

UGANDA:

Uganda: Uncertain future for IDPs while peace remains elusive

A profile of the internal displacement situation

24 April, 2008

This Internal Displacement Profile is automatically generated from the online IDP database of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It includes an overview of the internal displacement situation in the country prepared by the IDMC, followed by a compilation of excerpts from relevant reports by a variety of different sources. All headlines as well as the bullet point summaries at the beginning of each chapter were added by the IDMC to facilitate navigation through the Profile. Where dates in brackets are added to headlines, they indicate the publication date of the most recent source used in the respective chapter. The views expressed in the reports compiled in this Profile are not necessarily shared by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The Profile is also available online at www.internal-displacement.org.

About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Norwegian Refugee Council
Chemin de Balexert 7-9
1219 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 799 07 00
idmc@nrc.ch

www.internal-displacement.org

CONTENTS

CONTENTS	3
OVERVIEW	8
UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR IDPs WHILE PEACE REMAINS ELUSIVE	8
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND	18
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN ACHOLILAND	18
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE NORTHERN UGANDA CONFLICT (JUNE 2005)	18
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT (DECEMBER 2004)	21
FOUR MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT (APRIL 2004)	23
ETHNIC TENSION; MYTH OR REALITY? (FEB. 2004)	25
ACHOLI LACK CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT (JULY 2003)	27
ONE OUTLINE OF THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT IN ACHOLILAND (DEC 2002)	27
THE LEADER OF LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY BROKE AWAY WITH ALLIES IN OBOTE II ARMY, 1988	31
THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT FRONT AND ALICE AUMA 'LAKWENA', 1986-1987	32
THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY'S ARMED INSURGENCY, 1981-1986	32
DISPLACEMENTS IN ACHOLILAND	33
STRATEGIC USE OF CIVILIANS BY BOTH SIDES (MARCH 2002)	33
VOLUNTARY DISPLACEMENT OR DISPLACEMENT ORDERED BY THE GOVERNMENT? 1999-2004	34
DISPLACEMENTS IN THE LANGO AND TESO REGIONS	36
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT IN TESO REGION, 1985-2005 (JUNE 2005)	36
MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT IN LIRA DISTRICT, 2003-2004	37
THE WAR IS SPREADING EAST (MARCH 2004)	38
PEACE-EFFORTS	40
JUBA PEACE TALKS AT RISK OF COLLAPSE (APRIL 2008)	40
ICC ISSUES ARREST WARRANTS FOR TOP LRA COMMANDERS, COMPLICATING PEACE EFFORTS (JANUARY 2006)	41
IDPs PREFER PEACE BEFORE JUSTICE (JULY 2005)	42
ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS UNDERMINE AMNESTY ACT OF 2000 (MAY 2004)	44
PREMATURE PEACE HOPES, 1994-2005	45
REGIONAL ASPECTS: SUDAN, DRC, CAR	50
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF SUDAN AND UGANDA, 8 DECEMBER 1999	50
INVOLVEMENT OF CAR AND SUDAN (APRIL 2008)	51
LRA ABDUCTS PEOPLE IN CAR AND SUDAN (APRIL 2008)	52
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN THE KARAMAJONG AFFECTED AREA	52
COMPLEX CAUSES OF CONFLICT RESULT IN DISPLACEMENT WITHIN KARAMOJA (AUGUST 2005)	52

INTER AND EXTRA COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AMONG THE KARAMAJONG (JULY 2005)	54
HISTORICAL COMPLICITY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND KARAMAJONG WARRIORS (JUNE 2005)	56
COMPETITION FOR NATURAL RESOURCES (DECEMBER 2001)	56
THE ROLE OF SMALL ARMS IN KARAMOJA (2000)	57
ADF-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT	58
THE THREAT FROM ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES REDUCED (2003)	58
DISPLACEMENTS RELATED TO THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) IN THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST (1998-2003)	60
BACKGROUND OF THE ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC FORCES, 1996-1999	62
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN WEST NILE	63
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN THE WEST NILE AND THE WNBF, 1971-2002	63
<u>POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE</u>	67
GLOBAL FIGURES	67
1.17 MILLION IDPS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (APRIL 2008)	67
ESTIMATED 25,000 CHILDREN ABDUCTED SINCE THE START OF THE LRA CONFLICT (APRIL 2006)	69
GENERAL	69
<u>PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT</u>	70
GENERAL	70
SLOW RETURN PROCESS IN THE ACHOLI REGION (FEB 2008)	70
NO OFFICIAL IDP CAMPS LEFT IN LIRA, BUT THOUSANDS OF IDPS REMAIN IN FORMER CAMPS (MARCH 2008)	70
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT IN KARAMOJA	71
SHIFTING POPULATION PATTERNS IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	71
<u>PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT</u>	72
PHYSICAL SECURITY IN THE ACHOLI REGION	72
SECURITY SITUATION CALM; CRIME IS BIGGEST SECURITY THREAT (MARCH 2008)	72
EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE HAMPERED BY LACK OF TRAINING AND RESOURCES (FEB 2008)	72
KARAMOJONG ATTACKS IN KITGUM, PADER, LIRA (MARCH 2008)	73
DELAYS TO DEMINING PROGRAMME (MARCH 2008)	73
PHYSICAL SECURITY IN KARAMOJA	73
DISARMAMENT OPERATIONS CONTINUE; 67 KARAMOJONG INCIDENTS IN ONE MONTH (MARCH 2008)	73
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (SGBV)	74
INCREASE IN GBV CASES AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (MARCH 2008)	74
LACK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR FEMALE VICTIMS OF SGBV (NOVEMBER 2007)	74
CASES OF DEFILEMENT ON THE INCREASE IN PADER (MARCH 2008)	75
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	76
IN ACHOLI DISTRICTS, SOME IDPS ARE UNDER PRESSURE FROM LANDLORDS TO LEAVE THE CAMPS (FEB 2008)	76

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS **77**

FOOD	77
PERSONS WITH SPECIFIC NEEDS AT RISK OF MISSING OUT ON FOOD RATIONS (FEBRUARY 2008)	77
PARISH-LEVEL GENERAL FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS ARE EXPANDING (MARCH 2008)	77
RETURN MOVEMENTS CALL FOR DIFFERENT APPROACH TO MALNUTRITION (DECEMBER 2007)	77
SEASONAL CALENDER FOR HARVESTS AND HUNGER SEASON (NOV 2007 - NOV 2008)	78
WIDESPREAD FOOD INSECURITY IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	79
HEALTH	80
LACK OF RESOURCES HAMPERS THE PROVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES IN NORTHERN UGANDA (MARCH 2008)	80
POOR SANITATION IN IDP CAMPS LEADS TO HEPATITIS E EPIDEMIC IN KITGUM (FEBRUARY 2008)	81
HEALTH SERVICES AND PSYCHOSOCIAL CARE FOR FORMERLY ABDUCTED YOUTH IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE (NOV 2007)	81
INADEQUATE HEALTH SERVICES IN NABWAL RESETTLEMENT CAMP IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	81
WATER AND SANITATION	82
AVERAGE ACCESS TO SAFE WATER IMPROVING; SITUATION IN RETURN SITES STILL CRITICAL (MARCH 2008)	82
LOW ACCESS TO SAFE WATER AND SANITATION IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	82
SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS	83

ACCESS TO EDUCATION **84**

GENERAL	84
ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN THE ACHOLI REGION	84
SCHOOLS ARE RETURNING TO THEIR ORIGINAL SITES, BUT LACK OF FACILITIES REMAINS A CHALLENGE (MARCH 2008)	84
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND IN IDP CAMPS BECAUSE OF LACK OF SCHOOLS IN RETURN AREAS FORM MAJOR PROTECTION CONCERN (FEBRUARY 2008)	85
RETURNING SCHOOLS IN PADER FACE SHORTAGE OF CLASSROOMS AND WATER	86
ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN LANGO	86
EFFORTS ARE MADE TO INCREASE ENROLMENT AND ATTENDANCE; END OF SCHOOL FEEDING PROGRAMME MAY HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT (FEB 2008)	86
ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN KARAMOJA	87
ENROLLMENT CAMPAIGN IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	87

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION **88**

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	88
SELF-RELIANCE	88
SHIFT TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS (MARCH 2008)	88

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP **89**

GENERAL	89
----------------	-----------

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE	90
---	-----------

GENERAL	90
----------------	-----------

A SOCIETY VERGING ON BREAKDOWN (SEPTEMBER 2007)	90
---	----

WEAK FAMILY STRUCTURES AND VULNERABILITY OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN CONTINUE TO PRESENT OBSTACLES (NOVEMBER 2006)	90
--	----

TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PRACTICES SEVERLY RESTRICTED BY CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT (SEPTEMBER 2005)	91
---	----

DISPLACEMENT ERODES SOCIAL TIES (JULY 2005)	92
---	----

MANY ABDUCTED WOMEN AND GIRLS FIND IT HARD TO ADJUST TO THE LIFE BACK HOME (JULY 2003)	93
--	----

FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS DISADVANTAGED DURING RESETTLEMENT (2002)	93
---	----

CONFLICT AFFECTED AREAS IN NORTHERN UGANDA SUFFER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BREAKDOWN (2002)	96
--	----

DIVERGING PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER ROLES AMONG IDPs IN THE CAMPS (2002)	98
--	----

YOUTH	98
--------------	-----------

NEW SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE OF MALE YOUTH IN IDP CAMPS (SEPTEMBER 2006)	98
--	----

INTERNALLY-DISPLACED YOUTH A VULNERABLE CATEGORY (OCTOBER 2005)	100
---	-----

ELDERLY PEOPLE	102
-----------------------	------------

MANY ELDERLY PEOPLE WERE SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES DURING DISPLACEMENT (OCT 2007)	102
---	-----

KARAMOJA	102
-----------------	------------

UNCERTAIN COPING MECHANISMS MAKE CHILDREN AND WOMEN MOVE IN SEARCH OF FOOD AND LABOUR IN KARAMOJA (NOVEMBER 2006)	102
---	-----

WOMEN AND CHILDREN AFFECTED BY CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA (AUGUST 2005)	103
---	-----

PROPERTY ISSUES	105
------------------------	------------

GENERAL	105
----------------	------------

ASSETS OF IDP HOUSEHOLDS (DECEMBER 2007)	105
--	-----

LAND	105
-------------	------------

LAND AS A PREREQUISITE FOR RETURN (DECEMBER 2007)	105
---	-----

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT	108
--	------------

GENERAL	108
----------------	------------

RETURNS IN ACHOLI DISTRICTS STILL SLOW (MARCH 2008)	108
---	-----

SECURITY IMPROVES, BUT FEAR OF LANDMINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE HAMPERS RETURN (FEB 2008)	109
--	-----

MAJOR CHALLENGES IN RETURN AREAS (MARCH 2008)	109
---	-----

FOR THE ELDERLY, LACK OF SHELTER IS MAJOR OBSTACLE TO RETURN (OCT 2007)	110
---	-----

DISABLED PEOPLE STUCK IN CAMPS (APRIL 2008)	110
---	-----

RETURN AND REINTEGRATION	110
---------------------------------	------------

RETURN OPENS CONFLICTS OVER LAND (DECEMBER 2004)	110
--	-----

PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTANCE FACED BY FORMERLY ABDUCTED CHILDREN (NOVEMBER 2007)	111
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS	113
GENERAL	113
NO OBSTACLES TO HUMANITARIAN ACCESS (FEB 2008)	113
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN KARAMOJA	113
OCHA OPENS SECOND FIELD OFFICE IN KARAMOJA (MARCH 2008)	113
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES	114
NATIONAL RESPONSE	114
OVERVIEW: NATIONAL RESPONSE (APRIL 2008)	114
PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (SEPTEMBER 2007)	114
NATIONAL RESPONSE: IDP POLICY (OCTOBER 2005)	115
THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER ISSUES NEW RESPONSE PLAN TO ADDRESS KARAMOJA SITUATION (JANUARY 2007)	116
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	117
OVERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (APRIL 2008)	117
THE CLUSTER APPROACH IN UGANDA (DECEMBER 2007)	118
INCREASED ATTENTION ON KARAMOJA HAS YET TO LEAD TO TANGIBLE RESULTS (APRIL 2008)	119
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT	120
ANALYSING THE "PROTECTED VILLAGES" IN REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (MARCH 2002)	120
LIST OF SOURCES USED	123

OVERVIEW

Uncertain future for IDPs while peace remains elusive

With the peace process plagued by delays and confusion, and with conditions in return areas often worse than in the IDP camps, the future for IDPs in northern Uganda remains uncertain.

In August 2006 the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA), which led to significant improvements in the security situation in northern Uganda. After many delays, progress in the peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army in early 2008 gave rise to cautious optimism that an end to the conflict in northern Uganda might finally be on the horizon after 22 years of war. However, the process stalled again when on 10 April 2008 Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, at the last moment failed to sign a Final Peace Agreement. The CHA has not been renewed and has now expired.

Since the signing of the CHA, about half of the more than 1.8 million people who had been internally displaced by the conflict have returned to their homes or have moved to transit sites nearer to their homes. However, many IDPs are reluctant to go home in the absence of a final peace agreement. Moreover, a significant number of IDPs who live in camps or transit sites close to their land might not intend to move back onto their land, preferring to live in communities near basic services such as schools and clinics.

Lack of access to basic services and security guarantees form a major obstacle to the return process. Concerns about an increase in crime, and the insufficient capacity of the police and the judicial system to respond, also impedes the return process, as do concerns about land-mines and other unexploded ordnance. In areas neighbouring Karamoja, fears of attacks by Karamojong warriors further add to IDPs' considerations for staying in the camps.

Humanitarian conditions in the IDP camps remain very poor, while conditions in some transit sites are even worse, with very little access to clean water and sanitation. There is an urgent need for early recovery, development and institutional capacity-building to be scaled up in the north. The long-awaited launch of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) in October 2007 represented a first step, but there are still significant uncertainties about its implementation which is planned to start on 1 July 2008.

Meanwhile, the crisis in the north-eastern Karamoja region continues unabated. Forced disarmament operations have led to intense clashes between Karamojong warriors and the Ugandan army, resulting in displacement in and near the region.

Background: war and displacement in northern Uganda

The current conflict in northern Uganda began in 1986 and ultimately caused the displacement of an estimated 1.8 million people. The history of antagonism and political distrust between the Acholi people of northern Uganda and southern-based elites contributed to the forming of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 1987, after the January 1986 overthrow of President Tito Okello, an ethnic Acholi, by the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by current President Yoweri Museveni (LIU, 30 October 2003, p.33; RLP, February 2004, p.5; CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, p. 28). The LRA was initially a popular uprising known as the Holy Spirit Movement. Since 1988 it has been led by Joseph Kony, and has fought a low-level guerrilla war in an ostensible effort to overthrow Museveni's government, rebuild the Acholi nation and culture and purportedly ensure

that Uganda is ruled in accordance with the biblical ten commandments (CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, p.28).

Over the course of the conflict, the LRA has carried out a multitude of atrocities against the civilian population, including abduction, rape, torture and forced conscription. LRA crimes have been classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. In July 2005 the court issued arrest warrants for five top LRA leaders (ICC, 14 October 2005), one of whom has since been killed by the army, while two others are reported to have been killed in LRA infighting (BBC, 21 December 2007; BBC, 23 January 2008; The Monitor, 14 April 2008).

Prior to 1996, some people in the Acholi region fled their villages as a direct result of LRA attacks, mainly in the districts of Kitgum and Pader (W. Weeks, March 2002, p.2). But the main cause of the large-scale displacement in northern Uganda was the government's decision in 1996 to force civilians into "protected villages" (RLP, February 2004, p.25; CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, p.6; CSOPNU, 31 December 2004, p.1; HRW, September 2005, p.10). As rebel activity increased, the Ugandan government sought to separate civilians from the rebels in order to reduce the LRA's ability to benefit from suspected civilian collaborators and to clear the territory for military operations (CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, p.6).

In October 2002 the displacement crisis worsened when the Ugandan army, in the course of a large-scale offensive entitled "Operation Iron Fist", ordered all civilians remaining in "abandoned villages" to move to government camps within 48 hours. With the consent of the Sudanese government, the Ugandan army targeted the LRA's rear bases in southern Sudan. The rebels responded by returning to northern Uganda where they carried out an increasing number of abductions, kill-ings and lootings. The IDP population grew from 500,000 in early 2002 to almost 800,000 by the end of the year (HRW, September 2005, p.9). During this period, the area affected by displacement expanded as the LRA moved eastwards into the Lango and Teso regions of eastern Uganda. In March 2004, after the failure of Operation Iron Fist, the Ugandan army, with renewed support from the Sudanese government, launched "Operation Iron Fist II".

The policy of forced encampment dramatically increased people's vulnerability. The LRA succeeded repeatedly in attacking IDP camps despite the deployment of the army to protect them. The lack of protection and the almost total lack of government assistance to IDPs constituted a failure of the state to protect those living in the north from physical harm and human rights abuses (ODI, December 2006, p.5). The failure of the policy and the appalling humanitarian conditions in the camps also further entrenched the Acholi people's sense of political and social marginalisation (CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, p.2; RLP, February 2004, p.25).

Peace between the government and the LRA?

Peace talks between the government and the LRA began in the southern Sudanese town of Juba in July 2006, marking the third attempt to negotiate a peace agreement since 1994. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a landmark Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA), which resulted in substantial improvements in the security conditions and in humanitarian access.

The signing of the CHA paved the way for continuing negotiations, and despite repeated walk-outs and delays, the parties signed agreements on comprehensive solutions to the conflict (2 May 2007), and on reconciliation and accountability (29 June 2007) (ICG, 14 September 2007, p.1). In February 2008, five further agreements were signed in rapid succession: an annexe on the implementation of the accountability and reconciliation agreement; an annexe on the implementation of comprehensive solutions; a permanent ceasefire; an agreement on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and an agreement on implementation and monitoring mechanisms.

Kony had been expected to sign a final peace agreement on 10 April in Ri-Kwangba in Southern Sudan, with President Museveni signing the agreement in Juba on 15 April. However, Kony failed to appear, and was said to have asked for further clarifications about the provisions of the annexe on the implementation of the accountability and reconciliation agreement (BBC, 11 April 2008; Mail and Guardian, 12 April 2008, The Monitor, 14 April 2008). This annexe provides for the creation of a special branch of the High Court to try rebels for serious crimes, while lesser crimes will be dealt with by traditional justice mechanisms as part of a broader reconciliation process.

Kony's failure to sign the peace agreement created uncertainty about the state of the peace process. The CHA expired on 16 April: the government has not extended it and Museveni has hinted instead that his forces could resume operations against the LRA (Reuters, 19 April 2008). Even if Kony ultimately signs the peace agreement, disarmament and accountability are likely to remain challenges.

Indeed, in early 2008, many of Kony's men were reported by Sudanese officials to have moved to the Central African Re-public (CAR), fuelling speculation that the LRA may have forged links with Sudan-backed rebels there (Reuters, 2 April 2008) and concerns that the Sudanese government might have an interest in ensuring that the LRA survives as a potential proxy militia in Southern Sudan should the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the southern Sudanese collapse (ICG, 14 September 2007, p.6). In April 2008, LRA strength was reported to be 1,200 fighters, almost half of which were civilians from CAR, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo who had been newly abducted in the preceding three months (The Monitor, 14 April 2008; Reuters, 22 April 2008; The Monitor, 22 April; Voice of America, 23 April 2008).

Background: crisis and displacement in Karamoja

The north-eastern region of Karamoja continues to suffer from violence, mainly related to cattle-rustling by semi-nomadic pastoralist Karamojong warriors. Traditionally, clans fought each other with spears, sticks, bows and arrows, but in the post-colonial period these traditional weapons have been replaced with more lethal small arms. Inter-clan fighting is still rampant, but the violence has increasingly been directed at clans living across the border in Kenya, as well as against the Ugandan army, local defence units and civilians in the Teso region (GoU, 15 June 2005; UHRC, September 2004). The violence in Karamoja is rooted in a history of colonial and post-colonial neglect, shrinking access to pasture and grazing land for cattle, and successive years of drought. Commercialisation of cattle-rustling has further fuelled incentives to carry out raids. The result is a cycle of violence in which victims of the raids, particularly rival Karamojong clans, acquire weapons to protect themselves and retaliate against attacking clans.

In May 2006 President Museveni directed the Ugandan army to begin "cordon and search" disarmament operations, in which the army uses tanks and helicopter gunships, surrounds villages and searches for weapons (GoU, January 2007, p.12; OHCHR, 24 November 2006, p.3; IRIN, 13 November 2006). The operations are characterised by excessive use of force by the Ugandan army, and widespread human rights abuses including killings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and looting and destruction of property (OCHA, 7 November 2006; OHCHR, 24 November 2006; HRW, September 2007, pp.36-66; OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.2). Although noticeable improvements were made in the middle part of 2007, the situation has deteriorated again since then. In February 2008, the army carried out eight disarmament operations, in which five people were reported to have been killed (OHCHR, 3 September 2007; IDMC, 15 November 2007; OCHA, 29 February 2008).

Karamoja has the worst humanitarian and development indicators in the country, including the lowest primary school enrolment, highest maternal and infant mortality and the lowest life

expectancy in all of Uganda. The continuing inadequacy of government services, such as social, medical and judicial institutions, has contributed to an overall breakdown in the rule of law and the flight of women and children in search of food and employment. Such movements have increased vulnerabilities and contributed to a protection crisis (OHCHR, 24 November 2006; OCHA, 30 November 2006, p.1, and 10 December 2007, p.2, and 31 March 2008, p.5; OCHA and OPM, 18 April 2008).

While the disarmament campaign has disrupted traditional movement patterns and has caused displacement within Karamoja, there are no accurate estimates of the number of people displaced, and it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish the forced displacement from the ordinary movement patterns of the semi-nomadic Karamojong. Nevertheless, a representative of the international humanitarian community in Uganda has estimated that about 30 per cent of all displacement in Karamoja is related to the ongoing disarmament campaign (IDMC, 12 November 2007).

Observers do not believe that the army's disarmament operations, and the extensive presence of the army in Karamoja, can ultimately succeed in restoring law and order in the region, or in reducing the demand for weapons. Instead, security can only be restored by means of an integrated development plan to bring Karamoja up to the same economic and development levels as the rest of the country (IDMC, 12 November 2007; OCHA and OPM, 18 April 2008). The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) has now been absorbed into the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) (Government of Uganda, September 2007). However, while there is substantial donor support for the PRDP in general, donors are reluctant to contribute to the KIDDP, because it conditions development on the continuation of disarmament operations which have regularly led to human rights abuses (IDMC, 12 November 2007).

Background and causes of displacement in the Teso region

As noted above, following Operation Iron Fist in 2002, LRA-induced displacement spread to the Teso region of eastern Uganda. By 2008 this had largely come to an end, but there was still large-scale displacement in the region as a result of high levels of insecurity caused by Karamojong raids, particularly in the Teso districts of Amuria and Katakwi which border Karamoja. Over 110,000 IDPs remained in camps in Katakwi and Amuria districts at the end of 2007; fewer than half of them are expected to return to their places of origin in 2008 (OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.1).

Physical security of IDPs in northern Uganda

The general security situation in northern Uganda has much improved since the start of the Juba peace talks, although there are still occasional reports of confrontation between the army and remnants of the LRA (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.1). Some parts of the Acholi and Teso regions continue to be affected by Karamojong incursions, in particular cattle raids in eastern Kitgum and Pader (Acholiland) (UNDP, December 2007, p.6; OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.1, and 31 March 2008, p.1), and parts of Katakwi district in Teso (OCHA, 30 November 2007, p.1). Nonetheless the changing environment in northern Uganda calls for a further scaling down of the military presence and an increase in police deployment.

Crime now poses the gravest threat to security in northern Uganda (OCHA, 30 Nov 2007, p.1, and 31 March 2008, p.1; Daily Monitor, 11 December 2007). There is a shortage of properly trained and qualified police officers. In late 2006, 600 Special Police Constables (SPCs) were recruited in Gulu and Amuru district in an effort to improve enforcement of the rule of law (OCHA, 7 January 2007, p.9; OCHA, 30 November 2006, p.6). Although they were not properly vetted and did not receive the same training as ordinary police officers, they have the same powers to

investigate, arrest and interrogate suspects. As a consequence, in some cases the SPCs have themselves become part of the problem, instead of contributing to the restoration of the rule of law in northern Uganda. SPCs require further training on the Code of Conduct and the protection of civilians. The effectiveness of the SPCs is further undermined by delays in payment of their wages (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.5). There are similar problems with the Anti-Theft Stock Units (ATSUs) deployed to guard against Karamojong raids (OCHA, 30 November 2007, p.5; IDMC, 13 November 2007; OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.5).

A further threat to physical security is posed by unexploded ordnance (OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.13; OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.1). The demining team deployed by the government is too small to respond to all reports of unexploded ordnance. The risk is greater in the dry season, when people move greater distances. There is a need for levels of awareness to be raised, because not everyone is able to identify and recognise unexploded ordnance (IDMC, 12 November 2007). For IDP women, who spend a significant proportion of their time collecting firewood, landmines and other unexploded ordnance constitute a particular risk (UNDP, December 2007, p.24)

The overall impact of the conflict on children in northern Uganda has been especially acute. The LRA largely consists of abducted children who have been forced to become child soldiers or sex slaves to commanding officers. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1986, an estimated 25,000 children have been abducted; 7,500 are girls with 1,000 having conceived children during captivity (UNICEF, January 2007). The LRA has thus far resisted international calls to release all the women and children it currently holds (ICG, 14 September 2007, p.6; UNICEF, 16 April 2008, p.2).

Humanitarian situation of IDPs

All IDP camps in northern and eastern Uganda are accessible without military escort; only the World Food Programme (WFP) continues to use light military escorts for its food convoys (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.1). The civilian population is moving about freely, apart from some areas of Lamwo county in Kitgum, where officials are refusing to allow movement for security reasons (IDMC, 14 March 2008).

The humanitarian conditions in IDPs camps continue to be poor, with a lack of adequate access to health care, shelter, water, and sanitation facilities. Nevertheless, the conditions in the IDP camps compare favourably with conditions in the transit sites, which are generally worse. For example, by November 2007 access to drinking water was below the SPHERE Project's recommended standard of 15 litres per person per day in transit sites in Kitgum, Lira, Oyam, and Pader districts, although ongoing work in the transit areas was beginning to produce improvements. Sanitation in the transit sites is cause for even greater concern, with ratios of between 50 and 70 persons per latrine stance in transit areas in Gulu, Amuru, Lira, and Oyam, as compared to the SPHERE standard of no more than 20 persons per latrine stance (OCHA, 30 November 2007, p.6).

Although access to land and production is gradually increasing as a result of the improved security situation, most IDPs are still far from their full potential in terms of the production of sufficient amounts of food for their own consumption (FEWS Net, February 2008, p.2). Many IDPs continue to be dependent on WFP for the bulk of their food needs. As of March 2008, 13 per cent of WFP's caseload were considered to be extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs), for whom food rations were set at 98 per cent of the recommended daily allowance (RDA). Of the remaining caseload, ten per cent received 60 per cent of their RDA, 50 per cent received half their RDA and the remaining 27 per cent 40 per cent of the daily allowance (email communication from WFP to IDMC, 20 March 2008).

There has been a significant reduction in the global acute malnutrition rates in northern Uganda; they are currently below five per cent in all Acholi districts except Kitgum. However, a reversal in the trend is being observed in Lira (and to some extent in Pader), which may be because in the return process spearheaded there, returnees' needs were not sufficiently anticipated. This should be seen as a warning sign and appropriate action must be taken to assist returnees in their places of return (Uganda Health, Nutrition, and HIV/AIDS Cluster, December 2007, p.4; WFP, 25 January 2008, p.7).

Meanwhile, the malnutrition rate in Karamoja has doubled between 2005 and 2007 from 5-10 per cent to more than 15 per cent, above the emergency threshold (Uganda Health, Nutrition and HIV/AIDS Cluster, December 2007, p.5). Only eight per cent of the population in Karamoja is deemed to be food secure, 14 per cent is chronically food insecure, 55 per cent is facing an acute food and livelihood crisis, and 22 per cent faces a humanitarian emergency (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.3). In the three northern districts of Karamoja (Kaabong, Kotido and Abim), less than three per cent of the population has access to sanitation facilities, while across all of Karamoja less than 50 per cent of the population has access to safe drinking water (OCHA and OPM, 18 April 2008).

Obstacles to return

The start of the Juba peace talks and the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in August 2006 led to a noticeable improvement in the security situation in northern Uganda. Nevertheless, the uncertain outcome of the peace talks continued to cause widespread concern amongst the displaced population, and few displaced people in Acholiland were willing to return to their villages of origin until there was a signed peace agreement. Indeed, many IDPs are planning to wait for some time after the signing to see if the peace holds before returning home (UNDP, December 2007, p.38).

As of February 2008 only 102,000 displaced people in Acholiland (nine per cent) had returned home, while 649,000 people (59 per cent) remained in IDP camps and 352,000 people (32 per cent) had moved to so-called transit sites closer to their land (IASC, April 2008). Some people who stay in transit sites access their land during the day for cultivation, but return to the transit sites at night.

The situation in Teso is comparable to the Acholi region, with 36,000 people (29 per cent) back in their home villages, 76,000 people (61 per cent) still in camps, and 21,000 (17 per cent) in transit sites. In Lango, on the other hand, the last remaining IDP camp has been de-gazetted, and officially there are no more IDPs. However, thousands of people remain in former IDP camps, including 669 people who are considered extremely vulnerable (IASC, April 2008; OCHA, 31 March 2008, p.2).

IDPs have to take account of many factors besides the security situation in deciding whether to leave the camps. Landmines and unexploded ordnance present an obstacle to the returns process, as does the lack of thatching grass without which people cannot complete their homes in the return areas (OCHA, 29 February 2008, pp.1-2).

Services in return areas are very limited, and most returnees have to travel considerable distances to access health care, education and water. In Lira, where almost all displaced people have now returned home, a survey conducted by Action Against Hunger (ACF) suggested that the mortality rate in the return areas there is in fact higher than in the Acholi districts, where most people are still in camps. This represents a grave warning about the impact of the desperate lack of basic social services in return areas (OCHA, 17 July 2007, p.1; UNHCR, August 2007, p.7; Monitor, 8 March 2008).

Asked what needs to be in place before they can return to their homes, displaced people in northern Uganda cite basic social services such as health centres, bore-holes, and primary schools as most important, but also frequently cite the need for roads (UNDP, December 2007, p.36).

Schools in the return areas struggle with a lack of facilities, including housing for teachers, classroom facilities, latrines, and water points. A lack of qualified teachers and absenteeism among teachers further adds to the reluctance of students to return to pre-displacement locations (OCHA, 29 February 2008, pp.2-3). In Lira and Oyam districts in Lango, the school feeding programme currently benefiting 114 schools is likely to end in 2008, raising fears about a possible increase in drop-out rates (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.3).

Durable solutions

After having lived in the camps for many years, returnees return with almost nothing. They have to rebuild their homes and clear their land for planting, and few have alternative livelihood strategies. They will thus continue to depend on humanitarian assistance for the foreseeable future. IDPs have expressed concern that food aid in the camps will be halted after the signing of a peace agreement between the LRA and the government. This would leave them with the choice of staying in the camps and risking starvation, or re-turning to insecure homes (UNDP, December 2007, pp.2, 23, 38). The WFP announced in March that it would stop providing food to 600,000 former IDPs in Lango and Teso (New Vision, 16 March 2008).

The decision to leave the camps is not always made from a position of strength; some early returnees are people with the most desperate living conditions in the camps, who have stronger "push" factors driving them out (UNDP, December 2007, pp.13, 21, 23, 39). The evidence is that households with more resources are less likely to leave the camps and more likely to be able to rent land near the camps, and provide for their own needs while remaining in the camps until they have sufficient confidence to return to their original homes. Close attention must thus be paid to the humanitarian assistance needs of those who have moved out of the camps (UNHCR, August 2007, p.7; UNDP, December 2007, p.52).

With the increasing number of IDPs who are returning to their land, or who are accessing it from transit sites, the number of land disputes is on the rise (UNDP, December 2007, pp.31, 43-44; World Bank, February 2008, p.ii). Because of the length of displacement in northern Uganda, not all returnees are able to recall the exact boundaries of their land. Some returnees, including orphans who grew up in the camps, do not know at all where their family's land is. Some early returnees take advantage of the fact that their former neighbours have not yet returned by moving the boundaries. This is a threat to female-headed households in Acholiland, since they are less likely than other households to be among the early returnees. In northern Uganda, 23 per cent of household heads are women (UNDP, December 2007, pp.12, 50).

Some widowed women are faced with attempts by their in-laws to deny them access to their deceased husbands' land; this is a particular concern in light of the fact that 18 per cent of women in the north between the ages of 30 and 49 are widows, twice as many as in the rest of Uganda (UNDP, December 2007, p.12). At the same time, care must be taken not to generalise and treat all widows and all orphans as vulnerable individuals: vulnerability in these cases is determined above all by whether these individuals have good relationships with their relatives and their clans (HURIFO, September 2007, pp.34-38).

The returns process is generating new protection concerns, in particular in relation to children. Scarcity of services in return areas has led to voluntary family separation, leaving thousands of children in camps without care-givers and at heightened risk of neglect, abuse and exploitation, including sexual violence and dropping out of school (OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.34).

There are concerns that the voluntary nature of the returns process may be compromised in some cases. Some owners of land on which the camps are situated put pressure on IDPs to leave the camps, and forced evictions have been reported, for example in Koro (Gulu district). In Atiak (Amuru district) the local authorities initiated evictions of IDPs on the grounds that land was needed for staff houses (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.5). In Kit-gum district local leaders are reported to have used radio programmes to instruct people to return homes by specific dates, and they have claimed that children can only be registered for school in their places of origin (IDMC, 14 March 2008).

There is, at the moment, some degree of uncertainty about the final return patterns. Uganda's National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons gives IDPs the right not to be forcibly returned, and to choose freely whether to return or to settle in another part of the country (Office of the Prime Minister, August 2004, section 3.4). It is possible that significant numbers of displaced people will prefer not to move all the way back to their own land, but to live in communities near services such as health clinics and schools, as long as they are close enough to their land to access it on a daily basis. Given that 46 per cent of the displaced people in northern Uganda currently reside in camps that are less than three kilometres from their land, a significant proportion may have no desire to leave them (OCHA, 31 August 2007, p.5). This points to the need for at least some camps and transit sites to be turned into viable communities. Guidelines are currently being prepared for the camp phase-out process, setting out conditions under which IDP camps can be closed down (OCHA, 31 March 2008, p.2).

The population of northern Uganda is young, with a median age of 14 years old for women and 13 years for men. Many of them have no memories or experience of rural life, and have grown used to living in population centres with relatively easy access to services. If no adequate provision is made for these young people, groups of them may drift back to those camps that will continue to exist as trading centres, or to towns such as Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader. One consequence could be rapidly increasing levels of crime and a new and deteriorating security situation, as returnees become the victims of alienated youth gangs (UNDP, December 2007, pp.6, 47-48).

Extremely vulnerable individuals, such as the elderly and disabled people, might not be able to return to their home areas, for example because they would not be able to rebuild their original homes or provide for themselves in their home areas. A study by the Ministry of Health showed that a disproportionate number of elderly and disabled people were stuck in the camps (The New Vision, 15 April 2008). UN agencies and NGOs are implementing programmes to assist people in this situation.

National response

On 15 October 2007 the government launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda, including Acholi, Lango, Teso, West Nile, Karamoja, and Elgon. The PRDP is a comprehensive development framework aimed at improving socio-economic indicators in those areas affected by conflict and a serious break-down in law and order and bringing them into line with national standards. The PRDP replaces the Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP) and its Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). The targets and objectives in the PRDP are to contribute to the national goals of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of 2004. The PRDP has four strategic objectives: consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, revitalisation of the economy, and peace building and reconciliation. The total estimated cost of the PRDP is \$606 million over a three-year period (Government of Uganda, September 2007, pp.vi-ix).

When implemented, the PRDP will be an important step on the path to addressing the perceived neglect and marginalisation that lie at the root of the conflict in north-ern Uganda. However, its implementation will be a significant challenge. The PRDP does not specify how its objectives are to be realised. Proper benchmarks to measure progress in implementing it will be crucial, as will further elucidation of the relation between the PRDP and the Consolidated Appeals Process (IDMC, 15 November 2007).

Finally, the Refugee Law Project in Kampala has raised concerns that while provisions are made for assistance for the returns process for IDPs who have been living in camps for the duration of the conflict in northern Uganda, no such provision has been made for the estimated 300,000 to 600,000 urban IDPs in the country (RLP, December 2007 and March 2008; The Monitor, 12 December 2007 and 17 December 2007).

International humanitarian response

After the then UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, Jan Egeland, in November 2003 described the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda as the “biggest forgot-ten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today”, the international hu-manitarian response improved signifi-cantly. The 2007 Consolidated Appeal for Uganda was 71 per cent funded. Nev-ertheless, according to a UNHCR report, “It is evident that the humanitarian effort continues to fall well short of what is re-quired for minimum standards to be met. Moreover, the provision of essential goods and services to different IDP popu-lations appears to be somewhat arbitrary in nature” (UNHCR, August 2007, p.10).

Moreover, there are serious concerns about funding for the Consolidated Ap-peal for 2008. The appeal totals \$374 million, compared to the revised total of \$346 million for 2007 (OCHA, 10 De-cember 2007, pp.108-110). On 29 Janu-ary 2008 UNHCR launched a Supplementary Appeal for \$15.4 million for protection and assistance to IDPs in northern Uganda (UNHCR, 24 January 2008). By the end of March 2008, only 17 per cent of the Consolidated Appeal had been funded, leading to warnings that programmes supporting the transition from humanitarian to recovery operations were at risk, as well as ongoing emer-gency projects aimed at addressing hu-manitarian needs (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.6, and 31 March 2008, p.6).

The situation in northern Uganda pre-sents a triple challenge, with humanitar-ian needs co-existing with urgent requirements in terms of early recovery and development. According to UNHCR, the uncertainties surrounding the peace process, combined with the almost total lack of infrastructure and services in the return sites, means that it is “incumbent upon the humanitarian community to ac-knowledge the profound problems that continue to affect northern Uganda, to be wary of overemphasizing the progress and impact of the peace process, and to recognize that a strategy based on the as-sumption of full and speedy return to home sites will be neither appropriate nor effective” (UNHCR, August 2007, p.8).

Uganda was one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the “cluster ap-proach”. The cluster approach, which is part of the broader humanitarian reform process, aims to increase the accountabil-ity and predictability of the overall hu-manitarian response through assigning UN agencies responsibilities for certain sectors, or clusters. The cluster approach has indeed resulted in a more coherent and consistent policy response from the UN and humanitarian community in Uganda, and in improved coordination, service delivery, and protection of IDPs and returnees. However, there is still in-sufficient recognition of the fact that if it is to be successful, the clusters must adopt a participatory approach, and must respect and reflect the priorities set by communities as well as by local and na-tional government bodies (UNHCR, Au-gust 2007, p.4; NRC, December 2007).

With the ongoing peace talks and the resulting improvement in the security situation in northern Uganda, early recovery programming has assumed a vital importance. However, coordination and leadership on early recovery issues are currently lagging behind developments on the ground. Thus according to UNHCR, "while the Cluster Approach was intended to reinforce the accountability and predictability of the humanitarian system, the low level of activity demonstrated by the Early Recovery Cluster ... suggest[s] that these objectives have not been met" (UNHCR, August 2007, p.11).

Under the humanitarian reform programme, responsibility for the Early Recovery Cluster lies with UNDP. However, a decision has now been taken in Uganda that early recovery activities in the fields of water and sanitation, education, and food security should remain within the purview of the relevant clusters, and the Early Recovery Cluster has been replaced with a Governance, Infrastructure, and Livelihoods (GIL) cluster. There remains nevertheless an urgent need for analysis and coordination of early recovery needs and activities across all clusters, a need which is not currently being addressed (IDMC, 14 March 2008).

Local authorities and the international community in Uganda are taking steps to implement the so-called "parish approach" in northern Uganda, which aims to facilitate the transition from the humanitarian to the recovery phase by rehabilitating priority basic service infrastructure at locations identified by district authorities in consultation with humanitarian actors and which are accessible to both IDPs in transit sites and returnees in villages of origin (OCHA, 31 March 2008, p.2).

In Karamoja, the international community is struggling to provide adequate assistance to IDPs, in part because of the difficult security situation and in part because the semi-nomadic population requires a non-conventional approach to service provision. Nevertheless, more UN agencies and international NGOs have now begun to expand their operations into Karamoja and are focusing mainly on longer-term development (IDMC, 15 November 2007).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background to the conflict in Acholiland

A Chronology of events in the northern Uganda conflict (June 2005)

IRIN, 9 June 2005:

"1986

- Remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army – the national army of the government toppled in January by President Yoweri Museveni's guerrilla National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) reorganise themselves to form the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA).
- UPDA launches a bush war against the NRA, with the first significant attack in Gulu on 20 August.
- By the end of 1986, many schools and dispensaries in rural areas of northern Uganda are closed, and some roads blocked.

1987

- A self-proclaimed Acholi priestess, Alice Lakwena, mobilises uneducated youths and links up with UPDA to form the Holy Spirit Movement.

1988

- Lakwena's movement advances across northern and eastern Uganda and finally is defeated near Jinja. She flees to neighbouring Kenya.
- Remnants of the Holy Spirit Movement regroup under the command of Joseph Kony, Lakwena's nephew, in Gulu, and her father, Severino Lokoya, in Kitgum.

1989 - 1990

- Lokoya is arrested by the NRA and imprisoned.
- Joseph Kony's group starts ambushing and looting civilians and burning schools.
- An Italian priest, Fr Egidio Biscaro, is killed in a rebel ambush.

