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Carta de fecha 26 de junio de 2014 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Centroafricana establecido en virtud de la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad

En nombre de los miembros del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Centroafricana establecido en virtud de la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, tengo el honor de transmitir por la presente el informe provisional preparado por el Grupo en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 59 c) de dicha resolución.

A este respecto, le agradecería que tuviera a bien señalar la presente carta y el informe a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y disponer su publicación como documento del Consejo.

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establecido en virtud de la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#)
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Informe del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Centroafricana establecido en virtud de la resolución 2127 (2013) del Consejo de Seguridad

Resumen

Tras la deposición del Presidente François Bozizé el 24 de marzo de 2013 y la dimisión forzada del Presidente siguiente, Michel Djotodia, el 10 de enero de 2014, el Gobierno de la República Centroafricana aún tiene que superar importantes obstáculos para culminar la segunda fase de la transición política, que debería conducir a la celebración de elecciones democráticas, libres e imparciales en 2015.

La impunidad total que permite que las personas cometan actos que socavan la paz, la seguridad y la integridad territorial de la República Centroafricana o les presten apoyo sigue siendo el principal obstáculo en la senda de la transición política. Esa impunidad ha creado un terreno abonado para las actividades rebeldes y delictivas en el país que ha impulsado un reiterado ciclo de violencia. El Grupo de Expertos toma nota de la decisión adoptada el 9 de mayo de 2014 por el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 2127 (2013) relativa a la República Centroafricana para aplicar sanciones selectivas a los Sres. François Bozizé, Lévy Yakité y Nourredine Adam como una medida que contribuye a poner fin a la impunidad en el país. El Grupo se propone supervisar la aplicación de la congelación de activos y la prohibición de viajar a las personas que figuran en la Lista.

El Grupo ha podido identificar a varios agentes políticos centroafricanos, como algunos elementos de la “nueva Séléka” o de las milicias autodeclaradas antibalaka (véanse los anexos 5 y 6), que están aprovechando el vacío de seguridad en el país para financiar, organizar o manipular grupos armados con el fin de posicionarse en el proceso de transición nacional o promover la partición del país. El Grupo observa que efectivos de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroafricanas y la gendarmería siguen ocupando puestos de mando en algunos de los principales grupos antibalaka.

Entre el 5 de diciembre de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014, el Grupo documentó en su base de datos un total de 444 incidentes que se saldaron con la muerte de 2.424 civiles. Sin embargo, el Grupo reconoce que el número de denuncias está significativamente por debajo de los incidentes que se producen.

La persistencia de esta situación, más de cuatro meses después de la elección del Jefe de Estado de Transición, socava el restablecimiento de la paz y la seguridad en el país, y plantea interrogantes acerca de la estrategia que las Autoridades de Transición aplican a los grupos armados en general y, en particular, a los antibalaka. Algunos miembros de la comunidad internacional expresaron su frustración al Grupo por la ausencia de una firme condena de las Autoridades de Transición ante los abusos perpetrados por las milicias antibalaka.

Los grupos armados han participado en la explotación y el tráfico ilícitos de recursos naturales, principalmente oro y diamantes. En la zona occidental de la República Centroafricana, los miembros de las milicias antibalaka están extrayendo y vendiendo diamantes en aldeas remotas como Boda (provincia de Lobaye) y Guen (provincia de Mambere-Kadeï). En la zona oriental, las fuerzas de la Séléka siguen manteniendo un férreo control sobre minas de oro artesanales como Ndassima

(provincia de Ouaka). Las autoridades estatales del sector de la minería están reestableciendo gradualmente el control en las zonas productoras de diamantes de Bria y Sam-Ouandja (provincia de Haute-Kotto) y reanudando el comercio oficial con Bangui. Sin embargo, algunos comandantes de la Séléka se han hecho con parte del comercio y envían los diamantes al Sudán.

La suspensión temporal de la República Centroafricana del Sistema de Certificación del Proceso de Kimberley en el mes de mayo dio lugar a una prohibición de las exportaciones oficiales de diamantes. No obstante, los centros de compra de Bangui han seguido adquiriendo y almacenando oficialmente diamantes procedentes de todas las zonas de producción, aunque el comercio fraudulento, bien a través de Bangui o de los Estados vecinos, va en aumento. Muchos coleccionistas de diamantes que huyeron de la zona occidental de la República Centroafricana a raíz de los actos de violencia sectaria y religiosa antibalaka registrados a finales de 2013 prosiguen actualmente sus negocios en el Camerún.

Aparte de las importaciones ilícitas de munición de caza, el Grupo no ha documentado ninguna transferencia importante de armas, municiones ni equipo militar desde la imposición del embargo de armas el 5 de diciembre de 2013. Los grupos armados utilizan fundamentalmente armas pequeñas que circulaban por el país antes de la crisis o que obtuvieron de las existencias estatales tras la caída de las fuerzas nacionales de defensa y seguridad y la toma de control de Bangui por la Séléka.

El presente informe provisional del Grupo se basa en las investigaciones llevadas a cabo entre marzo y mayo de 2014 en la República Centroafricana (incluidos Bangui y las provincias de Lobaye, Mambere-Kadeï, Nana-Mambéré, Ouham, Ouaka, Haute-Kotto y Bamingui-Bangoran) y los Estados vecinos (el Camerún, y el Congo), así como en la información proporcionada por las autoridades de transición de la República Centroafricana, los Estados Miembros, las organizaciones internacionales, regionales y subregionales y las entidades privadas, en cumplimiento de las resoluciones [2127 \(2013\)](#), [2134 \(2014\)](#) y [2149 \(2014\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad.

El Grupo observa el carácter regional de la crisis en la República Centroafricana, caracterizado, el origen diverso de los elementos de los grupos armados y el uso de los territorios de los Estados vecinos. El Grupo también reconoció las diversas medidas adoptadas por los países de la región para aplicar la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad.

En el presente informe provisional, el Grupo describe la evolución del contexto político y de seguridad en la República Centroafricana, presenta estudios de casos e incluye recomendaciones para el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#) relativa a la República Centroafricana.

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I. Antecedentes

A. Mandato y nombramiento

1. En su resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#), de 5 de diciembre de 2013, el Consejo de Seguridad impuso un régimen de sanciones a la República Centroafricana y estableció un comité de sanciones (el Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2127 \(2013\)](#) relativa a la República Centroafricana) y un grupo de expertos (el Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Centroafricana) para supervisar su aplicación. El mandato del Comité se amplió tras la aprobación de la resolución [2134 \(2014\)](#) el 28 de enero de 2014 a fin de facultarlo para imponer medidas selectivas (la prohibición de viajar y la congelación de sus activos) a las personas y entidades responsables de haber cometido los actos que se enumeran en los párrafos 36 y 37 de esa resolución.

2. El 13 de febrero de 2014 el Secretario General, en consulta con el Comité, nombró a los cinco miembros del Grupo ([S/2014/98](#)), que está integrado por un experto regional (Paul-Simon Handy), un experto en armas (Ahmed Himmiche), un experto en finanzas y recursos naturales (Ruben de Koning), un experto en grupos armados y coordinador del Grupo (Aurélien Llorca), y una experta en asuntos humanitarios (Carolina Reyes Aragón).

3. Los miembros del Grupo desempeñan su labor desde sus respectivos países de origen, pero han mantenido una presencia casi permanente en Bangui entre marzo y mayo de 2014 y se han desplazado a las provincias o bien por carretera (a Bambari, Batalimo, Beloko, Boda, Bouar, Bossangoa, Cantonner, Carnot, Gadzi, Guen y Mbaïki) o por vía aérea (a Ndélé y Bria). El Grupo también viajó al Camerún (Yaundé), el Gabón (Libreville), el Congo (Brazzaville) y Francia (París) para presentar su mandato y reunirse con funcionarios del Gobierno.

4. En marzo, el Grupo viajó a la Sede de las Naciones Unidas para examinar con el Comité su primer informe, que se transmitió al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad el 5 de marzo de 2014, y reunirse bilateralmente con miembros del Comité, diplomáticos de los Estados vecinos de la República Centroafricana, el Presidente de la Comisión de Consolidación de la Paz y su Enviado a la República Centroafricana, y entidades de las Naciones Unidas.

B. Metodología

5. El Grupo está decidido a asegurar el cumplimiento de las normas recomendadas por el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales Relativas a las Sanciones en su informe de diciembre de 2006 ([S/2006/997](#), anexo). Dichas normas consisten en basarse en documentos genuinos verificados, pruebas concretas y en la observación *in situ* de los expertos, incluidas pruebas fotográficas, siempre que sea posible. Cuando no fue posible realizar una inspección física, el Grupo intentó corroborar la información utilizando múltiples fuentes independientes a fin de alcanzar el nivel más alto posible, como corresponde, asignando mayor valor a las declaraciones de los agentes principales y los testigos directos de los acontecimientos.

6. Si bien tiene la intención de ser lo más transparente posible, en los casos en que identificar a las fuentes lo ponga a él mismo o a otras personas en una situación inaceptable de riesgo para la seguridad, el Grupo no publicará la información identificatoria y guardará las pruebas pertinentes en archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

7. El Grupo se ha comprometido igualmente a alcanzar el más alto nivel de justicia y se esforzará por poner a disposición de las partes, cuando corresponda y sea posible, toda información que figure en el informe en que se las mencione, para que la examinen, formulen observaciones al respecto y presenten una respuesta en un plazo especificado.

8. El Grupo salvaguarda la independencia de su labor en relación con cualquier intento de socavar su imparcialidad o de crear una percepción de parcialidad. El Grupo aprobó por consenso el texto, las conclusiones y recomendaciones del presente informe antes de que el Coordinador lo transmitiera al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad.

9. De conformidad con las resoluciones de la Asamblea General sobre el control de la documentación y los límites relativos al número de palabras, en particular las resoluciones 52/214, 53/208 y 59/265, el Grupo decidió incluir parte de sus conclusiones y observaciones en los anexos del presente informe, lo cual ha impedido que se traduzca una gran parte del contenido.

C. Cooperación con interesados y organizaciones

10. El Grupo desea destacar el excelente nivel de cooperación con las autoridades de transición de la República Centroafricana y en particular con el Gabinete de la Jefa de Estado de Transición, Sra. Catherine Samba-Panza. El mandato del Comité y el Grupo se explicó a los miembros pertinentes del Gobierno, incluido el Primer Ministro y varios ministros, y el Grupo obtuvo, de conformidad con su mandato, la información solicitada de las administraciones y los funcionarios competentes, cuando estaba disponible. El Grupo también explicó su mandato y las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad a los principales interesados presentes en la República Centroafricana, incluidas las fuerzas internacionales y los miembros de la comunidad internacional.

11. El Grupo pudo contar con la Misión Internacional de Apoyo a la República Centroafricana con Liderazgo Africano (MISCA) para que le proporcionase servicios de escolta en las provincias, acceso a las armas y municiones incautadas durante las operaciones e información pertinente para su mandato, con carácter confidencial. El Grupo espera con interés cooperar con la fuerza europea en la República Centroafricana, en espera de su despliegue efectivo sobre el terreno. Las fuerzas francesas en la República Centroafricana (Operación Sangaris) dieron al Grupo pleno acceso a las armas y municiones incautadas. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha el intercambio de información ha sido limitado, incluso en el contexto de los ataques perpetrados contra las fuerzas internacionales.

12. Por último, el Grupo recibió un valioso apoyo logístico de la Oficina Integrada de las Naciones Unidas para la Consolidación de la Paz en la República Centroafricana (BINUCA) para llevar a cabo su mandato, y actualmente trabaja con la Misión Multidimensional Integrada de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en

la República Centroafricana (MINUSCA) para formalizar el intercambio de información y obtener apoyo logístico a largo plazo.

13. El Grupo remitió 23 cartas oficiales a 18 Estados, organizaciones y entidades privadas, y hasta la fecha ha recibido nueve respuestas con la información solicitada (véase el anexo 1).

II. Amenazas a la paz y la seguridad

A. Contexto político y regional

1. Panorama general: comprender el conflicto

14. El conflicto que estalló en 2012 en la República Centroafricana y culminó el 24 de marzo de 2013 con el derrocamiento del Presidente François Bozizé por una oportunista alianza de grupos rebeldes denominada “Séléka” es la escalada más reciente de una serie de crisis que el país ha venido sufriendo a lo largo de casi 40 años. Durante varios decenios, sucesivos gobiernos han concentrado un poder débil en la capital mientras los grupos armados (rebeldes y bandidos) controlaban una gran parte del territorio del país.

15. Desde que obtuvo la independencia de Francia en 1960, la República Centroafricana ha experimentado cuatro golpes de Estado sucesivos y numerosos intentos de golpe, que han creado una cultura política caracterizada por la violencia y la depredación económica. La prestación de apoyo a los grupos armados y su desarrollo ha sido el método predominante para acceder al poder político y la riqueza económica (véase el anexo 2).

16. Este círculo vicioso de crisis políticas ha debilitado gravemente la economía de la República Centroafricana. Un país pobre y sin litoral caracterizado por una inestabilidad permanente, la República Centroafricana no ha podido explotar con éxito sus vastos recursos económicos, lo que ha dejado a la mayoría de su población en la pobreza¹.

17. Entretanto, la élite política y los grupos armados han monopolizado ilegalmente el control de los recursos minerales del país, en particular los diamantes y el oro. El control de las pequeñas explotaciones mineras ha pasado a ser un instrumento importante que beneficia al mismo tiempo a las redes clientelistas de la administración del Estado y financia parcialmente las actividades de los grupos rebeldes (véase la sección C sobre los recursos naturales).

18. La ubicación geográfica de la República Centroafricana la sitúa en la confluencia de una serie de regiones pobres y marginadas y en la frontera de Estados que, en el caso del Chad, el Congo, la República Democrática del Congo, el Sudán y Sudán del Sur, también han experimentado conflictos armados importantes en los últimos años.

19. En muchos sentidos, los conflictos violentos en la República Centroafricana han sido tanto un factor que ha impulsado la inestabilidad en los países vecinos como una consecuencia de esta. Por ejemplo, en los conflictos que han asolado el

¹ Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 2013, El ascenso del Sur: progreso humano en un mundo diverso* (Nueva York, 2013).

Sudán, el Chad y la República Centroafricana, este último país fue utilizado como base de retaguardia por grupos rebeldes de los países vecinos². El Ejército de Resistencia del Señor, un grupo rebelde ugandés que afirma estar basado en una ideología fundamentalista cristiana, ha huido de las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda y buscado refugio en el territorio de la República Centroafricana, donde ocasionalmente ataca aldeas en la región oriental (véase la sección B).

20. Por su parte, la República Centroafricana también ha exportado problemas de seguridad a los países vecinos. Por ejemplo, durante el decenio de 1990 un grupo local de bandidos, conocido como los *zaraguinas* (salteadores de caminos), creó inseguridad, sobre todo en las carreteras del Camerún. Además, las sucesivas crisis de seguridad en la República Centroafricana han generado un gran número de refugiados, algunos de ellos armados, en los países vecinos.

21. Esta situación, junto con otros factores, ha impulsado la creación, a nivel base, de milicias de autodefensa, algunas de las cuales constituyen el germen de los antibalaka (véase el anexo 5).

22. Debido a ello, los países de la región han participado en la evolución política de la República Centroafricana prestando apoyo a uno o más grupos políticos³, enviando tropas de mantenimiento de la paz al país o apoyando la mediación política.

23. Sin embargo, su participación no siempre ha estado exenta de fricción, como pone de manifiesto la percepción local acerca de la presunta relación del Chad con los rebeldes de la Séléka. Esas percepciones allanaron el camino para que el 3 de abril de 2014 el Chad anunciase que se retiraba de la MISCA, la fuerza regional establecida por la Unión Africana el 19 de diciembre de 2013 para sustituir a la MICOPAX, la Misión de Consolidación de la Paz en la República Centroafricana de la Comunidad Económica de los Estados de África Central.

Construcción de un discurso xenófobo y antichadiano

24. Una de las principales características de la crisis actual en la República Centroafricana es la emergencia de un fuerte discurso xenófobo y antichadiano con connotaciones religiosas en el contexto de la reconfiguración política y de seguridad. Su origen se sitúa tanto en la percepción local de identidad nacional como en incidentes más recientes protagonizados por combatientes extranjeros que asumieron puestos de poder en el aparato del Estado y en zonas controladas por los rebeldes. El elevado número de violaciones de los derechos humanos, como los saqueos a gran escala, las violaciones y el acoso que tuvieron lugar durante el breve período que transcurrió bajo el control de la Séléka facilitaron la incorporación al ámbito político del discurso xenófobo⁴.

² En 2006 rebeldes chadianos procedentes del Sudán utilizaron el territorio de la República Centroafricana para lanzar un ataque decisivo contra Yamena. En el decenio de 1980 el Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo del Sudán del Sudán meridional utilizó ampliamente el territorio como base de retaguardia.

³ François Bozizé accedió al poder en 2003 mediante un golpe de Estado con el apoyo del Chad y Francia. Sin embargo, los dos países toleraron el derrocamiento del Sr. Bozizé por la Séléka en marzo de 2013 después de que este se enemistase con ambos.

⁴ Reuniones con un miembro del Consejo Nacional de Transición y un ex Ministro del Gobierno de Transición del Sr. Michel Djotodia, Bangui, 21 y 24 de mayo de 2014.

25. Históricamente, el nordeste de la República Centroafricana es una zona escasamente poblada en la que habitan grupos étnicos (los goula, los árabes, los peuhl y los runga) con fuertes vínculos culturales y económicos con otros grupos similares en el Camerún, el Chad, el Sudán y el Sudán del Sur. El nordeste es la parte más desatendida del país y su población apenas tiene acceso por carretera a la capital y dispone de muy poca infraestructura social. Esta región es también la parte del país que está habitada mayoritariamente por musulmanes, que constituyen aproximadamente el 15% de la población total de la República Centroafricana. Por ello, el nordeste está económica y culturalmente más orientado hacia el Chad y el Sudán que hacia Bangui y el resto del país.

26. La población del nordeste es considerada extranjera en razón de su origen étnico, religión y medios de vida por la mayoría de los centroafricanos del resto del país y, por otro lado, la población del norte en general, y del nordeste en particular, ha cultivado a menudo un sentimiento de marginación⁵.

27. El detonante de la última erupción de sentimientos xenófobos y antichadianos, con fuertes connotaciones antimusulmanas, debe entenderse en el contexto de la toma del poder de los antiguos elementos de la Séléka y el período de 10 meses durante el que mantuvieron el control en 2013. Debido a la presencia de soldados del Chad y el Sudán en las filas de la Séléka, la mayoría de los centroafricanos consideraban a la coalición rebelde como un grupo extranjero que deseaba subyugar a la mayoría de la población. El acoso de la Séléka a comunidades mayoritariamente no musulmanas exacerbó una serie de resentimientos que fueron encauzados de manera oportunista con fines políticos a través de los antibalaka.

28. El resurgimiento en el segundo semestre de 2013 de lo que inicialmente era un grupo de autodefensa con el propósito de proteger a los civiles y las comunidades contra lo que se percibía como una opresión de los no musulmanes patrocinada por el Estado culminó en un movimiento contra la Séléka más amplio y mejor estructurado y organizado. También brindó una oportunidad a antiguos elementos de las fuerzas armadas centroafricanas para tomarse una muy esperada venganza contra quienes las habían derrotado durante el golpe de marzo de 2013.

29. El firme apoyo del que el movimiento antibalaka gozaba entre la población estaba en su mayor parte arraigado en la percepción de que había liberado al país de una invasión extranjera⁶. El activismo de una serie de agentes políticos, en particular, pero no exclusivamente, en torno a la figura del ex-Presidente Bozizé, contribuyó activamente a la aparición de este discurso que, en última instancia, motivó el asesinato selectivo de musulmanes en Bangui y otras zonas controladas por los antibalaka. Para entonces, los miembros de la comunidad musulmana ya eran sinónimo de elementos de la Séléka, extranjeros, chadianos y yihadistas.

⁵ Reunión con el Presidente de un partido político, Bangui, 24 de mayo de 2014. Un signo visible de esta marginación es que la población del nordeste está muy poco representada en los niveles superiores de la administración del Estado y las fuerzas armadas. Por ejemplo, no ha habido nunca un general del ejército del nordeste, excepto los autoproclamados generales de la Séléka.

⁶ Esta percepción generalizada entre los centroafricanos es errónea desde el punto de vista fáctico porque el despliegue de la misión de Francia, la Operación Sangaris, el 6 de diciembre de 2013, acabó con las matanzas de la Séléka y envalentonó a una milicia de autodefensa que aumentó sus ataques contra los musulmanes.

La transición en curso y los problemas que plantea

30. El actual proceso de transición está jurídicamente arraigado en el acuerdo firmado en Libreville en enero de 2013 y la Declaración de Yamena (véase S/2014/319, párr. 38). Para varios agentes y observadores el Acuerdo de Libreville es nulo de pleno derecho porque sus principales signatarios (el Presidente Bozizé y el Sr. Michel Djotodia) ya no están en el poder⁷. Sin embargo, los arquitectos de la Declaración de Yamena consideraron que este era una continuación del Acuerdo de Libreville, cuyo espíritu mantenía, aunque en circunstancias diferentes y con distintos agentes.

31. Se ha informado de que el Presidente del Chad, Sr. Idriss Déby, prometió a la Séléka el cargo de Primer Ministro del nuevo Gobierno de la República Centroafricana. El hecho de que esto no llegara a materializarse ofendió a la Séléka⁸. Por el contrario, los miembros del movimiento antibalaka consideraron que los signatarios del Acuerdo de Yamena habían perdido una oportunidad para reformar el Consejo Nacional de Transición nombrado por el Sr. Michel Djotodia⁹.

32. Los interrogantes sobre la legitimidad del proceso de transición en curso podrían derribar el Gobierno actual, especialmente dado que atañen a la delicada cuestión de la representación. El país tiene una larga historia de transiciones fallidas y débiles acuerdos de paz. Desde que el Sr. Bozizé tomó el poder en 2003, en la República Centroafricana han proliferado las rebeliones, seguidas posteriormente de una serie de acuerdos que no se han aplicado con seriedad. Entre otras cosas, la caída del Sr. Bozizé puede achacarse a una falta de voluntad política para aplicar los acuerdos políticos y participar con seriedad en el proceso de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración (véase el anexo 2).

33. El ejército nacional está totalmente ausente como resultado de la derrota militar de las fuerzas armadas centroafricanas en el golpe de marzo de 2013, el acantonamiento y posterior dispersión de la Séléka después de la intervención de Francia y la caída del Gobierno del Sr. Djotodia. Este problema se ha visto agravado por la fragilidad generada por el actual contexto de reorganización de las milicias y los informes contradictorios sobre la posible partición del país (véase la sección B relativa a los grupos armados). El desafío para los agentes internacionales consiste en establecer un entorno de seguridad en ausencia de un ejército nacional al mismo tiempo que se ayuda a las autoridades de transición a crear uno.

2. Contexto general

34. El conflicto en la República Centroafricana está arraigado en una red de dinámicas regionales que lo vinculan a los acontecimientos en varios Estados vecinos. La inseguridad en la República Centroafricana ha estado ligada al menos de forma parcial a la inseguridad en los países vecinos (el Chad, la República

⁷ Reunión con Jean-Jacques Démafouth (Ministro Consejero de la Presidencia a cargo de la seguridad y las relaciones con la Operación Sangaris y la MISCA), Bangui, 20 de marzo de 2014. Esta opinión es compartida por varios agentes en Bangui y Libreville.

⁸ El 14 de marzo de 2014, la Alianza de Fuerzas Democráticas para la Transición emitió su declaración núm. 007/014, en la que criticaba al Presidente del Chad por insistir en las promesas hechas a los antiguos dirigentes de la Séléka como condición para la destitución de Michel Djotodia y Nicolas Tiangaye. En la declaración la Alianza insta a todas las partes a que respeten el Acuerdo de Yamena y el proceso de transición en curso.

⁹ Reunión con Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 de mayo de 2014.

Democrática del Congo, el Sudán y Sudán del Sur). El contexto regional de la crisis está marcado por varios factores fundamentales: un gran número de combatientes extranjeros y grupos armados (los grupos rebeldes, los *zaraguinas* y los cazadores furtivos), una cantidad considerable de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras en circulación en la región, un puñado de países vecinos con intereses estratégicos en la República Centroafricana y la presencia de varias organizaciones regionales (la Comunidad Económica y Monetaria de África Central, la Comunidad Económica de los Estados de África Central y la Unión Africana). Además, la amenaza del extremismo religioso que representa Boko Haram, grupo añadido por el Consejo de Seguridad a la Lista de Sanciones de Al-Qaida el 22 de mayo de 2014, se considera un importante peligro para la seguridad en la mayoría de las capitales de la región.


35. La reciente inestabilidad de la República Centroafricana ha afectado a los países vecinos en diversos grados. Mientras que el Camerún, el Chad y la República Democrática del Congo sufrieron directamente sus repercusiones en los ámbitos de la seguridad, humanitario y económico, otros países como el Congo y, en particular, Sudán del Sur y el Sudán se resintieron en menor medida. En consecuencia, las medidas adoptadas por los países de la región para hacer frente a la crisis de la República Centroafricana reflejan el grado en el que consideran que la inseguridad en ese país amenaza su propia estabilidad.

36. Tras asumir sus funciones el 13 de febrero de 2014, el Grupo ha podido visitar el Camerún, el Congo y el Gabón, donde obtuvo información de primera mano sobre las medidas adoptadas por esos países para aplicar las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad [2127 \(2013\)](#) y [2134 \(2014\)](#) (véase el anexo 3).

B. Grupos armados

37. En la actualidad, la influencia de los grupos armados se extiende a casi todas las zonas habitadas de la República Centroafricana, con la excepción de unos pocos vecindarios de Bangui y la mayor parte de las provincias de Mbomou y Haut-Mbomou. El país está dividido de hecho en dos por una línea de separación situada actualmente al norte de la provincia de Ouham-Pendé, al norte y al este de las provincias de Ouham y Kémo, y al oeste y al sur de la provincia de Ouaka, con una presencia predominante de las llamadas milicias antibalaka en la zona oeste y de la “nueva” Séléka en la zona oriental de la línea del frente (véase el mapa que figura a continuación).

Zonas de control y de influencia de los grupos armados en la República Centroafricana al 25 de mayo de 2014



38. Aunque en menor medida, los grupos armados extranjeros también están utilizando el territorio de la República Centroafricana como una base de la retaguardia en la que saquean propiedades y extorsionan a la población civil. Más en concreto, el Ejército de Resistencia del Señor ha estado operando desde 2007 en la parte oriental de la República Centroafricana donde ha estado involucrado en incidentes aislados de manera regular (véase en el anexo 4 información sobre otros grupos armados).

