



## Security Council

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### Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2000 (2011), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 July 2012, and requested me, in paragraph 19, to provide a special report, no later than 31 March 2012, with recommendations on possible adjustments in the structure and strength of UNOCI, taking into account the holding of the legislative elections, prevailing security challenges and progress in rebuilding national capacities. The report covers developments since the report of 30 December 2011 (S/2011/807) and includes the findings and recommendations of an assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire.

#### II. Update on major developments

##### Political

2. Further to the legislative elections held on 11 December 2011, the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Guillaume Soro, resigned from the Government on 8 March 2012, together with his Cabinet. The first meeting of the new National Assembly took place on 12 March in Yamoussoukro, during which two members of the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) party, the outgoing Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro, and Sarah Sako-Fadika, were elected as President of the Assembly and Vice-President, respectively. On 13 March, President Alassane Ouattara appointed a new Government, headed by Jeannot Ahoussou-Kouadio from the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), who will also serve as Minister for Justice, while the President will serve as the Minister for Defence.

3. During the reporting period, opposition political parties continued to realign their structures and form coalitions as a result of divergent views on engagement with the Government. This resulted in the creation of the Ligue des mouvements pour le progrès (LMP) and Agir pour la paix et la nation (APN) platforms. On 27 January, the main opposition coalition, the Congrès national de la résistance pour la démocratie (CNRD), elected a new leadership and former CNRD Secretary-General, Simone Gbagbo, was replaced by Marthe Amon Ago, the former Vice-President of the National Assembly.



4. The Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party held a meeting in Abidjan on 21 January, during which a clash erupted when elements affiliated to the ruling coalition, the Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP), attempted to disrupt the meeting. One person was killed, several were injured and property was damaged, while FPI members assaulted national police officers, accusing them of inaction. UNOCI used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. No major incident was reported on 18 February, when some 500 supporters attended another FPI meeting at CNRD headquarters in Abidjan, at which UNOCI forces were also present. The future of FPI as a party was reportedly discussed on 6 February, when the interim President of FPI visited former President Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the Netherlands. On 8 March, the interim Secretary-General of FPI was briefly detained upon his return from Ghana.

5. Further to the announcement of the provisional results of the legislative elections, on 15 December 2011, by the Independent Electoral Commission, the Constitutional Council announced, on 31 January, the cancellation of the results in 11 of the 205 electoral districts. In keeping with his certification mandate, on 17 February, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire certified the legislative elections in the 193 electoral districts for which the national authorities had proclaimed the final results.

6. Repeat elections were held, on 26 February, in the 11 electoral districts in which results had been cancelled. Elections were also conducted in a district where polling had not taken place on 11 December, owing to the death of a candidate.

7. Polling took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere, except in two districts in western Côte d'Ivoire. In Bonon district, after the polling stations closed, UNOCI peacekeepers escorting the transport of result sheets to the office of the Independent Electoral Commission in Bonon were attacked by unidentified armed individuals. Later that night, peacekeepers repelled an attack by armed individuals against the electoral office in Bonon and extricated UNOCI and Ivorian polling staff to another location. The office was later ransacked and some electoral materials, including result sheets, were stolen. An investigation is being conducted into five deaths, which were reported in Bonon that day. In Facobly district, the result sheets for several polling stations were stolen by armed elements.

8. With the exception of the Bonon and Facobly districts, on 28 February, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the provisional results of the repeat elections in the other 10 districts. Further to the proclamation of the final results by the Constitutional Council on 7 March, the Special Representative certified the elections for these 10 districts, on 9 March.

9. President Ouattara continued to take measures to strengthen regional and international cooperation. During the period under review, he attended the eighteenth summit of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa, in January 2012; received the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in Côte d'Ivoire; and paid a State visit to France, during which a new defence agreement was signed. On 17 February, President Ouattara was elected Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States during a summit in Abuja, Nigeria. A delegation of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the West African Economic and Monetary Union visited Côte d'Ivoire for two weeks in March to assess progress

made towards meeting the country's debt obligations under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

10. National and international prosecutions continued. On 22 February, Pre-Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court in The Hague decided to expand the scope of its investigation to crimes committed in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002. In Côte d'Ivoire, the military tribunal reopened in Abidjan and started hearings on 2 March against 134 former Forces de défense et de sécurité and police elements for crimes committed during the crisis, as well as against nine members of the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI).

### **Security**

11. While the security situation has generally improved, incidents by various perpetrators continued to take place throughout the country, highlighting the vulnerability of civilians. Security incidents and human rights violations continued to be committed by FRCI elements. They were reportedly involved in clashes between communities in Arrah in eastern Côte d'Ivoire from 11 to 13 February, resulting in the deaths of three people and injuries to at least 19. Other incidents took place: on 27 February in Abidjan, where one youth was killed when FRCI elements responded to an incident; on 29 February in Séguéla, when a FRCI element fired shots in a crowd, killing two civilians; and on 3 March near Daloa, as a result of a FRCI element firing shots during a dispute between two villagers, seriously injuring one of them.

12. In response to such incidents, the Government took important measures to improve security and curb ill-discipline in the security forces. It reactivated the military police and deployed units in Abidjan and Bouaké; another unit is planned to deploy in Daloa. Efforts also continued to return FRCI personnel to barracks and to create a mixed unit to fight racketeering. At the same time, FRCI strengthened its deployment in the west, while another battalion will be deployed in the area bordering Ghana.