1991

- NRA launches a military campaign led by Maj Gen David Tinnyefuza. From April to August it seals off the northern districts of Apac, Lira, Gulu and Kitgum from the rest of Uganda.
- The rebels begin the practice of maiming and mutilating civilians, including cutting off lips, ears, breasts and hands.
- Tension between Sudan and Uganda increases after the Ugandan town of Moyo is bombed a number of times, reportedly by Sudanese government aircrafts, and rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) officials - including leader John Garang – are seen in Gulu and Kitgum.

1993

- Pope John Paul II visits Gulu on 6 February. A lull in rebel activities follows until August, when groups of heavily armed insurgents come from Sudan under the new name of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and launch attacks on Ugandan army units.
- Towards the end of the year, peace talks between the government and the LRA are initiated under the leadership of the minister for the pacification of the north, Betty Bigombe.

1994

- Peace talks continue until the beginning of February, when the rebels reject President Museveni's seven-day ultimatum to surrender.
- The LRA responds by launching armed attacks, especially on roads. Reportedly supported by the Sudanese government, which accuses Uganda of helping the SPLM/A, the LRA plants landmines on main roads and footpaths.

1995

- Violence escalates. In April, the LRA kills more than 200 people in Atyak.
- Uganda and Sudan cut diplomatic ties.
- In August, the LRA invades Kitgum district and carries out the first large-scale abduction of children to beef up their forces. During a retreat towards the Sudanese border they are bombed by an army helicopter, leaving dozens of rebels and abductees dead.
- The new constitution is introduced in October 1995, and the NRA is renamed the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF).
- From October, a joint offensive by the SPLM/A and UPDF dislodges the LRA from its base in Palotaka in southern Sudan. The fighting continues well inside Sudan.

1996

- Presidential and parliamentary elections are held. Over 90 percent of the Acholi people vote for opposition leader Paul Ssemogerere.
- In February the LRA makes a violent comeback, laying ambushes, planting landmines and abducting children.
- The year sees some of the worst atrocities committed by the rebels, who line up the bodies of their murdered victims along the Gulu-Kampala Road.
- Mass displacement begins and the government begins a policy of moving people into "protected villages" in Gulu – Pabbo camp for the internally displaced is opened in Gulu.
- In July, the LRA attack a refugee camp at Acholpii, in Kitgum district, killing 115 Sudanese refugees. Two elders who attempt to go on a peace mission to talk to the rebels are murdered on arrival at the venue.
- In August, the rebels kill 20 civilians in a market in Cwero.
- In October, 139 schoolgirls are abducted from St Mary's College at Aboke in Lira District. Most of them are released after the deputy headmistress, Sr Rachelle Fraser, follows the rebels and pleads for the girls, managing to get most of them released. More students are abducted from Sir Samuel Baker Secondary School in Gulu.

1997

- The new year starts with a five-day killing spree in Lamwo county and Kitgum district, with the LRA killing 400 people killed and displacing thousands more.
- Later in January, a parliamentary commission of inquiry about the war in the north passes a recommendation to pursue a military solution and not engage in peace talks with the rebels.
- In April, another joint offensive by the SPLM/A and the UPDF inside Sudan forces the LRA to move its camp further north from Aruu to Jebelein.
- Catholic, Protestant and Muslim religious leaders begin local peace initiatives.

1998

- Kitgum's assistant resident district commissioner, James Canogura, is shot dead in an ambush on the Kalongo-Kitgum Road. Thirty girls are abducted from a secondary school in Kalongo.
- The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative is formed.

1999

- Seventy LRA rebels are killed in a battle with Karimojong warriors near Morulem, Kotido.
- Rebels abduct more than 70 children and youths from Omiya Anyima, Kitgum.

- In February, rebels retreat to Sudan, and for about 10 months, there is almost complete peace. Many people attempt to leave the IDP camps to go back to their homes.
- Uganda and Sudan sign a peace accord on 8 December. The return of all abductees and the restoration of diplomatic relations are pledged.
- Uganda's parliament passes an amnesty bill that offers immunity from prosecution to rebels who denounce the rebellion and voluntarily surrender to the government.
- Hopes for peace collapse as LRA attacks Gulu at the end of December.

2000

- Rebels attack Padibe IDP camp, Kitgum district, in March, leaving 12 people dead.
- Kitgum's resident district commissioner, John Baptist Ocaya, dies after being ambushed on the Kitgum-Gulu Road in June.
- A second peace deal between Uganda and Sudan, brokered by Former US President Jimmy Carter's peace programme, the Carter Centre, is signed in September.
- A Catholic priest, Fr Raffaele di Bari, is shot dead in an ambush near his mission in Pajule on 1 October.

2001

- Presidential elections are held in March. Again, the majority of the Acholi people vote against Museveni. Twelve people, including 11 students from a catering college, are killed by the LRA near Paraa Lodge, in Masindi district in northwestern Uganda.

2002

- In March, Museveni sets up camp in Gulu to personally oversee operations against the rebels. Army commander James Kazini vows to resign if Kony is not captured or killed by 31 December.
- The LRA sets up Richard Matsanga, a.k.a. David Nyekorach, as its spokesman in London.
- In June, LRA field commander Vincent Otti sends a letter to the government seeking peace talks.

2003

- In January, a newly created presidential peace team gives the LRA hotlines on which to conduct peace talks.
- In February, Uganda says it has ended its support of the SPLM/A, and Sudan allows the Ugandan army to pursue Kony inside Sudanese territory.
- In April, the LRA abduct 290 people in Lira. In June, it launches attacks in the eastern region, hitting Katakwi and then Soroti districts, causing the displacement of thousands.

2004

- In February, nearly 30,000 people are displaced and 4,000 huts burned in Pabbo IDP camp.
- Later in February, the LRA attack Barlonyo IDP camp in Lira, killing over 200 civilians. Street protests follow the killings, with mobs hunting suspects from Acholi and demanding that Museveni resign.
- In July, the army captures Kony's training commander, Brig Kenneth Banya. He is the first high-profile rebel captured by the army since the rebellion started.
- The Uganda army claims to have the upper hand in the conflict.
- Betty Bigombe begins a fresh peace initiative in November. A government ceasefire ends unsuccessfully when the LRA refuses to sign the government's draft peace agreement.

2005

- In January, north and south Sudan sign a comprehensive peace agreement - both sides pledge to help the Ugandan government defeat Kony.
- In February, the government declares an 18-day truce to enable LRA soldiers to come out of the bush and seek amnesty. Brig Sam Kolo, LRA spokesman, becomes the highest-ranking rebel so far to surrender to the UPDF.

- In March, the LRA intensifies its attacks on civilians, killing and maiming several IDPs in Kitgum, Gulu and Pader districts.
- In May, the UN puts pressure on the government to seek a peaceful solution to the war. Bigombe says she is in regular contact with Kony and negotiations are "on course".
- In May, the UPDF kill the LRA's chief of operations, Brig Sam Okullu, near Gulu.
- In June, the rebels kill eight people in Kitgum, lining their bodies up on the road 10 km out of Kitgum town.
- In June, Museveni says Kony will benefit from the amnesty if he surrenders, in contrast to his previous statement that the LRA leadership should not be eligible for the amnesty."

History of the conflict (December 2004)

- Colonial rule followed the classic 'divide and rule' pattern
- Under the British, the North was considered a labour reserve for southern plantations, and as a source of army recruits
- Many Ugandans have come to identify themselves with their ethnic group rather than with citizenship of the Ugandan nation state
- Following Uganda's independence, power in government was progressively consolidated among politicians of northern origin
- Idi Amin, with the tacit support of the UK, US and Israeli governments toppled northern led government led by Milton Obote in 1971
- In recent times the Movement system led by Museveni has come increasingly under attack as monopolising political space, and centralising political power

CSOPNU, 10 December 2004, pp. 26-28:

"British rule in Uganda followed the classic 'divide and rule' pattern, accentuating the pre-existing ethnic divisions in the Protectorate with several large, and many smaller ethnic groups. Uganda is often conveniently divided into the 'North', dominated by Luo and Nilotics; the 'Centre' dominated by a balance of power between the Bantu-speaking Baganda and Banyoro; and the 'Southwest' dominated by the Bantu-speaking Banyakole and related groups. Under the British, the North was considered a labour reserve for southern plantations, and as a source of army recruits, and was marginalised in economic development plans, with most investment and planning favouring the Baganda region around Kampala. These ethnic and regional divisions laid down by the British sowed the seeds for a series of national crises since independence, in that many Ugandans have come to identify themselves with their ethnic group rather than with citizenship of the Ugandan nation state. They also served to entrench a series of damaging ethnic stereotypes (particularly relating to the Acholi as dangerous, militaristic, aggressive barbarians), which have fuelled ethnic tension and produced fear among Ugandans over the past 50 years.

Independence

Following Uganda's independence, power in government was progressively consolidated among politicians of northern origin led by Milton Obote, a Lango from Lira. Obote came to power via democratic means, leading the protestant based Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Unfortunately, during the following years, he progressively marginalised other political representation, including the Catholic Church linked Democratic Party (DP), and non-northern ethnic groups. He also built links with the USSR, and flirted with Marxism, a move which was to prove his downfall when in 1971 he was toppled by his army chief Idi Amin, with the tacit support of the UK, US and Israeli governments.

Initially, Amin was content to implement policies suggested by his foreign backers, and to represent the interests of the Sudanic speaking peoples from his region in the North-west of Uganda. Unfortunately Amin's rule degenerated into an anarchic misrule, and in 1979, he was finally toppled by an invading army of Tanzanian "liberators". Obote, a personal ally of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, was then returned to power amid accusations of fraud and rigged elections, and true to the tradition of Ugandan politics, set about swiftly reorganizing the army, returning Langi and Acholi officers to prominent positions, as well as reorienting the government to reflect his northern constituency. The army's name was changed to the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) and it quickly embarked upon an operation of trying to quell the rebel insurgencies that had sprung up over the previous years, including that of Yoweri Museveni, the National Resistance Army (NRA). In this process, the Obote regime waged a military campaign against both rebel groups and the civilian populations that they were affiliated with, thereby wielding state terror as an instrument of war. Of particular importance was the battle fought between the UNLA and the NRA in the area of Luwero in Central Uganda.

Museveni and the Movement

The NRA was constituted mainly by soldiers from Museveni's home area of Ankole in south-western Uganda, but was supported by ethnic Tutsi soldiers from Rwanda. The Rwandan connection emerged from the close ethnic ties between the two groups along the Rwanda/Uganda border, and also from the fact that Museveni had developed a strong friendship with Paul Kagame, a Rwandan Tutsi, while the two had been resident in Dar es Salaam. Their rebellion began in the southwest, but quickly moved up into the central region and into Luwero specifically, where for the next five years a brutal war was waged between the NRA and the UNLA on territory which is home to the Buganda people.

Museveni's motivation for beginning this conflict with the government was ostensibly to challenge Obote's legitimacy following what he claimed to have been rigged elections in 1980. He also sought to redress the balance of power in Uganda, this time in favour of his own people in the southwest region of the country, and to revenge the wrongs that he felt had been visited upon Bantu Ugandans in the south and southwest during the 18 years of northern rule.

Other groups – many representing particular ethnic groups or regional interests, including a faction of Amin's army – subsequently joined this campaign, united mainly by their opposition to Obote, rather than by a common ideology. Many atrocities against civilians were committed by the armed forces at this time, particularly in the Luwero triangle, and rebels fighting to topple the government were also known to target civilians perceived to be UPC sympathisers.

In 1985, Milton Obote was toppled once again, this time by his Acholi generals, however they were unable to resist Museveni's continuing rebellion, and in January 1986, following a breach of the Nairobi peace accord, the National Resistance Army (NRA) entered Kampala and seized control.

In the years that followed, the NRA succeeded in pacifying much of the country, and large parts of Uganda have since enjoyed the fruits of stability, economic recovery and the rise of the home-grown Movement system. This system notes the sharp vertical divisions in Ugandan society through religious and ethnic difference, and assumes that political parties would inevitably become defined by allegiance to such groupings. As a result no active political parties have been allowed for most of the past 18 years, and all Ugandan citizens are said to belong to the *Movement*.

In recent times however, the Movement system has come increasingly under attack as monopolising political space, and centralising political power, while operating as a de facto political party. This has spurred agitation for the opening up of a political space in which other

parties, including the UPC and DP, might operate freely. In the lead up to the elections due in 2006 the GoU has finally permitted the establishment of political parties.

A clear failure of the Movement has been to develop a mechanism for national reconciliation. In spite of the fact that the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights published a comprehensive report on rights abuses to 1986 in report in 1994, and that the Uganda Human Rights Commission was established in the following year, few legal cases have been brought against those who have committed human rights abuses under past regimes. Approaches to human rights abuses have so far been focused only on punishment rather than on healing, and there has been no proxy for a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' as part of the process. Instead, past wrongs have generally been blamed on current members of ethnic groups associated with particular institutions.

Thus many Ugandan citizens actively believe the Acholi people to be directly responsible for the wrongs perpetrated against civilians during the Obote II regime. They believe this because of the generally held stereotype that the national army at that time was an Acholi army, even though the Langi dominated the regime. This attitude goes some way to explaining the indifference toward, or even support for the suffering that Acholis in northern Uganda currently experience. Similarly, many Acholi see their experience in a highly polarised way, and are convinced that the government and people from the West are seeking revenge against them in a systematic manner. Some Acholi even speak of other Ugandans as foreigners, and talk of a plot among other Ugandans to persecute and destroy the Acholi.

Northern Resistance and the LRA

In spite of the pacification that took place in much of the rest of Uganda, peace has not yet settled in Acholiland. Since 1986 five rebel movements have waged a low level war against the GoU in the region. In 1986, the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) began a rebellion in response to Museveni's rise to the Presidency. The UPDA was largely comprised of remnants of the defeated UNLA who were predominantly northerners, and they continued fighting against the new government until 1988 when a peace accord was brokered between them and the GoU (the Pece Accord).

While some UPDA leaders were successfully integrated into the army and into the ruling party, mutual suspicion remained between the Movement and the Acholi people, and this continued to inform relations between the GoU and the North. In late 1986, these suspicions were reflected in the appearance of a popular Acholi uprising known as the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), led by a spiritualist named Alice Lakwena. In 1986, Lakwena succeeded in building a substantial force, partly consisting of old UPDA, which had some success until it was routed in Jinja. Lakwena fled into exile, but the struggle was carried on first by her father Severino Lukoya, and since 1989 by a cousin named Joseph Kony. His Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continues to fight a low-level guerrilla war with the GoU to this day, ostensibly in a desire to overthrow President Museveni, to restore order and legitimacy to the state of Uganda, to cleanse the nation through the establishment of a government that will rule in accordance with the 'Ten Commandments'

The fiercest period of fighting in northern Uganda prior to 2002 was in the mid-1990s when many Acholi were gathered into IDP camps by the GoU and UPDF for their own 'protection'. Since that time the conflict has fluctuated on a more or less cyclical basis."

Four main characteristics of the conflict (April 2004)

- Four main characteristics of the conflict;
- 1) It is a struggle between the government and the LRA

- 2) It is a struggle between the predominantly Acholi LRA and the wider Acholi population
- 3) It is a struggle fuelled by animosity between Uganda and Sudan
- 4) The struggle continues the North-South conflict that has marked Ugandan politics and society since independence
- The LRA insurgency lacks any clear (and negotiable) political objective
- President Museveni pursues a military solution in part to justify the unreformed army that is a key pillar of his regime
- As long as the situation in the North is dominated by security matters, the monopolisation of power and wealth by Southerners is not put into question
- Without the active support of the Acholi, however, the government is unlikely ever to defeat the LRA
- A main vulnerability of the LRA is that Joseph Kony is central not only to its organisation and tactics but also to its very purpose
- Most discussion of how to end the conflict centres on the false dichotomy of a military versus a negotiated solution

ICG, 14 April, p. ii:

“The conflict has four main characteristics. First, it is a struggle between the government and the LRA. Secondly, it is between the predominantly Acholi LRA and the wider Acholi population, who bear the brunt of violence that includes indiscriminate killings and the abduction of children to become fighters, auxiliaries, and sex slaves. This violence is aimed at cowering the Acholi and discrediting the government. Thirdly, it is fuelled by animosity between Uganda and Sudan, who support rebellions on each other’s territory. Finally, the LRA insurgency lacks any clear (and negotiable) political objective. Its claim to represent the grievances of the Acholi people is at odds with its methods. Because LRA actions are difficult to place within a coherent strategy aimed at achieving an identifiable political outcome, it is also difficult to develop an effective counter strategy. LRA targeting of the Acholi has created a self-perpetuating cycle of loss, resentment and hopelessness that feeds the conflict but also widens the gap between the government and local populations.

President Museveni pursues a military solution in part to justify the unreformed army that is a key pillar of his regime. Indeed, the war helps him justify and maintain the status quo in Ugandan politics, denying his opposition a power base and offering numerous opportunities for curtailing freedom of expression and association in the name of “the war against terrorism”. As long as the situation in the North is dominated by security matters, the monopolisation of power and wealth by Southerners is not put into question.

Without the active support of the Acholi, however, the government is unlikely ever to defeat the LRA. While the political and security configurations of the conflict need to be changed, Museveni’s response to international pressure and proposals for negotiation such as Washington’s Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) has been sceptical at best. Although the LRA’s desire for genuine dialogue appears minimal, the government has rarely acted in good faith when a variety of actors have sought to promote a settlement. The small likelihood that the LRA will respond to a concerted effort to negotiate does not remove the onus from the government to make the attempt. That would signal to both its opponents and supporters – and to the people of Northern Uganda – that it is genuinely pursuing all options. The Khartoum government, the LRA’s only known external supporter, should also be drawn into a negotiating strategy.

Most discussion of how to end the conflict centres on the false dichotomy of a military versus a negotiated solution. Elements of both approaches will be required, along with recognition of the limitations of each. A purely military solution could conceivably deal with the immediate manifestation of Uganda's northern problem, the LRA, but would make solving the North-South divide and achieving national reconciliation even more unlikely. The army's operational deficiencies in any event make such a solution unlikely. Similarly, there are limitations to negotiations, which can be manipulated by the belligerents for battlefield advantage, leading to more violence.

A main vulnerability of the LRA is that Joseph Kony is central not only to its organisation and tactics but also to its very purpose. Reported leadership tensions, particularly in a deteriorating military and political environment, may provide an opportunity to split the insurgency by isolating or removing him.

Another major element of any successful strategy will have to be a genuine effort to address Northerners' grievances. The Acholi must be made to feel more a part of Ugandan society. The NRM simply has not unified the country after the turmoil created by colonial policies of ethnic division and decades of armed conflict. Rectifying this will require specific political, economic and social initiatives aimed at building the North's stake in the central government and enhancing local decision-making. It is in the interest of Acholi leaders to develop mechanisms for articulating the views of their people, and it is in the interest of Museveni and the NRM to promote the emergence of effective and credible Acholi leaders.

There is not yet enough pressure on the LRA to make a political opening possible. While Museveni's government should make an honest, unconditional attempt at negotiations, the nature of the LRA is such that creating an environment conducive to negotiations should not mean renunciation of military and political pressure on the insurgency, including by invoking the help of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Sudanese government.

The role of the international community has been central to the conflict and will be central to achieving a resolution. The government needs to be attentive to the advice of donors, from whom it receives approximately half its budget. It has a good record on a number of issues, such as AIDS prevention, which disposes the international community positively towards it, but the conflict in the North undoes much of this goodwill. Uganda's friends have an interest and a right to pressure it on the humanitarian disaster produced by the continuation of the LRA insurgency. The U.S. initiative, however, would have greater promise if Washington also worked more closely with would-be European partners."

Ethnic tension; Myth or reality? (Feb. 2004)

- Anti-Acholi sentiments have been breeding quietly, mainly in Lira district
- Over 560 people have been killed by the LRA since November 2003
- Since most LRA fighters are Acholi, many Langi find it easy to vent their anger and frustration at the whole tribe
- One politician recently urged people living in Teso sub-region to "kill all Acholi above the age of 18"
- The LRA is extremely unpopular among the Acholi
- Sense of social alienation, political isolation and economic marginalisation on the part of many people in the Acholi sub-region
- The situation has only been made more precarious by the arming of ethnic-based militia

RLP, 27 February 2004:

"Since last year's LRA raids in Lango anti-Acholi sentiments have been breeding quietly, mainly in Lira district. According to Church sources there over 560 people have been killed by the LRA since November 2003 to the end of February 2004. Most of these killings have taken place in unofficial displaced persons camps North and East of Lira where conditions are appalling. Also according to the same sources, 48 people have died of hunger in Barapwo camp and 38 in Erute camp since January. Since most LRA fighters are Acholi, many Langi find it easy to vent their anger and frustration at the whole tribe. A march of protest in Lira on the 25th February degenerated into rioting and five people were killed. It turned out that only one of them was an Acholi and the other four died when the Police fired shots as they were harrassed by angry crowds. Sadly, this provoked a revenge reaction by some gangs of youth in Gulu town. Thankfully, this was swiftly brought under control by the Police.

The ethnic tension is likely not as serious as some segments of the national and international media report, but the issue is not trivial either and these incidents serve as an early warning of what could develop if the situation is not handled wisely. Reports of Amuka Lango militia present at some displaced camps in Acholi are causing fear. The religious leaders from Acholi, Lango and Teso met in Kampala on the 2nd of March and in Lira on 23rd – 24th March. The MPs from the same sub-regions met too on the 11th. These initiatives are commendable and should play a significant role in putting out potential fires of inter-ethnic hatred before is too late." (CSPNU, 13 April 2004)

" On the 25th February 2004, there were reports of violent attacks against members of the Acholi community living in Lira. The attacks followed a march that began as a peaceful demonstration against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government's failure to protect the people, following Saturday's massacre of approximately 200 civilians in Barlonyo IDP camp. This development has further resulted in retaliatory attacks against members of the Langi community resident in Gulu district.

The Refugee Law Project (RLP) of the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, notes with the gravest concern that the above events represent a development in the conflict that, if not addressed immediately, could both increase and spread to other parts of the country. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the recent violence is the result of ongoing ethnic articulations of the LRA conflict by government, the media, and other voices. As the RLP notes in its recently published report, *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda*, this ethnic representation of the conflict has had three results.

First, it has generated a perception that all Acholi are LRA supporters, thereby fuelling intense hatred for the former among many Ugandans, especially those living in the Lango and Teso sub-regions. For example, one politician recently urged people living in Teso sub-region to "kill all Acholi above the age of 18." Extensive RLP interviews across northern Uganda, however, revealed that the LRA is extremely unpopular among the Acholi.

Second, the articulation of the conflict along ethnic lines has resulted in a sense of social alienation, political isolation and economic marginalisation on the part of many people in the Acholi sub-region, a feeling reinforced by the government's seeming lack of commitment to peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Third, and most dangerously, the situation has only been made more precarious by the arming of ethnic-based militias (Arrow Group, Amuka and Frontier Guards). Rather than relying on a professionally trained national army, the use of regional militias has served to increase tensions between different ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the RLP firmly believes that the recent violence is generated not only by the ongoing attacks by the LRA but is also underpinned by factors that run deep within Uganda's socio-political history. As such, while the deployment of police and the army to quell the violence

may offer a degree of short term stability, nothing short of a process that addresses the above ethnic animosities in a genuine and holistic way will forestall future ethnic clashes."

Acholi lack confidence in the government (July 2003)

- Higher rates of military service by northern populations in the volunteer army after independence
- No ethnic group is in the majority in Uganda's 24.6 million population
- The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), drew heavily from the impoverished northern Ugandan Acholi population
- The National Resistance Army (NRA) took up positions and bases in the area known as the Luwero triangle to the north of the capital, Kampala
- Yoweri Museveni created the National Resistance Army and Movement in 1980 that took up arms to overthrow the government
- In an effort to crush local support of the NRA, the UNLA (including its Acholi soldiers) committed gross human rights violations, in the Luwero triangle

HRW, 15 July 2003:

"The current conflict in northern Uganda has its immediate roots in the troubled times after Ugandan independence in 1962, when military groups of different ethnic and ideological composition aspired to and often succeeded in overthrowing a succession of Ugandan governments. Colonial preference to development of the southern regions and neglect of the north led to an economic imbalance and hence to higher rates of military service by northern populations in the volunteer army. No ethnic group is in the majority in Uganda's 24.6 million population; they inhabit an area of 242,554 square kilometers, a dense population for an African country with an agricultural economy. The first prime minister, Milton Obote, was ousted by his army commander, Colonel Idi Amin, in 1971. Within Amin's army, his kinsmen from the West Nile (northwest) region began killing Langi and Acholi soldiers. Amin was overthrown by rebel Ugandan soldiers and the invading army of Tanzania in 1979. Contested national elections were held and Milton Obote returned to power in 1980. As was the case under the first rule of Obote, the national army, then known as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), drew heavily from the impoverished northern Ugandan Acholi population.

In part because of the election fraud that brought Obote back to power, Yoweri Museveni created the National Resistance Army (NRA) and Movement in 1980 that took up arms to overthrow the government. The NRA took up positions and bases in the area known as the Luwero triangle to the north of the capital, Kampala. In an effort to crush local support of the NRA, the UNLA (including its Acholi soldiers) committed gross human rights violations, in this area, including the mass killing of thousands of civilians, the looting of property and goods, and the destruction of government buildings and homes; the UNLA sustained heavy casualties itself. Many Acholi believe that, dating from these events, the incumbent (1986-present) government of Yoweri Museveni has written the Acholi and their northern region off, which the government denies."

One outline of the causes of the conflict in Acholiland (Dec 2002)

- Contemporary violent conflicts in the country are directly related to the profound crisis of legitimacy of the state, its institutions and their political incumbents
- This crisis reflects the way the state was constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences, administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further fractured the colonial entity

- Conflicts in the colonial state were exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones
- The post-colonial regime inherited a fractured state
- In April 1979, the exiled rebels, who were overwhelmingly from Acholi and Langi, assisted by the Tanzanian army and Yoweri Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), overthrew the Amin regime
- The new administration organized general elections in December 1980, which were won by Milton Obote and his Uganda People's Congress
- The main challenger, the Democratic Party (DP), rejected Obote's victory. Museveni also rejected the results
- The war in Acholi has become an extension of regional and international power struggles

Accord, 31 December 2002:

"The roots of the current war between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Acholiland are entwined with the history of conflicts in Uganda and the rise to power of the National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army (NRM/A). The conflict has persisted because of fragmented and divisive national politics, strategies and tactics adopted by the armed protagonists, and regional and international interests. The harrowing war has claimed many innocent civilian lives, forcefully displaced over 400,000 people and destroyed schools and health centres. In addition, the war has been characterized by widespread and systematic violations of human rights, including rapes, abductions of men, women and children, torture, increased economic decay, and national and regional insecurity.

Uganda: land and people

Uganda lies along the Equator, between the great East African Rift Valleys. It is a landlocked country, bordered by Sudan in the north, Kenya in the east, Tanzania in the south, Rwanda in the southwest and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west. With a landmass of 241,139 square kilometres, its population is about 20 million. Its territory includes Lake Victoria, Lake Albert, Lake Edward and Lake Kyoga. These lakes, together with several elaborate networks of river drainage, constitute the headwaters of the River Nile. The country's economy is primarily agrarian, comprised mostly of smallholdings though pastoralism is dominant in Karamoja and Ankole.

Lake Kyoga forms both a physical and linguistic marker. South of Kyoga is the so-called Bantu region, with the centralized pre-colonial states of Buganda, Toro, Ankole (Nkore) and Bunyoro the dominant territories. North and east of Kyoga are the non-Bantu territories of the Acholi, Alur, Langi, Iteso and Karamojong. The Acholi inhabit present-day northern Uganda and southern Sudan, where, in the pre-colonial era, they constructed decentralized states. In the 1970s, the Acholi district of northern Uganda was divided into Gulu and Kitgum districts. In 2001, Kitgum was subdivided to create a third district of Pader. The three districts constitute an area commonly referred to as Acholiland.

Conflicts and fragmentation in colonial Uganda

Contemporary violent conflicts in the country are directly related to the profound crisis of legitimacy of the state, its institutions and their political incumbents. This crisis, in part, reflects the way the state was constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences, administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further

fractured the colonial entity. These policies did not only undermine the faltering legitimacy of the state, but also impeded the emergence of a Ugandan nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute in later years to instability and political violence.

One significant divide was along the lines of religious affiliation, which can be traced back to the arrival of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism in Buganda. These religious groups engaged in a ferocious conflict for dominance, and the Protestant faction emerged victorious after the Imperial British East Africa Company intervened in their favour. Anglicans were to later dominate the top positions in the civil service, and this structural inequality was maintained after the colonial era. Consequently, religious beliefs and political party affiliations were to become entangled.

Conflicts in the colonial state were exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones. For example, while a large portion of the territory south of Lake Kyoga was designated as cash crop growing and industrial zones, the territory north of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour reserve. This partition, which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities between the south and the north. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-cum-administrative policy that left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely in the hands of the Acholi and other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf between the socio-political south and the socio-political north. This was further sustained by the administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as colonial agents in other parts of the country. The policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called 'indirect rule', led to widespread anti-Buganda sentiment.

Conflicts and fragmentation in post-independent Uganda

The post-colonial regime inherited a fractured state. Milton Obote responded to this crisis of legitimacy by forming an alliance between his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda monarchy party (Kabaka Yekka). With this marriage of convenience, Obote became the Executive Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II became the President and Head of State. However, the alliance collapsed over a conflict over land (the 'lost counties') between Bunyoro and Buganda. The 'divorce' led to widespread violence in Buganda. Obote responded by detaining five government ministers from the Bantu region, dismissing the President and Vice President and forcing President Mutesa into exile and suspending the 1962 constitution. The government also imposed a state of emergency in Buganda, occupied Buganda's palace, following the flight of the Kabaka to England, and introduced a republican constitution. Some Bantu-speaking groups perceived this struggle for legitimacy and power as a conflict between the Bantu south and the non-Bantu (Nilotic) north.

These difficulties overlapped with the instability generated in the region by the superpowers' quest for hegemony during the Cold War. These crises were compounded by a conflict between Obote and his army commander, General Idi Amin. In 1971, Amin seized power. Immediately after he came to power, Amin ordered Acholi and Langi soldiers, who constituted the backbone of the army, to surrender their arms. The overwhelming majority of them did so. However, many were subsequently killed. The government extended its conflict with the Acholi and Langi by arresting, detaining and killing highly educated and influential members of the ethnic groups. Over time, Amin began to target people he perceived as disloyal from other parts of the country. To protect the regime which lacked political legitimacy in the country, Amin recruited new soldiers into the national army from West Nile. In addition, he appointed prominent Bantu to important positions in his government. The regime however largely maintained the dominance of southerners in the civil service and commerce, while the northerners largely controlled the government and army.

In April 1979, the exiled rebels, who were overwhelmingly from Acholi and Langi, assisted by the Tanzanian army and Yoweri Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), overthrew the

Amin regime. Yusuf Lule assumed power. However, ideological and ethnic conflicts within the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the national army led to the collapse of the Lule administration within months. Godfrey Binaisa took over, but was himself deposed in May 1980 by Paulo Muwanga and his deputy Yoweri Museveni.

The new administration organized general elections in December 1980, which were won by Milton Obote and his Uganda People's Congress. But widespread irregularities and political violence undermined the legitimacy of the elections. The main challenger, the Democratic Party (DP), rejected Obote's victory. Museveni also rejected the results. Thereafter, a number of armed groups, including Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters, Museveni's Popular Resistance Army (later they were to merge to form the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), and Dr Andrew Kayira's Uganda Freedom Movement/Army (UFM/A), declared war against the Obote government. In West Nile, Brigadier Moses Ali's Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and General Lumago's Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) also engaged the army and the UPC in bitter armed opposition.

Fighting was particularly intense in the Luwero triangle, where the mostly Baganda population was targeted for their perceived support of rebel groups. Many innocent civilians were tortured and murdered by the UNLA. Although the UNLA was a national and multi-ethnic army, the NRM/A held the Acholi exclusively responsible for the atrocities committed, and this disputed perception was to shape subsequent attitudes toward the conflict.

In July 1985, conflict between some Langi and Acholi soldiers led to the overthrow of the Obote regime. The coup, which brought General Tito Okello to power, shattered the military alliance between the Acholi and Langi and escalated ethnic violence. The Okello regime invited all fighting groups and political parties to join the military government. Every armed group and political party, with the exception of the NRA, joined the administration. The NRA, however, engaged the regime in protracted peace negotiations held in Nairobi. In December 1985, the Nairobi Agreement was signed under the chairmanship of President Moi of Kenya. However, the Agreement was never implemented and Museveni seized power on the 25th January 1986.

The NRA's seizure of power effectively meant that for the first time, socio-economic, political and military powers were all concentrated in the south. The new administration, which absorbed political and military groups from the south and Moses Ali's UNRF group, engaged in intensive anti-northern propaganda. The administration also discriminated against groups from eastern Uganda and West Nile. This severe alienation and marginalization led to armed conflicts in Teso and West Nile. After much destruction and displacement of the population in Teso, the government negotiated an end to the conflict in the east.

Emergence of the conflict in Acholiland

By April 1986, the Acholi had largely come to terms with the NRA victory. The majority of former UNLA soldiers also heeded the appeal made by the government to hand over their arms and demobilize. The response by the Acholi ended the armed engagement in the territory. However, after months of relative calm, anxieties escalated when the NRA began to commit human rights abuses in the name of crushing a nascent rebellion. Over time NRA soldiers plundered the area and committed atrocities, including rape, abductions, confiscation of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, schools, hospitals and bore holes escalated. These atrocities in Acholiland were justified by some as revenge for the 'skulls of Luwero'.

Against this background of mistrust and violence, in May 1986 the government ordered all former UNLA soldiers to report to barracks. The order was met with deep suspicion, in part, because it was reminiscent of Amin's edict that led to the 1971 massacre of Acholi soldiers. Some ex-UNLA soldiers went into hiding; others fled to Sudan and some decided to take up arms. Soon, these

ex-soldiers were joined by a stream of youths fleeing from NRA operations. During this period, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was perceived by Acholi refugees as an ally of the Museveni government, attacked a refugee camp in southern Sudan. On August 20, 1986, some Acholi refugee combatants, led by Brigadier Odong Latek, attacked the NRA. This armed group, known as the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), was later joined by the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces / Movement (HSMF/HSM), Severino Lukoya's Lord's Army, ultimately to be followed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Why the war has persisted

The war has lasted for nearly sixteen years because of a number of interrelated factors. To begin with, the war in Acholi has become an extension of regional and international power struggles. On the regional front, Uganda provided military hardware and sanctuary to the SPLA. In retaliation, the Sudan government provided sanctuary and military hardware to the LRA. On the international front, both the Uganda government and the SPLA received military and political support from the US, in part to curtail the influence of the Islamic government in Khartoum. Another factor perpetuating the conflict has been that the war has become a lucrative source and cover for clandestine income for high-ranking military and government officials and other profiteers. In addition, the unwillingness of the government and the LRA to genuinely pursue a negotiated settlement has sustained the war. Lastly, atrocities committed by the LRA against unarmed civilians and the unwillingness of the rebel group to accept alternative political views on the conflict have prolonged the war."

The leader of Lord's Resistance Army broke away with allies in Obote II Army, 1988

- Ugandan People's Democratic Army signed a peace accord with the NRM [National Resistance Army]
- Those who had little education, stood little chance of significant gain, and had already committed atrocities remained in the bush

Westbrook June 2000, sects. III, VI:

" In 1988, however, the UPDA[Ugandan People's Democratic Army] signed a peace accord with the NRM [National Resistance Army] Many of those in the UPDA leadership were given positions in the government. It is said by some that those with the most to gain by coming back into the country mainstream and, thus, the most to lose by staying in the bush were the people who accepted the peace accord. Those who had little education, stood little chance of significant gain, and had already committed atrocities remained in the bush. According to Charles Alai, a founding member of the UPDA, who was, in 1996, Uganda's Minister of State for Public Services, '...by 1988 when we negotiated with the NRM government, Kony had already broken away from UPDA. When we came out, we had already disagreed with Kony and he took the most deadly and primitive officers with him.' Thus, at the conclusion of the 1988 peace accords, a rather large contingent of the disenfranchised stayed in the bush.

Though Kony adopted many of the methods of his supposed cousin Lakwena he never gleaned the popular support she had. His movement, known in 1988 as the Uganda Peoples Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) and later as the LRA, has had something more of a schizophrenic or disjointed nature about it. Kony has vacillated from near full adoption of Lakwena's beliefs,

including the Christian components denouncing witch doctors and diviners, to denying any links with Christian doctrine to incorporating many Muslim rituals and beliefs."

The Holy Spirit Movement Front and Alice Auma 'Lakwena', 1986-1987

- The Holy Spirit Movement Front closest to succeeding in overthrowing the NRM [National Resistance Movement] of any movement
- The movement's leader, Lakwena, rather than the UPDA, [Uganda People's Democratic Army] provided the greatest inspiration for Joseph Kony
- The HSMF promised redemption to a people who felt they were being punished for atrocities committed by Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and Lutwa

Westbrook June 2000, sections. III, VI:

"In late 1986, a temporary but significant figure emerged on this conflict scene in the form of Alice Auma 'Lakwena.' Lakwena is significant for several reasons: her movement, the Holy Spirit Movement Front (HSMF), came the closest to succeeding in overthrowing the NRM of any movement to date; Lakwena, through the HSMF, was the only early resistance to the NRA/M to claim moral and religious grounds to attempt to influence the conflict; and it seems that Lakwena, rather than the UPDA, provided the greatest inspiration for Joseph Kony, though he fought with the UPDA. Auma claimed to be possessed by the spirit of a dead Italian soldier named Lakwena. To a people who felt they were being punished for atrocities committed by Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and Lutwa, the HSMF promised redemption. In order to join HSMF, one had to undergo ritual purification to cleanse themselves of past sins. According to HSMF doctrine, only an impure soldier could die in battle. There can be little doubt that the success of the HSMF was due, in part, to the beliefs in magic and spirit powers that are a part of the Acholi culture and, in part, due to the early successes of the HSMF.

In October of 1987, a mere 80 km from Kampala, the NRA finally and resolutely defeated the HSMF. Lakwena is said to have escaped to Nairobi, but she has not made an overt gesture toward overthrowing the NRM since."

The National Resistance Army's armed insurgency, 1981-1986

- The NRA was comprised primarily of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda combatants from southern and central Uganda
- UNLA forces in Luwero were often referred to as "the Acholis" and were blamed for the deaths of 100,000 civilians
- Fearing revenge, the ex-UNLA Acholi forces fled to Sudan where they organised themselves into an armed insurgency against the NRA

UN November 2001, p.13:

"In 1981, the National Resistance Army (NRA) under Yoweri Museveni began an armed insurgency. The NRA was comprised primarily of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda combatants from southern and central Uganda, including Luwero District where in 1984, Obote forces carried out extensive reprisals against unarmed Baganda civilians. UNLA forces in Luwero were often referred to as "the Acholis" and were and blamed for the deaths of 100,000 civilians. In 1985, Acholi elements in the UNLA overthrew the Obote government, expelled other ethnic groups from the military, and put a predominately Acholi government in power under General Tito Okello Lutwa. This was followed by authoritative and well documented reports of looting

throughout the country by primarily Acholi officers and enlisted men. Following a short-lived power-sharing treaty between the UNLA and NRA, the NRA overthrew the government and took power. Fearing revenge, the ex-UNLA Acholi forces fled to Sudan where they organised themselves into an armed insurgency against the NRA."

Gersony, Section 1, 1997, "Advent of the NRA":

"As the Acholi UNLA forces crossed Acholiland, they warned Acholi civilians that the NRA would exact revenge - and in fact kill many of them - when it arrived in Gulu and Kitgum. They urged civilians to follow them across the border to Sudan, and many did. The rest remained at home and held their breath, awaiting developments."

Gersony 1997, Section 1, "Phase I UPDA":

"Most of the former Acholi UNLA soldiers who retreated from Kampala (fighting the NRA as they withdrew) continued north during March 1986 and finally crossed the international border into Sudan. Sudan provided refuge and a base from which to re-reorganize but, according to most reports, did not provide military assistance. Several Acholi asserted that, in fact, Sudanese authorities confiscated their weapons when they entered Sudan and returned them when they crossed back into Uganda."

Displacements in Acholiland

Strategic Use of Civilians by Both Sides (March 2002)

- Forced displacement of civilian population used as a tactic by both the LRA and the UPDF.

Weeks, March 2002, p.9:

"From the beginning, the LRA's principal tactic has been to target the civilian population of Acholiland, terrorizing the community and creating paralyzing despondency. In its attacks, it characteristically kills, maims, rapes, loots, burns homes, destroys crops, and – most traumatically – abducts civilians, especially children. Kony is said to believe (or to have been told by his spirits) that the Acholi are to be punished for their lack of support to his cause."

WFP, September 1999, pp. 6-7:

"[I]t was from 1995 onwards that the scale of violence, displacement and child abductions by the LRA increased dramatically.

[...]

A common theme throughout this devastating period of Acholi history has been the strategic use of civilians by both sides, including the calculated enforcement of displacement. In February 1996 the LRA issued an edict banning settlement within four kilometres of roads and prohibiting the use of bicycles. Their intention was the tight control of a population inaccessible to government troops which would provide cover and supplies for the rebels. To enforce the edict, hundreds of people were killed, villages and food stocks were burned and thousands drifted towards the relative safety of Gulu town. By September 1996 the Gulu District Council announced that 100,000 people in the district were now displaced.

Meanwhile, the government's Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) shelled villages they suspected of containing LRA units, discouraged the return of IDPs from the towns and conducted a number of 'clearances', particularly from Aswa and Kilak counties in northern Gulu District. By November 1996, the Gulu District Council estimated that IDP figures had doubled to 200,000.

