

# Onward Migration from Ethiopia


## Literature review and study findings per population group

### A. ERITREAN REFUGEES

The Ethio-Eritrean border war and the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in Eritrea have led many Eritreans to seek asylum in Ethiopia since the year 2000. Presently, Eritreans are recognized prima facie as refugees and represent the third largest group of refugees in Ethiopia, living across refugee camps, rural and urban settings in Tigray and Afar regions, as well as in Addis Ababa. As of May 31, 2016 there were 155,862 Eritrean refugees registered in Ethiopia. The Afari Eritrean refugees are generally found in the Aysaita and Barahle camps, as well as three mixed refugee-host community areas in Afar region. Other ethnicities (Tigrinya, Saho, Tigre, Belin, Nara and Kunama) are generally hosted in the four camps found in Tigray region – Shimelba, Mai-Aini, Adi Harush, and Hitsats – which will be referred to as the “Shire camps” in this report for ease of reference. There is also a transit or reception centre for new arrivals in Tigray region at Endagabuna that serves as a location for registration and nationality screening before transfer to a camp. Eritrean refugees are also present in urban areas, mainly on protection, medical or humanitarian grounds, or as part of the OCP. As noted in the Introduction, the OCP is a programme specifically for Eritrean refugees, announced by the Government of Ethiopia in 2010, which allows them to legally reside out of the camps upon individual request where they meet certain requirements<sup>[48]</sup>.

Figure 2: Shire Camps. Source: UNHCR

### Shire Camps Tigray Region




### I. Profile of the Population

The four Shire camps have a refugee population predominantly of Tigrinya/Tigrayan ethnicity. The total population of registered refugees, as of May 31, 2016, was 114,193. These refugees are predominantly single (78% of the households), and 68% of the adult population are male.

[48] The survey was not administered in Addis Ababa or another Ethiopian urban centre but information from qualitative data gathering indicates that the majority of this population, mostly the youth, but also older and respected members of the community, are also moving onwards from Ethiopia irregularly.

Some 40% of the registered refugees are children, of which 30% are unaccompanied and separated children (UASC). Over the past years, the arrival trend of UASC increased significantly to a rate of 300-400 UASC per month, which is about 10% of the new arrivals. As shown in the graph below, there was a 100% increase in arrivals of UASC from 2014 to 2015.



A food distribution monitoring exercise conducted in 2015 by UNHCR, World Food Program (WFP) and ARRA led to the deactivation of food ration cards for all refugees who have not collected their rations for three months. It was found that only 33,115 refugees were regularly collecting food in these camps. Based on UNHCR data analysis of migration trends over a three-month period, it was noted that almost 40 percent of Eritrean refugees leave the camps within the first three months of arrival to Ethiopia and 80 percent leave in the first year of arrival. In spite of an average rate of 2,000-3,000 new arrivals per month, official camp populations have remained relatively stable since active monitoring of use of food ration cards began, with similar number of new registrations and ration card inactivations.

**TABLE 4.**  
POPULATION IN  
SHIRE CAMPS  
INCLUDING UASC

	Registered refugee population as of Dec-2014	Population as of 31 May 2016 (after inactivation of food card)	Children under the age of 18 (as of 31 May 2016)	UASC as of 31 May 2016
<b>Mai-Aini</b>	<b>17,807</b>	<b>10,157</b>	<b>4,401</b>	<b>760</b>
<b>Adi Harush</b>	<b>34,090</b>	<b>7,808</b>	<b>2,893</b>	<b>629</b>
<b>Shimelba</b>	<b>6,607</b>	<b>5,282</b>	<b>2,154</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Hitsats</b>	<b>33,235</b>	<b>9,410</b>	<b>3,115</b>	<b>1,346</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>109,546</b>	<b>33,115</b>	<b>12,563</b> <small>38% of the total population</small>	<b>2,785</b> <small>10% of the total population; 30% of all children</small>

\*Source: UNHCR statistics as of 31 May 2016



It is believed by UNHCR that many of those who are not collecting food in the camps have spontaneously settled elsewhere in Ethiopia or irregularly migrated onwards outside of Ethiopia. Beginning in June 2016, a verification exercise was jointly conducted by UNHCR and ARRA in Addis Ababa, to determine how many of the Eritrean refugees who are absent from the camps may be located in urban centres around Ethiopia. By the time this study was concluded, the verification exercise had found at least 15,000 Eritrean refugees living in Addis Ababa, all of which will have their stay regularized and will be granted OCP status should they meet the programme requirements.

### II. Reasons for flight from Eritrea

Eritrean refugees in the Shire area camps stated that they flee to Ethiopia for a variety of reasons including fear of forced open-ended conscription into the national/military service; arbitrary imprisonment; human rights abuses including forced labor during military conscription; poor treatment while in the military; arbitrary arrest and detention, including torture and degrading treatment during detention; restrictions of freedom of expression, movement and religion; desire for reunification with immediate or extended family members in Ethiopia or abroad; economic problems; discrimination against Eritreans with Ethiopian lineage; and a desire to seek the end of the Eritrean regime.

“Sometimes they just grab a number of youth for no reason and jail them”

*Adi Harush camp, male under the age of 35*

“I saw people crawling like babies because they were beaten and had been crippled.

“I have burns from carrying hot rocks in prison”

*Mai Aini camp, male age 26 and Adi Harush camp soldier who were both imprisoned and tortured for two years for trying to leave Eritrea irregularly*

“The government does not allow protestant churches to operate or other religious gatherings for prayers etc. Even people on the streets used to sometimes throw things like wet bread on us. During my military school days in Sawa, the manager of student affairs used to use my religion as a pretext to call me in for disciplinary measures and make sexual passes at me.”

*Hitsats camp, female age 21*

“I was suffering in a place that is not even home. They [Eritreans] call people like me [half Ethiopian and half Eritrean] ‘Amce’ and assume we’re generally untrustworthy and criminals. They ostracize us. I would give up everything to go back to Dire Dawa. I do not miss that country at all.”


*Hitsats camp, male age 38*

Some UASC have indicated that family violence and stress, as well as a desire to obtain an education, are their primary reasons for leaving Eritrea. Other unaccompanied children cross the border with support of relatives in North America, Europe or Israel, often to pursue family reunification that would not be possible from Eritrea. Amongst girls, reasons for seeking asylum in Ethiopia have included sexual exploitation, both in the home (related to early or forced marriage) and during military training<sup>[49]</sup>. Other research has shown that younger children at times cross the border by accident, for adventure or to visit relatives not realizing that they cannot return. Some younger children have expressed their desire to return to Eritrea for family reunification related reasons. In the past, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was able to assist Eritrean refugee children to return home. However, this activity is currently on hold while authorities decide on the modalities to resume family reunification procedures.

[49] Women's Refugee Commission. "Young and Astray: An assessment of factors driving the movement of unaccompanied children and adolescents from Eritrea into Ethiopia, Sudan and Beyond" (May 2013) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84a764.html>[Young and Astray].

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The Kunama ethnic group, primarily found in Shimelba camp, declared slightly different reasons for coming to Ethiopia. The Kunamas are a small marginalized ethnic group found in the borderlands of Eritrea and began to flee to Ethiopia beginning in 1998 when the Ethio-Eritrean war broke out in their lands. According to interviews with refugees, many left Eritrea to avoid conscription into the Eritrean army. Those who chose to stay in the Ethiopian occupied territories prompted suspicion by the Eritrean regime of disloyalty. Thus, as indicated in our research, many fled in fear of government reprisals in 2000 when the Eritrean government regained control of the area at the end of the war<sup>[50]</sup>.



### III. Onward movements from Shire Camps

Fifty-six percent of refugees in the Shire area camps indicated an intention to move on irregularly from Ethiopia to a third country, making this population, out of all the groups studied, the most likely to irregularly move onwards from Ethiopia.



#### Profile of Eritrean Refugees in Shire Camps who indicated an intention to move onwards irregularly


This population is generally male (62 percent), single (70 percent) and young, with the majority under the age of 25 (68 percent) and almost half (46 percent) between the ages of 19 and 25. Most have not been in Ethiopia long, with more than half (58 percent) having been in Ethiopia less than two years. They are generally relatively well educated, with 41 percent having grade 7 to 9 education and 34 percent having grades 10 to 12 education. More than one-third have family members in the camps and of these, almost half are heads of their household.

[50] Also see, Refugees International, *Forgotten People: The Kunama of Eritrea and Ethiopia* (February 18, 2004), <http://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/forgotten-people-kunama-eritrea-and-ethiopia>

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
The high likelihood of onward movement is substantiated by the numbers of ration cards deactivated since 2015, indicating that 75 percent of registered Eritrean refugees appear to have already moved on from the camps, potentially having moved beyond Ethiopia. UNHCR migration trend analysis also confirms that the majority of refugees (80 percent) are found absent from Shire camps within the first year of arrival and 40 percent within the first three months.

**HITSATS**  
**87%**  
 with intentions to move onwards




Youngest and most mobile population

**ADI-HARUSH**  
**52%**  
 with intentions to move onwards




Highest percentage of men and most likely to have been in Ethiopia for more than two years

**MAI-AINI**  
**34%**  
 with intentions to move onwards



Population in this group is slightly older and more likely to have been in Ethiopia over four years

**SHIMELBA**  
**33%**  
 with intentions to move onwards



16% of the refugees (mostly Tigrinyans) have previously left Ethiopia and were returned.

While men irregularly move out of the camps in greater numbers than women, female refugees have a slightly different profile than the general population that is worth noting.

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Survey information indicates this group is more likely to be married, more likely to have family in the camps and more likely to have been in Ethiopian refugee camps for more than four years. The significant onward movement of men in particular has implications for the women that are left behind, both in terms of potential protection concerns and lack of financial and other support.

### Freweyni's\* Story

Freweyni arrived in Ethiopia as a minor and was placed in kinship care where she was married off to a local man in Sheraro town. She says that he soon divorced her and left to Europe via Sudan and Libya. She went back to her caregivers, who also left soon after - via resettlement to the US. After their departure, she started a relationship with a boyfriend who also left to go to Europe, soon after she fell pregnant. She says that life in the camp is difficult, especially with another mouth to feed.

*\*Not her real name*

There was also another 12 percent of Eritrean refugees surveyed in the Shire camps who indicated that they “might” migrate irregularly. In profile, they are older; more likely to be female; more likely to be married; better educated; and more likely to have been in the camps for over four years. Only nine percent of this group had family in the camps and of these, almost half were the head of their household.

### Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC) in Shire




In Shire, UASC are placed into four different types of care arrangements – kinship care, foster care, community care and independent living. Seventy-five percent of the UASC population live in community care. Upon arrival in Ethiopia, children are transferred to Endabaguna reception centre, while they wait for registration, family tracing and identification of an appropriate care arrangement. Stay in the centre takes an average of 30 days and can reach up to two months given the lack of available shelters for community based care in the camps.

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As statistics show, the Shire refugee camp population is predominantly young single persons who themselves are on the move; thus, promoting family-based alternative care for the unaccompanied children is quite difficult. While there are some recreational activities offered, there are no educational activities at Endabaguna and children are reported to face a wide range of protection challenges, including physical abuse and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).

The rate of onward movements amongst UASC is also substantial, with an average arrival rate of 300 to 400 UASC per month and an average departure rate of 250 UASC per month. Based on UNHCR statistics, the UASC who are no longer in the camps are mostly male, were in community care arrangements and were mostly located in Hitsats camp. Those in kinship care and in foster care were less likely to go missing.



While some UASC return, the majority of missing UASC are untracked and unfound. Of these, UNHCR interviews with known acquaintances of missing children indicated that they are likely to have moved to another camp, to Sudan, to Addis Ababa, or to have returned to Eritrea. Although some of them may be in urban centres around Ethiopia, the majority are believed to have moved to Sudan with the intention of moving onwards to Libya and Europe.

Survey data from unaccompanied youth in the Shire camps between the ages of 16 to 18 confirms that the majority of these youth (71 percent) intend to migrate irregularly from Ethiopia to a third country<sup>[51]</sup>.

### IV. Main reasons for moving onwards



#### Lack of life opportunities and hopelessness

Hopelessness resulting from not having a full life was mentioned repeatedly in qualitative data gathering as well as in secondary literature about the irregular onward migration of Eritrean refugees in the Shire camps<sup>[52]</sup>.

[51] This age category inadvertently crosses between children and adults.