39. El Grupo logró entrevistar a la mayor parte de los dirigentes políticos y militares más destacados del movimiento antibalaka y de los distintos grupos de la antigua Séléka, tanto en la capital como en las provincias a las que se puede desplazar.

40. Según se explica anteriormente (véase la secc. A), la actual situación de vacío de poder es terreno abonado para perpetuar la larga tradición de movimientos político-militares de la República Centroafricana. De hecho, las personas con aspiraciones políticas rivalizan por representar a los grupos armados y hablar en su nombre para negociar cargos en el Gobierno e impulsar su propia carrera política, con una cierta tendencia a exagerar el grado en el que representan a partes de la población (en cuanto a la zona de influencia o el contingente de las milicias) y, en última instancia, su capacidad para supervisar y controlar las actividades de dichos grupos de manera efectiva.

41. Además, la información recibida y las observaciones realizadas por el Grupo de Expertos sobre el terreno indican que los autoproclamados grupos antibalaka, así como la “nueva” Séléka, cobran impuestos ilegales procedentes de la circulación de mercancías y pasajeros y de las empresas locales que operan en sus zonas de influencia (véase la secc. C), lo que refuerza su presencia y su capacidad política y militar para mantener a largo plazo su control y su influencia directa sobre la mayor parte del país, incluida la capital.

42. Por último, el Grupo cree que quienes desean frustrar el proceso político han manipulado e incitado a los grupos armados, tanto a los asociados con el movimiento antibalaka como con la antigua Séléka, para que cometan actos de violencia contra la población civil y las fuerzas internacionales, con el fin de reforzar la influencia de esos dirigentes y desestabilizar el proceso de transición, o de promover la partición del país.

43. El Grupo considera que esta situación menoscaba la credibilidad y la capacidad de las autoridades de transición para restablecer y mantener la seguridad pública y el estado de derecho, y, por tanto, amenaza los acuerdos de transición y el proceso de transición política, lo que incluye la organización en 2015 de elecciones democráticas libres y limpias.

44. Así pues, el Comité debe estudiar la posibilidad de imponer sanciones selectivas a las personas y las entidades que, con arreglo a las conclusiones del Grupo, participan o prestan apoyo a esos actos, según lo dispuesto en los párrafos 36 y 37 de la resolución [2134 \(2014\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, entre ellos, a quienes promueven la partición del país, lo que constituye actualmente la principal amenaza para la estabilidad de la República Centroafricana y de la región.

Incidentes de seguridad

Grupos antibalaka

45. El movimiento antibalaka no es un grupo con una estructura centralizada, que tenga mando y control efectivo sobre sus integrantes. El Grupo más bien define al movimiento antibalaka como una multitud de distintas milicias que, o bien se identifican como parte del movimiento, o bien están o han estado asociados a este por defecto.

46. Según la información que figura en la base de datos del Grupo, entre el 5 de diciembre de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014, 670 civiles y 3 trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria fueron asesinados por grupos considerados miembros del movimiento antibalaka. En los anexos 5.5 y 23 se presentan estudios sobre la situación de los grupos antibalaka en Bossangoa y Boda, donde el Grupo documentó casos de ataques contra la población civil, destrucción de propiedades y obstrucción de la asistencia humanitaria.

47. En Bangui, el Grupo considera, sobre la base de entrevistas con diversas fuentes del movimiento antibalaka y otros agentes, que los grupos antibalaka vinculados a la facción dirigida por Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona han llevado a cabo ataques contra las fuerzas internacionales. Por ejemplo, el 22 de marzo de 2014 varios soldados congoleños y rwandeses de la MISCA resultaron, según un informe oficial proporcionado al Grupo por la MISCA, heridos de gravedad por grupos antibalaka en los barrios de Combattant y Fou de la ciudad de Bangui. El 25 de

marzo de 2014, el Grupo fue testigo del intenso ataque lanzado contra las fuerzas francesas en las inmediaciones del aeropuerto (véase el anexo 5.6).

48. Si bien el Grupo puede confirmar que los ataques contra el barrio PK5 de Bangui, donde sigue viviendo la mayoría de las víctimas de la violencia sectaria y por motivos religiosos, fueron obra principalmente de grupos antibalaka procedentes del campamento de desplazados internos situado en el aeropuerto y en los barrios de Boeing y Castors, aún no se ha señalado a un jefe antibalaka concreto como responsable directo. Sin embargo, Ngaïssona declaró durante una reunión con el Grupo que su organización controlaba los grupos antibalaka presentes en esos barrios¹⁰.

49. En el anexo 5 se describen los distintos componentes del movimiento antibalaka y sus dinámicas actuales.

Séléka

50. Según la información que figura en la base de datos del Grupo, la antigua Séléka ha sido responsable de la muerte de 453 civiles y 7 trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria entre el 5 de diciembre de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014.

51. El Grupo logró corroborar información facilitada por varias fuentes sobre la participación de elementos de la antigua Séléka dirigidos por el Coronel Issa¹¹, oficial de alto rango bajo el mando del General de Brigada Alkhatim¹², en el asesinato de 3 trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria y 15 miembros de la población civil y dirigentes comunitarios en Boguila el 26 de abril de 2014.

52. Las fuerzas del General de Brigada Alkhatim también participaron en un violento enfrentamiento con las fuerzas francesas al sur de la localidad de Bémal (provincia de Ouham-Pende) el 5 de mayo de 2014 (véase el anexo 7). Varias fuentes confidenciales confirmaron de nuevo al Grupo que el Coronel Issa estaba directamente involucrado.

53. Además, el Grupo obtuvo un testimonio que implicaba al Coronel Saleh Zabadi, comandante de zona de la “nueva” Séléka en Batangafo (provincia de Ouham), y al General de Brigada Alkhatim en el secuestro el 16 de abril de 2014 del Obispo de Bossangoa, junto con otros tres sacerdotes, a su llegada a Batangafo para celebrar la festividad de la Pascua¹³. Los cuatro sacerdotes fueron puestos en libertad al día siguiente en Kabo, tras una intensa movilización de la comunidad internacional y otras entidades en Bangui¹⁴, aunque sin ninguna de sus pertenencias.

54. Por último, fuentes militares informaron al Grupo sobre la participación el 24 de mayo de 2014 de fuerzas leales al General de Brigada Ali Daras en intensos ataques contra las fuerzas internacionales realizados con granadas propulsadas por cohetes y ametralladoras ligeras durante la aplicación de “las medidas de fomento de la confianza” en Bambari.

¹⁰ Reunión celebrada con Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 de mayo de 2014.

¹¹ Reuniones con fuentes confidenciales y contactos institucionales, Bossangoa y Bangui, abril y mayo de 2014.

¹² Conversación telefónica con el General de Brigada Alkhatim Mahamat, 20 de mayo de 2014.

¹³ El testimonio está archivado en las Naciones Unidas.

¹⁴ Los diplomáticos que participaron en las conversaciones para liberar a los sacerdotes confirmaron al Grupo la implicación directa del General de Brigada Alkhatim.

55. A pesar de su fachada política, que sigue siendo muy endeble, los defensores de la partición continúan ejerciendo su influencia sobre la suerte y el devenir de la “nueva” Séléka. Esa influencia no se debe subestimar, dado que representa un riesgo real para la estabilidad y la integridad territorial de la República Centroafricana.

56. En el anexo 6 se detalla la nueva estructura militar de la Séléka y su coordinación política provisional.

C. Explotación de los recursos naturales

1. Diamantes

57. El 23 de mayo de 2013 se suspendió temporalmente a la República Centroafricana del Sistema de Certificación del Proceso de Kimberley. Con arreglo a lo dispuesto por la Asamblea General en su resolución 55/56, de 1 de diciembre de 2000, el Proceso de Kimberley, puesto en marcha por los países africanos productores de diamantes, involucra a los gobiernos, el sector y la sociedad civil en las iniciativas encaminadas a interrumpir el flujo de diamantes en bruto utilizados por los movimientos rebeldes para financiar actividades militares contra los gobiernos legítimos. Dos meses antes de la suspensión se publicó en el sitio web del Proceso de Kimberley un mapa que mostraba los avances y las posiciones de los rebeldes de la Séléka en zonas ricas en diamantes de la zona oriental del país, a saber, Bria, Sam-Ouandja (provincia del Alto Kotto) y Bamingui (provincia de Bamingui-Bangoran) (véase el anexo 8). El 18 de abril de 2013, el Presidente del Proceso de Kimberley exhortó a los participantes a mantenerse alerta ante la posibilidad de que los grupos rebeldes introdujeran diamantes en bruto de forma ilícita en la cadena de suministro. En ese momento los rebeldes de la coalición Séléka ya habían tomado el poder en Bangui.

58. Según el informe anual para 2013 de la Secretaria Permanente del Proceso de Kimberley en la República Centroafricana, durante el primer trimestre de 2013 el país exportó 43.929 quilates, valorados en más de 9 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos. Durante el segundo trimestre exportó otros 75.017 quilates, por un valor superior a 11 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos. Los principales destinos de las exportaciones fueron la Unión Europea (el 67%) y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (el 31%). En comparación, en 2012 el país exportó 371.917 quilates, valorados en más de 62 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos¹⁵.

59. Si bien se han suspendido las exportaciones de diamantes en bruto, las compras de diamantes legales se han seguido realizando. En marzo de 2014, la Dirección General de Minas y Geología y la Unidad Especial de Lucha Contra el Fraude verificaron conjuntamente las existencias de las principales empresas compradoras de diamantes de Bangui. La empresa Sodiam (Société centrafricaine du diamant) tenía almacenados 40.576 quilates, valorados en 8,3 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos, procedentes en su mayor parte del oeste de la República Centroafricana. Los registros de compra de la Dirección General de Minas y Geología muestran que la gran mayoría del inventario de Sodiam (el 90%) se

¹⁵ Véase

https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/public_statistics/2012/2012GlobalSummary.pdf (página consultada el 1 de mayo de 2014).

adquirió después de la suspensión¹⁶. Según la información que facilitaron al Grupo los intermediarios de diamantes de Carnot, Guen y Boda, en las provincias occidentales de Mambéré-Kadéï y Lobaye, Sodiam sigue comprándoles diamantes¹⁷.

60. En marzo, la empresa Badica (Bureau d'achat de diamants en Centrafrique) tenía en inventario 760 quilates¹⁸. El director gerente de Badica dijo al Grupo que la empresa había paralizado las adquisiciones a causa de la suspensión del Sistema de Certificación del Proceso de Kimberley y por el riesgo de que se produjesen saqueos en las oficinas sobre el terreno, como había sucedido en Berberati en febrero de 2014¹⁹. Sin embargo, una segunda inspección del inventario realizada en Badica en abril de 2014 descubrió que la empresa había adquirido otros 1.698 quilates, valorados en 292.917 dólares de los Estados Unidos, procedentes de Bria y Sam-Ouandja²⁰. Los paquetes de diamantes del inventario de Badica aún no habían sido sellados y fechados por las autoridades competentes en materia de minería, de conformidad con lo exigido en la hoja de ruta presentada por las autoridades de la República Centroafricana en junio de 2013 para la reincorporación de la República Centroafricana al Proceso de Kimberley²¹.

61. No se encontraron existencias en las empresas Sud Azur y Socdiam. El director gerente de Sur Azur dijo al Grupo que la empresa había financiado por anticipado actividades mineras en el oeste y el este del país, pero que, debido a la inseguridad, no había podido hacer un seguimiento de sus inversiones.

62. Aunque una pequeña parte de los diamantes en bruto se vende legalmente en la República Centroafricana y se almacena en Bangui, en la capital también se cortan diamantes en bruto que se venden localmente y se pueden sacar al extranjero como artículos de joyería o de otros modos. Por ejemplo, la empresa Bijouterie Guinot, que tiene licencia para comprar, cortar y pulir diamantes, procesa hasta 100 quilates al mes. Los diamantes cortados que se venden en Bangui son, por lo general, para uso personal, y no se destinan de nuevo a la venta. El Sistema de Certificación del Proceso de Kimberley no se aplica al comercio de diamantes cortados.

63. En abril de 2014, el Grupo visitó zonas de extracción artesanal de diamantes en la zona occidental del país. A lo largo del eje Boda-Guen-Carnot, la producción de diamantes se ha reducido, según los mineros locales, entre un 50% y un 70% en comparación con 2013. La disminución se debe en gran medida a la marcha de la práctica totalidad de los intermediarios musulmanes, tras la retirada de las fuerzas de la Séléka y la insurrección de las milicias antibalaka a finales de enero de 2014. Esos intermediarios solían financiar por anticipado las operaciones de minería, comprar a los mineros y vender a las empresas compradoras de Bangui o pasar los diamantes de contrabando al extranjero. Estos intermediarios se fueron a sus países

¹⁶ El informe completo está depositado en los archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

¹⁷ Diversas entrevistas con intermediarios de diamantes, Carnot, Guen y Boda, 24 a 27 de abril de 2014.

¹⁸ Badica forma parte del Grupo Abdoulkarim, domiciliado en Amberes, que es miembro de la Bolsa de Diamantes de Amberes. La empresa abarca además la empresa de aviación Minair y la empresa Sofia de transporte por carretera. Las tres empresas están registradas en la República Centroafricana. (Véase www.groupeabdoulkarim.com/ (página consultada el 22 de mayo de 2014).

¹⁹ Entrevista con el director gerente de Badica, Bangui, 28 de abril de 2014.

²⁰ El informe sobre la verificación del inventario de Badica está archivado en las Naciones Unidas.

²¹ La hoja de ruta del Proceso de Kimberley (junio de 2013) está depositada en los archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

de origen, como el Chad, Malí o el Senegal, se trasladaron a zonas diamantíferas de la parte oriental todavía bajo el control de la Séléka, o se establecieron en las ciudades fronterizas camerunesas de Kenzou y Garoua Boulaï. Los intermediarios que permanecen en las zonas productoras de diamantes del oeste son a menudo cristianos o de origen mixto cristiano y musulmán. Algunos, como Leonard Bakongo en Guen y Gregoire Moussa en Sasele, actúan al mismo tiempo como jefes locales de los grupos antibalaka.

64. Además de operar como mineros o intermediarios, los grupos antibalaka también intentan ofrecer protección a cambio de pagos a los comerciantes de diamantes de los centros urbanos. En Carnot, los miembros del movimiento antibalaka admitieron ante el Grupo que el jefe de su sección, Aimé Blaise Zoworo, se había puesto en contacto con los intermediarios asociados o anteriormente asociados a las empresas compradoras para negociar acuerdos de protección. Esto sucedió después de que el Grupo viera los nombres de las personas señaladas como objetivo escritos en una hoja de papel (véase el anexo 9). Zoworo y sus hombres forman parte de la estructura de mando de Ngaïssona (véase el anexo 5), y lucen los distintivos reglamentarios de identificación de los grupos antibalaka (véase el anexo 5.3).

65. Los grupos antibalaka de Carnot solicitan pagos a cambio de protección a los agentes económicos como antes hacía la Séléka. De conformidad con la Unidad Especial de Lucha contra el Fraude de Carnot, la Séléka solía exigir a cambio de protección pagos de 400 dólares al mes a las empresas compradoras, y de 100 dólares al mes a los intermediarios radicados en Carnot.

66. En mayo de 2014 el Grupo visitó el centro de comercio de diamantes de Bria. Según las autoridades mineras locales, los elementos de la Séléka patrullan la principal carretera hacia el norte, pero no están presentes en las zonas mineras. Los intermediarios dijeron al Grupo que la Séléka está presente en las zonas mineras, pero que no cobra tributos. Con anterioridad a la llegada de las fuerzas de la Misca y de la Operación Sangaris el 7 de abril, la Séléka solía cobrar 75 dólares de los Estados Unidos en concepto de tasas de aterrizaje a las compañías aéreas cuyos aviones fletaban Sodiam y Badica para agilizar el traslado de los diamantes a Bangui.

67. Los principales intermediarios de diamantes de Bangui, Guen y Bria afirman que venden legalmente los diamantes a las empresas compradoras de Bangui, y acusan a otros intermediarios y traficantes de diamantes de sacar las gemas de contrabando a países extranjeros como el Camerún, el Chad y el Sudán. En realidad, muchos intermediarios venden parte de sus diamantes de forma legal para cumplir con las autoridades mineras, mientras que otra parte sale del país de forma fraudulenta, por la mera razón de que la capacidad adquisitiva de las empresas compradoras de Bangui es muy baja. De acuerdo con oficiales de las Fuerzas Armadas Centrafricanas, los intermediarios de diamantes y los expertos de Bangui y Bria, el “General” de la Séléka Omar Younous (alias “Oumar Sodiam”), trafica pasando diamantes de Bria y Sam-Ouandja al Sudán. El Grupo sigue investigando sobre la base de información preliminar acerca de traficantes de diamantes que operan en el Camerún y el Chad.

2. Oro

68. La producción artesanal de oro de la República Centrafricana se ha estimado en dos toneladas al año, lo que representaría un valor similar al del sector de los

diamantes del país²². Los yacimientos de oro están situados más o menos en las mismas zonas que los diamantes. En 2013, la República Centroafricana exportó oficialmente 11 kg de oro, mientras que se vendió menos de 1 kg para uso de las joyerías locales que había sido marcado por la Dirección General de Minas y Geología (archivos de las Naciones Unidas)²³. Prácticamente todo el oro se trafica a los países vecinos. Por ejemplo, en 2013 y 2014 las autoridades aduaneras del Camerún interceptaron en el aeropuerto de Douala un total de 7,5 kg de oro a viajeros, un ciudadano camerún y dos ciudadanos chinos, que se encontraban en tránsito procedentes de Bangui²⁴.

69. En diciembre de 2012, la única empresa industrial de prospección de oro en la República Centroafricana, la canadiense Axmin Inc., puso fin a sus actividades en Ndassima (provincia de Ouaka), a unos 400 km al noreste de Bangui, debido a la constante actividad rebelde. La empresa informó de que los rebeldes que acudían desde el norte para tomar la localidad de Bambari habían ocupado su campamento minero y se habían apoderado de alimentos, suministros médicos y vehículos²⁵. Las operaciones de Axmin en Ndassima forman parte de su proyecto Passendro, y se esperaba que la mina Passendro, una vez puesta en marcha, produjese unos 6.400 kg al año durante los tres primeros años²⁶.

70. El Grupo visitó en mayo de 2014 la mina situada en Ndassima, donde varios cientos de mineros artesanales trabajan actualmente en la concesión de Axmin y producen un total estimado de 15 kg de metal al mes (véase el anexo 10). Las fuerzas de la Séléka de la quinta Región Militar del distrito de Ouaka, bajo el mando del General Ali Daras, han ocupado el campamento minero de Axmin y están presentes a la entrada del poblado minero que conduce a la explotación (véanse los anexos 6 y 11). Según los mineros artesanales, los comerciantes locales y un comandante de la Séléka, los soldados tienen instrucciones de no participar en actividades comerciales y no recaudar tributos²⁷. Sí reciben contribuciones de la población cuando se ocupan de incidentes como los casos de robo. La mayor parte del oro que se produce en Ndassima se saca mediante el tráfico ilícito al Camerún, a través de Bangui, por vía aérea y terrestre.

3. Fauna salvaje

71. La caza furtiva y el tráfico de animales salvajes han sido un factor fundamental en la rebelión de la Séléka que se inició en la zona nororiental del país y se propagó al sureste una vez que la Séléka tomó el poder en Bangui en marzo de 2013. En diciembre de 2012, 22 de los 60 “guardias ecológicos”, es decir, los contratados

²² Tieguhon Julius Chupezi, Verina Ingram y Jolien Schure, *Impacts of Artisanal Gold and Diamond Mining on Livelihoods and the Environment in the Sangha Tri-national Park Landscape* (Bogor (Indonesia), Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009). Disponible en www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BChupezi0901.pdf (página consultada el 3 de mayo de 2014).

²³ La documentación sobre la situación minera y aduanera relativa a las exportaciones de oro (enero a diciembre de 2013) está depositada en los archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

²⁴ Documentación archivada en las Naciones Unidas.

²⁵ Véase www.axmininc.com/site/Newsnbsp/News2012/PRDecember242012.aspx (página consultada el 3 de mayo de 2014).

²⁶ Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo, “The mineral industries of Central African Republic and Togo”, *2012 Minerals Yearbook* (Servicio Geológico de los Estados Unidos, diciembre de 2013).

²⁷ Entrevista con los mineros artesanales, los comerciantes de oro y comandantes de la Séléka, Ndassima, 22 de mayo de 2014.

mediante el proyecto Ecofaune, financiado por la Unión Europea, para patrullar los parques nacionales de la zona septentrional de Bamingui-Bangoran y Manovo-Gounda-Saint Floris, se sumaron a la Séléka y saquearon su puesto de guardia en Sangba²⁸. Al parecer, participaron en la matanza de 12 elefantes que tuvo lugar en la zona el 12 de febrero de 2013²⁹.

72. Aunque se cree que es pequeño el número de elefantes que permanecen en la zona, la caza de especies de antílope de gran tamaño, como el de Lord Derby y el bongo, y la venta de carne de antílope sigue proporcionando ingresos a las fuerzas locales de la Séléka. Las fuerzas de la Séléka controlan esas actividades, ya sea cazando ellas mismas o suministrando armas y municiones a los cazadores furtivos. Las rutas comerciales de la carne de caza conducen a Bangui, así como al Chad y al Sudán. Las autoridades locales y los conservacionistas de N'délé (provincia de Bamingui-Bangoran) señalan al propietario de camiones Aroun Assane (alias "Tigane") como al principal transportista de carne de caza que colabora con la Séléka³⁰.

73. Antes de la desertión de los guardias ecológicos y el saqueo del puesto de Sangba, el proyecto Ecofaune había transferido la mayoría de sus armas, incluidos 62 fusiles de asalto AK-47, al Ministerio de Recursos Hídricos y Silvicultura en Bangui para evitar que los confiscara la Séléka³¹. Cuando la Séléka tomó el control de Bangui el 24 de marzo de 2013, se saqueó el depósito del Ministerio. Entre los artículos robados figuran 135 fusiles de asalto AK-47 y 124 colmillos de marfil que las autoridades competentes en materia forestal y de fauna salvaje habían confiscado durante los dos decenios anteriores (véase el anexo 12).

74. El 6 de mayo de 2013, un grupo de cazadores furtivos fuertemente armados entraron en el Parque Nacional de Dzanga-Ndoki, en la provincia de Sangha Mbaere (en la zona suroeste del país), mataron 26 elefantes y les arrancaron los colmillos, que se llevaron³². Las autoridades de la Séléka en Bangui, tanto del Ministerio de Recursos Hídricos y Bosques como del Ministerio de Defensa, han autorizado las actividades de los cazadores furtivos mencionadas anteriormente, que viajaban en una caravana de caballos y camellos³³.

75. Con la marcha de las fuerzas de la Séléka del suroeste de la República Centroafricana a fines de enero de 2014, volvieron los cazadores furtivos que actuaban anteriormente en la zona. El 17 de febrero de 2014, la gendarmería y las autoridades responsables de la fauna salvaje en Bayanga arrestaron a René Sangha Zéle, cazador furtivo durante muchos años, en el interior del Parque Nacional de Dzanga Sangha por

²⁸ Entrevista con conservacionistas, Bangui, 20 de marzo de 2014.

²⁹ Kasper Agger, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic* (Proyecto Enough, mayo de 2014. Disponible en www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf (página consultada el 17 de mayo de 2014).

³⁰ Entrevistas con los conservacionistas y los administradores locales en Ndélé y Bangui, 20 y 22 de marzo y 8 de abril.

³¹ Una carta por la que se reconoce la transferencia de armas del proyecto Ecofaune al Ministerio está depositada en los archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

³² Wildlife News, "Elephant death toll at Dzanga Bai starts to come in", 10 de mayo de 2013. Disponible en <http://wildlifeneews.co.uk/2013/elephant-death-toll-at-dzanga-bai-start-to-come-in/> (página consultada el 17 de mayo de 2014).

³³ Entrevistas con los conservacionistas y los guardias forestales, Bangui, 20 de marzo y 21 de abril de 2014.

posesión ilegal de un fusil Mauser de calibre 375, rifle utilizado para la caza mayor (en África Central, la caza mayor consiste principalmente en búfalos y elefantes, que son especies protegidas)³⁴. Las autoridades Centroafricanas ya habían detenido a René Sangha Zéle en 2007 por matar elefantes, pero se fugó de la cárcel, y volvió a ser detenido en agosto de 2013 en el Parque Nacional Lobeke (Camerún) en posesión de dos colmillos de marfil y un fusil grande de caza. En septiembre de 2013 el tribunal de Yokadouma condenó a René Sangha a dos meses de cárcel, mientras que su hermano gemelo, Symphorien Sangha, recibió una pena máxima de tres años de prisión, ya que el tribunal lo declaró culpable no solo de matar elefantes, sino también de atacar a una guardabosques³⁵. Los hermanos han sido acusados de matar en total 100 elefantes en la zona de Sangha, donde hay tres parques nacionales³⁶.

76. El Grupo sigue investigando la red de cazadores furtivos de René Sangha, a la que, según los conservacionistas y las autoridades que protegen a los animales salvajes, pertenece un agente de policía de Salo, y el papel que René Sangha podría haber desempeñado en la introducción de rifles de caza y municiones en la República Centroafricana, lo que contraviene el embargo de armas.

77. En el anexo 13 figura un análisis más amplio de las cuestiones relativas a la madera, el ganado y el petróleo.

III. Violaciones del embargo de armas

A. Situación de la República Centroafricana en materia de armas y municiones

78. El refuerzo de las tropas francesas y de la MISCA en diciembre de 2013, conforme a lo dispuesto en la resolución 2127 (2013) del Consejo de Seguridad supuso el colapso de la Séléka y su pérdida total del control sobre las armas y las municiones que estaban anteriormente bajo la custodia del Gobierno.

79. El Grupo ha preparado datos de referencia sobre las armas, los pertrechos y las municiones en circulación en la República Centroafricana que se utilizarán como pauta para evaluar la aplicación y el efecto del embargo de armas. A tal fin, el Grupo ha utilizado varios indicadores y fuentes que ofrecen un cálculo cuantitativo y cualitativo de los distintos arsenales del país.

