	January	Ouham - Pendé	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	INGO vehicle on the way to projects was threatened and thrown stones at by young armed men allegedly looking for Muslims. Vehicle and staff were let go unharmed. Vehicle was slightly damaged.	Panel Interview with INGO
27	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	On 20 January 2014, armed men entered the offices of an INGO breaking down the main entrance and robbed all the furniture, some desks, chairs and others. According to the statement of the aid worker, at this time of year the PK13 was totally controlled by the Anti-Balakas and they as well as the eyewitnesses believed that it was Anti-Balakas men who attacked the office. No civilian casualties or injuries were reported. After the incident the INGO moved to another location.	Panel Interview with INGO
28	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Two unidentified armed men forcibly entered an INGO run clinic in Bangui and hit the guard.	Panel Interview with INGO
29	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Insecurity in the border area with Cameroon has led to the suspension of trucks connecting Cameroon and Bangui. This threatens the supply to the capital, Bangui, and prevents humanitarian aid agencies from replenishing their stocks.	UN
30	January	Kemo	Various	0	0	0	0	0	Clashes between Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements in Sibut obstructed the circulation of INGO vehicles, staff and therefore hindered their humanitarian operation.	Panel Interview with INGO
31	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed elements arrived to the INGO run health centre and threatened the staff to give preferential treatment to Ex-Seleka patients	Panel Interview with INGO

32	January	Bangui	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	<p>A group of armed men attacked the home of an aid worker. They first shoot at the air and after climbed the entrance gate and destroyed the side door to access the premises. The nephew of the aid worker was threatened; they stole 03 mattresses, one antenna and 5 cell phones. After their crime, they fled to an unknown destination. The aid worker requested assistance and UNDSS immediately responded with a detachment of the Moroccan Guard Unit. Upon arrival, the bandits had already disappeared.</p>	UN
33	January	Bamngui-Bangoran	Bamngui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>INGO vehicle was hijacked by unknown armed men in the road N'Dele - Manovo</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
34	January	Bamngui-Bangoran	Bamngui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Armed men entered the hospital in a village of the Prefecture, ran by INGO, they stole material from the building (Mattresses, fuel and others)</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
35	January	Bangui	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>In January 2014, unknown armed elements entered the house of an aid worker in Bangui, looted the house and threatened to kidnap a relative of the aid worker. A post assessment of the neighbourhood showed considerable damage and destruction after several acts of violence committed in the area.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
36	January	Bamngui-Bangoran	Bamngui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>A group of ex-Ex-Seleka who fled disarmament from Bangui to Ndelé, intercepted and stole the vehicle Land-Cruiser of the INGO as well as envelope containing money.</p>	UN
37	January	Mambéré-Kadéi	Mambéré-Kadéi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Armed ex-Ex-Seleka elements arrived to a village in the Prefecture of Mambéré-Kadéi late at night, looted an INGO compound and stole two vehicles.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
38	January	Kemo	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>Ex-Ex-Seleka armed men came during the night and looted an INGO compound. The door of the compound was broken down and the place was thoroughly emptied of all valuables, i.e. motorcycles, mattresses, bicycles, furniture, floor mats and recreational kits.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
39	January	Bangui	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>In January 2014 in Bangui, a group of armed Anti-Balaka (two ex-FACA were recognized by neighbours according to investigations made in relation to the incident) stormed into the house of an aid worker with the intention to loot it under the pretext that the house belonged to a Muslim. Neighbours who were witnessing the event approached the armed men and explained that the owner of the house was not a Muslim, intervention that allegedly stopped the armed men from harming the premises. The Moroccan Guard Unit arrived to the scene to intervene but the armed men had already left.</p>	UN
40	January	Bangui	Bangui	Others	0	0	0	0	0	<p>A wood vendor threatened INGO staff and stopped the passage of one of their trucks at the entrance of unknown place in Bangui. No injuries or looting reported.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
41	January	Nana-Mambere	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	<p>Armed men entered the hospital run by INGO, shooting and threatening the population and staff present. They stole one INGO vehicle.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO

42	February	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	<p>A UN staff member (SM) was attacked by a Anti- Balaka when he went to visit his residence in Bangui which he had abandoned since the beginning of the crisis in December due to security reasons. When he was leaving the premises he was stopped by a group of anti-Balaka who demanded him to give them money, after he gave them all he had and left the scene. A few meters after he was stopped for the second time by another group of anti-Balaka who demanded money as well, this time the UN SM explained that he did not have any more money with him. The anti-Balaka responded by pointing a gun at him, the SM managed to escape the scene in his car, the anti-Balaka opened fire while he was fleeing, causing minor injuries to the SM and damaging the vehicle.</p>	UN
43	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Elements of the Moroccan Guard Unit and the UNDSS intervention team were sent to intercept in a situation at the home of a UN staff member. His house was under attack and being looted by Anti-Balaka elements in the Miskine neighbourhood. The incident happened while Anti-Balaka elements were in process of conducting a significant operation of "cleansing" Miskine neighbourhood from Muslims living in the area. All valuables were taken from the residence of the staff member.</p>	UN
44	February	Ombella MPoko	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>An NGO convoy carrying humanitarian aid goods was stopped on the road between Boguigolo and Bangui for a period of more than three hours. The convoy was released and continued it's way but all communications equipment and valuable were stolen from personnel present.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO, UN
45	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>On February 2014 at around midnight a group of six Ex-Seleka armed men broke into an INGO compound in a village of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and looted the compound. The attackers demanded where was the white person (implying the expatriate staff of the INGO) who managed to escape at a certain point of the incident without being noticed. The armed men robbed one vehicle, six cans of diesel, two mobile phones and 130,000 XFA.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
46	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>An NGO was the target of a robbery by unidentified gunmen. Pharmaceuticals and some medical material was stolen.</p>	UN
47	February	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	<p>The office of an INGO in a village in Ouham-Pende was pillaged by Anti-Balaka, who allegedly have taken all the material collected to Paoua.</p>	UN
48	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>Four armed anti-Balaka forced their way into the house of an aid worker threatening the guard and the family members of the aid worker present at the time of the incident. The anti-Balaka elements took a vehicle. The aid worker called the to report the incident to the security officer of the organization who intervened and met the anti-Balaka commander who was in charge of the group (Commander Dieudonné). After negotiations the AB commander agreed to return the vehicle.</p>	UN

49	February	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	0	In the month of February in the Prefecture Kemo an INGO vehicle was undertaking a humanitarian mission when the vehicle was stopped by ex-Seleka armed men. Three of the four aid workers who were inside the vehicle were kidnapped by the armed group. The three aid workers were able to escape the day after and find their way to the nearest village. All valuables and the vehicle were taken by the ex-seleka elements.	UN
50	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed men broke into the compound of an INGOs on the night of 10 to 11 February 2014. The group forced the front gate open to get into the compound, two vehicles and money were taken.	UN
51	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	0	Ex-Seleka broke into the compound of an international NGO in Batangafo and stole a vehicle.	UN
52	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men tried to break into the home of a UN Staff Member, with guns and machetes. Caretaker and neighbours alerted the security staff in the neighbourhood, in response the bandits attacked three people with machetes. Once the security team arrived, the bandits were gone.	UN
53	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	0	An aid worker was stopped at a Ex-Seleka checkpoint was killed after declaring he had no money to hand over as requested by the perpetrators. The staff clearly identified himself as a humanitarian worker	Panel Interview with INGO
54	February	Mboomou	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	0	Three rental trucks of an INGO going from Bangui to Bangassou were hijacked by members of the Ex-Seleka. Upon arrival in Onango, a village 73km from Bangassou they were attacked by armed inhabitants from the village who took the trucks from the ex-Seleka men.	UN
55	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed elements obstructed and threatened INGO convoy stating that they were helping the Muslim community. The threat included to throw a grenade to the staff.	Panel Interview with INGO
56	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	0	The Guest House of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men. Money, equipment and personal items of staff were stolen	Panel Interview with INGO
57	February	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014, Anti-Balaka armed men blocked an inter-agency protection mission to PK12. One aid worker's vehicle was stopped between two roadblocks of armed men for many hours before being rescued. The mission did not accomplish its objective which was to assist civilian survivors of a previous attack.	UN
58	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	0	Two Ex-Seleka armed men attacked an INGO guesthouse. Money, satellite phone and a vehicle were taken after threatening with a weapon to the expat staff	Panel Interview with INGO
59	February	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	Tensions growing and increasing number of threats against humanitarian being accused of partiality have been hindering the movement of aid workers in the city and surrounding.	Panel Interview with INGO