[52] See for example Young and Astray, supra at note 49. It found that, among UASC in Mai-Aini camp, reasons for onward migration included hopelessness and helplessness with respect to their future prospects.

To capture the lack of life opportunities or the notion of “hopelessness” that has often been noted as a reason for irregular migration, the research team first turned to the general definition of “hopelessness” which is to have “no expectation of good or success”. Recognizing that “hopelessness” is a complex psychological phenomenon, for the purposes of our study, in the context of potential policy implications in a refugee camp, the survey asked general questions about the lack of life opportunities. Lack of life opportunities was surveyed by looking to see whether irregular migration was motivated by one of three factors: a lack of employment/desire to find employment; inadequate or unavailability of education opportunities; and lack of opportunity for oneself and/or family in the host community.

Qualitative research indicates that some Eritrean refugees come to Ethiopia hoping for a better life, but become discouraged by the lack of employment and other life opportunities. This general lack of opportunity “for a life” and the resulting hopelessness was mentioned by nearly all Eritrean interviewees in the Shire camps. Strikingly, in 2015, among the 12 attempted suicides of UASC in Adi Harush camp and the four in Mai-Aini camp, reasons cited included the stress of staying in the camps for long periods of time and the inability to migrate onwards from Ethiopia.

“We leave our country with dreams and aspirations, we want to grow, see development and feel connected to others”

*RCC Member Hitsats Camp*

Feeding into this feeling of hopelessness is the lack of employment opportunities for this population. Seventy-three percent of respondents who intend to irregularly migrate indicated that the lack of employment and/or a desire to find employment was motivating their decision and this number was even higher (78 percent) amongst unaccompanied youth (aged 16 to 18). Almost all qualitative interviews indicated that inability to work was a factor driving migration. Interviewees stated that although refugee incentive workers can earn up to 700 ETB per month, this amount is insufficient to provide an adequate standard of living. The ability to earn 2000 ETB per month was quoted by at least one respondent as sufficient to deter irregular migration. In addition to self-support, employment is sought to provide financially for family left behind in Eritrea and to pay back debts owed to family by those who previously migrated irregularly and were forced to pay ransoms. Movement to the urban centres does not appear to substantially alleviate lack of work as a motivating factor for irregular migration as urban Eritrean refugees interviewees noted that their inability to work left them without hope to build a life or meet even their basic needs, thus creating the primary driving force for irregular onward movement from Ethiopia.

Approximately one-third of respondents indicated that the lack of opportunities for oneself and one’s family in the host community is motivating their irregular migration. This was particularly pronounced in Mai-Aini camp where 97 percent of survey respondents cited this as a factor motivating irregular migration. In FGDs across almost all camps, lack of opportunities for personal growth and entertainment opportunities were cited as motivations for irregular migration. In individual interviews with the youth, the inability to move freely outside of the camps was cited as a factor motivating irregular migration as was the inability for youth to “build their lives” and the lack of social acceptance by Ethiopians.

“A camp is like a big prison. Although I was luckily able to sneak out of the camp and work in a little computer place in Mai Tsebri with the town people for a short while, others do not get the opportunity to get out of the camps.”

*Adi-Harush camp, man age 25*



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The unavailability and quality of education as push factors for irregular onward migration were consistently raised in qualitative data gathering. Hitsats camp offers only primary education (grades 1 to 8) with currently no access to secondary education. Secondary education in Adi Harush camp is available in neighboring host community schools, but children who arrive in the middle of the school year have to wait a full term until the beginning of a new school year. A participatory assessment from Shire camps listed a number of concerns with education for Adi Harush camp, including a lack of adequate numbers of classrooms for primary and secondary schools resulting in over crowding and poor education quality; lack of educational materials and libraries; corporal punishment and forced labour which discourages children from attending school; hunger and a lack of adequate food at school resulting in drop outs; a lack of qualified teachers; as well as safety concerns for children en route to and from school. In Shimelba camp, there is a preschool as well as schooling for up to grade 10 and secondary school available in Shiraro town. Concerns were raised with respect to the quality of education for that camp, given lack of language and education qualifications of the teachers.



Photos: ©UNHCR

### Family and friend considerations including the role of the diaspora

Qualitative data gathering clearly indicates that a number of family and friend considerations play significant roles in motivating irregular migration. While the discussion below has been “categorized” for ease of discussion, it must be emphasized that these factors are complex and inextricably linked.

#### Communicating with family and friends in Eritrea

Direct calls to Eritrea from Ethiopia are blocked by the government and as such it is difficult, if not impossible for refugees to learn about the well-being of family left behind in Eritrea. Although there are creative ways around this problem, e.g. “three-way” phone systems, with a person in Sudan connecting a phone in Ethiopia and in Eritrea, this is not available to all Eritrean refugees. As such, inability to communicate directly with family and friends in Eritrea is a motivating factor to move onwards, and was especially noted amongst female refugees in general and refugees in Shimelba camp.

### Family reunification

Family reunification is also an often cited as a factor motivating irregular onward movements, especially amongst UASC and young adults<sup>[53]</sup>. Additionally, indirect UNHCR data collected with arriving UASC supports a strong family reunification motivation, as detailed in the table below. Some of the refugees, particularly men, are irregularly migrating with the goal of creating future regular channels of family reunification for loved ones left behind in the Ethiopian camps or in Eritrea<sup>[54]</sup>. While some men had chosen to stay in the camps with their families, seeing the family reunification opportunities generated by refugees who successfully moved onwards has created pressure on these men to do the same. Other refugees indicated that they intend to irregularly migrate should their ongoing family reunification procedures fail or take long periods of time. In addition, some refugees claim that either they are not aware of or do not have access to reliable information regarding family reunification procedures. Restrictive eligibility criteria and differing concepts of family ties lead to skepticism on the part of refugees that family reunification is an actual possibility for them, possibly factoring into decisions to undertake dangerous irregular movement.

### FAMILY REUNIFICATION PROFILE FOR UASC

Based on a sample survey of Registration and BIA data conducted by UNHCR for newly arriving UASC in 2016:

- Approximately 80% of Eritrean UASC have relatives outside of Eritrea: 35% in Europe; 35% in Ethiopia; 15% in Israel; 15% in other
- Approximately 30% of Eritrean UASC have a mother or father abroad: 50% of these parents are in countries that can potentially support family reunification for biological children (Netherlands; Germany; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland)

### Indirect pressure

Indirect family pressure to irregularly migrate was raised extensively by refugees. Remittances form an essential part of the budget of regular Eritreans and those with family abroad are able to afford better lives including houses, schooling and food, paid for by their overseas “bread-winners”<sup>[55]</sup>. The resulting increased social status and lifestyle, as well as a “hero discourse” surrounding those who have successfully made it overseas, results in a significant expectation upon young people to find a way to assist their families who are suffering in Eritrea and emulate those who have successfully done so<sup>[56]</sup>. There are reports that where refugees have declined diaspora support to irregularly migrate, they earn the disappointment of their families and the offer does not come again.

“They have been brainwashed by their families to be brave and not to be weaker than other youngsters in other families who are now in Europe. Their departure to Ethiopia is even timed as they try to time everything in relation to when it’s safer to make the boat trip across the Mediterranean.”

*Adi-Harush camp, male age 37*

#### Haftom’s\* story – a 23 year old Eritrean refugee living in Mai-Aini camp

As the eldest son in his single mother household, Haftom began to work at a young age to help make ends meet in an increasingly expensive Eritrean society. His family continued to struggle and it was apparent to him that only those families with remittances from abroad were able to not just survive, but to thrive. The community calls the ones who leave Eritrea the “brave, dedicated ones” and he found that there was a lot of expectation that young men go out of Eritrea to support their families back home. Although his mother never directly pressured him to leave the country, he felt like a failure, an underachiever who was unable to do what countless others had done.

*\*Not his real name*

[53] Also see for example Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, supra at note 14.

[54] In addition to qualitative data, see for example, Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, supra at note 14. This could also be referred to as simple chain migration that has been defined as the “movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants”, see John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, Chain Migration Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks, *The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly* 42: 82-97.

[55] Cosmologies of destinations, supra at note 13.

[56] Ibid. See also Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, supra at note 14.

This notion is even more deep seated for those who were financially sponsored by their families, at great risk and cost to themselves, to leave Eritrea. For example, for refugee victims of trafficking who were deported to Ethiopia and sent to the camps, their onward migration from the country of origin had already plunged their families in Eritrea into debt and further poverty. Interviewees indicated that they could not afford to sit idle in the camps, they had to find a way to pay off their family's debt and make their suffering worthwhile, no matter the risk. This factor was raised in a qualitative interview in Hitsats camp and by respondents to the survey in Shimelba camp where four percent of those intending to move onwards are doing so to pay back previous family debts.

"I used to cry the whole day and night but now I am fine. I still worry about how to pay back my aunts who sold all their gold and houses to pay 10,000 USD to free me from Sinai. I had promised to repay them every cent when I was calling and begging them to save me while being tortured. I am now unable to work and repay them and that's always something that I'm going to be losing sleep over. So, of course, I'd move again, if I had the money."

*Hitsats camp, female age 20*

Similarly, indirect pressure from other refugees who were in the camps and successfully moved to Europe is also a significant factor resulting in feelings of failure and desperation created by others' successful migratory stories. Indeed, the FGD with children and some individual interviews indicated that the feeling of being "left behind" without hope is a dominant factor in motivating onward migration<sup>[57]</sup>.

"When you see the people that made it to Europe posting their pictures on Facebook clearly looking like they're in great condition, it will really test your sanity when you see that was what you could have been. But who can you blame - being born poor is no one's fault but yours."

*Hitsats camp, married male age 36*

### Diaspora

In the Shire camps, most refugees who intend to move onwards have family or friend connections overseas. Over a quarter have family in destination countries and 45 percent have friends in destination countries. Forty-five percent communicate with their diaspora connections through mobile phone applications, the most popular being Facebook followed by Whatsapp, Viber and email. A small number communicate with diaspora through computers, presumably available in internet cafes in nearby towns.

Slightly more than half of those who intend to move onwards indicate that they have been encouraged by family and friends abroad to leave Ethiopia and of these, the majority (77 percent) have been offered support by diaspora to do so. Those with diaspora contacts who actively encourage irregular migration also have their journeys organized and paid for by these connections who act as the primary agents of their movements. In response to specific questions about financing of irregular migratory journeys, almost half of those who wish to migrate irregularly indicated that their journeys will be paid for by family still present in Eritrea, by family in destination countries or by friends in destination country. In Hitsats camp, more than 90% of the UASC are encouraged and offered support to move onwards by family in Eritrea, as well as by family or friends in destination countries.

[57] Also see Young and Astray, supra at note 49.

“Diaspora are not only the financiers of migration but also the inspiration behind migration. They tip the balance in terms of making others think that risking their lives is worth it.”

*Adi-Harush camp, married male with two children*

Qualitative interviews confirm that Eritreans abroad spend most of their income on financing the irregular migration of their families to Europe and that such diaspora will only encourage irregular migration where they are willing to provide the accompanying financial commitment.

“No one will tell you to leave. If they do, they’ll have to send money to support you.”

*Hitsats camp, female age 18*

Even where there is discouragement from diaspora to irregularly migrate, the study found that refugees still intend to move onwards even without being actively supported for their journey. Refugees often take the chance that the strong familial obligations of their relatives in third countries, and the common knowledge of the torture and other horrific treatment at the hands of traffickers, will result in the payment for release from traffickers and money for further passage when the time comes<sup>[58]</sup>. This is reportedly true even for children who move onwards without plans to pay for the journey, hoping that when the time comes, their family abroad will pay.

Those without diaspora connections are less likely to move as they have no way to finance their journeys short of desperate measures such as selling one’s organs. They tend to stay in the camps for longer periods than those from affluent families or those with relatives abroad.

“Generally, the rich ones go and the poor ones just wish they did.”

*Hitsats camp, female age 21*

If they do irregularly migrate, these unconnected individuals also tend to undertake more piecemeal, and hence more dangerous, migratory routes, e.g. they may become stranded along their migratory route, having to work to save enough money for the next leg of their journey, thereby exposing them to more risk from different trafficking networks<sup>[59]</sup>.