Three months later, the figure was again upwardly revised to 270,000 as the policy of creating camps (introduced in October 1996) intensified. Tens of thousands of people had swelled the towns (particularly Gulu), trading centres and areas around army barracks. By mid-1998 the majority of IDPs were in 20 official camps."

Voluntary displacement or displacement ordered by the government? 1999-2004

- Some IDPs moved to camps spontaneously, but others felt that the authorities left them no choice, and yet others were physically forced by the UDFP.
- In 1996, governmental forces embarked on a strategy of displacing the local population into 'protected villages'.

MSF, 1 December 2004, p.7:

"Pader District was created in 2001. Kitgum District was split in two, and two of the counties in the lower part of the district became Pader. Created in the midst of the conflict, Pader has always been "a new district that never got what it needed", as described by one camp dweller. Pader has been affected by LRA presence and attacks for many years. In the beginning, people often spent the night in the bush outside their homesteads in order to avoid violence and abduction during nightly attacks on their villages. Massive displacement occurred in September 2002 when, in a radio-transmitted message, the government army instructed the population to leave their homes and move into protected villages within forty-eight hours. People who later returned to their abandoned homes reported them looted, with granaries plundered and crops destroyed. By 2004, twenty-four camps had been established, hosting a total of 290,000 people, almost the entire population of the district."

HRW, 15 July 2003, pp. 61-62:

"The oral army order of October 2, 2002, displacing some 300,000 people, together with those 500,000 previously displaced, resulted in approximately 800,000 displaced and needy persons originating in the three northern districts, according to the WFP-a total of 70 percent of their population-an astoundingly high percentage. Most of adults in this population are capable of economic self-sufficiency through small farming for themselves and their families-but now they are dependent on international relief to survive.

Article 17 (1) of Protocol II [Additional Protocol II of 1997 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions] states in part: '1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.' The term 'imperative military reasons' usually refers to evacuation because of imminent military operations. The provisional measure of evacuation is appropriate for example if an area is in danger as a result of military operations or is liable to be subjected to intense bombing or other military action. It may also be permitted when the presence of protected persons in an area hampers military operations. The prompt return of the evacuees to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area have ceased is implied in the article.

Displacement or capture of civilians solely to deny a social base to the enemy has nothing to do with the security of the civilians. Nor is it justified by 'imperative military reasons," which require 'the most meticulous assessment of the circumstances' because such reasons are so capable of abuse. One authority has stated:

Clearly, imperative military reasons cannot be justified by political motives. For example, it would be prohibited to move a population in order to exercise more effective control over a dissident ethnic group.

The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that, 'prior to any decision requiring the displacement of persons, the authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether.' The principles state that states are under

'a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of . . . peasants, pastoralists, and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands.'

The commander of the Fourth Division, Brig. Aronda Nyakairima, handing down the oral army evacuation order to the people of northern Uganda of October 2, 2002, stated:

'This announcement goes to all law-abiding citizens in the abandoned villages of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum districts to vacate with immediate effect. . . . This is because we have discovered that the LRA terrorists when pursued by the UPDF hide in huts located in these villages. . . . Get out of these villages in order not to get caught in cross fire.'

This order suggests both 'imperative military reasons' and the security of the population.

Forty-eight hours after this order was issued, the UPDF began shelling, bombing, and using helicopter gun ships to attack the areas around the camps. The government, interpreting the order broadly, reasoned that after the forty-eight hour ultimatum, everyone found outside the 'protected villages' or IDP camps would be a rebel or a rebel collaborator----therefore converting almost the entire northern Uganda into a military operational zone in which civilian movement is sharply limited. This order, together with the LRA military campaign, has further crippled the rural economy of northern Uganda.

Whether the security of the civilians or 'imperative military reasons' justify such massive disruption of life and the economy is a hotly contested issue. It remains to be established what the imperative military reasons are that would warrant forced displacement of 70 percent of the population for such a long period--some have been displaced since 1996. Nor is it clear why the government is unable to provide for the security of the civilians in any way other than such forced displacement, which is so drastic for the affected population that it should be the last resort. Because these facts are exclusively within government knowledge, the burden is upon the government to establish that its actions comply with international legal standards and its own policy on displacement."

Weeks, March 2002, p.2

"In Gulu district, the establishment of the villages followed a decision by the military authorities in 1996; most of the villages appear to have been established between August and October of that year. The population was ordered into the villages on short notice; those who remained outside them were subject to army attack. In Kitgum/Pader, the villages were more often established as a result of the flight by rural residents following LRA attacks in 1995-97; these villages evolved more spontaneously, with people moving near trading centres and military cantonments in search of security; there has been more movement back and forth from people's original homes than is the case in Gulu."**OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned":**

"Under the Geneva Convention, the GoU has the right to move or contain people if, for reasons of insecurity, such relocation is in the people's best interest. In the majority of cases, it would appear as if displaced Ugandans have been able to exercise their right to residence and movement and that their choice of location/abode has generally been voluntary."

US DOS February 2001, sect.1f:

"Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued, there were no reports during the year that government forces used threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the conflict."

AI 17 March 1999, "Introduction"

"Many people have moved to camps "spontaneously", fleeing from the LRA. Others feel that the authorities gave them no choice about leaving their farms and livelihoods. Yet others were physically forced by government soldiers. Few people are happy to be in camps, which appear to have become semi-permanent, regarding them as punitive. However, the extreme violence of the LRA poses a real dilemma. Returning to the countryside may provide more opportunities (for example, for education) but may increase the risk of being killed, either by the LRA or by patrolling government soldiers."

AI 17 March 1999, para. 2.1

"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army was unable to prevent LRA activity. The decision to create camps was taken at the highest level. On 27 September 1996 President Yoweri Museveni informed members of the Parliamentary Committee on the Offices of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs that the authorities were going to establish "protected villages". However, from interviews with villagers and others, it appears to Amnesty International that some UPDF units were already moving people out of their homes a number of weeks before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to the Parliamentary Committee."

WFP September 1999, p.8

"Initially, in 1997, there were about 50 settlements where IDPs were grouped either spontaneously or under army supervision. The district authorities could not manage such a widely dispersed group of people. Following a needs assessment undertaken by WFP, the camps in Gulu District were merged into 23 officially designated sites where 270,000 people would be provided with continuing assistance. In October 1998, three of these camps were found to have sufficient access to land for cultivation (though they were still served through food-for-work (FFW) projects by WFP). This effectively brought the camp total in Gulu to 20 where humanitarian assistance was (and still is) given. In Kitgum the IDP population was about 80,000 in five official camps."

Displacements in the Lango and Teso regions

Causes of displacement in Teso region, 1985-2005 (June 2005)

- Karamajong warriors have caused small-scale displacement for decades
- Confrontations between the LRA and the government army in 2003 caused the displacement of more than 200,000 people
- By late 2003 the majority of the LRA left Teso region and moved into Lira district

GoU, 1 July 2005

"Katakwi District was carved out from Soroti District in 1997. It lies in the North Eastern region of Uganda. Katakwi constitutes part of the Teso Region, which comprises three other districts of Kumi, Kaberamaido and Soroti. In June 2003, the LRA penetrated into Teso Region through Katakwi District. The LRA attacks [in 2003] caused massive displacement of over 200,000 people, which constitutes to about 75 % of the people in Katakwi District thus disrupting peace and delivery of social services. The district was thrown into a state of emergency. There was increased demand for humanitarian response especially for IDPs in camps. In 2004, LRA attacks started to decline in Teso Region. However, the borders of Katakwi with Kaberamaido and Lira continued to experience intermittent security incidences. Meanwhile the Karamojong malpractice of stealing cattle, killing people and destroying food crops in gardens was still going on along the borders of Katakwi and Karamoja region.

In November 2004, Inter Agency assessment was carried out for Teso Region. The assessment findings, among others, revealed that the LRA induced camps were receiving more attention while the Karamojong affected camps were not. For the past three decades, Katakwi has borne the greatest brunt of the Karamojong raids.

Cattle rustling in Teso Region have existed since the 1940s. In the beginning, the cattle rustlers used spears and later locally made guns called "Amatida". This low capacity limited cattle rustling activities to the borderline areas of Karamoja and the then Soroti District. Cattle rustling reached its peak between 1986 and 1990 when the Karamojong warriors overran the whole of Teso region. This was at the time when there was rebellion in Teso against the government and delivery of social services including security broke down. The affected people moved into government facilities like sub county H/Q, dispensaries, schools which later became camps where government provided security through the local militia and soldiers. Today there are over 74 Karamojong induced camps hosting about 176,911 people in Katakwi district."

MSF, 1 December 2004, p.10

"Small scale displacement caused by neighbouring Karamajong cattle rustlers in the Teso region has occurred for more than two decades ago, and has resulted in several camps in Katakwi district. The Teso rebellion in 1985 also resulted in large scale displacement when people were forced into a "protected" camp by the government in 1990. When the LRA entered the Teso region in June 2003, its confrontation with the government and locally formed militias caused an escalation in violence that displaced approximately 250,000 people, mostly in Katakwi, Kabermaido and Soroti districts. Mass killings, looting and burning of houses and land, and abductions of children became common.

Tens of thousands of people from villages in Soroti and Katakwi district poured into Soroti town in search of safety. Kabermaido residents mostly fled to nearby village camps or trading centres, surviving without any assistance and facing severe shortages of food and water. [...]

By late 2003 the majority of the LRA left Teso region and moved into Lira district. A few months later, some of those who had sought refuge in Soroti town started to return home to rebuild their homes. The return process has been slow, and will take many more months. Many people still fear that the LRA or the Karamajong will return and destroy everything once again."

Massive displacement in Lira District, 2003-2004

- The majority of the violence and subsequent displacement took place in 2003 and 2004
- The LRA entered Lira district with a vengeance in November 2003
- In less than a month, the numbers of IDPs grew from 65,000 to more than 200,000
- There was a second peak of terror, including the Barlonyo massacre, which took place in February 2004, after the creation of a local militia meant to provide protection

MSF, 1 December 2004, pp, 11-12:

"Although Lira had experienced hit and run raids by the LRA throughout 2002, the majority of the violence and subsequent displacement took place in 2003 and 2004. The LRA entered Lira district with a vengeance in November 2003 causing massive population movements from rural villages to Lira town and trading centres throughout the district. Overcrowded and unprotected, the camps have proven to be death traps. Populations have been cut off from their livelihoods, and are barely surviving with little water, deplorable sanitation, and no health services, in some cases, for more than a year. This has contributed to emergency high death rates, widespread disease, fear and trauma.

By early November 2003, as many as 65,000 people had already fled into Lira town. In less than a month, the numbers grew to more than 200,000. People were scattered throughout the city. Some were living in makeshift camps while others sought shelter in an abandoned factory, in the railway station, under verandas or in the street. "People were everywhere and anywhere they

could find a place to lay their head. And still at night the population ballooned as, mostly children, funnelled into town in search of safety.

There was a second peak of terror in February 2004, just after the creation of a local militia, the Amuka boys. The LRA, having been attacked by the militia, sought revenge and brutally massacred hundreds of people in two horrific attacks. More than fifty people were killed in Abyia, on 4 February, when the LRA, disguised as Amuka boys, entered the camp in broad daylight and started shooting. The second attack, and one that caught the world's attention, took place in Barlonyo on 21 February 2004. More than 300 people, mostly women and children were killed. Many died as they were forced to stay in their huts as the rebels set fire to them and burned whole families alive. In addition to the heavy death toll, these attacks left many physically wounded, and the whole district mentally scarred."

The war is spreading east (March 2004)

- The year 2003 saw what appears to have been a deliberate and well coordinated spread of the war
- Movement of the LRA into Teso and Lango districts
- Teso is known as a fertile farming region that supplies beef, chicken and potatoes
- The LRA appears to have believed it could gain support from these areas
- The incursion could be an attempt to punish the Iteso for their continued support of the National Resistance Movement of president Museveni
- The conflict increasingly seen within a national historical context

ISS, 31 March 2004 chapter 5:

"Apart from attacks in West Nile and Lango since the early 1990s, the LRA conflict has been felt most intensely in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. The year 2003, however, saw what appears to have been a deliberate and well coordinated spread of the war, to the east in particular. In May 2003, the LRA ambushed a bus along Pakwach-Karuma road in Gulu District. This was followed on 15 June 2003 by simultaneous attacks in the districts of Lira, Apac and Katakwi, in what some in Teso have called their "September 11th ". Three days later, the LRA attacked Adjumani town for the first time in fourteen years. These attacks were soon followed by others of greater frequency and intensity in the districts of Kaberamaido and Katakwi in Teso region. On 24 June, the LRA attacked Soroti town, resulting in at least 200 deaths and the abduction of hundreds more children, including 100 schoolgirls. A group of IDPs in Lira described this sequence of events: "The attacks were gradual. We knew the rebels were camped at a certain place, but they did not attack for a long time, so we waited . We told the UPDF but they did not respond. So we waited , and suddenly places were attacked and because they didn't protect us, we had to run." Thus, LRA attacks have not only continued with intensity across the Acholi sub-region, but have also spread to several other areas.

On 26 June, it was reported that more than 2 000 veterans of the defunct Teso-based rebel Uganda People's Army (UPA) led by Musa Eweru, then Resident District Commissioner (RDC) of Kasese, and local MP John Eresu, had joined the UPDF to fight the rebels in Teso. This development was later opposed by a group of northern parliamentarians, who viewed the deployment of paramilitary groups as unconstitutional.

The movement of the LRA into Teso and Lango appears to have occurred for several reasons. First, many believe that the LRA were running short of food and other logistical supplies, having thoroughly looted Gulu, Kitgum and Pader for the past 17 years. With more than 80% of the population in these districts displaced in IDP camps, most of the land currently lies fallow. Given

the fact that the LRA relies chiefly on plundering agricultural stocks to resupply its food needs, and that many planting seasons have been missed in these districts, there are few crops left to loot. Teso, on the other hand, is known as a fertile farming region that supplies beef, chicken and potatoes to other regions of Uganda . It was thus a key target area to attack when foodstuffs were in short supply in the usual operational area.

Second, the LRA appears to have believed it could gain support from these areas, particularly among former rebels from Teso and Tororo/Busia. As an official in Soroti commented , [Kony] thought that since we had a rebellion here, he could find potential allies. They thought they could then proceed to fight the government until Kampala . They wanted to spread their area of influence. The UPDF is taking over Gulu and Kitgum, so they came here. But the people of Teso have not joined them; we have the Arrows. 214

Our interviews reveal that the LRA first spent several days in both areas without attacking. According to local residents in Obalanga (Katakwi District, part of Teso region), the rebels were initially very friendly – playing football, watching videos, and generally interacting freely with the population. 215 Informants also reported that the LRA came with a list of names of former UPA rebels who had fought against the government from 1987 to 1992. They wanted to know the locations of these ex-fighters so as to activate them to fight the “dictatorial” Museveni government. A similar thing appears to have occurred in Tororo and Busia in September and October 2003, with the LRA allegedly sending six scouts in search of fighters from the former 9 October Movement. 216 Kony appears to be following in the footsteps of UPDA fighters from Gulu, who in 1988 attempted to join UPA rebels in Teso against the government. 217 The move to Lango (Lira and Apac districts) came later in September, and appears to have been in part a reaction to being pushed back from Teso. 218

The drive to activate former fighters in the east may have been an attempt by the LRA to reorganise itself in a time of uncertainty, given the potential implications of the Sudan peace process, which brought the LRA’s key supply line increasingly under threat. In the past, Kony had shown his ability to adapt to changing circumstances. For instance, during the 1994 negotiations he evidently took advantage of a lull in the fighting to abduct more children and go to Sudan for arms and ammunition. 219 With reports that the LRA command structure had been reshuffled in recent weeks, 220 something similar may have been taking place.

Another explanation for the war’s spread was that it was an attempt to punish the Iteso for their continued support of the NRM. As one informant in Soroti said, “They say the Iteso are the strongest supporters of the Movement in the north, so they must be punished for it.” 221 Others claimed that it was a deliberate attempt by Kony to prove that, after Operation Iron Fist, the LRA was still a force to be reckoned with, giving the lie to claims that the LRA was about to be finished off once and for all. For instance, Museveni wrote in a letter to the *New Vision* in August 2002, “You can be sure this conflict will be over, latest by February, when the grass will have been burnt, if it goes that far.” 222 As a religious leader said, “Kony wants to prove that he is alive and well after Operation Iron Fist, which is supposed to have finished him. So to show that it was a failure, the best way is to spread.” 223

Some interviewees believed that the LRA attacked Soroti because they were seeking revenge for Acholi UNLA soldiers who were killed in Teso in 1986: “During the withdrawal of UNLA, as they were running north, they were intercepted in Teso and killed. This was in 1986. The Iteso pretended to entertain them, but they killed them at night. Some people are coming to revenge these killings.” 224 Others speculated that ex-UPA rebels who had joined the LRA in the 1980s, invited the LRA to enter their district: “We have heard of the invitation sent by the rebels to come here by many rebels, especially the ex-UPA ones who did not surrender. These ones are with the rebels and they are the ones directing them in this region.” 225

Whatever the reasons for the LRA extending its geographical focus, it has radically changed perceptions of the conflict. The extent to which the conflict is being seen increasingly within a national historical context is symptomatic of this change of opinion. In addition, and in response to such wider interpretations of the war, there has been an increase in pressure for the war to end both by those directly affected by the war, and by those increasingly aware of its protracted nature."

Peace-efforts

Juba peace talks at risk of collapse (April 2008)

The Monitor, 15 April 2008

Museveni in Juba to save peace talks

Grace Matsiko & Agencies

Juba

President Yoweri Museveni yesterday accused Joseph Kony, the leader of the rebel LRA, of not being serious about peace talks and hinted his forces could resume operations against the rebels.

Prospects of an end to the 21-year rebel insurgency were dashed last week after Kony, commander of the Lord's Resistance Army, failed to attend a signing ceremony on the Sudan-Congo border, stalling nearly two years of intricate negotiations.

"You have been able to persist until it is clear that it's Kony who is not serious," Mr Museveni told South Sudanese mediators during a visit to the southern capital, Juba.

He accused LRA fighters of continuing to kidnap villagers from South Sudan, Congo and the Central African Republic and then forcing them into the rebel ranks.

"The people of South Sudan should know we stand with them and we have the means to work together with them to solve some of these problems," Mr Museveni told reporters.

Uganda's military fought the LRA across South Sudan, but these clashes largely stopped in mid-2006 after peace talks began in Juba. The UN envoy to the conflict told journalists earlier on the Congo border that the negotiations with Kony were not dead, despite rebel infighting that apparently killed a fugitive commander and delayed the final signing.

Mr Joaquim Chissano, a former Mozambican president and UN special envoy, blamed a breakdown in communication with the elusive guerrilla boss. "The peace process is not dead. There is a lack of effective communication, and that's what the LRA leader wants," he said.

"There are people who are assisting in establishing that effective communication, and once that clarification is made the peace process will be back on the road."

Mr Chissano was expected to meet Mr Museveni later in Juba. However, hopes of reviving the peace process were fading yesterday as Kony continued to rebuff requests to contact the Chief Mediator and South Sudan Vice President, Dr Riek Machar, who has camped at Nabanga until the truce expires today.

The 22-year civil war has killed tens of thousands of people and uprooted two million more in northern Uganda alone. It has also destabilised neighbouring parts of Sudan's oil-producing south and eastern Congo, which has large mineral wealth.

Kony, who is wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, had been expected to sign a final agreement in Ri-Kwangba on Thursday. But he failed to show up.

An LRA spokesman said the rebel is ready to sign, but wants guarantees for his safety and financial security. Then on Sunday, rebel sources said disputes within the LRA over the proposed deal triggered gun battles last week that killed at least nine people - including Okot Odhiambo, a top commander who is also wanted by international prosecutors.

Kony, Odhiambo and a third senior rebel, Dominic Ongwen, were accused by the ICC in 2005 of offences including rape, murder and the abduction of thousands of children who were forced to serve the group as fighters, porters and sex slaves.

If confirmed, Odhiambo would become the third of five LRA suspects named by the ICC who have since died. Kony executed his deputy Vincent Otti last October after accusing him of being a government spy, while fifth indictee Raska Lukwiya was killed by the Ugandan military in August 2006.

Even if Kony does sign a peace agreement, the LRA says it will not disarm until the ICC indictments are scrapped. The Ugandan government has said it will only call for the warrants to be lifted after a final deal has been reached.

The world court says its warrants remain active, and that Uganda has a legal obligation to arrest the targets.



ICC issues arrest warrants for top LRA commanders, complicating peace efforts (January 2006)

- Chief peace mediator says ICC arrest warrants undermine peace efforts
- Amnesty process confused by ICC arrest warrants
- ICC warrants draws widespread praise
- International Crisis Group offers strategy to resolve 20-year conflict

IRIN, 17 October 2005

"The decision by the International Criminal Court's (ICC) to issue arrest warrants for the leaders of the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has changed the dynamics of ongoing peace talks between the Uganda government and the rebels, the mediator said.

"You can no longer talk to the LRA as before, the dynamics have changed. The situation is different and I would not like to talk to the LRA now because the ICC has not yet given me details of the warrant," Betty Bigombe told IRIN on Monday."

[...]

"The head of the Uganda Amnesty Commission (UAC), a statutory body set up by the government to give a blanket amnesty to surrendering rebels, also said the decision by the international court had left their work in "total confusion".

Since the commission started its work, we have based our sensitisation on the blanket amnesty and the impact has been tremendous. But now the issue has changed and we also have to deal with the uncertainty the ICC warrants have brought about," Peter Onega, the UAC chairman, told IRIN on Monday.

Onega said the warrants would scare away willing rebels and frustrate the commission's efforts to negotiate for ex-rebels' return.

"It means we have to start afresh to sensitise them [the rebels] that the warrant is only for a few people and the rest are free to come back home," he said.

"The statute establishing the ICC overrides the national laws and the court may decide to issue other warrants of arrest for people we have even issued amnesty to. Where does this leave the amnesty statute, where we derive our mandate?" he added" (IRIN, 10 October 2005).

"The EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, called on countries in the region to cooperate with the court to take its first ever indictments off the ground.

"I welcome this historic decision - the first ICC indictments ever - which expresses the Court's wish to put an end to the impunity in a region that suffered so much from grave human rights violations," Solana said in a statement on Friday.

"The EU has supported the ICC since its early beginnings. I call upon all countries in the region to cooperate with the ICC in the execution of this decision," he added.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the indictments would "send a powerful signal around the world that those responsible for such crimes will be held accountable for their actions."

"The Secretary-General calls on all states, particularly those in the region concerned, to extend their full cooperation to the ICC, including by acting expeditiously to execute the arrest warrants against the suspects, while taking seriously their responsibility to protect civilians, particularly women and children," a UN statement said on Friday."

IDPs prefer peace before justice (July 2005)

- International justice may hamper national peace efforts
- Representatives from Lango, Acholi, Iteso and Madi community leaders have requested the International Criminal Court (ICC) to reconsider its investigations against rebel leaders
- The conflict is still ongoing and the ICC has no special powers of arrest
- Pro-government politicians favour combining the peace and ICC processes

- Fear that the LRA will have no incentive to dialogue with the Government if they face arrest and detention by the ICC

Refugee Law Project, July 2005, p.5

"In response to numerous failed military attempts at resolving the conflict – with disastrous consequences for civilians – the government, under pressure from civil society, enacted an Amnesty Act in 2000, which allows rebels to receive amnesty if they voluntarily come out of the bush and renounce rebellion. Seen primarily as a tool for ending the war, it has allowed a significant number of combatants to escape from the rebels and, in theory, return to their communities. It must be noted that this conception of amnesty is very different than amnesties that have been implemented in other situations of transitional justice. The amnesty granted in Chile, for example, was granted to military personnel after the conflict was finished, and in blanket form, to keep them from being prosecuted in the trials that would come after. The amnesty granted in South Africa as part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process was granted on an ad hoc basis in exchange for testimony. The amnesty in Uganda has been declared before the end of the conflict. While people in Uganda appear to perceive of the amnesty as having been very much a tool to end the war, there is less clarity over the consequences it might have afterward.

At the same time, the [International Criminal Court \(ICC\)](#) was asked by President Museveni in December 2003 to investigate the actions of the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The ICC has now determined that there is enough evidence to begin an investigation. What this means, of course, is that those found guilty of crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, all of which have almost certainly been committed in the long-running conflict, will be sentenced and imprisoned according to the penalties set out in the Rome Statute, the legislation upon which the ICC is based.

As a result, there appears to be a contradiction between the Amnesty Act, seen by many as an alternative to punishment, and the investigations and subsequent punishment by the ICC.

Indeed, several delegations of Lango, Acholi, Iteso and Madi community leaders have prevailed upon the ICC to reconsider or at least to carefully consider its actions in light of the fact that the conflict is still ongoing and the ICC has no special powers of arrest. In other words, people want the amnesty to take precedence at the moment, even though the granting of amnesty to senior members of the LRA is not necessarily a final measure in the minds of many; certain individuals could still face prosecution by the ICC. It also raises the question as to just how far down the chain of command such prosecutions will reach – at what "rank" or number of crimes against humanity or war crimes committed will the prosecutors cap their investigations? Yet another question is the perceived adequacy of any punishment that the ICC can offer, since internationally-conceived prison conditions are vastly different than what prisoners could expect in Uganda. Numerous additional logistical and legal questions surround the whole viability of the process. Ultimately, however, the people living in the war-affected region will have to live with the decisions that are being made."

OCHA, 22 June 2005

"Another issue that complicates the search for peace in northern Uganda is the continuation of the investigation of senior LRA commanders, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity committed during the insurgency. While civil society organisations, religious, traditional, and some political leaders from northern Uganda believe that the investigations and

the potential issuance of arrest warrants against top LRA commanders do not serve the cause of peace in northern Uganda. Pro-government politicians favour combining the peace and ICC processes to put pressure on the LRA."

LIU Institute, May 2005

"The initiation of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Northern and Eastern Uganda has sparked intense debate on its impact on the prospects for peace in the region. On one side of the debate, it is argued that the Chief Prosecutor's timing negatively impacts the efforts of Betty Bigombe, chief mediator between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), to re-initiate talks. The fear is that the LRA will have no incentive to dialogue with the Government if they face arrest and detention. Second, the investigation provides a disincentive for rebel commanders to come out under the provision of the Ugandan Amnesty Act (2000). Third, the investigation undermines the efforts of locally-based civil society groups to support the peaceful return and reintegration of combatants under the Amnesty. On the other side, the Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo's investigation has had a positive impact, facilitating prospects for realizing sustainable peace, primarily by drawing greater international attention to the conflict and pressuring conflicting parties to resolve it.

This Human Security Update examines the origins and evolution of the two sides of the debate on 'peace vs. justice' and attempts to bring them into conversation. Recent efforts to exchange information and views on this topic may provide an entry point for finding a balanced approach between international and local initiatives. Both approaches have relative merits and limitations. Neither are a stand-alone solution, but a well-planned, long-term, coordinated and transparent approach could stimulate both peace and justice in the region.

The origins and evolution of the debate

The current debate surrounding the ICC's investigation does not revolve around the necessity of an international criminal justice system, nor the concept of the International Criminal Court; the issue is timing. As His Highness Rwot David Onen Acana II, Paramount Chief of the Acholi, explains: "we all need justice. Peace and justice go together, but let's work on the peace first and the justice later on".¹ Bryn Higgs, Uganda Programme Development Officer for Conciliation Resources, further explains the position: "to start war crimes investigations for the sake of justice at a time when northern Uganda sees the most promising signs for a negotiated settlement of the violence risks having in the end neither justice nor peace delivered".² This view should not, however, be seen as the population's support for either LRA leader Joseph Kony or impunity.³ Nor is the ICC viewed as an irrelevant or anti-conflict resolution institution; its inception will have a tremendous impact on the future protection of human rights and justice of those committing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression."

Anti-terrorism laws undermine Amnesty Act of 2000 (May 2004)

- The Amnesty act was intended to grant any combatant who surrendered voluntarily immunity from prosecution
- It initially ran for six months, but has been extended six times – most recently on 17 January 2004 for an additional three months
- While the Amnesty Act grants amnesty for those engaged in 'war or armed rebellion', the Anti-Terrorism Act provides for the death sentence for someone 'influencing the government or influencing the public... for a political, religious, social or economic aim
- The amnesty does not apply to the top LRA commanders

- Very few LRA rebels – only 3,848 – have taken advantage of the amnesty law and been resettled

Christian Aid, 10 May 2004

"The Ugandan government's Amnesty Act of 2000 has been completely undermined by the War on Terror. The act was passed as a result of pressure from non-governmental organisations, many supported by Christian Aid, which were concerned about the plight of the conflict's victims. Many of them are also the perpetrators. The act was intended to grant any combatant who surrendered voluntarily immunity from prosecution.

It initially ran for six months, but has been extended six times – most recently on 17 January 2004 for an additional three months. The whole process, however, has been plagued by a lack of resources for adequate resettlement packages. The World Bank has promised US\$3.6 million to help resettle 15,000 former rebels. But, according to Justice Peter Onega, the chairman of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, it is demanding proof of the government's commitment: 'One of the conditions of the World Bank is that the commission must be in existence at least for the next two years.'

Of more concern to those involved in the amnesty process is the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 – another of the Ugandan government's moves following September 11, 2001. While the Amnesty Act grants amnesty for those engaged in 'war or armed rebellion', the Anti-Terrorism Act provides for the death sentence for someone 'influencing the government or influencing the public... for a political, religious, social or economic aim'. Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorism Act designated the LRA a terrorist organisation, membership of which is a criminal offence.

Thus, anyone attempting to establish a dialogue with the LRA is immediately branded a collaborator. This has particularly affected the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARPLI), a multi-religious organisation, which advocates communication with the LRA. Members of ARPLI, which is a Christian Aid partner, are under surveillance and have been threatened by the military.

Loud public statements by the government advocate a military end to the war and so directly contradict the concept of amnesty. President Museveni has repeatedly said that the amnesty does not apply to the top LRA commanders. As one man in a camp for displaced people in Kitgum asked, 'Museveni has agreed [to] the amnesty, but then he starts to talk of killing the rebels, of wiping them out. How can Kony know which one is true?'

Predictably, very few LRA rebels – only 3,848 – have taken advantage of the amnesty law and been resettled. Peter Olowa, in the Kitgum office of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, says that without money the whole amnesty process is doomed to failure."

Premature peace hopes, 1994-2005

- Tight limitations on February 2005 ceasefire risk undermining it as soon as it starts
- Glimmer of hopes for peace in January 2005
- Hopes for peace and return shattered in March 2003
- Hopes for return shattered in February 2002
- Hopes for gradual return shattered in November 2001
- Peace talks ended in 1994 when President Museveni gave the LRA seven days to put down their weapons and turn themselves over to the government

Oxfam, 4 February 2005

"The new ceasefire between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda, which takes effect today, has been welcomed, but Oxfam warns that 18 years of conflict cannot be ended in 18 days.

The Government of Uganda has today announced a renewed but limited ceasefire with the LRA. The ceasefire will last for only 18 days and cover an area of only 50 square kilometres.

"This is a desperate situation and any step towards peace is a step in the right direction. The LRA needs to respond to this ceasefire positively. At the same time, we are worried that the tight limitations on this ceasefire risk undermining it as soon as it starts. Attacks by both sides have led to a break down in trust that has to be rebuilt. We think that more time and patience is needed to rebuild confidence in the process and get down to real discussion about how to end this war. 18 years of conflict cannot be ended in 18 days," said Emma Naylor, Head of Oxfam Uganda.

The conflict has already had dire humanitarian consequences for the lives of 1.6 million people.

Oxfam is calling for the international community to use its influence to end the suffering and support the peace process. The United Nations Security Council met last week in New York. The council offered nothing more than a few remarks to the press and failed to take any substantive action.

"We must ensure a supportive environment for these talks. We urge the Ugandan government and the LRA to give this process their full commitment, whatever setbacks may occur along the way. We also call upon the international community to support these talks. We must make this peace process work and end the suffering of millions of people hanging in the balance," added Emma Naylor, Head of Oxfam Uganda."

ARLPI, 31 May 2004

"Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni said on Wednesday [January 2005] his army had defeated the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, whom he advised to surrender, saying no retribution awaited them.

In an address to the nation marking the 19th anniversary of his rise to power, Museveni made no reference to on-going peace efforts aimed at ending the 18-year war between the military and the LRA, which has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in northern Uganda.

There had been a glimmer of hope on Tuesday that the peace process might be moving ahead when the chief mediator, former Ugandan minister Betty Bigombe, announced that "by the end of the week, both sides will have agreed on a date when to sign a ceasefire agreement".

Museveni said: "Kony's group has been completely defeated and its remnants are simply fugitives whom we are capturing day by day [...] Those still remaining in the bush should come out now, because they have nothing to fear."

Museveni took power on January 26, 1986 after a five-year bush war. A few months later, armed men - mostly from the defeated government army - began a rebellion in the north of the country.

In 1987, an agreement was reached between Museveni's government and the main rebel Uganda People's Defence Army. However, some of the rebels joined a new group, the Holy Spirit

Movement led by Priestess Alice Lakwena, which later gave rise to the LRA."(IRIN, 27 January 2005).

"Has anything changed in Northern Uganda during the last few months? [...]

Judging things from the ground, experience has taught us that in the Northern Uganda war things need to be taken cautiously avoiding being over-optimistic. During the 18-year old war there have been some other similar moments. The much-repeated statements that "the war is almost over" or that "it is generally calm" are not new to our ears. There are moments in which we think that the violence is scaling down, only to be taken by surprise by another massacre, as it happened in Odek on April 29 (see chronology attached). The situation continues to be very serious, and so far the supposed wearing out of the LRA is not having much effect in having any significant impact in changing in the lives of the at least 1.6 million displaced persons staying in the camps. Abductions, although generally unreported in the Press these days, continue almost on a daily basis and a good number of them end up being killed in armed clashes and reported as "rebels killed".

Is an outright victory by the UPDF possible? Supporters of this view often refer to the defeat of the ADF in Western Uganda as an example. Whether this is possible or not, ARLPI's view has always been that peace achieved by military means on the long run is not as sustainable as peace achieved by dialogue. The thousands of parents whose children were abducted and who have lost them during armed clashes may remain with a bitterness that will not go away easily.

Moreover, even with the scenario of a weakened LRA without support from Sudan the chronic insecurity might not stop at once. The LRA violence may continue even without any military assistance from Sudan. In order to get a comprehensive solution that will last we need to keep working on a peaceful settlement that will end with a general demobilisation of the LRA. This is the main challenge still lying ahead of us.

In this respect, President Museveni's public statement on April 15 [2004] that he was ready to talk to the rebel leaders either directly or through mediators is surely a step in the right direction. The UPDF new top command is also more positive about peace dialogue with the rebels. Although there is not yet a clear response from the LRA –whose second-in-command Vincent Ottii rings people here and there every now and then but so far with no concrete proposals- all these new developments open a glimpse of hope for the near future, even if we may not go beyond a cautious and moderate optimism.

Announcements about the intended amendment of the Amnesty Law (which expires on May 17th) and the International Criminal Court's possible prosecution of the LRA top leadership have had an adverse effect in making the scenario of peace talks easy."

OCHA, 2 October 2002

Apart from the Ugandan army's troubled campaign against Kony, there have been some, so far unsuccessful, attempts to bring a peaceful end to the war. These peace initiatives have included a presidential peace team, which was established by Museveni with a view to starting serious negotiations.

However, the initiative has floundered after a ceasefire agreement was dishonoured, and it is now a widely held view in the north that the Ugandan government is primarily interested in wiping out the LRA by force, rather than reaching a settlement through dialogue.

Some civil society groups, most notably the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARPLI), have tried to fill the vacuum left by the failure of government-led initiatives. However, members of this team have also been frustrated by an apparent unwillingness on the part of the rebels to come out of the bush to negotiate, and by the difficulties in talking peace while war is still being waged.

Fr. Carlos Rodriguez, a high-profile member of the ARPLI, says the time has come for international mediation to resolve the conflict, and that the LRA would also respond positively to such engagement.

This is a sentiment shared by Baker Ochola, the retired Bishop of Kitgum. 'Those being targeted are the children, women and the elderly. This is why we feel there is a need for the international community to put pressure on the Ugandan government and Sudan in order to give a break to the people,' he told IRIN." (UN OCHA, 15 September 2003)

"Following recent peace moves by the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army(LRA), there is hope that finally an end may be in sight to the bloody insurrection in the north of the country" (IRIN 12 March 2003)

"The government is estimating that peace will have returned to the north of the country by February 2003 and resettlement of displaced populations to have taken place in March. However it has not put forward any timetable for peace talks with rebels."

Government hoped that IDPs would be able to return to their homes by early April 2002

OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.31-33

"As Kony's position is weakened and the UPDF estimates LRA numbers in Uganda at only 100 with a further 300 in southern Sudan, Museveni appears confident that there will be a direct, and positive, impact on the situation for IDPs in the north and he has expressed a hope that IDPs will be able to return to their homes by early April. While there continue to be a small number of attacks and ambushes on roads, these are often attributable to banditry and incidences of abduction have decreased. In response, IDPs have begun to venture out of the camps to work in their gardens and travel to their villages, a trend that had already been noticed in Kitgum over the last six months, and is now apparent in Gulu where 25% of the IDP population are estimated to be accessing their gardens."

Hopes for gradual return of the civilian population to their homesteads or villages of origin(2002)

UN Uganda, 30 November 2001

"The North (Gulu, Pader, Kitgum):_Most Likely Scenario: it is assumed that the Amnesty Act (Section 1.2), with its option for active combatants to report for their Amnesty Certificate and return to normal life, will weaken the strength of the LRA and its impact on the civilian population. Additional efforts will be made by Khartoum and Kampala to bring an end to the meaningless attacks on the civilian populations. LRA rebel activity will consequently decline, including looting, abductions and sporadic attacks, as was experienced during 2001. This will result in a gradual return of the civilian population to their homesteads or villages of origin."

Increasing isolation of LRA facilitated return(First half of 2002-before military offensive)

IRIN, 11 January 2002

"Improvements in security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA in recent months had facilitated the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas, humanitarian sources told IRIN on Thursday, 10 January 2002.

'It is happening in a fairly ad hoc manner. It is pretty slow but it is going in the right direction,' they said.

The population of one of the largest camps at Pabbo, Gulu District, had fallen by around 5,000 and was now estimated at 41,000 people, sources added.

The president assuring IDP that they would be able to return during 2002

IRIN, 11 January 2002

"Although the Ugandan government has no clear policy on tackling internal displacement, Museveni said in his end of year address that the security status of the northern and western Uganda would improve enough to allow the IDP camps to be dismantled.

"I would like to assure those Ugandans that are still in those camps that they will be able to go back to their homes this year," he said on Radio Uganda on 31 December."

Political changes may result in the resolution of the long-running LRA rebellion (2001)

UN November 2001, p.6

"Events that have contributed to the comparative quiet include:

The ongoing Amnesty;

A number of community based peace initiatives such as the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI);

Government's efforts to dialogue with the LRA rebels, spearheaded by the Gulu LCV Chairperson's meeting with several LRA Commanders on June 4th; and

Improved relations between the governments of Sudan and Uganda, which led to Sudan Government's formal decision to cut support to the LRA on August 20th.

Further, as part of the peace overtures to restore diplomatic relations (broken in 1995), Sudan reopened its embassy in Kampala August 2001, with Uganda doing the same in Khartoum a month later. These political changes may result in the resolution of the long-running LRA rebellion. Gulu district officials are already reviewing the possibility of resettling IDPs in camps nearer to their homes."

Peace talks ended when President Museveni gave the Lord's Resistance Army seven days to lay down weapons in 1994

Westbrook June 2000, sects. III, VI

"By 1994, things had once again reached a state where the government felt it needed to attempt to bring peace to the north. Thus, in 1994, peace talks were held between Kony and the NRM. These talks were facilitated by Betty Bigombe. Bigombe, herself an Acholi, was then the Minister for Pacification of the North. Bigombe's efforts very nearly came to fruition. It is said that, at the time, LRA soldiers were staying freely in the trading centers and that a cease-fire existed. These talks ended badly when President Museveni suddenly announced that he was giving the LRA

seven days to put down their weapons and turn themselves over to the government. Within three days of this announcement, the LRA had once again begun attacking.

After the breakdown of the 1994 talks, any support that the LRA had enjoyed from the Acholi people dried up. Thus, the mass abduction of children began in early 1995.

[...]

Clearly, the people of Acholi-land have little stomach for a movement that has inflicted so much harm and contributed so greatly to the destruction of their culture and people. Whatever support the LRA has enjoyed in the past in Acholi-land has long since dissipated."

OCHA 23 May 2001, "Historical Backdrop"

"The Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) deployed in all main trading centres throughout Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts and continued to engage in low-intensity battles with the LRA until February 1996, when the later, buttressed by alleged arms and logistical from Khartoum, escalated its attacks against Acholi communities. By July 1996, the LRA had attacked numerous locations throughout Gulu in what appeared to be a campaign to breed fear amongst the population and to force the UPDF to respond in a more forceful and imprecise manner. There followed numerous incidents of Acholi citizens being caught up in "friendly fire" or of being brutally interrogated and accused of being LRA collaborators."

Regional aspects: Sudan, DRC, CAR

Agreement Between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda, 8 December 1999

United States Institute for Peace, 8 December 1999

"In order to enhance relations between our two countries and to promote peace in the regions, we make the following commitments:

Each of us will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other, in accordance with the charters of the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity.

We renounce the use of force to resolve differences, and will take steps to prevent any hostile acts against each other.

We will make every effort to disband and disarm terrorist groups and to prevent any acts of terrorism or hostile actions that might originate in our territory that might endanger the security of the other nation.

