



# Security Council

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## Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

### I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/8), issued on 28 March 2007, the Security Council welcomed the agreement signed by President Laurent Gbagbo and Mr. Guillaume Soro in Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 (S/2007/144), under the facilitation of the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The Council also expressed its readiness to take further steps to help the parties in implementing the agreement and requested me to submit, by 15 May 2007, recommendations on the role that the United Nations should play in that regard. The present report, which is based on the findings of a multidisciplinary technical assessment mission that visited Côte d'Ivoire from 10 to 22 April 2007, provides the requested recommendations.

### II. The Ouagadougou agreement

2. The Ouagadougou agreement seeks to resolve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire by merging the Forces nouvelles and the national defence and security forces through the establishment of an integrated command centre; replacing the zone of confidence with a green line marked by UNOCI observation points that would be dismantled gradually; deploying mixed Forces nouvelles and national police units to maintain law and order in the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence; re-establishing State administration throughout the country; dismantling the militias; disarming combatants and enrolling them in a civic service programme; granting amnesty for all crimes relating to national security committed between September 2000 and the date of signing of the agreement; simplifying and accelerating the identification of the population and the registration of voters; and organizing a free, fair, open and transparent presidential election, in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements. The agreement also provides for the creation of new institutional arrangements to implement these tasks, including a new transitional Government.

3. In order to facilitate monitoring of the peace process, the agreement created two new follow-up mechanisms. The first is a standing consultative mechanism comprising President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro, former President Henri Konan



Bedié, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara and the facilitator, President Compaoré. This mechanism will address all arising issues pertaining to the agreement. The second mechanism is an evaluation and monitoring committee, to be chaired by a representative of the facilitator, which will comprise three representatives each from the two signatory parties. The two parties may decide to include other Ivorian parties in the committee, while the facilitator may also call upon any member of the international community to participate in the committee, as he deems appropriate. The monitoring and evaluation committee's role is to assess the implementation of the agreement and offer recommendations on measures to facilitate the peace process. Any disagreements relating to the interpretation or implementation of the agreement will be settled through arbitration by the facilitator.

4. The schedule of implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement sets out the following key timelines: setting up of the integrated command centre beginning on 18 March 2007 (two weeks after the signing of the agreement); establishment of the institutional framework for implementing the agreement starting on 1 April (four weeks after the signing of the agreement); formation of the new interim government by 8 April (five weeks after the signing of the agreement); removal of the zone of confidence and creation of the mixed police and military units beginning on 15 April (one week after the formation of the new government); dismantling and disarmament of the militias starting on 23 April (two weeks after the formation of the new government), to be completed within two weeks (by 7 May); cantonment of the former fighting forces, storage of their weapons under the supervision of the impartial forces (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the Licorne troops) and the re-establishment of State administration throughout the country and the launching of mobile court hearings, all starting by 23 April (seven weeks after the signing of the agreement); voter registration and identification beginning on 21 May (one month after the beginning of the mobile courts hearings); unification of the two forces and enrolment of ex-combatants into the civic service programme starting on 5 June (15 days after the beginning of the voter registration process); and preparation and issuance of identity cards and voters' cards beginning once the voters register is officially adopted. The schedule envisages completion of all these tasks within a period of 10 months, that is by 4 January 2008, followed by the organization of a presidential election. The agreement does not, however, set the date for the elections.

5. On 26 March 2007, President Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro signed a supplementary agreement designating Mr. Soro as the new Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire. The supplementary agreement stipulated that Mr. Soro will remain in office until the holding of the presidential election. It also barred him from standing as a candidate for that election. The agreement further stated that the new Prime Minister would be accorded specific powers for the purpose of implementing the Ouagadougou agreement. Both the Ouagadougou agreement and the supplementary agreement were endorsed by ECOWAS in its communiqués of 16 and 28 March, and by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in its communiqués of 19 and 29 March. The African Union transmitted the agreements to the Security Council, with a recommendation to endorse them and to consider a gradual drawdown of the impartial forces.

### III. Status of implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement

6. Implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement started on schedule with the signing of a presidential decree establishing the integrated command centre on 16 March 2007. President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro subsequently inaugurated the headquarters of the command centre in Yamoussoukro, on 16 April.

7. Pursuant to chapter V of the agreement, on 7 April Prime Minister Soro announced a 33-member cabinet comprising 11 members from the ruling Ivorian Popular Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), seven from the Forces nouvelles and five each from the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), smaller political parties and civil society. Four members of the cabinet are women, compared to six in the previous Government.

8. On 12 April, President Gbagbo, in keeping with chapter VI of the Ouagadougou agreement, issued an ordinance granting amnesty for crimes relating to national security committed between 17 September 2000 and the date of the signing of the agreement. Economic crimes, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity were excluded from the amnesty.

9. In order to facilitate the lifting of the zone of confidence, on 11 April the Chiefs of Staff of the national defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles, General Philippe Mangou and General Soumaila Bakayoko, as well as the Force Commanders of UNOCI and Licorne, signed an agreement nullifying "code 14" of 31 July 2005, which had provided the legal basis and security arrangements for the zone. At the request of the two Chiefs of Staff, UNOCI and Licorne subsequently assisted the integrated command centre to define the coordinates of the green line that will replace the zone of confidence.

10. The removal of the zone of confidence started as scheduled, on 16 April, with the dismantling of the UNOCI checkpoints at Tiebissou and Djébonoua, the installation of the first UNOCI observation post along the green line at Ngatta Dolikro, and the deployment of the first mixed police unit. Two more mixed units were deployed at Bangolo and Zeale, in the west, on 30 April. The lifting of the zone of confidence will be conducted progressively, based on the pace at which the integrated command centre puts together and deploys the mixed police units responsible for maintaining law and order in the area. In the meantime, UNOCI will continue to maintain check points and to conduct patrols in areas where the mixed police units have not yet been deployed.

11. The parties were unable to meet the 23 April deadline for starting the implementation of the more complex cluster of tasks consisting of the dismantling of the militias, the cantonment of combatants, the redeployment of State officials throughout the country and the launching of the mobile court hearings for the identification of the population. These tasks required more detailed technical planning than envisaged by the tight timelines set in the agreement.

12. The Prime Minister's office has initiated a series of workshops with the participation of relevant Government ministries, national implementing institutions and international partners, including UNOCI, the United Nations country team, the office of the High Representative for the elections, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank and the European Union, to develop the operational plans and budgets for these processes,

as well as for the electoral process and security sector reform. A national workshop chaired by Prime Minister Soro in Yamoussoukro on 2 May determined the cost and funding gaps of these processes, as follows: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, approximately \$100 million (funding gap: \$78 million); the civic service programme, \$41 million (fully funded by the Government); identification of the population, \$37 million (shortfall: \$33 million); elections, \$72 million (funding gap: \$56 million); redeployment of State officials throughout the country, \$41 million (shortfall: \$29 million), national reconciliation, \$4 million (shortfall: \$4 million); and public information campaign, \$825,000 (shortfall: \$825,000). The Yamoussoukro workshop also designated the various national institutions that will be responsible for implementing these tasks and decided that a working group to be established by the Government would finalize the operational plans.

#### **IV. Issues arising from the Ouagadougou agreement**

13. The Ouagadougou agreement assigned most of the military tasks related to the peace process to the integrated command centre. The agreement was silent, however, on some major police and civilian tasks performed by the United Nations, including the United Nations role in the electoral process and the certification and arbitration role of the High Representative for the elections. It nevertheless mentioned a specific role for the United Nations in the following areas: overall supervision of the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization process; supervision of the cantonment of units of the former fighting forces and the storage of their weapons; and maintaining observation posts along the green line. The new follow-up mechanisms created by the agreement did not include the United Nations.