13. Violent attacks and armed robberies by unidentified armed elements also resulted in a number of civilian deaths and injuries. Three separate incidents were reported on the Bouaké-Katiola road, on 3 and 19 February and 8 March, when unidentified armed elements attacked vehicles, killing seven persons and injuring many more. During an attack by unidentified armed elements on 9 February, in the Zibabo Yablo village near Duékoué, unidentified armed elements killed three civilians, while some 400 people were displaced and over 25 houses burned. On 19 February, two persons were killed and others injured when a group of persons were attacked by unidentified armed elements on their way to a political meeting in the western part of the country. On 21 February, five unidentified armed elements attacked the village of Zriglo in the border area with Liberia, killing six persons and wounding many more.

14. The first months of the year also witnessed an increase in violent confrontations between communities, mostly in the west, including in Petit Guiglo on 4 January, in Dobia on 5 January, in Toa Zeo near Duékoué on 6 January and near Gagnoa on 15 January, resulting in the deaths of 16 people, injuries to many more and the burning of several houses. Four persons were wounded near Daloa during a confrontation between the local population and dozos (traditional hunters) on 7 January, while four people were killed in Tuého village near Man on

16 February, allegedly in retaliation for the prior killing of two nationals of Burkina Faso in a neighbouring village. Clashes were also reported around Abidjan, in Guéhiébly on 6 January and Ayamé on 9 January, resulting in the destruction of property. On 5 March, in Agboville near Abidjan, five people were injured when dozos violently intervened in a private matter.

15. There were also reports of confrontations between farmers and cattle breeders in Béoumi near Bouaké in the north, which started on 4 January and spread to the neighbouring villages of Konsou, Gnabra and Zedekan on 22 January, to Wawasidanet and Ndolisakissou on 26 January and to Odiénné in early February. Another confrontation occurred on 20 January in Touba in the north-western part of the country, spreading to a number of neighbouring villages and resulting in injuries to several persons and the displacement of some 200 people.

### **III. Assessment mission**

16. Further to Security Council resolution 2000 (2011), I deployed an assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire, from 6 to 17 February, to develop recommendations on possible adjustments to the structure and strength of UNOCI, taking into account the holding of the legislative elections, the prevailing security challenges and progress made in rebuilding national capacities. Participants included representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which also led the mission, the Department of Field Support, the United Nations Office for West Africa, the Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Group.

17. The assessment mission received detailed briefings from UNOCI and the United Nations country team and consulted a wide range of national and international stakeholders, including members of the Government; the leadership of the national security agencies and armed forces; the Licorne forces; representatives of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission; international and regional partners; political parties, including the former ruling FPI party; civil society; and non-governmental organizations. Members of the mission also visited a number of locations throughout the country, and a special assessment was undertaken in the border areas in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, together with representatives from UNOCI, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations country teams in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia.

18. The discussions of the assessment mission with Government officials, including former Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, ministers and the Director of the Cabinet of President Ouattara, as well as other national and international stakeholders, highlighted the significant progress made since the last assessment, in May 2011, particularly owing to initiatives undertaken by the Government. There was a visible improvement in the situation, with a gradual return to normalcy. Banks have reopened and economic activity is accelerating, while the security situation has improved in Abidjan. Legislative elections took place in a generally peaceful manner, civil servants have returned to work and many displaced persons and refugees have returned to their homes. The President strengthened regional and international cooperation and established the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The discussions also confirmed that the priorities identified by the

Government, which were outlined in the twenty-eighth report, of 24 June 2011 (S/2011/387), remain valid.

19. This notable progress notwithstanding, interlocutors stressed that the country continues to face important challenges and significant threats, in particular with respect to the overall security situation. All interlocutors characterized the security situation as fragile, and some felt that the challenges risk reversing the progress made since the end of the post-election crisis. Government and other interlocutors also expressed concern about such emerging subregional threats as drug trafficking, piracy and organized crime, as well as spillover from instability in neighbouring countries, while underscoring the limited capacity of the Ivorian security agencies to address them.

20. National interlocutors stressed that UNOCI presence in the country remained indispensable and that any reduction of its activities would be premature. They particularly emphasized that a continued robust presence by UNOCI peacekeepers in support of the Government was vital to address prevailing security challenges and threats to the country's stability.

## **A. Security situation**

21. Although security has improved in Abidjan, it was assessed that threats have become more diffuse and the security situation has deteriorated in other parts of Côte d'Ivoire, where State authority is weak and large numbers of weapons are in circulation. In spite of measures taken by the Government to improve discipline within the armed forces, FRCI continues to face challenges and lacks cohesion. The future of the approximately 40,000 elements associated with FRCI — most of them recruited on an ad hoc basis during and towards the end of the crisis — is uncertain. There is also a growing concern about potential destabilization from elements affiliated to former President Gbagbo, who had fled, during and after the crisis, to countries in the subregion.

22. There were also an increasing number of clashes between communities throughout the country, which have a potential to escalate into larger-scale conflicts as long as the underlying root causes, particularly land tenure, are not addressed. The return of refugees is likely to further exacerbate existing tensions. The proliferation of weapons has contributed to a higher incidence of violent crimes, such as armed robberies, looting and racketeering, including by FRCI and armed elements.