80. El análisis cualitativo de las armas y las municiones recogidas por la MISCA y las fuerzas francesas durante las operaciones de desarme llevadas a cabo desde diciembre de 2013 permitió que el Grupo se hiciera una idea clara del tipo y la marca del equipo militar en circulación en la República Centroafricana. El Grupo confía en que las existencias recogidas por las fuerzas internacionales constituyen una muestra suficientemente representativa de los arsenales que obraban anteriormente en poder de las fuerzas del Gobierno y de la Séléka. Este arsenal consta principalmente de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras, con unos pocos lotes de

³⁴ Información facilitada por los conservacionistas, Bangui y Yaoundé, 1 de abril de 2014.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Robbie Corey-Boulet, "Cameroon court judges twin brothers accused of killing 100 elephants", 24 de septiembre de 2013. Disponible en www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-court-judges-twin-brothers-accused-of-killing-100-elephants/1755919.html (página consultada el 17 de mayo de 2014).

morteros de hasta 120 mm de calibre y de otros sistemas de armamento como lanzacohetes múltiples, dos helicópteros de ataque Mil Mi-24, que no son operativos, destinados en la base de la fuerza aérea de la República Centroafricana en Bangui, y vehículos blindados de transporte de tropas (véase el anexo 14). El Registro de Armas Convencionales de las Naciones Unidas no menciona ninguna otra exportación de armas convencionales a la República Centroafricana aparte de los tres vehículos blindados exportados por Eslovaquia en 2008. Las características de las armas y las municiones figuran en los anexos 15 y 16.

81. Las municiones que circulan en la República Centroafricana son de diverso origen, y las más recientes se han fabricado en el Sudán entre 2011 y 2013. La tipología elaborada por el Grupo indica que las municiones que circulan en el país fueron producidas de 42 fabricantes de 16 países a lo largo de un período de 52 años que abarca de 1961 a 2013. La tipología comprende 116 lotes e información sobre el fabricante y el año de producción.

B. Proliferación de armas

82. La falta de registros y archivos dificulta al Grupo la labor de calcular las cantidades y los tipos de armas y municiones que han pasado a poder de diversos grupos armados y redes delictivas, y, por lo tanto, el alcance de la proliferación de armas y municiones en todo el país y en la subregión.

83. Se ha determinado que la mayor parte de las armas y las municiones que circulan actualmente en la República Centroafricana proceden de las siguientes fuentes:

- a) Los arsenales de las fuerzas armadas centroafricanas;
- b) Las existencias iniciales de la Séléka;
- c) El material detraído del inventario reunido en anteriores campañas de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración;
- d) El saqueo de las existencias del ex-Presidente Bozizé;
- e) Las armas pasadas de contrabando a través de las fronteras por diversos grupos armados y redes delictivas.

84. La antigua Séléka pertrechó a la mayoría de sus efectivos con las existencias gubernamentales durante su marcha sobre Bangui. A título de ejemplo, dos evaluaciones llevadas a cabo por el Servicio de las Naciones Unidas de Actividades Relativas a las Minas, respectivamente, en diciembre de 2012 y diciembre de 2013, en tres centros de almacenamiento de municiones del proceso de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración de Bangui pusieron de manifiesto que se desconocía el paradero de más del 82% de las municiones obsoletas y el 98% de las municiones para armas pequeñas, lo que equivale a la pérdida de 9.600 artículos obsoletos y 164.000 cartuchos. Además, las autoridades centroafricanas bajo la antigua Séléka también recuperaron armas de la Fuerza Multinacional de África Central que se habían recogido en anteriores actividades de desarme³⁷.

³⁷ Una copia del documento de entrega firmada por un miembro de la Fuerza Multinacional de África Central y el General Issa Issaka está depositada en los archivos de las Naciones Unidas.

85. Del equipo militar utilizado inicialmente por unos 8.000 soldados de las fuerzas armadas centroafricanas, incluida la gendarmería, y unos cuantos cientos de combatientes de la Séléka antes de que tomaran Bangui, en la actualidad solo 122 rifles de asalto obran en poder de las fuerzas regulares de la República Centroafricana (52 en la Gendarmería y 70 en las fuerzas armadas). En Bangui, las fuerzas internacionales han recogido unas 1.100 armas pequeñas y, probablemente, la mayoría de las armas ligeras y las municiones asociadas utilizadas por los efectivos de la antigua Séléka destacados en Bangui, incluidas ametralladoras ligeras y pesadas de hasta 14,5 mm de calibre, tubos de mortero de 60 a 120 mm de calibre y varias granadas propulsadas por cohete (véase el anexo 14).

86. Según ha sabido el Grupo, la proliferación ha redundado en la afluencia de armas pequeñas a los mercados locales, donde, al parecer, en algunas zonas los elementos de la antigua Séléka vendían rifles de asalto de tipo AK por unos 80 dólares de los Estados Unidos, y los elementos antibalaka vendían granadas de tipo 82-2 de fabricación china por entre 1 y 2 dólares de los Estados Unidos. Se ha informado de que las granadas han sido un problema grave para los agentes humanitarios durante el primer trimestre de 2014, en el que resultaron muertos o heridos por esta causa varios civiles, entre ellos, niños.

87. La presencia de armas pequeñas en Bangui ha disminuido considerablemente en los últimos dos meses, pero todavía hay zonas en las que se oyen disparos de armas de fuego de vez en cuando por la noche. Durante las visitas que realizó sobre el terreno fuera de Bangui, el Grupo vio varios puestos de control de los grupos antibalaka a cargo de personal armado, entre el que había individuos con uniforme militar y fusiles de asalto y combatientes locales vestidos de paisano que portaban rifles de caza o machetes tradicionales.

88. El Grupo también observó en ocasiones pequeños grupos de combatientes antibalaka bien pertrechados de fusiles de asalto, ametralladoras ligeras y granadas propulsadas por cohetes que se desplazaban en convoyes formados por dos camionetas. Los incidentes registrados en el norte y los informes de seguridad también indican una proliferación de armas pequeñas entre los grupos armados, tanto en grupos no identificados como en los asociados a la antigua Séléka. Sin embargo, no ha habido indicios del uso de ametralladoras pesadas, fusiles sin retroceso o granadas de mortero.

C. Tráfico ilícito de armas y municiones

89. La inspección de armas y municiones aprehendidas brindó al Grupo la oportunidad de comenzar a investigar las transferencias ilícitas de armas pequeñas y municiones que contravienen el embargo de armas. En tres casos el Grupo observó la presencia de armas pequeñas anteriormente desconocidas en el arsenal de las fuerzas armadas centroafricanas y de la antigua Séléka.

90. El primer caso se refiere a la eliminación deliberada de las marcas y los números de serie de numerosos rifles de asalto AKM mediante el uso de un utensilio para moler (véase el anexo 17). Las marcas sin duda se habían eliminado para ocultar el origen de las armas, que se podrían haber introducido de contrabando en la República Centroafricana infringiendo el embargo de armas. Otros comités y grupos de expertos establecidos por el Consejo de Seguridad han señalado la eliminación deliberada de marcas como medio para entorpecer las actividades de rastreo del armamento, que es uno de los procedimientos

utilizados para vigilar el embargo de armas³⁸. El Grupo está investigando en la actualidad los otros dos casos.

91. Por último, el Grupo está investigando un caso de incautación por las autoridades aduaneras centroafricanas de munición de caza (de 12 mm de calibre) introducida de contrabando por una mujer y un niño en el principal paso fronterizo con el Camerún. El Grupo ha sabido que se han dado casos similares de tráfico ilícito de cartuchos del mismo tipo en el mismo lugar. Esos cartuchos, fabricados en Europa, se facturaron a un intermediario en el Camerún, con la certificación del usuario final de que la munición no se vendería ni se exportaría nuevamente a ningún otro país. Este caso no solo deja patente que el contrabando de armas y municiones se debe a lo permeables que son las fronteras, sino también que es necesario que haya un intercambio efectivo de información sobre las transferencias de armas y municiones ilícitas entre los Estados de la subregión de África Central, en cumplimiento de la Convención de África Central de noviembre de 2010 para el Control de las Armas Pequeñas y las Armas Ligeras, sus Municiones y Todas las Piezas y Componentes que Puedan Servir para su Fabricación, Reparación y Ensamblaje.

92. El Grupo ha investigado a fondo este incidente, ya que durante las misiones y las inspecciones sobre el terreno también se observaron casos en los que los elementos antibalaka habían modificado cartuchos de caza diseñados para la caza menor a fin de mejorar su eficacia contra las piezas de mayor tamaño o las personas. Este proceso consiste en eliminar las cargas de plomo de menor tamaño que contienen los cartuchos originales y sustituirlas por pepitas hechas a mano o introducir un cartucho militar de 7,62 mm o un proyectil artesanal para imitar las balas de escopeta. El proceso sigue siendo rudimentario, pero, con el tiempo, podría mejorar hasta lograr el efecto deseado (véase el anexo 18).

93. El marco jurídico del régimen del embargo de armas se describe en el anexo 19. Los casos de incumplimiento y el apoyo internacional a las iniciativas de reforma del sector de la seguridad de la República Centroafricana se detallan en los anexos 20 y 21, respectivamente.

IV. Obstrucción de la entrega de asistencia humanitaria a la República Centroafricana

94. En 2014, las organizaciones humanitarias siguieron respondiendo a la crisis humanitaria en la República Centroafricana. No obstante, la falta de acceso a gran parte del país por la inestable situación de seguridad y las limitaciones en materia de financiación, entre otros factores, hacen que el país sea en la actualidad uno de los casos más graves de emergencia en el ámbito humanitario del continente africano.

95. Según la Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios³⁹ hay 560.050 desplazados internos en el país; de esta cifra, 135.050 se encuentran en 43 centros de Bangui y con familias de acogida. Casi la mitad de la población (unos 2,5 millones de personas de una población total aproximada de 4,6 millones) necesita

³⁸ El Grupo de Expertos sobre Côte d'Ivoire dio cuenta en varios de sus informes de esas prácticas en relación con las armas utilizadas por las antiguas Forces Nouvelles (véase, por ejemplo, S/2013/228).

³⁹ Informe sobre la situación de la República Centroafricana, núm. 25 (14 de mayo de 2014). Disponible en <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info> (página consultada el 21 de mayo de 2014).

asistencia humanitaria. La asistencia en materia de alimentos, agua y saneamiento, el alojamiento de emergencia, los artículos no alimentarios, la atención a la salud, la educación y la protección figuran entre las necesidades humanitarias de los grupos vulnerables.

96. Según la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, desde diciembre de 2013 hay 120.472 nuevos refugiados de la República Centroafricana en los países vecinos, además de los 244.783 ya desplazados. La mayoría de los refugiados se encuentran en el Camerún, seguido por el Chad, el Congo y la República Democrática del Congo (véase el anexo 31)⁴⁰.

97. Como resultado de las investigaciones del Grupo se han documentado 103 casos de obstrucción de la entrega de asistencia humanitaria a la República Centroafricana en el período comprendido entre el 5 de diciembre de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014, lo que constituye un acto sancionable con arreglo al párrafo 36 e) de la resolución 2134 (2014) del Consejo de Seguridad. Esta cifra no abarca todos los incidentes registrados en la totalidad del país. Los expedientes de los casos acaecidos en Boda y Ndélé ilustran el modo en que las organizaciones humanitarias y sus operaciones se han resentido por la inestable situación de seguridad, que a su vez ha entorpecido la distribución de la ayuda a los grupos vulnerables (véanse los anexos 22 y 23).

98. Durante el período antes mencionado, 14 trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria fueron asesinados en la República Centroafricana (véase el anexo 24). Los asesinatos no parecen responder a una pauta o una tendencia determinada (véase el anexo 28). En algunos casos se ha matado a las personas por la naturaleza del trabajo que desempeñaban, mientras que en otros, se trata, al parecer, de actos de violencia cometidos de manera fortuita (véase el anexo 24).

99. De acuerdo con la información que el Grupo recabó de fuentes primarias y secundarias, se ha identificado a los autores de aproximadamente el 60% de los incidentes documentados. Los grupos antibalaka parecen ser responsables de en torno al 30% de esos incidentes y los elementos de la antigua Séléka, de un 25%, mientras que la autoría del 45% de los incidentes restantes se atribuye a personas sin identificar o a otros grupos (véase el anexo 24).

100. De acuerdo también con la información recabada por el Grupo, en el período examinado ha habido 13 casos en los que se ha atacado, detenido o amenazado a convoyes que transportaban ayuda humanitaria. Los ataques contra convoyes tienen consecuencias graves para la prestación de ayuda humanitaria y el sustento de los grupos vulnerables (véase el anexo 24).

101. Además, se ha atacado a los convoyes de población musulmana que huía por razones de seguridad. Se documentó la muerte de al menos diez civiles como consecuencia de estos incidentes.

102. Resulta especialmente preocupante el hecho de que varios incidentes de obstrucción de la entrega de ayuda humanitaria, atribuidos a elementos antibalaka, tuvieron por objetivo concreto a trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria musulmanes o a la asistencia humanitaria destinada a zonas donde la mayoría de la población es

⁴⁰ Central African Republic Situation UNHCR External Regional Update 15, 9 a 15 de mayo de 2014. Disponible en <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/document/statistiques-de-la-population-deplacee-en-rca> (página consultada el 22 de mayo de 2014).

de religión musulmana (para obtener más información sobre incidentes concretos, véase el anexo 24).

103. Durante el período examinado, se detuvo, se hostigó y se puso impedimentos a las organizaciones humanitarias de manera constante en los puestos de control montados por distintos grupos armados y delincuentes en todo el país, que exigen dinero a cambio del paso en condiciones de seguridad o del permiso para utilizar las carreteras.

V. Violaciones graves del derecho internacional⁴¹

104. Mediante sus indagaciones y la información recabada de fuentes primarias y secundarias, el Grupo ha documentado aproximadamente 2.424 ejecuciones ilegales de civiles, entre ellos, trabajadores de la asistencia humanitaria, cometidas por todas las partes en el conflicto entre el 5 de diciembre de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014 (véase el anexo 25)⁴². Aunque la gran mayoría de los asesinatos documentados sucedieron en Bangui durante el momento de máxima intensidad de la violencia en diciembre de 2013, las ejecuciones ilegales de civiles cometidas por todas las partes en el conflicto se siguieron produciendo en todo el país durante los primeros meses de 2014 (véase el anexo 27).

105. Uno de los más graves incidentes documentados en el período que se examina fue la masacre cometida el 1 y el 5 de febrero de 2014 en la aldea de Guen (provincia de Mambere-Kadeï), visitada por el Grupo el 25 de abril de 2014, en la que los grupos antibalaka mataron a 43 civiles (véase el anexo 29).

106. El Grupo observa que la falta de libertad de movimiento de la población civil en todo el país es cada vez más preocupante. En respuesta a esta situación, el Grupo Temático de Protección del Comité Permanente entre Organismos ha ideado el concepto de “comunidades en situación de riesgo”⁴³. En el momento en que se redactó el presente informe, el grupo temático había establecido 11 comunidades en situación de riesgo en todo el país, la mayoría de ellas en la zona oeste, que comprendían a unas 21.000 personas. Los grupos del barrio PK5 (Bangui), Boda (provincia de Lobaye), Carnot (provincia de Mambere-Kadeï) y Bouar (provincia de Nana Mambéré) son motivo de especial preocupación⁴⁴. Si bien a algunas de esas comunidades se las ha clasificado como comunidades en situación de riesgo más recientemente, otras, como Boali, Bossembélé y Yaloke (provincia de Ombella-Mpoko) llevan muchos meses clasificadas como tales. Una parte de la población de esas localidades ha huido al Camerún, lo que ha reducido el número de personas en situación de riesgo, pero ha contribuido a que la zona occidental de la República Centroafricana pierda sus comunidades musulmanas como consecuencia de la violencia por motivos sectarios y religiosos⁴⁵.

⁴¹ Véanse en el anexo 28 los comentarios metodológicos.

⁴² Se trata de una estimación sobre la base de la información a la que el Grupo tuvo acceso.

⁴³ El Grupo Temático de Protección utiliza tres indicadores para determinar si una comunidad está en situación de riesgo: la falta de libertad de movimiento, la violencia y la inseguridad generalizadas, y la falta de acceso a la ayuda humanitaria.

⁴⁴ El Grupo corroboró esta información mediante entrevistas y visitas a los lugares mencionados.

⁴⁵ Entrevista con el jefe de Grupo Temático de Protección, Bangui, 22 de mayo de 2014.

107. Hasta la fecha, según el Grupo Temático de Protección, se ha reubicado a miembros de la población musulmana en tres ocasiones en otras partes del país y en el Camerún: de Bossembélé el 17 de enero de 2014 (58 personas), de Bossangoa (provincia de Ouham) el 14 de abril de 2014 (540 personas, en la mayoría de los casos, el traslado fue organizado por la propia población) y de PK12 entre el 21 y el 30 de abril de 2014 (unas 1.300 personas).

108. La falta de acceso de la población civil a los servicios básicos (salud, educación y seguridad, entre otros) es generalizada y constituye un motivo de especial preocupación.

109. En el momento en que se redactó el presente informe, el Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia observa que, cuando ya ha transcurrido más de la mitad del actual curso escolar, siguen cerradas casi las dos terceras partes de las escuelas en la República Centroafricana³⁹. Según el Grupo Integrado de Educación del Comité Interinstitucional Permanente, entre el 1 de marzo de 2013 y el 30 de abril de 2014, han sufrido ataques 111 escuelas en la República Centroafricana⁴⁶. Esta cifra equivale al 33% del total de las escuelas de todo el país. No se dispone de datos sobre la fecha exacta en que se produjeron esos ataques, principalmente, debido a que los agentes humanitarios no tienen acceso a muchas partes del país, sobre todo a las zonas rurales⁴⁷. El Grupo pudo verificar el cierre de las escuelas durante las visitas sobre el terreno a Ndélé y Boda.

110. Durante el período mencionado anteriormente, el Grupo documentó siete casos en que los hospitales fueron el blanco de la actividad de los grupos armados. En todos los casos, los grupos armados atacaron los hospitales, robaron el equipo y entorpecieron la prestación de asistencia humanitaria a la población civil. Se ha informado sobre incidentes en Bangui, Ndélé, Boguila (provincia de Ouham), Bouar y Yongoro (provincia de Nana Mambéré). Uno de los incidentes se saldó con la muerte tres trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria en Boguila el 26 de abril de 2014 (véase el anexo 24).

111. En el período que abarca este informe, el Grupo documentó seis incidentes distintos de violencia sexual a partir de fuentes secundarias en la República Centroafricana (véanse el cap. II B y el anexo 30). El Grupo investigará el asunto de la violencia sexual en los próximos meses.

112. El Grupo ha registrado a partir de fuentes secundarias cinco casos distintos relacionados con la existencia de niños soldados, ocurridos todos ellos en el sureste del país y cometidos, al parecer, por fuerzas del Ejército de Resistencia del Señor. El UNICEF calcula que el número de niños soldados ha aumentado considerablemente en la República Centroafricana y que hasta 6.000 niños (personas menores de 18 años) han sido utilizados por todas las partes en el conflicto no solo como combatientes, sino también para desempeñar funciones de apoyo⁴⁸. Durante las visitas sobre el terreno realizadas hasta la fecha, el Grupo no observó la presencia de

⁴⁶ La definición de ataque que utiliza el Grupo Integrado de Educación abarca los siguientes casos: actos de pillaje llevados a cabo por grupos armados y por civiles, situaciones de ocupación por grupos armados, incendios intencionados, disparos con bala o cualquier otro tipo de munición, y la existencia de explosivos y municiones en las instalaciones.

⁴⁷ Véase <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/education> [versión francesa <https://cor.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/education>].

⁴⁸ Reunión celebrada con el UNICEF, 27 de mayo de 2014.

niños soldados entre los grupos armados, pero tiene la intención de seguir investigando este asunto que es motivo de especial preocupación.

VI. Recomendaciones

113. El Grupo recomienda que:

a) El Comité solicite a los países vecinos de la República Centroafricana que publiquen, con carácter anual, estadísticas exhaustivas sobre la importación y exportación de recursos naturales, incluidos los diamantes y el oro;

b) El Comité insta a todas las partes, entre ellas, a los países de la región de África Central, la INTERPOL y las organizaciones regionales y subregionales, a fomentar el intercambio de información y la acción conjunta para investigar y combatir las redes delictivas regionales que participan en la explotación y el comercio ilícitos de los recursos naturales, lo que incluye los animales salvajes y sus productos derivados;

c) El Comité insta a las autoridades de transición de la República Centroafricana a que adopten todas las medidas necesarias para:

i) Certificar al Comité que los miembros del personal de los servicios de defensa y seguridad identificados como integrantes de los grupos armados que operan en la República Centroafricana han sido apartados de sus cargos en las fuerzas de defensa y seguridad;

ii) Comunicar al Comité las medidas adoptadas por las autoridades de transición para garantizar una gestión segura de las armas y municiones, incluidos su registro, distribución, utilización y mantenimiento, y determinar las necesidades de capacitación e infraestructura.

Annex 1: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel (last updated on 25 May 2014)

| Country/ Other Entity | Number of letters sent | Requested information fully supplied | Information partially supplied | No answer | Pending* |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|------------------|-----------------|
| African Union | 1 | | | 1 | |
| BINUCA/UNDP | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Cameroun | 3 | | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Central African Republic | 2 | 2 | | | |
| People's Republic of China | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Republic of the Congo | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Gabon | 1 | 1 | | | |
| IWI | 2 | | 1 | | 1 |
| MAXAM | 1 | 1 | | | |
| MINUSCA | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Morocco | 1 | | 1 | | |
| SAMT | 1 | 1 | | | |
| SANGARIS | 2 | | 1 | | 1 |
| Senegal | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Steyr AUG | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Sudan | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Togo | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Ukraine | 1 | | | 1 | |
| TOTAL | 23 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 4 |

* Either the Member State or the entity indicated that a response is forthcoming, or the deadline has not expired at the time of drafting.

Annex 2: The political context of the Central African Republic

1. The current crisis is the culmination of several unresolved structural problems that have characterized the CAR for several decades. The permanence of *coups d'état* has deepened state fragility and ethnic divisions in both the administration and the armed forces, which has impeded economic progress and triggered a proliferation of non-state armed groups and of light weapons throughout the region.
2. As a result the country's political landscape is deeply fragmented, militarised and saturated with political actors showing little interest in finding sustainable and peaceful solutions to the crises.¹

A weakly institutionalized state

3. The delay in state building in the CAR has resulted in successive governments' inability to project substantive presence beyond the capital Bangui. This is mostly visible from security and administrative points of view. In fact, the state has never had the monopoly on the use of force in the country.² Successive governments' security forces were not just insufficiently equipped to provide basic security, but they have, in many ways like non-state armed groups, also been drivers of insecurity against civilians.³
4. Physical infrastructure is poorly developed with northern provinces being more marginalised and neglected than the southern ones, a situation that also owes to colonial patterns of state formation. Most rebel groups in the northeast cite this as one of their central grievances.⁴ Weak deployment of state institutions throughout the country means limited access to basic education, healthcare and other social services for a majority of the population. However, the recent professionalization of armed groups and their ambition to control physical territories is pushing them towards forms of political and security rule that could pre-empt governance arrangements with the central government in Bangui.⁵

¹ Panel's discussions with several local political actors, members of armed groups and academics in Bangui and Paris in March and May 2014.

² The Central African Republic in: Bertelsman Transformation Index 2014, accessed on 22 May 2014 at: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/caf/2014/index.nc>

³ Between 1981 and 2013 successive heads of State have demonstrated a pronounced suspicion towards the army which led to the marginalisation of armed forces to the benefit of presidential guards. Panel's discussions with political and security actors in Bangui, May 2014; several studies have well documented the very poor human rights record of the CAR security forces. For an overview, see: Sian Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan and Marielle Debos (2013), *State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?* Rapid literature review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

⁴ Panel's interview with two ex-Seleka leaders, Bangui, 19 May 2014.

⁵ The recent Seleka statements after the meeting in Ndélé on 10 May 2014 mentioning their ambition to partition the country and create a "Republic of North Ubangui" are the most visible manifestations of this trend so far. Although this secession claim is contested within Seleka ranks, it nevertheless indicates that stateless enclaves are not necessarily lacking political and security control. See: Emmanuel Chauvin,

A profusion of politico-military groups

5. Since the early 2000s, a fundamental aspect of the CAR political landscape has been the presence and increased activities of a multitude of rebel groups (also referred to as politico-military groups) that have taken control of large swaths of the CAR's territory. While the reasons for their creation and expansion vary greatly, most rebel groups have understood the potential benefits linked to the maintenance of armed elements as a tool for political bargaining during peace negotiations. Because conflict resolution mechanisms in the CAR have favoured consensual exit strategies (inclusive political dialogue, power-sharing) with guaranteed impunity for grave human rights violations, the formation of a rebel group has become an additional tool for many political entrepreneurs with presidential ambitions.⁶
6. The systematic practice of impunity in the past has therefore increased militarisation tendencies and widespread human rights violations. In the last ten years state and non-state armed groups increasingly overlap. The distinction between rebels, bandits (*zarguinas*, poachers, illicit miners) and representatives of the state is not always clear. Not only do allegiances between actors fluctuate greatly, but also several fighters happen to be simultaneously rebels, bandits and representatives of the state. Many combatants follow the rebellion – reintegration – defection trajectory.⁷ It has come to the attention of the Panel in Bangui that several members of the former Seleka and anti-Balaka (currently the most important rebel groups) fall into this category, particularly those in government.

Decreased influence of political parties

7. In the last 20 years, the multiplication of politico-military groups has largely eclipsed political parties, which have struggled to exist in a context dominated by militarisation of social discontent.⁸ As a result of state capture by rebel groups, the space for political parties has been reduced and their capacity to mobilise social groups has suffered.
8. With the exception of independence, the last time a political party came to power without resorting to violence was in 1993 when Patassé's *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain* (MLPC) claimed victory and assumed power for 10 years. To date, there is no political party with nationwide representation and coverage.

Christian Seignobos (2014), L'Imbroglia Centrafricain. Etats, rebelles et bandits: La fusion des territoires; To be published in: Afrique Contemporaine, in 2014.

⁶ The leader of a political party in the CAR calls this 'the country's reward for violence'. Panel's interview in Bangui, 19 May 2014. See also : International Crisis Group (2007), RCA, Anatomie d'un état fantôme, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No 136, p.26

⁷ Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian combatants in the Central African Republic; African Affairs, Vol. 107, No 427, p.226.. E. Chauvin, C. Seignobos (2014) *ibid*.