We agree not to harbor, sponsor, or give military or logistical support to any rebel groups, opposition groups, or hostile elements from each others' territories.

We will join in a common effort to promote regional peace, both on our own initiative and in full support and in no way to prejudice or interfere with IGAD's role in bringing an end to the civil war in Sudan.

We will refrain from hostile and negative propaganda campaigns against each other.

We will return all prisoners of war to their respective nations.

We especially condemn any abuse or injury of innocent citizens, and will make a special effort to locate any abductees, especially children, who have been abducted in the past and return them to their families. All information about such cases will be shared with The Carter Center, UNICEF, and other international organizations and we will cooperate fully in the search and rescue of these victims, beginning immediately with those who can be identified.

We will honor international laws governing refugees, NGO activities, and cross-border transportation, and facilitate the return or resettlement of refugees in accordance with UNHCR regulations.

We will offer amnesty and reintegration assistance to all former combatants who renounce the use of force.

If all other terms of this agreement are honored satisfactorily, we desire to reestablish normal relations between our two countries. Within a month of this date, we will open offices in both capital cities and assign junior diplomatic personnel for service. By the end of February 2000, ambassadors will be exchanged and full diplomatic relations restored.

In order to implement this agreement, designated members of our contact groups will act as an interim committee. As soon as practical, a joint ministerial committee will be established with at least three sub committees, to deal with political, security, and humanitarian issues.

We understand that, when requested, the Carter Center will publicize this agreement and continue to play a role in its implementation."

Involvement of CAR and Sudan (April 2008)

- LRA fighters reported to have moved from from their hide-out in the DRC to CAR

In August 2007 the president of the Central African Republic (CAR), General Francois Bozize, visited Uganda. Commentators saw the renewed contact between the two countries, which last had official dealings in the 1970s, as an attempt by Museveni to win support from Bozize to pursue the LRA militarily should it seek to relocate from its hide-out in the DRC to CAR.

Reuters, 2 April 2008

"Officials in the Sudanese military say Kony's fighters have been seen crossing the porous border area between Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).

That has fuelled speculation among diplomats that the LRA may have forged links with Sudan-backed rebels there.

Khartoum backed the LRA in a proxy war with Uganda in the 1990s, in retaliation for Uganda's supporting south Sudanese rebels. But a peace deal in Sudan in 2005 removed Kony's safe haven in its south, forcing him to relocate to eastern Congo."

The Khartoum government backed the LRA in the 1990s, in retaliation for Uganda's support for separatist rebels in southern Sudan, and some commentators have expressed concerns that the Sudanese government might have an interest in ensuring that the LRA survives, so that it is available as a proxy militia in Southern Sudan should the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the southern Sudanese collapse:

ICG, 14 September 2007, p. 6

"Safer, well-supplied and stronger, the LRA also retains a relationship with the Sudanese government. Its leaders have told people close to the peace process they continue to talk to officials but insist Khartoum has no real influence. In March in Garamba, however, Otti told visitors that, "we are in Congo because [Sudanese President Omar] Bashir told us to come here, and we will stay in Congo until Bashir tells us to leave". There have been credible reports that elements within the Khartoum government have sent supplies to the LRA in CAR. But any support is small and difficult to trace. Khartoum is mainly interested in ensuring that the LRA can survive the next few years so it is available if needed as a proxy in southern Sudan if the troubled CPA collapses."

LRA abducts people in CAR and Sudan (April 2008)

The Monitor, 14 April 2008

"Kony is reportedly moving in the vast Garamba forest with between 300-500 abducted civilians from Central African Republic, Sudan and DRC."

OCHA, 31 March 2008

"The security situation in northern Uganda has remained generally quiet throughout the month, with no reports of activity by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the region. However, LRA movements from the Democratic Republic of Congo toward the Central African Republic have been reported. Two incidents, allegedly involving LRA groups, were also reported. The first, a raid on the village of Ezo (between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Sudan) was reported to have occurred on 16-17 March, with approximately 20 people abducted. The second – looting at Nabiapai (21 kilometres south of Yambio) – reportedly occurred on 22 March."

Background to the conflict in the Karamajong affected area

Complex causes of conflict result in displacement within Karamoja (August 2005)

- No single cause to account for frequent, unpredictable and intermittent conflict amongst Karamajong
- Peace building initiatives have been unable to bring about resolution, due to complexity of cause-effect relationship
- A web of social-cultural, economic, political and environmental factors have led to intensified conflict
- Conflict and displacement contribute to poverty levels

USAID, August 2005, Pg: 10-11:

“Pastoralist conflicts in the region are very complex and take place within several levels of the Cluster:

1. Intra-clan conflicts, the most common type, are characterized by sections of one community (clan) or one Sub-county (Sub division) fighting with one another. The Tepeth and Matheniko have long been in conflict, and the Dodoth and the Ik (Teuso) have sometimes clashed over suspicion that the Ik give protection to the Turkana. Intra-clan conflicts increased in scale in 1980s. Myth in Matheniko holds that raiding began in Karamoja as a curse from the most prominent elder, Lokolimoi. Inter-clan conflict brings the different clan of Karamoja against each other, for instances, Pokot versus Matheniko, Jie versus Bokora, Turkana versus Pokot, or Pian versus Bokora. Since 1987, inter-clan clashes have become more violent and regular and involve all different clans of Karamoja confronting each other.
2. Inter district conflicts bring the Karamajong against other tribes/ communities living in the districts neighboring the Cluster, possibly within the same country.
3. Cross border conflicts take place across the international borders of the Karamajong cluster groups where conflict exists between one tribe in one country against another tribe in the neighboring country. For example, the Karamajong of Uganda fighting the Turkana of Kenya or the Toposa of Sudan, or the Turkana of Kenya fighting the Merile of Ethiopia. Due to their complexity, cross border conflicts between the Turkana and the Karamajong pose a challenge to conflict analysis and management. Conflicts do not involve an entire group within either country, but one particular clan of Karamoja in Uganda against one particular section of the Turkana of Kenya. It may at any one time be the Jie against Kwatela, the Dodoth against the Lukmong, the Matheniko against the Woyakwara, or the Ngisonyoka against the Pokot. Each of these paired sections share frontiers.”


USAID, August 2005, Pg. 12 and 30:

“The causes of conflict in Karamajong cluster are varied and complex. There is no single cause to account for the frequent, unpredictable, and intermittent conflict in the Cluster.

There is no clear distinction either between the causes and outcomes of conflict in the region. At the far end of the continuum, the two appear to merge i.e. what appears to be a cause appears as a consequence too. Some issues emerging as causes as well as results pose a challenge to processes analysis and to the design of strategies and program to address them. The complexity of cause-effect relationship is probably one of the main reasons why peace building initiatives are not able to bring an end to conflict in the region.

A web of socio-cultural, economic, political, and environmental factors has led to intensification of conflict in the region. There is general agreement by respondents on a number of factors leading to conflicts in the Cluster. However, different people give differing emphasis and significance on varied causes. The main causes of conflict identified in the Cluster are summarized in the model below.”

Figure 1: Main causes of conflict in the Cluster



“Although conflict and poverty influence each other, conflict is one of the major causes of the poverty prevalent in the Cluster. Conflicts within the Cluster are reportedly responsible for the pastoralists’ under development. The unrelenting skirmishes are blamed for the displacements of whole settlements and for destitution in the region. In Todonyang village (Lapur division, Turkana District) for instance, frequent raids from neighboring Dassenech forced the relocation of the entire village to Lowareng’ak, twenty-three kilometers away. The attendant poverty and destitution is visible in the kind of livelihood activities undertaken by the newly displaced. These activities include fishing, basketry, and small scale retail trade. In such areas, pastoralism as a livelihood activity is itself threatened since very few pastoralist respondents are willing to take up the activity again because of lack of initial capital and the prevailing insecurity.”

Inter and extra communal violence among the Karamajong (July 2005)

- Two days of clashes between local warriors and soldiers killing at least 19 people (July 2005)
- At least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader district) by Karimojong armed herdsmen (February 2003)
- Karamojong raids perpetuate displacement in Kalongo township (April 2003)
- The Karamojong tribes Pian and Bokora clashed (February 2003)
- Kenyan cattle rustlers attacked two villages in Karamoja killing ten stealing 700 cattle (February 2003)

IRIN, 18 July 2005

"At least 19 people, including seven government soldiers, were killed during two days of clashes between local warriors and soldiers over control of livestock in the Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda, a military spokesman said on Monday.

Lt Gabriel Lomongin said trouble began when Pian warriors raided cattle from the rival Bokora ethnic group early last week. After soldiers recovered the cattle on Thursday, the Pian ambushed the army and a battle ensued. The attack was unprecedented because these people have always run to us whenever their herds are raided and we recover the animals, but this time the Pian clan from Amulek Kraal in Nakapiripirit district decided to attack our forces," the spokesman told IRIN.

Politicians from the area said several civilians were killed in crossfire and others were injured.

Paul Lokeris, MP, said more than 50 civilians were killed. Lomongin denied this, saying the fighting was not in the more highly populated areas of the district.

A humanitarian source in the region told IRIN no relief had so far reached those injured in the clashes, most of whom were too poor to afford medical treatment for their injuries. Many of them had lost their homes and all their property in the battle.

Lokeris blamed the army for the clashes: "Very many people were killed and so many were injured. About 200 huts and 400 granaries were torched by the army and property looted; about 800 people are homeless now," he said.

Following the fight the army launched an operation in Nabilatuk, the area where the clashes took place, to forcibly recover illegal guns.

"We have decided that whenever they fire at us, we will confiscate their animals and ask them to surrender their weapons," Lomongin said. "We want to pinch them where it hurts, and that is when you touch a goat, a sheep and a cow of the Karamojong."

Asked about the upsurge in these incidents, he said the rainy season had resulted in overgrown grass and shrubs that the warriors were using as cover to stage attacks.

The Ugandan army carried out a disarmament exercise in Karamoja in 2001, but it was effectively abandoned in 2002 when soldiers were redeployed to deal with the long-running conflict in northern Uganda against the rebel Lord's Resistance Army.

The Karamojong, for whom rustling is a cultural habit, formerly employed rudimentary tools such as spears, bows and arrows in their raids. Now they use guns. There have also been cross-border raids between communities living on the Uganda-Kenya border."

OCHA, April 2003

"The Joint Communication Centre must be strengthened to allow more efficient information exchange between UPDF and district authorities on security issues

A report by the Kalongo peace committee of Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI), released early April, indicates that at least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader district) by Karimojong armed herdsman during the months of February and March.2003

The report also indicated that 68,000 people have been displaced in Kalongo Township due to continuous acts of violence perpetrated by LRA rebels, Karimojong warriors and undisciplined UPDF soldiers. It also listed a total of 150 huts and hundreds of granaries allegedly burnt down in UPDF arson attacks aimed at forcing people into IDP camps."

USAID, 4 Feb 2003

"According to a UPDF spokesman, an estimated 30 people died in northeastern Karamoja Region in mid-January following clashes between two rival clans of the Karamojong tribe, the Pian and the Bokora. The dry season has led to clans moving with their livestock in search of pasture and water, prompting conflicts over limited resources. In an unrelated event, a group of suspected Kenyan cattle rustlers attacked two villages in Karamoja at the beginning of January, resulting in ten deaths and more than 700 cattle taken."

Historical complicity between the government and Karamajong warriors (June 2005)**Government of Uganda, 15 June 2005**

"Cattle rustling in Teso Region have existed since the 1940s. In the beginning, the cattle rustlers used spears and later locally made guns called "Amatida". This low capacity limited cattle rustling activities to the borderline areas of Karamoja and the then Soroti District. Cattle rustling reached its peak between 1986 and 1990 when the Karamojong warriors overran the whole of Teso region. This was at the time when there was rebellion in Teso against the government and delivery of social services including security broke down. The affected people moved into government facilities like sub county H/Q, dispensaries, schools which later became camps where government provided security through the local militia and soldiers. Today there are over 74 Karamojong induced camps hosting about 176,911 people in Katakwi district."

Competition for natural resources (December 2001)

- Introduction of modern weapons removed relevance of elders as a stabilizing element within the Karamajong communities
- The "so-called "Karamajong problem" arose partly because the colonial government adopted a policy to maintain Karamajo's natural heritage for tourism purposes
- In line with this colonial policy, the Obote I government Created Kidepo National Park thus destroying the Karamajong's access to grazing and watering points
- Endemic mistrust also developed, which furthered repressive policies, such as the use of heavy artillery and tanks in the region.
- Collapse of pastoral economy and lucrative arms trade has created vicious circle of violence
- The Sahara desert has continued to move southwards

Minority Rights Group International, December 2001, pp. 6, 14, 19

"The so-called Karamoja problem arose because the colonial government adopted a policy to maintain Karamajo's natural heritage for tourism purposes, a policy that never took of due to a break-down of law an order after Uganda gained independence. Successive post-independence have dealt with the 'Karamajo problem' as a problem of refusal to change and integrate, i.e. as a 'social deviance' problem. Government policies, as reflected in the wording of relevant laws and decrees, for example the Pacification of Karamoja Decree, deny the Karamajong any meaningful participation in their own social-cultural reforms. Extremes of post-independence policy came under in the mid-1970s. The government sought to 'civilise' the Karamajong using heavy artillery, including tanks, to stop Karamajong cattle raids in neighbouring areas. This lead to a very heavy death toll that Amin billed as a 'final solution to the Karamajong problem'. However, after the fall of Amin, the Karamajong renewed their resistance to government pressure to abandon their pastoral lifestyle.

During the 1960s, the Turkana from the West and the Toposa from the North with modern firearms and especially high-powered rifles-began frequent incursions into Karamoja, raiding for cattle and whatever else they could take. The armed police of the Ugandan government who were stationed in Karamoja were ineffectual in responding to these raids. This predicament continued until the coup by Amin in 1971 brought a different armed force into the district. While Amin's Army was more brutally efficient in stopping the raiders, the recovered livestock was stolen by the soldiers and sold to local cattle traders. This caused the Karamajong to distrust all formal government initiatives and to increasingly resort to self-help, creating a vigilant culture in addition to traditional cattle raiding.

[...]

Competition for scarce resources, particularly water and pasture, and the high value placed on cattle have produced a culture of raiding and warfare within which men are noted for their bravery and their wealth. This practice leads to a vicious circle in which the Matheniko raid the Bokora, Jie and Labwor; and the Bokora and the Jie raid the Matheniko. The Dodoth and Matheniko seem to have a permanent peace treaty, but the Dodoth raid the Jie and Turkana of Kneya. The Bokora, Dodoth, Jie and Matheniko all raid Labwor. This complicated cycle is underlain by the fact that men need cattle to marry. Young men have a powerful incentive to establish their reputation and build their own herds through mounting raids on other pastoral groups. [...]

Since colonial times, the Ugandan government has pursued legislative and taxation policies which, in practice, have led to only wild animals being allowed to live inside the national parks and reserves. The establishment of given areas as game parks and reserves has, since its inception in colonial times, caused affected minority groups to be totally uprooted and dispossessed. ... One enduring example is the British colonial government-originated 'conservation of Karamoja for tourist purposes' project.

[...]

This 'human reserve'-type scheme harmed and stigmatized the Karamajong, and reinforced false and offensive images of their being 'primitive' or 'backward'. In the 1960s, the Obote I government followed this policy and created Kidepo national Park. The creation of this park destroyed the Karamajong's access to grazing and watering points during the dry seasons. This has resulted in conflict between the Karamajong (in search of water and pasture) and their neighbours during the dry seasons. The fact that the Sahara desert has continued to move south and has therefore prolonged the droughts-sometimes lasting for a year at a time-has also prolonged the Karamajong's search for water. This has led to an intensification of conflict, mainly with their southern neighbours, the Itesot. Most governments have failed to understand this process.: instead they have often sanctioned fighting the army to attack and kill the Karamajong, frequently in large numbers, or have sanctioned fighting between rival groups."

The role of small arms in Karamoja (2000)

- Widespread availability of small arms amongst the Karamojong pastoralists and cattle raiding a tradition in the area
- Museveni allowed the Karamojong to retain their arms in order to protect themselves from external raids by the Turkana and Pokot in neighbouring Kenya.
- Drought ignited raiding by the Karimojong and displacement in the districts of Katakwi, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi during first half of 2000
- Normalised security situation facilitated return by mid-2000
- During 2001 there were reports of over 55 recorded violent attacks by Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers on neighbouring Katakwi District – causing new displacement
- During 2002 Karimojong attacks were reduced to thefts resulting in slight decrease of displacements and improved access to gardens

EPCPT December 2000

"The north-east of the country is inhabited by the Karamojong pastoralists, a marginalised minority of about 100,000 people. Since the Karamojong acquired automatic weapons the region has become a virtual no-go area. The area is suffering from environmental degradation and is periodically struck by famine. The military has been involved in regular punishment expeditions in the fight against cattle-raiding. Vigilantes have taken the law into their own hands, resulting in a breakdown of law and order. Guns are plentiful and gangs have terrorised the local population. An estimated 30,000 illegal weapons are in circulation which are used to rustle cattle and ambush and raid vehicles. These raids extend across the borders into Kenya and Sudan and on numerous occasions have provoked serious incidents with neighbouring countries."



IRIN, 22 March 2000

"The issue of the Karamojong warriors has been a thorn in the side of all Ugandan governments since independence. The current government of President Yoweri Museveni allowed the Karamojong to retain their arms in order to protect themselves from external raids by the Turkana and Pokot in neighbouring Kenya.

[...]

The Karamojong have maintained their armouries by buying guns cheaply from the SPLA [Sudan People's Liberation Army], and other sources in Somalia and northwestern Kenya," Wairagala Wakabi, a journalist with 'The EastAfrican' who specialises in the movement of small arms in the region told IRIN. "They have the option of barter trade where they exchange animals for guns."

ADF-induced displacement

The threat from Allied Democratic Forces reduced (2003)

- Relative calm in southwestern and west Nile region (2002-03)
- A team of defence attaches declared Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe from rebel infiltrators (April 2002)
- Numbers of IDP decreasing steadily (2002-03)
- Improved security further to "decisive action" (2001)

UN, November 2002, p.6

"Developments in the situation in southwestern Uganda are more positive. The threat from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) appears to have reduced significantly and the Amnesty Commission and Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) are currently approaching donors in Uganda for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the ADF as stipulated by

the Amnesty Act (2000). As a result, the situation in the Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo District, is much calmer. As a direct result, an increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to smaller settlements near their places of origin. While there has been no recent verification of the numbers in IDP camps in Bundibugyo (last established in February 2002 at 87,000), there are indications that up to 40,000 people have since left the camps. Similar returns has taken place in Kasese and Kabarole, where all IDPs have either returned home or integrated in the community.

[...]

Other areas previously affected by conflict (southwestern Uganda and most of West Nile region) continue to experience relative calm. In these areas, transition and rehabilitation efforts, the second focus of the 2003 CAP, can be pursued."

OCHA, July/August 2002

"Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks beginning in 1996 up to mid-2001 caused displacement of local populations, limited access to land, insecurity, collapse in purchasing power, family income/assets and morals. Bundibugyo District bore the brunt of the ADF attacks and had the largest number of IDPs in the region, which peaked at 120,000 in the year 2000. To date Bundibugyo is reported as the only district with IDPs in Southwestern or Rwenzori region. Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken, most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated into the community."

OCHA, April/May 2002

"A team of defence attaches from America, UK, France, Kenya and South Africa have declared the Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe from rebel infiltrators. The team, led by Richard Orth, the American defence attaché and dean to all defence attaches in Uganda, was on a fact-finding mission in the region during the week beginning 6th May 2002. This comes in the wake of over twelve months of calm in the Rwenzori region, which has seen several IDPs voluntarily return nearer to their homes. Further, UPDF second division commander, Col. Poteli Kivuna, reportedly said the displaced were free to go back to their homes."

But signs of a safer situation by end-2001

UN November 2001, p.6

"ADF attacks have decreased in number and magnitude since the year began. Save for the March 17th attack on Kasese, where unknown terrorists were involved, calm has reigned in the region, with very few Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks reported. With hope that this quiet is more than a lull in the storm, IDPs in Bundibugyo now have access to more garden areas during the day while still seeking the safety of camps at night. Approximately 20% have boldly resettled in four new camps nearer to their homes with the aim of increasing their food production. Consequently, the district is providing security to the new camps and humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of aiding IDPs resettlement in both Bundibugyo and Kabarole."

Rebel activities continues unabated (first half of 2001)

OCHA, 30 April 2001, p.31

"In the Southwest, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity continues unabated. Although the Kasese attack on 17 March was not linked to the ADF, on March 28 heavily armed ADF rebels attacked Hamukungu fishing village – about 30km southwest of Kasese town – reportedly killing three and abducting four. In early April, the UPDF claimed, however, to have reduced the force to 'less than 100' and to have overrun a local commander's headquarters. President Museveni has also declared a departure from the 'softer approach' implied in the initial amnesty offer and decreed decisive action to bring the terrorist threat to an end through strengthened UPDF

measures against them. IDPs in the Southwest remain hesitant about returning to the homes, due to continuing fear of attack by remnant rebels, although Kasese district is advocating for their resettlement."

Further escalation of ADF activities occurred during the second half of 1999:

UNHCU, 18 February 2000

"The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) substantially increased attacks in mid-December 1999 and these attacks have continued without abatement for the past two months in Bundibugyo and Kabarole Districts. President Museveni is currently in the Rwenzori Region leading operations against the rebels. Even with the President in the area, the ADF continues to attack IDP camps. There have been daily attacks, gun battles and/or ambushes occurring in parts of the District during the day and at night. Since the start of the year, there have been 28 separate ADF attacks and ambushes reported in the Monitor and New Vision newspapers. These attacks have left several dozen civilians dead. During his visit, the President is reported to have encouraged people to return to their homes and leave the IDP camps."

One report gives the following outline of the ADF atrocities in 1998:

US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c

"In the west and southwest, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces significantly heightened their activities [in 1998], which included repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of deaths and abductions. The ADF continued to plant land mines extensively and increased its attacks on both rural and urban civilian targets, police outposts, and UPDF encampments. In February 30 students were abducted by ADF rebels from Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In April rebels attacked a woman in Bundibugyo district and cut off her ears and nose. The ADF forces hacked two civilian women to death in Kasese district in May. The ADF's deadliest attack of the year occurred on June 8, when rebels killed 80 students of Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire. An additional 80 students were abducted in the raid. Also in June, ADF rebels abducted over 100 school children from a school in Hoima district. ADF conducted dozens of small-scale raids that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. An ADF-affiliated group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August that killed 30 persons."

Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west and southwest (1998-2003)

- Relative calm in southwestern and west Nile region (2002-03)
- Numbers of IDP decreasing steadily (2002-03)
- Improved security further to "decisive military action" (2001)

UN, November 2002, p.6

"Developments in the situation in southwestern Uganda are more positive. The threat from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) appears to have reduced significantly and the Amnesty Commission and Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) are currently approaching donors in Uganda for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the ADF as stipulated by the Amnesty Act (2000). As a result, the situation in the Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo

District, is much calmer. As a direct result, an increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to smaller settlements near their places of origin. While there has been no recent verification of the numbers in IDP camps in Bundibugyo (last established in February 2002 at 87,000), there are indications that up to 40,000 people have since left the camps. Similar returns has taken place in Kasese and Kabarole, where all IDPs have either returned home or integrated in the community.

..other areas previously affected by conflict (southwestern Uganda and most of West Nile region) continue to experience relative calm. In these areas, transition and rehabilitation efforts, the second focus of the 2003 CAP, can be pursued."

OCHA, July/August 2002

"Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks beginning in 1996 up to mid-2001 caused displacement of local populations, limited access to land, insecurity, collapse in purchasing power, family income/assets and morals. Bundibugyo District bore the brunt of the ADF attacks and had the largest number of IDPs in the region, which peaked at 120,000 in the year 2000. To date Bundibugyo is reported as the only district with IDPs in Southwestern or Rwenzori region. Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken, most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated into the community."

OCHA, April/May 2002

"A team of defence attaches from America, UK, France, Kenya and South Africa have declared the Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe from rebel infiltrators. The team, led by Richard Orth, the American defence attaché and dean to all defence attaches in Uganda, was on a fact-finding mission in the region during the week beginning 6th May 2002. This comes in the wake of over twelve months of calm in the Rwenzori region, which has seen several IDPs voluntarily return nearer to their homes. Further, UPDF second division commander, Col. Poteli Kivuna, reportedly said the displaced were free to go back to their homes."

Signs of a safer situation by end-2001

UN, November 2001, p.6

"ADF attacks have decreased in number and magnitude since the year began. Save for the March 17th attack on Kasese, where unknown terrorists were involved, calm has reigned in the region, with very few Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks reported. With hope that this quiet is more than a lull in the storm, IDPs in Bundibugyo now have access to more garden areas during the day while still seeking the safety of camps at night. Approximately 20% have boldly resettled in four new camps nearer to their homes with the aim of increasing their food production. Consequently, the district is providing security to the new camps and humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of aiding IDPs resettlement in both Bundibugyo and Kabarole."

Rebel activities continues unabated (first half of 2001)

OCHA, 30 April 2001, p.31

"In the Southwest, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity continues unabated. Although the Kasese attack on 17 March was not linked to the ADF, on March 28 heavily armed ADF rebels

attacked Hamukungu fishing village – about 30km southwest of Kasese town – reportedly killing three and abducting four. In early April, the UPDF claimed, however, to have reduced the force to 'less than 100' and to have overrun a local commander's headquarters. President Museveni has also declared a departure from the 'softer approach' implied in the initial amnesty offer and decreed decisive action to bring the terrorist threat to an end through strengthened UPDF measures against them. IDPs in the Southwest remain hesitant about returning to the homes, due to continuing fear of attack by remnant rebels, although Kasese district is advocating for their resettlement."

One report gives the following outline of the ADF atrocities in 1998:

US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c

"In the west and southwest, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces significantly heightened their activities [in 1998], which included repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in hundreds of deaths and abductions. The ADF continued to plant land mines extensively and increased its attacks on both rural and urban civilian targets, police outposts, and UPDF encampments. In February 30 students were abducted by ADF rebels from Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In April rebels attacked a woman in Bundibugyo district and cut off her ears and nose. The ADF forces hacked two civilian women to death in Kasese district in May. The ADF's deadliest attack of the year occurred on June 8, when rebels killed 80 students of Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire. An additional 80 students were abducted in the raid. Also in June, ADF rebels abducted over 100 school children from a school in Hoima district. ADF conducted dozens of small-scale raids that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. An ADF-affiliated group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August that killed 30 persons."

Background of the Alliance for Democratic Forces, 1996-1999

- The ADF emerged in western Uganda late 1996
- ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with strong Islamic ties
- Because of the war in DRC borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured thus depriving the ADF of its supplies (November 1999)

USCR, 1997, p. 102:

"A new rebel insurgency emerged in western Uganda in late 1996. The Alliance for Democratic Forces (ADF), using bases in Zaire, attacked in November and abducted 300 civilians. Tens of thousands of persons - some suffering severe wounds - fled heavy fighting between the rebels and Ugandan troops. They sought refuge on church properties, in school buildings, and in private residences of friends."

IRIN, 8 December 1999:

"A 'rebellion without a cause'. This is the description most often attributed to rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) who have been sowing terror and destruction in western Uganda for the last three years.

[...]

The ADF, which decided to adopt Islam as its ideology, was born from a core group of puritanical Moslems from the Tabliq sect whose members portray themselves as "Moslem evangelists". In Uganda, the Tabliqs claimed Moslems were being marginalised by the government.

Together with the obscure and largely defunct National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the Tabliqs moved to western Uganda to start the rebellion under the ADF umbrella. They set up rear bases in neighbouring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education. It was easier to recruit in Congo where the people were not hostile to the ADF.

The ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with strong Islamic ties such as Iganga, Masaka and Kampala itself. A former Catholic, Jamil Mukulu, is said to be the driving force of the ADF. The group also includes some ex-commanders of former president Idi Amin's army.

Military sources told IRIN there were three main reasons why the rebels adopted western Uganda as their theatre of operations: the mountainous terrain, the proximity to Congo and the ability to exploit an existing ethnic conflict in the area. They coerced some local people to help them, especially the Bakonjo people with their extensive knowledge of the mountains.

Using leaflets and a mobile radio in Congo (now dismantled), they tried to turn the population against the government by propaganda attacks against its policies. One such statement in 1998, signed by the ADF "chairman" Frank Kithasamba, warned that the group would "crack down" on those responsible for the deaths of its members and urged local people "to be on the lookout for politicians who kill and intimidate opponents and voters for their own interests".

There is little evidence of the ADF's Islamic claims. 'They attack indiscriminately, just to kill,' said David Magado Katesigwa, the assistant Resident District Commissioner (RDC) for Bundibugyo district. 'They hit soft targets, such as the IDPs [internally displaced people]'.

Government workers and humanitarian officials alike are unable to explain the ADF's continued senseless killing, other than that the rebels are now on the run with nowhere to go. 'They carry out revenge attacks because the local people refuse to support them,' Katesigwa told IRIN.

The ADF problem exploded in 1997. Prior to that there had been sporadic attacks which did not appear to concern the government too much. President Yoweri Museveni, in his book 'Sowing the Mustard Seed' published in 1996, makes no mention of the insurgency in the west. But in 1997, the ADF launched a surprise attack on Ugandan soldiers at Mpondwe on the border with Congo in Kasese district. Attacks and atrocities escalated the following year with the army apparently unable to contain them, one of its problems being the lack of an adequate alpine force.

[...]

Sources say that due to the war in DRC and Uganda's collaboration with Congolese rebel groups in northwest and northeast DRC, the borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured, thus depriving the ADF of its supplies. Other measures, such as posting soldiers at intervals along the Fort Portal-Bundibugyo road, have also been taken and there is a noticeable military presence in the whole area."

For information about displacement caused by ADF see:

[Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces \(ADF\) in the west and southwest \(1998-2000\)](#)

Background to the conflict in West Nile

Background of the conflict in the West Nile and the WNUF, 1971-2002

- Conflict in the West Nile different from the war in Acholi region
- West Nilers in the Idi Amin Army are believed to have participated in massacres of Acholi and Langi officers
- West Nile pacified by Tanzanian army forces mid-1979
- The Museveni force NRA reached the West Nile in March 1986 and relative peace followed
- Disruption of nine years of peace by the emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in 1995
- WNBF's military strength diminished during 1997 following demobilization of the rebels
- Most displaced people from the north-west returned to their homes during 1999

Gersony 1997, Section 2 "Amin overthrown - 1979":

"The conflict in the West Nile has been strikingly distinct from the war in Gulu/Kitgum in most essential respects. These include its duration, the level of motivation of rebel combatants, its intensity and degree of brutality, the magnitude of casualties and civilian displacement, and its economic impact.

[...]

Unlike the ethnically homogeneous area of Gulu and Kitgum, the West Nile is home to a number of distinct groups, including the Kakwa and the Aringa (mainly Lugbara-speaking Muslim) people of northern Arua's Koboko and Aringa counties. The overwhelming majority of Moyo District residents - except in its western Obongi County - are of the predominantly Christian Madi group, which has participated in neither the West Nile conflict nor in the war in Acholi, with which it also shares a border.

[...]

Like the Acholi people but in reduced proportion, West Nilers were prominently represented in the Obote I army. Muslims in northern Arua were considered to be strong supporters of President Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party. When Army Commander Idi Amin - an ethnic Kakwa (who was also a Muslim) and who claimed Koboko County as his birthplace - overthrew the Obote Government in January 1971, the prominence of West Nilers in the Ugandan army increased. It is believed that West Nile soldiers participated in the large-scale massacres of Acholi and Langi officers [...]" (Gersony 1997, Section 2, "Background" & "The Amin regime")

"Tanzanian army forces were responsible for pacification of the West Nile, which they achieved in mid-1979. According to all accounts, their conduct towards West Nile civilians was restrained and correct. In this environment, West Nilers began to trickle back from southern Sudan. Once the invading coalition had consolidated its control of Uganda, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was reconstituted, with prominent participation of Acholi and Lango elements.

When during 1980 the UNLA replaced Tanzanian occupying forces in the West Nile, it engaged in brutal reprisals against the local civilian population. In late 1980, ex-Amin forces invaded from southern Sudan and forced some UNLA units out of the West Nile region. They were organized into two main groups:

the Uganda National Rescue Front (**UNRF**), based principally among the Aringa people of northeast Arua; and

the Former Uganda National Army (**FUNA**) forces, based mainly among the Kakwa people of northwest Arua.

After it regained control of the area from the ex-Amin forces, the UNLA engaged in further reprisals and large-scale destruction of property in both Arua and Moyo. One UNLA massacre on 19 June 1981 gained international prominence: hundreds of displaced civilians had taken refuge in the Comboni (Verona) Fathers Catholic Mission, over which the flag of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was flying. UNLA soldiers entered the mission, located at Ombachi just outside Arua town, searching for ex-Amin guerrillas and in the process killed more

than fifty of the civilians, many of them children. As a result of such incidents, as many as 500,000 West Nile civilians fled to Sudan for refuge."

Period of relative calm between 1986 and 1994 interrupted in 1995 by the emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF):

Gersony, Section 2, 1997, "Advent of NRA":

"In late-March 1986, the NRA [Museveni's National Resistance Army] reached the West Nile, meeting no resistance within the region. The conduct of NRA forces was generally reported as positive. President Museveni visited Arua during the following month and consulted with the elders on his plans. The UNRF forces, led by Brigadier Moses Ali, joined the Museveni government. For almost a decade thereafter, the West Nile enjoyed relative peace. "

Gersony, Section 2, 1997, " The Sudan factor":

"A turning point in the West Nile occurred in 1994, when Sudanese Government forces recaptured from the SPLA the strategic town of Kajo Keji in southern Sudan, and consolidated their control of the Sudan/Uganda border west of the Nile. [This was the same year in which Sudan's assistance to Joseph Kony's LRA began.] With Sudan's assistance, former Amin Foreign Minister, Juma Oris, a Muslim and, at that time, resident of Juba, organized what became known as the West Nile Bank Front. Interviews in the West Nile suggest that WNBF officials offered the equivalent of a US\$300 recruitment bonus to former soldiers and young men to join the rebel organization. Recruiters reportedly predicted a rapid defeat of the Museveni government and attractive employment in a future government in which the WNBF would be a powerful force. It appears that some recruiters appealed to the Muslim religious background common to the WNBF's Sudanese sponsors and residents of northern Arua.

WNBF activities began to affect the West Nile in 1995 and intensified in 1996. In 1995, the WNBF (and Kony's LRA) began to use land mines apparently provided by Sudan. In September 1996, Moyo town was bombed by aircraft, which appeared to originate in Sudan. WNBF activities were based along the Uganda/Sudan border as well as in the towns of Aru and Mahagi in northeastern Zaire, from which it pursued its insurgency.

However, in comparison with the eleven years of Acholi insurgency, WNBF attacks were intermittent, uneven and less effective. Although their activities ranged from time to time throughout Arua and western Moyo - and even marginally in eastern Nebbi - to an outside observer, it appeared that the motivation of WNBF forces was lower than their LRA counterparts, even in some respects half-hearted.

During 1997, the WNBF's strategic capabilities were critically diminished. Banyamulenge operations in northeastern Zaire deprived the WNBF of its refuge along the Zaire/Uganda border. Military operations led by the SPLA recaptured control of most of the Sudan/Uganda border. Both military offensives were reportedly supported directly by UPDF forces. Significant numbers of WNBF leaders and combatants were captured and returned to Uganda. WNBF activity diminished considerably."

UN December 1998, p.8:

"The defeat and demobilization of the West-Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels in 1997 have brought increased security to Nebbi and parts of Arua. However, there are now concerns that some of the demobilized WNBF soldiers are returning to their arms after their hopes for a better life remains unfulfilled – this, despite distributions of seeds and tools by UNHCR and FAO aimed specifically at ensuring their successful reintegration."

US DOS March 1999, sect.1g:

"WNBF attacks resumed during the year [1998] in northwestern region bordering Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and more than 100 abductions in Arua district. The majority of

those taken in subsequent raids over a week-long period later escaped and returned to their homes. In November WNBF rebels killed and decapitated a Muslim religious leader in Arua, reportedly in retaliation for his son's defection from the WNBF ranks. The Uganda Salvation Front/Army carried out an attack on a police station and prison facility near Tororo in the east in August in which it abducted 110 prisoners. Members of the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF--II) also carried out a number of abductions and killings in the northwest. The UNRF-- II attacked a WFP vehicle in Moyo and killed a WFP driver in September."

ICRC 31 August 2000:

"The plight of Ugandans living in the West Nile region improved in 1999 as a result of peace negotiations between the government and the UNRF II. Most displaced people from the north-west were able to return to their homes and take steps towards resuming a normal life."

Ceasefire agreement reached between UNRF-II and GoU:

IRIN 19 June 2002:

"The government of Uganda and the rebel Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF-II) signed a formal ceasefire agreement in Kuru sub-county, Yumbe District, northwestern Uganda on Saturday, with the aim of paving the way for political dialogue in the West Nile region.

[...]

The UNRF-II rebels had taken the chance to return when they realised that the UPDF was serious in its campaign against the LRA in southern Sudan (an operation it is undertaking with the blessing of the Sudanese government) and would hardly be likely to leave another rebel force operating in Sudan, according to Ugandan military sources.

[...]

The challenge now, according to humanitarian workers, will be to set up rehabilitation centres in the north and west to help resettle those rebels who return, and to ensure at least some measure of social and economic development for these marginalised areas."

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

1.17 million IDPs in northern Uganda (April 2008)

- 1,168,501 IDPs in northern Uganda as of February 2008 (IDPs in camps plus transit sites).
- In addition, there are 646,564 returnees in villages of origin. Many of these returnees have ongoing protection and assistance needs.
- The above figures do not include IDPs in urban areas.

IASC Working Group

Inter Agency Standing Committee in Uganda

Update on IDPs movement			February					
A			B		C		D	
Region	District	Estimated original camp population - end 2005	Estimated Camp population (=A-C-D)	Estimated % remaining in camp	estimated IDPS in transit Sites	Estimated % in transit areas	Estimated returnees in villages of origin source: Protection Cluster	Estimated % in villages of origin
Acholi Source WFP	Gulu / Amuru*	453,359	331,359	73%	86,620	19%	35,744	8%
	Kitgum	310,140	206,816	67%	76,703	25%	26,621	9%
	Pader	338,939	110,626	33%	189,117	56%	39,196	12%
	Total Acholi	1,102,438	648,801	59%	352,440	32%	101,561	9%
Lango** Source IOM	Lira	350,828	-	0%	-	0%	350,828	100.0%
	Oyam/Apac	115,275	-	0%	-	0%	115,275	100.0%
	Total Lango	466,103					466,103	100.0%
West Nile Source DDMC	Adjumani****	54,460	12,000		-		42,000	
Toro - Bunyoro*** Source IOM	Masindi ****	67,000	58,260		-		900	
Teso**** Source OCHA	Katakwi	71,888	48,000	67%	7,000	10%	17,000	24%
	Amuria	53,103	28,000	53%	14,000	26%	19,000	36%
	Total Teso	124,991	76,000	61%	21,000	17%	36,000	29%
Gran tot.		1,814,992	795,061	44%	373,440	21%	646,564	36%

*Please note that 18 decongestion sites (55,000 IDPs) in Gulu/Amuru previously considered as transit sites, are now counted as camps under the request of local authorities.

**Please note that in Lira, not all the IDPs returned all the way to their village of origin - some have joined camps/transit sites in Pader

***Please note that in Masindi IDPs are not in camps but in settlements

**** Please note that complete data is not reported from Masindi and Adjumani

IASC Working Group

Inter Agency Standing Committee Working Group in Uganda

Update on IDPs movement			February 2008	
Region	District	Original N. of Camps (2005)	Original camps	Transit areas
Acholi	Gulu/Amuru	54	54	215
	Kitgum	24	24	258
	Pader	34	31	165
	Sub Total	112	109	638
Lango	Lira	41	1	-
	Oyam/Apac	20	-	-
	Sub Total	61	1	-
West Nile	Adjumani	8	8	8
Toro - Bunyoro	Masindi		N/A	-
Teso	Katakwi	44	44	9
	Amuria	17	17	30
	Sub Total	61	61	39
Total		476	179	685

Estimated 25,000 children abducted since the start of the LRA conflict (April 2006)

- 25,000 children abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) since the start of the conflict.
- 1,000 'child mothers' who conceived while in captivity.

UNICEF, April 2006:

"Child protection issues remain of particular concern, owing to the child-centric nature of the conflict. The LRA uses boys and girls as fighters and porters, with children often subjected to extreme violence shortly after abduction and many girls allocated to officers in a form of institutional rape. Of an estimated 25,000 children (7,500 girls) abducted by the LRA since the start of the conflict, some 1,000 are "child mothers" who conceived children of their own while in captivity."

General

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Slow return process in the Acholi region (Feb 2008)

- Return movements from camps to transit sites and villages of origin remains slow.
- Service provision in the return areas remains uneven.
- First camp closures planned for March 2008

OCHA, Feb 2008

"Population movement across the Acholi sub-region does not seem to have accelerated as expected at the end of the rainy season. In January, only an estimated 5,000 people moved out of the camps in Gulu and Amuru¹, a figure substantially lower than had been projected. The slow return is attributed to challenges such as the lack of thatching grass, inadequate basic services in return areas, and personal insecurity. Aid agencies and Amuru district authorities were expected to meet in early March to plan for joint confidence building and monitoring visits to IDP camps and return areas. In Gulu, the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) has established a taskforce to promote voluntary return. Its strategies will be piloted in Lalogi sub-county and will involve, among others, promoting basic service provision in all areas of settlement.

