



# Security Council

Distr.: General  
30 December 2016

Original: English

---

## Second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

### I. Introduction

1. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action concluded by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union, with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested that I submit a report on the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) every six months. The present report is the second submitted in fulfilment of that request and the request of the President of the Security Council that I submit a report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), with findings and recommendations (S/2016/44, para. 7).<sup>1</sup>

3. The provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) entered into force on 16 January 2016, upon submission by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a report confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken a series of initial nuclear-related actions as called for in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and in resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/57, annex).

4. Annex B includes provisions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers, and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the asset freeze and travel ban provisions. All those provisions will apply for set periods of time or until the date on which IAEA submits its report indicating the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains in peaceful activities (the “broader conclusion” report),<sup>2</sup> whichever is earlier.

---

<sup>1</sup> The first report of the Secretary-General was issued on 12 July 2016 (S/2016/589).

<sup>2</sup> In paragraph 6 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council requested that as soon as IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of IAEA will submit a report confirming that conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council.



## II. Key findings and recommendations

5. Since 16 January 2016, I have not received any report on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Since my first report (S/2016/589), five additional nuclear-related proposals were submitted through the procurement channel, three of which have already been approved by the Security Council. All the necessary operational linkages between the Council and the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action are in place and functioning fully for the processing of such proposals, with due regard given to information security and confidentiality.

6. Since 12 July 2016, no information regarding Iranian ballistic missile activity or ballistic missile-related transfers undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were brought to my attention or that of the Security Council.

7. I received one new report on an arms transfer alleged to have originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). On 5 July 2016, France informed the Security Council and me that, in March 2016, it had seized an arms shipment in the northern Indian Ocean. France concluded that the arms shipment originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen. In addition, the Secretariat was recently provided with information (by the Combined Maritime Forces and Australia) on an arms seizure in February 2016 by the Royal Australian Navy, off the coast of Oman, which the United States of America assessed as having originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I look forward to the opportunity for the Secretariat to examine those weapons and previously seized weapons, in order to corroborate the information provided and independently ascertain the origin of the shipments.

8. On 24 June 2016, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated in a televised speech that it receives all its weapons and missiles from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Any Iranian arms transfer to Hizbullah would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) should they have taken place after 16 January 2016.<sup>3</sup>

9. On 21 November 2016, Israel drew my attention to information it possessed regarding the alleged use of commercial flights by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to transfer arms and related materiel to Hizbullah. The information was also provided to the Security Council in identical letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel, dated 21 November (S/2016/987). The Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 22 November 2016 (S/2016/992), asserted that the claims were baseless and unsubstantiated accusations. I wish to remind all Member States of their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

---

<sup>3</sup> Any Iranian arms transfer to Hizbullah between the adoption of resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) and 16 January 2016 would have constituted a violation of paragraph 5 of that resolution. The provisions of resolution 1747 (2007) and those of other previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.

10. On the basis of information provided by both the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq, I have concluded my review of the participation of Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition. While no further action will be taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter, I wish to reiterate my recommendation that the Council clarify whether the provisions of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) on arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran apply to all supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel, including temporary transfers, regardless of change of ownership (see [S/2016/589](#), para. 10).

11. Since my previous report, Iranian and other media outlets reported that Major General Qasem Soleimani and Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi have engaged in foreign travel. I call upon all Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry or transit through their territories of individuals presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

12. In the course of the Secretariat's contact with the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to seek clarification on the statement by the Secretary-General of Hizbullah and the foreign travels of Major General Soleimani and Brigadier General Naqdi, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined "that measures undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region have been consistent with its national security interests and international commitments".

### **III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions**

13. In preparing the present report on the provisions of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), I note that in September and November 2016, IAEA issued quarterly reports on its verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), ([S/2016/808](#) and [S/2016/983](#)). In addition, on 6 December 2016, IAEA provided an update on developments in relation to the Iranian stockpile of heavy water since its last quarterly report. The Agency reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran were ongoing. The Agency also reported on its verifying and monitoring of the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the transparency measures contained in the Plan.

14. Since 16 January 2016, I have not received any information regarding the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

15. As of 30 December 2016, five additional proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) were submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel process. Two proposals submitted on 6 October 2016, for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2,

were approved by the Council on 17 November 2016. A proposal received by the Council on 16 November 2016, for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, was approved on 28 December 2016. Two proposals submitted to the Council on 6 December 2016, for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, are currently under review by the Joint Commission.

