# **ISSUE PAPER**

PERU: SELECTED ISSUES SINCE THE FALL OF FUJIMORI

All the sources of information contained in this document are identified and are publicly available.

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OTTAWA, CANADA

March 2002

This paper was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate.

# **Table of Contents**

MAP	111
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT	2
3. ELECTIONS AND NEW GOVERNMENT	3
4. UNRAVELLING THE WEB OF CORRUPTION	6
5. GUERRILLA GROUPS	9
6. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS	13
NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES	14
REFERENCES	15

# MAP

http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/peru.pdf

### 1. INTRODUCTION

After the sudden collapse of the ten-year Fujimori government in November 2000, a transitional government moved to restore the rule of law and maintain governability for eight months (Radio Netherlands 30 July 2001; *The Washington Post* 29 July 2001). Presidential elections held in early 2001 saw Alejandro Toledo elected for a five-year term (July 2001-July 2006), facing a number of challenges (ibid.; Radio Netherlands 30 July 2001).

Dominating national events is the fight against a network of corruption that has developed over the ten years of Fujimori's administration (ibid.), as well as the restoring of democracy, the rule of law and the credibility of state institutions amid deep economic recession and social problems (ibid.; *The Washington Post* 29 July 2001).

Key to the downfall of the Fujimori government was a videotape aired on 14 September 2000 by one of the few remaining independent media, showing an opposition congressman receiving and stashing thousands of U.S. dollars in a bundle from the de facto head of the National Intelligence Service and controversial presidential advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos (*LARR* 27 Feb. 2001; *The Economist* 30 June 2001; BBC 25 June 2001).

After this public evidence of corruption at the centre of government, Fujimori offered to hold new elections (ibid.). It was soon found that Montesinos had developed a vast archive of recordings of meetings with which to blackmail a variety of political and public figures; of these, some 2,000 tapes were recovered (*LARR* 27 Feb. 2001; *The Economist* 30 June 2001).

Montesinos initially left for Panama, where he was denied refugee status, and then returned to Peru (BBC 25 June 2001). He later escaped on a yacht, and was eventually found in Venezuela after the Peruvian government offered a US\$5 million reward for his capture (ibid.; *LARR* 24 July 2001b). As the corruption scandal unfolded, Fujimori left for Japan, from where he faxed a letter of resignation on 20 November 2000 (BBC 25 June 2001).

### 2. THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

With their leader gone and an unexpected election fast approaching, congressmen quickly moved to name a widely respected political figure as the new president of a transitional government that would lead the country to a new election the following year: Valentin Paniagua, a lawyer who belonged to an old centrist party and had a reputation for opposing Fujimori's political maneuvering (BBC 22 Nov. 2000). He formed a cabinet of figures praised nationally and abroad, including former UN secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar as minister of foreign affairs, and as minister of the interior Antonio Ketin Vidal□a former police general who headed the Anti-Terrorism Directorate during the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman in 1992(*Weekly News Update* 26 Nov. 2000).

The transitional administration faced a country that had fallen into a deep recession, and the previous government had corrupted public and private spheres to unexpected levels, including the judiciary, the military and police, political parties, mayors, media owners (AP 28 Feb. 2001), and even entertainment figures (*LARR* 27 Feb. 2001; *The Economist* 30 June 2001; *Terra* 19 Sept. 2001).

The interim government initiated institutional reforms, removing dozens of police officers and army generals, taking steps to restore the independence of the judiciary, and launching a national anti-corruption program (ibid.; *Latinamerica Press* 18 June 2001, 3). The new government also moved promptly to rejoin the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), which had ruled illegal an amnesty law issued by the Fujimori government for military personnel guilty of abuses (BBC News 8 Dec. 2000; AP 26 Mar. 2001; *La República* 6 Sept. 2001a). One of President Paniagua's achievements was the establishment of a truth commission of independent personalities, which would establish responsibility for human rights abuses perpetrated by guerrillas and the government during the conflict that began in 1980, and bring about national reconciliation (*LARR* 24 July 2001a, 8; *La República* 5 Sept. 2001a; HRW 2002). He also worked to improve prison conditions and accelerate a program started under Fujimori to review cases and release those wrongly convicted on terrorism charges (ibid.).