14. These aspects of the agreement, coupled with the ECOWAS and African Union recommendation to the Security Council to consider a gradual drawdown of the impartial forces (UNOCI and Licorne), as well as the announcement of Licorne's plans to downsize by one battalion by mid-May, created a widespread impression that the signatories to the Ouagadougou agreement were seeking a limited role for the United Nations in the peace process and expected a UNOCI drawdown. Furthermore, the ECOWAS and the African Union recommendation for a drawdown appeared to contradict the call in the agreement for the inclusion of more African troops in UNOCI. The purpose of the proposed additional troops therefore required clarification, since the agreement assigned all key military tasks to the integrated command centre.

15. The agreement was also silent on the important issue of promoting and monitoring human rights, which is crucial to the normalization of the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, it did not explain the expected role of the International Working Group, established by the Security Council through its resolution 1633 (2005), and its relationship with the new follow-up and monitoring mechanisms.

16. In the light of the ambiguities emanating from these issues, the Security Council, in a press statement issued on 14 March 2007, encouraged me to discuss with President Compaoré and the Ivorian parties, the role they expected that the United Nations should play in the peace process. To that end, on 26 March 2007, I sent a letter to President Compaoré, seeking his views on these issues. In addition, I sent a technical assessment mission, led by the Assistant Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping Operations, Hédi Annabi, to Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to consult with the facilitator and the parties and to gather the information required to develop the recommendations requested by the Security Council.

17. In a letter dated 27 March 2007, President Compaoré informed me that the signatories to the Ouagadougou agreement expected the United Nations and the international community to continue to play an important role in the Ivorian peace process, in particular to support the implementation of the key tasks set out in the agreement. He also stated that the impartial forces were expected to work in collaboration with the integrated command centre to implement the tasks leading to the removal of the zone of confidence and to assist in providing security in the area. President Compaoré's letter further indicated that the United Nations should help to provide security for the elections and, in particular, observe the electoral process and provide technical advice to the Ivorian institutions.

## **V. Technical assessment mission**

18. The technical assessment mission visited Côte d'Ivoire from 10 to 22 April 2007. Participants in the assessment mission included representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of Public Information, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Department of Safety and Security and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

19. The assessment mission received detailed briefings from representatives of UNOCI, the United Nations country team, the World Bank, IMF, the African Development Bank and the Licorne force and consulted with a wide spectrum of national and international stakeholders, including President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro, the Chiefs of Staff of the Forces nouvelles and the national defence forces, the heads of the police forces on both sides and representatives of opposition political parties and national institutions responsible for implementing the key tasks set out in the Ouagadougou agreement. Consultations were also held with members of the diplomatic community, civil society and national and international non-governmental organizations.

20. The mission travelled to Daloa, Duékoué and Guiglo, in the volatile western part of the country, where it visited one of the newly established UNOCI observation posts along the green line and a camp for internally displaced persons. In addition, on 14 April, Mr. Annabi travelled to Ouagadougou for consultations with President Compaoré and his facilitation team. During a visit to South Africa on 19 April, Mr. Annabi used the opportunity to consult with President Thabu Mbeki's legal counsel and, on his way back to New York, met with senior French officials in Paris on 23 April, at their request.

## **VI. Findings of the technical assessment mission**

21. The technical assessment mission's consultations with the parties and the facilitator helped to clarify the issues identified in section IV above. All national stakeholders, including the President, the Prime Minister and the facilitator, stressed that continued United Nations assistance for the peace process was essential. President Gbagbo publicly reaffirmed that view on 16 April when he officiated at the ceremonies marking the beginning of the removal of the zone of confidence.

22. The President and the Prime Minister explained that while the Ivorian parties have assumed ownership and leadership of the peace process, they expected the United Nations and other international partners to join the Ivorian institutions in carrying out the tasks set out in the agreement, providing the requisite resources, technical advice and logistical support and observing the implementation process. Prime Minister Soro emphasized that the Ivorian parties were just beginning to build mutual confidence and cautioned that a premature withdrawal of the impartial forces could precipitate a resumption of hostilities. The two leaders further confirmed that during the Ouagadougou talks the continued presence of the impartial forces in Côte d'Ivoire was not at issue and that neither they nor any other Ivorian leader had called for the withdrawal of UNOCI. This view was echoed by the facilitator during his meeting with Mr. Annabi on 14 April.

23. The Ivorian parties, including the President and the Prime Minister, presented a common view on the nature of the assistance they expect the United Nations to provide in specific areas, including the lifting of the zone of confidence, the restoration of law and order institutions in the north and west, the re-establishment of State administration and basic social services throughout the country, the disarmament of combatants and militias, the identification of the population, the protection of vulnerable populations, support for economic and social recovery and addressing the security and humanitarian situation, particularly in the western part of the country. President Gbagbo emphasized that, in accompanying, advising and assisting the Ivorian institutions as they carry out these tasks, the United Nations and other international partners should avoid substituting for, or imposing decisions on, the national institutions.

24. At the same time, the Ivorian authorities recognized the challenges emanating from the limited capacity of the key national institutions mandated to implement the tasks set out in the agreement. The newly formed integrated command centre and the mixed police units, which have the responsibility for performing crucial security tasks, face serious capacity constraints. While the two Chiefs of Staff have demonstrated commendable determination in providing effective and professional leadership to the integrated command centre and in pressing ahead with the implementation of the military tasks assigned to the centre, the requisite planning capacity, logistics, personnel and financial resources are not yet in place. Building the capacity of these key institutions will take time.

25. The President and the Prime Minister also called for an increased role for the development and humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in addressing the needs identified by the Government in the areas of economic recovery, resettlement of internally displaced persons, protection of vulnerable groups, restoration of basic services, rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the northern part of the country and support for the civic service programme. In addition, all Ivorian stakeholders,

including the President and the Prime Minister, appealed to the United Nations to increase the presence of its civilian personnel outside Abidjan and to reinforce its troop deployments in the western part of the country in order to effectively assist the local authorities in addressing the humanitarian and security challenges in that volatile region. The Chiefs of Staff from the two forces also emphasized the need to maintain and reinforce United Nations patrols in the areas along the border with Liberia and requested assistance in training and building the capacity of the police in the north and with their integration into the national police, within the context of security sector reform and the reunification of the country.

26. Both the Chief of Staff of the national defence and security forces and the President have drawn attention to the parties' request to the Security Council, contained in paragraph 6.1.2 of the Ouagadougou agreement, that it consider granting an exception to the arms embargo in order to allow the importation of riot control equipment and side arms for the national police. The Chief of Staff indicated that the exception should also include spare parts for the Government's military transport helicopter to facilitate travel throughout the country by personnel involved in the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement. The assessment mission advised them on the established procedure for requesting exceptions to the arms embargo from the sanctions.

27. Concerning the challenges facing Government officials who must travel around the country in connection with the implementation of the agreement, Prime Minister Soro requested that the United Nations should consider allowing such officials to travel on its aircraft and vehicles. In a related request, civil society groups and national relief organizations suggested that UNOCI should use its engineering assets to assist in rehabilitating roads, bridges, schools and clinics in the communities in which they are deployed, especially in the western part of the country.

28. All national stakeholders, especially civil society organizations, were very concerned about the lack of adequate information among the population in the countryside on the Ouagadougou agreement. They emphasized that, in some areas, this had created unfounded anxieties about the security implications of lifting the zone of confidence. In this context, President Gbagbo requested the United Nations to assist the Government to expand the coverage of the national radio and television (RTI) throughout the country in order to enable the Government to sensitize the population on the reunification and reconciliation process. The office of the Prime Minister informed the technical assessment mission that it was developing a public information campaign to ensure that the population was fully informed about the peace process. The assessment mission stressed the need for Radio télévision ivoirienne and Radio ONUCI-FM not only to expand their coverage, but also to enhance their collaboration and disseminate factual information about the peace process, where possible in the main local languages, and to work together with the more than 100 community radio broadcasters in the country.