⁸ Andreas Mehler (2009), Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR; Working Paper No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Accessed on 23 April 2014 at: http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wp116_mehler.pdf

9. The main political parties of the last 30 years (Kolingba's *Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain* (RDC), Patassé's MLPC and Bozizé's presidential coalition known as *Kwa na Kwa* (KNK)) hardly survived the ousting of their initiator, indicating their lack of ideological and social rooting. In fact, there are to date about 60 registered political parties in the CAR and it is rather unclear how representative they are at the moment, owing to the irregularity of elections under Bozizé. The result is a fragmentation of the party landscape and the persistence of personality-driven and ethnically based parties.⁹

Large presence of foreign combatants and implications

10. A recent development within politico-military groups is the increasingly large presence of foreign elements and particularly their direct involvement in political and military processes. Their presence in the CAR is the direct consequence of the decades long interconnection of local crises that have formed a regional conflict system between Chad, Sudan and the CAR characterised by historic transnational networks and cross-border activities in the tri-border zone.¹⁰
11. The porous nature of borders, historical patterns of living (including nomadism and an increasingly violent pastoralism)¹¹ and the existence of clan family links across borders have

⁹ After the demise of Bozizé's regime in March 2013, political parties have attempted to build electoral groupings in order to maximise their chances in the post-transition elections expected to take place in 2015. As a result, 3 main coalitions of political parties currently dominate the political scene. However, the Panel could note the opportunistic nature of these groupings, which makes them vulnerable to regular change. The first grouping is the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Transition* (AFDT), which is centred around the MLPC, the former ruling party under President Patassé now led by his former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé. In addition to the MLPC, the AFDT is composed of the *Alliance pour la solidarité et le développement* (ASD), the *Convention républicaine pour le progrès social* (CRPS) and the *Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain* (RDC). The second coalition consists of the parties that formed the former presidential majority under President Bozizé. It is currently led by his former communication minister Cyriaque Ngonda and is organized around the Kwa na Kwa. The third grouping, the *Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (ACDP) is comprised of parties from both former opposition and presidential majorities. It mainly claims to stand for a democratic renewal in contrast to the AFDT and KNK, which are linked to the previous regimes of Patassé and Bozizé.

¹⁰ Roland Marchal, *Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI* No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf. Paris. p.4

¹¹ The Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures have always been very popular among Chadian and Sudanese herders who come to the CAR to pasture their herds. In recent decades, these foreign herders have acquired firearms, which they often use against local populations. In addition to being illegal, this activity is potentially detrimental to the CAR's ecosystem in the region. For some government members, Chad openly ignores existing bilateral arrangements that regulate this transhumance sphere. Panel's interview with a current Transition Government member who previously served in former governments. Bangui, March 2014.

transformed the tri-border zone into a territory where civilians, traders, bandits and rebel groups are used to cross borders. The crisis in the CAR can therefore not be fully understood without taking into account the specific trajectory of mostly Chadian and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese combatants of various social provenances who have been roaming in the region for decades offering their skills to a multitude of clients across the borders of the tri-zone region.¹²

12. The composition of individual rebel groups forming the Seleka is representative of this trend without being unique in the Central African Republic's political history. In fact, the involvement of foreign elements in military-political battles started under Patassé who resorted to Libyan troops to protect his power, which had been threatened by a series of army mutinies and rebellions.
13. These rebellions, particularly the one led by the then former chief of staff Bozizé, were also comprised of substantial amounts of foreign fighters, mostly from Chad.¹³ However, the negative memory of Patassé's militarised response to mutinies and rebellions is rather linked to the support he got from foreign fighters from the DRC's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) led by the former warlord turned vice-president and subsequently ICC defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba.¹⁴
14. President Patassé was eventually ousted on 13 March 2003 and François Bozizé assumed power inaugurating a new era of rebel groups mostly composed and supported by foreign elements. President Bozizé subsequently relied heavily on both elements of the *Armée Nationale du Tchad* (ANT) and some former Chadian 'Liberators'¹⁵ to rebuild his Presidential Guard and the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), the CAR armed forces. This strongly contributed to the widespread perception that Chad was the main mentor and patron of Bozizé's regime and by extension of the CAR as a country.¹⁶
15. Bozizé himself lost his power to a rebel coalition that displays a number of similar features like the one that had helped him to conquer the presidency ten years earlier: a rebel coalition comprised of several Chadian and Sudanese fighters, as well as support from Chad and other countries in the region despite the presence of a regional stabilization force. Because of this and

¹² The conflict system between Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR also involves to a lesser extent the DRC and Uganda. It is however not unique in Africa where a similar 'nomadism of combatants' was observed in the Mano river conflicts in West Africa. See Marielle Debos (2008), *Fluid Loyalties*, op.cit.

¹³ ICG (2007), *ibid.* p. 16.

¹⁴ The brutal intervention of Bemba's forces alongside Patassé's Presidential Guard in 2002-2003 did not prevent Patassé's fall in 2003

¹⁵ Chadian Liberators are former unemployed Chadian soldiers that were recruited to fight alongside Bozizé's successful campaign to topple President Patassé in 2003. Many of them fell out with him and joined other rebel movements that later formed the Seleka and ousted Bozizé in 2013.

¹⁶ Michel Luntumbue et Simon Massock, 'Afrique Centrale, Risques et envers de la pax-tchadiana; Note d'Analyse du Groupe de Recherches et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP), 2014, pp 2-4.

other political developments, the CAR crisis cannot be understood without its regional dimension.¹⁷

The current transition

16. The incapacity of the Seleka to enforce a semblance of order and security in the country, including the capital, exposed the group's lack of governance capacity and ultimately prompted its downfall. In a combined diplomatic effort, France and ECCAS countries (particularly Chad and Congo) obtained the demise of the Seleka leadership on 10 January 2014 at an extraordinary summit of the regional organisation held in N'Djamena.
17. The removal of President Djotodia by ECCAS is an unprecedented move that reflects both the regional organisation's involvement in the crisis and the CAR's dependence on its neighbours. This paved the way to a new transition led by Catherine Samba-Panza who was elected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) on 20 January 2014.
18. Initial hopes of a new beginning did not increase security for the population. On the contrary, fighting between the former Seleka and the anti-Balaka continued in several parts of the country as did targeted inter-communal killings that contributed to the misleading framing of the crisis in CAR as a religious conflict. The deployment of MISCA troops alongside the French forces (under operation SANGARIS) prevented worse from happening but did not stop the killing of civilians. The interim government was facing a number of structural problems that needed immediate attention: state coffers were empty, civil servants had not been paid for several months, and the administration was not functioning because of internal displacement and the slow deployment of international troops¹⁸.

Political agreements

19. Although marginal, episodic contestations around the legitimacy of the current transition have the potential to derail the Transitional Government as they touch upon the sensitive issue of representation in a context of increased identity politics.¹⁹ The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Bozizé's seizure of power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the CAR followed by a series of agreements that, according to several actors, have not seriously been implemented. Bozizé's fall can among others be blamed on his lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in DDR.

¹⁷ Panel's telephone discussion with Roland Marchal, March 2014 ; see also Roland Marchal, *Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI* No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceci/sites/ceci/sciencespo.fr.ceci/files/etude153_154.pdf], and Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, *Mapping conflict motives: The Central African Republic*, Antwerpen: IPIS. 2009

¹⁸ It took the European Union about 3 months between the decision to deploy and the actual deployment of 800 soldiers to the CAR (EUFOR-CAR). The first soldiers only arrived in April 2014 and took control of the Bangui airport in order to allow the French troops to deploy elsewhere within the country.

¹⁹ Panel's discussions with political actors and representatives of anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka movements in May 2014 in Bangui could establish a growing contestation of the legitimacy of some transitional institutions like the Transitional National Council and the government.

Four main agreements were signed between Bozizé's government and different rebel groups.

- The first one was signed in Sirte (Libye) with the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) on 2 February 2007;
- The second one was signed on 13 April 2007 with the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR);
- The third accord was signed with the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie* (APRD) on 9 May 2007.
- In order to harmonise all these agreements a fourth one was signed in Libreville in June 2008 between the government and the three rebel groups.²⁰

20 For a good analysis of peace agreements signed between 2007 and 2008, see Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta (2013), *Gouvernance, rebellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA. Comprendre les crises centrafricaines*. Note d'Analyse du GRIP, pp. 2-5

Annex 3: Neighbouring countries' contributions to the implementation of resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014)

A. Cameroon

1. The CAR shares an 800 km long land border with Cameroon that culminates in a tri-border zone with Chad in the North and another one with the Republic of Congo in the south. This western border is vital for the CAR as it is the passing point for all goods entering and exiting the country.¹

2. Since the renewed outbreak of violence in December 2013, Cameroon has received 80,004 refugees from the CAR bringing the total number of CAR refugees in Cameroon to about 191,265 people.² Cameroon is the country with the highest amount of refugees from CAR.

3. Among those fleeing the violence since March 2013 has also been a minority of ex-FACA who were duly disarmed and cantoned in various sites in Bertoua and Douala. Around 150 ex-FACA were concerned.³ These soldiers remain in Cameroon in expectation of a return to the CAR once conditions for the reform of the army have been put in place. Before being asked to leave Cameroon where he had sought refuge after leaving his country and where he had stayed for a couple of months, President Bozizé was actively pursuing his objective of 'restoring the constitutional order' using various channels including propaganda by some organisations led by his supporters.⁴ President Bozizé arrived in Cameroon on a CAR governmental helicopter that was seized by Cameroonian authorities in expectation of their retrocession to CAR.⁵

4. Cameroon has taken a number of measures to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014), including tightening controls on goods and passengers at the border area with the CAR, a region already considered as a priority security area because of intense activities of *zaraguinas* and other armed groups in the region. Having ratified the Kinshasa Convention, Cameroon has also undertaken additional steps to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons in the country. An Inter-ministerial Committee has been set up that is comprised of all departments affected by the crisis in the CAR.⁶ The aim of this Committee is to coordinate the Government's responses to the crisis and improve much-needed inter-departmental communication. Cameroon has also tightened up the screening of goods arriving at the Douala seaport and destined to the CAR.

¹ The Cameroonian port of Douala is the nearest access the CAR has to the sea.

² Since the 1990s Cameroon has received successive waves of refugees fleeing war, widespread insecurity and hunger in the CAR. See UNHCR, Central African Republic Situation; UNHCR external Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014.

³ Meetings with Cameroonian government authorities and diplomats, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁴ Levi Yakité's Mouvement de Résistance Populaire pour la Refondation de Centrafrique (MRPRC) was one of the most active groups in this regard.

⁵ Meeting with a diplomat in Yaoundé, April 2014; meeting with Foreign Ministry officials in Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁶ Those are the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Territorial administration and decentralization (chair), Interior and finally Customs and the Presidency.

5. Through CEMAC and ECCAS Cameroon has also participated in regional diplomatic, security and financial efforts to settle the crisis and implement Security Council resolutions. In addition to providing 850 military and police troops to MISCA.⁷ Cameroon has also contributed its share of financial support to the Transitional Government⁸.

6. However, Cameroon faces several challenges in fulfilling its duty of implementing resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014); the difficulty to monitor movements across the long and porous CAR-Cameroon border is certainly one of the most important. The limited capacity of the police and the army in terms of vehicles to patrol, well-trained manpower and the chronic problem of lack of fuel make any systematic border control difficult. There are, however, some exceptions to this. The *Brigade d'Intervention Rapide* (BIR), a better equipped, trained and motivated elite corps within the army has often been called to the rescue of overwhelmed regular troops.⁹ However the 10,000 strong BIR is currently much occupied on Cameroon's western border where Boko Haram has been abducting European and Chinese nationals from Cameroon's territory, posing new challenges to Cameroonian security agents. In some instances, the BIR has also been deployed within national parks to confront increasingly armed poachers.

B. Gabon

7. The Republic of Gabon does not border the CAR and has not been affected by refugee flows like its northern neighbours.¹⁰ No movements of arms have been recorded into or from the country as a consequence of the crisis in the CAR.¹¹ Gabon has mediated successive crises in the CAR until it handed over to the RoC and has provided a substantial amount of diplomatic and financial resources in the past. Today, the country provides 850 military and police personnel to MISCA.

8. As poaching has intensified in Central African, Congolese and Cameroonian forests, the Republic of Gabon has increased its border monitoring activities because the forest that runs across the four countries is regarded as a common good.

C. The Republic of Congo (RoC)

9. The RoC has a common border with the CAR in the north. About 16,000 refugees have arrived from the CAR since December 2013. A small number of these refugees were armed and have

7 MISCA's Military Commander, General Tumenta, is from Cameroon.

8 CEMAC and ECCAS countries have all contributed 5 billion CFA francs (about 10 million USD) to help paying salaries in the CAR and partly fund MISCA.

9 Meeting with an official from the National Police of Cameroon, Yaoundé, April 2014.

10 According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, around 200 CAR refugees have been registered in Gabon; meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 24 April 2014.

11 Meeting with the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, Libreville, April 2014.

subsequently been disarmed and cantoned in refugee camps in Impfundo, Betou, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville.¹²

10. At the political and diplomatic level, the RoC has taken over the mediation of the crisis from Gabon and chairs the International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR). Congo also maintains the highest amount of military and police personnel (roughly 1000) within MISCA and provides the political head of the mission. Both at the regional and bilateral levels, the Government of Congo has often assisted the CAR authorities financially. The RoC was the first ECCAS' country to provide 10 million USD assistance, which helped paying the salaries of CAR civil servants in March 2014 at a time when social expectations about the new transitional Government were very high.

11. Similar to Cameroon, the RoC has put in place a ministerial coordination framework aimed at harmonising the country's actions regarding the crisis in the CAR. It is headed by the RoC Presidency.

12. For the RoC, the tri-border zone between Cameroon, Congo and the CAR is problematic because of increased poaching activities that deplete the country's forests of valuable resources. In general, the RoC's assessment of the crisis in the CAR is that it has the potential to spill across the border and sow divisions in a country that slowly recovers from its civil war of the late 1990s.

13. Measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) include increased monitoring of the border and the screening of arms movements. However, due the fact that the border zones are covered with dense forest, the RoC struggles to monitor movements and admits that there are multiple unknown footpads that could be used by violent entrepreneurs. Some officials also think that a better management of Congo's border with the CAR could start with the proper demarcation of the border, a step that is to be understood in the framework of long-term conflict prevention.¹³

¹² Meetings with government officials, Brazzaville, May 2014.

¹³ Meetings with officials at the Interior Ministry, Brazzaville, May 2014.

Annex 4: Other armed groups

1. The Panel received five reports of incidents in the region of Paoua (Ouham-Pendé province) from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 involving a group described as composed of armed elements formerly part of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR), formerly commanded by Chadian rebel Abdelkader Babba Laddé, with a total of 26 casualties, including civilians, and hundreds of incidents of destruction of properties.

2. In the same region, an armed group called *Révolution et Justice* (RJ), commanded by Armel Bedaya alias Armel Sayo,¹ with the rank of Captain in the FACA, and who is known as the son-in-law and bodyguard of former President Ange-Félix Patassé, is allegedly responsible for the killing of four civilians on 28 January 2014, an intrusion into a humanitarian compound on 4 March 2014, and an attack on MISCA troops in the district of Ngaoundaye, bordering Cameroon, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the destruction of one military truck.

3. According to the Panel's database, an armed group identified as part of the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) of Abdullaye Miskine,² formerly allied with Armel Bedaya,³ is allegedly responsible of the killing of one civilian during a clash with French forces in the vicinity of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambere province) on 2 April 2014, located twenty kilometres from Garoua-Boulai, and for one incident of looting of property committed on 14 April 2014 in the same area. During a mission to the region, the Panel was told that attacks on international forces by FDPC are happening on a regular basis, and were described as involving most of time around 20 fighters either by foot or on motorbikes.⁴

4. In the Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangora provinces, the presence of individuals bearing distinctive signs of Janjaweed from the Dafur region of Sudan was confirmed by multiple sources and institutional contacts of the Panel. Also, the Panel documented one incident of an attack against humanitarian aid workers in Ndele involving alleged Janjaweed militiamen.

5. Lastly, concerning the activity of small groups associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its presence was reported in the regions of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Haute and Basse-Kotto, the Panel documented in its database two killing of civilians, eight incidents of kidnapping of civilians (including 5 cases where the victims were released within approximately 48 hours), and three cases of looting and destruction of properties. The LRA has been moving during the past year deeper into the CAR territory, in reaction to increasing military pressure from African Union-Regional Task Force (AU/RTF).

¹ See annex 4.1.

² Abdullaye Miskine is included in the annex of US President Obama's executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

³ See annex 4.2.

⁴ Meeting with international forces, Béloko, 26 April 2014.

Annex 4.1: Armel Bedaya Sayo and “Révolution et Justice”

*Armel Bedaya Sayo delivering a speech to “Révolution et Justice” troops
(screenshots of a video allegedly taken in January 2014)¹*



¹ Video accessed on 1 April 2014 at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ybPTiMffLM>

Armel Bedaya Sayo with youths belonging to “Révolution et Justice” during a joint humanitarian operation with MISCA and UNHCR, on 31 March 2014



Annex 4.2: Abdullaye Miskine and Armel Bedaya Sayo

*Abdullaye Miskine (left) and Armel Bedaya Sayo
(picture allegedly taken in 2013)²*



² Accessed on 8 April 2014 at: <http://tchadonline.com/index.php/ufacard-communique-de-presse-crise-en-rca/ufacard-general-abdoulaye-miskine-et-commandant-armel-sayo-18-04-2013-17-01-55/>

Annex 5: Anti-Balaka - Structure and dynamics

History

1. The appellation “anti-Balaka” first appeared in the district of Bossangoa (Ouham) in mid-September 2013, following coordinated attacks conducted in the outskirts of Bossangoa on 6 and 7 September 2013 by militia then described by media as “pro-Bozizé armed men”.¹ The armed insurgency against Seleka troops then spread to the districts of Bouca (Ouham), Boali, Bossembélé and Bessemtélé (Ombella-Mpoko).
2. As confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, including anti-Balaka, and institutional contacts, FACA and *Gendarmes* personnel loyal to former President François Bozizé² were then recruiting youths from local communities from the Baya area (Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko provinces), some of them already part of hunting groups or self-defence militias called “*archers*”, created mainly in the mid-2000s in response to the activities of “*coupeurs de route*” or “*zaraguinas*”³, but also in the region of Garoua Boulai (border town between Cameroon and the CAR) and Zongo (DRC), a city located opposite to Bangui, on the DRC side of the Oubangui river.⁴
3. On 5 December 2013, around a thousand militia men conducted a coordinated attack by foot on Bangui, coming from at least three directions (international airport, Boy-Rabe/Cité Jean XIII neighbourhoods and Zongo), while groups of youth from the 4th and 8th arrondissements of Bangui, strongholds of the “*Coalition Citoyenne d’Opposition aux Rébellions Armées*” (COCORA) and “*Comité d’Organisation des Actions Citoyennes*” (COAC) created by key figures of President Bozizé’s *entourage* in December 2012 to track down supporters of the Seleka in Bangui, were also erecting barricades and harassing former Seleka troops in the capital.
4. At the same time, the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*”, commanded by a nephew of François Bozizé, Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’,⁵ and Mike Stève Yambété,

¹ « Centrafrique: des villages autour de Bossangoa sous le contrôle d’hommes armés pro-Bozizé », RFI, 8 September 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130908-centrafrique-villages-autour-bossangoa-sous-controle-hommes-armes-pro-bozize/>, accessed on 15 April 2014 ; see also annex 5.5 on Bossangoa.

² François Bozizé was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

³ Armed banditry in the region of northern Cameroon, southern Chad and north-west of the CAR has been extensively documented by researchers, in particular Louisa Lombard and Marielle Debos, and human rights organisations, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

⁴ According to UN sources in DRC, anti-Balaka groups continue to pose a security threat in the region of Zongo.

⁵ Also brother of Maxime Mokom, military coordinator of the CLPC, Colonel “Rocco” was killed on 11 May 2014 while driving a motorbike together with Camille Lepage, a French photojournalist.

founder of the COAC with the rank of Lieutenant in the FACA,⁶ based out of the region of Garoua Boulai, led its first military offensive on Cantonnier, on the other side of the border, and Béloko,⁷ clashing with former Seleka troops commanded by General Saïd Souleymane, of Sudanese origin, based in Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), who was eventually killed on 21 January 2014 while former Seleka troops were withdrawing towards southern Chad and eastern CAR. According to a diplomatic source in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian territory has been used by former President François Bozizé and his supporters to prepare the offensive on Bangui.⁸

Current status

5. The Panel classifies the anti-Balakas in four different categories:

- The first group, named “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC), is based out of the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui and operates in the north of the city, up to the town of Damara,⁹ and is issuing identification badges to its members, including in Carnot.¹⁰ It is coordinated at the military level by Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’,¹¹ a former FACA, and at the political level by a businessman named Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona,¹² former Youth and Sports Minister of the last Bozizé’s government, founder of the COCORA and president of the CAR Football federation.¹³
- The second group, which representation has shifted from Joachim Kokaté, adviser to the Primer Minister of the Transition with the rank of Captain in the FACA,¹⁴ to Sébastien Wénézoui, a 33 years-old engineer related to François Bozizé’s daughter Joséphine Kéléfio. The group, known as the “group of the anti-Balakas from the south”, is headed by the Chief-Corporal of the FACA Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Rombhot’ and FACA Lieutenant Gilbert Kamezoulai, and operates mainly in the southwest of the capital, out of the neighbourhood of PK9, and the towns of Bimbo, Bérengo, Pissa and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), racketing transport of goods and passengers as observed by the Panel.¹⁵

⁶ Stève Yambété was according to several sources still jailed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the time of drafting, after being arrested on 17 January 2014 by Cameroonian authorities for attacking the Ecobank agency in Béloko, alongside the *Gendarme* Sabe and Rochael Mokom.

⁷ See also annex 5.1.

⁸ Meeting with a diplomatic source, Yaoundé, 16 April 2014.

⁹ See annex 5.2.

¹⁰ See annex 5.3.

¹¹ Meeting with ‘Colonel 12 puissances’, 22 March 2014.

¹² Meeting and telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 and 20 May 2014.

¹³ <http://fr.cafonline.com/association/central-african/information>, accessed on 28 May 2014.

¹⁴ Meetings and telephone conversation with Joachim Kokaté, Bangui, 20 March, 26 April and 3 May 2014.

¹⁵ Meeting with ‘Rombhot’, Mbaiki, 21 April 2014; meeting with ‘Rombhot’ and Kamezoulai, Bimbo, 26 May 2014; see also annex 5.4.

- The third category regroups local armed militias, mainly located in the south-west of the country (Mambere-kadei, Sangha Mbaere and Lobaye provinces), like in Guen and Gadzi,¹⁶ but also in some neighbourhoods of Bangui where 72 anti-Balaka groups were identified.¹⁷ In Bangui, former *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* - APRD - commander Jean-Jacques Larma alias 'Larmassou', has reportedly control of a neighbourhood south of the airport, although the CLPC claimed that 'Larmassou' was a fake anti-Balaka. He was arrested on 28 February by 'Colonel 12 puissances',¹⁸ and freed under unclear circumstances.
- The fourth group, whose command structure is mainly composed of FACA and *Gendarmes* of Baya origin, is the backbone of the original military insurgency against Seleka, and does not have any political figurehead. It still controls directly the road from Cantonnier (border post with Cameroon) to Bangui, and more specifically the towns of Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), Bozoum (Ouham Pendé province), and Bossangoa (Ouham province), Bossembélé and all the checkpoints from Boali to the PK 12 neighbourhood of Bangui (Ombella-Mpoko province). The Panel obtained information that troops were gathering during the months of March and April 2014 in the area of Ben Zambé (Ouham province), place of origin of Bozizé's family located east of Bossangoa, where the presence in a training capacity of Teddy Bozizé, François Bozizé's adoptive son, with the rank of Captain in the FACA, was eye witnessed by individuals interviewed by the Panel.¹⁹

6. The idiosyncratic complexity of the structure of the anti-Balaka is reinforced by the fluidity which characterizes the relationship between its different components. For example, Ngaïssona and Wénézoui claim to represent 'Rombhot', or to control the anti-Balaka groups in Boda and Bouar. Also, Minister Leopold Narcisse Bara, officially appointed by the Transitional Head of State as a representative of the anti-Balaka movement, but not recognised as such,²⁰ is perceived as being behind the initiative of the Reconciliation Minister, Antoinette Montaigne, that led to the election on 15 May 2014 of Sébastien Wenezoui, former CLPC deputy spokesperson, as general coordinator of

¹⁶ See also annex 29.

¹⁷ Meeting with a transitional government official, Bangui, 27 May 2014.

¹⁸ Meeting with 'Colonel 12 Puissances', op. cit.; meeting with a confidential source member of the anti-Balaka, Bangui, 24 March 2014; see also Tweet from @lesamisdesiloe on 28 February 2014: #Centrafrique RNL - Thierry Libéré allias 12 puissances responsable Anti balaka a arrêté lieutenant Jean Jacques Larmassou après enquête, accessed at <https://twitter.com/lesamisdesiloe/status/439388030324191232> on 28 May 2014.

¹⁹ Meetings with local authorities, anti-Balaka representative, UN officials and international forces, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014; see also case study on Bossangoa, in annex 5.5.

²⁰ Meetings with anti-Balaka political and military leaders, March-May 2014.

the anti-Balaka movement. The leader of the CLPC, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, has qualified this election as a “farce”.²¹

7. The initiative of the Government seems to have weakened Ngaïssona’s group, with a disparate coalition of groups henceforth under the banner of Wénézoui, which main common ground appears to be opposition to Ngaïssona and the Baya ethnic group. Several defections of senior commanders of the CLPC, including its former military coordinator and nephew of former President Bozizé, Maxime Mokom, brother of ‘Colonel Rocco’, were reported to the Panel on 27 May 2014, in connection with the election of Wénézoui as representative of the “anti-Balaka from the South”. At the same time, Yvon Konaté’s vehicle was targeted by a grenade attack in the neighbourhood of Cité Jean XIII in Bangui.

8. The Panel also documented the significant presence in the chain of command of the above-mentioned different groups of personnel from the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) – including from the Presidential Guard, e.g. Yvon Konaté – and the *Gendarmerie*, who are still in some cases on the payroll of the current Government, and of individuals who were closely connected to former President François Bozizé and his family. The CAR Transitional Authorities have identified 89 members of the FACA within the group commanded by ‘Rombhot’ only,²² and the Panel obtained independently information that the first and fourth group are largely commanded and trained by FACA officers and non-commissioned officers, *Gendarmes* and some police officers.

9. In addition, the Panel was able to confirm information that the fourth group was at the time of writing the one carrying out the military offensive on the front line in the area of Ben Zambé, in particular in the town of Bouca, alongside a group commanded by Andilo Ngaïbona alias ‘Angelo’, and in the town Dékoa, with reinforcements coming from the towns of Bozoum and Bossembélé, clashing on a regular basis with the forces of Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat, appointed in Ndélé as deputy chief of staff of the “new” Seleka.