### 3. ELECTIONS AND NEW GOVERNMENT

The transitional government fulfilled its promise of holding new congressional and presidential elections in 2001 (*The Economist* 9 June 2001), which "all observers agreed was an exemplary democratic exercise" (*LARR* 19 June 2001, 6). After a first round on 8 April 2001, the former leader of the opposition Alejandro Toledo and former president Alan Garcia contested a run-off election held on 3 June 2001 (ibid.; *The Economist* 9 June 2001). More than 80 per cent of voters cast ballots in the run-off vote, and of these nearly 3 per cent cast blank votes and 11 per cent spoiled their ballots; Toledo won with 53.08 per cent of valid votes, with Garcia garnering 46.92 per cent (*LARR* 19 June 2001, 6).

Garcia is now the leader of the main opposition party in congress, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), although he had been facing a number of criminal charges related to his earlier period in office (*AgenciaPeru* 3 Sept. 2001). He was under investigation for allegedly using Montesinos' connections to obtain an early expiration of pending charges, allowing him to return to Peru from residing abroad and contest the presidency (ibid.; ibid. 17 Sept. 2001).

Alejandro Toledo, an economist of Amerindian ethnicity and humble background who studied economics in San Francisco at Stanford University, took office on 28 July 2001 (*LARR* 19 June 2001, 6; ibid. 28 Aug. 2001, 6). With a cabinet of well-known professionals, he faces the task of dealing with a fragmented congress to repair a badly hurt economy, as well as a slew of social problems (ibid.; *The Economist* 4 Aug. 2001).

Like Paniagua's administration, Toledo's cabinet includes "human rights advocates with long experience in non-governmental organizations" (HRW 2002), as well as persons "noted for their independence and honest reputations" (AFP 27 July 2001), including respected professionals with international experience and no political ties to any group in Peru (*LARR* 28 Aug. 2001, 7; *The Economist* 4 Aug. 2001). The minister of finance is Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (AFP 27 July 2001), a banker and fund manager who held a cabinet post during the 1980-1985 Belaunde administration and has been an executive with Toyota and other international firms (*LatAm Energy* 9 Aug. 2001). The minister of the presidency [roughly equivalent to deputy prime minister in Canada] and head of cabinet is Roberto Dañino, a corporate consultant (ibid.) and former finance ministry official, lawyer and economist who until recently lived in the United

States (AFP 27 July 2001; Xinhua 26 July 2001). The Interior and Defence ministries were placed under two civilians, journalist Fernando Rospigliosi and congressman David Waisman respectively (Xinhua 26 July 2001), and External Affairs is headed by Diego Garcia Sayan (justice minister under Valentin Paniagua) (ibid.; AFP 27 July 2001); the Transport and Communications Ministry is headed by Luis Chang, an engineer specializing in water and the environment who has worked with the World Bank and various government projects (*LatAm Energy* 9 Aug. 2001), while the Justice Ministry is now led by Fernando Olivera, a "maverick anti-corruption campaigner" who exposed Montesinos' corruption in 2000 (*The Economist* 4 Aug. 2001).

Although faced with a fragmented congress, the Toledo administration has managed to strike some important alliances and announced a "war on poverty and corruption," with reduction of poverty levels the central objective of the government (*Latinamerica Press* 18 June 2001, 3; AFP 29 July 2001; *LARR* 28 Aug. 2001, 7). In what Toledo has described as "a market economy with a social face," he has promised to defend human rights, and implement a regular monitoring of progress in such areas as employment, distribution of income and malnutrition (ibid.; *Latinamerica Press* 18 June 2001, 3; *The Economist* 4 Aug. 2001).

Ongoing and upcoming conflicts include regional protests to demand local changes, major strikes and labour disruptions, privatization of public utilities (*LARR* 28 Aug. 2001, 6-7; ibid. 19 June 2001, 6-7), and rural conflicts resulting from environmental damage from mining interests (*Latinamerica Press* 10 Sept. 2001, 3). Creating employment, fighting corruption and restoring democratic institutions will be some of the major tasks of the new government (Radio Netherlands 30 July 2001; *The Washington Post* 29 July 2001).