Gender appears to affect the likelihood of diaspora support of irregular migration. Survey results indicate that female refugees who intend to move onwards are more likely to be encouraged to leave by diaspora and that if they are encouraging such migration, diaspora is more likely to support the migration of women as compared to men. This is supported by other survey results which indicate that men are more likely to be self-supported on their journey, and that women are more likely to have been verbally encouraged than men to migrate irregularly and to have family organize their journeys. Women are also more likely to have family and friends in Eritrea or family abroad supporting their journey.

Endabaguna/ ©UNHCR

[58] Reuters Behind the Refugee Crisis, supra at note 38.

[59] See Young and Astray, supra at note 49 that indicated interviewees would often become “stranded” along the migratory route as they tried to look for work to pay for the next/final legs of their migration journey.

### Protection gaps and issues

Protection concerns in the country of asylum, aside from the lack of access to socio-economic rights (i.e. the right to work), were not commonly raised by refugees as motivating factors. Those referred to include difficulties with the refugee community/feelings of insecurity from other refugees (two percent), fear of sexual exploitation particularly early forced marriage (one percent) and lack of welcome in the host community/difficulties with the host community (one percent).

Lack of welcome in the host community and problems with refugees in the camps may stem from numerous sources. Based on qualitative data gathering, discrimination on the basis of having mixed Eritrean and Ethiopian parental lineage, both in the camps and in the host community, was reported to be an issue and a driver towards onward migration, as was stealing from the camps by the local community. Single mothers in particular reported theft of possessions, fear of violence, and lack of effective follow-up on incidents stemming in part from a weak justice system. Additionally, there are reports of conflicts with the host community and Hitsats camp which has resulted in refugees being unable to work in the informal economy. In Shimelba camp, refugees cited difficulties or feelings of insecurity from other refugees and difficulties with the host community as motivators for irregular migration. Based on qualitative data gathered, it is possible that difficulties with other refugees in that camp may arise from the isolation and stigmatization that refugees who have been victims of trafficking, particularly males, face due to the common view amongst other refugees that those who were trafficked have been subjected to sexual violence and are thus “damaged” or “unclean”.

While fear of sexual exploitation, particularly early forced marriage was not commonly raised as a motivating factor, sexual violence is not uncommon in the camps as reports indicate that in 2013 there were 189 incidents of SGBV in the Shire camps, 130 cases in 2014 and 211 reported cases in 2015. UNHCR has indicated that the heavy gender imbalance in the camps (over 61 percent male across camps), raises high protection concerns including survival sex, domestic violence, unwanted pregnancies, lack of sufficient shelter, female genital mutilation (FGM) and sexual violence in and around the camps, risks that are heightened during irregular onward movement. Indeed, UNHCR is of the view that protection concerns involving incidents of sexual and gender based violence are severely underreported.

#### Berhan's\* Story – Shimelba camp, Female, 23, Grade 11

Berhan previously lived in Hitsats camp but fled due to concerns about her safety. She lived in a tent with 10 people, both men and women, and was attacked one night by a fellow refugee who tore through her tent and threatened to rape her at knifepoint. She managed to escape but the next day, a Sunday, she noted that “UNHCR was closed” and could not find anyone to offer her protection. Scared for her life, she begged others in the camp for money to engage smugglers to take her to Sudan. Upon arrival to Sudan she was sold to the Bedouin who subsequently tortured her for ransom. She was released and brought back to Ethiopia thanks to the intervention of Dr. Al Ganesh [see excerpt on Dr. Al Ganesh below] and placed in Shimelba camp. As a result of her injuries she has a recurring uterus infection for which she has received standard medical assistance. In her view, the medical care is inadequate and she has since been using remittances from her sister in Sweden to seek private medical care.

“I was scared, I meant to stay here and work – but I ended up going from knifepoint to knifepoint”

*\*Not her real name*

Child protection concerns were not directly canvassed through the survey. However, qualitative data gathering indicates that with respect to child protection, the high turnover of trained refugee incentive social workers, due to their own irregular onward movement, results in huge gaps in implementing partners' ability to properly implement child protection programming, thus driving irregular onward migration. Providing family-based care for UASC is a challenge where the majority of the population in Shire camps are young, male, single and also moving onwards, resulting in the reliance on community-based small-group care. Social workers report that many of the UASC who are placed there often go missing quite soon after placement, migrating irregularly onwards or heading back to Eritrea on foot. Even when such cases are reported, follow up and tracking are still challenging. Moreover, social workers report that many families who take on unaccompanied children do so in spite of the higher financial costs in hopes of a higher chance of resettlement. When resettlement does not occur, these families reportedly take out their frustrations on the child, becoming resentful and physical or emotionally abusive.

Indicative of protection concerns amongst the UASC is that conflict with family members, caregivers and other children or friends, was cited amongst the reasons for 12 attempted UASC suicides in Adi Harush camp in 2015. Of the reported suicide attempts in Mai-Aini camp, at least one person cited separation from their family as the concern. Indeed, across Shire camps there is a need to strengthen case management databases to facilitate the follow-up, referral or case-review processes of UASC, and to step up child protection coordination and programming. It was also reported that there are insufficient spaces for UASC to be accommodated in the camps, leading to potential lengthy stays in Endabaguna Reception Centre<sup>[60]</sup>.

Amongst the UASC, there may also be indirect pressure to irregularly migrate because of resentment towards UASC from other camp members. Previous research found refugee community resentment against the UASC, based on the perception that they receive special treatment and also because of perceptions that the UASC are “out of control” in that they are threatening, unruly, undisciplined, have lost their cultural and traditional values and are frequently engaged in illicit activities in the camps<sup>[61]</sup>.

### Other motivating factors

#### Resettlement

The study found that lack of resettlement options, including the perceived lack of honest and straight forward communication about the possibilities of resettlement and updates on the process, play a role in feeding feelings of hopelessness. Moreover, interviewees raised concerns that resettlement was being “sold off” and that those most in need of protection were not receiving it. When resettlement opportunities do not materialize in a timely fashion, refugees report losing hope and resorting to irregular migration. This is especially true amongst victims of trafficking in the Shire camps who report that, in their perception, they were promised resettlement that never materialized and amongst the youth in Hitsats who believe that there has never been a person resettled from that camp. Particularly concerning is that amongst the 12 attempted suicides in Adi Harush camp and the four in Mai-Aini camp in 2015, reasons cited included the delays in, and lack of, resettlement opportunities.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Young and Astray, *supra* at note 49.



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“What can we do? Eritreans are trapped in darkness even after risking their lives and enduring horrifying conditions to come here, and there’s still no solution. We cannot work to feed ourselves and our families, we are unable to live and UNHCR is not providing the support that it stated in its policy that it would – resettlement. We have people that have been here for over 12/13 years, barely living and still awaiting help.”

*FGD Addis Ababa Eritrean Refugees*

“People are in prison here. UNHCR needs to communicate more on the status of cases. Whether it’s good news or bad, people still need to know because additional stress is not good for refugees.”

*Mai-Aini camp, female age 28*

UNHCR does prioritize survivors of violence and torture and in 2015 resettled 564 persons under the category of “Survivors of Violence and Torture” across Ethiopia. It is, however, unclear whether these particular individuals were victims of trafficking and how many were from the Shire camps. Presumably young, able-bodied men do not generally fall within a priority category for resettlement, thus explaining the lack of known resettlement submissions from Hitsats camp in 2015. More concerning perhaps is the clear frustration expressed by numerous refugees about the “promise” of resettlement that has not materialized. This scenario writ large arguably points to a need for better and ongoing communication about the nature of resettlement, processes and a clear and well advertised system for receiving ongoing updates from resettlement countries.

### Food, shelter and NFIs

The lack of food, shelter and non-food items (NFIs) like clothing was not included specifically in the survey, but these topics arose repeatedly in qualitative data gathering. Notably, Hitsats camp has been identified by interviewees as having less services and harsher conditions than other camps, making refugees there more vulnerable to smugglers’ promises.

“I have been here for almost two years and I do not have a blanket to put on my back. The 15 kg of wheat is not enough, especially when one sells a portion of it to buy other types of food that go with the wheat such as tomatoes, pepper, etc.”

*Hitsats camp, married male age 36*

The living conditions in that camp are reportedly very difficult - extreme heat, coupled with malaria and no water or electricity, no access to cooking utensils (and for many a lack of knowledge of how to cook with the limited food rations in general) and no basic NFIs like blankets.

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In Shimelba camp, interviewers identified inadequate food rations, lack of provision of clothes and lack of entertainment centres as drivers of onward movement. In Adi Harush camp, one respondent noted that his lack of clothing and subsequent inability to even wash his clothing for lack of anything to change into, is what ultimately drove him to leave the camps and attempt onward migration.

“I did not have any change of clothes. I remember I wore 1 piece for 2 months. That’s why I wanted to go and had to go”

*Adi-Arush camp, married male age 25*

### Girmay’s\* story – Mai-Aini camp

Girmay is a 14-year-old UASC who has been living in camp since April 2014. There was originally a family that cared for him under a foster care arrangement but, since they got resettled, he has now joined a community care arrangement. He says that he came to Ethiopia hopeful for a better life but now feels like he’s lost hope. There is a shortage of soap, no food diversity and inadequate provision of shoes and clothes, which makes travelling a long distance to attend school difficult. He admitted that he sometimes thinks of going to Sudan to see if life would be better there and even attempted to contact a ‘delala’ (smuggler) once but never succeeded.

*\*Not his real name*

## Use of technology

Feelings of hopelessness are exacerbated by the increasing access to information about life in other places and how to get there, made available through the increasingly easy access to internet and social media<sup>[62]</sup>. Refugees are encouraged, both directly and indirectly via their social networks and knowledge of life in other places, to irregularly migrate<sup>[63]</sup>

My son was 10 years old at arrival and he became 18, just waiting here [for resettlement]. Now, he is gone – we don’t know where he is. He got information about life abroad from Facebook and some of his friends who had reached [Europe]. He follows what he sees.”

*FGD Mai-Aini camp RCC*

Academics have reasoned that the use of technology in this way allows for learning through the experience of others, providing predictability of outcomes and maximization of benefits with minimal costs<sup>[64]</sup>. This knowledge reduces fear of the unknown, builds confidence and provides a sense of empowerment to prospective refugee migrants lowering their tolerance to put up with “life without a future”<sup>[65]</sup>. They use this information to attempt to control their lives and take calculated risks based on knowledge of hardships along the migratory route<sup>[66]</sup>. This is substantiated in numerous qualitative discussions which indicated that those who choose to move are influenced by what they see from their peers on social media like Facebook.

[62] Also see Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, supra at note 14.

[63] Ibid.

[64] See Assefaw Bariagaber, “Globalization, Imitation behaviour and refugees from Eritrea,” *Africa Today*, Volume 60, No. 2 (Winter 2013) pp. 2-18.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.



### V. Risks to irregular migration

#### Awareness and perception of risks

As corroborated by previous research, the study has demonstrated that the majority of Eritrean refugees in the Shire camps, including children, who choose to embark on irregular onward migration appear to have at least some knowledge of the migratory dangers involved at different stages.

Refugees who cited knowledge of particular risks mentioned awareness about the following risks: physical abuse; death; kidnapping; torture; sexual assault (for both men and women); drowning; ransom; organ removal; car accidents - such as falling off vehicles; being left behind in the desert; crocodile attacks during river crossings; hunger and thirst; forced religious conversion; and being burned with melting plastic. There was also some, but not widespread, knowledge of the risks posed by authorities to refugees moving onwards irregularly, including rejection at the border, prosecution, detention and documentation seizure.

This generalized knowledge of risk, however, does not seem to translate into a more comprehensive knowledge of all of the specific risks. A small proportion (six percent) even indicated that there were no risks from irregular migration.

This partial understanding and knowledge of risks en route could be explained in a number of ways. It is possible that interviewees chose not to provide an exhaustive list of risks, but rather only highlighted those that came readily to mind. It is also possible that there is a cognitive dissonance between knowledge of dangers and the application of this knowledge to oneself<sup>[67]</sup>. For example, despite the fact that many refugees have heard of the risks on the journey, they may feel that they are exaggerated given that so many have already made and that such risks do not apply to them.

“We hear of the deaths in the desert and the sea but all of my friends have made it”

*Hitsats camo male age 20*

Study results also indicate that refugees who have successfully irregularly migrated speak in generalities of the risks, not wanting to reveal any personal weakness.

If I ask my brother what he encountered, he might say things were a little uneasy, but that's it. The limited time we have during a phone call plays a part but also we, Eritreans, do not complain and have high tolerance for pain and suffering.”