10. However, the Panel could not confirm the involvement of any known anti-Balaka military commander in the region of Grimari, where troops of both Alkhatim and Brigadier-General Ali Daras (of Peulh origin) are regularly involved in clashes with groups of anti-Balaka, as observed by the Panel on 20 May 2014.²³ According to a military source, the groups of anti-Balaka attacking Grimari and Bambari would be partly coming from the district of Kouango (Ouaka province), at the border with DRC.

²¹ Telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 20 May 2014; Press communiqué number 11, received on 18 May 2014.

²² Meeting with a Defence official, Bangui, 23 April 2014; see also annex 5.4.

²³ During its road mission to Bambari, the Panel could observe of group of 20 anti-Balakas coming out of the bush by foot on the road from Grimari to Bambari.

Relationship with Transitional Authorities

11. The Transitional Head of State, Ms. Samba-Panza, met for the first time at the end of January 2014 with representatives of the anti-Balaka, which was followed by a split between Ngaïssona, Kokaté and Bara. The first was accused of promoting the interest of the Baya ethnic group only, the second of switching affiliations too frequently²⁴ and the latter was denied any form of legitimacy over the anti-Balaka, and suspected of promoting Bozizé's return.

12. However, the Authorities then decided to exclude Ngaïssona's group from the political process, appointing Bara as Minister of Youth and Kokaté as an adviser to the Primer Minister, leading coincidentally to a peak of violence in Bangui in March 2014.²⁵ Similarly, the level of violence in the capital reduced drastically after the issuance of a press communiqué by Ngaïssona on 4 April 2014, calling for a cease-fire and restoration of peace.²⁶

13. On 17 April 2014, the Head of State of the Transitional Authorities met again with a dozen of representatives of anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, at the Presidency. Following the meeting, Ngaïssona was arrested by the MISCA, in accordance with an arrest warrant issued by CAR judicial authorities, then handed-over to the Gendarmerie, and subsequently placed under judicial supervision by the Prosecutor's office in Bangui. This indicates further that Transitional Authorities and the international community have difference of views with regard to the strategy towards anti-Balaka leadership, as outlined in the executive summary of this report.²⁷

14. Lastly, the Panel obtained information that a group of anti-Balaka represented at a reconciliation meeting organised by a Christian INGO was during the same week involved in violent clashes on 25 May 2014 with Muslim self-defence militias based in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

15. According to an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, the current Government is planning to implement with the anti-Balaka a strategy based on a memorandum of understanding, which would be signed by Ngaïssona and the CAR Defence Minister. This document, not yet signed at the time of writing, would include more specifically a process of registering, demobilization and reintegration of members of the anti-Balaka into their communities of origin.²⁸ However, this approach may change in light of recent events.

²⁴ For example, on 24 February 2010, Joachim Kokaté was appointed 'coordinator' of the "*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix*" (CPJP) of Abdoulaye Issène, now coordinator of the "new" Seleka; see annex 5.7.

²⁵ See annex 5.6.

²⁶ See annex 5.8.

²⁷ Meeting with judicial authorities, Bangui, 25 April 2014.

²⁸ Meeting with an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

Annex 5.1: Anti-Balakas in Cantonnier, Béloko and Bouar (Nana Mambéré Province)

1. The Panel observed presence of anti-Balaka elements at the main Béloko-Garoua Boulai border crossing between the Central African Republic and Cameroon. From the village of Cantonnier, located at the border, these forces control an illegal border crossing just south of the official border. They were initially part of the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*” and composed mainly of former FACA officers who fled to Cameroon after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui.

‘Colonel’ Aron Wilibona (center, pointing his shotgun at the camera) and Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’ (right, with the cap), after taking over Cantonnier, in January 2014 (screenshot from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source)¹



2. This crossing is used to smuggle petrol and other merchandise, which is subjected to illegal taxes. The crossing is also used to smuggle ammunition (see also chapter III). In addition, forces also intervene whenever customs officers seize illegal imports of ammunition and drugs hidden in vehicles using the official border crossing, creating havoc to put pressure to release goods.

¹ Video archived at the UN.

Pick-up truck vehicle mounted with a light machine-gun, Cantonnier, January 2014 (source: ibid.)



3. Anti-Balaka elements with FACA background in Béloko told the Panel on 27 April 2014 that “Colonel” Aron Wilibona was still in command of the anti-Balaka from Cantonnier/Béloko to Bouar, capital of the province of Nana Mambéré.

Anti-Balaka in Cantonnier in front of a vehicle with painted inscriptions mentioning “Hibou-Rouge” and “Balaka”, making reference to the “Patrouilles Hiboux” (‘owls patrols’), nicknames of the “Compagnies éclairs”, special units of the Police based in Bangui and accused of tracking opponents to former President Bozizé at night (source: ibid.)



Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’, instructing a group of anti-Balaka to patrol the road from Damara (Ombella-Mpoko Province) to Sibut (Kémo Province)¹

ORDRE DE MISSION

Le soussigné, colonel Thierry LEBENE alias 12 Puissances, honneur pouvoir ordonner à mes éléments dont les noms sont cités ci-dessous de s'installer dans le village OMBELLA et de patrouiller dans la zone OMBELLA-SIBUT en vue d'identification des faux ANTIBALAKAS qui sèment la terreur dans la dite zone au noms de ANTIBALAKAS.

Chef de mission : GOANA Alban

1. Mr WEDANE Rock ;
2. Mr POUSSIDAMA Trésor ;
3. Mr BADAKARA Sébastien ;
4. BANGUE Alban ;
5. SELEBANGUE Ollida ;
6. IBLUK AZOR ;
7. SIMADORO Felix ;
8. DELEGUE Zacharie ;
9. SELEBANGUE Christophe ;
10. FEIKOUMON Augustin
11. NGAÏDAMA David ;
12. NDOROM Junior ;
13. GAZAYEKE Paulin.

Date de retour : Fin de mission

En foi de quoi le présent ordre de mission est établi pour valoir et servir ce que de droit.

Fait à Bangui le 17/02/2014

Le Commandant de la compagnie

Thierry Lébéné

Col. Thierry LEBENE alias 12 Puissances

Tél : (00236)72659569/72757709/72627962

17 FEV 2014
à le chef de poste du service P.M

chef de poste
OUYASSI
72 26 26 44


¹ Copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014.

Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)

*Badge of the anti-Balaka coordinator in Damara
(recto and verso – photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 23 March 2014)*



*Badge of a chief of post in Bangui
(copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014)*



*Badge of an anti-Balaka fighter in Carnot (Mambere-Kadei)
(photograph taken by the Panel in Carnot on 26 April 2014)*



Annex 5.4: Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Colonel Rombhot’

1. Anti-Balaka forces operating under FACA Chief-Corporal Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Colonel Rombhot’ exercise a significant degree of control over road transport into Bangui from the southern transport axis linking the country with Cameroon. On the 107 kilometre stretch of road between Bangui and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), the Panel observed the presence of Rombhot’s forces at seven different checkpoints, starting from PK 9, i.e. nine kilometres from Bangui city centre. In the towns of Cekia and Pissa, Rombhot’s forces are in uniform, identify themselves as FACA, and operate alongside regular forestry, police and road maintenance agents. Rombhot personally collects part of the taxes, which amounts to about 200 USD per barrier per week.

‘Colonel Rombhot’ and his ‘sister’, during a meeting with the Panel in Pissa, on 24 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



Rombhot’s forces also tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot’s elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives.

Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham Province)

1. The Panel conducted a two-day road mission to Bossangoa between 30 April and 1 May 2014, to interview a representative of a local anti-Balaka group, local authorities, United Nations officials and international forces. The Panel also met with religious authorities from Bossangoa in Bangui on 23 April 2014.

2. Bossangoa has played a key role in the crisis. As the capital of the Baya's region, it represents a symbol of the former regime of François Bozizé, and the region is commonly depicted as his family's stronghold and the berth of his power.

3. The region of Bossangoa is where the first military operations against forces of the former Seleka coalition were planned and conducted in early September 2013, during which killings of scores of civilians were also reported. In retaliation, many villages perceived by the Seleka as supporting the insurgency were burnt down by Seleka forces based out of Bossangoa, causing also civilian casualties.¹

4. Seleka forces in Bossangoa were at that time commanded by Général Yaya, who was killed in Bangui on 5 December 2013, and his deputy, Colonel Saleh Zabadi, who is currently the zone commander in Batangafo under the authority of Brigadier-General Alkatim Mahamat based in Sido.

5. According to analysis of satellite imagery conducted by UNOSAT (see annex 5.5.1), 227 buildings were probably destroyed in Bossangoa before 5 December 2013, and 1,007 buildings were destroyed between 5 December 2013 and 28 February 2014. Testimonies obtained by the Panel in Bossangoa and Bangui from eyewitnesses and local authorities describe three different waves of destruction:

- Before 5 December 2013: most of the destruction and lootings of properties were conducted by forces of General Yaya, in retaliation of the attacks carried out by anti-Balakas in the outskirts of Bossangoa;
- Between 5 December 2013 and 22 January 2014: the destruction of buildings was related to the attack of anti-Balaka groups on Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 in retaliation of actions of Seleka fighters; and

¹ Human Rights Watch reported extensively on atrocities and sectarian violence committed by both sides in the region of Bossangoa between September and November 2013: "They came to kill", 19 December 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill> ; Amnesty International also reported on the events of September 2013: "Human Rights Crisis Spiralling Out of Control", 29 October 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR19/003/2013/en>

- Between 22 January and 28 February 2014: almost all the destructions of buildings was committed by local groups associated with the anti-Balaka, targeting more specifically the neighbourhood of Boro that is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, which appears now almost completely destroyed (see photographs below, and also inset in annex 5.5.1 and more photographs taken by the Panel in annex 5.5.2).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



6. The anti-Balaka local group in Bossangoa is based in the neighbourhood of the Evêché and is commanded by ‘Kéma’, who was appointed in mid-April 2014 and coming from Ben Zambé. His deputies are reportedly ‘Dorassio’ and ‘Dangba’, and the spokesperson of the movement is called “André”.² They do not carry identification badges and according to local authorities, the chain of command is loose and the leadership not in full control of the force.

7. According to local sources, the local anti-Balaka force in Bossangoa, which is approximately 250-strong, has a close relationship with the group in Ben Zambé, although it does not participate in

² The Panel could not meet with the main military leaders of the anti-Balaka in Bossangoa on 30 April 2014, as all of them were out of town and not reachable on their cellphones.

the military operations currently conducted in Bouca and Dékoua. However, the adoptive son of former President Bozizé, Teddy Bozizé, has been spotted on a regular basis since mid-April on a motorbike coming back-and-forth to Bossangoa.

8. The interface between the anti-Balaka and international actors is handled by a community liaison officer, a Pastor named ‘Bertin’, based at the Liberté neighbourhood, and ‘Rocky’, a local businessman described as holding influence and money, who lives and operates a garage close by the main WFP warehouse located in front of the Evêché.

9. According to an anti-Balaka representative, there are actually no “anti-Balaka” in Bossangoa but only youths organised in self-defence groups without any identified leadership. As a representative, his role is to liaise between the youths and external actors. However, despite his claim, the Panel could observe the inscription “anti-Balaka” on destroyed houses owned by members of the Muslim community in the Boro neighbourhood (see photograph below).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



10. The group of anti-Balakas in Bossangoa is also reportedly responsible of several incidents targeting the humanitarian community, including an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 20 March 2014, an abduction of one humanitarian aid worker on 1 April 2014, and an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 27 April 2014.³


11. However, the Panel could not observe any checkpoint on the road between the towns of Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko province) and Bossangoa, and no armed elements were spotted in Bossangoa during the Panel's mission. According to the local population, this was related to the successful implementation of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) since the arrival of the French forces on 6 April 2014.

³ See also the Panel's database of incidents.

Annex 5.5.1: Destruction in Bossangoa area, Ouham, CAR – UNOSAT

DESTRUCTION IN BOSSANGOA AREA, OUHAM, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Analysis with WorldView-2 Data Acquired 22 January 2014 and 5 December 2013 and WorldView-1 Data Acquired 28 February 2014



Complex Emergency

 Production Date: 14-Feb-14
 Version 1.0
 Activation Code: CE20131215CAF



This map illustrates locations of destroyed structures in Bossangoa, Central African Republic. Using a satellite image acquired 28 February 2014 and compared to images from 22 January 2014 and 5 December 2013, UNOSAT reviewed the town of Bossangoa and surrounding areas to locate signs of destroyed structures. A total of 1,234 destroyed structures were located in the area, though structures marked as destroyed on 5 December are classed as 'probable' due to the lack of a previous image for comparison. Some of the destruction detected in the 28 February 2014 image was likely a result of burning given the blackened structural remains visible in the imagery. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been validated in the field. Please send ground feedback to UNITAR / UNOSAT.

- LEGEND**
- Destroyed Building (as of 28 February 2014)
 - Destroyed building (as of 22 January 2014)
 - Destroyed Building (Probable; as of 5 December 2013)
 - Primary Road

Map Scale for A3: 1:20,000

Satellite Data (1): WorldView-2
 Imagery Dates: 5 December 2013
 Resolution: 60 cm
 Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
 Satellite Data (2): WorldView-2
 Imagery Date: 22 January 2014
 Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
 Satellite Data (3): WorldView-1
 Imagery Dates: 28 February 2014
 Resolution: 60 cm
 Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
 Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
 Road Data: Google Map Maker / OSM / ESRI
 Other Data: USGS, UNCS, NASA, NGA
 Analysis: UNITAR / UNOSAT
 Production: UNITAR / UNOSAT
 Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.1

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 33N
 Projection: Transverse Mercator
 Datum: WGS 1984
 Units: Meter

The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names and related data shown here are not warranted to be error-free nor do they imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. UNOSAT is a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN humanitarian and development agencies and their implementing partners.

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 www.unitar.org/unosat

Annex 5.5.2: Photographs of the Boro neighbourhood taken by the Panel, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and United Nations convoy by anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)

Explosion of a grenade next to French forces armoured personnel carriers



Anti-Balakas attacking a United Nations convoy with stones and arrows






Anti-Balaka arming his bow with an arrow and targeting a United Nations convoy



Annex 5.7: Joachim Kokaté, 'coordinator' of the CPJP (copy archived at the UN)



Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC) (copy archived at the UN)



ANTIBALAKA



COMITE DE DIRECTION

N° 022 /ATB/14.

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 9

Dans le cadre de la recherche des voies et moyens de sortie de crise en République centrafricaine, et tenant compte de l'urgente nécessité de la restauration de la paix et de la sécurité dans notre pays, le Coordonnateur Général du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka, Monsieur **Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA**, en attendant d'entrer en négociation avec les Autorités gouvernementales, prend l'engagement solennel en ce jour, 04 Avril 2013, de déclarer la fin de toutes hostilités sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

A cet effet, le Coordonnateur national du Mouvement des Antibalaka, demande impérativement à tous Chef des bataillons des Patriotes Antibalaka, de veiller à l'observation scrupuleuse de la présente décision. Ils doivent instruire tous les patriotes Antibalaka, afin que ceux-ci regagnent leur base respective.

Il s'agit ici de donner une chance à la paix et à la sécurité, seule condition sine qua non pour une relance des activités socio-économiques en vue du développement national.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Avril 2014



Le Coordonnateur Général

Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Annex 6: Seleka - Structure and dynamics

1. The Seleka coalition was dissolved by former President Michel Djotodia¹ on 13 September 2013, and subsequently 3,437 soldiers were integrated on 10 October 2013 into the Central African armed forces (FACA) by a decree of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour.²
2. In Ndélé and Bria, the Panel met with the zone commanders, known as Seleka, but presenting themselves as Colonel of the FACA appointed by Presidential decrees.³ In fact, most of the senior officers of the former Seleka wear the distinctive characteristics of the Central African Army, e.g. the red beret, the flag of the CAR as a badge or the “Forces centrafricaines” insigne.
3. It is the understanding of the Panel that the administrative situation of the soldiers integrated by decree on 10 October 2013, and of the senior officers appointed or promoted by Presidential decree under Djotodia’s regime, needs to be clarified by the Transitional Authorities.⁴

Current status

4. On 11 May 2014, military and political leaders of the former Seleka concluded a conclave in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran province), which led to the following two substantial outcomes:
 - Formation of a new military structure, referred to by the Panel as the “new” Seleka, headed by Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (former UFDR Chief of Staff, from the Goula ethnic group), with two deputies (Brigadier-Generals Alkhatim Mahamat and Adam Kanton Yacoub) (see photograph in annex 6.2 and organogram in annex 6.3); and
 - Establishment of a temporary political coordination structure, headed by Abdoulaye Issène (President of the CPJP, from the Rounga ethnic group), with Rizigala Ramadane as deputy coordinator (UFDR) (see chart in annex 6.4).

Dynamics

5. The Panel could obtain copy of the first version of the final recommendations distributed after the conclave, stating that the international community should “facilitate the process of partition of the

¹ Michel Djotodia is included in the annex of the executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

² See annex 6.1.

³ Meeting with Seleka zone commanders, Ndele, 10 April 2014, and Bria, 15 May 2014.

⁴ Meeting with Defence official, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

country”.⁵ According to participants and observers present at the conclave,⁶ the drafting of the recommendations was coordinated by General Zacharia Damane (UFDR, of the Goula ethnic group), who was heading the organisational committee of the conclave.

6. General Damane admitted to the Panel that the first communiqué recommending the partition was not distributed “by mistake”, as claimed by the political leaders of the coordination structure, but was the result of an agreement amongst the military leaders of the “new” Seleka. He also explained that the partition may happen in case the requirements outlined as “recommendations” by the “new” Seleka are not met.⁷

7. Another senior member of the coordination structure confirmed to the Panel⁸ that the political leaders of the former Seleka had to convince their military counterparts to reverse their position and issue a second communiqué reaffirming the commitment of the “new” Seleka to maintaining the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic and ensure its national unity. They also consider that some prominent military leaders, in particular affiliated with the UFDR or close with Nourredine Adam (former strongman of the Seleka, leader of the CPJP-Fondamentale, and listed by the Committee for targeted sanctions),⁹ are currently pushing for the partition of the CAR.¹⁰

8. Moreover, military leaders involved in the cantonment of Seleka forces following the imposition of the “*mesures de confiance*” (confidence-building measures) by French forces in Bangui in December 2013, most notably General Issa Issaka, who signed as the representative of the former Seleka the memorandum of understanding with the Transitional Authorities regarding the relocation of cantoned fighters outside Bangui, and Colonel Abdulkarim Moussa, are absent from the structure of the “new” Seleka and considered now as “sidelined”.

9. Therefore, the expected outcome of the conclave might not yet be forthcoming, neither from the perspective of the international community in terms of having a single partner for future discussions, nor from the perspective of most of the political leaders of the former Seleka who wanted to take over the leadership of the “new” Seleka permanently. Furthermore, the fact that Brigadier-General Alkhatim appears as the main winner of the restructuration of the former Seleka gives the impression once again that military activism leads to political gains.

10. In addition, the establishment of its military head-quarters in Bambari have modified a fragile balance of powers in a key town, where gold production generates significant incomes, and sparked great tension amongst troops loyal to Ali Daras and Damane.

⁵ See annex 6.5.

⁶ Meetings, Bangui, 14 and 16 May 2014.

⁷ Meeting with General Damane, Bambari, 22 May 2014.

⁸ Meeting, Bangui, 17 May 2014.

⁹ Nourredine Adam was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

¹⁰ Telephone conversation, Bangui, 20 May 2014.

Annex 6.1: Decree (last page) of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour integrating 3,437 Seleka into the FACA (original copy archived at the UN)

| N° | Grade | Nom | Nom | N° Mle |
|------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| 3420 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZONDORO | ETIENNE | 201324438 |
| 3421 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZONIWA | JEAN-PIERRE | 201324439 |
| 3422 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUA | GUY-ROGER | 201324440 |
| 3423 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUABA | YOUSOUF-MAX | 201324441 |
| 3424 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUANGBA | FREDERIC-LE-PLY | 201324442 |
| 3425 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUBAÏROU | BAKARI | 201324443 |
| 3426 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUBINGUI | CHRISTELAIRE-DIEU-BENI-COME | 201324444 |
| 3427 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUCKBA-ZAKARIA | DAMANE | 201324445 |
| 3428 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUMBEIDA | ADRIZIT | 201324446 |
| 3429 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNDECKO | SEVERIN | 201324447 |
| 3430 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNDEKO | JOSEPH | 201324448 |
| 3431 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNDEKO | DIDIER | 201324449 |
| 3432 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNDI | GILDAS RODRIGUI | 201324450 |
| 3433 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNGUERE | BIENVENU | 201324451 |
| 3434 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNONGO | MAXIMEN | 201324452 |
| 3435 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOUNOUA | LETICIA | 201324453 |
| 3436 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOYONDOKO | DEYA | 201324454 |
| 3437 | Soldat de 2° Classe | ZOYO-NDOKO | SIDICK-NESTOR | 201324455 |

Art.2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Art.3 : La présente Décision sera enregistrée, notifiée aux intéressés et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

DESTINATAIRES

- Cabinet Militaire
- I G A N
- D.G.I.A.N
- D.G.R.H
- Tous Corps et Sces FACA
- Intéressés
- Major de Garnison
- Archives & Chrono

BANGUI, le 10 OCT 2013


General de Brigade
Bertrand MAMOURET

Annex 6.2: Photograph taken by international observers in Ndélé of the newly appointed senior leadership of the “new” Seleka

Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (Chief of Staff, left), Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat (First Deputy, center) and Brigadier-General Adam Kanton Yacoub (Second Deputy, right)



Annex 6.4: Organigram of the provisional political leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.5: First version of the final recommendations to the international community initially distributed in Ndélé by the military leaders of the “new” Seleka (copy archived at the UN)¹

Bangui et des autres préfectures hostiles.

- ❖ Considérant le non respect de l'accord de Ndjamena de janvier 2014.

RECOMMANDONS

A- Au Gouvernement Centrafricain

- De tout mettre en œuvre pour que les exactions contre les musulman cessent avant une semaine ;
- De prendre en charge l'intégralité des réparations des biens des musulmans (civils et militaires) détruits ;
- De mettre a disposition un fonds pour la construction des infrastructures (Routes, Ecoles, centres de santé, des édifices de l'administration...) dans le Nord-Est.
- D'autoriser sans délai l'exfiltration de nos compatriotes.

B-A la communauté internationale :

- De prendre acte des agissements de certains chrétiens.
- De continuer l'exfiltration de la population musulman de ces zones.
- De veiller au respect des droits humains de tous les citoyens.
- De faciliter le processus de la partition.

Fait à NDELE, le 10 mai 2014

¹ Provided to the Panel by a confidential diplomatic source on 26 May 2014.

Annex 7: French forces clashing with Seleka forces of General Alkhatim (photographs taken by French forces)¹



¹ Accessed on 23 May 2014 at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-attaque-par-un-groupe-lourdement-arme-au-nord-ouest-du-pays>

Sangaris : attaque par un groupe lourdement armé au Nord-Ouest du pays

Mise à jour : 06/05/2014 12:24

Le 5 mai 2014, dans l'après-midi, en République Centrafricaine, à environ 450 km au Nord-Ouest de Bangui, la force Sangaris a été attaquée par un groupe lourdement armé, d'un volume d'une quarantaine d'individus qui étaient engagés dans un raid entre Bémaï, au Nord du pays, et de Boguila. Une partie du groupe armé qui composait cette colonne adverse a été détruite, d'autres attaquants se sont repliés. Il n'y a pas de blessé parmi les soldats français.

Ces combats ont débuté alors qu'un détachement de la force Sangaris conduisait une mission de reconnaissance depuis Bossangoa vers Paoua, ville située dans l'extrémité Nord-Ouest de la RCA. Cette mission visait à reconnaître cette zone difficile d'accès, dans laquelle de nombreuses exactions étaient rapportées depuis une dizaine de jours, et à y rétablir la situation sécuritaire avec la MISCA.




A moins d'une centaine de kilomètres au Sud de Paoua, au niveau de la localité de Boguila, les éléments de tête de la force Sangaris se sont déployés, sur renseignement, pour protéger le village de Boguila et barrer la route à une colonne de pick-ups et de motos transportant des individus lourdement armés.

Le groupe armé adverse a immédiatement engagé le combat manœuvrant avec agressivité semblant décidé à s'emparer de la position des éléments français.


Ces combats, ont duré plus de trois heures et ont cessé à la tombée de la nuit. Face à l'agressivité de l'adversaire, la force Sangaris a fait usage de son armement lourd, incluant missile anti-char et mortier. La décision a également été prise d'engager un appui aérien d'avions de chasse, en provenance de Ndjamena.

Les patrouilles ont repris ce matin autour du village de Boguila, il n'est pas encore possible de déterminer avec précision les pertes adverses. Néanmoins plusieurs véhicules ont été détruits et plusieurs individus armés tués. L'adversaire a rompu le contact et semble s'être exfiltré. L'identité et l'appartenance de cet adversaire est à ce stade difficile à déterminer avec précision. Il pourrait néanmoins s'agir des éléments de la bande armée qui est à l'origine des exactions rapportées dans la région depuis plusieurs jours. La force Sangaris maintient son dispositif de contrôle du village de Boguila.

