



Security Council

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Letter dated 2 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached report from Germany, submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Jeremy Greenstock**
Chairman
Counter-Terrorism Committee

Annex

Letter dated 27 December 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

On instructions from my Government, I hereby have the honour to transmit a report from Germany to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, prepared in compliance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (see enclosure).

Germany stands ready to provide the Committee with further information, as required.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and the enclosed report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Hanns **Schumacher**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Enclosure

Report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Committee, CTC)

G e r m a n y

General Remarks

The Federal Republic of Germany herewith submits her first report under paragraph 6 UNSC Res. 1373. In so doing, Germany wishes to demonstrate the will and determination with which it has responded to the challenge of international terrorism.

Germany successfully countered the domestic terrorist threat posed by the Red Army Fraction and its successors in the 1980s. However, Germany continued to be a target of international terrorist groups in the 1990s. Therefore Germany was not unprepared when the tragic events of 11 September 2001 occurred, even if combating and preventing international terrorism was only one of several priority issues for German politics before that day. Germany unequivocally welcomed the condemnation of these terrorist attacks by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. Germany particularly welcomed Security Council Resolution 1373, which reiterated the obligation of all United Nations member states to prevent and suppress acts of international terrorism.

This report clearly proves that Germany had a solid foundation for combating and preventing international terrorism, both at national level and in international cooperation, even before that tragic date. As early as 19 September, the Cabinet adopted a first anti-terrorism package intended to improve air-traffic safety. The report also clearly indicates that the German Government has since then considerably improved and strengthened the relevant legal framework and enhanced its implementation. The second anti-terrorism package, described in part later in this report, has been passed by the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) and the Bundesrat (German Federal Council) and will enter into force at the beginning of 2002. International cooperation has also been considerably widened and deepened. For example, immediately after 11 September, the Federal Criminal Police Office created a special task force of more than 600 police experts to deal with the Al-Qaida network, in close cooperation with the competent authorities of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and other partner states. We are convinced that this challenge of international terrorism cannot be taken on by individual UN member states alone. While it is necessary to have national instruments and experienced personnel available at national level, our report also stresses the utmost necessity of global cooperation in preventing and combating and finally eliminating international terrorism.

Germany has tackled many of the problems posed by this challenge, which has taken on new forms in the last years, in close cooperation with its partners within the European Union. The European Union has developed a road map, which it is in the process of implementing with utmost urgency. That is why some of the measures taken by Germany as a member of the European Union are not outlined in this report but in a separate report presented by the European Union, which has to be read in close conjunction with our national report.

Security Council Resolution 1373 states very clearly that international terrorism is not only a global but also a complex threat to human civilization. It notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and organized crime. We therefore have to combat international terrorism and transnational crime simultaneously, since they are two interrelated dark sides of globalization. We have to tackle the sources of international terrorism, while not losing sight of the necessity of combating organized crime, trafficking in drugs and corruption. The United Nations have repeatedly called our attention to these causes: lack of proper economic development, unequal distribution of material resources, failing states, the lack of respect for human rights and equal opportunities. If we want a world free from terrorism and crime, we will have to strengthen our efforts to solve these problems as well. Preventing and combating terrorism is one side of the coin, eliminating its sources and root causes the other.

Just as the images of the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September will not fade away and the victims will stay in our memories, our commitment to fight international terrorism within the framework of international and national law will remain.

We are prepared to extend our assistance to countries willing to join us in this fight, to cooperate on a global level with all those who join with us in the aim of eliminating this threat to human civilization.

1. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;

What measures if any have been taken to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts in addition to those listed in your responses to questions on 1(b) to (d)?

Crucial administrative and legislative steps have already been initiated in order to trace money that is being used or could potentially be used to finance terrorism: the 4th Financial Market Promotion bill (4. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) was approved by the Federal Cabinet on 14 November 2001 and has since been submitted for parliamentary debate. The bill is aimed primarily at counteracting non-transparent, global capital flows and financial transactions of criminal origin. To this end it provides, among other things, for amendments to the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) aimed at bringing bank supervision up to the most advanced international standards, creating the prerequisites for the more effective prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The main focal points of the bill include:

- Automated retrieval of information on accounts (section 24c of the Banking Act, new): by expanding the existing bank supervisory notification and reporting system by giving banking institutes automated access to accounts and security accounts, the ability of the yet to be established Federal Agency for Financial Services (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungen) and of prosecution authorities to identify not just money laundering and illegal banking practices but also transactions used to finance the logistics of terrorism will be enhanced.
- Improved security systems within banks (section 25 a, paragraph 1, No. 4 of the Banking Act, new): by obliging institutions to create “adequate internal security systems for combating money laundering and fraudulent activities detrimental to the institutions themselves”, a strict “know your customer” policy will be implemented within the meaning of the supervision principles set forth in the Basel Committee’s publication “Customer due diligence for banks” of 4 October 2001. These internal systems within banks must be capable of tracking down payment flows and financial transactions with a criminal background, employing the state-of-the-art technology that is used in retail banking.

Under the legal system of the Federal Republic of Germany, preventing acts of terrorism and their structures is primarily a task for the police force. Hence, the Money Laundering Act (Geldwäschegesetz) is to be adapted in line with the aims of the 4th Financial Market Promotion Act to cope with the new threat. In so doing, the recommendations made by the Financial Action Task Force regarding the identification of money used to finance terrorism are to be implemented, extending the use of the instruments provided for in the Money Laundering Act (the reporting and evaluating of suspicious activities by the enhanced central agency of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt), security systems within banks, identifying dummy transactions) to trace cash flows used for terrorist purposes.