By the end of 2001, the economy was "reviving" with a rise in employment and manufacturing raising hopes for significant growth in 2002 (*The Economist* 8 Dec. 2001). Nevertheless, as the year ended, protest marches continued throughout the country for a variety of causes, in some cases turning violent (ibid.; *Weekly News Update* 16 Dec. 2001; ibid. 9 Dec. 2001b; ibid. 9 Dec. 2001d). Early in the new year, land conflicts in remote areas, where the presence of the national government is weak, gained national attention after a group of settlers who had repeatedly failed to heed legal eviction orders was massacred by an indigenous group (AP 21 Jan. 2002; *Weekly News Update* 20 Jan. 2002; IPS 25 Jan. 2002).

Although the Truth Commission created under the Paniagua transitional government was off to a "slow start" due to disagreements over its membership (HRW 2002), by early 2002 it yielded its first results: the remains of 18 persons buried in a mass grave in Chuschi, Ayacucho, were handed to the victims' relatives for proper burial, after teams of experts from the Office of the Attorney General and the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team had exhumed and analyzed the bodies (*La Hora* 29 Jan. 2002).

Under Paniagua's presidency, 144 persons wrongfully convicted on terrorism charges received pardons and 52 saw their sentences commuted, following the recommendations of an ad-hoc commission (HRW 2002). Some 600 persons had been released since the commission began its work under the leadership of a Catholic priest in 1996 until the end of 2001 (AP 26 Dec. 2001). In mid-January 2002 President Toledo announced the creation of a "multi-sector committee to handle the complaints of the 726 people pardoned to date" and promised to review the "more than 1,700 clemency requests still pending" through the Ministry of Justice Human Rights Council, which replaced the earlier ad-hoc commission (EFE 15 Jan. 2002; IFEX 10 Jan. 2002). Toledo also issued a public apology "on behalf of the nation" to those who had been wrongfully convicted on terrorism charges (EFE 15 Jan. 2002).

After serving more than eight years of a sentence based on testimonies of guerrillas seeking to reduce their own jail terms, journalist Pedro Carranza Ugaz received a pardon after his case was reviewed by the Human Rights Council, and was released on 2 January 2002 (IFEX 10 Jan. 2002). On 31 January 2002, in accordance with a sentence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the government made a public apology and paid US\$95,000 in compensation to a man unjustly jailed as a terrorist for more than four years, with compensation to his relatives and a scholarship (*Editora Perú* 1 Feb. 2002; *El Comercio* 1 Feb. 2002). Luis Alberto Cantoral Benavides had been detained on 6 February 1993 and received an "amnesty" (*amnistiado*) in mid 1997 after his innocence was proven, but received no compensation and remained with a criminal record (ibid.; *Editora Perú* 1 Feb. 2002). Cantoral's was one of four Peruvian cases in which the IACHR issued sentences requiring the state to compensate victims of abuses, including monetary compensation for the surviving relatives of those killed in a 1991 massacre in Barrios Altos, Lima (IACHR 18 Dec. 2001; *El Comercio* 19 Dec. 2001). The Minister of Justice reported that there are approximately 300 cases against the Peruvian

government pending before the IACHR, and announced the intention to abide by the country's international commitments and ensure full respect for human rights (*Editora Perú* 1 Feb. 2002; *El Comercio* 1 Feb. 2002).

By the end of 2001 the Ministry of Justice had reportedly "come under attack...for [its] failure to adequately sanction and address corruption" (OTI Dec. 2001). However, a new "anti-corruption czar, Martin Belaunde Moreyra, was installed as head of the National Commission to Fight Corruption and Promote Ethics and Transparency in Public Administration" at the end of the year, and was expected to present his work plan in 2002 (ibid.).