29. On the same issue, national non-governmental organizations and civil society groups emphasized the importance of placing the state media under the management of professionals without political affiliations to ensure that they can objectively promote national unity and reconciliation. Furthermore, these organizations requested the United Nations and other international partners to help empower women, including through providing advice to the Government on gender

mainstreaming in various national institutions. They also called on the United Nations to pay particular attention to the special needs of women and children associated with the former fighting forces when supporting the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the envisaged civic service programme.

30. Reports from civil society groups about cases of misconduct by some UNOCI troops in Abidjan have been a major source of concern. The assessment mission was also informed that there were instances when UNOCI troops in the western part of the country had failed to intervene when civilians in their areas of deployment were under attack, including cases of gender-based violence. In that regard, they echoed the call to reinforce the United Nations military and civilian presence in the west. Mr. Annabi discussed these issues at a debriefing meeting with the heads of all components of UNOCI and stressed the need to take immediate action to ensure full compliance with the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy. The leadership of the mission has initiated an investigation into the allegations of misconduct.

31. The only issue on which the Ivorian parties initially expressed divergent views was the role the United Nations should play in the electoral process and, in particular, the certification and arbitration roles of the High Representative for the elections. While Prime Minister Soro and the opposition parties expressed the view that, since the issue had not been addressed by the Ouagadougou agreement, the role of the United Nations in the electoral process remained unchanged, the President initially objected to the certification and arbitration roles of the High Representative for the elections. In a letter addressed to Mr. Annabi dated 18 April, the President contended that the role of the United Nations in the electoral process should be limited to observation and technical advice. The President also cited a letter dated 27 March 2006 addressed to me by the facilitator, in which he had expressed the same view. The opposition parties, however, expressed very strong views in support of the certification role of the High Representative, pointing out that that role was provided for in the Pretoria agreement and was based on a delicately negotiated compromise after the parties had failed to agree on the demand of the opposition parties that the elections should be organized and conducted by the United Nations.

32. When he met with the facilitator on 14 April, Mr. Annabi brought to his attention the differences among the Ivorian parties on this important issue and requested him to help them to reach a common view. During a second round of consultations with President Gbagbo, the assessment mission provided a detailed explanation of the importance of maintaining an international certification mechanism to guarantee the transparency and credibility of the electoral process and to ensure that all parties accept the results. The mission stressed that such international certification would not replace but rather would be in addition to the role to be played in this regard by the Constitutional Council of Côte d'Ivoire. It also emphasized that it was important for the parties to reach a common view on this important issue in order to enable the Security Council to decide on any necessary adjustments to the role of the United Nations.

33. Ultimately, President Gbagbo informed the assessment mission that he had consulted the Prime Minister and that a consensus had been reached on this issue. In this regard, he confirmed that, based on the explanations provided by the mission, he accepted that the United Nations should retain responsibility for international certification of the electoral process. However, he maintained his objection to the



arbitration role and other functions of the High Representative for the elections as defined in Security Council resolution 1721 (2006), insisting that they were too intrusive. With regard to arbitration, it should be noted that President Compaoré, in his capacity as the facilitator, is expected to act as arbitrator on all aspects of the Ouagadougou agreement.

34. The assessment team's consultations with the facilitator and his team in Ouagadougou helped to clarify the request that additional African troops be included in UNOCI and the issue of United Nations participation in the new follow-up mechanisms. With regard to the latter, President Compaoré was amenable to the inclusion of the United Nations, the African Union and ECOWAS in the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee and he undertook to consult the Ivorian parties on this issue. Meanwhile, during the fourteenth meeting of the International Working Group, which took place on 13 April, members of the Group were divided over its future. Some maintained that the Group should be dissolved to avoid a proliferation of competing monitoring mechanisms, others proposed streamlining the Group to make it smaller and less formal, while several other members insisted that the Group still had a useful monitoring role because the peace process was still fragile and vulnerable to possible reversals. The co-chairs of the Working Group (UNOCI and Ghana, in its capacity as Chairman of the African Union) were therefore requested to consult ECOWAS and the African Union and submit recommendations for consideration by the Security Council.

35. Concerning the deployment of additional African troops in UNOCI, Prime Minister Soro and the Burkinabé facilitation team explained that the purpose of the request was to reassure key political leaders who were concerned about their personal security. They advised, however, that in the light of the positive political and security climate emerging in Côte d'Ivoire, there was no longer a need to deploy those troops at the present stage.

36. UNOCI continues to depend on the Licorne force for quick reaction support. The Licorne presence also complements the role of UNOCI in providing security for key processes. During the consultations with the Licorne Force Commander, the assessment mission received assurances that the planned adjustments to the force would be tailored to support the redeployment of UNOCI troops from the zone of confidence and that the quick reaction force capabilities provided by Licorne to UNOCI, under the memorandum signed on 29 December 2005, are likely to remain unchanged.

37. On the whole, the assessment mission returned with the feeling that the signing of the agreement and the determination shown by the parties to respect the implementation schedule had created a more relaxed political atmosphere in the country. An encouraging trend in this regard is the significant decrease in the dissemination of messages from the hate media and in other messages inciting violence, which had become the hallmark of Côte d'Ivoire's political discourse. The agreement has also engendered a new spirit of consensus, which was highlighted by the information by the opposition parties that they were consulted by the facilitator and the signatories before, during and after the Ouagadougou talks and that they fully supported the agreement.

38. However, beyond the optimism and high expectations generated by the significant improvement in the political climate, there was a widespread acknowledgement of the enormity of the challenges still facing the country. In

particular, it was noted that the agreement is yet to have a commensurate impact on the humanitarian situation. All international and national stakeholders who met with the assessment mission, including President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro, were very concerned about the host of humanitarian and security challenges in the western part of the country, where internally displaced persons remain in camps, militias maintain an ambivalent attitude towards the agreement and land disputes, ethnic tensions and possible cross-border movement of combatants could reignite violence. Most of the internally displaced persons are still hesitant to return to their places of origin, citing the uncertainty of the security situation, concerns that returning may render them ineligible to receive humanitarian assistance without the provision of alternative aid and the lack of clarity regarding the recovery of their property. The absence of basic public services for the population in the north is causing equal concern.

39. Nonetheless, the agreement is expected to create an environment in which international organizations can continue to provide humanitarian aid while recovery and developmental partners help to build the capacity of national partners and institutions. At present the United Nations and other international organizations are assisting some 4 million persons affected by the conflict at some 23 locations nationwide. These organizations plan to provide support for the various aspects of the Ouagadougou agreement that have implications for the overall humanitarian situation, such as the national programme to assist persons affected by the conflict, the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the dismantling of the militias, the provision of assistance to and protection of vulnerable groups during cantonment and reintegration, the removal of the zone of confidence and the re-establishment of State administration. The humanitarian community will also accompany and observe the identification process, including the development of modalities to ensure that the process takes into account the special situation facing internally displaced persons seeking access to the identification and voter registration processes. They will also provide assistance to Ivorian returnees and refugees who may decide not to be repatriated.

40. Representatives of the World Bank, IMF and the African Development Bank explained to the assessment mission the heavy toll the crisis has taken on the economy of Côte d'Ivoire. Most macroeconomic and social indicators have declined. Since the onset, economic growth has averaged 0 per cent. The industrial sector has suffered the most, owing to the lack of investment. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire has seen its role as a regional trading hub diminish. Fiscal performance and transparency have also declined. Tax revenues have fallen below the convergence criteria set by the West African Economic and Monetary Union of 17 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and the composition of spending has shifted towards more sovereignty outlays at the expense of social and investment needs. Overall, fiscal deficits have risen, financed increasingly through higher domestic and external arrears and debt. Governance and bank prudential indicators have deteriorated. On the social front, the low farm-gate prices offered to coffee and cocoa producers during the period from 2004 to 2006, the depressed private sector climate, very high unemployment, especially among the young, and the delay in economic recovery have particularly affected the most vulnerable groups. Poverty has grown from an estimated 38 per cent before the crisis to about 44 per cent, while access to health care and education has decreased. Delays in the restoration of Government services in the northern part of the country have also contributed to the

increasing gap in service delivery between war-affected regions and the rest of the country. The crisis has resulted in a significant deterioration in Côte d'Ivoire's human development index. The country now ranks 164 out of 177 countries and per capita GDP dropped from \$1,242 in 1980 to \$839 in 2005.