In Kitgum, general movement trends indicate a preference for transit sites over villages of origin. Only an estimated nine per cent of IDPs leaving the camp during the reporting period returned to their villages of origin, while 34 per cent moved to transit sites. Return movements in some areas have been higher than in others: in Chua County, for instance, over 80 per cent of the population in some camps has moved to transit sites or villages of origin. The district plans to phase out six camps beginning in March 2008."

No official IDP camps left in Lira, but thousands of IDPs remain in former camps (March 2008)

- In Lango, the last remaining IDP camp has been officially de-gazetted
- Thousands of IDPs remain in former camps
- The plight of the remaining vulnerable camp population is cause for concern

OCHA, March 2008

"Meanwhile, the last remaining IDP camp in the Lango sub-region – Olilim camp in Lira District – was officially de-gazetted during the March District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) meeting. Several thousand internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in former camps, including 669 extremely vulnerable individuals, but while the DDMC recognizes the figure, there are officially no more camps in Lango."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In the Lango sub-region, Olilim camp in Lira district remains the only officially-recognised camp," accommodating 1,234 IDPs. During the month of March, the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) plans to conduct a second assessment of the camp to determine what its status should be. The remaining vulnerable population in camps is a source of some concern in the sub-region; a consultative meeting to discuss the plight of these populations in Lira and Oyam is planned for 27 March 2008."

Patterns of displacement in Karamoja

Shifting population patterns in Karamoja (March 2008)

- Improved security in some parts of Karamoja has led to shifting population patterns
- Basic services insufficient to cope with new arrivals

OCHA, March 2008

"In Karamoja, the temporary improvement in security led to a substantial population migration into new resettlement areas such as Apeitolim and Nabwal in Moroto. Since October 2007, the population in Apeitolim has risen four-fold to 4,500, while the population of Nabwal has risen from 700 in November 2007 to an estimated 14,000. Furthermore, it is estimated that as many as 19,000 people might settle in Nabwal and 25,000 in Apeitolim. Estimated are still being gathered for the number of people who have settled in Lokales in Nakapiripirit and in new resettlement sites in Abim."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In Karamoja, increased movements to Apeitolim in Moroto district have led to concerns over the welfare of the new arrivals. During the course of the last two months, over 4,000 people have moved to the area, a four-fold population increase against October 2007 figures. Yet basic services in the area remain extremely sparse, with only one nursing aid and one borehole available. In Nakapiripirit, between 8,000 and 10,000 people have moved to Lokales in Karita sub-county. These shifting population patterns have been attributed in part to improved security in the receiving districts."

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security in the Acholi region

Security situation calm; crime is biggest security threat (March 2008)

- General security situation in northern Uganda is calm.
- Biggest security threat is posed by theft and burglaries

OCHA, Feb 2008

"Among reported incidents in northern Uganda, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remnants were reportedly in confrontation with the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) on 9 and 18 February in Pader district. No civilian injuries or abductions were reported, although three alleged LRA were killed in the confrontations. In Kitgum, there were also reported sightings of LRA elements in Agoro and Lokung sub-counties and across the border in South Sudan. Incidents of cattle raiding by illegally armed Karimojong were reported in Padibe and Lukole subcounties, Pader District, and in Madi Opei, Kitgum District. In Gulu, UPDF confronted and killed a Local Defence Unit (LDU) deserter, recovering two guns. In a reported domestic dispute, a hut in Awere IDP camp, Gulu District, was set ablaze, killing nine people and injuring two others. Overall, the general security situation in northern Uganda remained calm during the month; for humanitarian organisations and UN agencies, the biggest security threat remained burglary and other theft of goods."

OCHA, March 2008

"Within the northern Uganda region, several incidents of criminality were reported, with the population expressing concern about the rising incidence of crime. In Gulu, the widespread availability of guns and an increasing number of idle youths are believed to be the main reasons for the hike in crime rates. More than 20 guns were voluntarily handed over to the office of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) by youths during the month. The RDC, in consultation with stakeholders, is lobbying for an extension of the amnesty programme to cover defectors of all armed groups."

Effectiveness of police hampered by lack of training and resources (Feb 2008)

- Special Police Constables (SPCs) deployed, but lack of training and resources for new police remain a concern.

OCHA, Feb 2008

"The deployment of Special Police Constables (SPCs) has been effected in nearly all sub-counties in Gulu and Amuru Districts, but the delay in salary disbursements has undermined the protection offered by SPCs. The Government reports that it has distributed three months' salary out of the backlog of six to seven months for Gulu and Amuru.

In Kitgum, 456 SPCs received training on human rights and gender based violence (GBV), while sensitisation training on the role of the police in the community is planned for LCIIIs and LCIIIIs

across the district. The deployment of Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTU) in the district has been hampered by inadequate facilities at bases; for instance, four of the seven proposed bases lack water; while the other two sites require repairs.

In Pader, a total of 30 unarmed SPCs have been deployed across the district's 19 sub-counties. The District Protection Officer has noted that the SPCs require further training on the code of conduct and the protection of civilians."

Karamojong attacks in Kitgum, Pader, Lira (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"Frequent raids, suspected to be the work of illegally-armed Karimojong, have been reported in eastern subcounties of Kitgum, Pader and Lira Districts. During the dry season, illegally-armed Karimojong cross into neighbouring districts and Kenya in search of pasture and water for their animals; moving through areas, they often carry out raids and clash with Anti Stock Theft Units (ASTUs) and the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF)."

Delays to demining programme (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"During the reporting period, 61 UXOs were reported in Gulu and Amuru, with 26 destroyed. The total number of UXOs now pending destruction is 226 (105 in Gulu and 121 in Amuru). Speedy programme implementation in terms of coordination, monitoring and support has been hampered by the absence of a UMAC field office in northern Uganda; the impending rainy season is also expected to further delay the demining programme.

In Pader, the mine action team recently deployed to the district has declared that while there is a low risk from mine contamination, there is a high number of UXOs in the district. During the reporting period, the team recovered 82 UXOs and continues to work with humanitarian agencies to collect information and map information on areas suspected to be contaminated with landmines and UXOs."

Physical security in Karamoja

Disarmament operations continue; 67 Karamojong incidents in one month (March 2008)

- Number of cattle raids has declined
- UPDF continues disarmament operations, but number of weapons gathered by UPDF falls steeply

OCHA, March 2008

"In Karamoja, low levels of aggressiveness were reported at the beginning of the month, but gained momentum in the third week. By month's end, aggressive Karimojong activities were at their highest in six months, with 67 incidents reported. The upsurge in aggressiveness is likely linked to the sustained disarmament operations being conducted by the UPDF: 15 operations have reportedly taken place in the past month, with 43 guns seized and several hundred individuals arrested. However, in a change of tactics, the UPDF has begun seizing cattle to be

returned against guns handed over. The Government also announced that illegally-armed Karimojong that did not surrender their weapons voluntarily would be court-martialled."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In Karamoja, insecurity was also at its lowest in six months, although general hostility prevailed. There were two road ambushes reported in February, while the number of raids throughout most of the sub-region has declined. The exception was Kaabong District, where attacks and cattle raids continued. Of particular concern is the failure by the UPDF to defend the protected kraals adequately. Since the beginning of 2008, four attacks on protected kraals in Kaabong District have been reported, including a reported five-hour raid on 17 February in which 400 to 600 head of cattle were taken. The UPDF conducted eight disarmament operations during the month, in which five people were reportedly killed, one injured, four guns collected and more than 100 Karimojong detained. The number of weapons being gathered by the UPDF in its disarmament operations has dropped considerably: in 2007, the UPDF was gathering an estimated 2,000 weapons per month, whereas only a few hundred are estimated to be gathered now."

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)

Increase in GBV cases and domestic violence (March 2008)

- Increased number of GBV cases recorded in Gulu and Amuru
- Concerns about access to justice for victims of GBV

OCHA, March 2008

"In Pader, cases of domestic violence are on the increase, with alcohol consumption presumed to be the major contributing factor. Only one agency in the district is carrying out a substance abuse project, in just two sub-counties. Domestic violence also continues to be a major concern in Kitgum, where displacement has augmented the problem. In Amuru, increased reporting of GBV cases is attributed to community awareness arising from intensified advocacy and sensitization campaigns."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"Increases in the number of GBV cases were recorded in Gulu and Amuru. During the reporting period, 92 cases were registered in Gulu (42) and Amuru (50). Nearly 65 per cent of the reported cases in Amuru were incidents of sexual violence, while 45 per cent of those in Gulu were.

Difficulties in administering Police Form (PF) 3 continue to be of concern in Pader district where the sub-cluster convened a meeting with the District Police Commander (DPC) to discuss, among other concerns, police practices in handling GBV cases that hinder victims' access to justice. The DPC informed the cluster that a notice had been posted to all police outposts clarifying that the PF3 form and police bond were free of charge. Other practical challenges to effective handling of GBV cases remain, such as the lack of photocopiers and vehicles to transport victims or perpetrators. Agencies have offered to support the police with photocopying of the PF3 forms and other communications."

Lack of access to justice for female victims of SGBV (November 2007)

- Female victims of SGBV often face insurmountable obstacles in trying to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice.

Amnesty International, 30 November 2007

"Many women and girls in northern Uganda suffer sexual and gender-based violence committed by state actors, including official authorities and military officers, and non-state actors within the family and in the community. These women victims of violence in northern Uganda often face insurmountable difficulties in trying to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. Many are afraid to report rape and other forms of violence, not only because of intimidation, hostility and ridicule from the community, but also due to state inaction in ensuring redress. As a result, the justice system in northern Uganda ignores, denies and tacitly condones violence against women and girls and protects suspected perpetrators. Amnesty International considers victims' lack of access to justice as an issue of serious concern warranting the immediate attention of the Ugandan government and the international community.

Amnesty International visited five districts of northern Uganda (Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, Pader and Lira) in August 2007. During this visit, delegates were told about the frustrating experiences of female victims of violence in attempting to access justice, the discrimination they suffer in the process and the entrenched culture of impunity that prevails regarding cases of rape, defilement, domestic violence, assault and other forms of violence. Often, there are no police officers to report cases to. Police posts and stations are few and far between in the whole of northern Uganda. Many times the police officers who are available to report to are not sensitive to the rights of victims in the context of the trauma of the violence (including rape). The majority of police officers in northern Uganda are Special Police Constables (SPCs) who are newly deployed, with limited training. They are ill equipped and unmotivated. Even the basic ingredients of laying a report to the police and other authorities seemed undermined; most police stations and police posts do not have medical examination forms. These forms have to be filled by the medical officer carrying out the medical examination and are crucial for documenting evidence of violence. Where the medical examination forms are available, there is usually an inadequate supply and they quickly run out. Obtaining the forms usually requires the payment of an illegal "photocopying fee" by the victim or her family who are often too poor to afford these costs. Even when the victim obtains the medical examination form, it is not clear which medical officer is authorised to fill in the forms. Victims have to wait for inordinately long periods for the medical examination to be conducted, as government doctors and medical officers are very few. Victims are often charged for the medical examination. In addition, medical officers who conduct the examination are reluctant to give evidence in court. Although the court structure is taking shape and the judiciary is beginning to function in a limited manner in northern Uganda, these courts are barely adequate and have overwhelming caseloads. All these constraints often mean that even where a case is referred for trial, very few cases, if any, are successfully concluded. The result is that many female victims of sexual and gender-based violence have lost trust in the justice system – they often opt to remain silent."

Cases of defilement on the increase in Pader (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"Cases of defilement and consensual sex among minors are reportedly on the increase in Pader due to children being left without adult supervision. Parents often opt to settle defilement cases out of court in the face of difficulties in resolving the cases legally. In response to alleged cases of defilement of pupils by teachers, agencies working on education will undertake sensitization of teachers."

Freedom of movement

In Acholi districts, some IDPs are under pressure from landlords to leave the camps (Feb 2008)

- In northern Uganda, some IDPs appear to be under pressure from landlords to leave the camps

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In northern Uganda, some IDPs appear to be under pressure to leave the camps, despite the principle of voluntary return. Forced evictions have been reported in Attiak (Amuru) and Koro (Gulu)

sub-counties, with the pressure mostly coming from landlords, although the evictions in Attiak were initiated by the local authority on the grounds that the land was wanted for staff houses."

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

Food

Persons with specific needs at risk of missing out on food rations (February 2008)

UNHCR, February 2008

"Despite many improvements towards providing the community early notification of food distribution, the community is still experiencing difficulties as many had missed their food rations.

Of especial concern amongst community members missing their food rations are the PSNs (persons with specific needs). This past month reports show that PSNs are often ignored in the line or are unable to stand in line and subsequently miss their food rations. There is need for community sensitization and early information passed on community on distribution dates."

Parish-level general food distributions are expanding (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"Meanwhile, parish-level general food distributions are expanding in locations of 500 plus households. It is hoped that this will reduce recipients' challenges of covering long distances from return sites to former IDP camps. Some 4,321 flood-affected households received three kilogrammes (kg) of millet and 15 kg of bean seeds from the district. Other agencies have also been distributing inputs for the first planting season, although the distribution is of lower scale than previously; some farmers will have to rely on their seed reserves to cultivate their gardens."

Return movements call for different approach to malnutrition (December 2007)

- There has been a significant reduction in malnutrition rates in northern Uganda.
- However, a reversal of the downward trend is being observed in Lira, which was the first place where people started to return to their home areas. Limited access to basic health and nutrition services in the return areas compared to the camps may be to blame.
- This should be a warning sign for the return process in northern Uganda: adequate services must be made available in the return areas.
- Karamoja has seen a doubling of malnutrition rates between 2005 and 2007, from 5-10% to above 15%, exceeding the emergency threshold.

Uganda Health, Nutrition, and HIV/AIDS Cluster, December 2007:

"Since the mid-1980s, northern Uganda has been trapped in a cycle of violence and suffering due to conflict between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lords' Resistance Army (LRA).

In particular, the people of Acholi land in northern Uganda have been significantly affected, evidenced by the more than one million Acholis who have been forced to flee from their villages of origin to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in search of relative peace and security. Thanks to progress made in the peace talks, the situation of the IDPs has evolved with currently massive population movement out of camps, to new settlements or to their original homestead.

Significant reduction in malnutrition rate in northern Uganda has been noted. United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other humanitarian partners stepped in to roll out an effective emergency response plan following an elevated prevalence of malnutrition in 2003 which coincided with the peak of the insurgency in northern Uganda.

The Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) was above the emergency level (15% GAM) in all conflict affected districts from as high as 30% in Gulu to current rates below 5% in all northern districts except in Kitgum.

Overall, the downward trends in malnutrition can be attributed to the effective humanitarian response in addressing the hunger gap mainly through food aid and emergency feeding programmes on the one hand and the effective management of severe acute malnutrition on the other hand.

However, a reversal in the downward trend is being observed (2006-2007) in Lira district and to some extent in Pader. This may be as a result of the return process spearheaded there in 2006.


Progress made over the last 4 years in reducing malnutrition rate is significant. The upward trend depicted in Lira and Pader should be seen as warning signs. The situation is still fluid and it is therefore important to put in place relevant plans and actions to sustain the gain.

Experience has shown that access to basic health and nutrition services by populations moving out of camps is limited, compared to when they were in IDP camps. Sustaining reduced malnutrition rates requires a change of focus and a change of strategy.

Till date, priority was given to treatment of severe malnutrition through Therapeutic Feeding Centres (TFC) and more recently through the Community Based Therapeutic Care (CTC). This is based in most cases, on VHTs, involved in screening for early identification and referral of children with severe malnutrition. In some cases, moderately malnourished children are referred to Supplementary Feeding Programme (SFP). It is high time to move out of the reactive mode to adopt a pro-active way of preventing onset of malnutrition.

With people settling in more or less permanent areas, nutrition programmes should be oriented towards community based promotion of adequate nutrition practices which include early initiation of breastfeeding (within one hour after birth), exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, and timely initiation of adequate (quantity, quality, feeding frequency) complementary feeding with breastfeeding up to two years and beyond. This effort should be complemented by promotion of healthy behavior including hand washing, use of latrine, use of clean water and promotion of health care seeking behavior."

Seasonal calendar for harvests and hunger season (Nov 2007 - Nov 2008)



Widespread food insecurity in Karamoja (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"In Karamoja, meanwhile, the first round of 2008 food distributions was completed in the most food insecure areas in Moroto, where hunger is increasingly evident. The average global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate for the Karamoja region is 10.9 per cent according to preliminary figures from the Ministry of Health, while much higher rates have been registered in specific locations, particularly Moroto at 15.6 per cent. In the first round of distributions, 17,766 people in Moroto received food, while 26,363 people received second-round distributions. Initially, some 36,000 of the most food-insecure were targeted for immediate assistance. Over the next six months, more than 700,000 Karimojong could be in need of nearly 35,000 metric tons (MT) of food: nearly 410,000 people living in areas classified as acute food and livelihood crisis are recommended for 50 per cent RDA (recommended daily allowance) rations, while nearly 300,000 people in areas of humanitarian emergency are recommended for a 70 per cent ration."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In Karamoja, the rapid food security assessment begun in January was concluded. The assessment found widespread food insecurity as a result of late rains, floods, the honeydew and livestock diseases, and raids. The worst-affected sub-counties were identified as Lolachat (Nakapiripirit), Kacheri (Kotido), Kapedo and Kaabong Town (Kaabong), Matany, Lokopo, Lotome, Ngoloriet, Nadunget and resettlement sites in Iriiri (Moroto). Immediate food aid was recommended for 65,755 people. Some 762 metric tons (MT) of food has already been distributed to over 70 per cent of the targeted beneficiaries, while the remaining 17,766 were set to receive their rations in early March.

Also in Karamoja, a two-day relief planning meeting involving local governments from the sub-region, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations was held in Moroto on 22 February. Using the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) System, participants arrived at the consensus that 55 per cent of the region's population was experiencing an acute food and livelihood crisis, while 22 per cent faced a humanitarian emergency. Only eight per cent of the region was deemed generally food secure, while the other 14 per cent of the region is chronically food insecure."

Uganda Health, Nutrition, and HIV/AIDS Cluster, December 2007:

"While significant improvement is being seen in Northern Uganda, malnutrition rate in Karamoja sub-region has increased two folds between 2005 and 2007, increasing from 5 – 10% to above 15%, exceeding the emergency threshold.

Moreover, the recent UDHS (2006) has revealed high prevalence of malnutrition in Karamoja and South Western Uganda, with prevalence of stunting reaching 50% in Southwest and 54% in Karamoja. To significantly influence national indicators and thus, contributing to achieving MDGs 1 and 4, it is imperative for the nutrition community to carefully target areas of high malnutrition and to roll out and support government to roll out relevant strategies/programmes, not only aiming at curbing prevalence of severe malnutrition, but also designed to successfully prevent onset of under nutrition."

Health

Lack of resources hampers the provision of health services in northern Uganda (March 2008)

- Lack of resources hampers the provision of health services in northern Uganda.

UNOCHA, March 2008

"Lack of resources generally continues to hamper the provision of health services in northern Uganda. In Gulu, 11 health centres remain non-functional despite having been earmarked for rehabilitation. The District Director of Health Services (DDHS) says maternity wards are required in six health centres but cannot be constructed due to lack of funding. Where resources are available, they are insufficient to meet all the requirements. For instance, staff houses will be constructed at only six of 11 health centres and just one third of the required 2,484 village health teams (VHTs) have been trained. The district's health staffing level stands at only 25 per cent.

In Amuru, 116 health personnel have been recruited, but their deployment is hampered by lack of staff accommodation. The district is considering building huts as a stop-gap measure."

UNHCR, February 2008

"Humanitarian Gaps in Camps: Health

Again health centres and misuse of ambulances deserve urgent attention.

Overall reporting of a lack of staff, absenteeism among health staff and short opening hours for the health centers. This is an ongoing and general concern.

Malaria has continued to be in this period the highest cause of illness. In certain camps, even when medical services are available at the health centre, the costs are still too high so the community does not seek treatment except in emergency situations.

Ambulances assigned to specific health centers are usually in use elsewhere and not therefore available to the population to which they are allocated."

Poor sanitation in IDP camps leads to Hepatitis E epidemic in Kitgum (February 2008)

- Poor sanitation in IDP camps leads to Hepatitis E epidemic in Kitgum

OCHA, Feb 2008

"The Hepatitis E epidemic in Kitgum continues to defeat containment measures. By the end of February, a cumulative 415 cases had been registered since the beginning of the outbreak, with 11 fatalities - a case fatality rate (CFR) of 2.7 per cent. The epidemic has persisted, due in large part to poor sanitation in IDP camps. For instance, there is only one latrine for every 112 people at the most-affected camp, Madi Opei. The cluster has developed an inter-agency contingency plan to strengthen interventions in the camp and in nine other subcounties. Meanwhile, the district is on the alert following reports of a cholera outbreak in neighbouring Owiny- Kibul and Pajwar in Southern Sudan."

Health services and psychosocial care for formerly abducted youth is grossly inadequate (Nov 2007)

Survey of War Affected Youth, 27 November 2007

"Health services and psychosocial support for the most severely affected youth have been grossly inadequate, leaving a core group of highly-affected youth without the attention they require. For these acutely-affected youth, treatment is among their most pressing concerns.

At least 3 percent of female and 9 percent of male returnees report serious war injuries that prevent them from performing basic tasks such as walking and running, working in their fields, or even standing up with ease. Chest and back injuries from carrying heavy loads are most common, followed by shrapnel in the body—for instance, 2 percent of males reported metal or bullets still in their torso or limbs. Unfortunately, few (if any) programs for war injuries exist outside of reception centers and programs for land mine victims.

The figures above suggest that thousands of returnees have not received adequate medical care, and are in urgent need of specialized assistance. Moreover, those abducted longer than one year report more than double the rate of injuries—a rate that we might expect to be mirrored in those yet to return from the bush.

A small percentage of youth are also experiencing frequent nightmares, lack of concentration, insomnia, irritation, and isolation. These symptoms are often related to their traumatic past, current daily stressors, and family relationships. For this small percentage whose symptoms impact their daily functioning, targeted mental health services (other than spiritual and traditional ceremonies) have not been available."

Inadequate health services in Nabwal resettlement camp in Karamoja (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"In Moroto, health actors conducted a rapid health assessment of Nabwal resettlement camp, finding prevalent malnutrition, inadequate health services, poor shelter, lack of basic food and non-food items and inadequate water facilities. The camp has no pit latrine, and there is only one borehole located three kilometres away for a population of about 13,000. In another coordinated initiative, cholera outbreak preparedness plans are being developed ahead of the oncoming rainy season."

Water and sanitation

Average access to safe water improving; situation in return sites still critical (March 2008)

- In Gulu between 70 and 75 per cent of boreholes in IDP camps are functional.
- Water supply in return areas is provided by boreholes, shallow wells, and protected springs.
- Many streams have dried up during the dry season, leaving people to drink stagnant water.
- In some return sites, returnees travel 4 to 5 kilometers to fetch water.

OCHA, March 2008

"Average access to safe water in Gulu and Amuru has improved over time, with current statistics indicating 14 litres/person/day in Gulu and 12 l/p/d in Amuru, the situation in return sites and villages of origin remains critical. With the advent of the rainy season, Amuru has initiated a district-wide approach to water quality monitoring and surveillance. Access to safe water also remains a concern in transit sites and villages of origin in Pader District and in the Lango sub-region. Average access to safe water is 12.1 l/p/d in Oyam District and 14.8 l/p.d in Lira. Two thirds of drinking water sources in return areas of Lango sub-region are unsafe, i.e. unprotected springs, rivers or streams.

In Kitgum, access to water was at 14 litres/person/day in main IDP camps (the SPHERE standard is 15 l/p/d) , while the average in transit sites was 14.38 l/p/d. However, the situation in villages of return remains of concern as only 42 per cent of villages have a borehole.

Sanitation and hygiene issues also continued to feature large in areas affected by the Hepatitis E epidemic; key continuing challenges pertain to hand-washing and lack of commitment by the community for well construction. Bucket chlorination is ongoing at all water points in Madi Opei sub-county."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In Gulu, average access to safe water stands at approximately 14.7 litres per day (l/p/d), with between 70 and 75 per cent of boreholes in IDP camps functional. Water supply in return areas consists mainly of 269 deep boreholes equipped with hand pumps and 15 motorized boreholes supplying simple reticulated water systems. Other sources include shallow wells and protected springs. However, many streams have dried up during the dry season, leaving people to drink stagnant water. In some villages of return, people continue to travel four to five kilometres to fetch water. School water and sanitation facilities desperately need upgrading."

Low access to safe water and sanitation in Karamoja (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"Approximately 50 per cent of the population of Abim District, 32 per cent of Kaabong and 33 per cent of Kotido have access to safe drinking water, while respectively only 28 per cent, two per cent and 1.3 per cent of the population has access to safe sanitation. Access to hand-washing at the household level and in schools is reportedly around two per cent.

Across the three districts very few health facilities have dedicated water sources, impacting on hygiene and waste management. In Abim, for example, only 64.3 per cent of the health facilities have a functional pit latrine, which is shared by patients, the community and health workers. Half of those latrines are reportedly filled up. Meanwhile, staffing of health posts is at 56 per cent in Abim, 45 per cent in Kaabong and 51 per cent in Kotido, although all together only eight doctors account for those statistics."

Shelter and non-food items

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Access to education in the Acholi region

Schools are returning to their original sites, but lack of facilities remains a challenge (March 2008)

- More schools are returning to their pre-war locations
- Lack of facilities (class rooms, housing for teachers, latrines, water points) remains a challenge
- Conflicts with landlords mean some schools need to find alternative locations

OCHA, March 2008

"In Gulu, all but 10 of 64 displaced schools have returned to their original sites, while in Amuru 33 of 53 schools have returned. However, academics are constrained by the lack of adequate numbers of teachers, teacher houses and other infrastructure. The Ministry of Public Service has authorised Gulu district to recruit only 60 teachers, given that its registry shows that there are enough teachers in the district. In response, a detailed assessment of schools in Gulu and Amuru Districts is planned for April to register the number of teachers in both districts and eliminate ghost teachers from the central government payroll.

Kitgum District has completed a headcount of students in post-primary schools under the Universal

Secondary Education (USE) programme, with preliminary results indicating that the number of students in rural schools has dropped significantly compared to the number in town schools over the last year. Schools in towns have registered an influx in the number of students due to their better facilities; however, the influx has led to challenges including inadequate classroom and dormitory space, water and sanitation facilities and number of teachers. Reports also indicate that some headmasters have insisted on students registering only in the school associated with their village. As schools have to return to their original locations, this has meant students must walk long distances from IDP camps and/or transit sites to attend returned schools.

In Pader, increased support supervision has been recommended to counteract the high levels of teacher absenteeism, cited as one of the greatest challenges to education along with lack of school infrastructure. On the latter front, classes in 63 schools are taking place under trees due to a lack of classrooms. Cluster members have pledged to construct new classrooms, but the onset of the rainy season has hindered activities. At present, only 1,224 of the needed 2,870 classrooms in district primary schools are in place."

OCHA, Feb 2008

"The return process in Gulu and Amuru continues apace, with 74 schools re-locating to their pre-war sites during the reporting period, 33 in Amuru and 41 in Gulu. Meanwhile, enrolment at some host schools has almost doubled over 2007, suggesting reluctance on the part of students to return to pre-displacement locations. Among purported reasons for the reluctance are the lack of facilities for teachers, including housing; lack of qualified teachers; absenteeism among teachers; and the poor learning environment, including lack of classroom facilities.

In Kitgum, 45 schools have returned to their original sites since the first term began, with 35 more expected to relocate by year's end. Many of the returned schools face significant challenges, notably the lack of adequate facilities such as latrines, teacher housing and water points. According to the District Education Officer (DEO), at least 30,000 tarpaulins are required to set up temporary structures at the various return sites. An emerging problem is conflict with landlords: in Omiya Anyima sub-county, for example, a landlord sued and won a case against the district over the location of Wigweng Primary School.

Inadequate facilities also remain a major challenge in Pader district. The current pupil to classroom ratio (PCR) is 1:80 against the national average of 1:54. Classes in 63 schools take place under trees due to a lack of classrooms. About 2,800 classrooms will need to be constructed to bring the PCR ratio to par with the national standard."

UNHCR, February 2008

"Beginning at the end of January and still ongoing, many schools in both Amuru and Gulu Districts are returning home from their areas of displacement. Based on a request from Amuru District covering 53 schools and from Gulu District covering 61 schools, UNICEF, SCiU and UNHCR have joined together to support the districts in their efforts to bring the schools home before or at the

beginning of the new school year. Through the camp management organisations such as AVSI and ARC a number of schools have requested assistance and the communities have provided the labour needed to move furniture, textbooks and water tanks to allow the children and their parents to settle more permanently in their original locations. As of the 5th of February, 25 schools have been moved in Amuru and 14 in Gulu. Some schools will be remaining in their displaced locations for the time being as they either have no structures to return to in their original location, have a concern about the possibility of mines or UXOs in the area surrounding the original school structures or because the community does not feel ready to return yet. However, it is a very positive sign that

so many communities are requesting assistance and the cooperation between the various organisations involved will continue to fulfill these requests."

Children left behind in IDP camps because of lack of schools in return areas form major protection concern (February 2008)

UNHCR, February 2008

"Children left unattended in camps while parents and primary carers have moved to areas of return remain a major protection concern. It is expected that with a number of schools returning to their original locations in the new term, coming months will see a decrease of children unattended in camps."

Returning schools in Pader face shortage of classrooms and water

The New Vision, 22 April 2008

"At least 194 displaced primary schools in Pader district have returned to their original sites in the villages despite the acute shortage of classrooms and water for the pupils, according to the LC5 chairman.

Peter Odok W'Ocheng noted that only 23 displaced schools were still stuck in the internally displaced people's camps because their former classrooms at the previous sites had collapsed.

"There is a general problem of classrooms. Most of the pupils are studying under trees.

"We are worried that during this rainy season, many of the children may not go to school."

Odok, who last week spoke to The New Vision in Gulu, added that most of the teachers had also returned home except those whose schools were still in the camps.

The district chief observed that some parents had returned home but left their children in the camps where they are studying in the displaced schools.

He urged the school administrators to speed up the return process. But Odok noted that it was not proper for parents to live separately with their children given the poor conditions in the camps.

He explained that they were lobbying for assistance from development partners like the Norwegian Refugee Council and UNICEF to build more classroom blocks.

"I am happy to report the council has accepted to build 32 classroom blocks in 16 primary schools and UNICEF promised to drill water in the schools."

The Atanga sub-county LC3 chairman, Francis Kikoya, stated that pupils in eight primary schools were studying under trees.

He cited the schools as Wi-Akedo, Lapak, Opate, Lacor, Aruu Falls, Akele-Kongo, Aswa Army Bridge and Laparanat.

"Jupa Primary School has two classroom blocks but their major problem is lack of water for the pupils.

These schools also lack latrines. Some parents tried to put up temporary structures but the buildings have collapsed," Kikoya explained.

As a temporary measure, the chairman said, the schools and returnee residents should be given tents as they reorganise themselves to build new houses."

Access to education in Lango

Efforts are made to increase enrolment and attendance; end of school feeding programme may have negative impact (Feb 2008)

- Efforts are underway to raise enrolment and attendance in primary schools.
- The end of the school feeding programme may impact negatively on student retention.

OCHA, Feb 2008

"In Lira and Oyam, the Education Department is focused on improving the quality of learning environments. Cluster members are seeking to raise enrolment and attendance in primary schools with upcoming campaigns to address the problem of school dropouts. However, the current school feeding program benefiting 114 schools is likely to end within the year, with a concomitant concern for a negative impact on student retention. Education stakeholders have been asked to start looking for alternative means of to provide school meals."

Access to education in Karamoja

Enrollment campaign in Karamoja (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"In Karamoja, agencies have undertaken to increase enrolment including by providing scholastic materials to all primary schools and launching an enrolment campaign. Initial reports on the enrolment campaign indicate an increase in enrolment between 60 and 80 per cent."

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public participation

Self-reliance

Shift towards sustainable livelihood options (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"Most agencies working on agricultural livelihoods in Gulu and Amuru Districts are shifting away from the emergency distribution of farming inputs to more sustainable livelihood options such as cash- or coupons-forwork and other income generating activities."

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

A society verging on breakdown (September 2007)

Oxfam, 24 September 2007

"Many IDPs also spoke of increasing breakdown among the traditional Acholi family unit. They blamed a combination of alcoholism, mental illness among victims of the conflict, and the myriad social stresses of camp life. First-hand evidence of some of these problems was apparent during the research for this paper, when focus group discussions were often interrupted by obviously drunk or mentally disturbed individuals. Also of great concern is the plight of youth. Half of all IDPs in Northern Uganda are under the age of 15. A shocking one-third of children above the age of 10 have lost a parent. With many having been in the camps for years — some more than a decade — a generation of young people is growing up knowing little else.

Focus group discussions highlighted incidents of sexual violence, domestic disputes, alcoholism, mental illness, youth alienation, idleness, and pent-up frustration, which many attributed to camp life.

Focus group discussions revealed a society verging on breakdown:

'We are people losing our sense of direction. This is the first meeting we've had where we've sat together and shared ideas.' — young man from Amida camp

'A lot of women have to go to other men, because they are so poor they do not see other ways. This is also a result of congestion and the demoralisation of camp life.' — camp commandant."

Weak family structures and vulnerability of women and children continue to present obstacles (November 2006)

- Need for social welfare mechanisms to identify and help the most vulnerable
- Limited night-commuting ongoing
- Women and girls in conflict areas still vulnerable to SGBV and with return vulnerability likely to increase

UN, 30 November 2006, Pg. 32-33

"Irrespective of location, the basic requirement for delivering protection to children is having social welfare mechanisms in place to identify the most vulnerable, provide frontline support to them and their families/care-givers and to enable access or referral to other forms of mainstream or specialist services (including education and skills training). A poor family situation is a reason why some children still night-commute even as overall security improves, resulting in the need to individually assess the situation of each commuting child and link them to social welfare provision. These same protection mechanisms support the social and economic reintegration of persons returning from the LRA (some of whom need specialised care in the reintegration process). Reception centres remain needed in anticipation of the possible return home of over 2,000 children, women and youth and new facilities will be required for adult men. With

attempted recruitment into the armed forces (especially for boys) still reported, measures to strengthen prevention within the UPDF are required, including more effective Birth and Death Registration.

Women and girls in the conflict areas remain vulnerable to GBV, including all forms of sexual violence, as a result of the prevailing humanitarian and security conditions. They are at high risk of sexual exploitation as they are forced to engage in sex to meet basic needs of themselves and their families. Even as a return process accelerates, women and girls' vulnerability to GBV will not reduce - indeed for some, such as those who head households and others with limited economic opportunities, it will be heightened. While progress has been made towards building a coordinated humanitarian response to GBV among IDP communities in northern Uganda, much still needs to be urgently done to scale-up and improve both protective and remedial mechanisms. Institutional responses remain weak, with referral procedures poorly resourced, poorly understood and often ignored."

Traditional cultural practices severely restricted by conflict and displacement (September 2005)

- Despite attempts to revitalize cultural rituals and practices, due to conflict many Acholi have lost traditions and cultural practices
- Acholi cultural principles and values essential to rebuilding Acholi-land
- Commission on Reintegration and Reconciliation should be established

Liu Institute for Global Issues, September 2005

"The findings suggest that the Acholi people continue to hold sophisticated cultural beliefs in the spirit world, which greatly shape their perceptions of truth, justice, forgiveness and reconciliation. Nevertheless, traditional cultural practices and the role of Elders, Mego and Rwodi have been severely restricted by the conflict and circumstances of displacement. In the words of one Elder, 'these children don't know how to be Acholi'. Since their re-institutionalization in 2000, traditional leaders, through Ker Kwaro Acholi, have attempted to revitalize cultural rituals and practices, and to reach out to the population to encourage the safe reintegration of formerly abducted persons. Findings suggest that this initiative has had varying degrees of success on the ground, largely dependant upon the camp setting, leadership within the camp, as well as the individual circumstances the formerly abducted person (FAP) returns to, such as family life. Likewise, the approaches are often ad-hoc and lack coordination with other existing efforts, reflecting an institutional weakness of the organization.

Ker Kwaro Acholi must begin to define a unified, consensual vision of not only cultural contributions to the reintegration process, but also of how to adapt traditional justice mechanisms. This requires sorting out who should be subject to this justice process, as well as the mechanics of how this could take place. It will require local, national and international consultation and coordination with other stakeholders. For instance, the process of Mato Oput has received much attention by national and international stakeholders, with little understanding of what exactly is involved. The research found that the majority of Elders and Rwodi interviewed did not think that the process itself was possible to adapt in its current form. However, the principles, values and symbolic meaning of Mato Oput were considered essential to rebuilding a devastated Acholi-land, and should be carefully taken into consideration in the design of any future justice program in that region.

It is recommended at the conclusion of this report (see Chapter 6) that a Commission on Reintegration and Reconciliation be established in order to begin to investigate questions related to how best to: promote both justice and peace; facilitate reintegration and reconciliation; to maintain the momentum of the Amnesty Commission while at the same time ending the current impunity; and, to balance traditional and international approaches to justice."

Displacement erodes social ties (July 2005)

- The physical structures of the camps have damaged the social fabric of the communities
- Killing and rape are not sanctioned anymore by customary justice
- Children grow up separated from their parents

Refugee Law Project, July 2005, p. 27

"[...]many informants referred to the fact that the essence of their lives had been destroyed by displacement: the physical structures of the camps have created an artificial environment that has damaged the fabric of the communities. As one elderly man said, "If you look at the way huts are built, squeezed together, and what people do at night – even at daytime – has removed respect completely now... Morally we are completely broken, the Acholi way of life is torn apart.... Raping women has not been acceptable in Acholi culture, but today it is very pleasing. Killing has never been accepted in Acholi culture, but today it is considered a game. Go and see in the street what kind of games people play, the words people use. Our children now talk about laying ambush, shoot to kill – war games. Before they used to play marriage games, dancing games, hunting games. Now they make tanks, lorries, airplanes. Said another, "Our culture was very rich. Education was not just got from formal classrooms. Wang 'oo' was the place all the cultural, moral education happened. In camps the wang 'oo' is not there. Now parents do not have time to talk to their children... Now the basic "family" is destroyed and also the community at large. The camp situation has left people not believing in reality. They now have this as their way of life, they now dwell on artificial life, the hand-outs, feeding on WFP [World Food Program-provided food]. Being dependants is now part of the system, something that used not to happen."

RLP, 28 February 2004, pp. 26-27

" However, the impact of displacement is not only interpreted in economic terms: it is also seen to have eroded the very roots of Acholi culture. A social worker commented: .Community laws are no longer there. There are very many family break-ups. Poverty is very deep. There was frequent reference to the fact that cultural taboos were being broken by families having to live close together, and that social support networks within the society were being eroded. As a local businessman commented, . We grew up with dignity. These children are not growing up as true Acholis. Our culture is being destroyed completely. The children won't know about seasons and agriculture. A religious leader summarised the impression of humiliation that came through so tangibly in discussions about displacement:

This community is destroyed because the culture has gone. What is a community without a culture? There is no privacy, no morality in the camps. Children die very young. A young girl died yesterday giving birth. There were so many burials in this cemetery we had to take her elsewhere. The whole future of Acholi people is at stake, and this will also cause problems throughout the country. Even look at the night commuters. You are forced to let your children go each evening, but you don't know where to.

The dramatic increase in the number of night commuters., referred to as another form of displacement in the previous quotation, has further highlighted the disruption within families

and communities. Every night, up to 25,000 people, mainly children, walk into towns to sleep on verandas out of fear of LRA attacks during the night. As one informant commented: The future of the Acholi is very bleak in the whole of the Acholi sub region. The culture of coming to town is a bad thing. If the commuters continue coming to town at night as the normal thing for the next three years, I don't know what will happen. It should be a concern for the whole nation. A Catholic priest talked of the situation in his church where many children were sleeping: The children who are accommodated in the church use condoms. When I go to celebrate early mass I find a lot of condoms in my church. Lack of adequate parental control over the situation is having a devastating impact. As a teacher said, "The students have no respect. A very small child can abuse you. There's no discipline. I found small children playing a game and one side played as rebels while the other as soldiers. Imagine these are nursery children!."

Many abducted women and girls find it hard to adjust to the life back home (July 2003)

- Higher rate of acceptance back into the community for long-term female abductees as opposed to male returnees
- Women who were married before being abducted are rarely accepted back by their husbands
- Returned women know they are a burden for their relatives

HRW, 15 July 2003, p. 30

"Although abduction is a traumatizing experience for all abductees, abducted women and girls suffer unique abuses and consequent problems. Whereas beating, torture, and maltreatment are the experiences for most people abducted by the LRA, rape and forced sexual slavery is inflicted on women and girls. While there seems to be a higher rate of acceptance back into the community for long-term female abductees as opposed to male returnees who spend several years with the LRA, the pattern is different for mothers who have LRA-born children.

According to several Ugandan NGOs in Gulu working with returnees, the children born in captivity as a result of rape by one or several LRA soldiers are sometimes seen as unacceptable outsiders. According to the custom and kinship structure found amongst the Acholi people, the child belongs to the father and his family. Since the father in cases of gang rape is not known, or the father is an LRA rebel, the child may not be accepted by the mother's kin. Women who were married before being abducted are rarely accepted back by their husbands, who often fear their wives are infected with sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS.

Another factor that makes it difficult for women to return from captivity is that they are expected to conform to certain stereotypes of female behavior. Women captive with the LRA for years have become used to war, fighting, rough bush life, harsh conditions, and living with other fighters. At times they may have difficulty adjusting to traditional expectations of women.

The twenty-two-year old former "wife" of LRA Commander Tabuley is one case in point, according to a woman responsible for following women's issues at Caritas: "She is a convinced LRA fighter and does not want to be here." Many women and girls find it hard to adjust to the life back home. "They know they are a burden for their relatives, they will not be able to go to school if they return with children, and they don't see any future for themselves here."