Annex 8: Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the Central African Republic as of 23 March 2013



Annex 9: Names of collectors associated or formerly associated with buying offices in Carnot with which the anti-Balaka want to negotiate protection arrangements



**Annex 10: Artisanal miners working in Axmin's Ndassima gold exploration concession
(photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)**



Annex 11: Seleka forces of General Ali Daras at Ndassima gold mining site (photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)



Annex 12: Stocks of arms, ammunition and trophies in the depot of the Ministry of Water and Forests prior to being looted

MINISTÈRE DES EAUX, FORÊTS,
CHASSE ET PÊCHE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES, DE LA
PLANIFICATION, D'APPUI JURIDIQUE
ET DES RESSOURCES
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES
ET DU CONTENTIEUX
SERVICE DU DÉPÔT ET DE LA POUDRIÈRE
N° 1/MEF/DIR/CAB/DGEPAJR/DJ/CSDP

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

SITUATION DES ARMES, MUNITIONS ET TROPHÉES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE
AVANT LE PILLAGE

I – ARMES DE GUERRE DISPONIBLES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE

- > Cent trente cinq (135) AK 47 + 270 Chargeurs ;
- > Deux (02) MAS 36 Sans munitions ;
- > Un (01) G 3 sans munitions ;
- > Quatre (04) grenades en bon état ;
- > Une (01) grenade moisie ;

II – ARMES AK 47 MISE EN SERVICE

- > Résidence du Ministre 2
- > Service de garde au Ministère 2

- > Aide-Camp DU Ministre de l'Environnement 1
- > Coordonateur BMC 1

III- MUNITIONS DE GUERRE

- ❖ 6.000 (Six mille) munitions de 7,62 court
- ❖ 1.514 (Mille Cinq Cent Quatorze) de 7,62 long

IV- ARMES DE CHASSE

- ❖ Quinze (15) armes de chasse calibre confondues en état moyen
- ❖ Treize (13) armes de chasse complètement rouillées
- ❖ Vingt deux (22) armes de chasse (anciennes saisies)
- ❖ Six (06) armes de chasse rayée (MOZER)

VI- ARMES DE CHASSE ARTISANALE

- ❖ Vingt (20) armes de chasse artisanale à détruire
- ❖ Six (06) crosse à bois
- ❖ Quatre Vingt Treize (93) munitions de chasse) détruire

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE ET DIVERS

7-1- POINTES D'IVOIRE

- ❖ Soixante trois (63) pointes d'ivoire
- ❖ Cinquante une (51) pointes d'ivoire (WWWF)

- ❖ Cinquante Six (56) défenses de phacochères

7-2- **DIVERS**

- ❖ Trois tronçonneuse marque STIHL guide 120
- ❖ Sept (07) grumeliettes
- ❖ Deux (02) guides
- ❖ Cinq (05) peaux de crocodile
- ❖ Une (1) de panthère
- ❖ Une (1) de Bongo

Fait à Bangui, le

27 JAN 2013

Le Chef de Service de Dépôts et de
la Récolte


LE CHEF DE
SERVICE
LE CHEF DE SERVICE DE
DÉPÔTS ET DE RÉCOLTE

Lt Alfred Modeste SEPAMIO MBAT

Annex 13: Other natural resources

Timber

2. Industrial logging and timber exports have continued all through 2013 to date, although at a slightly lower pace compared to 2012. Log exports were down 2 per cent, while sawn wood exports declined by 23 per cent.¹ Timber is officially exported to European and Asian destinations through Cameroon, using the border crossings of Garoua-Boulai and Kenzou. While the Seleka were in power, illegal artisanal exploitation surged in non-attributed forest areas, as well as industrial concessions close to Bangui, some of which was exported illegally to Chad.²

3. Logging trucks operating between concession areas and Cameroon were systematically subjected to illegal tax levying during the Seleka's time in power.³ Illegal taxes levied by Seleka forces at checkpoints along transport routes within CAR amounted to about 70 USD per truck.⁴ Calculating from an average monthly export volume in 2013 of 15,000 m³ and an average load of 30-40 m³ per truck, per month Seleka would have fetched 30,000 USD of revenues per month from the timber industry.⁵ In addition some logging companies paid Seleka commanders protection money of up to 6,000 USD per month for their facilities in Bangui.⁶

4. Since the departure of Seleka forces from the southwest of the CAR at the end of January 2014, illegal taxation of logging trucks by armed forces reduced. However, anti-Balaka forces also demand payments haphazardly at checkpoints. The Panel confirmed the presence of anti-Balaka forces under commander Alfred Yekatom "Rombhot", alongside the *Gendarmerie*, at Pissa, Mbaiki and Boda in Lobaye province, where trucks to practically all forestry concessions pass coming from Bangui. Rombhot's soldiers levy up between 2 and 10 USD on each truck at the three checkpoints.⁷ In addition, a forester told the Panel that within his concessions local unidentified anti-Balaka youths occasionally steal chainsaws and petrol for sale.⁸

Cattle

5. With the departure of Seleka forces from the west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, Muslim and Peuhl cattle owners have come under siege of anti-Balaka forces and have either been killed or forced to flee. On the road between Guen and Carnot, the Panel observed anti-Balaka elements in the possession of cattle they claimed to have recuperated from the forest.⁹ All

¹ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 19 May 2014.

² Interview with forest guard and official in the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment in Bangui, 21 April 2014.

³ Multiple Interviews truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁴ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 23 March, 2014.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with forester in Bangui, 21 March 2014.

⁷ Interviews with truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁸ Interview with forester op. cit.

⁹ Interview with anti-Balaka cattle herders and motorbike drivers on the road between Guen and Carnot, 26 April 2014.

along the road meat is smoked to be transported by motorbike to Carnot and onwards by truck to Bouar and Bangui.

Oil

6. On 7 March 2014, the Minister of Mines, Energy and Waterworks signed a ministerial order cutting-up non-attributed oil-blocks D-G into sub-blocks of 500 square kilometres, with the view to enable entry of more exploration companies.¹⁰

7. A map was attached to the ministerial order showing attribution of blocks A and B to Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), a Beijing-based company wholly owned by the Government of China (annex 13.1). Block B was attributed to PTI in joint venture with Doha based company IAS by a Presidential decree signed by Bozizé in 2007.¹¹ For block A the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted a prospecting licence in January 2011, which was never publicly announced.¹² CNPC carried out seismic tests in the area of Boromata in Bamingui-Bangoran province up until February 2013 when Seleka fighters forced its workers out.¹³ It is unclear when the CNPC licence was transferred to PTI. In March 2012 a third oil block C, in the southeast of the country, was awarded to the South African firm Dig-Oil (see annex 13.2).


¹⁰ Arrête no 005/14/MMEH/DIRCAB/DGP portant découpage du domaine pétrolier de la République Centrafricaine en blocs et sous-blocs surfaces, 7 March.

¹¹ <http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/ias-wins-exploration-bid->, accessed on 4 May 2014.


¹² <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1798133564&Country=Central+African+Republic&topic=Economy&subtopic=Current+policy&subsubtopic=Economic+policy:+Oil+exploration+is+to+resume+in+north-eastern+CAR>, accessed on 3 May 2014.

¹³ <http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/spotlight/2013/02/05/the-oil-stakes-in-an-armed-conflict,107943013-EVE>, accessed on 6 May 2014.

Annex 13.1: Oil blocks in northern Central African Republic as per 7 March 2014



Annex 13.2: Map of oil block in the Central African Republic before 7 March 2014



Annex 14: Arms and ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic

1. The panel developed lists of arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR based on samples collected by international forces. The lists within this annex will serve as a baseline to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.
2. Currently, based on the Panel's observation and information collected, the typology of weapons in custody in the CAR can be presented as follows:

| Entity | Estimated holding |
|---|---|
| Government forces FACA, police and Gendarmerie | - about 110 rifles - 3 ammunition stores secured by MISCA |
| Cantoned elements of Ex-Seleka in 3 sites in Bangui | individual arms kept by combatants under confidence building measures |
| Ex-Seleka not cantoned | Not known |
| FACA associated with anti-Balaka | Individual arms and few light weapon |
| Anti-balaka | Military arms and hunting rifles, grenades and machete |
| Other armed entities | Not known |
| Civilian for self-protection and hunting | Military arms and hunting rifles |
| Collected by impartial forces | Around 1,100 small arms and a number of light weapon |

Photograph of containers of ammunition in Bossembélé looted after the Seleka seized power in March 2013¹



¹ See “Centrafrique: à Bossembele, les fantômes du régime de Bozizé hantent encore la ville”, RFI, 8 April 2013, accessed at: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130408-centrafrique-bossembele-fantomes-regime-bozize-sont-encore-presents/>

3. Sangaris discovered on 11 February 2014, after the cantonment of former Seleka, abandoned containers of ammunition north of Bangui that were looted (left)². Mortar shells 60 to 120 mm not useable without mortar tubes were left behind on the open, while small arms and grenades have probably been taken by anti Balaka (right)³.



² Screenshot from France 24 international news.

³ See “Sangaris: la force se déploie en province”, Website Ministère de la défense, 11 February 2014, accessed at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/sangaris-la-force-se-deploie-en-province>

List of arms and military equipment found in the CAR
Rifles

AK type (see profile)
 AR-15 A2 Cal 223
 CS/LS 06
 FAL 50.00
 HK-G3 A3
 HK MP-5 SD3
 Galil AR
 Lee-Enfield
 MAS 36
 MAT 49
 Mauser
 M-16 A1
 R4 Vector
 SAR 80
 STEYR AUG
 SVD
 Type 85
 UZI

Light Machine Gun

AA-52
 Browning M1919 A4
 MAG-58
 Model 68
 PKM
 Type 56
 Type 56-1
 Type 67-2C
 Type 80
 Type 81
 Vector MG 4
 VZ 59

Medium Machine Gun

Type 54
 Type 85
 W-85

Heavy Machine Gun

KPVT
 Type 58
 ZPU-1
 ZPU-2
 ZPU-4
 ZU-23/2

Grenade Launcher

AGS 17
 ARSENAL UGBL
 GP 25
 HK-69 / GPZ-1
 M 79
 MILKOR MGL
 QLZ 87
 Zastava M-93

Multiple rocket launcher

AT-4 M136
 BM 21
 LAW M-72
 RBR64 M80
 RPG-7
 RPO-A
 Type 63
 Type 69

Mortars

60 mm WW90L
 60 mm NIMIR
 81 mm B 499
 M 37
 Type 67

Recoilless rifle

SPG-9
 106 SR M40 A1

APC

FV 107 FERRET
 BRD-2
 BTR-152
 OT-90
 RATEL-90
 VAB

Vehicles

RDLVS Gecko
 SAFIR 106 mm M40A1
 SAMIL-20 HUNTER
 TOYOTA LC Serie 70

List of ammunition found in the CAR**Mortar Shells**

Mle 44
M48
M49A3
M61
M73
OF-D
O-832-DU
PP87
PP-93
Type 63
Type 832

Propelled Grenades

DZP1C
F-7
PG-7L
PG-7M
PG-7S
PG-7V
PG-9
Type 63
Type 69
Type 69-3
R-107

For Grenades launchers

Arsenal RHE-F
Arsenal RHV-HEF
DFS 87-35 HE
ENERGA
FI AP 34-52
HEAT 83
M 433 HEDP
M-60 AC
Super ENERGA

Hand Grenades

DF-37
F1
F1 V2
M-26 T
OF-37
RG-4
82-2

Mines

M-19
TC6

Cartridge

See Profile Annex 16

Annex 15: Profile of type of assault-rifles found in the Central African Republic

1. Pursuant to the adoption of resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of models of AK-type rifles found in the CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of AK-type rifles in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the Panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of the arms embargo in cases where new types of weapons are discovered.
3. The profile shows that there are 20 different models of AK-type rifles in circulation in the CAR, which were produced in ten different countries.


Profile of AK models found in the CAR


90/158











AKM USSR 1961







AKM USSR 1966



AKM USSR 1971



| | |
|---|---|
| <p>AKM USSR 1973</p>  |  |
| <p>Zastava M-64 Yugoslavia</p>  |  |
| | |

Not Known TBC



Not Known TBC



Not Known TBC



Annex 16: Profile of arms cartridges found in the Central African Republic





Background



1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of cartridges found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of ammunition in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.






Analysis

3. The profile shows that the ammunition found in the CAR was produced by 42 different manufacturers from 16 countries, over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013, and include calibres from both former “Western”- and “Eastern”-bloc states. The profile includes 116 lots representing manufactures and year of production of which 29.3 per cent were produced in France up to the year 1990, 26.7 per cent in China up to 2011 and 9.5 per cent in Sudan up to 2013. It has to be noted that these percentage figures represent the diversity of the ammunition profile rather than its volume.

Profile of cartridges found in the CAR















| Manufacturer: Belgium / FN | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Calibre | 8x60mm | 7.62x51 | | |
| 1 |  | | | |
| Markings | FN 8x60 S | FN 77 | | |
| Year manufactured | Not known | 1977 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: Bulgaria / 10 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | | | |
| 2 |  | | | |
| Marking | 10 69 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1969 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 41 | | | | |
| Calibre | 14.5x114 | 14.5x114 | | |
| 3 |  | | | |
| Marking | 41 95 | 41 07 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1995 | 2007 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 61 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 |
| 4 |  | | | |
| Marking | 61 74 | 61 87 | 61 95 | 61 97 |
| Year manufactured | 1974 | 1987 | 1995 | 1997 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
















| Manufacturer: China / 61 | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | |
| 5 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | 61 71 | 61 80 | 61 90 | |
| Year manufactured | 1971 | 1980 | 1990 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: China 71 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | |
| 6 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | 71 73 | 71 90 | 71 98 | 71 01 |
| Year manufactured | 1973 | 1990 | 1998 | 2001 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: China / 71 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 9 | | |
| 7 |  |  | | |
| Marking | 71 98 | 71 11 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1998 | 2011 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 81 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x39 | | |
| 8 |  |  | | |
| Marking | 81 90 | 81 97 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1990 | 1997 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |











| Manufacturer: China / 270 | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | | | |
| 9 |  | | | |
| Marking | 270 74 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1974 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 351 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 12.7x108 | | |
| 10 |  |  | | |
| Marking | 351 78 | 351 76 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1978 | 1976 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 539 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | | | |
| 11 |  | | | |
| Marking | 539 72 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1972 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: China / 811 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | | | |
| 12 |  | | | |
| Marking | 811 08 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 2008 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |












| Manufacturer: China / 911 | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | |
| 13 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | 911 76 | 911 77 | 911 78 | |
| Year manufactured | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: China / 945 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | |
| 14 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | 945 07 | 945 09 | 945 10 | |
| Year manufactured | 2007 | 2009 | 2010 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: China 9121; 9611, 9631 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x54R | 12.7x108 | |
| 15 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | 9121 86 | 9611 77 | 9631 05 | |
| Year manufactured | 1986 | 1977 | 2005 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia bxn | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | bxn 62 | bxn 68 | bxn 72 | bxn 73 |
| Year manufactured | 1962 | 1968 | 1972 | 1973 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |



| Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / bxn | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R |
| 17 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | bxn 80 | bxn 65 | bxn 66 | bxn 87 |
| Year manufactured | 1980 | 1965 | 1966 | 1987 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / CZO | | | | |
| Calibre | 14.5x114 | | | |
| 18 |  | | | |
| Marking | CZO 55 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1955 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: Egypt /10 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | | | |
| 19 |  | | | |
| Marking | ١٠ ع ٢٤ ٨٠ | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1980 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: France LM | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.5 x54 | 7.5 x54 | 5.56x45 | 5.56x45 |
| 20 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | LM 65 | LM 77 | LM 1.86 | LM 90 |
| Year manufactured | 1965 | 1977 | 1986 | 1990 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |

| Manufacturer: France LM | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 |
| 21 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | LM 1-61 | LM 1-67 | LM 1-70 | LM 3-71 |
| Year manufactured | 1961 | 1967 | 1970 | 1971 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: France LM | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 | | |
| 22 |  |  | | |
| Marking | LM 3-72 | LM 4-74 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1972 | 1974 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: France TE | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 9x51 | 9x51 | 12.7x99 |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | TE 7.5 S | TE 9 F | S TE | TE S |
| Year manufactured | 1971 | 1974 | 1983 | 1987 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: France SF | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 9x51 | 9x51 | 9x51 |
| 24 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | SF 84 | SF 57 | SF 81 | SF 82 |
| Year manufactured | 1984 | 1957 | 1981 | 1982 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |

| Manufacturer: France SF | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 | 7.5x54 |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | SS 2.70 | SF 81 | Sf 2.83 | SF 84 |
| Year manufactured | 1970 | 1981 | 1983 | 1984 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: France SF | | | | |
| Calibre | 5.56x45 | 5.56x45 | 5.56x45 | 12.7x99 |
| 26 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | SF 1 78 | SF 83 | SF 84 | SF 4-87 |
| Year manufactured | 1978 | 1983 | 1984 | 1987 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: France FNM, VE | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.5x54 | 5.56x45 | 5.56x45 | |
| 27 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | VE 2 40 | FNM 83 | FNM 89 | |
| Year manufactured | TBC | 1983 | 1989 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: Iran | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x51 | 7.62x54R | 12.7x108 | 14.5x114 |
| 28 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | 7.62x51 97 | 7.62x54 01 | 12.7 03 | 14.5 81 |
| Year manufactured | 1997 | 2001 | 2003 | 1981 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |

| Manufacturer: Israel / IMI | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| Calibre | 5.56x45 | | | |
| 29 |  | | | |
| Marking | IMI 07 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 2007 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: Romania | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x54R | 14.5x114 | 14.5x114 |
| 30 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | 22 70 | 21 76 | 21 77 | 21 78 |
| Year manufactured | 1979 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: Saudia Arabia | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x51 | | | |
| 31 |  | | | |
| Marking | 7.62 1405 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1985 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: South Africa | | | | |
| Calibre | 5.56x45 | 7.62x51 | 7.62x51 | 12.7x99 |
| 32 |  |  |  |  |
| Marking | 86 13 | 90 12 | 90 22 | 92 14 |
| Year manufactured | 1986 | 1990 | 1990 | 1992 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |

| Manufacturer: Sudan / س (TBC) | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| Calibre | 7.62x51 | 7.62x51 | | |
| 33 |  |  | | |
| Marking | س ١٩٨٠ | س ١٩٨٢ | | |
| Year manufactured | 1980 | 1982 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: Sudan / | | | | |
| Calibre | | | | |
| 34 |  |  |  | |
| H Marking | 2 39 011 | 2 39 12 | 1 39 13 | |
| Year manufactured | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: Sudan / | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x51 | 7.62x51 | 7.62x51 | |
| 35 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | SUD 51 97 | SUD 51 98 | Su 1 51 01 | |
| Year manufactured | 1997 | 198 | 2001 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |
| Manufacturer: Sudan / | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | |
| 36 |  |  |  | |
| Marking | 54 05 | 54 07 | 07 54 | |
| Year manufactured | 2005 | 2007 | 2007 | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | |

| Manufacturer: Sweden / | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|----------|----------|
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | | | |
| 37 |  | | | |
| Marking | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Year manufactured | Not Known | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: USA | | | | |
| Calibre | .280 | | | |
| 38 |  | | | |
| Marking | RP 280 REM | RP 20AUTO | | |
| Year manufactured | Not Known | Not Known | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: Former USSR / 60 and 711 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | 7.62x39 | | |
| 39 |  | | | |
| Marking | 60 74 | 711 74 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1974 | 1974 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188 | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 12.7x108 | 12.7x108 |
| 40 |  | | | |
| Marking | 188 72 | 188 74 | 188 73 | 188 79 |
| Year manufactured | 1972 | 1874 | 1973 | 1979 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |

| Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188, 3 | | | | |
|--|---|----------|----------|----------|
| Calibre | 12.7x108 | 14.5x114 | | |
| 41 |  | | | |
| Marking | 188 80 | 3 74 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1980 | 1974 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |
| Manufacturer: Former Yugoslavia / ППУ | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x51 | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R | 7.62x54R |
| 42 |  | | | |
| Marking | ППУ 03 | ППУ 1986 | ППУ 1988 | ППУ 1989 |
| Year manufactured | 2003 | 1986 | 1988 | 1989 |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 |
| Manufacturer: Zimbabwe / ZI | | | | |
| Calibre | 7.62x39 | | | |
| 43 |  | | | |
| Marking | ZI 96 | | | |
| Year manufactured | 1996 | | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | | | |
| Manufacturer: Not Known | | | | |
| Calibre | 14.5x114 | 14.5x114 | | |
| 44 |  | | | |
| Marking | 86 30 | 9 52 | | |
| Year manufactured | 1986 | 1952 | | |
| First reported in CAR | Mar 2014 | Mar 2014 | | |

Lists of Markings

| Marking | Manufacturer | Head stamp picture |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| FN | Belgium | 1 |
| 10 NN | Bulgaria | 2 |
| 41 NN | China | 3 |
| 61 NN | China | 4, 5 |
| 71 NN | China | 6, 7 |
| 81 NN | China | 8 |
| 270 NN | China | 9 |
| 351 NN | China | 10 |
| 539 | China | 11 |
| 811 | China | 12 |
| 911 | China | 13 |
| 945 | China | 14 |
| 9121 NN | China | 15 |
| 9611 NN | China | 15 |
| 9631 NN | China | 15 |
| Bxn NN | Former Czechoslovakia | 16, 17 |
| CZO NN | Former Czechoslovakia | 18 |
| ع م ج | Egypt | 19 |
| LM NN | France | 20,21,22 |
| TE NN | France | 23 |
| SF NN | France | 24, 25, 26 |
| VE NN | France | 27 |
| 7.62x51 NN | Iran | 28 |
| 12.7 NN | Iran | 28 |
| 14.5 NN | Iran | 28 |
| IMI NN | Israel | 29 |
| 22 NN | Romania | 30 |
| 21 NN | Romania | 30 |
| Swords palm | Saudia Arabia | 31 |
| 12/13/14 /22bottom | South Africa | 32 |
| س | Sudan | 33 |
| N 39 NN | Sudan | 34 |
| SUD 51 NN | Sudan | 35 |
| SU N 51 NN | Sudan | 35 |
| N 54 NN | Sudan | 36 |
| norma | Sweden | 37 |
| R.P | USA | 38 |
| 60 NN | Former USSR | 39 |
| 188 NN | Former USSR | 40, 41 |
| 3 NN | Former USSR | 41 |
| IIIIY NN | Former Yugoslavia | 42 |
| ZI NN | Zimbabwe | 43 |

Annex 17: Removal of markings and serial numbers from AKMs

1. The Panel observed four cases of removals of markings and serial numbers from one Soviet-made AKM model. These rifles were observed at three different locations in Bangui, within collected weapons by MISCA and Sangaris and with cantoned former Seleka.
2. Their markings were certainly removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which might have been smuggled to the CAR potentially in violation the arms embargo. The Panel is investigating these cases.



Marking erased on an AKM held by a cantoned former Seleka



Fire selector indication of Soviet origin



Marking erased on an AKM collected by MISCA



Marking erased on an AKM collected by SANGARIS



Annex 18: Smuggling of hunting ammunition in violation of the arms embargo


Background

1. On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs supported by a unit of MISCA seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the CAR at its main land crossing point with Cameroon, (Garoua Boulai-Beloko). The Panel was conducting a field visit to this border crossing during the same day and was informed of this seizure. It could therefore document this case and take photographs of the seized materials (see below).
2. The director of the CAR customs in Béloko informed the Panel that the box of cartridges was hidden inside a bag of onions carried by a woman and a child who managed to escape at the time of the seizure. The Panel learned from other sources of another seizure of 64 boxes of 25 hunting cartridges calibre 12, which occurred in mid-February 2014 and that alleged anti-Balaka elements threatened customs agents to release the seized boxes. MISCA intervened and confiscated the ammunition.
3. The Panel is aware of cases of original cartridges designed for smaller game being modified to allow more effectiveness against larger game or human beings. The process consists of removing the original smaller lead and replacing it with artisanal pellets made from lead made of battery electrodes or by inserting a single artisanal large projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary and might improve over time to achieve the expected effect (see pictures below).

Investigation

4. The cartridges were made in Spain by MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. In response to the Panel's letter dated 30 April 2014, MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. informed that the ammunition mentioned above were part of a lot of 528,000 cartridges of 12-00 Redstar and Rio 20 sold to SAMT (Armes Transports et Munitions SARL) in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and shipped on 9 January 2014. A bill of lading and an end user undertaking for exclusive use in Cameroun are below.
5. In a letter dated 9 May 2014, the Panel requested from SAMT, the list of entities and individuals that have bought large quantities of hunting cartridges from January 2014 to date. SAMT sent to the Panel a list of 26 clients who bought this type of cartridges. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations requesting a visit to discuss this case and other arms related issues and awaiting a response.

Bill of lading indicating the shipment of ammunition

| | | | | |
|---|--|---|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
|  | | BILL OF LADING FOR OCEAN TRANSPORT OR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT | | SCAC MAEU B/L No. 951253142 |
| Shipper MAXAM OUTDOORS,S.A AV PARTENON 16-18 28042 MADRID ESPANA | | Booking No. 951253142 | | Export references E4779 |
| Consignee (assignable only if consigned "to order", "to order of" a named Person or "to order of bearer") ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN | | Notify Party (see clause 22) ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN | | |
| Vessel (see clause 1.1.19) GLUECKSBURG | Voyage No. 1402 | Place of Receipt, Applicable only when document used as Multimodal Transport B/L. (see clause 1) Nandares de Oca | | |
| Port of Loading Bilbao | Port of Discharge Douala | Place of Delivery, Applicable only when document used as Multimodal Transport B/L. (see clause 1) | | |
| PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER | | | | |
| Kind of Packages; Description of goods; Marks and Numbers; Container No./Seal No. 1 Container Said to Contain 2112 BOXES UN0012, CARTRIDGES FOR WEAPONS, INERT PROJECTILE, CLASS 1.4S NET EXPLOSIVE CONTENT: 845Kg 528,000 UNITS 2112 BOXES GROSS WEIGHT: 24.264 KGS NET WEIGHT: 22.903 KGS MSKU4217896 ML-ES2342696 20 DRY 8'6 2112 BOXES 24264.000 KGS 20.000 CBM SHIPPER'S LOAD, STOW, WEIGHT AND COUNT FREIGHT PREPAID SD/CY Consignee Ref: ORDER E4779 First Notify Ref: null Inward Forwarders reference null | | Weight 24264.000 KGS | Measurement 20.000 CBM | |
| FREIGHTED COPY | | | | |
| Above particulars as declared by Shipper, but without responsibility of or representation by Carrier (see clause 14) | | | | |
| Freight & Charges Basic Ocean Freight Inland Haulage Export Export Intermodal Fuel Fee Examination Service Dangerous Cargo Service Documentation Fee - Origin Terminal Handling Service- Ori | Intentionally masked | | | Collect |
| Carrier's Receipt (see clause 1 and 14), total number of containers or packages received by Carrier: 1 container | Place of Issue of B/L Madrid | <small>WHETHER BY THE SIGNATURE OF AN AUTHORIZED AGENT OF THE CARRIER OR BY THE SIGNATURE OF THE SHIPPER, THE LABEL NUMBER OR QUANTITY OF CONTAINERS OR OTHER PACKAGES OR UNITS INDICATED IN THIS BILL OF LADING IS RECEIVED FROM THE PORT OF LOADING (OR THE PLACE OF RECEIPT, IF MENTIONED ABOVE) TO THE PORT OF DISCHARGE OR THE PLACE OF DELIVERY, IF MENTIONED ABOVE, SUCH CARGO BEING ALWAYS SUBJECT TO THE TERMS, RIGHTS, DEFERRED PROVISIONS, CONDITIONS, EXCEPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND EXEMPTIONS HEREIN DEVELOPED, ALL THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF REFERRED TO-26 AND THOSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE CARRIER'S APPLICABLE TARIFFS and the Merchant's attention is drawn in particular to the Carrier's terms in respect of on deck stowage (see clause 14) and the carrying vessel (see clause 18). Where the bill of lading is non-negotiable the Carrier may give delivery of the Goods to the named consignee upon reasonable proof of identity and without receiving surrender of an original bill of lading. Where the bill of lading is negotiable, the Merchant is obliged to surrender any original bill of lading in exchange for the Goods. The Carrier accepts a duty of reasonable care to check that any such document which the Merchant surrenders as a bill of lading is accurate and complete. If the Carrier complies with this duty, it will be entitled to enforce the Goods against what it reasonably believes to be a genuine and original bill of lading, such delivery discharging the Carrier's delivery obligations. In accepting this bill of lading, any local customs or procedures to the contrary notwithstanding, the Merchant agrees to be bound by all Terms and Conditions stated herein, whether written, printed, stamped or incorporated on the face or reverse side hereof, as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. BY SIGNED WHEREAS the number of original bills of lading stated on this bill have been signed and whatever one original bill of lading has been surrendered any others shall be void.</small> | | |
| Number & Sequence of Original B(s)/L THREE/3 | Date of Issue of B/L 2014-01-13 | | | |
| Declared Value (see clause 7.3) | Shipped on Board Date (Local Time) 2014-01-09 | | | |
| Signed for the Carrier A.P. Hilde - Maersk A/S trading as Maersk Line | | | | |
| Maersk Spain, SLU As Agent(s) for the Carrier | | | | |
| This transport document has one or more numbered pages | | | | |

End user undertaking certifying that the ammunition "will be used solely for civil use purposes" and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from Cameroon

S.A.M.T
Sarl ARMES ET MUNITIONS - TRANSPORTS
Vente et Réparation Armes - Munitions et Articles de chasse

END - USER UNDERTAKING

DATE: 04 december 2013

We Armes et Munitions - Transport, certify that we are

- 1.- The end user
2.- The importer/Consignee of the goods x

to be supplied by MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A.