The relevant bill aimed at improving the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism (to be the Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering - Geldwäschebekämpfungsgesetz) is to be submitted to parliament as soon as possible.

Under currently valid law, the financing of a terrorist organization is already considered to be an offence preliminary to money laundering under section 261 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). However, in order to ensure that all forms of financing are covered, the addition of individual items to the catalogue of preliminary offences set forth in section 261, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the Criminal Code is currently being considered. A relevant bill is also to be submitted to parliament as soon as possible.

- (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;**

What are the offences and penalties in your country with respect to the activities listed in this sub-paragraph?

Under German law, the financing of terrorist activities can constitute a separate criminal offence (section 129a German Criminal Code). The penalties which can be imposed under this provision depend on the circumstances of the case: if the person who does the financing is considered a “backer”, for example, the law provides for a term of imprisonment of three to fifteen years for this alone, and for an “ordinary member” of the organization it makes provision for a term of imprisonment of one to ten years. If the person in question is not a member of the organization, the penalty imposable is imprisonment from six months to five years.

In addition, consideration can also be given to imposing punishment for the financing of terrorist activities under the rubric participation in the principal offence. For example, if the perpetrator finances the purchase of weapons used by others to kill people in an attack, imposing punishment for participation in the offence of murder may also be considered. The penalties imposed then depend on the penalties which can be imposed for the actual terrorist offences (in this example, the penalty for murder is life imprisonment).

- (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;**

What legislation and procedures exist for freezing accounts and assets at banks and financial institutions? It would be helpful if States supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

- (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;**

What measures exist to prohibit the activities listed in this sub-paragraph?

1. Legislative measures

- 1.1 The Federal Republic of Germany will implement UNSCR 1373 (2001) in close coordination with the other EC Member States. The financial sanctions pursuant to sections 1 c) and d) of the Resolution will be the subject of an EC Regulation, which the Council is to adopt. Cf. report of the European Community to the Counter Terrorism Committee for details of the Regulation.
- 1.2 Beyond the instruments available under the EC Regulation, it is additionally possible in Germany to take preliminary national measures to restrict capital and payment transactions involving the persons or organizations targeted under UNSCR 1373 (2001). These measures are based on sections 2 and 7 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz – AWG). The provisions of those two sections enable the German Government to restrict legal transactions or activities concerning foreign trade and payments in order to protect against specific risks to the values referred to in section 7, paragraph 1 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, viz:
- the security of the Federal Republic of Germany;
 - the peaceful co-existence of peoples;
 - the external relations of the Federal Republic of Germany.

As soon as the EC Regulation is adopted, it will constitute the principal instrument for the implementation of paragraphs 1c) and 1d) of UNSCR 1373 (2001), so that the purely national instruments provided for in the Foreign Trade and Payments Act only have a limited scope of application. As a matter of principle, application of those instruments could be considered:

- in respect of persons whose inclusion in the scope of application of the EC Regulation, although already applied for, has not yet been decided upon;
- in respect of persons who are not included in this EC Regulation, but who nevertheless pose an evident danger to the values mentioned in section 7, paragraph 1 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act in Germany.

2. Administrative measures

In the period between 28 September 2001, i.e. the date on which UNSCR 1373 (2001) was adopted, and the date on which the EC Regulation enters into force, the German Government decided to adopt a number of restrictions on capital and payment transactions on the basis of sections 2 and 7 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (cf. above). These restrictions concerned persons and organizations whose inclusion on the relevant lists of the Taliban Sanctions Committee of the Security Council and in Annex I of EC Regulation No. 467/2001 (which implements UNSCR 1267/1999 and 1333/2000) was to be expected, but had not yet been decided upon. To prevent the targeted persons from withdrawing their funds, the German Government – based on UNSCR 1373 (2001), because the targeted persons/organizations had not yet been added to the relevant lists of the Taliban Sanctions Committee under UNSCR 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) – introduced provisional national measures to freeze any existing financial resources. In parallel, the preliminary national measures prohibited the provision of any funds to the targeted persons and organizations. These measures were of course lifted after the targeted persons and organizations had been included in Annex I of Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001.

2. *Decides also that all States shall:*

(a) **Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;**

What legislation or other measures are in place to give effect to this sub-paragraph? In particular, what offences in your country prohibit (i) recruitment to terrorist groups and (ii) the supply of weapons to terrorists? What other measures help prevent such activities?

(i) Recruiting for terrorist organizations is a separate offence pursuant to section 129a of the German Criminal Code. Depending on the circumstances of the case the law provides for a term of imprisonment from six months to fifteen years. Recruiting for terrorist organizations may also be considered as participation in the actual offences themselves.

(ii) The legal position with respect to supplying terrorist organizations with weapons is in principle the same as that in respect of financing or recruiting for terrorist organizations.

(b) **Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;**

What other steps are being taken to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, and in particular, what early warning mechanisms exist to allow exchange of information with other states?

Preventing acts of terrorism is a joint task that is incumbent on all the security authorities in Germany. In this field, both the intelligence services, particularly the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution, and the Federal and Länder police forces make an important contribution to internal security in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The intelligence services are responsible for keeping a close eye on any endeavours undertaken by persons or organizations that are directed against the constitutional system of the Federal Republic.