Female-headed households disadvantaged during resettlement (2002)

- Survey found that Female-headed households (FHH) were extremely disadvantaged and vulnerable compared to male-headed households (MHH)
- FHHs will have limited capacity to grow and access enough food upon resettlement
- FHH have limited sources of income and thus limited access to required farm inputs
- The number of MHHs that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement found to be almost double that of FHH
- Only 7 percent of FHHs endowed with house construction skills

Oxfam, 8 February 2002, p.10

"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or separating with their wives."

"The purpose behind this inquiry was to understand the required support priorities of both displaced male and female-headed households [MHH/FHH in the Gulu district] which would in turn enhance strategic and effective targeting of donor, government and aid agency resettlement programmes.

[...]

Key findings include a deprivation trap [...], in which most female-headed households are entrapped making them extremely disadvantaged and vulnerable compared to male-headed households.

[...]

The project also discovered that resettlement priorities differ according to the age and gender of the household head. It was further discovered that though there may not appear to be a big divide between female and male-headed household resettlement priorities, the two groups emerge as two worlds apart when viewed from the vantage point of how their assessed capacities and vulnerabilities will impact on the identified resettlement priorities.

[...]

the FHH phenomenon has been exacerbated by the now 15 year-old civil conflict. An article by Onyango-Obbo (1996) observed that, *"in Acholiland, there is virtually no generation of elders. Most people are widows or orphans. In some families, the grandmother was a young widow, the mother a widow, and the grandchildren too are widows or orphans."* The same article reports that by 1991, women were heading about 60% of the homes, while a survey report by ICRC (2001) indicated that on average, widows head about 20.4% of the households in Acholiland."

Food Production

World Vision/Cranfield University, December 2001, pp. 1, 6, 24, 52

"When it comes to crop production, a typical Acholi household practices gender division of labour. Opening virgin land and digging is traditionally a male occupation, while planting and weeding is a female occupation.

[...]

For those that mentioned inability to grow enough food upon resettlement, a number of reasons were given to explain their responses and included the following. *"The land is fertile, but being a woman with young children, it will be very difficult at the beginning...I don't have enough working tools, and there will be no man around to help me. We will try, but I don't even know where to begin,"* said Lucia, a 43 year-old widow and mother of eight.

[...]

A comparison of findings between FHH and MHH reveals that upon resettlement, FHH will have limited capacity to grow and keep enough food. This is explained by a number of factors. Firstly,

FHH have weak labour compared to MHH and will comparatively not be able to open up enough land. This is coupled by the fact that digging is traditionally a male activity thus women don't have enough digging skills. Thirdly, compared to MHH, FHH have limited sources of income, thus limited access to required farm inputs, e.g. farm tools, animal traction technologies, and improved seeds.

Again, compared to MHH, FHH do not have the skills to make granaries nor the funds to have one made for them. They will therefore experience more post-harvest losses than MHH, and may continue to be lured into selling their produce during the immediate harvest period. There is therefore ample evidence for this study to conclude that compared to MHH, FHH will be more vulnerable to food insecurity during the reconstruction period."

Means of production

World Vision/Cranfield University, December 2001, pp.27, 28, 54

"All respondents confirmed having had some form of life supporting skill before displacement. For the FHH, new and old life supporting skills include embroidery, brewing, pottery, modern agronomic practices, knitting, baking and cookery, livestock keeping, fish farming, bee keeping, TBA skills, tailoring, handcrafts and witchcraft. For the MHH new and old life supporting skills include modern agronomic practices, bicycle repair, tailoring, building huts and thatching skills, pitsawing, carpentry, brick making, brick laying, and making and weaving local crafts.

All interviewed MHH confirmed ability to continue using all their new and old skills, but mentioned problems associated with lack of investment capital. On the other hand, only 75% of the FHH confirmed ability to continue using all their life supporting skills amidst grinding constraints.

[...]

In their long lists of constraints, both FHH and MHH emphasised lack of capital as one of the leading constraints that continues limiting their production potential. *"I learnt carpentry and tailoring while undergoing rehabilitation with agency X, and am still taking tailoring classes for returned abducted children in the camp...If I had a sewing machine, I would be able to make dresses for sale,"* says Vincent, a 17 year ex-child soldier (formerly abducted). Vincent was abducted for two years, is still single but heads a household of eight, including his very weak mother.

[...]

Traditionally, the Acholi would keep livestock, especially cattle, as their main form of wealth. The study discovered that the number of IDP MHH keeping some form of livestock is more than double that of FHH, and the number of MHH that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement is also almost double that of FHH. It would therefore follow that in times of severe stress; more MHH would have some form of fall back, which their FHH counterparts would not have.

Arguably, most of the MHH skills especially building, carpentry, opening up new land etc, will be more marketable during the reconstruction period, while for the FHH, their non-agricultural skills will have lost much of the market to the scattering effect caused by resettlement. It would therefore appear that during resettlement, more FHH will be more economically disadvantaged than MHH.."

Housing

World Vision/Cranfield University, December 2001, pp. 30

"House construction is a male domain activity, and as a result, only 7% FHH acknowledged to be endowed with house construction skills, and can construct their own huts without seeking for

male participation. Male participation is usually paid for in cash or in-kind, and the study discovered that some women have had to trade unwanted sex in exchange for the required male construction skills.

[...]

The study also found out that while in displacement, a number of FHH had acquired some of the required hut construction skills in order to reduce expenditure on house construction. Some of the skills include brick making, and the meticulous work of constructing the roof frame from the ground [...], instead of doing it from the housetop as usually done by men. Once the bricks are ready and the roof frame is in place, they then hire men to erect the wall and thatch the roof using the finished roofing frame."

Conflict affected areas in northern Uganda suffer social and cultural breakdown (2002)

- Loss of livestock one of the greatest economic and morale blows of the war.
- Parents feel they loose control over their children
- Problems include increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and values and breakdown of family structure
- Anecdotal evidence suggests an increasing trend in child abuse
- Camp regulations undermining traditional gatherings

Gersony, 1997, Section 1, " The cattle factor"

"In an instant, the Acholi farmers were deprived of the milk their cows provided; the additional acreage and higher yields which their oxen permitted them; their fallback for marriage dowries and education; and the savings which carried them through drought, hard time, sickness and old age. The self-respect which attached to cattle ownership and the cultural functions upon which exchange of cattle had relied were disrupted. It was one of the greatest economic and morale blows of the war. It also deprived the insurgents of livestock upon which they relied for food and which they might have used to trade for the arms and ammunition upon which their viability increasingly depended."

Weeks March 2002, p.3

"Whereas the Acholi are accustomed to living in widely dispersed settlements, the populations of the "protected" villages are tightly packed together, often with only an arm's length between houses.

Sanitation is inevitably poor, and exposure to communicable diseases high. Social conditions are a matter of universal concern: parents feel, in particular, that they are losing control over their children's behavior. Sexual promiscuity is perceived to be unacceptably high, with correspondingly high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. Girls and women turn to prostitution in the absence of other economic outlets, boys to brawling, to petty crime, to rape, and in some cases to armed banditry."

UN, November 1999, p.21

"The ongoing conflicts have also caused loss of life and major disruptions to the communities. Many children have witnessed violence and atrocities; lost family members to the war; been separated from their families, and undergone severe physical and mental hardships in fleeing the conflict. In addition, there have been massive abductions of children being trained as fighters or forced into slave labour. The conflict has destroyed or undermined the community support systems that once assisted and protected these affected children and reintegrated them in the community.

With the full consensus of the members of the Psycho-social Core Team composed of NGOs working with affected communities in northern Uganda, national technical experts, line ministries and UN Agencies, an in-depth Northern Uganda Psycho-Social Needs Assessment (NUPSNA) was carried out in 1998. The final report highlighted negative social trends of magnitudes previously unknown to the affected areas. These problems include social and cultural breakdown e.g. increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and values, as well as breakdown of family structure e.g. separation, orphan hood and increased domestic violence."

UN, July 2000, p.8

"Anecdotal evidence points to an increasing trend in child abuse, especially sexual abuse. One problem is that there is little knowledge of legal protection and how to obtain justice. To respond to this need, Child Rights Advocates are being trained. These advocates have basic training on the legal aspects of child protection and child abuse. In cases of child abuse, the advocates can give advice as to how to pursue the case and to ensure that justice is obtained. So far, 30 Advocates have been trained in Nwoya County, Gulu district."

OCHA, 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned"

"Over 800,000 IDPs have been traumatized by terrorist attacks and have remained physically and mentally idle in camps for over five years. Nearly all traditional community and family mechanisms for ensuring cohesiveness and stability in society have broken down. Children have lost years of schooling, preventing them equal access to employment and future opportunities for participating in the national political system and economy."

Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace, July 2001, p.13

"As one moves through any of the displaced camps, one of the most depressing sights is to see scores of unattended children everywhere, idle youth loitering about and men drinking alcohol. This is just the surface of a deeper problem that most people, especially elders, feel as something very painful: the collapse of the good cultural values that people used to feel proud of. A whole generation is growing up in a moral and cultural vacuum, and considering that children under the age of 15 account for more than 55% of the total population in the IDP camps in Acholi this is a very serious situation.

The main means of transmitting the Acholi traditional culture to the younger generations is the evening family gathering at the fireplace, referred to in the Acholi language as *Wang oo*. Army-enforced regulations in most camps state that everybody is expected to be indoors or at least next to their huts by 7:30 p.m. Those who break this rule are routinely beaten. The consequence is that since there is no more *wang oo*, children - adults often complain - are not taught good cultural values.

Cramming together people in a small space is seen in all camps as another main reason for the lack of respect that children show towards their parents, since both parents share the same hut with the children without any privacy and at times children make fun of their parents when they see them sleeping together at night.

As a result, very early pregnancies (at the age of thirteen or fourteen), children becoming thieves, and alcoholism among adolescents who have dropped out of school, are worrying features of life in the displaced camps. People resent very bitterly the fact that in recent years no pupil from a school in the camps got a first grade. Little wonder when one considers that in Acholibur there are only four classrooms for 1050 pupils (only 17% of their students pass exams to continue to secondary school after P7). Palabek Gem Displaced Schools had 20 teachers for the 1060 enrolled pupils, and only 13% were able to pass exams to continue to secondary school. Pajule Displaced Primary School has an average of 300 pupils in the P1 classes, and in Pabbo the

average size of a P1 class is about 500 pupils. Given these circumstances for most young people going to Secondary School is just a dream beyond all possibility."

Oxfam, 8 February 2002, pp. 13-14

"Displaced persons were concerned with the degeneration of social values and order, as a result of displacement and staying in camps. Respondents noted that displacement has led to moral degeneration as reflected in behavior changes, neglect of responsibilities and disrespect.

[...]

Change in sexual behavior is among the areas that have significantly deteriorated. Many people confessed engaging in multiple and casual sexual relationships than before displacement. While the team did not collect any statistical data on this issue, female youth were reportedly most affected by the problem although adult and married people too are involved.

[...]

Alcoholism and drug abuses have been on the increase among IDPs staying in camps in particular those located in towns. The assessment observed several people chewing *mairungi/khati* in union camp located near Bundibugyo town. The youth were reported to be mainly engaged in drugs, while all categories (youth, men and women) locally brewed alcohol.

[...]

Respondents noted that the rate of domestic violence had increased with staying in camps. Wife battering and sexual harassment were reported as the most common forms of domestic violence. Women were particularly affected most by domestic violence. Idleness, poverty and increased alcohol use has aggravated the problem of domestic violence. Women reported being sexually harassed and or battered after their husbands were drunk."

Diverging perceptions of gender roles among IDPs in the camps (2002)

- Male perception: Men looking after children
- Female perception: Men resorting to alcohol and shunning work

Oxfam, 8 February 2002, p.10

"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or separating with their wives.

"It is us the men who are mostly affected because for example when your wife is taken, it is us men who will look after the children by feeding them and doing domestic work"

Women on other hand reported taking over men's roles, as many men have resorted to drinking thereby shunning work. Some men were reported to avoid going to the gardens under the pretext that rebels will abduct them. This has resulted in increased workload for the women."

Youth

New survey highlights vulnerability and resilience of male youth in IDP camps (September 2006)

- Over 50% of youth in northern Uganda remain in IDP camps in northern Uganda

- A balance between emergency services and long-term development programs must be carefully sought
- Dual focus on broad-based education and economic support needed
- Youth protection programming ought to be more inclusive of young adults, a group that should be referred to as a central category of concern

UNICEF, September 2006, Pg 6, iii-iv, 71

Table 1: Average household characteristics in each camp/sub-county

Characteristic	Acholibur	Akwang	Atanga	K.Matidi	Orom	Pader	Pajule	Palabe
Years household in camp	3.0	2.2	7.9	2.5	2.2	3.2	3.3	8.4
Household head a farmer	97%	82%	99%	84%	91%	91%	93%	89%
Household head a professional	2%	14%	0%	12%	6%	7%	6%	9%
Household head a soldier	1%	4%	1%	4%	4%	2%	1%	1%
Acres of land in 1996	27.1	30.4	25.3	22.9	21.0	25.2	26.7	22.6
Number of cattle in 1996	2.7	34.7	0.0	7.7	9.0	4.9	1.0	14.7
Number of other livestock in 1996	7.4	28.1	0.9	13.7	20.5	7.2	3.9	11.4
% pop in bottom 25% by assets	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
% pop in top 25% by assets	0.2	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3
% youth male	56%	54%	54%	55%	52%	55%	49%	53%
% youth staying in IDP camp	54%	62%	48%	64%	62%	64%	55%	62%
Avg yrs education (Male youth)	6.1	7.1	7.4	6.1	6.5	6.7	7.4	6.3
Avg yrs education (Female youth)	3.8	5.6	5.4	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.5	3.9
% males 18 to 30 in military	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.07
% youth abducted 3 days or longer	0.46	0.50	0.41	0.18	0.42	0.52	0.35	0.24
% youth died since 1996	19%	18%	15%	14%	23%	20%	11%	13%

“In short, the evidence argues for humanitarian organizations to maintain a delicate balance between emergency services and a long-term development program. Such a hybrid response is, we argue, the only effective response to what is essentially a hybrid problem: a prolonged emergency. The contradiction in terms is obvious most of all to those living it—an emergency situation stretched over years or even decades, where inattention to schooling and economic activity risks losing a whole generation to poverty, while inattention to food and sanitation risks losing their lives.

The findings discussed in the previous seven chapters suggest that there is currently a mismatch between the needs of youth and the programs on offer. Current programming focuses primarily on humanitarian needs and psychosocial support (broadly-defined) with less emphasis on education and economic interventions. Moreover, programs and spending also appear to be more oriented towards children rather than young adults. SWAY data and analysis, however, suggest a strategic reorientation of governmental and non-governmental assistance.

In general, we advocate a two-pronged strategy: broad-based education and economic support, combined with targeted interventions to the youth facing the greatest social, psychological, and material challenges.

This programming ought to be more inclusive of young adults, treating them as a central category of concern, rather than an addendum to child support and protection programs.

In particular, there is an urgent and immediate need to support broad-based secondary and tertiary schooling, support which should target the most able as well as the most vulnerable.

Further, we argue for an increased focus on (and funding for) youth economic programs. However, the only real economic solution is to return youth and their households to their land and traditional livelihoods. Thus economic programs must include innovative strategies for increasing access to land in addition to the current attention on other income-generating activities.

In terms of "high-deprivation" youth, one of our most surprising findings was the prevalence of serious war wounds. Such injuries, which have received little attention, should be addressed immediately through emergency medical services.

We also note the significant number of illiterate young adults, who we feel can be targeted through alternative age-appropriate literacy and numeracy programs.

We argue that psychosocial programming also needs to be more targeted and specific. In particular, psycho-social programming ought to: (i) target highly-affected individuals; (ii) shift from community sensitization to conflict resolution; and (iii) focus on family support and connectedness.

Finally, we make a case for more evidence-based programming, in particular the formal and informal evaluation of programs."

Internally-displaced youth a vulnerable category (October 2005)

- Internally-displaced youth (IDY) neglected as a vulnerable category by humanitarian community
- Coping strategies of IDY often put exacerbate their vulnerability
- IDY perceived as a homogenous displaced category
- IDY endure high levels of sexual violence, torture, and abuse both by the LRA and Ugandan army

Liu Insitute for Global Issues/Gulu District NGO Forum/Ker Kwaro Acholi, October 2005

"The aim of this report is to learn from the voices and experiences of internally displaced youth (IDY) about their protection needs while living in the Gulu District of Northern Uganda. The report argues that neither the Government of Uganda nor humanitarian agencies officially recognize IDY as a vulnerable social category. Thus IDY are seldomly integrated into relief efforts or policies.

The lack of recognition, research, and response to the particular threats facing IDY has generated a gap between government and humanitarian responsibilities, and field realities.

This report found three main factors that foster IDY vulnerabilities. First, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Uganda's People Defence Force (UPDF) often recruit the youth into their forces. Their age group is viewed as ideal fighters or "wives." Second, IDY are often the labour force in their communities, making them responsible for sustaining family members; when trying to fulfill these obligations this group is susceptible to a series of physical threats and dangers. Third, IDY are perceived as a homogenous displaced category. IDY are regularly grouped with children or adults, though they seldom belong in either category. IDY are at the mental development stage of adolescents, but are forced to take on responsibilities of adults - without receiving any aid that directly targets their needs.

A Generation At Risk dissects the daily struggles confronting IDY. For organizational purposes, these are categorized into two sections – socio-economic challenges and physical security threats. However, this report recognizes that these two categories are complex, often overlapping, and therefore cannot be entirely divorced from each other. Socio-economic challenges entail:

Food Insecurity – Out of 71 IDY respondents, 75% identified food insecurity as a major threat. The two most common constraints are the insufficient rations supplied by World Food Program (WFP), and lack of access to gardens, meant to complement aid distributions

Health Threats – Congestion and the lack of medical facilities perpetuate the spread of diseases. IDY are most susceptible to HIV/AIDS as they are most sexually active.

Alternative Sources of Income: Underage Recruitment and Sex Workers – Returnee youth commonly join Local Defence Units (LDUs) due primarily to stigmatization from communities and/or the critical lack of employment opportunities in camps. IDY involvement in sex work has devastated cultural roles as well as spread sexually transmitted disease.

Domestic Violence and Forced Relationships – Lack of economic opportunities has escalated both of these problems, while disrupting family households. Both female and male youth enter into forced relationships because they lack financial alternatives, or because they are pressured by their family to do so.

Physical security threats involve:

Sexual Violence – Of 71 IDY respondents, 79% identified sexual violence as a major threat. Sexual violence was in fact the most frequently mentioned threat by respondents. Female youth were particularly targeted, and the UPDF were viewed as a major source of this threat.

Abduction – Of the random sample of respondents 1/3 had been previously abducted by the LRA or had either a family member or friend that had been abducted. The possibility of being abducted is a constant fear for IDY.

Physical Attacks and Related Violence (Unlawful Detention, Beatings, Mutilations, Torture and Killings) – IDY identified both the UPDF and the LRA as agents of this type of violence. Breaking camp curfew, alcohol consumption and undisciplined soldiers are common factors that lead to abuses committed by UPDF soldiers against Internally Displaced Youth. LRA abuses were common during a camp attack or an encounter in the fields.

IDY have developed a series of protection strategies for these challenges and threats; for the most part, they have learnt to simply rely on their basic instincts and senses. Tragically, some of the protection strategies against socio-economic threats employed by IDY expose them to security threats. For example, IDY move into their gardens or fields to collect food and firewood to supplement limited supplies; however as they do this, they endanger themselves through the possibility of encountering the LRA or breaking a camp curfew. IDY are not granted any specific legal provisions under the National Youth Policy or the National Policy on Displacement; instead they are perceived as part of the general population. Similarly, responses by humanitarian

agencies fail to adequately identify or address IDY threats and needs. For instance, although 75% of IDY reported food security as a problem, only 18% agencies made the same comment. Moreover, 59% of agencies further identified returnee youth as particularly vulnerable to stigmatization, verbal or physical abuse. Yet only 18% of agencies had programs that specifically addressed this problem.

The recommendations of this report focus on immediate ways to increase protection of IDY and to minimize their socio-economic challenges. This report views sustainable peace as a priority to end the identified threats; nevertheless it focuses on urgent actions required to promote better IDY protection. A Generation At Risk advocates for national and international agencies to recognize IDY vulnerabilities and strengthen strategies and mechanisms for youth protection.

A Generation At Risk explores the above-mentioned issues through six main sections. The first section provides a background to the report and the methodology used throughout the project. The second section provides a background to the war in Northern Uganda, with detailed descriptions of displacement camps titled '19 Years of War: A Snapshot'. The third section launches into the socio-economic challenges and physical security threats endured by IDY. Included in section three are descriptions of the threats and challenges as well as an explanation of what circumstances expose IDY to these conditions. The fourth section outlines IDY protection strategies based on the particular agent and threat. Vulnerable IDY categories are highlighted in the fifth section. The sixth section, 'Failure To Protect,' outlines the national policies that apply to IDY and critiques humanitarian aid responses from a youth centred perspective. Finally A Generation At Risk concludes with a set of recommendations for relevant actors"

Elderly people

Many elderly people were separated from their families during displacement (Oct 2007)

IASC, 24 October 2007:

"The conflict in Uganda scattered families widely and the research team heard of many examples of old people who had become lost and separated from their families. People were often not given the choice to stay or leave – that decision was often taken and enforced by the parties to the conflict. Once separated, old people were often abandoned by their families, or remained unaccompanied in displaced camps and settlements."

Karamoja

Uncertain coping mechanisms make children and women move in search of food and labour in Karamoja (November 2006)

- Children and women move out of Karamoja searching for food and labour, falling pray to exploitation
- Children appear on streets of urban centers subjecting themselves to risk of exploitation and trafficking

UN, 30 November 2006, Pg. 12, 33

“The Karamoja sub-region consistently demonstrates Uganda’s lowest scores on key development and humanitarian indicators. A protection crisis in relation to disarmament (as per above) but also due to commonly accepted coping mechanisms is ongoing. Critically risky coping mechanisms include the movement of women and children out of Karamoja in search of occasional labour or food that easily become victim of Gender Based Violence (GBV) or other forms of exploitation. Climatic and environmental factors, a long history of marginalisation by successive national governments, cultural traditions and a breakdown of law and order have all led to increased banditry, inter-communal and cross-border cattle raids and to a human rights and development crisis of complex dimensions.”

“Protection monitoring is particularly weak in Karamoja and issues such as SGBV go largely unreported. However, the consequences of marginalisation and insecurity are putting vulnerable populations, including children, at risk of exploitation. Growing numbers of Karamojong children are reported to be appearing on the streets of urban centres within Karamoja, in surrounding districts and in Kampala. Amid reports of labour markets established in Katakwi, there is concern that children may be at risk of being trafficked to other parts of Uganda. Forcible returns complete a cycle of disadvantage and vulnerability that needs to be better understood and responded to.”

Women and children affected by conflict in Karamoja (August 2005)

- Women and children most affected by conflict, often displaced and/or widowed
- Women play a role both in conflict causation (due to high bride prices) and in conflict prevention

USAID, August 2005, Pg. 37-38

“Conflict among pastoralist is indiscriminate and affects all people. Women and children are generally the most affected because they are vulnerable and defenseless, they aren’t in a position to feed themselves, they can lose loved ones (spouses, parents and sons), and they are easily made homeless and turned into refugees. The pastoralists women play a significant role in the conflict environment.

Role of women in conflict causation.

Women play a central part in raiding in a number of ways. When faced with shortages of household necessities, married women scorn the male members of the household, singing songs that pressure them to go raiding. They do this physically or indirectly, through beating of children and telling them things such as: “where can I get the milk to give you when your father is seated while other men have gone to look for cattle for their children’s milk.”[] In the past, renowned women were consulted by raiders. Warriors on a mission brought them gifts of tobacco or a ram in exchange for blessings for the raid. Women bless the men and smear them with protective soil, *Emunyen*. There is considerable dancing, ululation, celebration and merry making spearheaded by women after a very successful raid.

Women are also at the base of raiding because men are forced to pay high bride prices for them in exchange for social status. Sometimes women incite conflicts by abandoning men who have not paid dowries to join those who are capable of paying them off, or by belittling men who marry their daughters with few animal dowries. Such mortification compels men to collect livestock before they decide to marry. Disrespect accorded to men who are not fully married through dowry payment forces men to raid.

Role of women in conflict prevention

Women suffer the effects conflict a great deal. They are left as widows, displaced, left without food, and often bear the consequences of being inherited by the kinship of their deceased husbands. To avert this anguish, women have considerably contributed to reducing conflicts in the region. Their various involvements are summarized below:

Due to death of many male members of the households, most women discourage their husbands and sons from going for raids.

Women have been organizing peace marches and peace campaign rallies in the villages of Rupa, Tapac, and Iriir. Women peace group of Naoi Parish organize peace retreats and peace meetings.

Refusing to praise raiders.

Women have composed songs that draw warriors' attention to the tribulations of raiding. They sing these songs to discourage the men from participating in raiding.

Women encourage and entreat men to give back their guns to the government during disarmament exercises. Some women actually physically handed over their husbands' guns.

They enrollment their children in schools with the hope of transforming the society in the future.

Senior women lament for peace at dawn before men are out. They decry the way raiding and the young generation have strayed."

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Assets of IDP households (December 2007)

UNDP, December 2007, pp. 34-36

"Assets among dwellers and returnees

The asset base of households both in and outside the camps is limited, although male-headed households seem to be somewhat better off. Most households, whether male-headed or female-headed, own hoes, jerry cans, and blankets. Male-headed households are more likely to also own chairs, pangas (machetes), bicycles, radios, mattresses, tables, and beds (Figure 10). It is nevertheless noteworthy that, in almost all districts, fewer than 50 percent of households possess a bicycle or basic items of furniture (chairs, bed, mattresses/mats and tables).

There is no significant variation in asset ownership between those that have moved back to their places of origin, and those remaining in camps. The main difference is that those that have returned home are somewhat more likely to possess furniture: tables, beds, and chairs. Households with these items nevertheless remain a minority.

Other 'missing' assets from households are animals. Whereas most households reported previously owning poultry and sheep, and many claimed to have had goats and cattle, now only 14 percent of households in IDP camps report having any animals at all. Many households abandoned or lost their animals when moving into the camps; others took the animals with them, but have since slaughtered or sold them for food or income. In some areas, cattle raiding has also contributed to the loss of animals from households. In this respect, however, returnees and partial returnees are doing better: 32 percent claim they own some animals. Accordingly, as alluded to above, 31 percent of returnees claim to have recent experience in herding animals, versus 12 percent in IDP camps and 11 percent in transitional sites. Nevertheless, this is still severely less than previously, especially considering the central role that livestock and animals play in the food security and labour needs of subsistence farmers."

Land

Land as a prerequisite for return (December 2007)

UNDP, December 2007, pp. 31-33

Land as prerequisite for early return

As a rural and agrarian community, the most important resource for Northern Ugandans is land (see Refugee Law Project, 2006). One of the crucial factors shaping return decisions is, therefore, access to land (see also Oxfam, 2007).

The people of Northern Uganda traditionally lived in villages on their own land with their livestock and cattle. Prior to the war, the primary activity was agriculture, with millet and sorghum being the

staple crops. Farmers also grew substantial amounts of maize, sweet potatoes, cassava, peas, beans, sesame, groundnuts, squash and various vegetables, as well as other savannah crops, largely for consumption. Before the war, avocados, mangoes, pineapples and other fruits were also cultivated for commercial purposes. Small-scale agro-businesses based on tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, sunflower and rice also operated. The land in Northern Uganda is very fertile, particularly in Gulu and Amuru, and hardworking farmers could make a good living before the conflict started.

Previously, most land was held under customary tenure.⁸ People typically owned land by virtue of the fact that they and their families always lived on it, and therefore were regarded as the 'owners' of their land. Most have no official papers or titles proving they own the land, and many of the vernacular rules governing land were not written down, and/or were constantly changing to adapt to new circumstances. These rules were also developed under conditions very different from those prevailing today. Until only one or two generations ago, a person could claim land as his own by settling on and cultivating virgin land. Some villages were established as recently as fifty years ago, when groups of people settled in forested areas and became the owners of sometimes large pieces of land. Due to land pressure and the formalization of property relations (exacerbated by the conflict), this tactic of claiming virgin land is much less available today.

Before the conflict, land was usually allocated and managed by the family patriarch (often the grandfather), who provided plots to each male family member according to their needs and perceived ability to use the land. Men controlled the land, but women also had certain rights. A woman had rights to use her parents' land prior to marriage, and her husband's land afterwards. No husband was supposed to prevent his wife from using his land, and if he predeceased her, she still had user rights: she could use the land as she saw fit and pass it on to her children, but could not sell it. If somebody tried to take this right from her, she could appeal to the elders who would then intervene on her behalf. On the other hand, if she remarried, she would get the right to her new husband's land, but would also relinquish her user rights to her first husband's land (see also Bøås and Hatløy, 2005a). Although the system created and maintained hierarchies of power (especially along gendered lines), it had the advantage of being relatively transparent. People knew their rights and how to protect them, and who to appeal to if they felt these had been violated. However, this transparency or relative predictability cannot be taken for granted in the return situation, as years of displacement have weakened these mechanisms.

As noted above, today there is not much free land left in Northern Uganda, despite the apparent emptiness in some parts of the region. Not all land is intended for cultivation, and even that which is will not be kept in constant cultivation (notwithstanding the lack of cultivation prompted by displacement). Prior to the displacement, some land was used for grazing, and the other was kept as forest for hunting and the collection of forest products. Yet other plots of land were kept fallow in a system of shifting cultivation and rotational cropping. Local people, however, knew who owned what land. In a village, boundaries were known because they were usually agreed upon by owners of neighbouring fields, using a mixture of natural border posts (such as trees and edges of swamps)

and border signs developed over time, such as the lines of field refuse which develop into durable demarcation lines. One problem is that the longer people are kept away from their land, the less useful such practices become. Border signposts, such as the lines of field refuse, disappear, while the fact that the fields become overgrown makes it difficult to recognise natural border posts between the tracts owned by different people and families. Some will simply have forgotten the actual borders, some will be too young to remember, and some will try to take advantage of the confusion to try to enlarge their property or lay claim to land that never belonged to them (see also Bøås and Hatløy, 2005a; 2006).

The current confusion over land is exacerbated by widespread uncertainty among the IDPs about what has happened to their land during their time in displacement. 'Everywhere one goes in

Acholiland, one encounters fear that the Acholi's land will be stolen from them' (CSOPNU, 2005:15); and whereas some of the rumours circulating about land-grabbing are false (if not perceived as such among those hearing them), others are more convincing. The uncertainty about what has happened to their land during displacement, in combination with the fact that people know all too well that land is their most important asset, fuels speculation and creates tension among the IDPs.

Given the centrality of land to livelihoods and coping strategies in Northern Uganda, therefore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of those that have returned to their places of origin claim an inherited right to land (see Figure 8). This includes both male-headed and female-headed households. Of those remaining in IDP camps or living in transitional sites, the percentage claiming access to inherited land is noticeably less than among returnees: only 48 percent of IDP residents reported having an inherited right to land. Accessing land through renting is thus a somewhat common coping strategy among camp dwellers (less so among transitional site residents).

Cumulatively, these findings imply that movement home is – if not predicated on, then – strongly correlated with access to one's own (inherited) land. We noted in Chapter 3 that some of the first movers might be households that were 'pushed' rather than 'pulled' out of the camps. While the findings here do not shed light on specific reasons for movement, they indicate that, at this stage, the pull factor of access to inherited land seems to be an important condition for the push factors to be acted upon. In each site, there are only small differences between male-headed and female-headed households in terms of access to inherited land, with most female-headed households seemingly retaining rights to the deceased husband's land (see also Chapter 6). However, it is interesting to note that in place of origin, male-headed households tend to cultivate larger plots than female-headed households (see Figure 4). Overall, approximately 15 percent of the female-headed households and 13 percent of the male-headed households have no rights to any land – inherited, rented, or otherwise.

Finally, it is worth reiterating a point made implicitly in Figure 3 above: namely, that while most people are cultivating, their other activities are quite limited. Given the crowded and confined nature of the camps, this is not so surprising. It is, however, surprising that there is not a more marked difference among camp dwellers and returnees (in terms of current experience) involved in tasks such as building latrines, constructing grass roofs, and making bricks. Instead, differences between returnees and camp dwellers show up in terms of herding animals, gathering wild plants for food, and digging wells – all markedly more prevalent among returnees, as Figure 9 shows. This implies that construction and maintenance tasks are not confined to transitional sites or return areas, but are ongoing in the camps as well, as people continually try to make their living conditions as decent as possible. While not the majority activities, the investment of labour in camp dwellings is seemingly in line with people's cautious and patient approach towards return. Conversely, the increase in well-digging among returnees is indicative of return in areas without boreholes, while plant-gathering and animal-herding indicate attempts (out of necessity or choice) to diversify coping strategies and livelihoods once outside the camps."

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Returns in Acholi districts still slow (March 2008)

- Return movements from camps to transit sites and villages of origin remains slow.
- Service provision in the return areas remains uneven.
- First camp closures in Kitgum planned for March 2008

OCHA, March 2008

"Across the Acholi sub-region, movement out of internally displaced persons (IDPs) out of camps has been increasing in the first months of the year, although there has been no large scale movement to transit sites / villages of origin; rather significant back-and-forth movements have been reported as IDPs have returned home temporarily to prepare their gardens for the first planting season."

OCHA, February 2008

"Population movement across the Acholi sub-region does not seem to have accelerated as expected at the end of the rainy season. In January, only an estimated 5,000 people moved out of the camps in Gulu and Amuru1, a figure substantially lower than had been projected. The slow return is attributed to challenges such as the lack of thatching grass, inadequate basic services in return areas, and personal insecurity. Aid agencies and Amuru district authorities were expected to meet in early March to plan for joint confidence building and monitoring visits to IDP camps and return areas. In Gulu, the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) has established a taskforce to promote voluntary return. Its strategies will be piloted in Lalogi sub-county and will involve, among others, promoting basic service provision in all areas of settlement.

In Kitgum, general movement trends indicate a preference for transit sites over villages of origin. Only an estimated nine per cent of IDPs leaving the camp during the reporting period returned to their villages of origin, while 34 per cent moved to transit sites. Return movements in some areas have been higher than in others: in Chua County, for instance, over 80 per cent of the population in some camps has moved to transit sites or villages of origin. The district plans to phase out six camps beginning in March 2008. "

UNHCR, February 2008

"By the end of January 2008 the approximate total number of people who have moved from camps to either areas of return or villages of origin in Gulu and Amuru districts has been 109,000. (Gulu district approximately 56,000 and Amuru district 48,000). There has not been a significant influx of IDPs returning as it had been earlier expected for this period. There are various general factors affecting movement of those families who would like to return but feel it is not yet the right time. Amongst others, security and the increase of criminality. The community wishes SPCs to have greater presence in the sites including more regular patrols before they decide to return. Nevertheless the psychosocial impact of living so close together for many years with the military providing security is longstanding and will require significant efforts by the Government as the

affected population return to a more regular, civilian life. Amongst other seasonal factors, shortage of water due to sources drying up has been identified as a major cause impeding full return this period."

Security improves, but fear of landmines and unexploded ordnance hampers return (Feb 2008)

- Improved security means increased access to land for IDPs
- Fear of landmines and unexploded ordnance hampers return movement

OCHA, Feb 2008

"Improved security has meant increased access by internally displaced persons to agricultural land and increased access to return areas for humanitarian organizations. Only the World Food Programme (WFP) continues to use light military escorts for food convoys, particularly in sub-counties close to the border with South Sudan or adjacent to Karamoja. However, IDP return movement reportedly continues to be hampered by the feared presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In Pader, for example, there are close to 200 reported suspected landmine or UXO locations."

Major challenges in return areas (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"In Amuru, the preliminary report from the District Security Committee's visit of return areas highlighted the lack of basic services as a chief impediment to return. Most IDPs are settled at transit sites at which some services are available, rather than villages of origin.

The findings of a rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), carried out by the Food Security Working Group in 20 camps in Gulu, listed a number of constraints to population movement cited by IDPs, including security concerns (79 per cent), waiting for the availability of local building materials (53 per cent), waiting for the signing of a final peace agreement between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (46 per cent) and waiting for a directive to return from the Government (30 per cent).

Similarly, in Kitgum, frequently cited reasons for maintaining a home in the camp, even if a family resided elsewhere was the availability of services and continuing general food distributions. Generally, the biggest obstacle to return or resettlement is lack of thatching grass: bush fires and demand from returnees has resulted in the depletion of the grass in areas."

UNHCR, February 2008

"Major Challenges in Return Areas

Increased criminality and still limited police presence in return areas. Now that the police have received logistical support from various partners, there is need for effective even deployment and regular patrolling.

Water sources have dried up during the dry season. This is especially affecting areas of return. Lack of general infrastructure for institutions especially.

Despite ongoing works, there is need for further efforts on clearing community roads. This ongoing activity goes a long way to promote Freedom of Movement and return with safety and dignity.

Fear of mines and UXOs. Lack of professional UXO mapping to guide quick and systematic demining efforts.

Lack of services in areas of return prevent full return: many returnees continue to maintain two homes in order to benefit from access to land in their villages and services in the camps (especially food, health and education)."

For the elderly, lack of shelter is major obstacle to return (Oct 2007)

IASC, 24 October 2007

"One of the greatest obstacles to old people's return after displacement was the absence of shelter. In Uganda, after years away from home, people faced the daunting prospect of starting from scratch, with roads, water sources as well as fields overgrown. Many old people said they were physically unable to rebuild their houses – especially the oldest old, but that if some way were found to build them, then they would prefer to return to their villages and attempt to restart their lives."

Disabled people stuck in camps (April 2008)

The New Vision, 15 April 2008

"It is mainly the elderly and the disabled who are still stuck in displaced people's camps, a study by the ministry for the disabled has revealed.

Herbert Baryayebwa, a commissioner, said the two vulnerable groups form almost 80% of the people still living in camps.

Addressing journalists in Kampala recently, he said children also posed a special problem.

"Voluntary resettlement is taking place but majority of the young people who were born in the camps have nowhere to go."

Return and reintegration

Return opens conflicts over land (December 2004)

- Most IDPs wish to go home
- Confidence among IDPs that land borders will be clearly recognisable
- Fears of land grabbing
- Short distances from camps to return areas

CSOPNU, 31 December 2004, p. 44

Return and the land act

As soon as this war ends, the next one will begin. It will be a land war, and it will be between brothers in the same clan. (Several interviewees, in almost identical words)

This chapter looks firstly at the likely process of return and the importance of land in that process, and then examines the changes in the rules and institutions of land that the IDPs are likely to find. Potentials for conflict are examined, together with the different processes by which people risk losing their land. Some factors that could help people secure their assets are also identified.

The process of return

Previous research among IDPs has already shown that the vast majority want to go back to their own land. This study did not look for quantitative data, but almost everyone interviewed expressed the desire of only wanting to go home (the few exceptions were widows and orphans who had been thrown off their land and who had nowhere to go). Some agencies had expressed fears that people would not know where their land was after many years in camps. Such fears appear to be misplaced according to all the IDPs interviewed. People say they know where their land is, and that if young people have difficulties, there are enough elders and neighbours alive who can help them identify their land. There was also confidence that land borders will be clearly recognisable for at least several more years and even if some marker trees have been cut down or burnt, the borders between fields made over the years by piles of field refuse (*kingingi*) will still be visible and enough natural landmarks will be identifiable (even from a plane over Gulu, the outlines of fields can still be seen). The fear is not that people will be unaware of where their borders are, but that some will attempt to take advantage of others' weaknesses.

The actual process of return is likely to be simple. Most people are displaced only a few kilometres (on average six and a half kilometres or just two hours walk). This means that they will have little difficulty in carrying with them the few items they still have with them in the camps (utensils, clothes, tools, food and seeds, etc.). The distance from people's homes to the camps does not seem to vary much from district to district, with people in Kitgum displaced on average just 1 km more than in Gulu.

Table 5: Percentage of IDP households by the distance displaced (in the three Districts of Acholiland)

Distance displaced IDP households

2 km or less	17%
4 km or less	45%
6 km or less	64%
8 km or less	76%
10 km or less	86%

Many displaced have already had experience of the process of returning home in 1999 and 2000. Initially, more people would go to gather food and firewood from their home fields, then men would gradually spend longer, passing an occasional night in hiding in the village, and slowly preparations would be made to prepare shelter for a progressive return of other family members. It is likely that such a process would be repeated in many camps, although in others IDPs may wait for a clear end to the war and a clear directive from the Army that they can return home, which would mean a more sudden departure."

Problems of acceptance faced by formerly abducted children (November 2007)

Survey of War Affected Youth, 27 November 2007

"Large numbers of youth report difficulties with their families and communities when they first return home from abduction, yet for most these problems lessen over time. Relatively few youth report conflicts within families and communities today, although for these youth such conflicts are extremely important and painful. Such conflicts may have been mitigated but not solved by blanket and broad-based sensitization programs. Like severe injuries, estrangement from one's family is painful and pressing, and few targeted services are available for these youth.

Relatively few (3 percent of males and 7 percent of females) report any current problems of acceptance by their families. Communities appear to have come to accept the majority of former abductees. Less than 10 percent of males and females report still having some problem with neighbors or community members.

Such acceptance was not immediate, however. For instance, 39 percent of females reported that they were called names by their community when they returned, 35 percent said they felt the community was afraid of them, and 5 percent report that their own family was physically aggressive with them. Current reports by females of such experiences were dramatically lower, however—7 percent for insults, 1 percent for community fear, and 0.4 percent reporting family aggression.