We further certify that the goods are sporting shotgun cartridges and will **be used solely for civil use purposes** and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from CAMEROUN.

We further certify that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Neither will the goods be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. Products will not be sold nor re-exported to a third party without previous consent from the Spanish Authorities.

Yours sincerely

NAME AND STAMP OF THE COMPANY

Armes et Munitions - Transport

NAME AND POSITION OF THE UNDERSIGNER

AUTIN Nicole - Directrice

ARMES ET MUNITIONS
Transport s.a.r.l
BP 147 YDE Tél./Fax 22 22 15 23

SARL au Capital de 4 000 000 FCFA - RC : RH-810 - N° contribuable : M06760000030Y
Yaoundé : B.P. : 147 - Tél./Fax : +237 22 22 15 23 • Douala : B.P. : 13174 - Tél./Fax : +237 33 43 11 39
E-mail : armes_munitions@yahoo.fr

Photographs of seized ammunition



Box containing 250 cartridges



Label indicating manufacturing entity:

- Made in EU - Spain by
MAXAM Outdoors
- Address: **Avda. del Partenón, 16 bajo**
28042 Madrid
- www.rioammo.com



Lot number: #C1312149#

Use of hunting ammunition by anti-Balaka combatants



Top:
Hunting cartridges modified by removing the original pellets (lead shots) and replacing them with bigger artisanal shots (seized from anti-Balaka in Carnot).

Bottom:
Hunting cartridges modified by inserting machine gun cartridge 7.62x54R shown on the left (seized from anti-Balaka in Bouar)

Annex 19: Legal framework of the arms embargo regime

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, and by paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014, decided with regards to the arms embargo that initially from 5 December to 27 January 2015, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
 - a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned;
 - b) technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities;
 - c) the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel; and the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

2. The Council established the following standing exemptions to the arms embargo in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014):
 - a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MICOPAX, MISCA, BINUCA and its guard unit, the AU-RTF, and the French forces deployed in the CAR (paragraph 54 (a) of resolution 2127 (2013));
 - b) protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only (paragraph 54 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013));
 - c) supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of CAR or CAR's international legal obligations (paragraph 54 (d) of resolution 2127 (2013));
 - d) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union operation (paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 (2014)); and
 - e) supplies used by MISCA, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, the AU-RTF and the French forces operating in the CAR for the implementation of their mandates (paragraph 37 of resolution 2149 (2014).

3. Finally, the Council decided in its resolution 2127 (2013) that an advance approval by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of the same resolution is required for exemptions to the arms embargo for:
 - a) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training (paragraph 54 (b) of resolution 2127 (2013));

- b) supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013); and
- c) other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel (paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013).

Annex 20: Support to the Central African Republic Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A. Support approved by the Committee

1. Support to the CAR SSR process is currently limited to the Police and *Gendarmerie* for public order operations in Bangui. Since its establishment, the Security Council Committee on the CAR has approved the provision of eleven pick-up trucks, the provision of 48 rapid-response vehicles, equipment and materials for two projects in the CAR for a total of 730 CAR police officers. The Committee has also approved two in-country training modules, each for the duration of eight weeks that would benefit around 250 members of the CAR security forces.
2. The Committee has approved the transfer by French forces to the CAR internal security forces of 51 individual arms from the stockpile of weapons seized during the disarmament operations carried out by SANGARIS. However, the Panel observed that at least six assault-rifles were transferred in April by the *Gendarmerie* component of the French forces to local security forces in Bria (Hautte-Kotto) before the Committee's approval, in addition to the provision of training.

On 31 March 2014, UNDP and BINUCA handed over 11 pick-up truck vehicles to Central African Police and Gendarmerie¹



3.

¹ See “L’ONU remet 11 véhicules aux policiers et gendarmes de Centrafrique”, 31 March 2014, PNUD/CAR website accessed on 24 May 2014 at: http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/03/1_onu-remet-11-vehicules-aux-policiers-et-gendarmes-de-centrafri/

B. Stockpile management

1. The Panel noted that stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Bangui are secured by MISCA and French forces under the confidence-building measures (“*mesures de confiance*”) implemented by the international forces. MISCA is securing three ammunition sites originally belonging to Government forces in Bangui.
2. The Panel noted the absence of proper physical security and stockpile management as well as record keeping for FACA ammunition secured by MISCA. Moreover, the three sites where FACA ammunition is stored are located within population centres in Bangui and hence present risks especially due to the poor quality of storage and the presence of large quantities of obsolete ammunition. The Mine Action Section of MINUSCA and its partners have made contributions to improve stockpile management, safety and awareness and assisted to destroy 742 artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris.

*Cutting of artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris from 20 to 25 March 2014 in Bangui
(photographs taken by the Panel)*



Annex 21: Cases of non-compliance

1. The Panel noticed cases of non-compliance with the embargo regime, that were addressed with the concerned parties. It concerns provision of training, assistance and equipment to the CAR defence and security forces without prior approval of the Security Council Committee on the CAR.
2. On 31 March 2014, BINUCA and UNDP handed over to the police forces of the CAR eleven pick-up truck vehicles. The Panel sent a letter on the issue, which prompted a *post facto* notification from UNDP to the Committee on 29 April 2014. On 1 May 2014, a large quantity of equipment and accessories, including military-style uniforms, was donated by Togo to the Police and *Gendarmerie* of the CAR during a ceremony in Bangui. In this connection, the Panel sent a letter to the Government of Togo on 6 May 2014 to obtain further information, but to date no reply has been forthcoming.
3. With regard to assistance and training, Sudan provided basic infantry training to around 170 soldiers from the CAR in a Sudanese training centre north of Khartoum between 8 November 2013 and 5 March 2014. The Panel learned that sixty of these recruits returned to Bangui in April 2014 while the rest headed to Birao (Vakaga province) and presumably joined the former Seleka according to one General of that group. The Panel sent a letter requesting further information on this training to the Government of Sudan on 2 May 2014, but no reply has been forthcoming.
4. On 5 May 2014, the Panel sent two letters to the Governments of Morocco and Senegal, where a number of CAR defence and security personnel are being trained. Morocco confirmed that 34 military trainees who were in the country before 5 December 2013 (the imposition of the arms embargo) were still present in May 2014. Senegal, where about 20 FACA trainees are believed to be still present, has not yet replied to the Panel's letter. The Panel has also obtained information that small numbers of military trainees are also still present in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France and Niger. The Panel is in the process of informing those countries that exemption requests should be transmitted to the Committee in connection with these trainings.
5. With regards to support to the CAR SSR process, the Committee has approved so far all requests for the provision of equipment and training to the Police and Gendarmerie.¹ However, the Committee reiterated that the provision of training by international forces is exempted from the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) only in the context of support given by MISCA for its contribution to the reform of the security sector in coordination with MINUSCA.

¹ See annex 20.

Annex 22: Case Study I: Killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross staff in Ndélé

1. On 8 March 2014, three armed men killed an International Committee staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of Ndélé. At the time of the incident, the ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with three other ICRC staff members; the other three were unharmed. The incident happened in the context of civil unrest that was taking place in the town on the day of the incident, but clearly amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law.¹
2. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of the incident by contacting witnesses and by visiting the town of Ndélé on 10 April 2014.

Background

3. The town of Ndélé is located in the northeast of the CAR in the prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran. The town has approximately 51,000 inhabitants; 60 per cent are Christians and 40 per cent are Muslim.² The grand majority of the population belongs to the Goula and Runga ethnic groups; a considerable percentage of the population is of Chadian origin.
4. Being close to the Chadian border, Ndélé is a town where commercial and migration routes intersect. Sudanese and Chadian individuals, armed and non-armed, pass through this town.
5. Ndélé has been under the control of the former Seleka since they took power in March 2013³. As per accounts from several sources consulted by the Panel, the security situation in Ndélé has been more volatile since December 2012. Banditry has been common phenomenon in the area for decades. During the period when the former Seleka was in power (March – December 2013) the security situation improved according to several sources, there was a reduction of robberies, car hijackings and other crimes, but since December 2013 and during the past five months the situation has deteriorated.
6. Since December 2013 different factions of the former Seleka have been present and in control of the town. Mainly CPJP and UFDR, but none has absolute control of the town. These different factions have been cohabitating on relatively good terms for the past few months

1 ICRC Press Release, 8 March 2014; <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-08-central-african-republic-icrc-staff-member-killed.htm>;

Jeune Afrique, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20140308T221625Z20140308T221554Z/>; and Reuters, Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA270PV20140308>

² According to Government institutions and humanitarian organizations.

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel with a wide variety of sources as well as the field visit conducted by the Panel on 10 April 2014 confirm this statement.

apart from isolated incidents. There is no clear and unique command and control in Ndélé and its surroundings.

7. There was no significant change of local authorities in Ndélé in December 2013 when former Seleka was pressured to give up power in Bangui. The Préfet, Sous-Préfet and COMZONE remained in place.
8. Nevertheless it is noteworthy to mention that the Chadian contingent of MISCA evacuated the Préfet, Mr. Bernard Sendeo Okape on 26 January 2014 due to security threats he had received from armed men based on accusations that he was supporting the anti-Balaka forces.

Humanitarian situation

9. Presence: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (WASH⁴), food security and protection); *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (health); *Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale* (PU-AMI) (health and food security); as well as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (education and protection), have on-going humanitarian operations in N'Dele and surrounding areas. The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) recently closed its operations in the area. Since November / December 2013 all organizations have reduced their operations and number of staff in Ndélé, mainly due to the volatile security situation. Various humanitarian actors have expressed their precautions of deploying either expatriates or national staff ('impats') who are white or non-Muslims to Ndélé as a mitigating measure to be able to operate in an insecure environment.
10. Needs: Potable water remains the main humanitarian need for the population of Ndélé.
11. IDPs: Approximately 5,000 IDPs mainly integrated within host community, no existing IDP sites. All IDPs belong to the Muslim community.
12. Previous incidents reported in 2014: Attacks against humanitarian organizations

In the course of 2014 humanitarian organizations have been victim of various security related incidents in Ndélé. On 29 January 2014, unknown armed men robbed the health centre that is run by an INGO; On 31 January, the vehicle of an INGO was hijacked in the road between Ndélé and Manovo; on 14 February, the base of an INGO in Ndélé was attacked, property and money was stolen; on 25 February, another INGO vehicle was attacked and their staff robbed on the road between NDélé and Bamingui; On 28 February 2014, after mid-night, five unknown armed men unlawfully entered the Guest House of an INGO, verbally and physically threatened the staff present and damaged some equipment; On 30 April 2014, an INGO convoy

⁴ WASH stands for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene services

composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the NDélé population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through, but one was held behind. This truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.⁵ The incident was widely condemned by the international community.

13. All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February 2014 through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter (see below) was signed by a group that calls themselves *Groupe des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. According to several sources consulted and interviewed by the Panel in relation to the investigation of this incident the group is composed of few young men from Ndélé who are not directly related to the different former Seleka factions that are present in the town. However, after the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and former Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and to assure their security. There were no more threats issued by the group, according to various sources consulted by the Panel, the group of young men were identified and approached by one of the former Seleka commanders in the town and ordered them to discontinue this type of threats. The letter was the last time (until the writing of this report) where the existence of this group had been mentioned.

Description of Events

14. On 8 March 2014 at around 09:00 hours, a SANGARIS patrol of one vehicle went to the Commissariat to arrest former Seleka Colonel Inus and hand him over to MISCA⁶. Upon their return to the base, a vehicle coming from the Gendarmerie commanded by Colonel Isa and his armed men followed them. They shot at the SANGARIS vehicle from behind to which they reacted by shooting back. The exchange of fire took place at the roundabout that leads towards the airstrip, close to the church and the commercial part of the town.
15. The SANGARIS patrol left the scene and returned to its base. The clash left four former Seleka fighters dead and two others wounded. The corpses and wounded were left in the street. The Muslim population reacted a while after the exchange of fire had ended, and went to take the dead to be buried and the injured to the hospital.
16. The clash caused fear within the civilian population of the town, mostly the Christian population, some of which took refuge in the catholic church of Ndélé.

⁵<http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/rca-apres-une-nouvelle-attaque-l-inquietude-grandit-au-sein-des-ong.html>; and http://www.pu-ami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879&Itemid=28

⁶ The arrest was related to a verbal threat that Colonel Inus had made against SANGARIS in Ndélé. He had stated publicly on 7 March 2014 that if SANGARIS did not leave Ndélé within 48 hours they would be attacked. Information obtained by primary sources through interviews conducted by the Panel.

17. At around 10:00 hours, three armed men in military attire (beige camouflage) followed the crowd of civilians seeking refuge at the church. The men forced themselves into the house next to the church and fired at the ICRC staff who was residing at that house with the other three ICRC staff members and the cleaning lady.
18. According to several accounts of the incident, the three men just entered the premises and shot at the ICRC staff, no explanation was given in relation to why the other three were left unharmed. Only one of the three-armed men fired at the moment of the incident, the same person who the local authorities have signalled as the perpetrator of the killing. There is no explanation of why the other two did not shoot.
19. The three armed men asked everyone inside the premises to gather in the garden at the back of the church, right after they went to the church and the other church residence premises (where three priests and a seminarist resided) and also requested everyone to gather in the back garden.
20. At this time, the three armed men asked the civilians who were present at the church: “*where are the men?*” question to which one of the priest responded that there were none left. After the armed men took the personal belongings and money from the people present and entered the priests’ residence to take some money, a computer and mobile phones.
21. The three armed men were not recognized by any of the individuals who were present at the moment of the incident, nor did they carry any insignia or indication as to which armed group they belonged. However, all individuals interviewed and consulted in the course of the investigation indicated that these young men were related to former Seleka factions present in Ndélé.
22. After taking all the valuables they could find they left the church premises.
23. According to local authorities interviewed by the Panel in Bangui and in Ndélé, the perpetrator of the incident is a young man named Jamal Amat. He left Ndélé the day of the incident and has been on the run since. The local authorities have been trying to arrest him for detention. The father of this individual has a money transfer business in the centre of town. There is no further information about the individual; however at the moment of writing of this report the Panel obtained information from three confidential sources that clearly stated that the individual is closely related to former Seleka members in Ndélé.
24. The day after the incident representatives of the former Seleka present in town formally apologized to the ICRC for the incident and expressed their willingness and intention to

apprehend the perpetrator, however at the moment of writing of this report this has not happened.⁷

25. The Panel conducted this investigation independently and did not receive any information from ICRC.

⁷ Interview with confidential source on 10 April 2014.

Annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organizations

1. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left Boda. On 29 January 2014, clashes between the Muslim and non-Muslim population erupted in town. As many as 61 civilians were killed, approximately 850 houses and shops were burned and destroyed and more than half of the population in Boda was displaced. The violence decreased upon the arrival of the SANGARIS forces on 5 February 2014. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile and unstable until the time of writing.
2. On 22 February 2014, a team from an INGO was forced to stop the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs) in the town of Boda due to threats made by anti-Balaka militias. This incident amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. It happened in the context of confrontations and high tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda. The Panel has decided not to disclose the name of the INGO that was victim in the incident investigated in this case file to protect humanitarian operations in the country as well as future investigations of similar incidents by the Panel.
3. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of this incident, by interviewing sources and by visiting the town of Boda on 19 April 2014.

Background

4. Boda is located approximately 160 km south-west of Bangui in the Lobaye Prefecture. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants.¹ These figures include approximately 12,000 Muslims² and 30,000 non-Muslims, the remaining figure is the estimate number of people living outside the town; no reliable information is available in relation to which religious community they belong to. Since end of January 2014 most of the Muslim population is cantoned in the centre of town and the non-Muslims population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town but there is no information on this matter available.
5. During the last couple of decades the livelihoods of the inhabitants in Boda consisted mainly of trading diamonds and to a lesser extent of agricultural production. The latter mainly for

¹ Evaluation Report, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), February 2014; OCHA figures; the number of inhabitants was calculated by the RRM team based on the statistics from the health centre in Boda.

² According to information collected by humanitarian organizations, the Muslim community in Boda is composed not only of Central Africans but also individuals of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian origin.

local consumption. Traditionally, individuals belonging to the Muslim community in Boda and Mbaki managed most of the diamond trade, but since the end of January 2014 these individuals have not been able to access the mines due to a lack of freedom of movement. According to primary sources of the Panel the diamond trade has partially resumed under the control of the non-Muslim community.

6. Boda has one hospital and thirteen schools (twelve public schools and one private school), one kindergarten and two maternity centres, all were closed after the eruption of violence in late January 2014 and none were operational at the time of writing this report.
7. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left the town of Boda. Presence of local authorities was reduced to the Mayor, one gendarme, one policeman (both un-armed) and 15 teachers / educators, all others authorities left.³
8. According to numerous local sources, during the time the former Seleka controlled Boda, they were responsible for committing crimes against the non-Muslim population. The former Seleka having armed the Muslim population is one of the allegations received by the Panel during its investigations.⁴ Nevertheless, the same sources agreed in stating that the security situation was calm during the period when the former Seleka were in power. There were no reports of anti-Balaka militias in Boda before the end of January 2014.
9. On 29 January 2014, violence erupted between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the town. Houses and shops in and around the centre of town and the market were attacked and burned, as many as 61 civilians were killed during this event according to several sources.⁵ Reports of humanitarian organizations stated that approximately 850 houses and businesses

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel, Boda, 19 April 2014

⁴ It is important to note that more than one humanitarian organization has received testimony from the Muslim community that they were armed by the former Seleka and have a certain level of capability to defend themselves; which is one of the reasons why they haven't been "eliminated" or "expelled" from Boda.

⁵ Interviews conducted by the Panel in Boda on 19 April 2014; HRW <http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; Rapport d'Evaluation, RRM, Boda, Prefecture de la Lobaye, February 2014; Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-centralafrican-killings-idUSBREA121PF20140203>; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAWEB20140203152234_centrafrique-flambee-de-violence-entre-chretiens-et-musulmans-pres-de-bangui.html; HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; UN, <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-un-rights-office-warns-worsening-insecurity-bangui>; UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/hk/files/2014%20Emergency/CAR/update/Feb/Regional%20Update%20II%20-%20Central%20African%20Situation.pdf>

were burned down between 28 January and the 5 February 2014. On 5 February 2014, SANGARIS Forces arrived in Boda.⁶

10. According to three reliable primary sources interviewed by the Panel, anti-Balaka militias arrived in Boda shortly after the eruption of violence. One or two days after 29 January 2014, a group of about 50 young men from the non-Muslim community left Boda and went to be “trained” by an anti-Balaka commander with the nom de guerre “General 8-8” from the town of Pama (around 40 km north of Boda), they returned to Boda and partially took control of the town. The anti-Balaka militias of Boda are locals.
11. It remains unclear who exactly was responsible for the commencement of violence, destruction of property and killing of civilians. The Panel interviewed individuals from both communities who were present at the beginning of the violence between Christians and Muslims and each presented their own version of events. However, it is clear that both communities were armed at that time and the departure of the former Seleka left a vacuum of power that triggered the violence. Most of the crimes reported after 29 January 2014 seem to have been committed by anti-Balaka militias.
12. Since 29 January 2014, the Muslim community has been compelled to live in the centre of town with no freedom of movement, limited access to basic health and educational facilities, restricted livelihood activities and, furthermore, under continuous threats from anti-Balaka militias who surround the centre of town and partially control the town and its surroundings.
13. The non-Muslim population inhabits five IDP sites, they have access to the fields to cultivate and potable water, however due to their sudden forced displacement and the fragile security situation in the town they lack mainly NFIs and access to health and educational facilities.
14. The IDP sites are:⁷
 - St Michele Church: approximately 9,517 persons
 - *Sous-Préfecturale* School for girls: approximately 4,407 persons
 - Cotonaf School: approximately 3,000 persons
 - Samboli School: approximately 840 persons
 - *Préfecturale* School for boys: approximately 2,400 persons

⁶ Confidential source of the Panel within a humanitarian organization.

⁷ Names and figures were obtained by the Panel from OCHA and corroborated on the ground during a field visit.

15. After the eruption of violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda its market has been closed mainly due to the fact that shops were burned and destroyed and no reconstruction has taken place.
16. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and OCHA reports show that until end of March 2014 no sexual violence cases had been reported or documented in Boda. However, the lack of proper and functional health facilities as well as protection mechanisms in place could be the cause for the lack of reports.
17. Reports from various sources state consistently that the anti-Balaka militias present in Boda had not only been targeting the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim population. A confidential report from a mission to Boda conducted by various humanitarian organizations between 12 and 14 March 2014 stated that anti-Balaka militias had confiscated mobile phones from several people in the Saint-Michel Church IDP site, accusing them of being in touch with the Muslim community.
18. Some Muslims have expressed their willingness to be relocated outside of Boda, others want to stay. The Muslims who have expressed their willingness to be relocated seem to be the ones who are not originally from Boda, but who fled to Boda seeking protection from violence.

Description of Events: Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance

19. On 22 February 2014, at around 1730 hours, a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) mission conducted by an INGO to distribute NFIs for the population in need arrived in Boda.
20. The first truck of NFIs arrived in Boda's Muslim neighbourhood and delivered part of the supplies, after the truck was emptied the driver decided to take the truck to the Catholic Church Saint Michele for security reasons.
21. Once at the Catholic mission, the RRM team encountered a group of anti-Balaka militias as well as a group of representatives from the non-Muslim community. The individuals expressed their disapproval of the distribution of NFIs to the Muslim community underlining that the NFIs given to the Muslim community were of better quality than those distributed among the non-Muslim communities.⁸
22. Individuals (both civilians and armed anti-Balaka) threatened to burn the vehicles and trucks of the RRM team and to throw grenades at them if they didn't leave the town immediately and to kill the INGO director (the "white" person) claiming that white people were the cause of all the problems in the CAR. Furthermore a very distressed anti-Balaka individual approached the

⁸ The Panel consulted and verified with several humanitarian sources that the NFI packages were the same for both communities, same items and same quality.

RRM team with a machete crying out loud: “who are the people who came to help the Muslims?”.

23. After this incident, the RRM team took their vehicles and went to the SANGARIS base to seek advice and protection, leaving the trucks, drivers and some team members behind.
24. At around 1900 hours part of the team went back to the Catholic mission to join the remaining part of the team and the trucks. At that moment the individual who claimed to be the leader of the anti-Balaka militias in Boda, ‘Général 8-8’, spoke to the RRM team and assured their security. Nevertheless, anti-Balaka elements present at the meeting point said in Sango that they would still kill them and burn their trucks if they stayed in Boda. This comment was picked up by one of the national staff of the team. The entire team returned to the SANGARIS base to spend the night there.
25. At 0500 hours on 23 February 2014, the RRM team left the SANGARIS base and held a meeting with the representatives of the non-Muslim community (some of them being the Priests) and explained that the NFI distribution had to be suspended due to the security situation. The RRM team did the same with representatives of the Muslim community and then left Boda and returned to Bangui.
26. All NFIs that were not distributed remained in Boda together with paperwork for representatives of each community to continue the distribution. NFIs were distributed to both communities by each of their representatives.
27. None of the individuals that were part of the RRM team returned to Boda until the time of writing of this report.
28. The distribution of humanitarian aid was suspended in Boda until late March 2014 when another INGO took over the activities of the previous INGO. Even though the tensions in the town continue and the unstable security situation for the civilian population remains a mayor concern, humanitarian aid has resumed and no mayor incidents have been reported since then.

Perpetrators

29. According to the investigation conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka Commander ‘Général 8-8’ is responsible for threatening humanitarian organizations and hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians in need. Information collected until the time of writing of this report indicates that the ‘Général 8-8’ is still in Boda and commands and controls the anti-Balaka militias in the town.
30. According to investigations conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka in Boda seem to be one example of a community based militia that falls under the third category mentioned in the Armed Groups Section of the report.