Apart from detecting crime, the police are also responsible for averting danger and preventing crime. In accordance with the division of tasks between the Federation and the Federal Länder defined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Criminal Police Office, as the Federation's own police force, gathers, analyses and coordinates any information that is of significance to more than one Federal Land, or of international or other significance. A central organizational unit set up at the Federal Criminal Police Office ensures that information and reports on threats are exchanged swiftly and without delay at home and abroad. In this context, acts of terrorism committed anywhere in the world and the activities of extremist and terrorist groups are observed closely and evaluated, even if there is no concrete link with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The aim is to process and manage information relevant to threats in a comprehensive, targeted and structured fashion. To this end, a coordinated procedure for the Federal Republic of Germany has been agreed between intelligence services and police authorities that ensures that sensitive information concerning threats is handled professionally and prevents it from being managed by several parties in an uncoordinated manner. This system has proven to be most effective from the national perspective. Against this backdrop, the Federal Minister of the Interior has proposed to his European counterparts that a comparable network of special agencies be set up at European level. In addition, Germany has suggested that a comparable system be implemented within the framework of G8 cooperation.

The exchange of threat-relevant information between EU Member States is a traditional, integral part of their cooperation. It generally takes place within the framework of cooperation within the individual bodies and in particular through the introduction of a special emergency reporting service for terrorist incidents that also involves Europol.

The resources of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) must also be borne in mind when early warnings are given to other countries. The Federal Intelligence Service has many well-established international contacts at bilateral and multilateral level that facilitate the exchange of relevant information. Information on threats is passed on immediately.

In the battle against international terrorism, top priority has been given to the prevention of terrorism at supra-European level in a concerted effort made within the G8 Group of Experts on Terrorism. The importance of comprehensive, targeted and structured management and processing of threat-relevant information and facts has been highlighted.

The threat posed by terrorism took on new global dimensions when the suicide attacks were launched in the United States of America on 11 September 2001. The degree of violence, the logistics network of the terrorists and their long-term international strategy mean that legal instruments need to be further evolved. To this end, a large number of statutory amendments have been submitted to parliament in the wake of the terrorist acts in the USA.

A crucial focus of these legislative projects consists of granting the necessary legal powers to security authorities such as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst), the Federal Intelligence Service, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz). Another focus of the bill was the creation of the necessary legal conditions for enhancing the exchange of information between the relevant authorities, for preventing terrorists from entering the Federal Republic of Germany and for increasing the range and use of identification measures.

In this context, provision is being made in particular to enhance the competences of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution:

- The duties of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution will in future include the gathering and evaluation of information on endeavours that are directed against the principle of international understanding and the peaceful co-existence of peoples. The intention is to monitor any such endeavours aimed at political

opponents abroad where it is often difficult, if not impossible, to prove either the use of violence or that a person is actually involved in preparing acts of terror in Germany that could possibly affect internal security.

- In order to perform its duties in the field of counter-terrorism, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is in future to be granted the right to information, as defined by law, from credit institutes, financial service institutions, finance companies, aviation companies and companies providing telecommunications services and teleservices.
- In future, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution will also, in the framework of counter-terrorism measures, be able to use technical means, under certain circumstances defined in a special law, to locate mobile phones that are switched on so that it can establish the number of the phone itself and of the phonecard. However, this measure shall only be permissible if it would otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish the goal thereby pursued.

Just how important certain pieces of information can be is clearly demonstrated by the example of telecommunications and teleservices. Information about a person's pattern of use of telecommunications services and their usage of teleservices can reveal important facts about the environment in which such persons, suspected of being involved in activities that may be relevant for the prevention of terrorism, circulate. Data on connections and usage can help to identify other persons who are involved in terrorist networks and is therefore helpful for preparing additional targeted investigations.

- The ultimate aim of course is to enhance the flow of information between the Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge) and the aliens authorities on the one hand and the authorities of the Federation and Federal Länder who are responsible for the protection of the Constitution on the other. In future, the Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees and the aliens authorities are to be permitted, under certain circumstances, to transmit at their own initiative any data that has come to their attention about endeavours or activities which the authorities responsible for protecting the constitution are permitted to collect and evaluate information on, if there are concrete grounds to suggest the transmission of such data is necessary to enable the authorities responsible for protecting the Constitution to perform their duties.

In future, the Military Counterintelligence Service, just like the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, is to be permitted to gather and evaluate information on activities that are directed against the principle of international understanding and the peaceful co-existence of peoples, within its area of competence. It will also have the right to request companies providing telecommunications services and teleservices as part of their business to divulge information on data relating to the usage of telecommunications services and teleservices.

The Federal Intelligence Service will be granted the same right as the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution to request information, under certain circumstances, from credit institutes, financial service institutions and finance companies about accounts, account-holders and other authorized persons as well as on monetary transactions and investments. The same restrictions and the same obligation to provide information will apply vis-à-vis those concerned. The Federal Intelligence Service, like the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Counterintelligence Service, will additionally be permitted, within the framework of its counter-terrorism measures, to use technical instruments to locate mobile phones that are switched on and to determine such mobile phone and phonecard numbers under certain circumstances defined by law.

The Federal Criminal Police Office will be given the original competency to investigate certain serious forms of cybercrime involving in particular acts that may pose a serious threat to the internal or external security of the Federal Republic of Germany or that are aimed against facilities whose breakdown or malfunction could lead to an extended shortage of supply to large sections of the population or have other critical consequences.