23. The situation remains particularly fragile in western Côte d'Ivoire, where large numbers of weapons, armed elements, former combatants, militias and dozos, as well as competition over the control of resources are significant sources of insecurity. Most of the incidents occurred in the west, although insecurity has increased in other parts of the country. Law enforcement, while present throughout the country, remains ineffective, and some areas are still under the protection of the dozos, which increases insecurity.

24. The situation with respect to the dozos has become a matter of concern as a result of the recent crisis and the proliferation of weapons. Reportedly, there now are some 10,000 elements claiming to be or perceived as dozos, while prior to the crisis there were only 1,000, creating fear and confusion among the local

population. Some posing as dozos use automatic weapons, while traditionally, dozos were armed only with spears or long hunting rifles.

#### **Security situation in the border areas**

25. Côte d'Ivoire's borders remain porous and largely uncontrolled. The situation in the immediate border area with Liberia is of particular concern, as the continued presence of armed elements, including former combatants, and of weapons, as well as uncontrolled cross-border movements and illicit trafficking, continue to threaten the stability of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and the entire subregion. Illegal mining in the border areas has also led to cross-border incidents.

26. National authorities in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia have limited capacity to control effectively the movement of people and goods and address security challenges along the border, which stretches over more than 700 km and is often inaccessible as a result of poor roads, dense vegetation and river banks, and most crossings take place through unofficial entry points. The assessment mission visited two official border crossing points, and noted that Liberian immigration officers and other national security personnel were present on the Liberia side, while there was little evidence of an immigration or border management structure on the Côte d'Ivoire side.

27. Despite the political will expressed at the highest levels in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, so far no national strategy has been developed in either country to address, in a more comprehensive manner, border security and the issue of Ivorian and Liberian former combatants. Relevant Ivorian and Liberian civilian and security authorities at the local level generally have limited cooperation mechanisms and have contact on an ad hoc basis or in the context of operations organized by the peacekeeping operations.

28. The assessment mission also met returnees in Côte d'Ivoire as well as Ivorian refugees in camps in Liberia. The refugees cited lack of security and confidence in national authorities, limited access to land, loss of property, the absence of return assistance and slow progress in repatriation assistance as factors preventing them from returning to their areas of origin in western Côte d'Ivoire. However, to date the majority of refugees have spontaneously returned from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire, although some 70,000 Ivorian refugees remain in Liberia, including about 50 per cent in host communities. The decrease of food assistance to refugees between December 2011 and February 2012, as a result of funding shortages, placed further strain on refugees, host communities and returnees and increased uncontrolled cross-border movements of refugees.

29. Some refugees in the camps closely affiliated with the former regime, including ex-combatants who seem to exert some control over refugees, questioned the legitimacy of the outcome of the 2010 presidential election and the current Government. The lack of capacity of the Liberian Government has challenged its ability to effectively screen arriving refugees, including for the presence of former combatants, and it would need increased support to do so.

30. Groups of former combatants who sought refuge in Liberia during or after the crisis seem to have maintained some of their networks. They are also believed to remain within host communities in the border area, which are primarily composed of people of the same ethnic groups and often include close family relations.

31. The whereabouts of the estimated 3,000 foreign combatants that entered Côte d'Ivoire during the crisis, mainly from Liberia, are unknown, although some are believed to be in the refugee population. Others did not return to their home countries and are believed to have stayed in Côte d'Ivoire or along the border. Weapons caches have also been reported in the border areas between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. Although some weapons have been found there, there are indications that this is a small fraction of the weapons that are believed to be hidden in the border area.

32. A total of 88 suspected armed elements, mainly from Côte d'Ivoire, were detained in Liberia in April 2011, of whom two Ivorians remain in detention, as well as three suspected Liberian mercenaries. The other detainees were released on 13 March. In addition, since June 2011, 43 persons, including 39 Ivorians, have been in pretrial detention in Zwedru on charges of mercenarism, while in January 2012, a second group of 73 Ivorians was arrested and detained on the same charges, but was released on 20 February.

33. All interlocutors recognized the regional dimension of most of the security challenges that Côte d'Ivoire is facing and stressed the need for increased cooperation in the subregion to address them. Interlocutors also stressed the importance of building on existing regional mechanisms, including the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials, the Regional Action Plan of ECOWAS to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa and the related West Africa Coast Initiative, as well as initiatives spearheaded by the countries of the Mano River Union, to address the growing problem of illicit trafficking and drug abuse, while national capacities are developed. Subregional aspects should also be taken into account when addressing issues of youth unemployment, land tenure issues, early recovery and humanitarian assistance, reconciliation and community security and disarmament. Some interlocutors were of the view that the gradual normalization of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as President Ouattara's chairmanship of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, could constitute an important window of opportunity to tackle these security threats and emerging threats to the subregion.

#### **Staff safety and security**

34. The safety and security of United Nations personnel has improved since the end of the post-election crisis. However, challenges persist, in particular owing to the volatile security situation and the limited capacity of the Ivorian security forces to ensure effective protection of the population and of United Nations personnel. United Nations personnel and property are mostly confronted with crime, especially armed robberies and burglaries.

## **B. Political situation and prospects for reconciliation**

35. Although results are outstanding in two electoral districts, the first meeting of the new National Assembly took place in March. The Assembly will play an important role in representing the people and ensuring more democratic governance,

including through passing legislation for key reforms and addressing the root causes of the crisis, such as land tenure.