# 4. UNRAVELLING THE WEB OF CORRUPTION

Although the compromising videotapes made by Vladimiro Montesinos were said to have numbered nearly 30,000, only some 2,300 have been seized by investigators and have led to the arrest and prosecution of numerous prominent figures (*The Economist* 30 June 2001; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* 14 Feb. 2001; *Washington Post* 4 Mar. 2001). Videotapes found to contain material related to "sexual honour" or personal matters not directly related to government issues were given to Catholic Church officials for safekeeping (ibid.), while those found to contain legally compromising material were made public and passed on to a team of specially designated anti-corruption public attorneys and judges (ibid.; *LARR* 27 Feb. 2001). The investigating attorneys, despite working to unravel a multi-million dollar network of corruption, had a monthly budget of approximately US\$120,000 to cover 33 staff and investigation costs, and by October 2001 were working for two months without pay because congress had failed to approve their assignment of resources (*La República* 29 Sept. 2001).

According to *Latinamerica Press*, the network of corruption reached the highest levels of military power, involving top officers of all branches of the armed forces; to avoid a military crisis, the transitional government waited until the first round of elections was completed in April 2001 to relieve the top military commanders of duty (30 Apr. 2001, 6).

Changes to the military leadership started by Paniagua's government continued under Toledo: in December 2001 "an unprecedented purge within the armed forces" was carried out (OTI Dec. 2001). In early-December 40 generals and 279 colonels of the army were "forced into retirement and replaced by a smaller number of officers," with "similar purges and reductions"

scheduled for the navy and air force (IPS 14 Dec. 2001). In all, more than 400 middle and high-ranking military officers were formally retired before the year ended (OTI Dec. 2001).

Individual police and military officers were in some cases arrested and prosecuted for crimes, such as involvement in organizing the violence that disrupted an opposition march of 28 July 2000 (*La República* 13 Sept. 2001), as well as the organization of death squads under the cover of counter-insurgency efforts in the early 1990s, which were responsible for a number of torture deaths and massacres (AP 26 Mar. 2001). Human Rights Watch reports that by June 2001 charges had been laid against 19 alleged members of the Colina Group, "a paramilitary death squad answering to Montesinos," among them "several who had been released in 1995 under two sweeping amnesty laws..." (HRW 2002). The man who allegedly founded the death squad on Montesinos' request, retired army colonel Fernando Enrique Rodriguez Zabalbeascoa, was arrested on 18 January 2002 (*Weekly News Update* 27 Jan. 2002).

In addition to the leadership reforms, by October 2001 nearly 20 of the "more than thirty senior military officers...accused of corruption, drug trafficking, wiretapping of government opponents, extrajudicial executions and other crimes...were in detention or under house arrest" (HRW 2002). By the end of the year numerous military officials continued to be under investigation (OTI Dec. 2001).

At the end of September 2001 at least 878 persons had been implicated in the Fujimori-Montesinos corruption network (*La República* 29 Sept. 2001). At the time, 114 were detained, 276 appeared in court and 110 were considered fugitives (ibid.). By November, the number of persons under investigation surpassed 1,000 (HRW 2002), and by the end of January 2002 the number of persons investigated reached 1,400 (BBC 31 Jan. 2002).

Chief among those sought is Fujimori himself, who, once in Japan, revealed his Japanese citizenship and has defied arrest orders by claiming he is the subject of political persecution, and has mounted an Internet website to publicize his position (*Agencia Peru* 26 July 2001). The Peruvian Supreme Court issued in early September 2001 an international arrest warrant for Fujimori; however, the Japanese government has refused to extradite him, as Fujimori holds Japanese citizenship and there is no extradition treaty between Japan and Peru (BBC 14 Sept. 2001).

The level of official corruption and involvement in drug trafficking during the Fujimori administration is only now coming to light, as evidence and testimonies emerge. Reports include alleged financing of Fujimori's political campaign by the late Colombian drug trafficker Pablo Escobar (BBC 12 Nov. 2000), bribes by a Peruvian trafficker paid to Montesinos and the head of the armed forces (ibid. 6 Apr. 2001), and Montesinos' reported role in the sale of 18 tons of cocaine to the Mexican Tijuana drug cartel (*LARR* 24 July 2001b, 3).

The links of official corruption have been found to reach also terrorist and guerrilla groups: Montesinos and a number of military officers were reportedly behind a contraband of 10,000 assault rifles, purchased from Jordan for the Peruvian Army and diverted to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (*El Comercio* 19 Sept. 2001a; *La República* 27 Sept. 2001). More recently, and from the maximum security jail where he is being held, Montesinos was found to be coordinating actions with his first cousin, jailed leader of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), Oscar Ramirez Durand (a.k.a. Feliciano), held in the same prison (ibid. 23 Sept. 2001a).