The competency of the Federal Criminal Police Office as a central organ is also to be strengthened by enhancing its powers to procure information to supplement any information it already has and to implement evaluation projects. In cases in which it has reason to suspect criminal activity, the Federal Criminal Police Office, in its capacity as a central organ, will be able to gather additional information without having to clarify in each and

every case – as is now the law – whether a Federal or Land police force already has this information. The abolition of this bureaucratic requirement will make it much easier and quicker to obtain any necessary information.

In order to ensure the security authorities also have access to social data, an obligation for social insurance institutions to provide relevant information to the security authorities will be incorporated into law.

In addition to improving the exchange of information, a large number of other measures are to be taken to prevent criminal terrorist activities.

The staff and financial resources available to the Federal and Land security authorities are to be stepped up to adequately compensate them for the added burden associated with the prevention of terrorism.

By tightening up the Act governing Private Associations (Vereinsgesetz), the state's options for taking action against extremist associations of foreigners and foreign organizations have been increased and enhanced. This is true especially when the activities of these associations provide a breeding ground for terrorism and intolerance, and when they make calls for people to support such foreign organizations, collect donations or recruit "fighters".

According to the envisaged revised grounds for banning associations of foreigners and foreign organizations, the security authorities will now have enhanced means of counteracting any such dangers and of combating these organizations.

Further statutory measures will create a legal basis for the conduct of (simple) security clearance checks on persons who are or will be employed at security sensitive positions within airports, with airlines or at facilities that are crucial for life or vital for defence purposes such as energy suppliers or communications facilities. The aim behind this is to ensure that only reliable persons are employed in critical positions in order to prevent terrorism from within and to preclude this resulting in any unforeseeable consequences to the public.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) inserts a legal basis into the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) for measures aimed at establishing the identity of persons who are engaged in or support terrorist activities or are willing to resort to violence, as well as persons coming from certain countries who apply for a visa to reside in Germany for more than 3 months. Endeavours are being made to standardize procedures within Europe regarding the granting of visas for up to 3 months.

At the same time, the scope for data exchange between missions abroad, aliens authorities and security authorities and services regarding national residence titles will be improved.

Checking the authenticity of identification documents and residence titles (including travel documents used as replacement passports and visas granted by way of exception) is another important focus within the framework of intensifying control and supervision measures aimed at preventing acts of terrorism. In order to be able to implement these measures more effectively, the Federal Border Police are to be permitted in future to carry out a simple identity check on persons who do not give any grounds for suspicion. This will cover cases in which although no concrete danger is discernible, it is, for instance, established that persons who do not of themselves look suspicious are found to be conspicuously loitering in the vicinity of protected property (constitutional bodies of the Federal Government, railway stations and railway facilities, airports etc.), are found to be watching them, creating the impression they are spying on them or are gathering other information.

In addition to the above-mentioned legal amendments, a large number of administrative measures have been taken in order to prevent acts of terrorism.

Border controls and surveillance measures conducted by the Federal Border Police along borders have been stepped up. Security plans for property at risk drawn up before the USA launched its military action have been implemented by the Federal and Land security authorities. The protection of American, British, Israeli and Jewish facilities in particular has been stepped up.

Special search measures are being carried out by the Federal Länder on the basis of their right to avert dangers with the aim of tracking down suspects living in Germany and, if possible, nipping any other attacks in the bud.

To this end, available files are being evaluated systematically on the basis of specific criteria which have been developed in the course of the investigations.

Germany is seeking to gain support at EU level to facilitate the expansion of such search measures throughout the whole of Europe.

One focal point of national measures aimed at preventing further attacks relates to safeguarding aviation security at national and international level. In order to do so, security measures have been stepped up for all air traffic at all airports in addition to the checks that are already being implemented. Police presence has been stepped up. This involves, inter alia, stepping up patrols and surveillance of check-in areas, parked aircraft and transit and waiting rooms by the Federal Border Police. All checks carried out on air passengers and baggage have been stepped up. The introduction 100% screening of hold baggage constitutes an important factor of aviation security. This goal has been by and large accomplished at most of Germany's 37 airports and is being pressed ahead with in view of the deadline of 31 December 2002 set out by the EU. State-of-the-art equipment is being used to support the intensified aviation security checks being carried out on passengers and baggage. Without this equipment, air traffic would come to a standstill, assuming the same security requirements had to be met.

Additional security measures have been implemented by US, Israeli, and British airlines and other airlines flying to destinations in the USA and Israel (for instance, 100% manual body searches of passengers prior to departure, 100% screening of cabin baggage accompanied by ongoing, additional manual searches).

Apart from conducting comprehensive security measures on the ground, it has also become necessary to enhance security precautions on board aircraft in order to prevent aircraft from being hijacked, terrorist acts from being committed and hostages from being taken. To this end, the Federal Border Police are deploying air marshals on board German aircraft. This measure is part of a comprehensive concept aimed at enhancing aviation security by taking additional staff-related and technical measures.

Owing to the special responsibilities the job entails, police officers from the Federal Border Police who are particularly suited to the job and have undergone extra training for this purpose are employed. The air marshals are always on board aircraft with the pilot's approval, assisting him in providing security on board the aircraft. Their job is to maintain or restore security and order on board German aircraft. It is in particular their responsibility to prevent or stop actions that might endanger the security and safety of the aircraft or the lives of the people on board. The in-flight authority of the pilot in control of the aircraft (section 29, paragraph 3, sentence 1 of the Civil Aviation Act (Luftverkehrsgesetz) in conjunction with the Tokyo Agreement remains unaffected.