36. National authorities also reiterated their commitment to holding local elections later in 2012, which could be an important opportunity to widen the political spectrum and strengthen governance at the local level. On 7 March, the Government revoked six decrees issued between 2001 and 2010 relating to the creation of close to 1,000 new communes, resulting in a return to the initial number of 197, which existed when the last municipal elections took place in 2000. National authorities stressed the need for the United Nations, including UNOCI, to provide logistical support for these elections.

37. The political landscape in Côte d'Ivoire is polarized, with marginal representation of opposition parties in the National Assembly. Most interlocutors stressed that reaching some form of political accommodation would therefore be important.

38. While many members of the former ruling party remained in exile, rifts developed among the opposition in the country. Although some have stated their willingness to engage with the Government and to participate in the local elections, FPI continues to impose conditions for doing so, including the release of all high-level FPI officials from detention, the lifting of arrest warrants against those in exile and the unblocking of frozen assets. In meetings with the assessment mission, representatives of the political opposition raised concerns about acts of reprisals and attacks against them by elements of FRCI because of their political and ethnic affiliations, including arbitrary arrest and killings. Some were of the view that UNOCI did not do enough to protect them from the Ivorian security forces, especially during demonstrations. They expressed concern about the lack of political space for the opposition and what they perceive as an absence of freedom of assembly and expression. They also stressed the need for the Government to make efforts towards promoting justice for crimes committed by all sides during the crisis and to curb corruption within their ranks.

39. On the other hand, representatives of the ruling coalition noted that many in the opposition continued to question the legitimacy of the President and his Government. It was also found that State media had improved in terms of professional standards and impartiality, in comparison with the period before and during the crisis, although some private media affiliated to the opposition continued to publish inflammatory statements.

#### **Reconciliation and social cohesion**

40. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission commenced its work under the leadership of former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, with the support of regional and international partners. In spite of some initial consultative meetings in the western and eastern part of the country, its activities have so far concentrated on Abidjan, although the Commission plans to increase its activities at the local level, including through the establishment of 36 local commissions. At the local level, early warning and sensitization committees, created under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and comprised of traditional leaders, local authorities, political parties and civil society, have been instrumental in addressing local conflicts and easing tensions in a number of locations.



41. In spite of these efforts, meaningful reconciliation at any level has yet to progress. The root causes of instability remain unaddressed and issues surrounding citizenship, access to land, the control of natural resources and unbalanced socio-economic development and unemployment, particularly for youth, continue to fuel local conflicts across the country, leading to clashes between communities. The United Nations continued to support reconciliation efforts at the national and local levels, while also pursuing community security and violence reduction initiatives.

### **C. Human rights and transitional justice**

42. Serious human rights violations, including: summary executions; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; rape; arbitrary arrest and illegal detention; extortion and the seizure of private properties; and illegal occupation of private premises, continue to be committed by armed elements, including from FRCI and associated untrained armed elements, dozos and other armed elements. Women and children continue to be the subject of sexual- and gender-based violence, while overall the situation of children remains of concern. Impunity continues, partly as a result of shortcomings in the judicial system, including lack of resources and limited access to justice.

43. The Government has established judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to facilitate accountability, most importantly the special investigation cell and the national commission of inquiry, whose composition and working methods have faced some national and international criticism. There are concerns that the Commission of Inquiry is finalizing its report without having documented all relevant crimes through comprehensive investigation. Government interlocutors stressed that promoting and protecting human rights remained a priority, along with developing a fair and equitable justice system, which was important for reconciliation.

44. To date, all 148 persons charged by national prosecutors with crimes committed during the post-election crisis are from or affiliated with the regime of former President Gbagbo. This has further contributed to the perception of “one-sided justice” and prevailing impunity. However, the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court of 22 February to expand the scope of its investigation to crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 was perceived by segments of the population, notably the political opposition, as a step towards applying justice in a more even-handed manner.

### **D. Humanitarian situation and economic recovery**

45. Although the majority of people displaced during the crisis have returned home, several hundred thousand remain vulnerable. One hundred thousand people are still displaced in the country (of which 11,700 are in camps) and 96,000 Ivorians remain refugees in neighbouring countries, of whom some 70,000 are in Liberia. Insufficient return and livelihood assistance as a result of funding constraints and lack of access to basic services hamper sustainable returns, particularly in the west where humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations and displaced persons is still critical. Returns are also likely to further exacerbate tensions unless they are mitigated through progress towards stabilization, disarmament,

reconciliation and access to basic social services, as well as addressing impunity and the root causes of the conflict, including land tenure issues. Funding for humanitarian activities is likely to remain a major challenge, which risks further affecting food security. While humanitarian aid continues to be coordinated mainly by an international structure, efforts are under way to progressively move it to Government-led coordination and to align it with a national development plan for 2012 to 2015, which is being prepared by the Government.

#### **Economic recovery**

46. Progress has been achieved at the macroeconomic level. In addition, efforts are under way to improve livelihood conditions, access to basic services, conditions for sustainable return and local capacities. The development of a national development plan is an important step in this regard. At the same time, enhanced partnerships, including with the private sector, and coordination will be necessary to complement the efforts of the Government in economic recovery and development. The United Nations will continue to assist the Government by supporting improved access to basic social services, professional integration and job creation for young people, including through labour intensive work projects, cash-for-work programmes and access to independent and entrepreneurial employment, coupled with elements of professional training and access to microfinance.