*Hitsats camp female age 18*

There are some gender differences with respect to knowledge of risks. With respect to knowledge of sexual abuse, slightly more women knew of such risks than men. In addition, the risk of slavery was known by more men than women, while more women knew of the risk of being rejected at the border than men.

There are also some differences in knowledge of risk as between those refugees who intend to migrate regularly as compared to those who intend to migrate irregularly. Those intending to migrate regularly have more knowledge about risks posed by authorities, e.g. detention and prosecution, document seizure and rejection at the border.

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[67] See for example U. N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “E-platform: Telling the Real Story, Information campaign for Somalis and Eritreans heading for Europe” (unpublished 2015) that discusses the cognitive dissonance in refugees who know of the risks but do think that it happens to other people.

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With respect to physical risks, those who intend to migrate irregularly seem to have slightly more knowledge of risks with the exception of bodily harm, torture and sexual abuse. From this, it could perhaps be argued that knowledge of certain risks, e.g. from authorities, has a role in determining choice as between regular and irregular migration.

The risk of irregular migration is perceived by refugees in different ways. While most are aware of at least some risks, many continue to decide to move despite this knowledge. Of this group, some have indicated that it is better to take risks and have a chance at success than stay in Ethiopia where, like Eritrea, there are no opportunities to have a “real life”.

Attempts are made at risk mitigation, illustrated through reports that women take three-month contraceptive shots before departure. Some pointed to the significant abuse and difficulties they faced in Eritrea to demonstrate that they are not afraid of the any risks that could arise in irregular migration. Even previous personal experience with the risks of irregular migration is not necessarily a deterrent. Interviews with those who have attempted irregular onward migration and failed show that the majority would try migrating again even though they had lost all their money, been arrested (some beaten) and detained for 3-8 months in poor conditions.

“You cannot even trust your own family. Your cousins sell you, your uncles and aunts sell you. I do not want wish what I went through to happen upon anyone let alone risk it happening to me again. But I've got no choice, I've got to fix the lives I have destroyed.”

*Hitsats camp, 20 year old female speaking of paying off the debts she incurred from her last irregular migration attempt where she was kidnapped in Egypt, ransomed, freed from her captors, and subsequently deported to Ethiopia*

Conversely, some Eritrean refugees indicated that knowledge of the risks, and in a few cases personal experience with kidnapping, torture and sexual abuse, as well as learning about risks from camp workers, has deterred them from leaving the camps.

“The captors would take and keep the women in separate rooms and I understand this is to rape them. Such sick things, together with other things I have seen, discourage me from ever thinking about leaving again.”

*Hitsats camp, male age 20*

Concerns were raised by numerous refugees about the particular vulnerability of children. Their young age and lack of life experience makes them vulnerable to peer pressure and lies and stories told by smugglers and, while knowing of some of the risks, they do not fully understand the consequences, e.g. while an adult may decide not to irregular migration if they do not have someone to assist them in paying the costs of such movement (including ransoms) children often do not have the capacity to consider this factor and adjust their behaviour.



### Sources of information

Most refugees learned of risks through news reports and articles. Other sources include other refugees, family and friends, camp workers, diaspora, previous personal experience and through the experience of other refugees. Such information is conveyed via phone calls from family and friends abroad; social media like Facebook, accessed on mobile phones or through internet café's in neighboring Ethiopian towns; videos shown to new arrivals by UNHCR at Endabaguna reception centre; as well as information sessions upon arrival to refugee camps in Ethiopia[68].

Interestingly, male refugees are more likely to have learned of risks through news reports, whereas females are more likely to have learned of risks through camp workers. Notable variations were found at a camp level in Adi Harush camp, where some refugees indicated that they had never been told of the risks previously and almost a quarter of Shimelba camp respondents mentioned they learned of the risks through previous personal experience.

### Knowledge of alternatives to irregular migration

The majority of Shire camp refugees surveyed (80 percent) were aware of legal alternatives to living in refugee camps. Specifically, 26 percent knew of educational opportunities outside of the camps, 14 percent knew of the OCP and 14 percent knew of legal migration options and resettlement. The low numbers of refugees indicating specific knowledge of alternatives may be attributable to factors such as survey question non-response or respondent misunderstanding of the survey question, e.g. survey respondents may have understood the question as being, "are you personally able to access this alternative?" However, it may also be indicative of a greater problem in terms of understanding of the mechanics of how the alternatives, including resettlement, actually operate. Qualitative data gathering indicates that amongst those who know of the scholarship program, the specific details of the program are not well understood. One young man in Adi Harush camp obtained a scholarship to attend university but, not knowing that he would receive a monthly stipend and food at the university, decided to irregularly migrate instead.

### The role of smugglers

It is known that Eritrean refugees and Ethiopian nationals partner in the smuggling networks. Eritreans, including children, are mainly used for identification of clients and recruitment on the ground, whereas Ethiopian partners are responsible for transportation and logistics between cities and to the border. Children are reportedly used because of the perception that they attract less suspicion. New children and youth arrivals at Endabaguna Reception Centre are targeted by refugee children who pass on information to smugglers, hoping that such assistance will eventually lead to free passage for themselves. Family connections and/or regional ties in country of origin are used to generate trust with potential migratory clients.

There are conflicting reports about the actual identities of the smugglers. While some key informants have indicated that since the passage of the 2015 Trafficking Proclamation[69], smugglers have been resorting to anonymous phone communications to make detection difficult[70], difficult others report that refugees continue to know exactly who to contact and how to obtain smuggling services. Indeed, consistent with academic research, some interviewees have reported well known places in each camp where smuggling intermediaries can be met, even if the smuggler is not personally known [71]. There are reportedly a greater concentration of smugglers operating in and around Hitsats than in Shimelba camp, likely related to the numbers of potential clients residing in each camp.

[68] Also see Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, supra at note 14 and Young and Astray, supra at note 49.

[69] See infra at note 113

[70] Corroborated by Reuters Behind the Refugee Crisis, supra at note 38.

[71] The interviewee reported that a smuggler was caught this way in a "sting" operation where two refugee women went to a well known smuggling "hotspot" and posed as individuals seeking smuggling services. Also see Migrant's agency in the smuggling process, supra at note 16.



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Refugee irregular migrants are generally extremely secretive about their travel plans, indicating that they do not tell family, friends or teachers that they are leaving the camps, nor who is facilitating their journeys. The reasons for refugee reluctance to speak of the smugglers and their plans are manifold, mostly seeming to stem from a general feeling of fear, e.g. fear of being stopped from moving onwards by their families, teachers or government officials; fear of being captured along their route and sold<sup>[72]</sup>; fear that their families will be implicated if knowledge of their use of smuggling routes becomes known; and fear authorities could close the smuggling networks leaving themselves and other refugees out of options in the future.

Not surprisingly, only one percent of the surveyed refugees openly admitted that they will be utilizing a smuggler to organize their journey. In addition to secrecy, the survey question was posed in an open ended fashion, and as such, some respondents may have interpreted it as asking who will be organizing the entire journey, including the hiring of smugglers. Thus, most commonly, respondents referred to the “overall” organizer of the journey, rather than referring to the smuggler’s role for part of their journey, with 34 percent noting that their journeys were organized by family (not specified whether abroad or in camps), 18 percent self-organized and 7 percent organized by friends.

Given that smuggling networks often rely upon reputation and referrals to obtain business, smugglers do not operate with complete impunity. Rather, where their services turn out to be dishonest or to bring harm to their clients, it is known that the refugee community will make efforts to ensure they are brought to justice. For example, an Eritrean refugee smuggler who was known to sell his clients to the Rashaida and also to assist in the torture for ransom, was eventually brought to justice through the testimony and assistance of the refugee community and his victims.

Perceptions of smugglers amongst refugees varies. Qualitative data gathering indicates that some refugees believe that the smugglers are criminals who will do anything to make a profit, including selling them like commodities to the highest bidder. Others view them as individuals who have no other options for livelihood and who may be willing to act with compassion to assist others. This is consistent with academic research on smuggler/migrant relationships which has found that the mutual interest of the smuggled and smuggler makes the process much more complex than the traditional picture of a “merciless criminal and passive victim”<sup>[73]</sup>. In all situations, despite views on their morality or criminality, smugglers are seen as offering a service for individuals who otherwise would have no hope.

Regardless of their perceived morality, it is also understood that, perhaps with the exception of children and UASC, refugees are responsible for choosing whether to use them or not.

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[72] Consistent with previous academic research on the matter where migrants were found to be reluctant to talk of their plans to leave for fear of being betrayed. See Migrant’s agency in the smuggling process, supra at note 16.

[73] Migrant’s agency in the smuggling process, supra at note 16.

## From Eritrea to Ethiopia and onwards

During the flight from Eritrea, some refugees hired smugglers or “pilots” to bring them to the border with Ethiopia. Others, especially if they lived close to the border, fled on foot while trying to avoid Eritrean military and others reported catching buses to the border. Upon crossing the border, they were generally, but not always, met by Ethiopian militia and then brought to Endabaguna reception centre. Some Eritreans first went to Sudan and then to Ethiopia via Humera or Metema towns (both Ethiopian towns bordering on Sudan), where they were met by Ethiopian officials and taken to Endabaguna transit centre.

“We were not certain we were in Ethiopian soil. We feared that we had somehow circled back and ended up in Eritrea again so when I first saw a house, I hid my wife and sister under a rock before knocking. The moment I heard the accent of the lady who answered, I was relieved that we had all finally come to safety.”

*Hitsats camp, married male age 35*

For those who utilized smugglers, the sum paid was reportedly in the range between 1,167 to 6,200 USD to bring Eritreans to the Ethiopian border<sup>[74]</sup>. An additional approximately 910 - 3125 USD is levied by the Eritrean government against family left behind<sup>[75]</sup> and failure to pay reportedly results in a prison term for the family left behind.

Once the decision to move onwards from Ethiopia to third countries is made, 80% of surveyed refugees stated that Europe is their top destination.

### MOST POPULAR COUNTRIES

**NORWAY 8%**

**NETHERLANDS 6%**

**GERMANY 5%**

**SWEDEN 4%**

### ERITREAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN EUROPE <sup>[76]</sup>

**SWITZERLAND 26%**


**NETHERLANDS 17%**

**UNITED KINGDOM 10%**

**NORWAY 9%**

**DENMARK 8%**

**SWEDEN 8%**



[74] Between 70,000 to 120,000 Nakfas, USD amounts depend upon whether the black market or bank exchange rates are used. Due to stricter Eritrean government regulations introduced around September 2015 ago, the bank and black market exchange rate for USD to Nakfa is fairly close (\$1 USD = 16 Nakfa at the bank and \$1 USD = 20 Nakfa in the black market). However, before these regulations, the black market rate of 1 USD could be as high as 55 to 60 Nakfa.

[75] 50,000 Eritrean Nakfa, USD amount depending on exchange rate used as indicated *ibid*.

[76] Eurostats, Five Main Citizenships of (non-EU) asylum applicants, 2015 (number of first time applicants, rounded figure) YB16.png, (last accessed April 27, 2016), [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/1/18/Five\\_main\\_citizenships\\_of\\_%28non-EU%29\\_asylum\\_applicants\\_%2C\\_2015\\_%28number\\_of\\_first\\_time\\_applicants%2C\\_rounded\\_figures%29\\_YB16.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/1/18/Five_main_citizenships_of_%28non-EU%29_asylum_applicants_%2C_2015_%28number_of_first_time_applicants%2C_rounded_figures%29_YB16.png)

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Practical reasons given for Europe as a destination of choice include the perception that Europe: is less “secure” to enter than Canada, the United States and Australia; is “cheaper” and “easier” to get to; is currently the “open” route, offers legal family reunification; and is less likely to deport an Eritrean refugee to Eritrea. Our survey results indicate that in terms of specific motivations, the primary pull factor to go to Europe is for work opportunities (69 percent). While there seems to be a general knowledge of the difficulties in finding employment in Europe amongst the the Eritreans refugees, many believe that such information may be false, designed to discourage them from going.

### Routes, costs and protection concerns

The exact routes are not necessarily well known or openly talked about amongst the Eritrean refugee community in the Shire camps. Twenty-seven percent of survey respondents did not know the route that would be taken to get to their destination of choice. In a study with Eritrean refugees who had already arrived in Europe, it was apparent that there was an uneven distribution of pre-knowledge concerning routes and costs amongst Eritrean asylum seekers, seemingly correlated with factors such as general level of resources and education[77].