Other technical protective measures to prevent hijackings – such as bullet- and bomb-proof cockpit doors – are currently being investigated.

In addition to national measures, due to the international character of air traffic, great importance is being attached to ensuring that standardized and binding security standards are in place in all of the countries that are involved in international air traffic. These goals are being actively pursued by Germany within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the EU and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) involving 38 member states. It needs to be emphasized in this context that the European Union is hoping to complete the work on an EU Regulation on Aviation Security as soon as possible. This regulation is to enter into force early next year. Its aim is to set uniform and binding aviation security standards in the EU.

Equally, in discharging its railway policing duties, the Federal Border Police have stepped up the security measures in place at major passenger railway stations in close consultation with the police forces of the Federal Länder and Deutsche Bahn AG. In doing so, property of American companies has also been included in the protective measures.

Instructions have also been given to monitor the train routes of US and British military and ammunition transports and to conduct constant protective and surveillance measures during stopovers at freight stations.

First preparatory steps have been taken to facilitate the increased use of immediate searches of persons and hazardous items at railway stations and throughout the Federal rail network (immediate searches on traffic routes/searches on traffic routes), as required in the particular situation.

(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;

What legislation or procedures exist for denying safe haven to terrorists, such as laws for excluding or expelling the types of individuals referred to in this sub-paragraph? It would be helpful if States supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

The draft Prevention of Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) makes provision for restrictions under aliens law and asylum law, in particular in respect of entry, residence and the legal status of foreigners. These changes were made in light of the events of 11 September 2001.

Nationally uniform residence documents for foreign citizens are to be created which may include, inter alia, biometric characteristics; the legal basis for this is a legal ordinance. Further-reaching measures to ensure correct identification are to be introduced in the procedure for issuing visas and in the asylum procedure, in particular. In this context it is intended that voice recording ensure greater certainty in determining a person's country of origin. In order to enable early identification of individuals who belong to the terrorist milieu, provision is also being made to involve the intelligence services extensively as early as during the procedure to issue visas. Lastly, the Federal Minister of the Interior's bill contains stricter provisions in respect of granting residence permits and extends the grounds for which a person can be expelled from the country.

A further section of the bill contains amendments to a large number of other statutes, such as the Act governing Passports and Identity Cards (Pass- und Personalausweisgesetz) and the Security Screening Act (Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz).

The amendments to the Act governing Passports and Identity Cards make it possible, on the one hand, to include identification characteristics in coded form in a person's passport. In addition, it will in future be possible for biometric characteristics to be included in a person's passport, also in a coded form.

The amendments to the Security Screening Act serve the purpose of extending security screening to cover all persons who work in a "vulnerable area" in security terms. Employers in both the public and private sector will in future be obliged under these amendments to have all individuals screened who are to be entrusted with particularly sensitive duties in an area which is vulnerable in security terms.

(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;

What legislation or procedures exist to prevent terrorists acting from your territory against other states or citizens? It would be helpful if States supplied examples of any relevant action taken.

Several options exist within the framework of German criminal law. In particular, all persons, including foreign citizens, are subject to German jurisdiction regardless of the place of commission of an offence, if they are apprehended in Germany. This principle also applies to German nationals even if they are not resident in Germany. This means that offences committed by such persons abroad must in principle also be punished pursuant to German law. Certain offences can only be prosecuted in Germany if the offence also incurs criminal liability in the country where it was committed.

As a result of a thorough evaluation of the German legal position, not least in light of recent events, it has become clear that the penal provisions relating to being (merely) a member of a criminal or terrorist organization do not adequately cover all possible situations, namely they do not apply to all cases of activity by foreign citizens abroad which should incur criminal liability. For this reason, the Federal Government has proposed extending the penal provisions applicable to criminal and terrorist organizations in such a way as to better cover this aspect of global activity of criminal and terrorist organizations. The debate on these provisions in parliament gives reason to hope that they will soon enter into force.

- (e) **Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;**

What steps have been taken to establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offences and to ensure that the punishment reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts? Please supply examples of any convictions obtained and the sentence given.

Firstly, in respect of the individual acts themselves, either the commission of the act in a way characteristic of terrorist acts or the motive of the perpetrators can constitute grounds for the imposition of the most severe penalty available for the acts in question. For example, causing a person's death as a result of a terrorist bombing can incur a penalty of imprisonment for life even if there was no intention to cause the death of another person (section 308 (3) German Criminal Code). If the person was killed with intent, there is indeed no alternative to the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment where means were used which constituted a danger to the general public or where the perpetrator acted for base motives. In addition, acting for terrorist motives, and in some cases the commission of an offence in a way characteristic of terrorist acts, can, for any offence, be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance justifying the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Furthermore, German criminal law takes account of the gravity of terrorist acts by means of the above-mentioned Criminal Code provision concerning terrorist organizations. According to this provision, ringleaders or backers can, for participation in such an organization alone, be punished by three to fifteen years' imprisonment even if it is not possible to prove that they were involved in a specific terrorist act; this applies analogously to "ordinary" members of such an organization or to persons who give their support to them, as explained above in paragraph 1 (b)

- (f) **Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;**

What procedures and mechanisms are in place to assist other states? Please provide any available details of how these have been used in practice.