Among the most recent and high-profile persons to be arrested for corruption, are the former Chief of Staff of the Army, army general Carlos Indacochea Ballon, and two former chiefs of military regions (*El Comercio* 19 Sept. 2001b). The three were arrested on a variety of charges, including illicit enrichment (ibid.).

Other high-profile detainees include Victor Joy Way, former minister of finance and later minister of the presidency, found to have two Swiss bank accounts worth about US\$10 million (*La República* 6 Sept. 2001b), and Alejandro Rodriguez Medrano, former chief justice (*vocal supremo*) of the judiciary accused among other things of coercing other judges (*La República* 7 Sept. 2001a; ibid. 7 Sept. 2001b).

Before handing the leadership of the investigations to a successor, investigating attorney Jose Ugaz declared that the extensive inquiry "will last more than five years" (BBC 31 Jan. 2002). He pointed out that "the only institutions unaffected [by Monstesinos' web of corruption] were the Roman Catholic Church and the Ombudsman's Office," and added that Montesinos was "still trying to use his influence despite being in jail" (ibid.).

### **5. GUERRILLA GROUPS**

The Shining Path was never completely defeated: a column of the remaining fighting faction ambushed a group of policemen and their guides in a jungle area some 350 kilometers east of Lima, ten days after Toledo's inauguration (*La República* 9 Aug. 2001; *LAWR* 21 Aug. 2001, 393). Forces sent to rescue survivors and casualties fought intense battles, as the government announced that the attacking column was one of at least three remaining Shining Path groups active in remote areas of the country with support of drug traffickers (*La República* 31 Aug. 2001; ibid. 9 Aug. 2001).

The Minister of the Interior, himself a former Marxist leader, has vowed to overhaul government anti-insurgency strategies and tactics to eliminate the remaining columns of the Shining Path (*LAWR* 21 Aug. 2001, 393; La *República* 16 Aug. 2001).

In late August 2001 the Ministry of Defense provided a detailed estimate of Shining Path forces in the eastern jungle areas (*La República* 31 Aug. 2001). A Principal Regional Committee (*Comité Regional Principal* or CRP) of the Shining Path is reported to have some 400 members under three identified leaders: Victor Quispe Palomino (a.k.a. José) as political leader, Dalton Zuñiga (a.k.a. Alipio) as military leader, and Julia Danles (a.k.a. Valia) as head of logistics (ibid. 3 Dec. 2001; ibid. 21 Aug. 2001). The CRP is reportedly divided into two regional "guerrilla nuclei" (*bases guerrilleras*) and active in areas of the Departments of Junin and Ayacucho; one of the guerrilla bases reportedly comprises up to four sub-groups (ibid.). The Fujimori government had removed 24 counter-insurgency military bases and 122 police stations in the last few years, most of them from the areas in which the CRP is now active; the Toledo administration recently announced that several of these would be re-opened (ibid.).

A police intelligence report attributed to the Shining Path 18 incidents in Lima between January and May 2001, ranging from an attack on the National Elections Board (JNE) to distribution of propaganda leaflets (*Caretas* 24 May 2001; *La República* 3 Dec. 2001). In late May, approximately forty heavily armed members of the Shining Path entered two villages in Ayacucho, threatening to sabotage the runoff presidential vote scheduled for early June (AFP 30 May 2001). Similar threats were made before the first round of voting that had taken place on 8 April 2001, but the elections proceeded unhindered (ibid.). No reports of Shining Path attacks during the two rounds of voting could be found among the sources consulted.

In its June 2001 *Travel Report*, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada stated that terrorist activity had "declined significantly," indicating that "in 2000, there were isolated terrorist incidents in remote areas within the departments of Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Junin, Ayacucho, Cuzco, Ucayali, San Martin and Huanuco" (DFAIT 28 June 2001). The incidents "were mostly robberies, temporary takeovers of small villages and, very occasionally, violence or threats of violence against security forces personnel or local community figures" (ibid.). The report added that "in large centres, terrorist activity has been restricted to propaganda" (ibid.). In September 2001 police arrested in Lima a man wanted on terrorism charges, who had been identified as a "political head" (*mando político*) of the Shining Path's Northern Regional Committee and responsible for recruitment activities in various northern cities (*La República* 5 Sept. 2001b).