## **VII. Recommendations**

41. Based on the common view and requests conveyed to the technical assessment mission by the Ivorian authorities, and taking into account the advice provided by the main national and international stakeholders and the assessment mission's overall findings, it is recommended that the United Nations should adjust its role in Côte d'Ivoire to effectively support the new phase of the peace process as set out below.

### **A. Support to the integrated command centre**

42. The Ouagadougou agreement assigns the lead role in the implementation of all military and security tasks relating to the peace process to the integrated command centre. However, in view of their capacity constraints, the parties have requested the support of the United Nations for the implementation of those tasks, which include the integration of the Forces nouvelles and the national defence and security forces, the lifting of the zone of confidence, the deployment of mixed police units, implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the provision of security for all key processes, such as the identification of the population, the restoration of State administration throughout the country and the elections. As it performs those military tasks which the Ouagadougou agreement specifically assigns to the impartial forces, such as the maintenance of observation posts along the green line, UNOCI will also work in close coordination with the integrated command centre and the Licorne force.

#### **1. Setting up the integrated command centre**

43. At the request of the Chiefs of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles, UNOCI and the Licorne force have provided assistance to the two forces in defining the structure and functions of the command centre and setting up the headquarters of the integrated command centre in Yamoussoukro. The command centre will comprise seven functional sections as follows: human resources; operations, short-term planning and intelligence; logistics, including finance, transport and operations; long-term planning, including for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; communications and information systems; and civil-military cooperation. The centre will also have a secretariat, including a public information adviser.

44. A service support company comprising about 120 soldiers and 10 gendarmes, with each party providing a half of these personnel, will provide administrative and logistics support for the integrated command centre. In addition, the centre will include a gendarmerie liaison detachment, whose size is yet to be determined, with personnel drawn from both parties. The military chiefs have also agreed on the methodology to be followed in appointing the members of the command centre, ensuring an equitable division of key posts between the two parties. The commander

of the centre will report directly to the two Chiefs of Staff. The total strength of the command centre is subject to further discussion by the parties, but it is estimated that the two forces will collectively provide some 230 personnel, most being military.

45. The two Chiefs of Staff have requested UNOCI and the Licorne force to assign two military liaison officers each, and have also requested one United Nations police liaison officer, for the integrated command centre. The parties have further requested the impartial forces to deploy a platoon each to provide security to the integrated command centre headquarters in Yamoussoukro. It is recommended that the Security Council approve the liaison and security support tasks requested of UNOCI by the parties as described above. In addition to those tasks, it is recommended that UNOCI continue to provide technical advice to the integrated command centre, extend to it the necessary logistical support within its capabilities and assist in developing its operational capacity.

## **2. Lifting the zone of confidence and establishing the green line**

46. As indicated, in paragraph 4 above, the process of lifting the zone of confidence and replacing it by a green line started as scheduled, on 16 April. UNOCI will establish 17 observation posts at designated axes of infiltration along the green line. Half of these observation posts are to be deactivated every two months, until all are removed. As of 16 April, UNOCI had started setting up the observation posts at the designated 17 sites. However the removal of the zone of confidence and the dismantling of UNOCI checkpoints in the zone will be conducted progressively as the integrated command centre establishes and deploys mixed police units that will be responsible for maintaining law and order in the area. A total of six such mixed units will be deployed in the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence. The two parties have requested UNOCI to assign four United Nations police officers to each mixed unit to provide with advice and support in the performance of their law enforcement responsibilities.

47. Each mixed unit will comprise 25 personnel (10 each from the two parties, 4 from UNOCI and one medical assistant) and will be assigned to a particular civilian administration jurisdiction. Two units will operate in each of the three zones sub-dividing the green line, which will be called the west, centre and east zones. In addition, one joint military support unit will provide immediate security support for the two mixed units operating in each zone. The three joint military support units will each comprise about 70 military personnel (one platoon from each party). Leadership of the three joint military support units has been divided between the two parties, with an officer from the Forces nouvelles commanding the west zone unit and officers from the defence and security forces commanding the remaining two units in the centre and east zones.

48. It is recommended that the Security Council approve the assignment of United Nations police officers to support the mixed police units and the integrated command centre, as requested by the parties. Furthermore, the police personnel that would come from the Forces nouvelles would require training and mentoring. With the consent of the two parties, UNOCI would support the national police and gendarmerie in providing training for these police personnel. In addition, the UNOCI battalions operating adjacent to the green line will each provide a company

sized quick reaction force to support their subordinate units and green line observation posts.

### **3. Security sector reform and deployment of the new defence and security forces throughout the country**

49. As the removal of the green line and the reunification of the country progresses, the mixed police and gendarmerie units deployed in the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence would eventually be replaced by the security arrangements envisaged in the framework of the country-wide deployment of the new restructured defence and security forces. If requested by the parties, UNOCI could provide advice on the reform and restructuring of the new army and police, in particular on the development of the country's new defence and security policy and architecture. However, it would be advisable for the Government to seek assistance from bilateral partners who have the capacity to provide support for the training and restructuring of the new armed forces. The United Nations could assist the Government in identifying such bilateral partners.

50. United Nations police could also provide training to the police personnel from the Forces nouvelles and advice on the integration of such personnel into the national police force. It is recommended that, in addition to assisting in the training of the police and providing advice on the reform of the security sector, United Nations police also accompany, advise and provide logistical assistance for the deployment of national police throughout the country, within its capabilities.

### **4. Reinforcement of UNOCI deployment in the west**

51. The capacity of the integrated command centre and the envisaged integrated police and armed forces to tackle the security challenges in the volatile western part of the country will take some time to develop. The Ivorian authorities have therefore requested UNOCI to reinforce its military and police deployments in that area, including the regions along the border with Liberia. It is therefore recommended that, as it redeploys from the zone of confidence, UNOCI should conduct a careful troop-to-task analysis with a view to determining the level to which it could reinforce its presence in the west and in the areas along the border with Liberia. However, as requested by the parties, the role of UNOCI in this sensitive area should not substitute for the national institutions. In this regard, as the development of the envisaged new armed forces progresses, the integrated command centre should be encouraged to give priority to deploying national defence and security personnel to this area. In the meantime, the anticipated reinforcement of the UNOCI military and police presence in the west should be complemented by increased assistance from UNOCI and United Nations country team to the Government and Ivorian civil society in developing initiatives for the promotion of social cohesion and national reconciliation, as well as the restoration of basic social services in that area. Radio ONUCI-FM coverage would also be strengthened correspondingly in the west. In addition, UNOCI will continue to conduct coordinated patrols with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the border areas.

## **5. Implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme**

52. Prime Minister Soro confirmed that, in keeping with the Ouagadougou agreement, the integrated command centre will assume the lead role in the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization phases. The National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration is expected to continue to play a key role in the implementation of the programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants and rehabilitation of communities. Both the Prime Minister and representatives of the National Programme informed the technical assessment mission that they expected UNOCI, the United Nations country team, the World Bank and the European Union to assist the national institutions in the planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. They also indicated that the reintegration aspect would be modified to take into account the civic service programme. The Chiefs of Staff of the two forces indicated that they expect to establish a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration planning and implementation cell, to be co-chaired by the two forces, in which they expect UNOCI to participate.