### Northern route

Based on a literature review and key informant interviews, it is clear that currently the most common route to Europe is from **Ethiopia to Sudan, Libya**, and across the Mediterranean Sea.

To leave Ethiopia and enter Sudan, the most popular routes seem to be from the Shire camps through Metema or Humera (via Gondar or Bahir Dhar), both towns close to the Sudanese border in Amhara region[78]. Some refugees have reported being robbed, attacked and beaten by bandits in Ethiopia on their way to the border with Sudan. Along the Humera route, migrants need to cross the Tekeze river which runs from Ethiopia to Sudan. For those crossing by foot, many drownings and crocodile related deaths have been reported. For those crossing by vehicle, concealment is necessary with the accompanying risk of detection by checkpoints. Upon arrival at the Ethiopian border with Sudan, some previous reports indicate that those being smuggled are generally handed off to another group of smugglers who will take them across the border[79].



[77] Jan-Paul Brekke, Stuck in Transit: Secondary migration of asylum-seekers in Europe, national differences, and the Dublin Regulation (September 30, 2014) *Journal of Refugee Studies* Volume 28, No.2 [Stuck in Transit].

[78] See for example Trafficking and Smuggling on the HoA, supra at note 37.

[79] EC Study on smuggling of migrants, 2015, supra at note 15.

## ARRA DIRECTIVE

Recognizing the number of Eritrean refugees migrating to Sudan through Metema and Humera, ARRA issued a directive that came into force on July 8, 2015 that attempts to provide a uniform law to deal with refugees caught attempting to leave for Sudan and Eritrea illegally, as well as those who are found in Ethiopia without travel documents<sup>[80]</sup>.

This directive allows refugees to seek written permission from ARRA to leave the camp to travel to the Sudan border. Knowledge of this directive is not widespread, even amongst ARRA officials in the various Shire camps. Pursuant to the directive, if a refugee applies and is granted permission to travel to Sudan, ARRA issues an official permission letter to the individual and requires that the refugee leave a copy of their food ration card with the authorities. Groups of refugees may also request to be escorted by ARRA to Humera or Metema<sup>[81]</sup>. Upon arrival at the border with the official permission letter, immigration officials deem such refugee migrants to be legal and allow them to pass through the border. Reportedly, there has been some uptake of the directive at least insofar as the issuance of a permission letter to the border. That said, sources also indicate that there is general reluctance amongst most refugees to follow the directive due to concerns that it would make them easy trafficking and kidnapping targets upon crossing the Sudanese border (especially if arriving in groups escorted by ARRA) and also because the directive makes it clear that individuals utilizing the directive will not be allowed back into Ethiopia.

For those that arrive at the border irregularly, e.g. without the official ARRA permission letter, the directive sets out that they shall be arrested and sent to the nearest police station. If they are suspected of being smugglers they will be sent back to their camp of origin where the relevant authority will determine how to proceed legally. For those who are subsequently found not to be involved in smuggling, their ration cards will be taken and they will be sent to Sudan. In practice, our research has found that those caught at the border are detained by immigration officials who will check if they have any criminal cases pending, consult ARRA and determine what information can be gleaned about the smuggling networks. The immigration officials then decide on a case by case basis whether a refugee can pass through the border or have to be returned to the camps. Those to be returned to the camps are detained at the border until transportation back can be arranged at the refugee's own expense<sup>[82]</sup>.

The directive also applies to refugees irregularly moving and caught at non-border locations. It sets out that such refugees must be held at the place of capture and returned to their camp of origin. In our research it was reported that irregular movers who are caught at checkpoints, like on the bridge over the Tekeze river, by police and local militias are detained until a background check is completed, including reporting to ARRA, and then sent back to the camps through police organized vehicles.

Once in Sudan, some Eritrean refugees choose to stay and work in Khartoum, making enough money to fund their onward journeys to Europe. Dangers faced en route in Sudan vary but generally include some combination of kidnapping by bandits or the Rashaida for ransom by torture or sale to the Bedouin and then torture for ransom by the Bedouin<sup>[83]</sup>. Deportees to Mai-Aini and Adi Harush refugee camps from the Sinai have previously reported the following types of traumatic experiences or torture: rape, including rape of men; being whipped with chains; being burned by a hot poker; suspension in the “helicopter” position (hands tied behind the back); women being suspended by their hair; confinement in a one meter by one meter underground cell with no light; long-term outdoor exposure to heat (daytime) and cold (nighttime); beating of the soles of the foot; simulated drowning (waterboarding); restriction of breathing by placing a plastic bag over the head; being tied down and having sugar water poured on the body to attract flies; being kidnapped and threatened with organ removal for resale; various types of torture while being trafficked through Sudan and Egypt; and beatings<sup>[84]</sup>. Some are taken to Khartoum where they endure severe abuses and are subject to forced labor or transferred to other countries for similar purposes<sup>[85]</sup>.

[80] A Directive for Refugees who leave the camp for different reasons, issued by the National Intelligence and Security Service Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, 07/11/2007 (Ethiopian calendar) (Unpublished) [ARRA Directive]. The document was translated from Amharic to English.

[81] ARRA Directive, *supra* at note 82. Note that some interviewees indicated that ARRA used to do something similar to this in 2011 as well, requiring payment of approximately 400 ETB (\$20 USD) for fuel costs.

[82] Reportedly, in the past, busloads of refugees heading towards the border have been turned around in the same vehicle that they have arrived in and sent back to their camp of origin.


[83] The Rashaida ethnic group are a nomadic tribe present in northeast Sudan and Eritrea and the Bedouin are a semi-nomadic group who, among other places, is present in the Sinai desert of Egypt.

[84] Centre for Victims of Trauma – Ethiopia, Information pamphlet (unpublished updated August 26, 2015).

[85] U.S. TIP Report 2015, *supra* at note 29.

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
Costs seem to be extremely changeable for a variety of reasons including kidnapping and ransom (estimated at around 40,000 USD for kidnapping in the Sinai) as well as costs like smuggler “transition” fees (between 100-250 USD) when the refugee is transferred from one smuggling network to another. Moreover, the exact means of transit may vary depending upon the agreement with the particular smuggler, e.g. one person may only have agreed to pay to Sudan and then be transferred to another network for the rest of their journey, whereas some may have agreed to pay for their journeys all the way from the Shire camps to Libya. The following is some general information obtained from interviews as well as secondary sources.



Hawala is the primary means of payment to smugglers and traffickers for those transiting through Khartoum. Hawala is a legal method of payment that depends on close personal relationships and does not involve signed contracts or ledgers.

**FIGURE 3. How Hawala works**  
**How hawala works**

Hawala is a legal but informal means of transferring money across the globe.



Sources: Financial Action Task Force (FATF); Interpol

[86] With respect to the 25 USD, although not confirmed that this was the direct means of transport, it is common knowledge that in 2011, ARRA was providing low cost transport for refugees to the border.

[87] Reuters Behind the Refugee Crisis, supra at note 38.



Reportedly, the *hawala* agents are based in Khartoum where money transfers are then arranged to the Somaliland border town of Tug Wajaale<sup>[88]</sup>. From there money is cashed out to finance the transportation network feeding across Ethiopia into Sudan.

Although many Eritreans continue to irregularly migrate through Sudan to Libya to the Mediterranean, given more recent concerns about the Islamic State and the dangers to be faced on the Libyan route, there are some reports that Eritrean and other refugees have begun to move through Sudan (Khartoum), to Libya then to the Western part of Egypt and across the Mediterranean at Alexandria, Egypt. Others continue into Jordan and across the waters to Turkey and Greece<sup>[89]</sup>. As the route is new, costs are still relatively unknown.

Qualitative data gathering also indicates that some refugees also move from Shire to Juba, South Sudan through the Beninshangul-Gumuz region and also through the Gambella region, although these routes do not appear to be as popular as the one through Metema and Humera towns. Through Beninshangul-Gumuz region refugee migrants, pass through Kurmuk, Gizen, Tongo and Abramo border towns. UNHCR statistics indicate that in the first four months of 2015, 122 males, aged 30-50 were returned to Shire from Assosa town prison (Beninshangul-Gumuz region) after having been caught attempting to irregularly migrate to Juba, South Sudan. Their average length of stay in the camps before attempting to move onwards again was 3 to 6 months and all those interviewed by UNHCR had been detained for a period of 3 to 8 months in Assosa before being sent back to the Shire camps. One refugee reported that he was apprehended by authorities in Gambella and then imprisoned for six months in Shire before being sent to Hitsats camp. From the Shire camps to Assosa town (by bus) and then through Abramo, Ethiopia to Yabus, South Sudan, the cost was cited as 10,000 ETB (~ 500 USD) and no cost estimates were obtained for the route through Gambella.

Interviews revealed that the horrific dangers of trafficking, kidnapping and other abuses found on the Sudanese route appear to be absent on the way through South Sudan. Upon arrival in Juba, it is reported that many Eritreans stay to work given the large presence of an Eritrean diaspora business community. Other reports also indicate that many Eritreans move to Juba willingly with the promise of legitimate work in hotels, restaurants or construction sites, but are often forced to work for little to no pay or are trafficked for sexual purposes<sup>[90]</sup>. From Juba, some are purchasing false travel documents and flying to Istanbul, Turkey, where they continue their journey into Europe. Others reportedly travel via land through Sudan and again on to Libya and along the Central Mediterranean Route. Still others reportedly continue on to Uganda.



©UNHCR

[88] Trafficking and Smuggling on the HoA, supra at note 37.

[89] Supported by Stuck in Transit, supra at note 78. Also see Trafficking and Smuggling on the HOA, supra at note 37.

[90] E.S. TIP Report 2015, supra at note 29.

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### Eastern route

From the Shire camps, a few Eritrean refugees are also reported to go by foot to Logia, Afar region, across to Djibouti, over the Red Sea to Yemen and further by foot to Israel or Saudi Arabia. Along the route through Djibouti, refugees and migrants have reported witnessing or being victims to a number of crimes including physical and sexual abuse, robbery, interception and detention. There is a shortage of food and water in Obock, Djibouti – the port where migrants typically depart across the Red Sea – and many resort to begging and working in menial labor jobs to pay for the journey to Yemen. The boat ride across the Gulf of Yemen is treacherous, with 95 deaths recorded in sea crossings to Yemen in 2015<sup>[91]</sup>. Reported risks upon arrival to Yemen include capture by bandits who torture, starve and severely beat irregular migrants for ransom in the amount of approximately 2,000 USD. From the Shire camps to Yemen the cost has been estimated as 100 USD to get to Djibouti and another 100-150 USD to go across the sea by boat<sup>[92]</sup>. From the Shire camps to Saudi Arabia via Yemen, one interviewee indicated that he previously paid 2,000 USD.



### VI. Regular migration

#### Profile of Shire Camps eritrean refugees who indicated an intention to move onwards through regular channels

Almost one-third (29 percent) of Eritrean refugees surveyed in the Shire camps indicated that they intend or would prefer to move onwards from Ethiopia through regular channels. This group is young with almost half (45 percent) between the ages of 16 and 25. The majority are male (60 percent) and single (55 percent). There is a fairly equal distribution in terms of length of time in the camps, with 39 percent having been in the camps for four years or more and another 40 percent under two years. This group is relatively well educated with 73 percent having a grade seven education or higher. More than one-tenth (11 percent) have left Ethiopia in the past and returned and about one-third have family in the camps (33 percent). Amongst the camps, the majority of the survey respondents in Shimelba camp intend to migrate regularly (58 percent) in contrast to Hitsats camp where only 8 percent intend to do so.

#### Main reasons for intending to move onward through regular channels

Life opportunities as a category figured prominently in the motivation of this group to engage in regular migration, although the emphasis was significantly different than for those who intend to migrate irregularly. While the majority of refugees who intend to irregularly migrate are solely driven by lack of employment, this group are also significantly motivated by the lack of opportunities in the host community and by inadequate educational opportunities. Specifically, the majority of those refugees who intend to migrate regularly do so because of lack of employment (56 percent) and lack of opportunity for oneself and one's family in the host community (54 percent). Almost one quarter (24 percent) also cited insufficient or inadequate educational opportunities as a motivating factor.