60	February	Lobaye	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	An INGO team was forced to stop a distribution of NFIs in a village in the Prefecture of Lobaye due to threats made by Anti-Balaka militias in the village. The aid workers were forced to evacuate the village before finishing the distribution of humanitarian aid.	Panel Interview with INGO
61	February	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	On February 2014 in the Ouham Prefecture and INGO vehicle was hijacked by Ex-Seleka armed men. The incident took place on the Kabo - Sido axis during a transfer of patients by the said vehicle. The vehicle was returned one day after to the INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
62	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	An INGO vehicle traveling from Bamingui to N'Dele was attacked and robbed by unknown armed men. Personal items and money from staff were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
63	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Various	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter was signed by a group that call themselves <i>Group des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran</i> . After the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and Ex-Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and assure their security.	Panel Interview with INGO
64	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed men stormed the a town in the Prefecture of Ouham and killed three people, looted the city hospital and stole computer equipment, bikes and a sizeable amount of money. In addition, they took two INGOs vehicles.	UN
65	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1300 hrs, at camp Don Bosco, a team of UN staff was threatened by a dozen Anti-Balaka elements that were carrying machetes and firearms. They stopped the two vehicles that were transporting the team. The Anti-Balakas shouted threats and showcased their firearms, and even tried to take one of the passengers of vehicles out of the car. However both vehicles were able to leave the area and join the main road without further consequences.	UN
66	February	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014 at around noon, the distribution of food by humanitarian organizations in a town in the Prefecture of Nana-Mambere generated tension within the local population. Difficulties arose due to the discrepancies between the lists of beneficiaries as well as identified fake ID holders demanding to receive aid. Threats against aid workers created a very tense situation, which eventually forced the staff to take refuge in a protected building nearby.	UN
67	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	Five armed individuals entered the INGO expat Guest House at late hours of the night threatening the staff with weapons to leave the town. Some staff were physically harmed by the assailants. Valuables were taken.	Panel Interview with INGO
68	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Armed men entered the INGO run hospital, physically harmed the guards and stole all the money which was meant to pay the daily salary of hospital workers.	Panel Interview with INGO

69	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men attacked an INGO base and staff were obliged to take refuge at the MISCA base for a few days. No further details were made available on the incident.	UN
70	March	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed individuals entered the INGO Expat Guest House, threat the staff present and loot the money and the communications devices in possession of the present individuals	Panel Interview with INGO
71	March	Ouham - Pendé	FPR	1	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 in a village 30 km from Panoa, an aid worker was allegedly stabbed to death by members of the RPF General Baba Laddé, which would be stationed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
72	March	Ouham - Pendé	RJ	0	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 at around 0900 hours a group of around ten (10) armed men from RJ stormed a UN compound in a town in the Prefecture of Ouham-Pendé. Guards in the compound questioned the reason for this unlawful entry to which the armed men responded that they were searching for their commander. The guard informed that he was not there, nevertheless they insisted and searched the premises. They left without further harm done.	UN
73	March	Keno	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1530, a vehicle of an INGO with one driver on board was returning from Sibut. The vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka in a village about 55km from Sibut. The Anti-Balaka elements demanded to use the vehicle for transportation. The driver explained the prohibition of the use of humanitarian assets for purposes other than humanitarian operations but in any case the Anti-Balaka requested to be transported to a location not far away from the point where the vehicle was initially intercepted. After this the driver was allowed to leave without further trouble. The driver later discovered a machete in the booth that was probably left by one of the Anti-Balaka elements.	UN
74	March	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Four armed Ex-Seleka assaulted the village and went to the health centre, a patient run off and a Ex-Seleka shoot him but did not injure him. INGO Staff gave what they had (50000 XAF) and yelling that they may have more than that	Panel Interview with INGO
75	March	Ombella M'Foko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO Convoy stopped by 16 armed anti-Balaka, threatening of throw a grenade against INGO next time	Panel Interview with INGO
76	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	On the 08 March 2014 three armed men killed an ICRC staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of N'Dele. The ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with other three staff members at the time of the incident; the other three were unharmed. The incident was investigated by Panel and perpetrator was identified.	IA090314; ICRC080314; ICRC; Open source on file: News Release 08-03-2014; Breaking and US International News, Reuters.com (Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic); UN
77	March	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 9 March 2014, a 36-year-old volunteer with the Central African Red Cross Society, was gunned down in Bangui by unknown armed men.	ICRC0314
78	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	INGO vehicle involved in water distribution efforts was attacked, driver was stabbed and the water pump was stolen. Later demanded ransom for the pump.	UN