Women and girls who returned from the LRA with children were most likely to report problems with their families and communities upon return, although the vast majority now say they are accepted into their families. An important minority of these young women do seem to have more persistent problems with family and community members than other female returnees, however. For instance, 14 percent of these females report that their families sometimes say hurtful things to them—far more than that reported by other long-term abductees. The reasons for such challenges seem to vary from case to case, however, suggesting that targeted conflict resolution or mediation may be the most appropriate intervention.

Where youth do report problems with families and communities, these problems often relate to specific conflicts with particular neighbors or family members rather than difficulties with the entire family or community. Of course, these conflicts are no less painful to these youth simply because they are with just a few rather than all community members. The important point is that such specific conflicts are not easily addressed by the majority of community sensitization interventions, which typically take a blanket, one-size-fits-all approach. Moreover, our study finds that conflict resolution, psychological support, and family counseling services are seldom targeted at the most severely affected."

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

No obstacles to humanitarian access (Feb 2008)

- Only WFP now uses light military escorts for food convoys.

OCHA, Feb 2008

"Improved security has meant increased access by internally displaced persons to agricultural land and increased access to return areas for humanitarian organizations. Only the World Food Programme (WFP) continues to use light military escorts for food convoys, particularly in sub-counties close to the border with South Sudan or adjacent to Karamoja."

Humanitarian access in Karamoja

OCHA opens second field office in Karamoja (March 2008)

OCHA, March 2008

"The opening of a second field office in the Karamoja region, in Kotido, has enabled OCHA to expand its coverage and coordination services throughout northern Karamoja. The three districts of northern Karamoja – namely Abim, Kaabong and Kotido – continue to exhibit alarming performance against humanitarian indicators. For example, at present, only 20 per cent of the population of the three districts is literate on average, varying from only six per cent of the population in Kotido to 12 per cent in Kaabong to 40 per cent in Abim. The pupil-teacher ratio for Abim is 1:71; for Kotido, 1:90; and for Kaabong, 1:111, while the classroom to pupil ratios for the respective districts are 1:118, 1:76 and 1:93."

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

Overview: national response (April 2008)

On 15 October 2007 the government launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda, including Acholi, Lango, Teso, West Nile, Karamoja, and Elgon. The PRDP is a comprehensive development framework aimed at improving socio-economic indicators in those areas affected by conflict and a serious breakdown in law and order and bringing them into line with national standards. The PRDP replaces the Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP) and its Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). The targets and objectives in the PRDP are to contribute to the national goals of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of 2004. The PRDP has four strategic objectives: consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, revitalisation of the economy, and peace building and reconciliation. The total estimated cost of the PRDP is \$606 million over a three-year period (Government of Uganda, September 2007, pp.vi-ix).

If implemented, the PRDP would be an important step on the path to addressing the perceived neglect and marginalisation that lie at the root of the conflict in northern Uganda. However, its implementation will be a significant challenge. The PRDP does not specify how its objectives are to be realised. Proper benchmarks to measure progress in implementing it will be crucial, as will further elucidation of the relation between the PRDP and the Consolidated Appeals Process (IDMC interview with NGO staff, 15 November 2007).

Finally, the Refugee Law Project in Kampala has raised concerns that while provisions are made for assistance for the returns process for IDPs who have been living in camps for the duration of the conflict in northern Uganda, no such provision has been made for the estimated 300,000 to 600,000 urban IDPs in the country (RLP, December 2007 and March 2008; The Monitor, 12 December 2007 and 17 December 2007).

Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (September 2007)

- In October 2007, the Government of Uganda launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda. The start date for the PRDP's implementation is mid-2008.

PRDP, September 2007, page vi

Context

Since the 1990s, the Government of Uganda (GoU) has been promoting a development agenda that has led to a reduction in poverty nationally, with visible improvement in many of the welfare indices. The number of Ugandans who are unable to meet their basic needs declined from 56% in 1992 to 38% in 2003 and further to 31% in 2006 with a simultaneous improvement in other indices relating to access to health, education and water and sanitation. However, the welfare indices for Northern Uganda have not improved at the same pace as the rest of the country.

Income poverty remains significantly high, literacy rates are low and access to basic services is poor. The presence of prolonged conflict in the North for over 20 years is the most important factor explaining the poor living conditions in the North whilst at the same time it is the major impediment to increasing GDP growth in Uganda.

Process of preparing the PRDP

Bearing this in mind, the H.E the President kick started a process to prepare a recovery and development plan for the North. The first step was the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) that has spearheaded a two year consultative process with all stakeholders at the district and national level resulting in the National Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). The PRDP is a commitment by Government to stabilise and recover the North in the next three years through a set of coherent programmes in one organising framework that all stakeholders will adopt when implementing their programmes in the region."

National response: IDP Policy (October 2005)

- Government adopts IDP Policy
- Policy is broadly consistent with UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- Policy launched in Kampala followed by regional launches in districts affected by the conflict
- A lack of resources and government will and participation has hindered the policy's implementation
- The majority of IDPs are unaware of that the policy exists

GoU, August 2004

"In August 2004, the Ugandan Cabinet adopted the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons. The Policy establishes rights of IDPs, specifies the roles and responsibilities of various branches of the government, humanitarian and development agencies, donors, displaced persons and other relevant stakeholders. It also introduces various multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary structures at national, district and sub-county levels in an attempt to more effectively address the protection and assistance needs of displaced persons. The overall goal of the Policy is to ensure that IDPs enjoy the same rights and freedoms under the Constitution and national and international laws as do all other Ugandans. To meet this objective, the IDP Policy attempts to integrate IDP issues into all aspects of government planning and programming.

DANIDA, August 2005, p.25

While the adoption of the IDP Policy is considered a positive achievement, it has yet to succeed in improving situations endured by IDPs. In certain areas, there is a total lack of awareness regarding the existence of the Policy. In the Teso sub-region a recent study found that out of 13 camps visited only one camp leader had a copy of the Policy whereas the other camp leaders had not even heard of it .

UNHCR, October 2005, p.2

A lack of resources has also hindered the Policy's implementation. At the district level, the Policy mandates that a District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) act as the lead agency in responding to and providing for the needs of displaced persons. Yet the Committees, constituted by all relevant heads of local government as well as humanitarian actors, do not have the resources nor the capacity to implement the IDP Policy and thus have been unsuccessful in ensuring that displaced persons are able to fully exercise both their social and livelihood-related rights (UNHCR, October 2005, p.1; IDMC interviews, Kampala, 29 October 2005). While the IDP Policy notes that the DDMC can establish a district disaster management fund, in Katakwi district

for example, local authorities have received no instructions from the central government as to where and how they were expected to find the resources to enable them to implement the many activities mandated by the IDP Policy (DANIDA, August 2005, p.27). While the government has acknowledged that the resources needed to operationalise the IDP Policy are considerable (GoU, April 2005, p.7), these resources have yet to materialise in the affected districts. The IDP policy does make provision for disaster-prone districts to recruit a full time District Disaster Preparedness Coordinator, many of whom have already been recruited and are operational in the affected districts. However because the Coordinators are funded by an outside agency, research in the Teso region has shown that many within the local government were confused about the Coordinator's role in relation to the rest of the district structure (DANIDA, August 2005, p.14). Anecdotal evidence also indicates that Coordinators are not integral members of the local government and lack authority and credibility to make decisions.

UNHCR, October 2005, p. 1

Another concern relates to government's participation in implementing the Policy – in Lira district for example, for three months government representatives failed to attend the District Disaster Management Committee meetings (UNHCR, October 2005, p.1). The highest level committee, the Inter-Ministerial Policy Committee consisting of various government ministers, which is mandated to meet in Kampala as needed, is non-functional as it has yet to convene its first meeting.

The Office of Prime Minister issues new response plan to address Karamoja situation (January 2007)

- Revised government plan for Karamoja to enhance security and promote recovery, the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
- Military operations to be used in one component aimed at enhancing security
- Virtually no attention to the issue of displacement
- IDP camps in Northern Uganda to be dismantled and people to be resettled in their former homes as part of PRDP for Northern Uganda

Government of Uganda, January 2007, Pg. xii, 43:

"KIDDP is intended to contribute to human security and promote conditions for recovery and development in Karamoja, and to formulate a course of action that will define interventions by government and other stakeholders necessary to achieve a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament that will enhance sustainable peace building and development in Karamoja.

Component 1 on: *'Providing and Ensuring Adequate Security for the People of Karamoja'*:

Undertake strategic deployment of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and Local Defence Units (LDUs) to effectively check the international trafficking of small arms and ammunition into Karamoja, as well as protect the people of Karamoja and their property
Planned interventions under the KIDDP are thematically categorised into three: (a) Military-type operations; (b) development-type interventions for socio-economic transformation; (c) conflict management and peace building initiatives. Military operations will be coordinated through the normal military command structures and systems."

"In this revised KIDDP, the primary strategy to be pursued during the disarmament is the voluntary surrender of illegally held guns. Peaceful and voluntary disarmament is encouraged as

far as possible. The recourse to the use of force to disarm is considered necessary, only and only as a last resort, when it becomes completely unavoidable. Forceful disarmament should only become necessary to disarm: (i) those who are found with arms and ammunition in public places; (ii) those who commit crime using guns, including staging road ambushes and conducting cattle raids.”

“In order to provide a framework for the coordination of intervention for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Northern Uganda, government launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. The primary goal of the PRDP is to accelerate poverty reduction and development of Northern Uganda to bring it at parity with other regions.”

International response

Overview: international response (April 2008)

After the then UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, in November 2003 described the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda as the “biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today”, the international humanitarian response improved significantly. The 2007 Consolidated Appeal for Uganda was 71 per cent funded. Nevertheless, according to a UNHCR report, “It is evident that the humanitarian effort continues to fall well short of what is required for minimum standards to be met. Moreover, the provision of essential goods and services to different IDP populations appears to be somewhat arbitrary in nature” (UNHCR, August 2007, p.10). Of all the regions in Uganda affected by displacement, the inadequacy of the response to humanitarian needs in Karamoja is of greatest concern.

Moreover, there are serious concerns about funding for the Consolidated Appeal for 2008. The appeal totals \$374 million, compared to the revised total of \$346 million for 2007 (OCHA, 10 December 2007, pp.108-110). On 29 January 2008 UNHCR launched a Supplementary Appeal for \$15.4 million for protection and assistance to IDPs in northern Uganda (UNHCR, 24 January 2008). By the end of March 2008, only 17 per cent of the Consolidated Appeal had been funded, leading to warnings that programmes supporting the transition from humanitarian to recovery operations were at risk, as well as ongoing emergency projects aimed at addressing humanitarian needs (OCHA, 29 February 2008, p.6, and 31 March 2008, p.6).

The situation in northern Uganda presents a triple challenge, with humanitarian needs co-existing with urgent requirements in terms of early recovery and development. According to UNHCR, the uncertainties surrounding the peace process, combined with the almost total lack of infrastructure and services in the return sites, means that it is “incumbent upon the humanitarian community to acknowledge the profound problems that continue to affect northern Uganda, to be wary of overemphasizing the progress and impact of the peace process, and to recognize that a strategy based on the assumption of full and speedy return to home sites will be neither appropriate nor effective” (UNHCR, August 2007, p.8).

Uganda was one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the “cluster approach”. The cluster approach, which is part of the broader humanitarian reform process, aims to increase the accountability and predictability of the overall humanitarian response through assigning UN agencies responsibilities for certain sectors, or clusters. The cluster approach has indeed resulted in a more coherent and consistent policy response from the UN and humanitarian community in Uganda, and in improved coordination, service delivery, and protection of IDPs and returnees. However, there is still insufficient recognition of the fact that if it is to be successful, the clusters

must adopt a participatory approach, and must respect and reflect the priorities set by communities as well as by local and national government bodies (UNHCR, August 2007, p.4; NRC, December 2007).

With the ongoing peace talks and the resulting improvement in the security situation in northern Uganda, early recovery programming has assumed a vital importance. However, coordination and leadership on early recovery issues are currently lagging behind developments on the ground. Thus according to UNHCR, "while the Cluster Approach was intended to reinforce the accountability and predictability of the humanitarian system, the low level of activity demonstrated by the Early Recovery Cluster ... suggest[s] that these objectives have not been met" (UNHCR, August 2007, p.11).

Under the humanitarian reform programme, responsibility for the Early Recovery Cluster lies with UNDP. However, a decision has now been taken in Uganda that early recovery activities in the fields of water and sanitation, education, and food security should remain within the purview of the relevant clusters, and the Early Recovery Cluster has been replaced with a Governance, Infrastructure, and Livelihoods (GIL) cluster. There remains nevertheless an urgent need for analysis and coordination of early recovery needs and activities across all clusters, a need which is not currently being addressed (IDMC interview with NGO staff member, 14 March 2008).

Local authorities and the international community in Uganda are taking steps to implement the so-called "parish approach" in northern Uganda, which aims to facilitate the transition from the humanitarian to the recovery phase by rehabilitating priority basic service infrastructure at locations identified by district authorities in consultation with humanitarian actors and which are accessible to both IDPs in transit sites and returnees in villages of origin (OCHA, 31 March 2008, p.2).

In Karamoja, the international community is struggling to provide adequate assistance to IDPs, in part because of the difficult security situation and in part because the semi-nomadic population requires a non-conventional approach to service provision. Nevertheless, more UN agencies and international NGOs have now begun to expand their operations into Karamoja (IDMC interview with member of international humanitarian community, 15 November 2007).

The cluster approach in Uganda (December 2007)

Forced Migration Review, December 2007

The Cluster Approach in northern Uganda
by Jessica Huber and Nina M Birkeland (NRC-Uganda)

"The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) strongly believes that the Cluster Approach holds promise for improving the international response to internal displacement. The approach represents a serious attempt by the UN, NGOs, international organisations and governments to address critical gaps in the humanitarian system. We want this reform effort to succeed and to play an active role in northern Uganda to support the work of the clusters and improve their effectiveness.

The introduction of the Cluster Approach in Uganda must be recognised for the role it has played in maintaining focus on the humanitarian crisis that continues to affect a significant proportion of the population across northern Uganda. The Cluster Approach has resulted in a more coherent and consistent policy response from the UN and humanitarian community, working to balance the priorities of ensuring freedom of movement and freedom of choice for IDPs and continued

provision of assistance to people in camps. The challenge that remains will be to see how the Cluster Approach develops in line with the improving situation on the ground, most notably responding to movement from humanitarian relief to transition and early recovery, and ultimately to a post-conflict environment. Investment and support for the transition to a post-conflict environment must be done in such a way to ensure protection and assistance to IDPs and refugees throughout the region, regardless of their location.

Awareness and leadership

Effective implementation of the clusters depends largely on the ability of the cluster leads, headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, to hold the Government of Uganda (GoU) accountable for its actions. To date the linkages between the cluster leads and the Humanitarian Coordinator remain tenuous, with weak leadership as a result. The unsuccessful introduction of a stand-alone Humanitarian Coordinator for Uganda was a disappointment.

To ensure better implementation, cluster leads and members must have a better understanding of the process, particularly with regard to tools, planning and strategic planning. The GoU must be brought on board, informed about the process and, where possible, included in coordination mechanisms.

Coordination

Despite the proliferation of coordination mechanisms, led by the UN, NGOs and the GoU, coordination still remains insufficient. As a result, many feel that little real decision making and follow-up take place in the clusters. Furthermore, local government officials lack clear understanding of the roles in the clusters and how they can push for action. A key challenge remains the capacity of the clusters to be all-inclusive (involving not only the UN and international NGOs but also national NGOs and, at district level, local NGOs and community-based organisations) and to establish clear linkages with the GoU and local government. Lastly, the clusters continue to fail to recognise that coordination amongst all actors will be most successful when it respects and reflects the priorities set by communities as well as by local and national government bodies. If the Cluster Approach is to be successful, a participatory approach must be the basis for coordinated interventions across northern Uganda.

Clusters in the context of transition

At this moment of cautious optimism in Uganda, the Cluster Approach should prioritise working towards a gradual and smooth transition from humanitarian aid to long-term development assistance. NRC looks forward to supporting the important role UNDP is beginning to play in developing and implementing the Early Recovery Cluster. For many actors in Uganda, it continues to be unclear that UNDP is responsible for this cluster; it is also unclear how it relates to other sector working groups and especially to clusters where there appears to be significant overlap in activities e.g. food security, non food items and protection.

Conclusion

The Cluster Approach is now at last actively working to improve humanitarian response and coordination in Uganda. We have seen improvements in coordination, service delivery and protection of IDPs and returnees in northern Uganda. However, much work is still needed to realise the full benefits of an inclusive Cluster Approach where all relevant actors are included as partners. With more attention to and progress on leadership and coordination, inclusiveness and the transition to early recovery by the clusters, we expect the rights of IDPs to be better met."

Increased attention on Karamoja has yet to lead to tangible results (April 2008)

UNICEF, 16 April 2008

"In the Karamoja sub-region (Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit Districts), an ongoing expansion of life-saving humanitarian interventions and renewed interest amongst development partners have yet to be met by substantive progress to address some of the worst humanitarian and development indicators in the country – and indeed, on the continent.

Despite the sub-region's inclusion in the 2008 Interagency Consolidated Appeal (CAP), persistent insecurity and a dearth of both social and economic investment have hampered progressive efforts, including those undertaken by local communities themselves. Strong partnerships, advocacy and capacity for culturally sensitive service delivery in this unique area is urgently needed."

References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Analysing the "Protected Villages" in reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (March 2002)

- Prolongation of forced encampment seem arbitrary
- Lack of clarity if IDPs may or may not leave the "protected villages" seem to contradict a number of core personal freedoms
- Complaints about lack of reaction or preventive measures against destruction and looting of property and possessions
- Reason for concern but no direct evidence of punitive treatment of the Acholi on ethnic grounds

Weeks, March 2002, pp. 26, 27, 28

Extracts from Weeks' analysis:

Finding 1:

While the establishment of the "Protected Villages" may have been justifiable on grounds of military exigency in 1996, their prolongation into 2002 would seem to be inconsistent with international humanitarian principles.

In the UN "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", Principle 6 states as follows: "(1) Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence. (2) The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:...(b) In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;(3) Displacement shall last no longer than required by circumstances". [Emphasis added.]

While the LRA is still an active menace to civilians, it seems to have been sub-stancially weakened in recent years. The "imperative military reasons" that presumably led to the establishment of the villages would thus seem to have re-ceded accordingly, while the situation with regard to the security of civilians would appear to vary considerably from one area to the next, making the blanket prolongation of forced encampment to seem arbitrary and to reflect a failure to fully examine possible alternatives.

[...]

Finding 2:

The arbitrary nature of the forced encampment of the majority of the people of Acholiland, and the lack of clarity as to the circumstances under which they may or may not leave the “protected villages”, for example to pursue agricultural activities in their home areas, would seem to stand in contradiction of a number of core personal freedoms.

Though all of the interviewees with whom the consultant spoke expressed a passionate desire to return home as soon as feasible, many recognized that the circumstances now were not right, and that as long as insecurity continued to prevail they would choose to remain in the camps until (for example) “guarantees of security” could be given by the authorities. Many of these would doubtless choose to remain in the villages even if a blanket green light for a return home were given.

But many others feel passionately that the time to return is now. Guiding Principles 14 states: “(1) Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence. (2) In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements.”

[...]

Finding 3:

Most or all property and possessions of the internally displaced, including houses, have been destroyed or looted. Personal security in the “protected villages” is often poor, with attacks, abductions, rapes, lootings and other violent acts being committed variously by LRA assailants, by UPDF elements, by free-lance bandits, and by other village residents. While there is no evidence of a deliberate official policy to incite or encourage such acts, residents complain that too little is done to prevent them or to hold perpetrators accountable.

Guiding principle 11 (2) holds that “internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be protected in particular against: (a) rape, mutilation, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, another outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender-specific violence, forced prostitution or any form of indecent assault.’

Guiding Principle 21 (2) states: ‘The property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts: (a) Pillage; (b) Direct or indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence....’

[...]

Finding 4:

Prolonged, enforced encampment of the Acholi threatens the basis of their economic system.

According to Principle 9, “States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with special dependency on and attachment to their land.”

As a long-established agro-pastoral society, the Acholi have such a dependency, and their displacement is consequently far more destructive, socially and economically, than might be the case for, say, a more urbanized population.

Finding 5:

There is no direct evidence that the Acholi displaced are being targeted for punitive treatment on ethnic grounds.

Principle 6, (2) (a) and (e), is relevant here: "The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: (a) when based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar practices and at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious, or racial composition of the affected population...(e) When it is used as collective punishment."

When combined with the history of tension and mutual suspicion between the Acholi and the central government mentioned previously in this report, the very fact that Acholiland is ethnically so homogeneous (virtually all the displaced are presumed to be of Acholi origin and ethnicity) and so distinct from the rest of the country must raise some concerns. Loose talk noted among government officials in Kampala adds to the concern: at a superficial level, remarks are often made that, taken out of context, could be interpreted as laying collective blame on the Acholi for, for example, the actions of the LRA. If this came to reflect a clear pattern of thought, as opposed to being mere passing expressions of frustration, it would raise the matter of enforced encampment in Acholiland to the very highest level of international concern and invite a level of scrutiny that the circumstances do not at present appear to warrant."

LIST OF SOURCES USED

(alphabetical order)

Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), 2002, Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda

Internet : <http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/index.htm> , accessed 14 January 2003

Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), 31 December 2002, Causes and consequences of the conflict in Acholiland

Internet : <http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/theconflict.shtml> , accessed 12 November 2003

Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, 30 April 2003, Chronologies 2003 Events between March 1 - 31, 2003

Internet : <http://www.acholipeace.8k.com/chronology.html> , accessed 11 June 2003

Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, 31 May 2004, NORTHER UGANDA SITUATIONAL REPORT. MID-MAY 2004.

Internet : <http://www.acholipeace.org/chronology.html> , accessed 1 June 2004

Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, July 2003, Justice and Peace News Middle of May to End of June 2003

Internet : http://www.acholipeace.org/justice_news.html , accessed 5 November 2003

Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, 23 September 2004, TRAVELLING AROUND ACHOLI. PEACE AROUND THE CORNER?

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/1EAF089F879C5AD9802570B7005A57C0/\\$file/TRAVELLING+AROUND+ACHOLI.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/1EAF089F879C5AD9802570B7005A57C0/$file/TRAVELLING+AROUND+ACHOLI.doc) ,

Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA), November 2003, Food security assessment in Gulu IDP camps

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/aah-uga-28oct.pdf> , accessed 12 November 2003

Agence France-Presse (AFP), 27 May 2004, Sudan deal expected to help bring peace to northern Uganda

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/220b0a0a0e58c69e85256ea100740667?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2004

Agence France-Presse (AFP), June 2004, At least 170 killed in northern Uganda in May: army

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/7cdd5edd2e2477a285256ea60067609e?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2004

Amnesty International (AI), 17 March 1999, Uganda Breaking the Circle: Protecting Human Rights in the Northern War Zone (Report - AFR 59/01/99)

Internet : <http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR590011999> , accessed 21 August 2002

Amnesty International (AI), 30 November 2007, Doubly Traumatized: Lack of access to justice for female victims of sexual and gender-based violence in northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A782A507E1B8178DC12573A6003F5C12/\\$file/AFR-59-005-2007+\(2\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A782A507E1B8178DC12573A6003F5C12/$file/AFR-59-005-2007+(2).pdf) ,

BBC News, 21 December 2007, Otti 'executed by Uganda rebels'
Internet : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7156284.stm> , accessed 3 January 2008

BBC News, 23 January 2008, Uganda's LRA confirm Otti death
Internet : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7204278.stm> , accessed 29 January 2008

BBC News, 11 April 2008, Ugandan negotiators leave venue
Internet : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7342123.stm> , accessed 14 April 2008

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 31 January 2004, Water & Sanitation Survey in IDP Camps
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/664B9C6F4562A068802570B7005A571F/\\$file/Watsan+Survey+Report+-+Gulu.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/664B9C6F4562A068802570B7005A571F/$file/Watsan+Survey+Report+-+Gulu.doc) ,

Christian Aid, 10 May 2004, The politics of poverty: Aid in the new Cold War
Internet : <http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/404caweek/index.htm> , accessed 2 June 2004

Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, 5 August 2005, "Fighting and Talking" offers no relief for people of northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/28C6C24CC1BF4049802570B7005A58C2/\\$file/CSOPNU+statment+on+ICC+August+05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/28C6C24CC1BF4049802570B7005A58C2/$file/CSOPNU+statment+on+ICC+August+05.pdf) ,

Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, 10 December 2004, Nowhere to Hide
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/5AA559D220DB947A802570B7005A57DC/\\$file/FINAL+Nowhere+to+Hide+Draft+041204.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5AA559D220DB947A802570B7005A57DC/$file/FINAL+Nowhere+to+Hide+Draft+041204.doc) ,

Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, 31 December 2004, Land matters in displacement
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/B3CDEB6AE6786545802570B7005A56B2/\\$file/Land+matters+in+displacement+final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/B3CDEB6AE6786545802570B7005A56B2/$file/Land+matters+in+displacement+final.pdf) ,

Daily Monitor, 11 December 2007, Thugs Prevail in Camps
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/C60FF3BD37F0EC24C12573AE004D401B/\\$file/thugs+prevail+in+camps.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/C60FF3BD37F0EC24C12573AE004D401B/$file/thugs+prevail+in+camps.pdf) ,

Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), August 2005, The Implementation of the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons in Teso
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DA6F67AB5F772D18802570B7005A58CE/\\$file/DANIDA_COTIR+Report+August+2005.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DA6F67AB5F772D18802570B7005A58CE/$file/DANIDA_COTIR+Report+August+2005.pdf) ,

Department for International Development, UK (DFID), 28 February 2005, REVIEW OF HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY IN UGANDA - GENERAL COUNTRY EXPERIENCE AND NORTHERN UGANDA
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/4430CE56A7C9B835802570B7005A589A/\\$file/Uganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/4430CE56A7C9B835802570B7005A589A/$file/Uganda.pdf) ,

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT), December 2000, Uganda: Explosive Mix of Problems could re-ignite Civil War
Internet : http://web.archive.org/web/20010714152759/www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/258_.htm ,
accessed 22 August 2002

Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, September 2005, Northern Uganda IDP Profiling Study, Volume 2: Northern Uganda IDP Study
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E5B4FD15FF3F3162C12570C40047ED3A/\\$file/Northern+Uganda+IDP+Study+FAFO.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E5B4FD15FF3F3162C12570C40047ED3A/$file/Northern+Uganda+IDP+Study+FAFO.pdf) ,

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), 8 December 2004, High Need for Non Food Assistance, Better Information on IDPs
Internet : <http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/1000584.pdf> , accessed 8 February 2005

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), 8 January 2005, FEWS Uganda Food Security Update 08 Jan 2005
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MHII-69D32Y?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 February 2005

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), February 2008, Uganda Food Security Update - February 2008
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/895BBA5ACA141469C1257421006BDB53/\\$file/FEWS+Net+Uganda_2008_02_final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/895BBA5ACA141469C1257421006BDB53/$file/FEWS+Net+Uganda_2008_02_final.pdf) ,

Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 2005, Eastern Nilotic Language Groups
Internet : <http://countrystudies.us/uganda/24.htm> , accessed 22 July 2005

Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 2005, Eastern Nilotic Language Groups
Internet : <http://countrystudies.us/uganda/25.htm> , accessed 22 July 2005

Forced Migration Review (FMR), December 2007, The Cluster Approach in northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E9C359EA4F0EAAA3C12573A6004CD46B/\\$file/FMR.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E9C359EA4F0EAAA3C12573A6004CD46B/$file/FMR.pdf) ,

Gender equality incorporated, August 2003, Justification for Family land Rights in Uganda
Internet : <http://www.genderequality.ca/uploads/Articles/Justification%20for%20family%20land%20rights%20-%20GEI.doc> , accessed 19 November 2003

Gersony, Robert, 2 October 1997, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, Section 3-5, (US Embassy - Kampala)
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3FF99DEEED86A1D3802570B7005A5558/\\$file/The+anguish+of+northern+Uganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3FF99DEEED86A1D3802570B7005A5558/$file/The+anguish+of+northern+Uganda.pdf) ,

Government of Uganda, 2007, Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: "Creating Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2007/2008-2009/2010"

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/35BCF528E11C9735C1257279004E0484/\\$file/2+JANUARY+2007+REVISED+KIDDP+DOCUMENT.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/35BCF528E11C9735C1257279004E0484/$file/2+JANUARY+2007+REVISED+KIDDP+DOCUMENT.pdf) ,

Government of Uganda, 11 November 2005, Proposed Standard Operating Procedures for IDP Camp Decongestion

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/465194D5D395A049C12570C400524222/\\$file/OPM+Proposed+Standard+Operating+Procedures+for+IDP+Camp+Decongestion_Draft2.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/465194D5D395A049C12570C400524222/$file/OPM+Proposed+Standard+Operating+Procedures+for+IDP+Camp+Decongestion_Draft2.pdf) ,

Government of Uganda, 28 February 2005, REPORT ON TESO REGION (SOROTI, KATAKWI and KABERAMAIDO) JOINT INTER-AGENCY ASSESSMENT MISSION FROM 08 – 13 NOVEMBER 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/4AF1703F6C084724802570B7005A57A5/\\$file/Teso+Region+Joint+Assessment+Mission+310105.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/4AF1703F6C084724802570B7005A57A5/$file/Teso+Region+Joint+Assessment+Mission+310105.doc) ,

Government of Uganda, 15 June 2005, Inter-agency assessment mission report on Karimojong-induced camps, Katakwi district

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/4BC9AF84B5811304802570B7005A5727/\\$file/Karamojong+induced+camps+assessment+-+13-15+June+2005.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/4BC9AF84B5811304802570B7005A5727/$file/Karamojong+induced+camps+assessment+-+13-15+June+2005.doc) ,

Government of Uganda, 25 March 2005, Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assessment of Rural IDP Camps in Lira District 21st March to 24th March 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/5614399C3298EC26802570B7005A5899/\\$file/LIRA+MARCH+05+INTERAGENCY+ASSESSMENT+REPORT+Final.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5614399C3298EC26802570B7005A5899/$file/LIRA+MARCH+05+INTERAGENCY+ASSESSMENT+REPORT+Final.doc) ,

Government of Uganda, April 2005, Operationalising the National Policy for IDPs

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/60259A620BE31947802570B7005A5626/\\$file/Operationalising+the+National+Policy+for+the+IDPs+20+APRIL+05.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/60259A620BE31947802570B7005A5626/$file/Operationalising+the+National+Policy+for+the+IDPs+20+APRIL+05.doc) ,

Government of Uganda, 16 December 2004, RECONCILIATION: THE WAY FORWARD"- Conference Report

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/7AFD8C498049E55D802570B7005A5621/\\$file/RECONCILIATION+conference+report+16-12-04.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/7AFD8C498049E55D802570B7005A5621/$file/RECONCILIATION+conference+report+16-12-04.doc) ,

Government of Uganda, 31 August 2005, Framework Paper for the IDP Camp Decongestion Working Group of the National Policy on IDPs

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E2B7BF679C5E04D4802570B7005A5937/\\$file/TA+IDP+Camp+Decong+WG+Draft+310805+_2_.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E2B7BF679C5E04D4802570B7005A5937/$file/TA+IDP+Camp+Decong+WG+Draft+310805+_2_.pdf) ,

Government of Uganda, September 2007, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, 2007-2010

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/F9933A32534907A8C12573B700779C11/\\$file/PRDP+Sep+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/F9933A32534907A8C12573B700779C11/$file/PRDP+Sep+2007.pdf) ,

Government of Uganda, August 2004, The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons

Gulu District Sub Working Group On SGBV, 15 June 2005, *Suffering in Silence: A Study of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) In Pabbo Camp, Gulu District, Northern Uganda*
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/7858DAA74DCD4FAF802570B7005A589C/\\$file/SGBV+Report-Gulu.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/7858DAA74DCD4FAF802570B7005A589C/$file/SGBV+Report-Gulu.pdf) ,

Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPPEC), Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, 30 October 2003, *The hidden war: the forgotten people*
Internet : http://www.hurippec.ac.ug/Hidden_War.pdf , accessed 11 November 2003

Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), February 2002, *'Between Two Fires': The Plight of IDPs in Northern Uganda*
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A3A777B2C3CB4B59C12570C400460E7E/\\$file/Between+Two+Fires+HURIFO.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A3A777B2C3CB4B59C12570C400460E7E/$file/Between+Two+Fires+HURIFO.pdf) ,

Human Rights Focus (HURIFO), September 2007, *Fostering the Transition in Acholiland: From War to Peace, from Camps to Home*
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/AB4477A92034463CC125736A0057710D/\\$file/HURIFO+-+Sep+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/AB4477A92034463CC125736A0057710D/$file/HURIFO+-+Sep+2007.pdf) ,

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 15 July 2003, *Abducted and abused: Renewed conflict in Uganda*
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/> , accessed 18 July 2003

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 20 September 2005, *Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda*
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/034ABAB9C459F170802570B7005A58FA/\\$file/uganda0905.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/034ABAB9C459F170802570B7005A58FA/$file/uganda0905.pdf) ,

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 11 September 2007, *"Get the Gun!": Human Rights Violations by Uganda's National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region*
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/EBE3B1CFFFBC9E30C12573B7006DB3D9/\\$file/Karamoja+-+HRW+Sep+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/EBE3B1CFFFBC9E30C12573B7006DB3D9/$file/Karamoja+-+HRW+Sep+2007.pdf) ,

Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 31 March 2004, *The spread of the war*
Internet : <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No99/Chap5.htm> , accessed 23 June 2004

Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN – CEA), 8 December 1999, *Uganda: IRIN Special Report on the ADF rebellion*
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/6fd2b49f84494512c12568410064386d?OpenDocument> , accessed 31 January 2000

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 24 January 2005, *Thousands left homeless by fires in northern IDP camps*
Internet : <http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/bd04b12de0537a2c85256f9300631596?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 February 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 27 January 2005, *Uganda: LRA rebels should just surrender*

Internet :
<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/fbba0a05d991fa03c1256f96004cd3d6?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 February 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 17 October 2005, Indictment of LRA leaders draws widespread praise

Internet : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051017-irin04.htm> ,
accessed 5 December 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2 November 2005, Hunt for LRA rebels intensifies, MONUC deploys troops to border

Internet : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/11/mil-051102-irin03.htm> ,
accessed 25 November 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 10 November 2005, UN says no sign of LRA in the east, UN mission says

Internet : <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/11/mil-051110-irin01.htm> ,
accessed 25 November 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 19 June 2002, Uganda: Government in peace deal with UNRF-II rebels

Internet : <http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=28399> , accessed 19 August 2002

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 13 November 2006, Gov't urged to probe reported abuses during disarmament

Internet : <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61547> , accessed 28 March 2007

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 January 2002, IRIN Focus on humanitarian issues in 2001 //yearender//

Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=18924&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 21 January 2002

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 22 March 2000, UGANDA: Focus on growing tension in Karamoja

Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=24150&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 21 August 2002

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 18 April 2002, Uganda: Special Report on concerns at anti-LRA campaign

Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27340&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 October 2002

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 14 November 2002, "Uncertainty over IDP returns"

Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30803&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 11 June 2003

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 March 2003, "Hopes for peace in north and an end to suffering"

Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=32787&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 12 June 2003

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 3 February 2004, UGANDA: Row over fire and arrests of "rebels" in IDP camp
Internet : http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=39267&SelectRegion=East_Africa ,
accessed 4 February 2004

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 26 November 2004, UGANDA: Landmine question needs to be addressed, experts say
Internet : http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44370&SelectRegion=East_Africa ,
accessed 7 February 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 26 April 2005, Ex-rebels begin farming; first step to rehabilitation
Internet : http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46819&SelectRegion=East_Africa ,
accessed 28 April 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 July 2005, UGANDA: Water shortages worsen health problems in north
Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48092&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 13 July 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 18 July 2005, UGANDA: Nineteen killed as army, warriors clash in northeast
Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48164&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 21 July 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 10 October 2005, ICC indictments to affect northern peace process, says mediator
Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49453&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 25 November 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 22 November 2005, UN to increase presence in the north
Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50237&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 25 November 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 23 November 2005, Escalating violence worsening northern IDP plight - MSF
Internet :
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50259&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=UGANDA , accessed 25 November 2005

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 9 June 2005, UGANDA: A Chronology of events in the northern Uganda conflict
Internet : http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=47576 , accessed 21 July 2005

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), April 2008, Update on IDPs Movement
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A97D0BF600EB491EC125742B00467D31/\\$file/February08_IDP+population+movement.xls](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A97D0BF600EB491EC125742B00467D31/$file/February08_IDP+population+movement.xls) ,

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 24 October 2007, Report on an inter-agency review conducted by HelpAge International
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DC044A9F45A74745C12573A60072F6E3/\\$file/Report+to+IASC+on+ageing+and+emergencies--+Nov+07.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DC044A9F45A74745C12573A60072F6E3/$file/Report+to+IASC+on+ageing+and+emergencies--+Nov+07.pdf) ,

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 12 November 2007, IDMC interview with member of international humanitarian community, Kampala

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 13 November 2007, IDMC interview with member of international humanitarian community, Kampala

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 14 March 2008, IDMC interview with international NGO staff, Gulu (Uganda)

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 15 November 2007, IDMC interview with member of international humanitarian community, Kampala

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 26 July 2005, Forgotten Voices, A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda
Internet : <http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/127.pdf> , accessed 26 July 2005

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 31 August 2000, Annual Report 1999: Uganda
Internet : <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57JQKJ?OpenDocument> , accessed 17 January 2003

International Criminal Court (ICC), 14 October 2005, Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders
Internet : <http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/114.html> , accessed 25 November 2005

International Crisis Group (ICG), 23 June 2005, Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda
Internet : http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b027_building_a_comprehensive_peace_strategy.pdf , accessed 24 June 2005

International Crisis Group (ICG), 14 April 2004, NORTHERN UGANDA: UNDERSTANDING AND SOLVING THE CONFLICT
Internet : http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/077_uganda_conflict.doc , accessed 15 April 2004

International Crisis Group (ICG), 11 January 2006, A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda's Crisis
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2E3FEACC2E9A6A60C12570F40037932B/\\$file/ICG+N+uganda+11+jan.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2E3FEACC2E9A6A60C12570F40037932B/$file/ICG+N+uganda+11+jan.pdf) ,

International Crisis Group (ICG), 14 September 2007, Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/EF8E6AF75FE3874DC125735A00614017/\\$file/b46_north_uganda_peace_process_need_to_maintain_momentum.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/EF8E6AF75FE3874DC125735A00614017/$file/b46_north_uganda_peace_process_need_to_maintain_momentum.pdf) ,

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 31 May 2005, UGANDA: Internally Displaced Persons in the 2006 National Elections
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A67E3FC4ED77CE24802570B7005A586E/\\$file/Uganda_Action_20Plan_PRESS_May_05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A67E3FC4ED77CE24802570B7005A586E/$file/Uganda_Action_20Plan_PRESS_May_05.pdf) ,

Kacoke Madit (KM), 11 February 2004, KM NEWSLETTER 11 February 2004 No 40
Internet : http://www.acholipeace.org/feb_40.html , accessed 1 June 2004

Kacoke Madit (KM), 2000, "About Kacoke Madit"
Internet : <http://www.c-r.org/km/about/km/about.htm> , accessed 21 December 2000

Land and Equity Movement of Uganda, 31 March 2004, First draft-Land market research by LEMU
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0C06391926906108802570B7005A579C/\\$file/FIRST+DRAFT+-+LAND+MARKET+RESEARCH+BY+LEMU+\(2\).doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0C06391926906108802570B7005A579C/$file/FIRST+DRAFT+-+LAND+MARKET+RESEARCH+BY+LEMU+(2).doc) ,

Liu Institute for global issues, 31 May 2005, Northern Uganda - Human Security Update
Internet : http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/HSUpdate-Northern_UgandaMay05.pdf
accessed 21 July 2005

Liu Institute for global issues, 30 October 2003, The Hidden War: The Forgotten People
Internet : http://www.up.ligi.ubc.ca/_assets/031106uganda_fullreport.pdf , , accessed 18 December 2003

Liu Institute for Global Issues/Gulu District NGO Forum, October 2005, A Generation at Risk: Acholi Youth in Northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/F0482DEC8BEFDB0A802570B7005A592D/\\$file/A+Generation+At+Risk.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/F0482DEC8BEFDB0A802570B7005A592D/$file/A+Generation+At+Risk.pdf) ,

Liu Institute for Global Issues/Gulu District NGO Forum/Ker Kwaro Acholi, September 2005, Roco Wat I Acoli
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0708E055022B8F29C12570D0005DBF09/\\$file/Roco+Wat+I+Acoli-2005.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0708E055022B8F29C12570D0005DBF09/$file/Roco+Wat+I+Acoli-2005.pdf) ,

Mail and Guardian, 12 April 2008, Signing of Ugandan peace deal delayed amid chaos
Internet : http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=336820&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news_africa/ , accessed 14 April 2008

Médecins Sans Frontières, December 2004, Life in Northern Uganda All Shades of Grief and Fear
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/5A52423221DCB7E8802570B7005A57F2/\\$file/Life+in+Northern+Uganda+All+Shades+of+Grief+and+Fear.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5A52423221DCB7E8802570B7005A57F2/$file/Life+in+Northern+Uganda+All+Shades+of+Grief+and+Fear.doc) ,

Minority Rights Group International (MRG), December 2001, Uganda; The Marginalization of Minorities
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/D9CABA AF78769667802570B7005A58AA/\\$file/UgandaReport.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D9CABA AF78769667802570B7005A58AA/$file/UgandaReport.pdf) ,

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 12 February 2005, SECURITY REPORT FOR JANUARY 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/667D370EC2AFD1648025712C003BA989/\\$file/SecurityReportJan2005.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/667D370EC2AFD1648025712C003BA989/$file/SecurityReportJan2005.doc) ,

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), December 2007, The Cluster Approach in Northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/809E3564D57359C6C12573D4006841ED/\\$file/NRC+-+Cluster+approach+in+northern+Uganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/809E3564D57359C6C12573D4006841ED/$file/NRC+-+Cluster+approach+in+northern+Uganda.pdf) ,

Office of the Prime Minister, Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, August 2004, The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8322680A2C742CD8C12573A8004E826D/\\$file/Internal+Policy+for+IDPs.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8322680A2C742CD8C12573A8004E826D/$file/Internal+Policy+for+IDPs.pdf) ,

Overseas Development Institute (ODI), December 2006, Humanitarian protection in Uganda: a Trojan Horse?