Various sources report that the Shining Path continues to be a well-organized group, even within the prisons: it has carried out a number of riots and uprisings at different jails in 2000 and 2001, some of them coordinated, with at least two uprisings in the first weeks of the Toledo administration (EFE 3 Sept. 2001; AFP 28 Nov. 2000; ibid. 25 Oct. 2000; ibid. 9 Feb. 2000). When quelling the most recent mutiny in the remote highland prison of Yanamayo, police confiscated a variety of handcrafted weapons, including rifles and flame-throwers (*La República* 23 Sept. 2001b).

By the end of 2001, the Shining Path was reported to be resurfacing after a period of proselytizing and working underground (ibid. 3 Dec. 2001; *The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001). On 1 December 2001 the U.S. State Department issued a warning of renewed activity by the group (AP 3 Dec. 2001; *Weekly News Update* 9 Dec. 2001a), as the Peruvian interior ministry reported the 20 November 2001 arrest of two Shining Path leaders who had plans for attacking the U.S. embassy in Lima and other sites (ibid.; AP 1 Dec. 2001; *The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001). The two, alleged to be part of the Shining Path's Leftist Liquidationist Line (LLI), had reportedly met with leaders of the group's Lima-based Metropolitan Regional Committee, the Huallaga Regional Committee, and the Ayacucho-based Main Regional Committee (*La República* 3 Dec. 2001). The LLI is reported to have been working to reorganize Shining Path front groups, including Socorro Popular (Popular Aid), Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas (Classist Workers' Movement, MOTC), Movimiento Femenino Popular (People's

Women's Movement, MFP), Movimiento de Artistas Populares (Movement of People's Artists, MAP), and the Movimiento de Intelectuales Populares (Movement of the People's Intellectuals, MIP) (ibid.).

Along with news of the arrest, other reports of recent Shining Path activity became public: in the jungle area of Nuevo Progreso a column attacked an army barracks "after harassing neighbouring towns for several weeks" (*The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001), and from 25 January to 16 May 2001, in addition to 18 operations in Lima, police attributed to the Shining Path "121 [operations] throughout the country" (*La República* 3 Dec. 2001). In March 2001 the Shining Path "murdered fourteen civilian non-combatants in separate incidents" in the departments of Huanuco and San Martin; the victims may have been "former guerrillas or sympathizers who their captors accused of collaborating with the government" (HRW 2002).

Soon after the November 2001 arrest of the two leaders was announced, the Shining Path allegedly blew up an electricity tower in the outskirts of Lima (AP 3 Dec. 2001; *Weekly News Update* 9 Dec. 2001a), and later in the month was suspected of attacking policemen at a check point outside the mountain city of Ayacucho (AP 21 Dec. 2001). Police had reportedly been investigating "seven acts of sabotage" against electricity towers around Lima since October 2001 (ibid. 3 Dec. 2001).

By December 2001 there were "signs that violent activity [by the Shining Path] may be on the increase" (DFAIT 7 Dec. 2001), with the Shining Path reported to have been operating in various cities, "resurfacing as a threat...regrouping with far stronger ties than in the past to the drug trade" and "modestly [increasing] its numbers in...the Upper Huallaga and elsewhere across rural Peru" (*The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001). The group has been reported to be operating "in alliance with cocaine traffickers" in Junin and Ucayali departments (HRW 2002); this alliance has raised questions about the degree to which the group's activities are purely ideological (*The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001; AP 21 Dec. 2001).

The other known guerrilla group, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), has not made the news in recent months, except in connection to the new trials for its jailed foreign members; the most recent report available of an action attributed to this group is the discovery of explosive devices—booby-trapped MRTA flags—in three areas of Lima on 8 April 2001, the day of the first round of voting in the recent general elections (AFP 8 Apr. 2001). New

trials were to be held for jailed foreign members of the MRTA, following a decision handed down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (HRW 2002; *LAWR* 5 Sept. 2000; *The Washington Post* 29 Aug. 2000). So far, one United States citizen was retried in a public civilian trial, which confirmed her participation in terrorist plans and activities, while four Chileans are awaiting new trials (*Weekly News Update* 20 May 2001).