### **E. Rebuilding national capacities and restoration of State authority**

#### **Security sector reform**

47. Government interlocutors stressed that the reform of the security sector remains a critical priority, while recognizing that building independent, professional and impartial security institutions is a long-term process that requires national ownership. Notwithstanding the implementation of important steps towards the restructuring of the defence and security institutions, the national vision for the reform of the security sector is still being developed and the institutional structure to move the agenda forward has yet to take shape. Ideally, such a vision would result from a process of inclusive and consultative national dialogue and include, inter alia, the development of a legislative framework with the National Assembly playing an oversight role. In the meantime, the Government is taking a number of measures to address immediate challenges in the security sector, with United Nations support.

48. Government interlocutors indicated that President Ouattara intended to become more closely involved in security sector reform. The Government is also considering additional measures to enhance its coordination of national security matters and security sector reform. In the light of the need to restore confidence between the population and the armed forces, the Office of the Prime Minister is organizing meetings (*assises nationales des armées*) between the security and law enforcement institutions, local authorities and the population.

#### **Armed forces**

49. The Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire, created in March 2011, has an estimated overall strength of some 40,000 elements, including 15,000 members of the gendarmerie. Efforts to address shortcomings notwithstanding, FRCI remains a

heterogeneous force facing considerable challenges with command and control, ill-discipline and cohesion. FRCI leadership stressed the importance of returning military personnel to barracks to enhance command and control of the troops. The leadership also emphasized the need for training and capacity development to bring the troops to the required level of quality and professionalism. Other priorities included the need for more effective control of the borders, establishing a maritime capacity and improving weapons and stockpile management, while United Nations assistance was requested in building new and rehabilitating existing barracks.

50. In addition, there are an estimated 40,000 personnel (although the numbers remain fluid), mostly recruited on an ad hoc basis during the crisis, who are associated with FRCI and placed nominally under FRCI leadership, although they are not considered regular members of the armed forces and are not paid salaries. The Government intends to assemble these personnel in 18 areas across the country, where they will undergo disarmament, identification procedures and selection. It is envisaged that 2,000 of them would be recruited to join FRCI; 15,000 would constitute a so-called reserve force to undertake development activities; and the remaining 23,000 would undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Government has requested UNOCI support in building some of these assembly sites.

#### **Police and gendarmerie**

51. Police and gendarmerie personnel have redeployed in most parts of the country but their effectiveness is hampered by poor infrastructure and a lack of training and essential logistics, most importantly vehicles and communications equipment, particularly outside Abidjan, as well as the continued influence of former command structures in parts of the country. Therefore, in some instances, FRCI or associated armed elements continue to perform law enforcement responsibilities, and there continued to be incidents arising from mistrust between FRCI and the police and gendarmerie, although relations between the security agencies have improved.

52. As mentioned in the previous report (S/2011/807), a joint audit conducted by UNOCI and the Ivorian police, at the request of the Government, revealed important challenges that need to be addressed, including restructuring and professionalizing the national police and increasing its operational ability, which would require rehabilitating and re-equipping units vandalized during the crisis. Only around 30 per cent of police units and 20 per cent of gendarmerie units are appropriately equipped and have weapons. In addition, training remains an immediate priority as is reactivating the municipal police to enhance law and order at the local level.

#### **Rule of law institutions**

53. All 37 courts and 22 prisons have reopened since the end of the crisis, while work is under way to reopen the remaining 11 corrections facilities. However, shortcomings in the judicial system, including lack of resources, limited availability of legal aid programmes, slow and inefficient judicial proceedings, politicization of its personnel, inadequate case management systems and poor public perception and corruption, continue to hamper the effective maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice. National authorities have taken initiatives to address these issues with UNOCI support, including through the development of a national justice sector reform strategy. There are also initiatives under way to reform the corrections

system, although challenges remain in the management of corrections facilities and the lack of capacity to address shortcomings.

### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

54. The Government acknowledged the importance of finding a solution for the untrained elements associated with FRCI during the crisis, including through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and creating a reserve force. However, a comprehensive national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is not yet in place to address other target groups, including militia, so-called dozos and foreign armed elements. Efforts are under way to develop this programme, which, as a first step, would require the establishment of a national body responsible for the planning, coordination and implementation of the programme. Interlocutors in Liberia also stressed the need for an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in Côte d'Ivoire in order to enhance stability in the border area. In Côte d'Ivoire, interlocutors identified the urgent need for the Government to establish clear eligibility criteria for those who would enter a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, with a view to defining the size of the respective caseloads. The Government has announced an estimated caseload of some 60,000 who may benefit from such a programme, including 23,000 individuals associated with FRCI.

55. Once the Government decides on the reinsertion package to be offered to those who will disarm, UNOCI has the expertise and means to assist the Government with reinsertion. However, such assistance would be limited in time and scope. Coordinated, long-term and sustainable reintegration solutions for former combatants in Côte d'Ivoire are essential, but have yet to be identified. This is crucial, since some former combatants demobilized under previous programmes reportedly rearmed and joined the fighting in 2011, owing to a lack of sustainable reintegration. To avoid such a possible scenario in the future, the Government will need to develop a comprehensive and long-term reintegration programme, potentially on a subregional basis. The support of Côte d'Ivoire's bilateral and other partners will be important as the United Nations will not have the capacity or the funding to assist the Government in this important undertaking.