53. A new concept of operations for the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was developed at a coordination meeting convened by the Prime Minister's office on 25 April, which was attended by representatives of the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, UNOCI, the Licorne force, the World Bank, the European Commission and UNDP. Under the revised concept, the defence and security forces will be cantoned in eight sites in the southern part of the country and the Forces nouvelles in nine sites in the north, beginning on a date to be determined by the integrated command centre. The parties have agreed that, while the defence and security forces will be cantoned and their weapons placed in storage, there are no longer any armed forces personnel that will be eligible for disarmament and demobilization because all the 3,000 irregular armed forces personnel recruited after the events of September 2002 have been integrated into the armed forces through a presidential decree. Within the framework of the integrated command centre, the Chiefs of Staff of both forces will propose, for approval by the President and the Prime Minister, the number of Forces nouvelles personnel to be integrated into the unified army. Only those Forces nouvelles personnel who will not be integrated into the new army will be disarmed and enrolled into the civic service programme and other reintegration projects.

54. The National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and UNOCI confirmed that 25 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites have been refurbished and are ready for the cantonment of combatants. However, the Forces nouvelles have asked for an additional four sites and the defence and security forces for another two sites in order to reduce the distance the combatants would have to travel to the nearest site. The Government and the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration have asked UNOCI to assist in constructing these additional sites. In addition, the impartial forces will be expected to provide security for the disarmament sites, supervise the overall disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, in keeping with the Ouagadougou agreement, and assist the integrated command centre in destroying the unserviceable weapons and ammunition surrendered, while ensuring storage of those that are serviceable.

55. The disarmament and dismantling of the estimated 1,100 remaining armed militias will be conducted on the basis of the same process that was applied in August 2006: the armed groups will be identified and then disarmed. Profiles of the ex-militia personnel will be prepared in order to facilitate their inclusion into rehabilitation activities. Unarmed militias will be dismantled and will have the benefit of reinsertion programmes, but will not be entitled to the safety net package provided to armed elements.

56. In the light of the above requests, it is recommended that UNOCI support the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme by, *inter alia*, constructing the additional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites, continuing to provide strategic planning and logistical assistance to the integrated command centre and the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, helping the integrated command centre to provide security at the cantonment sites, assisting in the destruction of collected weapons, coordinating the assistance provided by international partners and overseeing the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization processes and the storage of weapons collected from the cantoned military units. As indicated in my report of 4 December 2006, the cost of constructing the additional six disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites is estimated at \$10 million (S/2006/939, para. 28). If requested by the integrated command centre, UNOCI could also assist in establishing a database on the combatants and the weapons collected.

57. The United Nations agencies, together with the World Bank and the European Commission, will assist the Ivorian authorities to formulate and implement equitable reintegration programmes that take into account similar programmes for internally displaced persons, former militia members and those joining the youth reinsertion and civic service programmes. They will also assist the Government in mobilizing the resources needed for the reintegration and civic service programmes. Furthermore, UNOCI and the agencies will work with humanitarian organizations to assist the Ivorian authorities in developing appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for the estimated 4,000 children associated with the former fighting forces, as well as other vulnerable groups affected by the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, such as women combatants and women associated with the fighting forces. UNDP will continue to assist with the procurement of equipment for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and will work with UNOCI to help the Government in the preparation of information campaign strategies in support of the collection of small arms and light weapons.

58. In order to ensure effective and integrated support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, it is also recommended that the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire set up an integrated implementation support cell, which would be co-located with the integrated command centre's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration cell in Yamoussoukro. The United Nations integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration implementation support cell would include all relevant UNOCI military, police and civilian components, including logistics and public information, and all concerned United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. It is further recommended that UNOCI establish an additional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration field office in the west, which is currently covered by only one officer based in Daloa. In addition, UNOCI

intends to deploy a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration logistics officer at each of the 17 cantonment sites.

## **B. Support for the restoration of State administration throughout the country**

59. The Executive-Secretary of the Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'administration informed the technical assessment mission that, based on the Ouagadougou agreement, the Government has decided to put in place new institutional arrangements to implement the restoration of State administration throughout the country. Under these arrangements, the Prime Minister will oversee the work of the Comité national, with the support of the Minister of Public Service and the Minister of Home Affairs and Local Administration. According to the Comité, to date, out of the 24,437 civil servants who were displaced during the crisis, a total of 12,343 have already returned to their posts, including 3,962 to the west and 8,381 to the north. The Government is currently focusing on appointing préfets and sous-préfets, who are expected to be deployed to the north and west. The Prime Minister indicated that the two parties have already agreed on 90 per cent of the candidates for the posts of préfets. The 600 police auxiliaries from the Forces nouvelles, who were trained by UNOCI, are expected to provide security for the return of the préfets and civil servants.

60. The Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l'administration has requested specific assistance from the United Nations to support the redeployment of the remaining 12,094 civil servants, which is scheduled to take place between 23 April and 22 July 2007. The requested support includes sensitization campaigns through Radio ONUCI-FM and funding workshops to train préfets and sous-préfets in post-crisis management. The Comité also indicated that, until the Ivorian financial institutions re-establish their branches throughout the country, the Government will need logistical and security support from UNOCI to transport funds for the payment of salaries to civil servants in the field. The Comité also requested the United Nations to assist in mobilizing funding for the rehabilitation of public administration infrastructure in the north, the cost of which is estimated at \$22 million.

61. It is recommended that UNOCI support the sensitization programme for the redeployment of State administration to the north, as requested by the Ivorian authorities. UNOCI would also assist in the training of préfets in post-conflict crisis management. The relevant United Nations funds, agencies and programmes should support the rehabilitation of public administration infrastructure in the north and west. In addition, the United Nations will work with other partners to support the provision of basic services during the return of local state administrators and law enforcement authorities. The United Nations will also support the restoration of rule of law institutions in the north and west, in particular the judicial system and police, as part of overall restoration of state authority and administration throughout the country.

62. As indicated earlier, the United Nations police would provide mentoring and training assistance to Ivorian police and gendarmerie personnel deployed to the north to support the delivery of professional and democratic law enforcement and police services and gain the trust and confidence of the population. Initial efforts



would focus on the 600 security auxiliaries, to be deployed at 54 locations within the former zone of confidence and throughout the northern part of the country. In the southern part of the country, United Nations police will continue to accompany, support and advise Ivorian law enforcement personnel, including by helping the authorities to conduct a comprehensive needs analysis, formulate strategies and develop and implement programmes.

### **C. Supporting the identification and voter registration processes**

63. The Ouagadougou agreement sets out detailed procedures for the general identification of the population in Côte d'Ivoire, which are linked to the registration of those eligible to vote. These procedures include the deployment of some 208 special mobile courts throughout the country to issue judgements, in lieu of birth certificates, to persons who do not have them. The judgements will record the birth place and the nationality of the individual's parents, which would determine the citizenship of the individual. The parties also made a commitment to reconstitute destroyed or lost civil registers.

64. In addition, in order to facilitate the holding of the presidential election, the agreement seeks to accelerate the process by which Ivorian citizens of voting age can obtain the documents they need in order to register to vote. To that end, the parties agreed that Ivorians of voting age can register to vote based on birth registration documents (birth certificates or court judgements in lieu of birth certificates, to be issued by the mobile courts). Upon registration, eligible voters will receive a receipt with a unique number, which would enable them to obtain both a voters card and a national identity card.

65. The final electoral roll will be prepared on the basis of the electoral lists established in 2000. Thus, individuals who are already on the 2000 voters list will be automatically enrolled on the new voters' list upon presentation of a valid identity card. Eligible Ivorians who are not on the 2000 voters list will be registered if they present the requisite birth registration documents.