The Federal Republic of Germany provides mutual assistance in criminal matters within the framework of a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements (cf. list in appendix below).

In addition, Germany also provides mutual assistance to the greatest possible extent in the area not governed by treaties, on the basis of the provisions contained in the German Act of 23 December 1982 on International Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen).

The Federal Republic of Germany is conscious of the importance attached to mutual assistance particularly in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or supporting of terrorist activity, as is demonstrated by the fact that Germany has, *inter alia*, implemented the 12 relevant UN Conventions.

- (g) **Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;**

How do border controls in your country prevent the movement of terrorists? How do your procedures for issuance of identity papers and travel documents support this? What measures exist to prevent their forgery etc?

Germany was recognized as having high standards as regards the implementation of border controls and the issuing of identity and travel documents, even before Security Council Resolution 1373 was passed. These standards are being further strengthened with the introduction of a series of statutory measures for the Federal

Border Police, in legislation governing aliens and asylum procedures as well as in the Act governing Passports and Identity Cards (Pass-und Personalausweisgesetz).

The Federal Border Police, who are responsible for border security, will thus be given greater powers. These include extending their border-related surveillance powers in spatial terms as well as increasing their powers to carry out identity checks on persons who are obliged to undergo questioning and provide information. So far, the Federal Border Police have only been permitted to use their discretion to stop and to interview people who can provide information needed for the performance of a specific duty. In future, persons who are obliged to stop and provide information can also be asked to prove their identity to the officers, so that any relevant, supplementary information obtained in individual cases can be verified and used appropriately – perhaps at some later date.

German passports and travel documents are internationally recognized as being very hard to forge. In addition to the existing security features, an element preventing documents from being copied was introduced in November 2001 in the form of an individual, optically variable hologram.

Furthermore, within the framework of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz), amendments to the Act governing Passports and Identity Cards (Pass-und Personalausweisgesetz) are planned, which will enable other biometric data to be included in a person's passport or identity card in addition to their photograph and signature. Additional biometric data will enhance the computer-aided identification of persons on the basis of identification papers.

It is also intended to make aliens' papers (residence permits, substitute identity cards, temporary suspension of deportation certificates, provisional residence permits) more secure, inter alia by incorporating a machine-readable zone and biometric data.

The enhanced powers to establish persons identities and the improved cooperation with missions abroad, aliens authorities and security authorities described in paragraph 2 (b) above will also help to prevent terrorists from entering the country.

- The fraudulent use of personal identity and travel documents is to be counteracted with improved information access for the authorities.
- To this end, the visa files which hitherto only incorporated information about the visas being applied for will be upgraded into visa-decision files. In future, visa files will contain data on the granting or refusal of visas as well as a photograph of the visa applicant. This will ensure an even more effective control of foreigners entering the country. Police authorities in particular will in future be able to establish immediately when conducting general checks on persons whether a person has entered the country with a valid visa issued by a German mission abroad. Furthermore, German missions abroad will also be able to find out, before issuing a visa, what decisions other missions abroad have taken in the past in relation to a particular visa applicant.

In addition to the statutory initiatives, operational measures have also been taken on the basis of existing regulations.

These include stepping up controls at the borders. All control measures will place special emphasis on establishing the authenticity of identification documents. This also applies to controls at critical locations conducted by the Federal Border Police in border areas, at railway stations, on trains that cross the border and at airports. In order to ensure a targeted procedure is adopted for all of the control and surveillance measures, all offices of the Federal Border Police are provided with criminal and behavioural data on potential terrorists.

Last but not least, instructions have been given to adopt a restrictive procedure along borders as regards issuing identity documents and residence titles (i.e. travel IDs used as replacement passports and visas granted by way of exception).

Germany promotes the following issues at international level:

- The use of the data to be stored in the central Eurodac database for police purposes. In future, the data of asylum seekers over the age of 14 and of foreigners apprehended in crossing external borders illegally and who are not sent back will be stored in this database. The EU "EURODAC" Regulation contains strict rules

according to which data can only be used for the implementation of the Dublin Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities. The aim of the initiative is to facilitate the use of data for security purposes.

- Within the framework of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, checks are carried out with the security authorities in all Member States on visa applicants who originate from certain countries in order to establish whether there are any reservations regarding their entry into the area. The findings from this consultation procedure are to be used for the benefit of the security authorities and a uniform list is to be drawn up of the States which are obliged to engage in consultations.
- The establishment of joint visa files and of a European central register on citizens of third countries who are residing in the territory of the European Union.
- The introduction of new methods of establishing a person's identity and new identification methods, such as the extremely secure integration of photographs and the incorporation of fingerprints into visas and residence titles.
- The recommendation made by the European Council that each and every Member State keep a central registration register and central register that store the data of all third country nationals residing in the territory of the EU.
- The networking of files by giving Europol, national public prosecutors as well as aliens authorities and asylum authorities online access to the database of the Schengen information system.

3. *Calls upon all States to:*

- (a) **Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;**

What steps have been taken to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information in the areas indicated in this sub-paragraph?

- (b) **Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;**

What steps have been taken to exchange information and cooperate in the areas indicated in this sub-paragraph?

As regards the distribution of tasks in fighting terrorism between the intelligence services and the police authorities of the Federation and the Länder please see the information provided under section 2 (b).