Refugees intending to seek regular migratory pathways are also slightly more motivated to move because of protection concerns than the other surveyed groups. Concerns raised include difficulties/feelings of insecurity from other refugees (six percent), fear of sexual exploitation particularly early forced marriage (four percent), and lack of welcome/difficulties with host community (four percent).

[91] Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, Monthly Summary December 2015, [http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/RMMS\\_Monthly\\_Summary\\_December\\_2015.pdf](http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/RMMS_Monthly_Summary_December_2015.pdf) (2015) [RMMS Monthly Summary December 2015].

[92] Ibid.

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Family reunification is an important factor motivating regular migration. Qualitative data gathering indicates that many refugees in the camps, including children, come to Ethiopia to await family sponsorship and have had their journeys, starting from Eritrea, planned by family overseas. Others come to Ethiopia in hopes that their family, who have already successfully moved, will sponsor them. Most refugees who are waiting to move onwards regularly have to go to Addis Ababa, either through regular or irregular channels, to obtain their official travel documents. Registered refugees are not the only Eritreans awaiting family reunification as there are also reportedly some Eritreans in Addis Ababa, who have been smuggled from Eritrea through Sudan, across to Metema and directly to Addis Ababa. These individuals await family reunification in third countries and never claim asylum in Ethiopia.

19 percent of those wishing to migrate regularly are also motivated by their inability to communicate with family and friends in Eritrea. Other peer and family pressures did not seem to have much importance; only four percent influenced by refugees who plan to move, four percent by those who have already gone ahead, four percent receiving verbal encouragement from diaspora to move and only two percent influenced by the known or perceived success of those who have already moved.

Some refugees wait in the camps in hopes of resettlement. This group is comprised of those who do not have the finances to undertake irregular migration, those who are fearful of the dangers of such a journey and those who recognize that finding work in Europe is not easy. Victims of trafficking, who previously failed at irregular migration, specifically noted that they no longer have the money nor the physical health to undertake the journey. One UASC specifically indicated a desire to wait for resettlement so as not to be a financial burden upon his already impoverished family in Eritrea.

A few interviewees were also applying for educational scholarship opportunities overseas rather than taking the risks of irregular migration.

### Afar Camps Afar Region

#### I. Profile of the population and reasons for flight from Eritrea

There are two refugee camps, Barahle (established 2010) and Aysaita (established 2010), in the Afar region hosting 20,575 refugees of Eritrean nationality and mostly of Afar ethnicity and pastoralist background. The average household size is about 4.4. Some 68% of the Afari refugees are children, while about 57% are women and girls.



Research was only undertaken in Barahle and Aysaita camps. However, it should be noted that due to a number of factors, including the Afari's strong clan ties and structure across national boundaries, many of the refugees are also based in host communities with approximately 17,086 refugees living in Erebti, Dalool and Ayne-Deeb towns. In June 2012, the Government of Ethiopia decided to relocate refugees and asylum seekers in the Afar Region living within the host communities near the border areas, to the camps. While the relocation began in late 2012, owing to a lack of adequate services in the camps and general lack of willingness to move by refugees, the majority remained with the host community.

The Afari Eritrean refugees generally come from the Red Sea area of Eritrea.



Figure 4. Camps in Afar Region. Source: UNHCR

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While many Afaris fled Eritrea claiming similar reasons as other Eritreans, e.g. forced military conscription, being orphaned by the Eritrean regime, being mistrusted by the government for having lived in Ethiopia, lack of peace in Eritrea, and arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement, others indicate they fled because of suspicion by the Eritrean government that they there were involved in rebel groups and many claim oppression by the Eritrean government of the Afari people and their culture.


A major challenge for the Eritrean-Afar refugees is the severe drought that affects the regional state hosting them. Basic services implemented in other regions, such as WASH facilities or shelter, are unsuitable for the harsh environment.

### II. Onward movements from Afar camps

According to survey data, Eritrean Afar refugees are extremely unlikely to irregularly migrate, with only one percent of respondents indicating an intention to do so. Many Afaris interviewed demonstrated no knowledge of irregular onward migration to third countries. To the extent that it is known, interviews confirmed that the majority of refugees are tied to their families and would not consider such journeys. The majority of the Afari Eritrean refugees surveyed indicated a desire to migrate through regular channels (62 percent).

Life opportunities as a category is a very important factor motivating the Eritrean Afari refugees to move onwards, both regularly and irregularly.

Lack of employment, lack of opportunity for oneself and one's family in the host community and inadequate or insufficient education were all cited as motivating factors by the vast majority (greater than 80 percent) of those intending to migrate through regular and irregular channels. It is worthwhile noting that the lack of life opportunities as a motivating factor feature even more prominently amongst Afaris than amongst the refugees in the Shire and Jijiga area camps.



"How are we supposed to survive and help ourselves if we are not able to work? Refugees do not have rights. We cannot even get work in the community. People spend years on education and it has no income yield in the end."

*Barahle camp, male aged 39 who plans to resettle in Canada*

Protection issues were raised significantly amongst refugees who declared an intention to irregularly migrate. Specifically, fear of sexual exploitation particularly early forced marriage and problems and difficulties with other refugees and the host community were highlighted. These concerns may arise because of the high rates of FGM and early marriage in the Afar region and potential conflict over resources caused by El Nino related weather phenomenon. Other factors reportedly motivating irregular migration include the scarcity of firewood and inadequate food rations. It was also noted that insufficient opportunities and knowledge of resettlement does drive some to seek irregular migration. In addition, as compared to the general Afari refugee population, those who intend to irregularly migrate had more diaspora connections, 43 percent having family connections in third countries and 21 percent having friend connections.


Inability to communicate with family and friends in Eritrea was a motivating factor for regular migration for 41 percent of the survey respondents, related to the fact that it is not possible to call Eritrean phone numbers directly from Ethiopia. Direct and indirect family and peer pressure also appears to play an important role in influencing the intention to move through regular channels. Almost half (45 percent) of respondents stated that they are influenced by those refugees that have already moved onwards, 44 percent influenced by those refugees who plan to move onwards, 34 percent who have been verbally encouraged by diaspora to migrate, seven percent who have been offered financial support to do so and 29 percent who wish to regularly migrate because of the known or perceived success of those who have already done so.

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Other reasons gathered through qualitative interviews for wanting to migrate through regular channels included lack of information on how to organize irregular migratory journeys; lack of diaspora connections; lack of finances; fear of deportation back to Eritrea; desire to ensure family is taken care of; and fear of risks associated with irregular migration. The lack of diaspora connections is corroborated in the survey results with 10 percent indicating they had family in third countries and 13 percent with friends in third countries.

In terms of preferred destinations and costs, the small number of refugees who declared the intention to irregularly migrate indicated Europe, North America, Saudi Arabia and South Africa as destinations. Estimated costs for the journey varied from 169 to 1171 USD.

### Desired countries



### Expected costs



### III. Knowledge of risks and alternatives to irregular migration

For the few Eritrean Afari refugees who intend to migrate irregularly, the majority (57 percent) did not know of any risks. Of the known risks, rejection at the border by officials was the most commonly cited (20 percent). Amongst those who know about irregular migration at all, qualitative interviewees noted risks like drowning, detention death, torture, kidney removal, kidnapping by the Islamic State, slavery, ransom and deportation.

Fifty-eight percent of Afari refugee respondents were aware of legal alternatives to migration. Specifically, 20 percent knew of legal migration and resettlement and eight percent knew of the OCP but only three percent had any awareness of educational opportunities outside the camps. In qualitative data gathering it was confirmed that many refugees in the camps are not aware of resettlement as an option and, for those that do, the particulars of resettlement are not well understood.



## SOMALI REFUGEES

Figure 5. Jijiga Camps.  
Source: UNHCR



### Jijiga Camps Somali Refugees

In Somalia, armed conflict, clan violence, widespread human rights violations, political instability and insecurity, cyclical climatic impacts and low levels of basic development indicators persist. This is exacerbated by high malnutrition rates, extensive food insecurity, vulnerable livelihoods, poor health infrastructure, recurrent disease outbreaks and lack of clean and safe water, poor provision of basic services, including education and pervasive protection violations.

In Ethiopia, Somalis from Central and Southern Somalia are recognized prima facie as refugees, while Somalis coming from other regions undergo Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures. Somalis represent the second largest group of refugees in Ethiopia, living across refugee camps in Jijiga and Dollo Ado areas, as well as in Addis Ababa. As of May 31, 2016 there were 251,537 Somali refugees in Ethiopia, living in a protracted asylum situation with limited prospects for durable solutions. The study with Somali refugees was conducted in two of the Jijiga area camps, in the Somali region.

#### I. Profile of the population and reasons for flight from Somalia

As of May 31, 2016 there were 36,918 Somali refugees in three refugee camps in Jijiga, in the Somali region – Kebribeyah (opened 1991), Aw-barre (opened 2007) and Sheder (opened 2008). Over half the overall population (59%) is under the age of 18 and 10 percent of these are UASC. Research activities were only undertaken in the newer Aw-barre and Sheder camps.

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The majority of refugees in the Jijiga area camps come from Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, South Central Somalia and Hargeisa and arrived between 2007 and 2009. Since 2009, while the population of the camps has been relatively stable, the Jijiga area camps have no separate reception arrangements and screening centre for asylum seekers. As such, one of the main protection concerns in the Jijiga area camps is the absence of registration opportunities for new asylum seekers resulting in the majority of new arrivals remaining unregistered. These individuals do not have a formal legal status in Ethiopia and have no access to refugee assistance. This, in turn, hinders early identification of and effective response to protection concerns.

Qualitative interviews reveal that refugees were fleeing terrifying violence, at times targeted at minority groups, and forced conscription of youth into terrorist groups. Many caught any available transport to arrive to the Ethiopian border.

“It was a harsh civil war and everyone was being killed”

*Aw-barre camp, young male*

## II. Irregular onward movements from Jijiga camps



### Profile of Jijiga camp Somali refugees who indicated an intention to move onwards irregularly

#### Profile of Somali refugees who are undecided about irregular movements

**31%**  
of the Somali refugees intend to move onwards

**13%**  
of the Somali refugees are undecided about irregular movements

**41%**  
over the age of 36

**45%**  
married

**37%**  
with higher education

**77%**  
4+ years in the camps

#### Profile of Somali refugees who intend to move onwards

**52%** female

**65%** single

**72%**  
under the age of 25

**80%** 4+ years in the camps

**62%** with family in the camps

**14%** head of households

**31%** with education of 10 to 12 grade, whilst 31% have no education

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Data analysis shows that female refugees intending to move onwards are generally less educated (45 percent with no education) than their male counterparts (16 percent with no education), are more likely to be between the ages of 19 to 25 and are more likely to be married.

The community view is that the majority of those who irregularly migrate are between the ages of 15 and 25, the age group targeted specifically by smugglers, and a mix of both genders. However, FGDs also indicated a perception that the majority of persons irregularly migrating are teenagers, a finding that was not substantiated in our survey results where only 35 percent of those irregularly migrating onwards were between 16 and 18 years of age. However, it should be emphasized again that the survey did not include those under the age of 16.

### Main reasons for moving onwards irregularly



#### Lack of opportunities and hopelessness

“People leave because they have nothing to do and nothing to look forward to. Death does not look so bad when you’re hopeless.”

*FGD Young Men, Aw-barre Camp*

In Jijiga area camps, a sense of hopelessness and the lack of anything to do is driving onward migration. Specifically, more than half (57 percent) of those who intend to migrate irregularly cited lack of employment as a major motivating factor. This was raised consistently in qualitative data gathering as well, where interviewees also noted that those who had found work in Jijiga town, as engineers, were not engaging in irregular migration and that more employment opportunities would stem irregular migration.

Another 15 percent of survey respondents indicated a lack of opportunity for oneself and one’s family in the host community as motivating their irregular migration. In qualitative data gathering, a lack of opportunity for those who have finished school, and a lack of support for young men in particular, was specifically mentioned as a motivating factor by school graduates who now have nothing to look forward to and nothing to lose. Lack of entertainment activities and activities to keep the youth “busy” was also mentioned.