56. In the meantime, the Government has proceeded, with UNOCI support, with the ad hoc disarmament of 1,640 former combatants (mostly militia), collecting 1,035 weapons and 220,265 rounds of ammunition since April 2011.

### **Extension of State authority**

57. Civil servants have resumed their duties across the country, but their effectiveness is hampered by damaged infrastructure and limited resources. Prefects have progressively restored their authority, including with regard to public order, although this varies depending on the capacity of the national security forces deployed in the respective areas. Prefects are chairing the local security committees tasked with ensuring and coordinating the provision of security at the local level. They comprise local FRCI and gendarmerie commanders, as well as other representatives of the local administration, including customs officials.

58. Some progress was made towards the reunification of the treasury. The fiscal administration began re-establishing its structures and services, and representatives of the public administration, in charge of controlling natural resources, are being

deployed across the country. Customs officials were deployed at different border crossing points along the borders with Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, although they lack capacity and sufficient deployment. In parallel, former Forces nouvelles elements allegedly continue to be involved in parallel networks, particularly in the north, including unofficial taxation and trade. The continued strengthening of the State at the local level was identified as crucial for the stabilization and consolidation of the country.

#### **IV. Recommendations on possible adjustments in the strength and structure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**

59. Further to the findings of the assessment mission, it is recommended that UNOCI should adjust its deployment and posture in order to be more effective and responsive to security developments, including by covering more remote areas and intensifying its engagement with local authorities and populations. This will require adjustments in the structure and strength of UNOCI military and police personnel (see annex I), as detailed below, in recognition of the progress made, while taking into account the challenges and risks that remain.

60. Stabilizing the security situation in a sustainable manner also requires continued support by UNOCI and the United Nations country team to the Ivorian authorities to strengthen the political process, rebuild national capacities, support the conduct of sensitive security-related processes, strengthen State authority, promote justice and reconciliation, provide basic services, promote and protect human rights, and address the root causes of the conflict, while supporting efforts with respect to humanitarian assistance and economic recovery. UNOCI is therefore reinforcing its field presence with a view to increasing its engagement at the local level.

##### **Military component**

61. The assessment mission specifically reviewed the need to retain the authorized troop level of UNOCI, which currently stands at 9,792 military personnel and includes the 2,400 additional troops authorized to reinforce UNOCI prior to and during the crisis. It was found that the crisis exacerbated existing problems and created new ones, which did not exist prior to the 2010 elections, as a result of the disintegration of the security apparatus during the crisis, the collapse of State authority, the creation of FRCI followed by ad hoc recruitment, the involvement of militias and foreign combatants in the crisis, the proliferation of weapons and the presence of key representatives of the former regime exiled in neighbouring countries. In addition, the French forces (Licorne forces) have further reduced their presence in Abidjan. It was therefore assessed that these challenges require maintaining the core strength of UNOCI, as well as retaining some of the additional capacities.

62. As the security situation in Abidjan has improved and the national security forces have an effective deployment in the city, fewer military patrols are required and some military tasks could be transferred to the national forces. It is therefore recommended to reduce the authorized military strength of UNOCI, in Abidjan, by the equivalent of one battalion. It is also recommended that UNOCI, in close

consultation with the Government, review the protection arrangements for Government members and key political stakeholders, as well as non-United Nations installations, with a view towards adjusting the resources required for that task.

63. In addition, it is recommended that the three armed helicopters currently deployed in UNMIL be transferred to UNOCI, in order to deter potential spoilers from any significant military action and to respond to localized threats to the population, especially in the border areas. It is also recommended that, although based in Côte d'Ivoire, the armed helicopters could be used in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, under a specific inter-mission cooperation arrangement.

### **Police**

64. It is recommended that the authorized level of the formed police component of UNOCI should be maintained at 1,000 personnel, including the 100 personnel authorized as part of contingency planning prior to the 2010 elections, in the light of the challenges outlined above. In addition to the presence of formed police units in Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Guiglo and Yamoussoukro, formed police units would be deployed to Boundiali, in the north, and Abengourou, in the east, to contribute to protecting civilians and supporting the Ivorian police and gendarmerie, including through joint patrols.

65. Furthermore, the 205 additional police advisers, authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2000 (2011), would be accommodated through a reduction in the authorized military strength of UNOCI, which would lead to a total authorized strength of 555 individual police officers. These officers would assist in building the capacity of the Ivorian law enforcement agencies in such specialized areas as crowd control, community policing, judicial policing, communication, criminal investigation, sexual- and gender-based violence, organized crime and border management. They would also facilitate coordination between Ivorian and Liberian security services in the border area and support the reform of national security services and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. At the same time, UNOCI police will continue its on-job training, collocation and mentoring programmes.

### **Enhancing border security**

66. It is recommended that the United Nations, through all aspects of its presence in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, enhance its support for the stabilization of the border area, while the Ivorian and Liberian authorities build their capacities to control their borders and develop national and subregional strategies in coordination with national authorities, ECOWAS and the Mano River Union. UNOCI, UNMIL and the respective country teams should facilitate increased cooperation between the Ivorian and Liberian authorities and security forces at all levels, including through the establishment of coordination and liaison mechanisms.