66. In order to help enhance the transparency and credibility of the crucial identification process, it is recommended that UNOCI and relevant United Nations agencies accompany and support the National Commission for the Supervision of Identification and participate in observing the operations of the hearings of the mobile courts. With the consent of the Ivorian authorities, United Nations agencies should also assist the national implementing institutions to formulate practical arrangements that would ensure access to the identification process by internally displaced persons and by refugees who choose to remain as permanent residents. They would also support the reconstitution and establishment of updated civil registries and help develop systems to update data for future census exercises. In addition, in keeping with its mandate to prevent and reduce statelessness, UNHCR would provide support and advice to the Ivorian authorities in implementing the identification process. The dissemination of information on the process, including the criteria and procedures, will be of crucial importance to the integrity of the process. UNOCI and United Nations agencies will assist the Ivorian authorities in developing and implementing a nationwide sensitization campaign for the identification process. It is also recommended that UNOCI assist the integrated command centre in providing security for the mobile courts operations.

## **D. Support to the electoral process**

67. The Independent Electoral Commission has completed setting up its central and regional structures and will soon deploy its local commissions throughout the country. The Chairman of the Commission stressed that the security of the electoral process before, during and after the elections was crucial. He therefore requested UNOCI to provide security for the 13,400 central and local commissioners of the Independent Electoral Commission, the 90,000 polling personnel, 430 local offices of the Commission, the 11,000 polling stations and the electoral observers. In addition, he requested the United Nations to assist in mobilizing funding for the elections and proposed that UNDP should manage the funds contributed by the international community. Furthermore, he expressed concern about the role of the media in the electoral process and requested the United Nations to support the Commission's public information programme. The Chairman also requested the United Nations to provide the necessary logistical support for the electoral process.

68. In its resolution 1528 (2004), the Security Council mandated UNOCI to contribute, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place and to provide technical assistance to the electoral process. It is recommended that UNOCI should maintain this role in support of the integrated command centre with regard to security.

69. It is also recommended that UNOCI maintain its current electoral mandate as defined in Security Council resolution 1739 (2007). In addition, the mandate should be adjusted to include coordination of international observers. The coordination of long- and short-term observation of the electoral process would require UNOCI to establish a small unit in its electoral component, which would be dedicated to that task.

70. It is further recommended that UNOCI technical support include assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission in reviewing its operational plans, budgets and calendar, conducting cartographic and logistical surveys of sites selected for the mobile courts and polling centres and planning how the public information, logistics and security components of the mission can assist in a broad civic education campaign. In this regard, UNOCI should enhance coordination between the military, police, logistics, gender, civil affairs, political and public information components of the mission, as well as with United Nations agencies that have a role in providing support for the identification and electoral processes.

71. Considering the constraints still facing the integrated command centre and the limited UNOCI troop levels, UNOCI would help to develop security plans that identify high risk areas where security arrangements would be put in place to protect the 208 mobile courts, the 24 regional, 48 departmental and 358 local electoral commissions and the envisaged 11,000 polling stations, in order to ensure the establishment of a secure environment for the election and its preparatory phases. United Nations police would assist Ivorian law enforcement agencies by providing technical advice and training on operational planning and elections security. If requested by the Ivorian authorities, UNOCI formed police units could provide training to the national police in crowd management and conduct joint exercises with Ivorian police and gendarmerie units on providing security for the elections.

72. United Nations agencies and programmes intend to support the electoral process by helping to mobilize resources to finance additional technical assistance

to the Independent Electoral Commission, the procurement of electoral material and data processing equipment, and the updating of voters lists and communication. UNDP is well positioned to mobilize additional resources for the elections and has taken steps to formulate a technical assistance project in close collaboration with UNOCI to support the Commission.

#### **E. Role of the High Representative for the elections**

73. All the Ivorian parties recognize the importance of and accept the need to maintain the United Nations responsibility for international certification of the electoral process, based on the Pretoria agreement, in order to ensure the transparency and credibility of the elections and to minimize the risk of a political crisis in the event that the electoral process is challenged by some parties. It was acknowledged that the United Nations certification role should not replace but should rather be in addition to the prerogatives of national institutions to certify the various aspects of the electoral process.

74. In the light of the above, and taking into account the wish of the parties to exercise greater ownership of the peace process and the difficulties which have arisen regarding the role of the High Representative for the elections, it is recommended that the Security Council consider entrusting the certification role to my Special Representative. In order to ensure that my Special Representative receives independent advice and support in performing this certification role, a small unit, separate from UNOCI's electoral component and consisting of up to three staff, would be set up in his office. In addition to his certification role, my Special Representative would also perform the original mandate of the High Representative as spelled out in Security Council resolution 1603 (2005).

#### **F. Support to persons affected by the conflict**

75. United Nations agencies and programmes will assist the Government in formulating a national strategy for providing assistance to vulnerable persons affected by the conflict, including a plan of action outlining areas of support by the United Nations and other international partners. They will also provide support for the dissemination of information on international humanitarian law and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to the public and to the civilian and military authorities. Other areas in which the development and humanitarian agencies will provide support include the formulation of a national legal framework for the protection and return of internally displaced persons, building the Government capacity to undertake humanitarian advocacy and contributing to the formulation of a comprehensive strategy that will outline immediate and longer-term investments in key service areas such as water, health and education. The overarching goal is to ensure that an agreement is reached with the Ivorian authorities and donors to provide a comprehensive response that concurrently addresses the needs of internally displaced persons, host families and receiving communities. It is equally important to support the authorities and displaced communities in identifying and implementing the most appropriate durable solutions for internally displaced persons.

76. Humanitarian activities will also continue to give priority to mitigating epidemic outbreaks and facilitating access of the population to potable water in order to prevent diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera, measles and guinea worm. The humanitarian community will also advocate the restoration of the social fabric and the rule of law, including the rapid return of the judiciary. In addition, they will assist the Ivorian authorities to create access for the youth, who constitute 42 to 48 per cent of the total Ivorian population, to education and employment opportunities.

77. UNOCI's HIV/AIDS Unit, in partnership with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), will assist in the training of peer educators, assure HIV/AIDS sensitization and provide voluntary counselling and testing services. UNOCI would also deploy voluntary counselling and testing mobile clinics to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites.

78. While the agreement does not explicitly address the issue of access to land and housing rights, this issue will come to the fore in the context of the return of internally displaced persons foreseen in the agreement. The international community, including the United Nations country team and its partners, would be prepared to support the Government to put in place appropriate mechanisms to deal with the recovery of land and property by returnees. Where such recovery is not deemed feasible, the Government would be encouraged to put in place appropriate compensation or another form of reparation mechanisms.

## **G. Supporting efforts to create a positive political environment**

79. In the Ouagadougou agreement, the Ivorian parties expressed their commitment to organize a wide campaign of information and sensitization of the population to support the peace and reconciliation process and to refrain from any type of propaganda that might jeopardize national cohesion and unity. In order to address the lack of information among the population about the peace process, it is recommended that UNOCI and relevant United Nations agencies work with the Ivorian authorities and other partners to assist in the development and implementation of an effective public information plan that would make full use of the available national and UNOCI communications capacities, including Radio ONUCI-FM, Radio télévision ivoirienne and the network of community radio stations. The Ivorian authorities will continue to have access to Radio ONUCI-FM to disseminate information on the agreement and the peace process in general. It is essential for the Government and UNOCI to discuss and agree on how Radio ONUCI-FM and Radio télévision ivoirienne can play complementary roles in supporting the peace process, promoting national reconciliation and helping to cultivate a positive political environment throughout the country. Additional resources will be required for the expansion of Radio ONUCI-FM coverage where it is most needed.

## **H. Supporting efforts to promote and protect human rights**

80. The Ouagadougou agreement does not expressly address the human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire. Nonetheless several public national and international stakeholders, in particular civil society organizations consulted by the technical assessment mission, stressed that serious human rights violations are one of the root

causes of the Ivorian crisis. They requested the United Nations and other international partners to continue to monitor and promote human rights in the country and to assist the Government to fight impunity in order to ensure a lasting solution to the crisis.