16. One notification was submitted to the Council on 17 November 2016 in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technology covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, intended for light-water reactors. Two further notifications were submitted to the Council, the first on 23 December and the second on 28 December 2016, in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 of INFCIRC/254/REV.12/Part 1, incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements intended for light-water reactors, as well as of equipment covered by B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part.1, intended for light-water reactors. Such activities and certain other nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Security Council and the Joint Commission (see resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), annex B, para. 2).

17. In September 2016, the Joint Commission provided guidance on temporary nuclear-related transfers. It indicated that all nuclear-related transfers in cases where the goods in question are intended to remain in the Islamic Republic of Iran only for a certain period of time and subsequently leave the Islamic Republic of Iran would follow the established procedure within the procurement channel, including an end-use certification signed by the designated Iranian national authority. The Joint Commission also indicated that it would endeavour to expedite its review of temporary exports for demonstration or display in exhibitions. The guidance was reflected in amended versions of the documents offering practical information on the procurement channel, which are available on the Security Council website dedicated to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)<sup>4</sup> and were brought to the attention of all Member States through a note verbale issued by the Security Council facilitator on 18 October 2016.

#### **IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions**

18. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such technology.

19. In addition, pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, the provision of various services or assistance, as well as the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile activities.

---

<sup>4</sup> [www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml).

20. Since my first report to the Security Council, neither I nor the Security Council have received any information regarding activity undertaken contrary to paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

## V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

21. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of the seven categories of arms as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and of related materiel. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of various related services or assistance.

22. As of 30 December 2016, one proposal to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) was submitted to the Security Council. The proposal is still under consideration by the Security Council.

23. The Security Council decided, in paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time of drafting of the present report, no proposal has been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

24. In July, I brought to the attention of the Security Council open-source information about the participation of several Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, held from 5 to 8 March 2016 at the Baghdad International Fairground (see [S/2016/589](#), para. 32). According to images published by the Islamic Republic News Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency, items displayed by those entities appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition and rockets. The Secretariat raised this issue with the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations and invited both Member States to provide further information.

25. As I reported in July, Iranian representatives considered that no prior approval was required from the Security Council for this activity because the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. In addition, in October 2016, Iraqi authorities informed the Secretariat that all items exhibited by Iranian entities during the exhibition were subsequently returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran “in compliance with requirements stipulated in the applicable resolutions issued by the [Security Council], ensuring legality of the process in its entirety”.

26. In view of the above, no further action will be taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate my recommendation that the Security Council clarify whether paragraph 6 (b) applies to all supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel, including temporary transfers, regardless of change of ownership (see para. 10 of [S/2016/589](#)).

27. On 5 July 2016, France brought to my attention information on the seizure of an arms shipment that, in its assessment, had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was likely bound for Somalia or Yemen.<sup>5</sup> According to information provided, the French frigate *Provence*, operating as part of the Combined Task Force 150, boarded a stateless dhow on 20 March 2016 in the northern Indian Ocean. That action resulted in the discovery of weapons aboard the vessel that included 2,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 64 Hoshdar-M sniper rifles, 6 type-73 machine guns and 9 Kornet anti-tank missiles. On the basis of an analysis of available information, including interviews with the crew and an inspection of the weapons, France concluded that the weapons had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that their transfer was being undertaken contrary to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

28. That report was brought to the attention of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations by the Security Council facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in July 2016. In addition, the Secretariat has requested the opportunity to examine the arms seized and obtain additional information.

29. In March 2016, the Combined Maritime Forces announced the seizure of a weapons cache aboard a small fishing vessel off the coast of Oman by HMAS *Darwin* of the Royal Australian Navy, also operating as part of the Combined Task Force 150.<sup>6</sup> Upon the request of the Secretariat, Australia and the Combined Maritime Forces recently provided information on that arms seizure. According to information provided, on 28 February 2016, HMAS *Darwin* discovered aboard a stateless dhow, the *Samer*, a total of 1,989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels and twenty 60 mm mortar tubes.

30. According to the United States, that arms shipment originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>7</sup> The Secretariat is still reviewing the information recently provided by Australia and the Combined Maritime Forces, and I intend to provide an update on the arms seizure in due course.