In performing their police duties, police forces exchange any information they may have if there are grounds to suggest it is necessary to do so. This exchange of information covers all areas mentioned in this item. The intelligence services also transmit relevant information to the competent authorities pursuant to their legal mandate.

State-of-the-art communications equipment is used to pass on information. This in itself ensures the intensive and swift forwarding of information on operative measures.

An intensive and swift exchange of operative information is also guaranteed at international level.

With regard to transfers of sensitive goods, Germany welcomes regular exchanges of information with other countries on the smuggling of weapons, explosives and other sensitive materials to curtail and/or prevent acts of terrorism. According to this philosophy, Germany advocates that the exchange of information be further strengthened by international export control regimes (NSG, MTCR, Australia Group) so as to counteract effectively the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Germany also advocates an intensified dialogue with countries not party to the international export control regimes. The aim of such talks is to promote on equal terms the adoption of a non-proliferation policy in those states.

According to international arrangements, exports of weapons, explosives and other sensitive materials are subject to authorization; in the case of war weapons, the mere handling (i.e. import, export, transit as well as internal transport) is also subject to authorization. The development and production of NBC weapons as well as trade therein and assistance of any kind thereto have been banned. Last year, Germany subjected transfers of sensitive technologies in intangible forms to authorization as well.

In principle, the Federal Republic of Germany participates in international judicial cooperation with all the countries of this world, either on a treaty or non-treaty basis. The Federal Republic has signed all the relevant agreements on the rendering of judicial assistance within the European framework.

The Federal Government has implemented all international conventions on terrorism, incorporating them into national law.

Agreements have been concluded with a large number of Central and Eastern European countries on the prevention of organized crime and terrorism.

Interpol channels are frequently used to exchange information on police and judicial matters. The Federal Criminal Police Office performs this task in its capacity as a central agency. This ensures that information can be forwarded swiftly and in a targeted fashion.

The Federal Criminal Police Office also employs its liaison officers to facilitate the swift and reliable exchange of operative information. To this end, 56 liaison officers of the Federal Criminal Police Office are currently deployed in 44 locations in 40 countries, and the deployment additional officers in line with recent demand is currently under review.

Furthermore, Germany makes intensive use of the possibilities available to police forces of exchanging police information with Europol. Cooperation with a body that has been set up at Europol to analyse the international financial structure of Islamic groups can be given as an example. In addition and in terms of police practice, the "Police Working Group on Terrorism" provides a well-established forum for the exchange of information between 17 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany).

As a direct consequence of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Customs Criminological Office (Zollkriminalamt) has set up a special unit (named BAO INFO). Its tasks include the coordination of the flow of information in support of counter-terrorism action within Customs and ensuring that relevant information gathered is forwarded to other competent national and international law enforcement authorities. To this end the Customs Criminological Office has also intensified cooperation with foreign Customs Attachés/Customs Liaison Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany. Relevant information will be passed on in full detail. It has also been agreed that regular meetings with the Customs Attachés/Customs Liaison Officers will be held on specified topics.

The intelligence services of the European Union have always worked closely together at different levels. In international terms, there are a large number of well-established contacts at bilateral and multilateral level that ensure there is efficient cooperation and that relevant information is actually exchanged. Due to decisions taken by the Special Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of the European Union on 20 September 2001, two meetings have already been held by the heads of services. The decision was taken at these meetings to intensify cooperation between the services as well as cooperation with Europol and the authorities of the United States. Furthermore, meetings are held on a regular basis between the heads of the relevant departments of the services responsible for the prevention of international terrorism.

Germany helps to prevent terrorism by participating constructively in the EU Task Force of Heads of Anti-Terror Units. A group of experts on the prevention of terrorism has also been set up in Europol, to which Germany sends experts.

(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;

What steps have been taken to cooperate in the areas indicated in this sub-paragraph?

Besides becoming party to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (cf. section 3 (d)), Germany has entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and to render mutual assistance in criminal matters, cf. the list annexed. Some of these agreements do not make explicit mention of terrorist acts. According to German law, however, terrorist acts are always considered to be criminal acts, so that treaties relating to these also allow the prevention and suppression of terrorist attacks and the taking of action against their perpetrators.

Germany has not yet signed the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime but intends to do so shortly.

Germany maintains an extensive network of police liaison officers, which also serves to facilitate international cooperation in the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts, cf. section 3 (a).

(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;

What are your government's intentions regarding signing and/or ratifying the conventions and protocols referred to in this sub-paragraph?

Germany strongly supports the establishment of an international legal framework to combat all forms of terrorism. Germany has thus signed all twelve UN Conventions and Protocols concerning international terrorism:

1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973
5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on 3 March 1980
7. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997

12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999

Germany has ratified all but the last two of these conventions. Ratification of these two is underway and being actively promoted by the government. Germany can, however, comply with all the obligations contained in those Conventions on the basis of domestic law, including international cooperation even in the absence of an international convention.

Germany reaffirms its support for the prompt finalization of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encourages the efforts of the UN Secretary-General in this matter.

A number of other multilateral conventions and protocols which serve to enhance international cooperation against terrorism are listed in the appendix.

(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);

Provide any relevant information on the implementation of the conventions, protocols and resolutions referred to in this sub-paragraph.

The Federal Republic of Germany has already implemented all of the relevant UN Conventions relating to the suppression of terrorism. Only the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism are still to be ratified. Ratification is being pursued in earnest and, as far as the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings is concerned, will be concluded shortly.