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/CD1063671A1FFD8FC1257279004CB915/\\$file/BG_Protection_Uganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/CD1063671A1FFD8FC1257279004CB915/$file/BG_Protection_Uganda.pdf) ,

Oxfam, 27 October 2005, Ugandan government must fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians in war-torn north

Internet : <http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/DPAS-6JTEHX?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 November 2005

Oxfam, 8 February 2002, The Challenges and Hopes for Protection and Resettlement of Internally Displaced People in the Rwenzori Region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/5451604D6BECA363802570B7005A55E9/\\$file/PROTECTION+AND+RESETTLEMENT+IN+THE+RWENZORI+REGION+_OXFAM+....pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5451604D6BECA363802570B7005A55E9/$file/PROTECTION+AND+RESETTLEMENT+IN+THE+RWENZORI+REGION+_OXFAM+....pdf) ,

Oxfam, 24 September 2007, The Building Blocks of Sustainable Peace: The Views of Internally Displaced People in Northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/70DF7DC62D8DDB4FC125736B003D7071/\\$file/bp106_NorthernUganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/70DF7DC62D8DDB4FC125736B003D7071/$file/bp106_NorthernUganda.pdf) ,

Oxfam, 4 February 2005, 18 years of conflict in Uganda cannot be solved in 18 days

Refugee Law project, Makerere Faculty of Law, 27 February 2004, Refugee Law Project statement on ethnic violence

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/300CBA7CC2650F55802570B7005A5725/\\$file/RLP+Position+Statement+on+ethnic+violence.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/300CBA7CC2650F55802570B7005A5725/$file/RLP+Position+Statement+on+ethnic+violence.doc) ,

Refugee Law Project, Makerere Faculty of Law, March 2008, Uganda's Urban IDPs Risk Being Left Out Of Government's Return Plans

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/4F399142BFD7D7A0C125740C00457B1/\\$file/idpspecialbulletin.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/4F399142BFD7D7A0C125740C00457B1/$file/idpspecialbulletin.pdf) ,

Refugee Law project, Makerere Faculty of Law, 28 February 2005, WHOSE JUSTICE? PERCEPTIONS OF UGANDA'S AMNESTY ACT 2000: THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/84647B140E383F4C802570B7005A5871/\\$file/RLP.WP15.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/84647B140E383F4C802570B7005A5871/$file/RLP.WP15.pdf) ,

Refugee Law project, Makerere Faculty of Law, 10 July 2005, PEACE FIRST, JUSTICE LATER: TRADITIONAL JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/87E844D389D06CE6802570B7005A5898/\\$file/RLP.WP17.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/87E844D389D06CE6802570B7005A5898/$file/RLP.WP17.pdf) ,

Refugee Law project, Makerere Faculty of Law, 28 February 2004, Behind the violence: causes, consequences and the search for solutions to the war in Northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/BF4B62BF3105925D802570B7005A5728/\\$file/RLP.WP11.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/BF4B62BF3105925D802570B7005A5728/$file/RLP.WP11.pdf) ,

Refugee Law project, Makerere Faculty of Law, December 2007, What about us? The exclusion of urban IDPs from Uganda's IDP related policies and interventions

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/D64EFC6D72CB5FA6C12573B8006AF103/\\$file/What+about+us.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D64EFC6D72CB5FA6C12573B8006AF103/$file/What+about+us.pdf) ,

Refugees International (RI), 15 December 2004, Uganda: Numerous Challenges Ahead for Formerly Abducted Children and Adults

Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/4689/?mission=4314> , accessed 7 February 2005

Reuters, 2 April 2008, Uganda and LRA will sign peace deal - UN envoy

Internet : <http://africa.reuters.com/country/UG/news/usnL02200603.html> , accessed 2 April 2008

Reuters, 8 November 2005, EU calls for protection of civilians from LRA rebels

Internet : <http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/vLCE/36234CC8AE0CBBADC12570B3004EB85C?OpenDocument&StartKey=Uganda&ExpandView> , accessed 25 November 2005

Reuters, 12 September 2003, Uganda openly accuses Sudan army of backing rebels

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/ed4fb31f55a32b7ec1256da20039ec48?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 October 2003

Reuters, 19 April 2008, Donors urge Uganda rebels to commit to peace

Internet : <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19348044.htm> , accessed 21 April 2008

Reuters, 22 April 2008, Uganda rebels kidnap 350 people - Amnesty

Internet : <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21458894.htm> , accessed 23 April 2008

Reuters, 31 January 2006, Guatemalan blue helmet deaths stir Congo debate

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ABES-6LKL3W?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 May 2006

Reuters, 30 November 2005, Uganda's LRA Rebels seek talks with government

Reuters, 8 November 2005, Uganda army says LRA rebels kill British tourist

The Monitor, 14 April 2008, Kony kills his deputy
Internet : http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Kony_kills_his_deputy.shtml , accessed 14 April 2008

The Monitor, 22 April 2008, LRA escapees speak out, ICC express concern
Internet :
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/LRA_escapees_speak_out_ICC_express_concern.shtml , accessed 23 April 2008

The Monitor, 15 April 2008, Museveni in Juba to save peace talks
Internet :
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Museveni_in_Juba_to_save_peace_talks.shtml ,
accessed 15 April 2008

The Monitor, 12 December 2007, The forgotten urban IDPs
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/660F5E7391113137C12573AF00590168/\\$file/urban+IDPs.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/660F5E7391113137C12573AF00590168/$file/urban+IDPs.pdf) ,

The Monitor, 8 March 2008, IDPs now shy away from returning to their homes
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8289DF59B2BCDC80C12574080079CBED/\\$file/Monitor+8+March+2008.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8289DF59B2BCDC80C12574080079CBED/$file/Monitor+8+March+2008.pdf) ,

The Monitor, 17 December 2007, Rural IDPs priority for refugee body
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/941A8ECAEC3C690EC12573B400435821/\\$file/rural+IDPs+priority+for+refugee+body.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/941A8ECAEC3C690EC12573B400435821/$file/rural+IDPs+priority+for+refugee+body.pdf) ,

The New Vision, 15 April 2008, Disabled stuck in camps
Internet : <http://newvision.co.ug/D/8/16/622352> , accessed 16 April 2008

The New Vision, 22 April 2008, Classroom shortage hits Pader
Internet : <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/16/623806> , accessed 23 April 2008

The New Vision, 16 March 2008, WFP stops feeding 600,000 IDPs in Lango, Teso regions
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/765C0FB184A82490C125740F003BC811/\\$file/New+Vision+16+March+2008.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/765C0FB184A82490C125740F003BC811/$file/New+Vision+16+March+2008.pdf) ,

The Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY), 27 November 2007, Research Brief: Making Reintegration Work for Youth in Northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/407D44791DBB56A7C12573A0005B4888/\\$file/SWAY.ResearchBrief.Reintegration.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/407D44791DBB56A7C12573A0005B4888/$file/SWAY.ResearchBrief.Reintegration.pdf) ,

Uganda Conflict Action Network, 27 July 2005, Seizing the Ripe Moment for Peace in Northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2F9834F1A88165B5802570B7005A58BD/\\$file/Working+Policy+Paper+1+1.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2F9834F1A88165B5802570B7005A58BD/$file/Working+Policy+Paper+1+1.doc) ,

Uganda Health, Nutrition & HIV/AIDS Cluster, December 2007, Health, Nutrition & HIV/AIDS Newsletter

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/23FC731483C4C365C12573CA00604AF4/\\$file/Uganda_H+N+HA_Cluster_Newsletter_Dec_2007_Final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/23FC731483C4C365C12573CA00604AF4/$file/Uganda_H+N+HA_Cluster_Newsletter_Dec_2007_Final.pdf) ,

Uganda Human Rights Commission, 30 September 2004, Human Rights and the Search for Peace in Karamoja

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0DD3851AC3DD2CBE802570B7005A54F3/\\$file/karamoja.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0DD3851AC3DD2CBE802570B7005A54F3/$file/karamoja.pdf) ,

Uganda Human Rights Commission, 31 March 2004, Conditions in Internally Displaced Peoples Camps in Lira district

Uganda People's Defence Forces, 17 May 2005, SITREP FROM 1ST JAN TO 14 MAY 2005

UN News Service, 23 December 2004, Plight of Ugandan child soldiers reveals overall neglect of children's rights

Internet : <http://www0.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12903&Cr=children&Cr1=> , accessed 1 February 2005

UN OCHA and OPM, 18 April 2008, Joint Factsheet on Karamoja: Humanitarian and development realities in the region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E04948E1F0146DB5C125742F0033FBF0/\\$file/Joint+OPM-OCHA+Karamoja+Region+Factsheet+-+18+April+2008+\(2\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E04948E1F0146DB5C125742F0033FBF0/$file/Joint+OPM-OCHA+Karamoja+Region+Factsheet+-+18+April+2008+(2).pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/World Food Programme (WFP), 31 August 2003, Humanitarian Update August 2003

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/CBE5E21A68EDBF66802570B7005A56C1/\\$file/August+2003-text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/CBE5E21A68EDBF66802570B7005A56C1/$file/August+2003-text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/World Food Programme (WFP), 28 February 2004, Humanitarian Update february 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/FB3E5D868B1266CD802570B7005A55C7/\\$file/February+2004+-+text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FB3E5D868B1266CD802570B7005A55C7/$file/February+2004+-+text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 January 2005, Sudan-Uganda: SPLM/A leader pledges to help Ugandan peace effort

Internet : <http://www.notes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/53fef54f8d6c5c20c1256f9a003ac1cd?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 February 2005

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 August 2003, UN System response to the IDP situation in Uganda and recommendations for enhanced support to the national and local authorities

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/docs/reports/UgandaAug03.pdf> , accessed 30 October 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 11 November 2004, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2005 for Uganda

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/1463710c996cedd2c1256f41004aa7f1> , accessed 1 February 2005

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 29 December 2004, Humanitarian Update Uganda Nov-Dec 2004 Volume VI and XII
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JMAN-687JJE?OpenDocument> ,
accessed 7 February 2005

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2003, Humanitarian Update - Uganda, Volume V, Issue 10 and 11
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/92a02ea216c3619185256df800657b08?OpenDocument> ,
accessed 18 December 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 March 2004, Humanitarian Update Uganda Mar 2004 Volume VI, Issue III
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/3cf098e3cbbf71f5c1256e7800436aa0?OpenDocument> , accessed 22 June 2004

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 June 2004, Mid-Year Review of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2004 for Uganda
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/006d4c6120c0149fc1256eac0059df23?OpenDocument> , accessed 17 June 2004

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 May 2003, Humanitarian Update - Uganda, Volume V, Issue 5
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/700e20df8c336cb485256d41005e2d2a?OpenDocument> , accessed 11 June 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 September 2003, Web Special on crisis in northern Uganda
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c399c31fd442c447c1256da2004dc43a?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 October 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 January 2003, Humanitarian Update, Uganda, Volume V, Issue 1
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4e5703bc9dcb971bc1256cc6004ea048?OpenDocument> , accessed 12 June 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 March 2003, Humanitarian Update - Uganda, Volume V, Issue 3
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/503c2336f16f0a7585256d020072c3bf?OpenDocument> , accessed 11 June 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 April 2003, Humanitarian Update - Uganda, Volume V, Issue 4
Internet :
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/b499c403284c47f2c1256d1f0047e2c1?OpenDocument> , accessed 11 June 2003

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 February 2002, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0330FBE404F86967802570B7005A55E2/\\$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0330FBE404F86967802570B7005A55E2/$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), February 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 2

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/07ADCB09DD7E9FA2802570B7005A553/\\$file/February+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/07ADCB09DD7E9FA2802570B7005A553/$file/February+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 February 2003, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 5, Issue 2

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0E9CAF8D55871BCD802570B7005A5668/\\$file/HumUpdateOCHAFeb03.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0E9CAF8D55871BCD802570B7005A5668/$file/HumUpdateOCHAFeb03.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 27 October 2005, Note for the File, Contact Group Security Meeting at OCHA Kampala, 27 October 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/120040BD6112FD2D802570B7005A5938/\\$file/Security+meeting_271005_OCHA+Kla+_2_.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/120040BD6112FD2D802570B7005A5938/$file/Security+meeting_271005_OCHA+Kla+_2_.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 July 2007, Uganda: Consolidated Appeal, Mid-Year Review

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2015CF1B505CC884C12573C900436594/\\$file/Uganda+CAP+2007+-+MYR.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2015CF1B505CC884C12573C900436594/$file/Uganda+CAP+2007+-+MYR.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 2 June 2004, Minutes of the Contact Group meeting 2 June 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2395A94190FD972F802570B7005A5797/\\$file/CG+minutes+02+June+2004+\(2\).doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2395A94190FD972F802570B7005A5797/$file/CG+minutes+02+June+2004+(2).doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 5 November 2003, MINUTES OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETING 05/11/03

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/24D7C6530C10B743802570B7005A5704/\\$file/Rapport+Final+IEM++05.11.03.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/24D7C6530C10B743802570B7005A5704/$file/Rapport+Final+IEM++05.11.03.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 29 February 2008, Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report, 1 – 29 February 2008

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/252B4162D5FB0030C125740F003A4E0C/\\$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+February+2008.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/252B4162D5FB0030C125740F003A4E0C/$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+February+2008.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 19 February 2005, REPORT ON PADER DISTRICT JOINT INTER-AGENCY ASSESSMENT MISSION FROM 06 – 18 DECEMBER 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2AAC3361640BD317802570B7005A589B/\\$file/District+Joint+Assessment+Mission+Pader++220205.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2AAC3361640BD317802570B7005A589B/$file/District+Joint+Assessment+Mission+Pader++220205.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), August 2005, Humanitarian Update, August 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2ECD260AC0B5F8F7802570B7005A591A/\\$file/August+2005+Humanitarian+Update.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2ECD260AC0B5F8F7802570B7005A591A/$file/August+2005+Humanitarian+Update.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), October 2004, Humanitarian update-September 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2F28B9F5220D97BC802570B7005A57C2/\\$file/September+2004+Update++text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2F28B9F5220D97BC802570B7005A57C2/$file/September+2004+Update++text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), March 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 3

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2F3672C784AE7DC1802570B7005A5559/\\$file/March+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2F3672C784AE7DC1802570B7005A5559/$file/March+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 7 January 2004, Humanitarian Update December 2003

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3034D8DB2D2172F9802570B7005A5718/\\$file/Dec+2003+text+update.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3034D8DB2D2172F9802570B7005A5718/$file/Dec+2003+text+update.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 10 December 2007, Uganda: Consolidated Appeal

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3380092BAA2D8F57C12573B7006E95A9/\\$file/CAP_2008_Uganda.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3380092BAA2D8F57C12573B7006E95A9/$file/CAP_2008_Uganda.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 8 October 2003, Minutes of information exchange meeting OCHA-Nairobi-08.10.03

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/37248AC0A4D707D6802570B7005A5700/\\$file/Rapport+Final+IEM++08.10.03.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/37248AC0A4D707D6802570B7005A5700/$file/Rapport+Final+IEM++08.10.03.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 April 2001, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/393316D4CEAA03D5802570B7005A5525/\\$file/OCHA-Great+Lakes+Report+\(April+2001\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/393316D4CEAA03D5802570B7005A5525/$file/OCHA-Great+Lakes+Report+(April+2001).pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 November 2004, Humanitarian update, October 2004 Volume VI, Issue X

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3A12CE68A4A0AF66802570B7005A57D8/\\$file/October+2004+formatted.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3A12CE68A4A0AF66802570B7005A57D8/$file/October+2004+formatted.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 May 2004, Humanitarian update Volume VI, issue V

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3C4A5F5F01319704802570B7005A5796/\\$file/May+2004++text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3C4A5F5F01319704802570B7005A5796/$file/May+2004++text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2006, Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report: 16 August – 31 August 2006

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/44202D1BF0EED7A4C125726E0038AE16/\\$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+situatioin+report+Nov+16+-+30.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/44202D1BF0EED7A4C125726E0038AE16/$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+situatioin+report+Nov+16+-+30.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 January 2003, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 5, Issue 1

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/48C9046B921004A3802570B7005A5657/\\$file/HumUpdateOCHAJan03.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/48C9046B921004A3802570B7005A5657/$file/HumUpdateOCHAJan03.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 August 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 7/8

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/54460A4C047EC556802570B7005A55DD/\\$file/HumUpdateOCHAJuly-August+2002.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/54460A4C047EC556802570B7005A55DD/$file/HumUpdateOCHAJuly-August+2002.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), February 2004, Humanitarian Update-January 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/600B5EDC86EC355A802570B7005A572A/\\$file/January+2004+Update+-+text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/600B5EDC86EC355A802570B7005A572A/$file/January+2004+Update+-+text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), October 2003, Humanitarian Update September 2003

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/6083AB5FCD96EDE5802570B7005A56FF/\\$file/Sept+text+update+-+2003.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/6083AB5FCD96EDE5802570B7005A56FF/$file/Sept+text+update+-+2003.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), April 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 4

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/632EDB4E2EF6DACF802570B7005A551C/\\$file/April+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/632EDB4E2EF6DACF802570B7005A551C/$file/April+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2007, Uganda Humanitarian Update - November 2007

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/6491C63932C16F3EC12573B600448F5F/\\$file/0711+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+November+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/6491C63932C16F3EC12573B600448F5F/$file/0711+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+November+2007.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 January 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 1

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/665E505E7C933E06802570B7005A54F2/\\$file/January++2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/665E505E7C933E06802570B7005A54F2/$file/January++2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), December 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 11/12

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/66FD5FE2F7C19D38802570B7005A55B7/\\$file/November-December+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/66FD5FE2F7C19D38802570B7005A55B7/$file/November-December+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), March 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 3

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/6BBFFA681807AE2F802570B7005A55CB/\\$file/March+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/6BBFFA681807AE2F802570B7005A55CB/$file/March+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 February 2002, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/6FFB44DA7FA11F18802570B700590296/\\$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/6FFB44DA7FA11F18802570B700590296/$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 7 November 2006, Kotido Inter-Agency Assessment Report

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/741A15A95ECFCF52C125722D00389108/\\$file/Kotido+Inter-Agency+assessment+report-November06.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/741A15A95ECFCF52C125722D00389108/$file/Kotido+Inter-Agency+assessment+report-November06.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 February 2005, HUMANITARIAN UPDATE, Volume VII, Issue I

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/754508331E50D8F18025712C003BA98C/\\$file/January+2005+Update-text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/754508331E50D8F18025712C003BA98C/$file/January+2005+Update-text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 8 November 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 9/10

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/76D2D9A9410CF2C7802570B7005A5604/\\$file/HumUpdateOCHASept-Oct+02.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/76D2D9A9410CF2C7802570B7005A5604/$file/HumUpdateOCHASept-Oct+02.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 4/5

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/77A6F3226BE04E34802570B7005A5671/\\$file/Humanitarian+Updates+April-May+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/77A6F3226BE04E34802570B7005A5671/$file/Humanitarian+Updates+April-May+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 24 March 2004, Uganda mission report March 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/7B345E95381BA0F6802570B7005A579A/\\$file/Uganda+mission+report+March+2004.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/7B345E95381BA0F6802570B7005A579A/$file/Uganda+mission+report+March+2004.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 March 2003, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 5, Issue 3

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/7EB3FD450A2D6A568025712C003BA910/\\$file/HumUpdateOCHAMarch03.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/7EB3FD450A2D6A568025712C003BA910/$file/HumUpdateOCHAMarch03.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2004, Humanitarian Update April 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/85A102E92442D356802570B7005A5785/\\$file/April+2004+-+text2.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/85A102E92442D356802570B7005A5785/$file/April+2004+-+text2.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 March 2008, Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report, 1-31 March 2008

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/85EE4E8700CD2DC7C125742C002E5214/\\$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+March+2008.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/85EE4E8700CD2DC7C125742C002E5214/$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+March+2008.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 September 2004, Minutes of the Contact Group Meeting, Wednesday 15 September 2004 at OCHA

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8895A57973D7EB34802570B7005A57C3/\\$file/CG+minutes+15+Sept+2004.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8895A57973D7EB34802570B7005A57C3/$file/CG+minutes+15+Sept+2004.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 March 2005, FINDINGS OF A NUTRITION SURVEY, PARABONGO, WOL & PAIMOL SUB-COUNTIES, AGAGO COUNTY, PADER DISTRICT, NORTHERN UGANDA, MARCH 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8BC285AD8B30713E802570B7005A567F/\\$file/GOAL+Nutrition+Survey+Pader+March+05.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8BC285AD8B30713E802570B7005A567F/$file/GOAL+Nutrition+Survey+Pader+March+05.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 19 May 2004, Pagak Assessment Report 17 05 04

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8CE7991A57969E4A802570B7005A57A0/\\$file/Pagak+Assessment+Report+17+05+04.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8CE7991A57969E4A802570B7005A57A0/$file/Pagak+Assessment+Report+17+05+04.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 28 February 2002, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8FDE3C844384E36B802570B70058785C/\\$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8FDE3C844384E36B802570B70058785C/$file/Affected+Populations+Report+-+February+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), November 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 9/10

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/917630A6F30903CF802570B7005A556B/\\$file/Sept-Oct+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/917630A6F30903CF802570B7005A556B/$file/Sept-Oct+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 3 May 2006, Minutes of the Contact Group Meeting

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/92F248DE6AAF0C85C125717600326675/\\$file/Minutes+of+the+Contact+Group+Meeting+3rd+May+06.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/92F248DE6AAF0C85C125717600326675/$file/Minutes+of+the+Contact+Group+Meeting+3rd+May+06.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), February 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 2

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/93F8758F989270DD802570B7005A55C1/\\$file/February+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/93F8758F989270DD802570B7005A55C1/$file/February+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), November 2005, OCHA - IDD Support Mission to Uganda, 14-18 November 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/97357D473852B6D2C12570CB0047AEC7/\\$file/IDD+mission+report_Nov05_final.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/97357D473852B6D2C12570CB0047AEC7/$file/IDD+mission+report_Nov05_final.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), May 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 5

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/9790F14B746836C2802570B7005A559F/\\$file/May+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/9790F14B746836C2802570B7005A559F/$file/May+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), September 2005, Humanitarian Update September 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/9B1D5A0363874A03802570B7005A591D/\\$file/OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+Sept+05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/9B1D5A0363874A03802570B7005A591D/$file/OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+Sept+05.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 2 October 2002, Information Exchange Meeting Report

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A95B903A706FAD97802570B7005A55FA/\\$file/OCHAInfo+Exchange+Meeting+02Oct02.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A95B903A706FAD97802570B7005A55FA/$file/OCHAInfo+Exchange+Meeting+02Oct02.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 23 May 2001, Conference On Internally Displaced Persons: Lessons Learned And Future Mechanisms, Oslo 23 May 2001: Uganda Case Study

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/A9EC86DE5701BE30802570B7005A5581/\\$file/OSLO+CONFERENCE+\(MAY+2001\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/A9EC86DE5701BE30802570B7005A5581/$file/OSLO+CONFERENCE+(MAY+2001).pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), July 2005, Humanitarian Update July 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/AB9EC580D6D8043A802570B7005A58C5/\\$file/OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+July05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/AB9EC580D6D8043A802570B7005A58C5/$file/OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+July05.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 29 September 2004, NUPI presentation at the Contact Group meeting, 29 September 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/B899E30AE6B641E5802570B7005A57C5/\\$file/NUPI+presentation+at+CG+29+Sept+2004.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/B899E30AE6B641E5802570B7005A57C5/$file/NUPI+presentation+at+CG+29+Sept+2004.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 December 2005, Humanitarian Coordination Update Uganda 15-31 Dec 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/B8C3EC7CD55D4267C12570FB00490057/\\$file/12+OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update_15-30+Dec+05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/B8C3EC7CD55D4267C12570FB00490057/$file/12+OCHA+Uganda+Humanitarian+Update_15-30+Dec+05.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), September 2004, Humanitarian update-August 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/BBD9BCBE76DE54B7802570B7005A57BF/\\$file/August+2004+Update+-+text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/BBD9BCBE76DE54B7802570B7005A57BF/$file/August+2004+Update+-+text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 26 October 2004, MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND THE MILITARY ON ISSUES RELATING TO ESCORTS ON THE 26TH/OCTOBER/2004.

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/C335C28B34480E86802570B7005A57D7/\\$file/Military+Escorts+Kitgum+position+Oct+04.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/C335C28B34480E86802570B7005A57D7/$file/Military+Escorts+Kitgum+position+Oct+04.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), June 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 6

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/C5E4C9AF195D8BE3802570B7005A555D/\\$file/June+2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/C5E4C9AF195D8BE3802570B7005A555D/$file/June+2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 January 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 1

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/C5E581CE156D1A85802570B7005A55BE/\\$file/January+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/C5E581CE156D1A85802570B7005A55BE/$file/January+2002.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 22 June 2005, CAP Mid-year review 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/CC0A0CCB3687DD92802570B7005A5521/\\$file/MYR_2005_Uganda.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/CC0A0CCB3687DD92802570B7005A5521/$file/MYR_2005_Uganda.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 7 January 2007, Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report: December 06 – January 07

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/D54F03E6E6780479C12572820036FEB0/\\$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+for+Dec-January+07.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D54F03E6E6780479C12572820036FEB0/$file/Uganda+Humanitarian+Update+for+Dec-January+07.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 27 June 2005, HUMANITARIAN UPDATE-MAY 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/D6AEEA2432189821802570B7005A5870/\\$file/May+2005+Update+-+text.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/D6AEEA2432189821802570B7005A5870/$file/May+2005+Update+-+text.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 August 2005, Minutes of NGO Contact Meeting, 17 August 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DEC8366AFDC31F0F802570B7005A58D3/\\$file/CG+minutes+17+Aug+05-ck.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DEC8366AFDC31F0F802570B7005A58D3/$file/CG+minutes+17+Aug+05-ck.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 13 November 2004, REPORT ON TESO REGION (SOROTI, KATAKWI and KABERAMAIDO) JOINT INTER-AGENCY ASSESSMENT MISSION FROM 08 – 13 NOVEMBER 2004

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E1663299A2BE981D802570B7005A56E1/\\$file/Teso+Region+Joint+Assessment+Mission+report+-+final.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E1663299A2BE981D802570B7005A56E1/$file/Teso+Region+Joint+Assessment+Mission+report+-+final.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), June 2002, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 4, Issue 6

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/E4EFA631168F85DC802570B7005A5500/\\$file/June+2002.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/E4EFA631168F85DC802570B7005A5500/$file/June+2002.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), September 2001, Affected Populations in the Great Lakes Region (as of 31 September 2001)

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/EA798BF7197D3B49802570B7005A551A/\\$file/OCHA-affected+populations+\(Sept+2001\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/EA798BF7197D3B49802570B7005A551A/$file/OCHA-affected+populations+(Sept+2001).pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 9 November 2005, Minutes of the Contact Group Meeting of Wednesday 09 November 2005 at OCHA

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/F112CB166E617EB9C12570C4004BDE54/\\$file/CG+minutes+09+November+05.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/F112CB166E617EB9C12570C4004BDE54/$file/CG+minutes+09+November+05.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 August 2007, Waiting for Godot in Gulu: Possible reasons for delay in IDPs' return process

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/FC0E54F6224A3E5BC125739900586FF3/\\$file/OCHA+-+Waiting+for+Godot+in+Gulu+-+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FC0E54F6224A3E5BC125739900586FF3/$file/OCHA+-+Waiting+for+Godot+in+Gulu+-+2007.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), September 2001, Humanitarian Update Uganda, Volume 3, Issue 7/8

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/FD3A1FDCA5F3780A802570B7005A54F8/\\$file/July,August++2001.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FD3A1FDCA5F3780A802570B7005A54F8/$file/July,August++2001.pdf) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 21 April 2005, Humanitarian Update, March 2005 Volume VII, Issue III

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/FE409C248EB7ECE5802570B7005A5861/\\$file/March+2005+formatted+light.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FE409C248EB7ECE5802570B7005A5861/$file/March+2005+formatted+light.doc) ,

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 May 2006, Minutes of the Contact Group Meeting

United Nations, 29 November 2002, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda 2003

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/uga03.pdf> , accessed 12 June 2003

United Nations, December 1998, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda, January-December 1999

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/8ab63301370dbb38c12566c7004e3908> , accessed 16 February 2005

United Nations, November 1999, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda, January-December 2000

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/b6af40bb5277321cc125681f004f7232?OpenDocument> , accessed 10 February 2000

United Nations, July 2000, 2000 Mid-Term Review of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda (Jan-Jun 2000)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/f5cdc92a96bffb00c1256921004d1c08?OpenDocument> , accessed 20 July 2000

United Nations, November 2001, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda 2002

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec125663300408599/6708f96222bcf276c1256b1000372fe5?OpenDocument> , accessed 17 December 2001

United Nations, November 2000, UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda 2001

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec125663300408599/a488e656a670dcc8c12569920030b1a0?OpenDocument> , accessed 21 December 2000

United Nations, 30 November 2006, Consolidated Appeals Process 2007
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/1138A18CCFFD77B6C125727C004EAAC0/\\$file/CAP+2007.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/1138A18CCFFD77B6C125727C004EAAC0/$file/CAP+2007.pdf) ,

United Nations, 23 November 2006, High Commissioner Expresses Serious Concern over Escalating Violence against Civilians in Northeastern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/3C31E118A9EF60DDC1257279004D2AF9/\\$file/Kotido+pressrelease+OHCHR+231106.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3C31E118A9EF60DDC1257279004D2AF9/$file/Kotido+pressrelease+OHCHR+231106.pdf) ,

United Nations, 30 July 2004, Uganda Inter agency assessment Report July 2004
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/4E2371C8704F77E9802570B7005A56AF/\\$file/Uganda+Inter+agency+assessment+Report+July+04.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/4E2371C8704F77E9802570B7005A56AF/$file/Uganda+Inter+agency+assessment+Report+July+04.doc) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 10 February 2005, Fires and disease threaten residents of overcrowded camps
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/JWIN-69LE4R?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=uga> , accessed 15 February 2005

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 17 May 2004, A chance to return to normal life: Former child soldiers return home in northern Uganda
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/425e7ad327092817c1256e9f0037198f?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2004

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 28 May 2004, A snapshot - the night commuters of northern Uganda
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/57bf748c1437a97549256ea5000ae163?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2004

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), September 2006, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in in Northern Uganda. Findings from the Survey for War Affected Youth. A Report for UNICEF Uganda.
Internet : <http://www.sway-uganda.org/SWAY.FinalReport.DRAFT.22Aug06.pdf> , accessed 5 March 2007

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 16 April 2008, Humanitarian Situation Report, Jan - March 2008
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0747896EBAA502A5C125742D004F5BE4/\\$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep\(Jan-Mar2008\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0747896EBAA502A5C125742D004F5BE4/$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep(Jan-Mar2008).pdf) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), November 2001, Abductions in Northern and South-western Uganda: 1986 - 2001
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/2F68FFB88812387C802570B7005A54EF/\\$file/UNICEF+Abducted+Children+Database+\(November+2001\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/2F68FFB88812387C802570B7005A54EF/$file/UNICEF+Abducted+Children+Database+(November+2001).pdf) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 2007, Humanitarian Situation Report – January 2007
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/636BDDCF38E74EDDC125728900325ACB/\\$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep\(Jan2007\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/636BDDCF38E74EDDC125728900325ACB/$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep(Jan2007).pdf) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), October 2005, Northern Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report - October 2005

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/B955B38384436440C12570C4004F8146/\\$file/NUganda+HumanitarianSitRep\(Oct2005\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/B955B38384436440C12570C4004F8146/$file/NUganda+HumanitarianSitRep(Oct2005).pdf) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 31 May 2005, Camp Decongestion in Kitgum

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DB45854E446A93B4C12570C4005277CF/\\$file/IDP+Camp+Decongestion+in+Kitgum.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DB45854E446A93B4C12570C4005277CF/$file/IDP+Camp+Decongestion+in+Kitgum.pdf) ,

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), April 2006, UNICEF HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT – APRIL 2006

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/F1CD9B67E1AE003CC125719A004661A6/\\$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep\(Apr2006\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/F1CD9B67E1AE003CC125719A004661A6/$file/Uganda+HumanitarianSitRep(Apr2006).pdf) ,

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), December 2007, Returning to uncertainty? Addressing vulnerabilities in Northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/55EA21A411447A46C12573B4004AAEC3/\\$file/returning+to+uncertainty.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/55EA21A411447A46C12573B4004AAEC3/$file/returning+to+uncertainty.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN HCHR), 24 November 2006, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Uganda: Situation in Kotido, Karamoja, from 29 October to 15 November 2006

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0F11C2D7099F07DBC1257233003067EB/\\$file/ohchr-uga-24nov.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0F11C2D7099F07DBC1257233003067EB/$file/ohchr-uga-24nov.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN HCHR), 3 September 2007, Update report on the situation of human rights in Karamoja, from 1 April to 12 August 2007

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/12A0E3B20E66A64AC125735B002D98C0/\\$file/Ugandareportfinal.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/12A0E3B20E66A64AC125735B002D98C0/$file/Ugandareportfinal.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 17 October 2005, Note on UNHCR Visit to Lira, Approach to Return and Decongestion

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/0F3D8BAF21E8C8A8C12570C40050BDA3/\\$file/Lira+decong+return.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/0F3D8BAF21E8C8A8C12570C40050BDA3/$file/Lira+decong+return.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 15 October 2007, Newsletter: Camp Management and Return Monitoring Reports: September to Mid-October 2007

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/338A03A959FFE0B1C1257399005AF497/\\$file/NewsletterSeptOct2007+\(2\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/338A03A959FFE0B1C1257399005AF497/$file/NewsletterSeptOct2007+(2).pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 24 January 2008, Supplementary Appeals for IDP Programmes 2008

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/762F1283DF556F98C12574340030131B/\\$file/UNHCR+supplementary+IDP+appeal.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/762F1283DF556F98C12574340030131B/$file/UNHCR+supplementary+IDP+appeal.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 11 February 2008, CAMP MANAGEMENT AND RETURN MONITORING Period covering November 2007/ early February 2008

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/F4331C0BC18C18D0C1257403006CAF3B/\\$file/NewsletterFeb08.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/F4331C0BC18C18D0C1257403006CAF3B/$file/NewsletterFeb08.pdf) ,

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), August 2007, Real-time evaluation of UNHCR's IDP operation in Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/FA3490728FEDBECCC125733A0027FAFF/\\$file/46c1b8b92.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/FA3490728FEDBECCC125733A0027FAFF/$file/46c1b8b92.pdf) ,

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 27 January 2006, Great Lakes: Resolution 1653 (2006) adopted by the Security Council at its 5359th meeting, on 27 January 2006 (S/RES/1653)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6LJTLS?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=bdi> , accessed 30 March 2006

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 8 December 1999, Agreement Between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda, 8 December, 1999

Internet : http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan_uganda/sudan_uganda_12081999.html , accessed 28 May 2004

US Agency for International Development (USAID), August 2005, Conflict Early Warning and Mitigation of Resource Based Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa: Conflict Baseline Study Report Conducted in the Karamajong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/23DED01BD8244151C1257279004D062D/\\$file/USAID+Karamoja+Conflict+Baseline+Study+Report.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/23DED01BD8244151C1257279004D062D/$file/USAID+Karamoja+Conflict+Baseline+Study+Report.pdf) ,

U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), 1997, World Refugee Survey 1997 (Washington, D.C.)

Internet : <http://www.refugees.org/worldmap.aspx?subm=19&ssm=115&area=Investigate> , accessed 5 April 2006

U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), 2000, World Refugee Survey 2000: Uganda

Internet : <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/2000/uganda.htm> , accessed 21 August 2002

U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), 28 February 2003, World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report

Internet : <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/2002/uganda.cfm> , accessed 11 June 2003

U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS), 9 February 2005, Uganda sees best chance for peace in 18 years

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-69GTMN?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=uga> , accessed 15 February 2005

U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS), March 1999, Uganda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 Part 1

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/53f1d5732803b96805256728006e3f47?OpenDocument> , accessed 31 January 2000

U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS), February 2001, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -2000: Uganda

Internet : <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/index.cfm?docid=847> , accessed 9 June 2001

Voice of America (VOA), 23 April 2008, Rebel Kidnappings Irk Uganda's Government
Internet : <http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2008-04-23-voa4.cfm> , accessed 23 April 2008

Westbrook, David, June 2000, "The Torment of Northern Uganda: A Legacy of Missed Opportunities"
Internet : http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/p3_2westbrook.htm , accessed 17 July 2000

Willet Weeks, March 2002, Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond 'Protected Villages' in Northern Uganda
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/328D3C51889A4384802570B7005A55F3/\\$file/Weeks+march+2002.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/328D3C51889A4384802570B7005A55F3/$file/Weeks+march+2002.pdf) ,

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission), 13 June 2002, Thousands of Ugandan children abducted by Lord's Resistance Army "lost" in southern Sudan
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/18ca1074602b075285256bde00738245?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 October 2002

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission), 28 February 2005, Learning in a War Zone: Education in Northern Uganda
Internet : http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/Ed_Ug.pdf , accessed 25 July 2005

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission), February 2005, Resilience in the Darkness: An Update on Child and Adolescent Night Commuters in Northern Uganda
Internet : http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/Ug_Resil.pdf , accessed 11 February 2005

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission), July 2001, Against All Odds: Surviving The War On Adolescents (Promoting The Protection and Capacity of Ugandan and Sudanese Adolescents in Northern Uganda)
Internet : http://www.womenscommission.org/reports/womenscommission_uganda_2001.pdf , accessed 27 March 2002

Women's E-News, 20 July 2003, Women Gain Inch in Push for Land Rights in Uganda
Internet : <http://www.womensnews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1456/context/cover/> , accessed 19 November 2003

World Bank (WB), February 2008, Northern Uganda Land Study. Analysis of Post-Conflict Land Policy and Land Administration: A Survey of IDP Return and Resettlement Issues and Lessons (Acholi and Lango Regions)
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/BCCBABA4FA281DEBC12574090046D2FA/\\$file/Northern+Uganda+Land+Studies+Lango+and+Acholi+Report+180108.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/BCCBABA4FA281DEBC12574090046D2FA/$file/Northern+Uganda+Land+Studies+Lango+and+Acholi+Report+180108.doc) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), February 2004, EFNA findings and malnutrition rates-February 2004
Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/1845348C2E84334B802570B7005A572F/\\$file/EFNA+FINDINGS+AND+MALNUTRITION+RATES.rtf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/1845348C2E84334B802570B7005A572F/$file/EFNA+FINDINGS+AND+MALNUTRITION+RATES.rtf) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), September 1999, WFP Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons: Country Case Study on Internal Displacement: Uganda, displacement in the Northern and Western Districts (final draft)

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/611FAD994328DB04802570B7005A55B3/\\$file/WFP+REPORT\(September\).pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/611FAD994328DB04802570B7005A55B3/$file/WFP+REPORT(September).pdf) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), September 2005, Emergency Food Security Assessment of IDP Camps in Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Pader Districts

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/8490BE2807FF434EC12570C4004FFFBD/\\$file/EFSA+March+2005+Write+Up+Final+Draft.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8490BE2807FF434EC12570C4004FFFBD/$file/EFSA+March+2005+Write+Up+Final+Draft.pdf) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), 31 December 2003, Situation report for December 2003-WFP

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/97126E226CBE56CC802570B7005A570C/\\$file/December03+Sitrep.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/97126E226CBE56CC802570B7005A570C/$file/December03+Sitrep.doc) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), 21 April 2005, Uganda Food security update

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/AE41F700CEDA4E48802570B7005A5862/\\$file/UG+Apr+2005.doc](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/AE41F700CEDA4E48802570B7005A5862/$file/UG+Apr+2005.doc) ,

World Food Programme (WFP), 25 January 2008, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation: Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/DD97080814F88416C125740C00515F87/\\$file/WFP+25+Jan+2008.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/DD97080814F88416C125740C00515F87/$file/WFP+25+Jan+2008.pdf) ,

World Vision, 25 September 2004, Pawns of politics: Children, conflict and peace in northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/JCDR-659KPF-WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf/\\$File/WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/JCDR-659KPF-WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf/$File/WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf) accessed 6 December 2005

World Vision, 25 September 2004, Pawns of politics

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/JCDR-659KPF-WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf/\\$File/WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/JCDR-659KPF-WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf/$File/WorldVision_UGA_27Sept.pdf) , accessed 14 February 2005

World Vision/Cranfield University, 28 May 2004, Uganda: Children of War Rehabilitation Centre stretched to its limits, as number of rescued children increases

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9282181038122c3449256ea2001280c9?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 June 2004

World Vision/Cranfield University, December 2001, Understanding Resettlement Capacities and Vulnerabilities of Displaced Male and Female Headed Households: A Case of Three Camps in Northern Uganda

Internet : [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/95B237E40199F673802570B7005A55E6/\\$file/World+vision+report_December+2001_.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/95B237E40199F673802570B7005A55E6/$file/World+vision+report_December+2001_.pdf) ,

Xinhua, 14 December 2004, More rebel families return home in northern Uganda

Internet :
<http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/7c879871b3f794c1c1256f6a0030c051?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 February 2005

,