67. Following the adoption of a plan by UNOCI and UNMIL during a meeting in Abidjan on 6 and 7 March, all components of UNOCI and UNMIL should further increase their cooperation and joint planning, including through formal and structured practices of information sharing, with a view to enabling a better understanding of regional dynamics, exchanging experiences and sharing of lessons learned. It is also recommended that the two missions increase joint border monitoring operations in coordination with the national security agencies and

conduct cross-border operations as required and authorized, which should include coordinated foot patrols along crossing points.

68. At the same time, the United Nations should enhance its efforts in support of the Ivorian and Liberian authorities in the sensitive border areas, in order to strengthen State authority based on a mapping of existing capacities; address immediate humanitarian needs; promote reconciliation and social cohesion at the local level; reduce the proliferation of weapons; and create the conditions conducive for the sustainable return of displaced populations. It may be useful in this regard for the United Nations presences in both countries to develop a shared strategic vision and plan for their respective engagement in the border areas over the short, medium and long term.

69. It is important that bilateral and other partners support the Ivorian and Liberian authorities, as well as the regional organizations, in the development of national and regional integrated border strategies and programmes within the framework of existing mechanisms of the Mano River Union and ECOWAS, with the support of the United Nations Office for West Africa, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2000 (2011).

## V. Observations

70. I am encouraged by the steady progress and considerable achievements Côte d'Ivoire has made in returning to normalcy since the violent post-election crisis of 2011. I commend President Ouattara and his Government for their initiatives to further stabilize the situation, including by addressing immediate security challenges, advancing economic recovery, holding critical national elections and strengthening international and regional cooperation. These efforts demonstrate the Government's strong political will to progressively move the country forward and to put the crises of the past behind them. And these efforts have already yielded tangible results for the country and its people, particularly with respect to the security and economic situation in the country.

71. In spite of the progress made, the security situation is still fragile. The risks and threats Côte d'Ivoire continues to face are significant. The post-election crisis created significant new challenges, while the root causes and potential triggers of instability remain unaddressed. I am particularly concerned about a number of risk factors that are a threat to the safety and security of people in Côte d'Ivoire, and which also carry the risk of destabilizing the country, most importantly, the state of the national security agencies, the unresolved issues related to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the circulation of weapons. The intent of persons affiliated to the former regime in neighbouring countries could also pose a potential risk. In addition, emerging threats to stability in West Africa could affect Côte d'Ivoire, while the border area between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia is particularly vulnerable. The peace has been hard won and is still fragile in both countries.

72. I would encourage the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to work closely with UNOCI, UNMIL and the United Nations country teams to enhance the stabilization of the border areas, while developing national and regional strategies. Support by bilateral and other partners to develop the capacity of the Ivorian and Liberian national security agencies with respect to effective border management will

be essential. However, the issue is much broader, and addressing cross-border threats will require a firm engagement from the subregion. The development of a strategy by ECOWAS to address the threats of cross-border movements of armed elements and weapons, as well as illicit trafficking and organized crime, therefore remains an important priority. I would reiterate that the United Nations presences in West Africa, and that of the United Nations Office for West Africa specifically, stand ready to actively support such initiatives by ECOWAS and by the Mano River Union. I further welcome the appointment of President Ouattara as Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, and call upon him to use this important opportunity to address pressing security challenges that threaten peace and security in West Africa.

73. Security incidents and human rights violations committed across the country are of serious concern. The initial efforts by the Government to curb ill-discipline within the armed forces are important and exemplify the urgent need for serious efforts to reform the security sector, which is vital to sustainable peace and stability. There is an equally pressing need to find a durable solution for former combatants, especially those who will not be absorbed in the security agencies. There is a real risk, based upon lessons learned from the recent crisis, that in the absence of such solutions for those elements, they could become a threat to human rights and stability in Côte d'Ivoire and the subregion, as they are more likely to pick up arms again, should the opportunity arise. I therefore urge the Government to work closely with UNOCI and other international partners to develop a comprehensive, long-term national plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, taking into account the subregional dimension. I also urge the Government and international and regional partners to support the Government in finding solutions to ensure sustainable reintegration, as well as early recovery and job creation.

74. I commend the successful conduct of the long-awaited legislative elections, which are particularly important for more representative governance, and will enable efforts aimed at consolidating peace and democracy as well as sowing the seeds for long-term development. All Ivoirians have a role to play in moving towards sustainable peace, stability and prosperity in Côte d'Ivoire, whether from within institutions, as political stakeholders or members of civil society. The Government represents the interests of all Ivoirians and it is therefore essential that it continues to reach out to the opposition through serious dialogue. I also urge political leaders to engage in dialogue in the interest of all Ivoirians seeking peace and a better future.

75. I would also recall that it is the responsibility of the Government to protect freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, which are fundamental democratic rights. But, it is equally the responsibility of all Ivoirians to refrain from inflammatory statements, actions and violence. Continuing to challenge the legitimacy of democratically elected officials only increases tensions, contributes to debilitating mistrust and encourages violence. I therefore call upon political leaders to engage constructively in the political life of the country in order to realize a better future. The good offices role of my Special Representative remains critical in this regard to facilitate enhanced political dialogue between all political stakeholders and to ensure a more vibrant and diverse political landscape that will contribute to the return of normalcy in all aspects.