81. It is therefore recommended that UNOCI continue to support the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as monitor, investigate and report on human rights abuses committed in the country. In addition, the mission should also assist the Government in the formulation and implementation of a national human rights action plan, in preparation and submission of outstanding country reports to United Nations human rights treaty bodies and in the effective functioning of the newly established National Human Rights Commission.

82. With regard to the protection of children, UNOCI and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) will continue to advise the Ivorian authorities on addressing issues pertaining to the juvenile justice system, the rehabilitation of children associated with fighting forces, street children and child prostitution, as well as to monitor and report on violations perpetrated against children in application of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005).

## **I. Supporting the economic recovery process**

83. The operations of IMF and the World Bank are being scaled up in Côte d'Ivoire. Since early 2007, the two institutions have designated country representatives, marking the beginning of a re-engagement with the country. Nevertheless, further development of relations will be tied to fundamental structural reform, such as transparency in the management of cocoa, coffee and oil revenues, the development of a detailed plan of action for clearance of arrears and concrete progress in the peace process. The World Bank is preparing a pre-arrears grant of some \$120 million in order to support reintegration of ex-combatants, the identification process and community rehabilitation. In the meantime, UNOCI and other United Nations agencies have begun preliminary work with the World Bank on the appropriateness and the timing of a post-conflict needs assessment, which would feed into steps for recovery and reconstruction.

## **VIII. Adjustments to the United Nations presence**

### **A. Military component**

84. As at 20 April 2007, the military strength of UNOCI stood at 8,050 personnel, comprising 7,758 troops, 193 military observers and 99 staff officers, against an authorized ceiling of 8,115. These troops make up 11 battalions, nine of which are deployed in the two sectors (East and West), and two in Abidjan. One aviation unit, three engineering companies, one transport company and one special force company are providing enabling capacity and an operational reserve to the force. A total of 14 light infantry companies and three mechanized companies are deployed in Sector West, the most challenging area; 10 light infantry companies, one armoured company and the aviation unit, are deployed in Sector East. The military component also includes the Sous-Groupement de sécurité, comprising 279 personnel, who provide security to the signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, members of

the Government, members of the Electoral Commission and the High Representative for the elections.

85. Based on the views expressed by the Ivorian authorities, it is recommended that UNOCI should not begin its drawdown at this stage. As the zone of confidence is progressively lifted, the troops deployed in the area will be redeployed to support the integrated command centre in performing the key tasks set out in the Ouagadougou agreement, as described in section VII above. In this regard, the priority is to deploy troops, as requested by the parties to the agreement, to each of the 17 cantonment sites, with up to a maximum of one company, as appropriate (some cantonment sites contain more than one disarmament site), to supervise and support the disarmament and demobilization process and the storage of weapons. In addition, the request of the parties that six additional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites be established may require UNOCI to establish temporary military bases in Kani and Ouangolodougou in the north-west. The remaining troops will be assigned to help the integrated command centre to secure other key processes, such as the identification process, the redeployment of State officials throughout the country and the electoral process, and to provide security for the command centre headquarters in Yamoussoukro and reinforce current UNOCI deployments in the west. The troops remaining in the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence will include a platoon (35 personnel) at each of the 17 observation posts along the green line and six companies (600 personnel) that will be deployed in the vicinity of the green line to serve as a quick reaction force.

86. The plans for the redeployment to the west and throughout the country in support of the key tasks are being developed in consultation with the integrated command centre and the Licorne force, based on a troop-to-task analysis. UNOCI is also reviewing the security protection priorities for the Sous-Groupement de sécurité, in consultation with the parties, to reduce their current range of tasks in order to provide more effectively protection support to those members of the current Government who request it and to respond to other mission related priorities.

87. It is recommended that, once the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the restoration of State administration throughout the country are completed, possibly within the coming three months, UNOCI would conduct a review of its troop level and determine the military resources required to support the completion of the remaining tasks. However, any troop reductions based on that review should take into account the need to retain sufficient troop levels to effectively secure the electoral process. The completion of the presidential election and the installation of the elected Government will be the next key benchmarks that should trigger the beginning of the withdrawal of UNOCI. In the meantime, I recommend the extension of the mission's mandate for a further period of six months, until December 2007. My next report, which will be submitted in September 2007, will take stock of the progress made towards completing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and restoration of State administration throughout the country and will provide recommendations concerning the mission's troop and police levels.

## **B. Police component**

88. The current strength of the police component of UNOCI stands at 1,157, including 408 individual police officers and 749 members of six formed police units, against an authorized strength of 1,200 police personnel. United Nations police personnel are deployed at 19 locations throughout the country. Two formed police units are deployed in Abidjan and four in Bouaké, Daloa, Guiglo and Yamoussoukro. The primary task of the formed police units is to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and facilities. Formed police units conduct regular joint exercises in crowd control management with United Nations and Licorne military forces.

89. In order to provide support to the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement, in particular to assist in the training of the national police in the north, the UNOCI police component will deploy to two new locations in the north. In addition, one formed police unit will be redeployed from Abidjan to Boundiali, in the north-west, to provide security for the increased number of United Nations police as well as other UNOCI personnel and equipment to be deployed to the north. Up to 72 United Nations police officers will be deployed to the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence to advise and support the mixed police units in performing their law and order maintenance functions. Although the integrated command centre has requested only one United Nations police liaison officer, UNOCI plans to assign five officers to the centre, given the tasks involved, which go beyond liaison and include providing advice on policing issues. The United Nations police officers deployed to the northern part of the country will provide further training and mentoring to the 600 police auxiliaries deployed at 54 locations and will also provide training for newly recruited police cadets from the Forces nouvelles, as requested by the parties.

## **C. Civilian component**

90. With respect to the civilian component, the mission will deploy more personnel in the north and west to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the restoration of State administration in those areas. In addition, an integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration implementation support cell will be co-located with the integrated command centre's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration planning cell in Yamoussoukro.

91. In order to ensure that the organizations of the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire support the peace process in a more efficient manner, UNOCI will coordinate its relevant civilian functions with those of the United Nations country team, with a view to ensuring integrated planning. Significant progress has already been achieved in the alignment of activities between UNOCI's human rights section and the country team. Key areas that require urgent synchronization include identification, gender, HIV/AIDS and public information.

92. The Ouagadougou agreement creates an environment in which partnerships between relief and development organizations can be strengthened to ensure coherence and the maximization of resources. Priority areas in which such partnerships could be forged include the rehabilitation of homes, roads, bridges and

public infrastructure and the provision of technical support to local state administrators and civil society. UNDP and other United Nations agencies are also harmonizing their approaches to humanitarian assistance and post-crisis early recovery as a basis for operational partnerships to support the electoral process, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community rehabilitation.

## **IX. Mission support issues**

93. Ongoing and planned integrated mission support activities will be assessed and adjusted as required to ensure a (United Nations system-wide) coordinated and optimal tasking and response to additional and changed operational priorities. Major support challenges include the dismantling of checkpoints in the former zone of confidence, the establishment of observation points along the green line and the establishment of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps and related operational support activities. Additionally, the planned reinforcement of deployments to the western part of the country, the provision of logistics support to the electoral process and the continued expansion of the mission's radio coverage in support of sensitization campaigns remain key support priorities.

94. Detailed resource implications and implementation plans will be determined on the basis of still-developing concepts of operations and implementation timelines for the respective programmes. It is important, however, to note that, based on current tentative timelines, the United Nations system may be expected to respond to major concurrent and resource-intensive support activities that may require short- to medium-term operational surge capacity.

## **X. Financial aspects**

95. By its resolutions 60/17 B and 61/247, the General Assembly appropriated the total amount of \$472.9 million for the maintenance of UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. The total resources approved for the mission would support 8,115 military personnel, 450 United Nations police personnel and 750 formed police personnel authorized by the Security Council in its resolutions 1609 (2005) and 1682 (2006).