79	March	Nana-Grebizi	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On March 2014, a convoy of UN vehicles, traveling from Bangui to the north was stopped at about 70km from Bangui, by Anti-Balaka elements. Amongst the staff (2 national and 2 international) was a Muslim (international staff), who was asked to get out of the car and his life was threatened. They demanded to search the vehicles but the UN staff responded that they had no right to do so. The anti-Balaka suspected that the vehicles were transporting ex-Ex-Seleka and their weapons. After negotiation the rebels took food, water and an unknown amount of money and the staff was allowed to continue.	UN
80	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	UN vehicle was hit by stray bullets while armed assailants attempted to attack a Muslim exiting a bank	UN
81	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	MISCA intervened on an attempted robbery against an INGO	UN
82	March	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	2	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka opened fire on the inhabitants of Dekoa. Two volunteers for the Red Cross died and one civilian was injured.	http://www.radiomondeleleka.org/societe/item/19036-tension-a-dekoa--la-population-est-en-brousse.html
83	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	The base of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men	Panel Interview with INGO
84	March	Nana-Grebizi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	The house of an aid worker was attacked and looted by armed men.	Panel Interview with INGO
85	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Two INGO vehicles were hijacked in Bangui	UN
86	March	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	The vehicle of an INGO was hijacked by Anti-Balaka armed elements at the Boy-Rabe. The vehicle was later recovered by the intervention of humanitarian organizations	Panel Interview with INGO
87	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	0	0	A UN vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka elements and asked the driver to drive them to an unknown location. The driver was physically harmed because he refused to drive faster than what the armed men were asking. As a result the vehicle spun out of control and fell into a trench. The Anti-Balaka men descended from the vehicle and left the scene leaving the driver and the car behind. The driver and vehicle were later recovered by a UN team.	UN

88	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>On April 2014, a UN vehicles and trucks mission returning to Bangui were stopped by Anti-Balaka elements 15km outside Dekoa in a checkpoint and demanded information in relation to the MISCA and the ex-Ex-Seleka in Dekoa, the team leader of the mission explained that they had no information on this matter, they passed. The mission had seen a MISCA and ex-Ex-Seleka meeting in Dekoa when passing by.</p> <p>Around 10km further south from Dekoa the mission was stopped at another Anti-Balaka checkpoint. The Anti-Balaka elements searched the vehicles and let them pass. For the third time, 15 km further south, they were stopped by another Anti-Balaka checkpoint, this time they stopped the convoy by shooting at the air with AK47s. They requested the staff to get out of the vehicles and sit at the side of the road while they searched the vehicles. It is to be noted that the AB elements were very aggressive with the staff. They questioned extensively the staff and requested to hand over 50,000 XFA per vehicle, the staff answered that they did not have that amount of money and that the humanitarian nature of the mission prohibited to pay for this type of requests. Nevertheless they forcibly took the wallet of one of the staff members and took around 12,000 XFA, additionally they took all valuable personal belongings of all the present individuals, mobile phones and money. They were all released around two hours after and the mission arrived to Bangui without further obstruction.</p>	UN
89	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Three trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the northern part of the country were intercepted by anti-Balaka elements 10km before Sibut. The armed anti-Balaka took 30 bags of rice of each truck and robbed all valuables from the drivers (mobile phones, money and others).</p> <p>Armed unknown individuals assault the INGO expat guesthouse threatening the expat with arms. Cash and communication assets were stolen.</p>	UN
90	April	Ouham - Pendé	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>On April 2014 in a village in the Kemo Prefecture at around 0100hours, a group of unidentified armed men stormed in the base of an INGO. They forced the safe of the compound and stole one Thuraya phone, several mobile phones, around 12 million XFA (two safe boxes), some electronic equipment and one vehicle. The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but independent sources indicate it was elements belonging to an Ex-Seleka faction.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
91	April	Kemo	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	UN	