76. Although significant, the establishment of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission is only a first step on the long road to achieving



meaningful reconciliation. Progress is slow and there is a need for reconciliation at all levels, with the aim of addressing the root causes of the crises and promoting social cohesion, which is indispensable for lasting stability in Côte d'Ivoire. I therefore encourage the Government and all partners to continue supporting the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission to ensure its effective functioning in line with international standards. At the same time, I encourage the Government to continue to promote reconciliation and dispute resolution mechanisms as part of the political process and an important factor for good governance, while building on reconciliation mechanisms at the local level. The United Nations will continue to support these efforts.

77. Reconciliation must go hand in hand with justice, and ensuring accountability for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law is critical. I therefore urge the Government to ensure that investigations are independent and impartial, and to ensure individuals are brought to justice, irrespective of their political affiliation.

78. In the light of these significant challenges, UNOCI peacekeepers will continue to play an important role in supporting Government efforts to further stabilize the security situation and protect civilians across the country. I therefore recommend that the current military strength of UNOCI (see annex II) be maintained during the current mandate period, ending on 31 July 2012. However, progress registered on the ground should be reflected for any future extension of mandate, and the implementation of a reduced authorized strength of 8,837, comprising 8,645 troops and staff officers and 192 military observers, should start after the renewal of the mandate of UNOCI, should the Security Council so decide. Given the need to enhance public order, I further recommend that the current strength of UNOCI formed police units remain at 1,000 personnel, while the authorized strength of its individual police officers reflect the additional 205 police advisers, for a total of 555 individual police officers, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2000 (2011). In addition, UNOCI and the United Nations country team will enhance the presence of civilian personnel at the local level in order to improve the effective delivery of mandated activities and programmes.

79. Looking ahead, I am confident that Côte d'Ivoire will continue on a steady path to recovery and I recommend that the situation be reviewed by 31 March 2013, at which time I will present my recommendations on the conditions that should be in place for future adjustments in the structure and strength of UNOCI. It will continue to be important that any such adjustments be made on the basis of the prevailing situation on the ground and threats to Côte d'Ivoire's sustainable peace and stability, and the capacity of Ivorian institutions to effectively meet such challenges.

80. In conclusion, I wish to thank my Special Representative, Albert Gerard Koenders, for his leadership, and all the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations country team for their determination and dedication in support of the Ivorian people. Their service, often under difficult conditions, has been instrumental in stabilizing the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. My appreciation also goes to the key partners, including countries contributing troops and police to UNOCI, regional organizations, donor countries and the multilateral and non-governmental organizations that continue to provide invaluable support to Côte d'Ivoire.

Annex I

Map of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire deployment



## Annex II

**United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and police strength as at 18 March 2012**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>				<i>Police component</i>	
	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Police</i>
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	3
Bangladesh	12	9	2 161	2 182	360	1
Benin	8	7	420	435	—	49
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	3	—	—	3	—	—
Brazil	4	3	—	7	—	—
Burundi	—	—	—	—	—	38
Cameroon	—	—	—	—	—	6
Canada	—	—	—	—	—	9
Central African Republic	—	—	—	—	—	15
Chad	5	1	—	6	—	23
China	5	—	—	5	—	—
Djibouti	—	—	—	—	—	36
Democratic Republic of the Congo	—	—	—	—	—	27
Ecuador	2	—	—	2	—	—
Egypt	—	1	175	176	—	—
El Salvador	3	—	—	3	—	—
Ethiopia	2	—	—	2	—	—
France	—	6	—	6	—	22
Gambia	2	—	—	2	—	—
Ghana	5	7	515	527	—	6
Guatemala	5	—	—	5	—	—
Guinea	3	—	—	3	—	—
India	7	—	—	7	—	—
Ireland	2	—	—	2	—	—
Jordan	7	13	1 058	1 078	486	14
Madagascar	—	—	—	—	—	14
Malawi	3	2	857	862	—	—
Morocco	—	3	721	724	—	—
Namibia	2	—	—	2	—	—
Nepal	3	1	—	4	—	—
Niger	6	4	930	940	—	43
Nigeria	6	1	63	70	—	10
Pakistan	8	11	1 378	1 397	149	—
Paraguay	6	2	—	8	—	—
Peru	3	—	—	3	—	—

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>			<i>Police component</i>		
	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Police</i>
Philippines	3	3	—	6	—	—
Poland	4	—	—	4	—	—
Republic of Korea	2	—	—	2	—	—
Republic of Moldova	4	—	—	4	—	—
Romania	6	—	—	6	—	—
Russian Federation	10	—	—	10	—	—
Rwanda	—	—	—	—	—	8
Senegal	13	7	517	537	—	3
Serbia	3	—	—	3	—	—
Togo	7	8	517	532	—	3
Tunisia	7	3	—	10	—	—
Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	13
Uganda	5	2	—	7	—	—
Ukraine	—	—	—	—	—	4
United Republic of Tanzania	1	2	—	3	—	—
Uruguay	2	—	—	2	—	1
Yemen	8	—	—	8	—	19
Zambia	2	—	—	2	—	—
Zimbabwe	3	—	—	3	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>9 312</b>	<b>9 600</b>	<b>995</b>	<b>367</b>