96. Should the Security Council approve my proposals made in paragraph 56 above, the resulting resource requirements would be met through the use of the mission's existing resources and resources that will be appropriated by the General Assembly for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.

97. As at 31 December 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to \$90.4 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1,760 million. Reimbursement of troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 28 February 2007 and 31 December 2006, respectively.

## **XI. Observations**

98. Prior to the Ouagadougou dialogue, the Ivorian parties had signed a total of five peace agreements since the outbreak of the conflict in 2002. Each of those



agreements significantly contributed towards resolving some important aspects of the crisis. In addition, within the framework of those agreements, the impartial forces helped to prevent the parties from returning to full scale hostilities. The advent of the Ouagadougou agreement, however, takes the Ivorian peace process to a unique turning point. For the first time since the beginning of the crisis, the Ivorian parties have undertaken a dialogue at their own initiative, with a facilitator of their choice. Furthermore, the parties have themselves drawn up the framework for resolving key issues that had hitherto impeded progress in the peace process. The opposition parties, which were not directly involved in the dialogue, have confirmed that they fully support the agreement and that they have mandated Prime Minister Soro to represent them. Prime Minister Soro and the facilitator consulted them throughout the dialogue. Accordingly, the Ivorian parties wish to assume full ownership of the process set out in the Ouagadougou agreement and to see national institutions take the lead in implementing it.

99. I congratulate the Ivorian parties for mustering the necessary political will to assume full responsibility for resolving the crisis in their country and I commend President Compaoré for his effective facilitation role. I also thank President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and President Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo for their mediation role over the past four years.

100. Ownership of the peace process imposes a unique responsibility on the Ivorian parties to implement the Ouagadougou agreement in full and in good faith. They have made a good beginning in this regard, meeting the first crucial deadlines set out in the implementation schedule. However, as in all peace processes, unforeseen events will test their will at every critical turn. I urge them to remain steadfast and keep the peace process on track. In this regard, it is imperative to nurture and sustain the spirit of consensus engendered by the Ouagadougou agreement and to forge national cohesion and promote genuine national reconciliation in order to underpin the emerging positive political environment. Furthermore, addressing the main sources of insecurity among the population, including human rights violations, the activities of militias and incitement to violence, inter alia, by the media, will also be crucial to the preservation of a healthy political climate and confidence among the parties.

101. The political will of the parties alone will not sustain the peace process. Already, the delays in launching the dismantling of militias, the cantonment of the former fighting forces, the redeployment of State authority and the mobile courts hearings, which were all scheduled to begin on 23 April, have underscored the challenges that the capacity limitations of national institutions can present for the implementation of the agreement. The Ivorian authorities will need the assistance of the United Nations and other international partners to develop the capacity of the main national institutions involved in the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement, especially the newly formed integrated command centre.

102. Needless to say, the ultimate test for the Ouagadougou agreement lies in its ability to resolve the fundamental issues that lie at the heart of the Ivorian crisis, in particular the identification of the population, the disarmament of combatants, the reunification of the country and the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country. Failure to effectively address these issues could lead to a breakdown of

the peace process, with dire consequences, not only for Côte d'Ivoire, but also for the subregion.

103. The Ouagadougou agreement provides an opportunity for both the Ivorian parties and their international partners to turn a new page. For the parties, this agreement could well be the last chance for a peaceful solution to the crisis. The setbacks and prolonged stalemates of the past should therefore be avoided. With the prevailing ideal situation, where the parties now own and lead the peace process, the international community should adjust its role and relationship with the Ivorian parties accordingly. In particular, it is important to respect and sustain the spirit of consensus among the parties, which is the critical factor propelling the peace process forward. At the same time, the considerable amount of resources already invested in Côte d'Ivoire imposes on the international partners on the ground the obligation to help the parties to ensure that all key processes are conducted in a transparent, balanced and credible manner. Accordingly, in accompanying the national institutions as they implement the agreement, the international partners cannot be mere passive observers, they should provide the necessary support and advice, with a view to ensuring that the peace process is conducted in accordance with internationally accepted standards. This requires regular consultations with the parties. I therefore urge the parties and the facilitator to involve the international partners in the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

104. For its part, the United Nations system is ready to provide the support requested by the Ivorian authorities. The capacity of UNOCI and the United Nations country team to support the implementation of previous peace agreements will remain to provide support to the new phase of the peace process, as outlined in section VII above. In providing such support, the United Nations system will also help to reinforce the capacity of national institutions, enhance the credibility and transparency of such crucial processes as the identification of the population, disarmament and the elections and assist in preventing the process from sliding back. The United Nations system will also coordinate and work closely with other international partners. I therefore invite the Security Council to approve the recommendations in section VII above.

105. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the Officer-in-Charge of UNOCI, Mr. Abou Moussa, the High Representative for the elections, Mr. Gérard Stoudmann, and the military and civilian personnel of UNOCI and members of the United Nations country team for their continued commitment to the peace process. I would also like to express my gratitude to the humanitarian and development organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors and the countries that are contributing military and police personnel to UNOCI for their invaluable contribution to peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

## Annex

## United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

## Military strength as at 7 May 2007

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>
Argentina						4
Bangladesh	11	10	2 722	<b>2 743</b>	250	9
Benin	8	9	420	<b>437</b>		28
Bolivia	0			<b>0</b>		
Brazil	4	3		<b>7</b>		
Burkina Faso				<b>0</b>		
Cameroon				<b>0</b>		62
Canada				<b>0</b>		3
Central African Republic				<b>0</b>		7
Chad	3			<b>3</b>		5
China	4			<b>4</b>		
Congo	0			<b>0</b>		
Croatia	3			<b>3</b>		
Djibouti				<b>0</b>		39
Dominican Republic	4			<b>4</b>		
Ecuador	2			<b>2</b>		
El Salvador	3			<b>3</b>		1
Ethiopia	4			<b>4</b>		
France	2	11	173	<b>186</b>		10
Guatemala	5			<b>5</b>		
Ghana	6	7	531	<b>544</b>		1
Gambia	3			<b>3</b>		
Guinea	3			<b>3</b>		
India	6			<b>6</b>		11
Ireland	2			<b>2</b>		
Jordan	7	11	1 049	<b>1 067</b>	375	4
Kenya	5	3		<b>8</b>		
Lebanon				<b>0</b>		0
Madagascar				<b>0</b>		6
Moldova	3			<b>3</b>		
Morocco	1	3	733	<b>737</b>		
Namibia	3			<b>3</b>		
Nepal	3			<b>3</b>		
Niger	6	3	379	<b>388</b>		71
Nigeria	8			<b>8</b>		17

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>
Pakistan	10	11	1 113	<b>1 134</b>	125	2
Paraguay	9	2		<b>11</b>		
Peru	0			<b>0</b>		
Poland	2			<b>2</b>		
Portugal				<b>0</b>		
Philippines	5	3		<b>8</b>		11
Romania	7			<b>7</b>		
Russian Federation	11			<b>11</b>		
Rwanda						15
Senegal	8	8	322	<b>338</b>		58
Serbia	3			<b>3</b>		
Spain				<b>0</b>		
Switzerland						2
Sri Lanka				<b>0</b>		
Togo	6	4	315	<b>325</b>		1
Tunisia	5	2		<b>7</b>		
Turkey				<b>0</b>		21
United Republic of Tanzania	1	2		<b>3</b>		
Uruguay	2	0		<b>2</b>		6
Uganda	5	2		<b>7</b>		
Vanuatu				<b>0</b>		4
Yemen	5			<b>5</b>		2
Zambia	2			<b>2</b>		
Zimbabwe	2			<b>2</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>7 757</b>	<b>8 043</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>400</b>