92	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>On April 2014, at 0100 hours, the house of an aid worker in Bangui was attacked by at least a dozen unknown armed men, carrying AK47s, machetes and spears. Upon arrival, the group posted a guard at each neighbouring house to control the movements of the people in the area and four (4) others went into the house of the aid worker whilst firing guns to the air. Then, by using a brick, they broke down the door of the house and demanded the keys to a motorcycle stationed outside. They also took a television, two mobile devices and a bag that contained a Motorola radio and other personal belongings. The neighbours caught two of the armed men while they were leaving with the television. The Burundian MISCA arrived to the scene and caught the two individuals. The rest of the armed men escaped the scene.</p>	UN
93	April	Basse Kotto	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>A team of an INGO was threatened after they refused to drive two armed Ex-Seleka men in their ambulance.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
94	April	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>Armed elements came into a health centre and guardians did not dare to ask them to leave their weapons. The Anti-Balaka armed men were identified by medical staff and were taken out of the health centre.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
95	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>An aid worker was robbed in the city centre by armed men.</p>	UN
96	April	Bamingui-Bangoran	Others	0	0	0	0	0	<p>A group of unidentified armed men stormed into the compound of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran and stole two vehicles. The vehicles were returned a few days later and the incident was attributed to Sudanese Janjaweed.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
97	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	<p>In April a contracted truck to transport humanitarian agricultural material had a mechanical problem in the outskirts of Bangui. The driver decided to spend the night with the truck while waiting for help to repair the truck. During the night, four Anti-Balaka armed men spotted the truck, beat the driver and looted the contents of the truck.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
98	April	Ouhann	Ex-Seleka	3	0	0	1	0	<p>On 26 April 2014 a group of Ex-Seleka armed men entered the town of Boguila located in the Sout Prefecture of Bossangoa and looted the offices of INGO and the local hospital. At the moment of arrival of the Ex-Seleka elements, a meeting of community leaders was being held in the compound where the offices of INGO and the hospital are located. Upon arrival, the armed men looted the compound, at the moment of departure and for unknown reasons two of the armed elements started shooting at the group of civilians, killing 17 of them including three INGO (3) staff. According to investigations conducted by the Panel the group of Ex-Seleka was commanded by Colonel Issa. The group of armed elements was passing by Boguila on the way to Bemal and coming from Bouca.</p>	<p>INGO: http://africa.com/stories/201404300989.html http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/three-INGO-staff-among-16-civilians-killed-central-african-republic-hospital</p>


99	April	Bangui	Government Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	<p>On 26 April 2014 five trucks of an INGO were stopped by the Gendarmerie at PK12, allegedly the Gendarmerie had received information that the trucks were carrying weapons with them. The trucks were carrying humanitarian aid food for N'Dele. The Gendarmerie found a bag in the front seat of one of the trucks containing a grenade and some military attire that were confiscated and the driver of the truck was arrested. According to the one of the drivers, before they were stopped by the Gendarmerie, the truck that contained the bag had stopped to talk to someone in a Jeep. Someone from the INGO went to the site of the incident to talk to the Gendarmerie. The five trucks were released a few days later with all the humanitarian goods, the driver of the truck remains arrested at the time of writing of this report and the bag was confiscated.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
100	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	0	<p>On 28 April a UN staff member was victim of a robbery at his house in Bangui. All valuable items were taken from the premises. No injuries or casualties were reported.</p>	UN
101	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	0	<p>On 28 April 2014, around 0045 hours, in a village of the Ouham Prefecture an aid worker was victim of an armed robbery at his house by a group of six armed Anti-Balaka elements. Under armed threats they forced the gatekeeper to open the front door. The perpetrators first searched the room of the colleagues of the staff member, after which they searched his own room and stole a duffel bag with clothes and a sum of about 45,000 CFA francs. The perpetrators fled to an unknown destination, no physical violence was exerted on the staff member.</p>	UN
102	April	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	0	<p>In April 2014 a truck part of an INGO convoy (six trucks) on the way to north west of the country carrying seeds for vulnerable population had a technical problem in the route around Boali. While the drivers were fixing the truck, armed Anti-Balaka elements intercepted the truck and looted a significant part of the sacks of seeds and some fuel. The driver was threatened by the Anti-Balaka but was not harmed. The rest of the bags were handed over to the Police in Boali and recuperated the next day by the service provider. The rest of the convoy arrived unharmed to the location.</p>	UN
103	April	Ombella MPoko	Anti-Balaka	3	0	0	1	0	0	<p>On 30 April 2014 a PU-AMI convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population were held at a Anti-Balaka militia checkpoint 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through but one was held behind, the truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.</p>	PU-AMI, PU AMI Communiqué de Presse 2 May 2014; Panel Interview with INGO

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilian Wounded
D	Destruction of Property. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
LT	Looting. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
T	Torture. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information


Annex 25: Graphs

Graph I – Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance from 01 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Graph II – Reported killings of aid workers from 01 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per Province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Annex 26: Reported Killings of Civilians

Graph III – Reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per Provinces.




Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Graph IV – Average reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating the alleged perpetrators.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents



Source: Panel Database of Incidents



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 28: Methodology

The Panel compiled a database of security incidents to that are potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and other crimes listed in resolutions 2127 and 2143. Other security related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.

Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of staff members of humanitarian organisations; attacks against humanitarian organisations; threats to humanitarian organisations or staff members and robberies.

The database does not contain all of the incidents that happen in the country in the period reported (From 05 December 2013 and on-going) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering / hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect mediate knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.

Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, incidents that are reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.

For the collection of primary source material the Panel met with Heads of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.

There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constrains as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.

The Panel also profited from cooperation with UN Agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.

A few methodological clarifications that apply to Chapters IV and V of the interim report of the UN Panel of Experts for the CAR are important to highlight:

1. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report¹ three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
2. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the CAR.

¹ See annex 24.

Annex 29: Case study: Massacre in Guen (Mambéré-Kadei province)

1. One of the most serious incidents documented in the period covered by this report was the massacre in the village of Guen in the Mambéré-Kadei province.
2. On 1 February 2014, the town of Guen came under attack of anti-Balaka forces seeking to drive out the former Seleka and associates among the Muslim population.

Houses owned by members of the Muslim community destroyed and looted by anti-Balaka

(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)



3. According to Muslim survivors, anti-Balaka leaders and local authorities interviewed, the attacking anti-Balaka forces came from the villages of Tedoa and Mbaina in the Nana Mambere province.¹ From 1 to 6 February 2014, approximately 75 civilians were killed.
4. The larger share of victims, 43 people, had, after the first spree of attacks, sought refuge in the house of a local resident. An allegation that this local resident was hiding a Seleka soldier set off the anti-Balaka to take the house under siege on 6 February and after killed 43 men. Women and children had sought refuge at the catholic mission after the first wave of attacks.

House that came under siege by anti-Balakas during the attack on Guen

¹ Panel interviews with Muslim survivors, local Anti-Balaka leaders and local government authorities, Guen, 25 April 2014.

(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)



5. The Panel's interlocutors in Guen claim that an anti-Balaka leader of the name of 'Edmond Beïna' from the village of Tedoa had ordered the attack. Villagers in Tedoa confirmed to the Panel the presence of Beïna,² but were unable to locate him in time for the Panel to interview him.³

² Edmond Beïna has also been mentioned by HWR as one of the perpetrators of the massacre. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages>; accessed on 24 May 2014.

³ Panel interviews with villagers, Tedoa, 17 April 2014.


Annex 30: Reported incidents of Sexual Violence¹

1. The Panel registered six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the CAR in the period covered by this report.
2. One case of rape was allegedly perpetrated by former Seleka elements in the town of Madja, Ouham Province.
3. Anti-Balaka forces are allegedly responsible for the rape of four women in two different incidents; on 02 January 2014 in Bossangoa two women were raped by Anti-Balaka armed men in the Liberte IDP site; furthermore on 06 February 2014 a group of Anti-Balaka armed men broke into a house in the Kokoro neighbourhood of Bangui and raped a 14 year old girl, and a 19 year old woman who were at the house at the moment of the attack, additionally the house was looted.
4. One case was reported in the village of Fode, Haut-Mbomou, where a woman was released after 18 years of LRA captivity, allegedly she was raped several times throughout her captivity.
5. One case of particular concern was reported in Bouca where allegedly a woman was gang-raped.
6. In addition UNICEF documented 26 cases of sexual violence in 25 IDP sites in Bangui during just one week in February 2014.

¹ All incidents have been extracted from the Panel Database of Incidents; see annex 28 on Methodology for details on collection of data of Sexual Violence.

Annex 31: Humanitarian Presence in the CAR

1. It is noteworthy that since December 2013 until today the number of humanitarian organisations present in the CAR has almost doubled. In December 2013, there were 47 humanitarian organisations operating in the CAR, by May 2014, 95 humanitarian organizations were undertaking operations or were in process of establishing themselves in the country. Most humanitarian operations are in Bangui, Ombella-Mpoko and Ouham provinces. The humanitarian presence has grown significantly, however, the population in need remains very high.¹
2. The grand majority of incidents have been documented in Bangui and the Ombella M'Poko provinces. This can be explained by the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian organisations operate and therefore coverage and presence is higher there than elsewhere in the country.²
3. See map below showing the current presence of humanitarian organizations in the country according to OCHA.³



¹ See <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info> for further details, accessed on 21 May 2014.

² See annex 25.

³ OCHA, Central African Republic (CAR) Situation Report No. 25 (as of 14 May 2014); accessed on 24 May 2014 at <http://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/30d02877-6777-42c3-8530-00ba35dbec72.pdf>