Peru has long been a major grower of coca and a source of cocaine, and thus has been a key participant in international efforts to fight drug trafficking (*INCSR 2000* 2001). The new anti-drug "czar," Ricardo Vega Llona, has vowed to defeat drug trafficking (*La República* 14 Sept. 2001), while the police has carried out large-scale operations to tackle violent crime (ibid. 24 Sept. 2001f). The main anti-drug efforts will be directed at three areas: the ongoing program of crop substitution to eradicate coca farming, interdiction efforts, and public health and investment programs (ibid. 14 Sept. 2001). Eight tons of drugs were seized during a nationwide anti-drug campaign in December 2001 and burned the following month, as the interior ministry announced that "more drastic measures to crack down on drug-smuggling activities" would be adopted (Xinhua 24 Jan. 2002).

Coca cultivation has recently increased in at least one region of Peru (*The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001), and trafficking of its derivative drugs has reportedly increased in Peru and Colombia since interdiction flights were suspended after a missionary's plane was mistakenly shot down over the jungle in early 2001 (AP 30 Jan. 2002). However, the United States, which operated the surveillance planes which led Peruvian interception flights, expects these to resume in 2002 (ibid.).

Poppy cultivation has been spreading through various regions, while poppy crop eradication and related drug seizures have greatly increased over the last year (*Latinamerica Press* 3 Dec. 2001; *The Washington Post* 10 Dec. 2001). However, opposition by local populations, at times violent, and the remoteness of locations are hampering efforts to prevent the spread of this trade (ibid.; *Latinamerica Press* 3 Dec. 2001).

### 6. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

The downfall of Fujimori resulted in "the unshackling of the independent press, which had seriously suffered under a regime that tried to manipulate public information for a decade" (CPJ Mar. 2001). While journals linked to Fujimori's intelligence service face "difficult times" (ibid.), with owners of two of the largest television stations having fled the country after receiving money from Montesinos (*The Economist* 8 Dec. 2001), other media have been returned to persons who were stripped of their ownership and legal actions against them have been dismissed (CPJ Mar. 2001). In early 2001 Peru had been removed from the International Press Institute's "Watch List" due to visible progress in restoring press freedom: including the return to Peru of a media owner who had been "stripped of his citizenship and TV station," the release of 45 journalists "wrongly detained" under the Fujimori government, and the case review of five journalists facing lengthy jail terms (IFEX 30 Jan. 2001). By late 2001 the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) reported "positive developments for freedom of speech and of the press in Peru" over the preceding year, including the release of a journalist incarcerated since 1994 on terrorism charges (IAPA 12-16 Oct. 2001). By mid-January 2002, only two journalists remained in jail "serving long prison sentences on questionable charges of terrorism" (IFEX 10 Jan. 2002).

Despite advances, journalists faced threats and legal action in retaliation for critical coverage (HRW 2002; IAPA 12-16 Oct. 2001). These included charges of libel and wrongful accusations against journalist Cecilia Valenzuela for a report "that drew a link between [opposition leader Alan] Garcia and Montesinos," and charges of libel and defamation against three journalists in Huaraz by a retired colonel who had been subsequently reported to the Truth Commission (ibid.). Journalists were reportedly attacked by Toledo supporters in the coastal city of Chimbote (IFEX 18 Jan 2002) and by a prefect in the jungle city of Iquitos in January 2002 (ibid. 21 Jan. 2002). In the first case, one of the assaulted reporters attributed the attack to government officials upset at the media's greater scrutiny of internal power struggles (ibid. 18 Jan. 2002).

# NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

La República, Lima.