Approximately one third (29 percent) of refugee respondents who wanted to migrate irregularly stated that insufficient or inadequate education was a push factor, a factor which was confirmed in qualitative interviews. Primary and secondary schools are available in both Aw-barre and Sheder camps, however, it was reported in qualitative discussions that difficulty in recruiting secondary school teachers that speak the Somali language has created an inability to pass exams for many students and is driving onward migration. As per the Ethiopian curriculum, secondary school education is in English but given that most students do not have high levels of English language ability, in a typical Ethiopian classroom, the teacher first explains the concepts in the local language of the students. As the teachers in the Jijiga camps reportedly only speak Amharic, they are not able to explain concepts in the local Somali language of the refugees, and given the low level of English amongst the Somali refugee population, this leads to difficulties in proper educational instruction.



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Camp leaders were also critical about post-secondary opportunities indicating that there are limited education opportunities beyond high school and, even though 45 youth from Aw-barre camp obtained a post-secondary scholarship to study in Ethiopia, almost half have reportedly irregularly migrated out of the country and the rest “have mental illness” from their inability to utilize their educational training. Of the youth who were aware that scholarship opportunities for tertiary education exist, they felt that there is insufficient financial support for them to provide for living expenses while they undertake their studies outside the camps.

### **Family and friend considerations** including the role of the diaspora

The vast majority (79 percent) of those who intend to move irregularly from the camps indicated that some form of family and friend consideration was influencing their decision to move onwards.

### **Communication with family and friends** in Somalia

While there are no restrictions with respect to phone communication to Somalia from Ethiopia, and indeed Somalia reportedly has excellent network coverage, 22 percent of Somali refugee survey respondents who intend to migrate irregularly indicated this as a motivating factor. The reason for this is unknown and qualitative data-gathering did not provide any explanation.

### **Family reunification, direct and indirect family peer pressure**

Survey results indicate that direct and indirect family and peer pressure play a significant role in motivating irregular migration. Almost half of those who intend to migrate irregularly are influenced by other refugees who plan to move onwards (49 percent) and those who have already moved onwards (48 percent). Over one-third (37 percent) are also influenced by the known or perceived success of those who have already moved onwards and almost a third are motivated by their family situation (30 percent). While “family situation” is not defined, it can presumably be interpreted as a catch all for any family related pressures, direct or indirect, that are motivating irregular migration.

These results were extensively confirmed in qualitative data gathering where it was clear that the success of those who have migrated irregularly, as well as those who were resettled abroad, act as a pull factor for those left behind in the camps, particularly for the youth. “Glamorous” pictures posted on Facebook by those who have migrated (irregularly or regularly) abroad create an image of life in Europe that is a pull factor for those left behind in the camps. Despite the reality that life as a refugee in Europe has numerous challenges, many similar to those found in refugee camps in Ethiopia, those who make it feel pressured to “sugarcoat” the stories they send home or to those already in transit to Europe as they feel that there are no alternatives<sup>[93]</sup>.

“They ask us what we are still doing here. It’s difficult seeing someone, who was in the camp just a month ago, having a transformed life, completely different to yours.”

*Aw-barre Camp, male age 25*

[93] Stuck in Transit, supra at note 78.

In contrast, it is interesting to note that the pull to Europe primarily affects the youth and that Somali parents, particularly mothers, are reported to strongly discourage irregular onward migration to the extent that there are reports of mothers making extensive efforts to trace and retrieve their children from smugglers before they have left the Ethiopian borders.

### Diaspora

With respect specifically to the role of the diaspora, sixteen percent of potential irregular migrators had family connections overseas and 76 percent had friends overseas. The majority (71 percent) communicate via mobile phone applications, the most popular being Facebook (52 percent), Whatsapp (23 percent), Viber (14 percent), email (seven percent). A small number also communicate using a phone landline (9 percent) and via computer (five percent).

It is clear that it is not merely the existence of diaspora connections that is important in influencing irregular migration but also their level of support, financial and otherwise, is determinative. In terms of finance and support, survey results show that 69 percent of potential irregular migrants were being encouraged by their diasporic connections to migrate out of Ethiopia. In contrast, of those who intend to migrate through regular channels, only 27 percent have diaspora contacts encouraging them to migrate and of those staying in Ethiopia only 21 percent have diaspora connections encouraging them to move and none of this group were offered support to do so. In response to specific questions about financing irregular migratory journeys, eight percent of potential irregular migrators indicated family and friends in Somalia were supporting their journeys, seven percent indicated family abroad were supporting their journeys and 15 percent that friends abroad were supporting their journeys. Focus group discussions and literature reviews confirmed that some Somali refugees draw upon diasporic connections around the world to pay for the costs of irregular migration and facilitate the route, providing information on safe routes and means of passage, to gain information on how to contact smugglers and providing recommendations on good and blacklisted smugglers<sup>[94]</sup>.

Based on survey data, there appears to be gender differences with respect to the role of diaspora in supporting irregular migration. Female Somali refugees are less likely to be encouraged by family and friends abroad to irregularly migrate (74 percent of males vs. 65 percent of females) but where they are encouraged to leave, the diaspora appear to be more willing to support their migration (11 percent of males vs. 32 percent of females). This preference to encourage males to irregularly migrate is supported in other survey results which indicate that women are more likely to hire smugglers for their journeys (15 percent of men vs. 20 percent of women) and more likely to be organizing the irregular migration themselves (27 percent of men vs. 48 percent of women), whereas men are more likely to have friends organizing their journeys (42 percent of men vs. 21 percent of women).



[94] EC Study on smuggling of migrants, 2015, supra at note 15.



## Protection gaps and issues

One-tenth of individuals who indicated a desire to migrate irregularly raised fear of sexual exploitation, particularly early forced marriage as a motivating factor. Problems with and feelings of insecurity with other refugees was raised by 11 percent of respondents and 6 percent raised lack of welcome and/or difficulties with the host community as a factor. Women were more likely to raise the issue of fear of sexual exploitation than men, whereas men were more likely to raise the issue of problems with and feelings of insecurity with other refugees than women.

It was not possible in the context of this study to determine the exact nature of the fear of sexual exploitation, however, qualitative data collection indicates that women must travel long distances to collect firewood which is subjecting them to possible sexual violence and that FGM and early childhood marriage are still prevalent in the camps.

Qualitative interviews indicate that difficulties with and feelings of insecurity from other refugees may arise from discrimination against Somali ethnic Bantu's in the schools, conflict arising amongst refugee because of limited supply of water at water points and household robberies that were common in the camps prior to the installation of doors on the shelters. Previous research has found that in this region, there is a high degree of homogeneity in terms of religion, language and culture between the refugee and local Ethiopian Somali clan composition; aiding in the acceptance by the local community of the refugees<sup>[95]</sup> perhaps explaining the lower levels of concern raised with respect to difficulties with the host community.

## Other motivating factors

While not included in the survey, qualitative data gathering found that the small, unappetizing and culturally inappropriate food ration is motivating irregular migration. One factor to consider in this regard is reportedly the large number of people who are still unregistered or have been registered by ARRA as asylum seekers but who have not been given food ration cards, resulting in their reliance upon existing family members in the camp for food.

The vast majority (80 percent) of those who indicate a desire to irregularly migrate have been in the camps for more than four years (and in individual interviews most had been here for 9 years). While there is a regular weekly individual reception for resettlement process update and a monthly meeting with the Refugee Central Committee (RCC)<sup>[96]</sup> to discuss the general resettlement policy and related matters, interviews and focus group discussions indicate that despair at never being resettled, at the lengthy resettlement process, or fear/realization of being rejected for resettlement after the interview, were commonly cited as reasons for irregular migration. Some of the despair has particularly been attributed to a misunderstanding amongst refugees that all refugees in Aw-barre camp would be resettled by 2015.

[95] Women's Refugee Commission, "In Search of Safety and Solutions: Somali refugee adolescent girls at Sheder and Aw-barre camps, Ethiopia" (August 2012) available at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/in\\_search\\_of\\_safety\\_and\\_solutions\\_ethiopia\\_2012-1percent5B1percent5D.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/in_search_of_safety_and_solutions_ethiopia_2012-1percent5B1percent5D.pdf) [Safety and Solutions Somali refugees]

[96] The RCC is composed of refugees chosen to represent the interests of broader group.

In the past 6 months, only 4 families were resettled. If you cannot get resettled, you cannot go back to Somalia where you'll be killed for being a 'spy' (if you return from Ethiopia) and you cannot live here, what's your choice?

*FGD Young Men, Aw-barre camp*

"Resettlement takes 2 to 3 years, in a week, a person can get to Europe!"

*Aw-barre camp, widowed male*

### Risks to irregular migration: awareness and perceptions of the risks and sources of information

Many Somalis are aware of the specific risks that may arise with irregular migration. The most commonly cited risks in the survey were rejection at the border (75 percent), torture (54 percent), sexual abuse (44 percent), slavery (42 percent), drowning (42 percent), ransom (41 percent), detention and prosecution (39 percent), organ removal (34 percent), forced labour (34 percent), physical abuse (34 percent), kidnapping (33 percent) and robbery (26 percent). Document seizure (nine percent) and hunger and thirst (four percent) were also mentioned. Other risks mentioned in qualitative data gathering include killing or coerced drafting by the Islamic State, wild animal attacks, car accidents, forced marriage to smugglers and being fed food cooked in motor oil.

Notably almost one fifth of respondents were not aware of any risks at all (19 percent) and perhaps not surprisingly, women were more aware of the risk of sexual abuse (65 percent) as compared to men (20 percent).

Knowledge of risks affects refugees differently. While some are deterred from irregular migration because of the risks, many are not because of the perception that the benefits of irregular migration outweigh any risks.

"If you make it, it's worth it. It depends on whether you die."

*Aw-barre camp, young man*

Others indicated that they are deterred by the risks of irregular migration and prefer to stay in the camps and await resettlement or other opportunities.

Respondents' knowledge of the risks of irregular migration came primarily from news reports (61 percent). Also significantly, 31 percent learned about risks through camp workers, 29 percent from family and friends, 26 percent from other refugees and 24 percent from ARRA/IOM and/or UNHCR. Other sources noted were previous personal experience (nine percent), diaspora (seven percent) and previous experience of others (two percent). Interestingly, men are more likely to learn of risks through camp workers (40 percent) than women (23 percent).

### Knowledge of alternatives to irregular migration

Forty-four percent of Somali refugees in Jijiga camps were aware of legal alternatives to living in the camps. Specifically, 31 percent were aware of legal migration options and resettlement and 15 percent are aware of educational opportunities outside of the camps. Qualitative interviews indicate that although the general knowledge of educational opportunities are low, the camp leadership is very aware of scholarship opportunities.

### Role of smugglers

The Jijiga area smugglers are reportedly part of a larger network that operates from Jijiga to Addis Ababa, Sudan and beyond. In Jijiga itself, the smugglers are reportedly Ethiopian Somalis or Sudanese who are “contracted employees” in the chain, but the main decision making authority lies generally with the Sudanese portion of the network that operates beyond the Ethiopian border. While our qualitative data gathering indicates that the Somali and Eritrean refugee smuggling networks operate using the same personnel and routes, secondary sources drawing on Government of Ethiopia information indicate that in fact the Eritrean refugee and Somali refugee smuggling networks operate in parallel<sup>[97]</sup>.

According to the refugee youth, the smugglers (‘magafe’ in the Somali language) operate directly in the camps and in Jijiga town. They are reportedly easy to find and prey particularly on the youth with family in the camps and abroad, knowing that their families will pay any amount to secure their safety. Others indicate that the smugglers use hired intermediaries to identify potential clients and generally operate by phone, not dealing face to face with potential irregular migrants anymore. They report that their identities are generally unknown by anyone, even those who have successfully moved onwards to Europe. This points to a trend that the smugglers are targeting youth who guard their identity carefully.

“We never get to see the magafe (smugglers). We don’t know if they are Somali or of any other origin. They are contacted quietly and our children follow quietly.”

*FGD, Elder Women Sheder camp*

Like the potential Eritrean irregular migrants from the Shire camps, the youth who intend to migrate irregularly do not tell anyone of their plans and reports are that the families only learn about their movements when they receive phone calls demanding money.

Thirty-eight percent of Somali refugee respondents in Jijiga intend to self-organize their irregular migration. Almost a third (31 percent) will have their friends organize, 18 percent will use a smuggler and 11 percent have family organizers. The low numbers of individuals who acknowledge utilizing smugglers may be attributed to the sensitivity of the subject matter or perhaps respondents understood the question as a reference to the overall organizer of the journey, including the finding and retaining smugglers.