31. In a televised speech broadcast by Al-Manar television on 24 June 2016, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated that the budget of Hizbullah, its salaries, expenses, weapons and missiles all came from the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am very concerned by that statement, which suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).<sup>3</sup> The Secretariat raised the matter with representatives of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in November 2016. In the course of the Secretariat's contact with the Permanent Mission to seek clarification on this issue, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined "that measures undertaken by the Islamic

---

<sup>5</sup> That information was also communicated to the Security Council, the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).

<sup>6</sup> "HMAS Darwin seizes large weapons cache", Combined Maritime Force press release dated 6 March 2016.

<sup>7</sup> See "Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea", United States Navy, story number NNS160404-01, dated 4 April 2016.

Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region have been consistent with its national security interests and international commitments”.

32. In addition, in identical letters dated 21 November 2016 (S/2016/987), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to transfer arms and related materiel to Hizbullah in order to supply Hizbullah with the capacity to enhance its missile arsenal. According to Israel, those arms and related materiel are shipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, using commercial flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran either directly to Beirut or to Damascus (the arms and related materiel being subsequently shipped to Lebanon by land). In identical letters dated 22 November 2016, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the information was baseless and “without a shred of evidence” (S/2016/992).

## VI. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions

33. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to those individuals and entities.

34. In July 2016, I brought to the attention of the Council that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015),<sup>8</sup> the Defence Industries Organisation, appeared to have participated in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition in March 2016 (see para. 35 of S/2016/589). Based on the information provided by Iraqi authorities in October 2016 (see para. 25 above), no further action will be taken by the Secretariat in relation to this matter.

35. Since my previous report, I have not received any other information, nor am I aware of any open-source information, related to the implementation of the paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

## VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision

36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). At the time of the drafting of the present report, no travel exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.

<sup>8</sup> The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who were delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

37. In my first report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council that Major General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, may have engaged in foreign travel (see [S/2016/589](#), para. 37). In recent months, additional information from open sources suggests that Major General Soleimani continues to engage in foreign travel. In late June 2016, several Iranian media outlets (Fars News Agency, Tasnim News Agency) reproduced pictures of Major General Soleimani visiting the former Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki. In October 2016, another Iranian media outlet (Mehr News Agency) reproduced a picture of the General in the Iraqi Kurdistan region, visiting the family of a Kurdish Peshmerga officer killed fighting ISIL militants in 2015. In November 2016, the leader of the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia declared that he was in Mosul along with other Iranian military advisers (Fars News Agency). In September 2016, the media group of the same militia, which had released the pictures of Major General Soleimani in the “Fallujah operations room” in May 2016 (see [S/2016/589](#), fig. V) released pictures showing him reportedly in southern Aleppo. The following day a picture showing Major General Soleimani reportedly with officers of the Syrian Arab Army was reproduced by various media outlets (Fars News Agency, Al-Masdar News). In mid-December 2016, pictures showing the General at the citadel of Aleppo were widely circulated by Iranian and other media outlets (Fars News Agency).

38. In addition, in late July 2016, Iranian media outlets (Basij Press, Fars News Agency) reported that another listed individual, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research, travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic in March and July 2016. In the following days, the same media outlets reproduced pictures of him reportedly in the Golan region, near Qunaytirah, as well as in the Sayyidah Zainab mosque in Damascus.

39. The Secretariat raised the travel of Major General Soleimani to Iraq with the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations in June 2016. In October 2016, the Permanent Representative of Iraq informed the Secretariat that “there [was] no means of confirmation regarding Soleimani’s entry into Iraqi territory; Iraq has not invited Mr. Soleimani to visit Iraq and no entry visa [was] requested by him or granted by the Foreign Ministry of Iraq”.

40. The Secretariat also raised the travels of both Major General Soleimani and Brigadier General Naqdi to the Syrian Arab Republic with the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations in November 2016. The Syrian Government affirmed that “no visas were issued to the above-mentioned individuals”. During the Secretariat’s contact with the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to seek clarification on this issue, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlined “that measures undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in combating terrorism and violent extremism in the region have been consistent with its national security interests and international commitments”.



## **VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)**

41. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division provided induction briefings for the incoming facilitator and members of the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

42. The Division continued to promote publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015), including through the Council's website<sup>9</sup> and outreach activities. Relevant documents were regularly added to the website in all official languages. In particular, revised versions of the documents provided by the Procurement Group of the Joint Commission offering practical information to States on the procurement channel were uploaded in October.

43. During the reporting period, the Division responded to queries from Member States regarding the termination of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue and the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.

---

<sup>9</sup> [www.un.org/en/sc/2231/](http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/).