Germany can already comply fully with the obligations under the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings on the basis of the law as it currently stands. Ratification will merely mean that an international law basis will be created for cooperation with those states which are not able to cooperate on a non-treaty basis.

The same is true as regards the obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1368. As far as the calls for cooperation contained in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1269 are concerned, reference is also made to the answer given above under no. 2 f).

(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;

What legislation, procedures and mechanisms are in place for ensuring asylum seekers have not been involved in terrorist activity before granting refugee status? Please supply examples of any relevant cases.

(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognised as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

What procedures are in place to prevent the abuse of refugee status by terrorists? Please provide details of legislation and/or administrative procedures which prevent claims of political motivation being recognised as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists. Please supply examples of any relevant cases.

The Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees automatically informs the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution if it learns of any facts during asylum proceedings that threaten the security of the Federal Government or a Federal Land with the use or preparation of violence. The law is being tightened up in this respect in the Prevention of Terrorism Act which is currently the subject of parliamentary debate.

The Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees can also pass on to the prosecution authorities any data collected in asylum proceedings for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.

Potential refugee status will not preclude extradition, if otherwise justified.

The planned amendments to the Aliens Act will in future limit protection against deportation, with due consideration of the legal principle set forth in Article 1 F of the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees adopted on 28 July 1951 (Geneva Refugee Convention).

The provisions do not rule out the examination and consideration of obstacles to deportation. However, it does mean that foreigners who are suspected on serious grounds of being involved in serious crime will no longer be granted the legal status under the Geneva Refugee Convention.

In future, it will also be possible to automatically match the fingerprints of asylum seekers with the fingerprints taken by the police at the scene of a crime and stored by the Federal Criminal Police Office. This will ensure that hitherto unknown offenders can be matched to evidence and thus to crimes committed in Germany.

Appendix

Agreements on Cooperation against Terrorism, Organized Crime etc.*

Bilateral:

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Belarus concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bonn, 4 April 1995

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium concerning Cooperation between Police Authorities and Customs Administrations in Border Areas, Brussels, 27 March 2000

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Drugs-related Crime, Sofia, 14 September 1992

Agreement between the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ministry for Public Security of the People's Republic of China concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Crime, Beijing, 14 November 2000

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Prague, 13 September 1993

Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech Republic concerning Cooperation between Police Authorities and Border Police Authorities in Border Areas, Berlin, 19 September 2000

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning Police Cooperation in Border Areas, Berlin, 21 February 2001

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Estonia concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bonn, 7 March 1994

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic concerning Cooperation between Police and Customs Authorities in Border Areas, Mondorf (Luxembourg), 9 October 1997

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Hungary concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Bonn, 22 March 1991

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Almaty, 10 April 1995

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bishkek, 2 February 1998

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Latvia concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bonn, 30 March 1995

* Not all agreements listed have yet come into force; in some cases the preparations for the entry into force are still under way.

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Vilnius, 23 February 2001

Arrangement between the Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Justice and the Minister for the Public Force of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg concerning Police Cooperation in the Border Area between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Bonn, 24 October 1995

Arrangement between the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Justice of the Netherlands concerning Police Cooperation in the Border Area between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, The Hague, 17 April 1996

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Poland concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Bonn, 6 November 1991

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Poland concerning Cooperation between Police Authorities and Border Police Authorities in Border Areas, Bonn, 5 April 1995

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of Romania concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bucharest, 15 October 1996

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Significant Offences, Moscow, 3 May 1999

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Significant Offences, Ljubljana, 2 March 2001

Treaty between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation concerning Cross-border Police and Judicial Cooperation, Berne, 27 April 1999

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of Ukraine concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bonn, 6 February 1995

Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Significant Offences, Bonn, 16 November 1995

Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on Preventing and Combating Crime, Hanoi, 28 February 1996

Multilateral:

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000

Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000

Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, Budapest, 23 November 2001

Agreements on Mutual Assistance and Extradition**Bilateral:**

Treaty of 14 April 1987 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Australia concerning Extradition

Supplementary Treaty of 31 January 1972 to the European Convention on Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria

Supplementary Treaty of 31 January 1972 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria

Treaty of 11 July 1977 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada concerning extradition

Supplementary Treaty of 2 February 2000 to the European Convention on Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech Republic

Supplementary Treaty of 2 February 2000 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czech Republic

Supplementary Treaty of 20 July 1977 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel

Supplementary Treaty of 24 October 1979 to the European Convention on Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy

Supplementary Treaty of 24 October 1979 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy

Supplementary Treaty of 30 August 1979 to the European Convention on Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Supplementary Treaty of 30 August 1979 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Supplementary Treaty of 13 November 1969 to the European Convention on Extradition between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation

Supplementary Treaty of 13 November 1969 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation

Treaty of 20 June 1978 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America Concerning Extradition, in the version of 21 October 1986

Multilateral:

European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957

First Additional Protocol of 15 October 1975 to the European Convention on Extradition

Second Additional Protocol of 17 March 1978 to the European Convention on Extradition

European Convention of 20 April 1959 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

Additional Protocol of 17 March 1978 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

Convention of 8 November 1990 on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.

Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union

Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union

Agreements against Proliferation, Chemical and Biological Weapons etc.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of asphyxiating, poisonous or other Gases and of bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 10 April 1972

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 3 September 1992

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, New York, 10 September 1996

OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Vienna, 24 November 2000

UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 20 July 2001