In Jijiga camps, parents, and mothers in particular, view the smugglers negatively as criminals who lure away and “colonize the minds” of their children. This is in contrast to the perception amongst the youth that although smugglers are “evil”, they will still use them as “they are the only ones available to help refugees.” The smuggling network is also reportedly heavily utilized by the host Ethiopian community as well, with some noting that the impact on the host community families is particularly severe, e.g. with demands of ransom requiring the sale of all land and possessions.

Hitsats camp/ ©DRC

[97] Trafficking and Smuggling on the HoA, supra at note 37.

## Destinations

Europe is generally considered to be the best destination for Somali refugees who wish to migrate irregularly because of ease of access and convenience to get there, as well as quality of life (74 percent), opportunities for finding work (60 percent) and safety (23 percent). Specific destination countries seem to depend upon where the diasporic connections are the strongest as well as understandings of the asylum process. One interviewee noted a strong preference for Germany amongst the refugee migrant community because of perceptions that obtaining refugee status there is faster than in other European countries.



**ITALY**  
10%



**GERMANY**  
8%



**SWITZERLAND**  
6%



**DENMARK**  
4%

## Routes, costs and protection issues

“If they see you’re not from the town, they approach you in Jijiga and offer to take you abroad. That’s how I agreed and they took me to Addis on a truck that was transporting khat. We only travelled at night and slept during the day. In Addis, they collected our cell phones so we did not communicate with anyone.”

*FGD, Young Men Aw-barre camp*

### Northern route

On the Northern Route toward Europe, Somali refugees reportedly leave the camps and transit first through Jijiga town, then through Harar and Debre Zeit towns and finally to Addis Ababa where they wait for a “sufficient” number of irregular migrants to gather. These individuals, like Eritrean refugees from the Shire camps, then travel through Metema and Humera on to Sudan. Those who are caught by authorities are reportedly detained until sent back to their camp or in the case of children, sent back to the camp immediately.


“We were stuffed in a Coaster Bus. They used old, small and outdated Nokia phones to communicate. Travel is only done at night and people stay and rest in hotels during the day. We had travelled for 2 nights and on the last night, one of the refugee passengers tried to escape and was reported by locals who saw the incident and so we were all caught. This was in a place called Humera. My mom had told on me to local authorities but since they were unable to support her in finding me, she traced my movement on her own, all the way to Humera and found me when I was detained there.”

*FGD Young Men, Aw-barre Camp*



Reports are that Somali refugees are held for ransom by their former smugglers, often resulting in the families selling all their belongings, even valuables or land in their home country, to pay for release.

## Chapter TWO



Generally, payment is made immediately upon arrival to the agreed upon destination, rather than upfront. Costs for each leg of the journey vary somewhat depending upon what types of services the refugee utilized en route, e.g. hotel cost, food and drink consumed etc. As set out above under the discussion for Eritrean refugees, hawala is the primary means of payment for those transiting through Sudan.

Ten percent of potential irregular migrants from the Jijiga area camps also indicated South Sudan as part of their route towards Europe. Presumably, like the Eritrean refugees, these individuals also stop in Juba to work or obtain travel documents and then continue their journeys from there. From the Jijiga camps to South Sudan, Sudan and then Libya (Benghazi being cited by at least two respondents) to Europe the cost estimate is lower, generally ranging between 1,500 and 3,300 USD.

### Eastern route

While there seem to be significant numbers of Somalis reportedly found along the Eastern Route, our research would seem to indicate that these are not typically Somalis originating from Jijiga area refugee camps<sup>[98]</sup>. Rather, none of the Somali refugees surveyed or qualitatively interviewed in the study indicated a desire to move along the Eastern route. Interviews confirmed that irregular migrants from Jijiga camps do not take the Eastern route because of the inability to obtain any type of secure work or refugee status in the countries along that route. Additionally, while reportedly Saudi Arabia used to be a preferred destination, the benefits offered by smugglers to go to Europe have now resulted in the Northern route being preferred.

That said, some interviewees did provide cost estimates. From Jijiga area, the cost of getting to Bossaso, Djibouti is reportedly 20,000 ETB (~1000 USD) and from Bossaso across the sea to Yemen an additional 5000 ETB (~250 USD).

[98] RMMS Monthly Summary December 2015, supra at note 92 and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, Monthly Summary February 2016, <http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/MonthlySummaryFebruary2016.pdf> (2016) which indicate that there were 1,038 Somalis that arrived on the Arabian Coast of Yemen in December 2015 and an additional 29 Somalis that arrived in January 2016. The vast majority of migrants arriving in Yemen are of Ethiopian nationality, with 1,974 arriving in January 2016 and 852 Ethiopians in December 2015.

### III. Regular migration from the Jijiga camps

#### Profile of Jijiga Camp Somali Refugees who indicated an intention to migrate through regular channels

A significant number (40 percent) of Somali refugees surveyed indicated a desire to migrate through regular channels. The profile of this group is well distributed across age categories from 16 to over 50. The majority are female (71 percent), married (66 percent) and have been in the camps for over four years (81 percent). Almost half (49 percent) have family in the camps and of these the majority (62 percent) are heads of their households. A significant portion of this group have no education (31 percent) and about one quarter (25 percent) have between grade 7 and 9 schooling.

#### Main reasons for moving through regular channels

In terms of life opportunities, the majority (64 percent) want to regularly migrate for work, one quarter for schooling (25 percent) and one-tenth (10 percent) because of lack of opportunity for themselves and/or their families in the host community. Interestingly, potentially regularly migrating Somali refugees are more motivated by the lack of employment than those who intend to migrate irregularly.

With respect to protection issues, almost one-tenth (nine percent) of respondents cited problems with other refugees as a motivating factor for regular migration. Small numbers of individuals raised problems/difficulties with the host community (three percent) and fear of sexual exploitation, particularly early forced marriage (two percent). Based on survey and qualitative data gathering it is not clear what the specific issues are with respect to problems with the host community, although previous studies indicate that in this region there is a high degree of homogeneity in terms of religion, language and culture between the refugee and local Ethiopian Somali clan composition; aiding in the acceptance by the local community of the refugees<sup>[99]</sup>.

Direct and indirect family and peer pressure appeared to be factors influencing this group's views as one quarter wanted to move because of influence from those who had already gone, one quarter because of influence of those who were planning to go and almost one quarter because of the known or perceived success of those who had already gone. In qualitative data gathering, the lack of diasporic connections as well as inability to finance irregular migration were also noted as motivations for regular migration.

Other reasons cited for regular migration in qualitative data gathering included waiting for potentially imminent resettlement as well as fear of the risks of irregular migration.



[99] Safety and Solutions Somali refugees, supra at note 96.



## CONGOLESE (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) REFUGEES

### I. Profile of the population and reasons for flight from the Democratic Republic of Congo

As of May 31, 2016, Assosa area camps host 50,347 refugees in six refugee camps – Sherkole, Tongo, Bambasi, Ashura, Tsore and Ad-Damazin. Overall, the infrastructure in the camps is poor and services are underfunded. The recent reduction in food rations has resulted in serious protection risks including exploitation and SGBV. Unlike the Eritrean and Somali refugees from Central and Southern Somali who receive prima facie refugee status in Ethiopia, all persons from the Democratic Republic of Congo must undergo a RSD procedure. There is a backlog of cases pending assessment of the refugee status and there are limited prospects for repatriation and integration. Alternative sources of energy are also lacking; there is limited access to transitional shelter and sex-segregated latrines and, currently, new arrivals are not provided with NFIs.

Congolese refugees are only found in Sherkole camp which, as of May 31, 2016 hosted a total of 11,036 refugees, amongst which 609 were Congolese. Based on individual interviews, refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo fled because of ongoing ethnic conflicts, particularly in the Eastern part of the country. Some first fled to Uganda, then Kenya before finally reaching Ethiopia.

### II. Irregular onward movements of Congolese refugees from Assosa camps

#### Profile

Twenty-five percent of Congolese refugees surveyed indicated an intention to move irregularly from Ethiopia. All are male, mostly between the ages of 26 to 35 (55 percent), about half are single (48 percent) and the majority have more than a grade 10 education (56 percent). The majority (63 percent) of this group have also been in Ethiopian camps for over 4 years and have family in the camps (67 percent) of which the majority are the head of the household (71 percent).

#### Main reasons for moving onwards irregularly

Almost half (48%) of the Congolese refugees are motivated to irregularly migrate because of lack of employment and another forty-eight percent due to inadequateness or unavailability of education. More than half (59%) indicate that lack of opportunity for themselves and their families in the host community is motivating their migration. This is interesting as, unlike the other refugee populations, this factor features more prominently amongst the Congolese than the lack of employment. Moreover, all of the Congolese refugees who intend to irregularly migrate indicated problems or difficulties with other refugees as an issue motivating onward movements, and 22 percent pointed to a lack of welcome and difficulties with the host community. While no information was gathered through qualitative methods that can elucidate the cause of these difficulties with host and refugee communities, it can be hypothesized that feelings of marginalization, both within and outside of the refugee camps, may be due to significant differences in language and culture with the majority Ethiopian host community and Sudanese and South Sudanese refugee populations (with whom they cohabit in the Assosa area camps).



Figure 6. Assosa Camps.  
Source: UNHCR

### IV. Knowledge of risks and alternatives to irregular migration

The Congolese refugees are well versed in the risks of migration in comparison to the other refugee groups in this study. The majority knew of the risks of torture (74 percent), physical abuse (52 percent), death (52 percent), forced labour (52 percent), robbery (52 percent) and detention and prosecution by authorities (52 percent).

The majority of refugees reported learning of the risks to irregular migration from previous personal experience (52 percent), other refugees (52 percent) and ARRA and IOM (54 percent). Another 22 percent had heard about the risks through camp workers and 19 percent from diaspora connections.


The majority of Congolese refugees surveyed were also aware of legal alternatives to living in Ethiopian refugee camps (81 percent). The most commonly known alternatives are legal migration and resettlement (57 percent). Only three percent were aware of educational opportunities outside of the camps.

#### Role of smugglers

No Congolese refugees that intend to engage in irregular migration indicated the intention to engage the services of smugglers, a finding that was substantiated in qualitative data gathering. This is an interesting phenomenon given that the study has found that smuggling networks are very active in the Beninshangul-Gumuz region, but they seem to cater only to Ethiopian migrants and Eritrean refugees trying to leave the country irregularly<sup>[100]</sup>.

#### Destinations and routes

Thirty-seven percent of the Congolese refugees willing to move onwards irregularly noted Europe as their preferred destination. As per qualitative data gathering, the route utilized is through Sudan and/or South Sudan to Libya and onwards to Europe. Qualitative data gathering also indicates that some Congolese refugees move to Kenya, through Moyale, Ethiopia, and then onwards to Rwanda and South Africa. The cost from Sherkole camp to South Africa was estimated at 4,320 USD.



Congolese refugee woman in Sherkole camp. ©UNHCR/D. Diaz

[100] See numbers of smugglers caught and prosecuted in prosecution and convictions of trafficking and smuggling offences section below.



Data collection tablet/ ©DRC

## II. Regular migration

### Profile of Congolese refugees from the Assosa camps who intend to move onwards through regular channels

Almost one-third (31 percent) of Congolese refugees surveyed intend to move out of Ethiopia via regular channels. The majority of these are: between the ages of 19 and 25 (63 percent) and almost a third (29 percent) between the ages of 36 and 50; male (86 percent); single (71 percent); have been in the camps between 3 and 4 years (65 percent); have family in the camps (76 percent) of which the majority are the head of their household (76 percent); and are well educated with 64 percent having between a grade 10 and 12 education. None have left Ethiopia and returned in the past.

### Main reasons for moving through regular channels

In terms of life opportunities, the most cited motivating factor for regular migration was the lack of opportunities for oneself and one's family in the host community (79 percent). This perhaps could be attributed to the ethnic and cultural differences between the Congolese refugees and the majority South Sudanese refugees living in Assosa camps as well as host community Ethiopians. Half of the survey respondents indicated that limited educational opportunities are motivating their desire to pursue regular channels of migration. Almost one third (29 percent) are motivated by the lack of employment opportunities. Of potential concern and worthy of further study is that 21 percent of respondents indicated that fear of sexual exploitation including early and forced marriage was motivating their desire to regularly migrate and another 29 percent are motivated by problems and difficulties with other refugees. An additional 29 percent are motivated to leave Ethiopia to find a better life elsewhere.



Refugee child in Endabaguna. ©UNHCR