One of Peru's leading daily newspapers, published in Spanish. It won the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) Grand Prize for Press Freedom in 2001. IAPA awarded the prize to *La República* for its "outstanding battle with the Fujimori regime for freedom of the press" and its "unswerving commitment to the truth, accuracy, impartiality and fairness" (IAPA 8 Aug. 2001). Under the Fujimori government the publication "battled harassment, attacks and attempts at intimidation by the administration of Alberto Fujimori for their criticism of its actions and succeeded in overcoming the pressure and threats against them" (ibid.).


http://www.sipiapa.org/otheractivities/press.cfm


Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Washington, DC.

OTI is a program of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that "helps local partners advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries" (USAID 2002). Its presence in Peru began in January 2001 and is scheduled to conclude in January 2003; OTI produces monthly progress reports on its work, which concentrates on the following: enhancing civilian oversight and increase transparency of the military; promoting transparency, accountability and citizen access to local government; providing technical assistance for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; supporting congressional reform; and strengthening national anti-corruption efforts (ibid.).

http://www.usaid.gov/hum response/oti/

# REFERENCES





- . 19 September 2001b. "Generales serán juzgados por peculado y enriquecimiento ilícito." <a href="http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/">http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/</a> [Accessed 19 Sept. 2001] Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), New York. March 2001. Attacks on the Press 2000. <a href="http://www.cpj.org/attacks00/americas00/Peru.html">http://www.cpj.org/attacks00/americas00/Peru.html</a> [Accessed 5 Nov. 2001] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Ottawa. 7 December 2001. Travel Report. "Peru." <a href="http://voyage.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/destinations/report">http://voyage.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/destinations/report</a> e.asp? country=Peru> [Accessed 1 Feb. 2002] . 28 June 2001. Travel Report. "Peru." <a href="http://voyage.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/destinations/">http://voyage.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/destinations/</a> report e.asp? country=Peru> [Accessed 25 Sept. 2001] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). 13 November 2000. "Second Video Indicates Peru Army, Police Involved in Voting Fraud." (NEXIS) *The Economist* [New York]. 8 December 2001. U.S. Edition. "Teething Troubles." (NEXIS) . 4 August 2001. U.S. Edition. "Starting Again." (NEXIS) . 30 June 2001. U.S. Edition. "Yes, He's Back." (NEXIS) . 9 June 2001. U.S. Edition. "Toledo Reaches the Palace, At Last." (NEXIS) . 5 August 2000. U.S. Edition. "A Bad Start." (NEXIS) Editora Perú [Lima]. 1 February 2002. "En acto público desagravian a ciudadano Luis Cantoral Benavides." <a href="http://www.editoraperu.com.pe/and">http://www.editoraperu.com.pe/and</a> on/edc/02/02/01/pol/pol3.html> [Accessed 1 Feb. 2002] EFE News Service. 15 January 2002. "Peru Repression: Toledo Apologizes to Those Improperly Convicted of Terrorism." (NEXIS) . 3 September 2001. "Peru-Terrorism: Shining Path Prisoners Again Stage Riot in Peru Prison." (NEXIS) La Hora [Lima]. 29 January 2002. "Entregan a Familiares Restos Encontrados en Fosa de Chuschi." <a href="http://www.lahoraylanoticia.com/lahora/html/02/01/29/1/5393.htm">http://www.lahoraylanoticia.com/lahora/html/02/01/29/1/5393.htm</a> [Accessed 29 Jan. 2002] Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2002. World Report 2002. "Peru." <a href="http://www.hrw.org/">http://www.hrw.org/</a> wr2k2/americas9.html> [Accessed 4 Feb. 2002] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), San Jose, Costa Rica. 18 December 2001. Comunicado de Prensa. <a href="http://www.corteidh.or.cr/prensa">http://www.corteidh.or.cr/prensa</a> 2001/cp13 01 esp.html> [Accessed 7 Feb. 2002] Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), Miami. 12-16 October 2001. Country-by-Country Reports: Peru. <a href="http://www.sipiapa.org/publications/report">http://www.sipiapa.org/publications/report</a> peru2002.cfm> [Accessed 1] Feb. 2002] <a href="http://www.sipiapa.org/otheractivities/press.cfm">http://www.sipiapa.org/otheractivities/press.cfm</a> [Accessed 6 Feb. 2002]
- Inter Press Service (IPS). 25 January 2002. Abraham Lama. "Politics-Peru: Indigenous Group at War Over Land." (NEXIS)