Photographs taken by the Panel

Households destroyed in Boda during January violence



Market area destroyed during January violence



Annex 24: Attacks against humanitarians in the Central African Republic from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014

| | Date | Prefecture | ATT | K | W | D | LT | T | Summary | Source |
|----|----------|------------|-------------|---|---|---|----|---|---|--|
| 1 | December | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Eight (8) Ex-Seleka elements stole 16 mosquito nets on a non-violent form after six of them received treatment in a health centre run by an INGO | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 2 | December | Bangui | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On the night of 05 December 2014, Ex-Seleka armed elements attacked the neighbourhood where the house of an aid worker was located. They entered the house and looted the premises taking with them all valuables and a vehicle. They stated that the reason for the attack was because the aid worker and the neighbours did not like Muslims. | UN Report |
| 3 | December | Bangui | Unknown | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | International Medical Corps (IMC) confirms the death of one of its national staff members in CAR, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in his home during the violent clashes in the capital Bangui on 5 December 2013. | IMC News Release through their website |
| 4 | December | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Unknown armed men forced an aid worker to attend a patient on an aggressive manner. The staff joined them on the tent where he was and gave indications this served to ease the tension | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 5 | December | Bangui | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On the night of 8 December 2013 at around 2100 hours a group of armed Ex-Seleka men stormed into the offices of an INGO, verbally threatened the guard and stole computers, the generator, money and destroyed documents and furniture. The perpetrators shouted to the guard that they did not want the presence of the INGO in the country and that all personnel should leave. After this, the group of armed men left. The office was then closed and activities were suspended for a few weeks. The organization was obliged to look for new premises due to the security situation. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 6 | December | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | INGO driver arrested by Ex-Seleka during an hour accused of conducting a survey in Moyen Sido against Ex-Seleka | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 7 | December | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Anti-Balaka armed men prosecuting Muslims in the hospital. They aggressively asked to expel the Muslims from the hospital. MISCA replied shooting in the air. Evacuation of Muslim patients was envisaged at the moment. INGO activities hampered due to general insecurity | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 8 | December | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Armed men chased a Muslim individual who had requested refuge in the health centre ran by an INGO. INGO reported the increasing difficulty of operating in such environment. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 9 | December | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Ex-Seleka accused and INGO of collaborating with the Anti-Balaka and asked for their presence in the headquarters | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 10 | December | Bangui | Various | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A Muslim civilian with his wife came to health centre run by INGO but was prevented from leaving by a crowd of civilians and armed men. They sought refuge in the INGO premises and later had to be relocated to a safer place | Panel Interview with INGO |

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|----|----------|---------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| 11 | December | Ouham | Various | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | In the context of an Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka clash in a village, aid workers had to run to the jungle to seek refuge. Civilians and non-civilians wounded and killed. Burning of houses also reported. Rockets were fired. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 12 | December | Ouham - Pende | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Anti-Balaka elements stole 50,000 XAF and a mobile phone from an aid worker after beating him. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 13 | January | Bangui | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Ex-Seleka armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker, and looted the house. They stole inventory such as a fridge, television and clothes. | UN |
| 14 | January | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Aid worker stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint who threatened him by shooting in the air. The INGO staff was held for some time and then released under the explanation that perpetrators thought it was another INGO. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 15 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | An unknown person threw a grenade that landed on a humanitarian agency truck parked nearby the airport IDP site after a tire problem. The truck was carrying food from the logistics base to the airport IDP site. The explosion of the grenade damaged two other tires of the truck, causing no casualties. The person suspected of throwing the grenade was reportedly arrested by Burundian soldiers. | UN |
| 16 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Unidentified armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker. They threatened one of the family members and looted the house. The aid worker was at the office at the moment of the incident but neighbours called to inform about what was happening. Aid worker notified Burundian MISCA troops and they immediately went to the house. They succeeded in rescuing the family member from the house, but the entire inventory and all the valuable items including cars and motorcycles were stolen | UN |
| 17 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Three grenades thrown in the IDP camp near Castor health centre ran by INGO after Djotodia resignation. 15 wounded (1 aid worker) and 3 civilians dead. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 18 | January | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | INGO team on their way back to the office was stopped by Anti-Balaka members on the road. They were demanded to identify themselves and hand over their mobile phones. Apparently the anti-Balaka were searching for Muslim contacts in the phones of the drivers and the team members with the aim of identifying and prosecuting those Muslim contacts. The INGO staff was released after few hours. The INGO no longer deploys Muslim staff to the area and has advised the staff to be careful of the type of names registered on their mobile numbers as a mitigating measure. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 19 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On 14 January 2014, in Bangui in the Bibale neighbourhood, the corpse of an aid worker was discovered floating in the canal that passed under the Jackson bridge. The employee was on his way to the airport, when he was allegedly stabbed to death by Muslims in the area of the Yakite neighbourhood. Young men marched with the body of the deceased on avenue Barthelemy Boganda to express their discontent. | UN |

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|----|---------|---------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| 20 | January | Kemo | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | At 0200 hours three armed men forcibly entered the compound of an INGO. The guards claim to have recognized Ex-Seleka and ran for their lives. Motorbikes were stolen. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 21 | January | Ouham - Pende | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Between the 15th and 17th of February, following heavy fighting in Bocaranga, Anti-Balaka elements looted shops of Muslims and also looted one (1) INGO Compound. | UN |
| 22 | January | Ouham - Pende | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | In January, a staff member of an INGO who was living at the BINUCA regrouping location point, was on his way to distribute a health kit at the Prefectural Hospital when he was intercepted on two occasions by Anti-Balaka elements. After checking the inside of the car, they verbally threatened the aid worker by saying: 'if you were carrying Muslims with you, we would kill you with them.' | UN |
| 23 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | At about 0930 hours unknown perpetrators hijacked a vehicle of an INGO in the PK12 area at the outskirts of Bangui. | UN |
| 24 | January | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | Anti-Balaka armed elements physically harmed and robbed an aid worker. Mobile telephone was stolen. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 25 | January | Nana-Mambere | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | In January, unknown quantity of food items was stolen from UN humanitarian Agency-contracted truck in the area of Beloko, when it was on the way from Cameroon to CAR. It is not clear how and by whom the theft was committed | UN |
| 26 | January | Ouham - Pende | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | INGO vehicle on the way to projects was threatened and thrown stones at by young armed men allegedly looking for Muslims. Vehicle and staff were let go unharmed. Vehicle was slightly damaged. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 27 | January | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | On 20 January 2014, armed men entered the offices of an INGO breaking down the main entrance and robbed all the furniture, some desks, chairs and others. According to the statement of the aid worker, at this time of year PK13 was totally controlled by the Anti-Balaka and they as well as eyewitnesses believed that it was Anti-Balaka men who attacked the office. No civilian casualties or injuries were reported. After the incident the INGO moved to another location. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 28 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Two unidentified armed men forcibly entered an INGO run clinic in Bangui and hit the guard. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 29 | January | Nana-Mambere | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Insecurity in the border area with Cameroon has led to the suspension of trucks connecting Cameroon and Bangui. This threatens the supply to the capital, Bangui, and prevents humanitarian aid agencies from replenishing their stocks. | UN |
| 30 | January | Kemo | Various | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Clashes between Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements in Sibut obstructed the circulation of INGO vehicles, staff and therefore hindered their humanitarian operation. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 31 | January | Kemo | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Ex-Seleka armed elements arrived to the INGO run health centre and threatened the staff to give preferential treatment to Ex-Seleka patients | Panel Interview with INGO |

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|----|---------|-------------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| 32 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A group of armed men attacked the home of an aid worker. They first shoot at the air and after climbed the entrance gate and destroyed the side door to access the premises. The nephew of the aid worker was threatened; they stole 03 mattresses, one antenna and 5 cell phones. After their crime, they fled to an unknown destination. The aid worker requested assistance and UNDSS immediately responded with a detachment of the Moroccan Guard Unit. Upon arrival, the bandits had already disappeared. | UN |
| 33 | January | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | INGO vehicle was hijacked by unknown armed men in the road N'Dele - Manovo | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 34 | January | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Armed men entered the hospital in a village of the Prefecture, ran by INGO, they stole material from the building (Mattresses, fuel and others) | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 35 | January | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | In January 2014, unknown armed elements entered the house of an aid worker in Bangui, looted the house and threatened to kidnap a relative of the aid worker. A post assessment of the neighbourhood showed considerable damage and destruction after several acts of violence committed in the area. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 36 | January | Bamingui-Bangoran | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A group of ex-Ex-Seleka who fled disarmament from Bangui to Ndélé, intercepted and stole the vehicle Land- Cruiser of the INGO as well as envelope containing money . | UN |
| 37 | January | Mambéré-Kadéfi | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Armed ex-Ex-Seleka elements arrived to a village in the Prefecture of Mambéré-Kadéfi late at night, looted an INGO compound and stole two vehicles. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 38 | January | Kemo | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Ex-Ex-Seleka armed men came during the night and looted an INGO compound. The door of the compound was broken down and the place was thoroughly emptied of all valuables, i.e. motorcycles, mattresses, bicycles, furniture, floor mats and recreational kits. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 39 | January | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | In January 2014 in Bangui, a group of armed Anti-Balaka (two ex- FACA were recognized by neighbours according to investigations made in relation to the incident) stormed into the house of an aid worker with the intention to loot it under the pretext that the house belonged to a Muslim. Neighbours who were witnessing the event approached the armed men and explained that the owner of the house was not a Muslim, intervention that allegedly stopped the armed men from harming the premises. The Moroccan Guard Unit arrived to the scene to intervene but the armed men had already left. | UN |
| 40 | January | Bangui | Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A wood vendor threatened INGO staff and stopped the passage of one of their trucks at the entrance of unknown place in Bangui. No injuries or looting reported. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 41 | January | Nana-Mambere | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Armed men entered the hospital ran by INGO, shooting and threatening the population and staff present. They stole one INGO vehicle. | Panel Interview with INGO |

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|----|----------|----------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|--|-------------------------------|
| 42 | February | Ombella M'Poko | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A UN staff member (SM) was attacked by a Anti- Balaka when he went to visit his residence in Bangui which he had abandoned since the beginning of the crisis in December due to security reasons. When he was leaving the premises he was stopped by a group of anti-Balaka who demanded him to give them money, after he gave them all he had and left the scene. A few meters after he was stopped for the second time by another group of anti-Balaka who demanded money as well, this time the UN SM explained that he did not have any more money with him. The anti-Balaka responded by pointing a gun at him, the SM managed to escape the scene in his car, the anti-Balaka opened fire while he was fleeing, causing minor injuries to the SM and damaging the vehicle. | UN |
| 43 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Elements of the Moroccan Guard Unit and the UNDSS intervention team were sent to intercept in a situation at the home of a UN staff member. His house was under attack and being looted by Anti-Balaka elements in the Miskine neighbourhood. The incident happened while Anti-Balaka elements were in process of conducting a significant operation of "cleaning" Miskine neighbourhood from Muslims living in the area. All valuables were taken from the residence of the staff member. | UN |
| 44 | February | Ombella M'Poko | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | An INGO convoy carrying humanitarian aid goods was stopped on the road between Bogangolo and Bangui for a period of more than three hours. The convoy was released and continued its way but all communications equipment and valuable were stolen from personnel present. | Panel Interview with INGO, UN |
| 45 | February | Ouham - Pende | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | On February 2014 at around midnight a group of six Ex-Seleka armed men broke into an INGO compound in a village of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and looted the compound. The attackers demanded to be told where the white person was (implying the expatriate staff of the INGO) who managed to escape at a certain point of the incident without being noticed. The armed men robbed one vehicle, six cans of diesel, two mobile phones and 130,000 XFA. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 46 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | An NGO was the target of a robbery by unidentified gunmen. Pharmaceuticals and some medical material were stolen. | UN |
| 47 | February | Ouham - Pende | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | The office of an INGO in a village in Ouham-Pende was pillaged by Anti-Balaka, who allegedly have taken all the material collected to Paoua. | UN |
| 48 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Four armed anti-Balaka forced their way into the house of an aid worker threatening the guard and the family members of the aid worker present at the time of the incident. The anti-Balaka elements took a vehicle. The aid worker called the to report the incident to the security officer of the organization who intervened and met the anti-Balaka commander who was in charge of the group (Commander Dieudonner). After negotiations the AB commander agreed to return the vehicle. | UN |

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| 49 | February | Kemo | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | In the month of February in the Prefecture Kemo an INGO vehicle was undertaking a humanitarian mission when the vehicle was stopped by ex-Ex-Seleka armed men. Three of the four aid workers who were inside the vehicle were kidnapped by the armed group. The three aid workers were able to escape the day after and find their way to the nearest village. All valuables and the vehicle were taken by the ex-Seleka elements. | UN |
| 50 | February | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Ex-Seleka armed men broke into the compound of an INGOs on the night of 10 to 11 February 2014. The group forced the front gate open to get into the compound, two vehicles and money were taken | UN |
| 51 | February | Ouham - Pende | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Ex-Seleka broke into the compound of an international NGO in Batangafo and stole a vehicle. | UN |
| 52 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Anti-Balaka armed men tried to break into the home of a UN Staff Member, with guns and machetes. Caretaker and neighbours alerted the security staff in the neighbourhood, in response the bandits attacked three people with machetes. Once the security team arrived, the bandits were gone. | UN |
| 53 | February | Bamingui-Bangoran | Ex-Seleka | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | An aid worker was stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint was killed after declaring he had no money to hand over as requested by the perpetrators. The staff clearly identified himself as a humanitarian worker | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 54 | February | Mbomou | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Three rental trucks of an INGO going from Bangui to Bangassou were hijacked by members of the Ex-Seleka. Upon arrival in Ouango, a village 75km from Bangassou they were attacked by armed inhabitants from the village who took the trucks from the ex-Seleka men. | UN |
| 55 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Anti-Balaka armed elements obstructed and threatened INGO convoy stating that they were helping the Muslim community. The threat included to throw a grenade to the staff. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 56 | February | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | The Guest House of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men. Money, equipment and personal items of staff were stolen | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 57 | February | Kemo | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On February 2014, Anti-Balaka armed men blocked an inter-agency protection mission to PK12. One aid worker's vehicle was stopped between two roadblocks of armed men for many hours before being rescued. The mission did not accomplish its objective which was to assist civilian survivors of a previous attack. | UN |
| 58 | February | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Two Ex-Seleka armed men attacked an INGO guesthouse. Money, a satellite phone and a vehicle were taken after threatening the expat staff with a weapon. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 59 | February | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Tensions growing and increasing number of threats against humanitarians being accused of partiality have been hindering the movement of aid workers in the city and surrounding. | Panel Interview with INGO |

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| 60 | February | Lobaye | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | An INGO team was forced to stop a distribution of NFIs in a village in the Prefecture of Lobaye due to threats made by Anti-Balaka militias in the village. The aid workers were forced to evacuate the village before finishing the distribution of humanitarian aid. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 61 | February | Ouham | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On February 2014 in the Ouham Prefecture and INGO vehicle was hijacked by Ex-Seleka armed men. The incident took place on the Kabo - Sido axis during a transfer of patients by the said vehicle. The vehicle was returned one day after to the INGO. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 62 | February | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | An INGO vehicle traveling from Bamingui to N'Dele was attacked and robbed by unknown armed men. Personal items and money from staff were stolen. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 63 | February | Bamingui-Bangoran | Various | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter was signed by a group that call themselves <i>Group des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran</i> . After the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and Ex-Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and assure their security. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 64 | February | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | Ex-Seleka armed men stormed the a town in the Prefecture of Ouham and killed three people, looted the city hospital and stole computer equipment, bikes and a sizeable amount of money. In addition, they took two INGOs vehicles. | UN |
| 65 | February | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | At around 1300 hrs, at camp Don Bosco, a team of UN staff was threatened by a dozen Anti-Balaka elements that were carrying machetes and firearms. They stopped the two vehicles that were transporting the team. The Anti-Balakas shouted threats and showcased their firearms, and even tried to take one of the passengers of vehicles out of the car. However both vehicles were able to leave the area and join the main road without further consequences. | UN |
| 66 | February | Nana-Mambere | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On February 2014 at around noon, the distribution of food by humanitarian organizations in a town in the Prefecture of Nana-Mambere generated tension within the local population. Difficulties arose due to the discrepancies between the lists of beneficiaries as well as identified fake ID holders demanding to receive aid. Threats against aid workers created a very tense situation, which eventually forced the staff to take refuge in a protected building nearby. | UN |
| 67 | February | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Five armed individuals entered the INGO expat Guest House at late hours of the night threatening the staff with weapons to leave the town. Some staff were physically harmed by the assailants. Valuables were taken. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 68 | March | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Armed men entered the INGO run hospital, physically harmed the guards and stole all the money which was meant to pay the daily salary of hospital workers. | Panel Interview with INGO |

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| 69 | March | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Armed men attacked an INGO base and staff were obliged to take refuge at the MISCA base for a few days. No further details were made available on the incident. | UN |
| 70 | March | Ouham | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Armed individuals entered the INGO Expat Guest House, threat the staff present and loot the money and the communications devices in possession of the present individuals | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 71 | March | Ouham - Pende | FPR | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On March 2014 in a village 30 km from Pauoa, an aid worker was allegedly stabbed to death by members of the RPF General Baba Laddé, which would be stationed in the area. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 72 | March | Ouham - Pende | RJ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On March 2014 at around 0900 hours a group of around ten (10) armed men from RJ stormed a UN compound in a town in the Prefecture of Ouham-Pende. Guards in the compound questioned the reason for this unlawful entry to which the armed men responded that they were searching for their commander. The guard informed that he was not there, nevertheless they insisted and searched the premises. They left without further harm done. | UN |
| 73 | March | Kemo | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | At around 1530, a vehicle of an INGO with one driver on board was returning from Sibut. The vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka in a village about 55km from Sibut. The Anti-Balaka elements demanded to use the vehicle for transportation. The driver explained the prohibition of the use of humanitarian assets for purposes other than humanitarian operations but in any case the Anti-Balaka requested to be transported to a location not far away from the point where the vehicle was initially intercepted. After this the driver was allowed to leave without further trouble. The driver later discovered a machete in the booth that was probably left by one of the Anti-Balaka elements. | UN |
| 74 | March | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Four armed Ex-Seleka assaulted the village and went to the health centre, a patient run off and a Ex-Seleka shoot him but did not injure him. INGO Staff gave what they had (50000 XAF) and yelling that they may have more than that | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 75 | March | Ombella M'Poko | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | INGO Convoy stopped by 16 armed anti-Balaka, threatening of throw a grenade against INGO next time | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 76 | March | Bamingui-Bangoran | Ex-Seleka | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On the 08 March 2014 three armed men killed an ICRC staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of N'Dele. The ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with other three staff members at the time of the incident; the other three were unharmed. The incident was investigated by Panel and perpetrator was identified. | JA090314; ICRC080314; ICRC; Open source on file: News Release 08-03-2014, Breaking and US International News, Reuters.com (Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic); UN |
| 77 | March | Bangui | Unknown | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On 9 March 2014, a 36-year-old volunteer with the Central African Red Cross Society, was gunned down in Bangui by unknown armed men. | ICRC0314 |
| 78 | March | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | INGO vehicle involved in water distribution efforts was attacked, driver was stabbed and the water pump was stolen. Later demanded ransom for the pump. | UN |

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| 79 | March | Nana-Grébizi | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On March 2014, a convoy of UN vehicles, traveling from Bangui to the north was stopped at about 70km from Bangui, by Anti-Balaka elements. Amongst the staff (2 national and 2 international) was a Muslim (international staff), who was asked to get out of the car and his life was threatened. They demanded to search the vehicles but the UN staff responded that they had no right to do so. The anti-Balaka suspected that the vehicles were transporting ex-Ex-Seleka and their weapons. After negotiation the rebels took food, water and an unknown amount of money and the staff was allowed to continue. | UN |
| 80 | March | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UN vehicle was hit by stray bullets while armed assailants attempted to attack a Muslim exiting a bank | UN |
| 81 | March | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | MISCA intervened on an attempted robbery against an INGO | UN |
| 82 | March | Kemo | Ex-Seleka | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Ex-Seleka opened fire on the inhabitants of Dekoa. Two volunteers for the Red Cross died and one civilian was injured. | http://www.radiondekeluka.org/societe/item/19026-tension-a-dekoa-la-population-est-en-brousse.html |
| 83 | March | Bamingui-Bangoran | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | The base of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 84 | March | Nana-Grébizi | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | The house of an aid worker was attacked and looted by armed men. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 85 | March | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Two INGO vehicles were hijacked in Bangui | UN |
| 86 | March | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | The vehicle of an INGO was hijacked by Anti-Balaka armed elements at the Boy-Rabe. The vehicle was later recovered by the intervention of humanitarian organizations | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 87 | April | Ouham | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A UN vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka elements and asked the driver to drive them to an unknown location. The driver was physically harmed because he refused to drive faster than what the armed men were asking. As a result the vehicle spun out of control and fell into a trench. The Anti-Balaka men descended from the vehicle and left the scene leaving the driver and the car behind. The driver and vehicle were later recovered by a UN team. | UN |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------|---------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|
| 88 | April | Kemo | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | <p>On April 2014, a UN vehicles and trucks mission returning to Bangui were stopped by Anti-Balaka elements 15km outside Dekoa in a checkpoint and demanded information in relation to the MISCA and the ex-Ex-Seleka in Dekoa, the team leader of the mission explained that they had no information on this matter, they passed. The mission had seen a MISCA and ex-Ex-Seleka meeting in Dekoa when passing by. Around 10km further south from Dekoa the mission was stopped at another Anti-Balaka checkpoint. The Anti-Balaka elements searched the vehicles and let them pass. For the third time, 15 km further south, they were stopped by another Anti-Balaka checkpoint, this time they stopped the convoy by shooting at the air with AK47s. They requested the staff to get out of the vehicles and sit at the side of the road while they searched the vehicles. It is to be noted that the AB elements were very aggressive with the staff. They questioned extensively the staff and requested to hand over 50,000 XFA per vehicle, the staff answered that they did not have that amount of money and that the humanitarian nature of the mission prohibited to pay for this type of requests. Nevertheless they forcibly took the wallet of one of the staff members and took around 12,000 XFA, additionally they took all valuable personal belongings of all the present individuals, mobile phones and money. They were all released around two hours after and the mission arrived to Bangui without further obstruction.</p> | UN |
| 89 | April | Kemo | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | <p>Three trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the northern part of the country were intercepted by anti-Balaka elements 10km before Sibut. The armed anti-Balaka took 30 bags of rice of each truck and robbed all valuables from the drivers (mobile phones, money and others).</p> | UN |
| 90 | April | Ouham - Pende | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | <p>Armed unknown individuals assault the INGO expat guesthouse threatening the expat with arms. Cash and communication assets were stolen.</p> | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 91 | April | Kemo | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | <p>On April 2014 in a village in the Kemo Prefecture at around 0100hours, a group of unidentified armed men stormed in the base of an INGO. They forced the safe of the compound and stole one Thuraya phone, several mobile phones, around 12 million XFA (two safe boxes), some electronic equipment and one vehicle. The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but independent sources indicate it was elements belonging to an Ex-Seleka faction.</p> | UN |

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|----|-------|-------------------|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 92 | April | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On April 2014, at 0100 hours, the house of an aid worker in Bangui was attacked by at least a dozen unknown armed men, carrying AK47s, machetes and spears. Upon arrival, the group posted a guard at each neighbouring house to control the movements of the people in the area and four (4) others went into the house of the aid worker whilst firing guns to the air. Then, by using a brick, they broke down the door of the house and demanded the keys to a motorcycle stationed outside. They also took a television, two mobile devices and a bag that contained a Motorola radio and other personal belongings. The neighbours caught two of the armed men while they were leaving with the television. The Burundian MISCA arrived to the scene and caught the two individuals. The rest of the armed men escaped the scene. | UN |
| 93 | April | Basse Kotto | Ex-Seleka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A team of an INGO was threatened after they refused to drive two armed Ex-Seleka men in their ambulance. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 94 | April | Bangui | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Armed elements came into a health centre and guardians did not dare to ask them to leave their weapons. The Anti-Balaka armed men were identified by medical staff and were taken out of the health centre. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 95 | April | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | An aid worker was robbed in the city centre by armed men. | UN |
| 96 | April | Bamingui-Bangoran | Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A group of unidentified armed men stormed into the compound of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran and stole two vehicles. The vehicles were returned a few days later and the incident was attributed to Sudanese Janjaweed. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 97 | April | Ombella M'Poko | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | In April a contracted truck to transport humanitarian agricultural material had a mechanical problem in the outskirts of Bangui. The driver decided to spend the night with the truck while waiting for help to repair the truck. During the night, four Anti-Balaka armed men spotted the truck, beat the driver and looted the contents of the truck. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 98 | April | Ouham | Ex-Seleka | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On 26 April 2014 a group of Ex-Seleka armed men entered the town of Boguila located in the Sous Prefecture of Bossangoa and looted the offices of INGO and the local hospital. At the moment of arrival of the Ex-Seleka elements, a meeting of community leaders was being held in the compound where the offices of INGO and the hospital are located. Upon arrival, the armed men looted the compound, at the moment of departure and for unknown reasons two of the armed elements started shooting at the group of civilians, killing 17 of them including three INGO (3) staff. According to investigations conducted by the Panel the group of Ex-Seleka was commanded by Colonel Issa. The group of armed elements was passing by Boguila on the way to Béal and coming from Bouca. | INGO; http://allafrica.com/stories/201404300989.html . http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/three-INGO-staff-among-16-civilians-killed-central-african-republic-hospital |


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|-----|-------|----------------|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| 99 | April | Bangui | Government Forces | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | On 26 April 2014 five trucks of an INGO were stopped by the Gendarmerie at PK12, allegedly the Gendarmerie had received information that the trucks were carrying weapons with them. The trucks were carrying humanitarian aid good for N'Dele. The Gendarmerie found a bag in the front seat of one of the trucks containing a grenade and some military attire that were confiscated and the driver of the truck was arrested. According to the one of the drivers, before they were stopped by the Gendarmerie, the truck that contained the bag had stopped to talk to someone in a Jeep. Someone from the INGO went to the site of the incident to talk to the Gendarmerie. The five trucks were released a few days later with all the humanitarian goods, the driver of the truck remains arrested at the time of writing of this report and the bag was confiscated. | Panel Interview with INGO |
| 100 | April | Bangui | Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On 28 April a UN staff member was victim of a robbery at his house in Bangui. All valuable items were taken from the premises. No injuries or casualties were reported. | UN |
| 101 | April | Ouham | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On 28 April 2014, around 0045 hours, in a village of the Ouham Prefecture an aid worker was victim of an armed robbery at his house by a group of six armed Anti-Balaka elements. Under armed threats they forced the gatekeeper to open the front door. The perpetrators first searched the room of the colleagues of the staff member, after which they searched his own room and stole a duffel bag with clothes and a sum of about 45,000 CFA francs. The perpetrators fled to an unknown destination, no physical violence was exerted on the staff member. | UN |
| 102 | April | Ombella M'Poko | Anti-Balaka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | In April 2014 a truck part of an INGO convoy (six trucks) on the way to north west of the country carrying seeds for vulnerable population had a technical problem in the route around Boali. While the drivers were fixing the truck, armed Anti-Balaka elements intercepted the truck and looted a significant part of the sacs of seeds and some fuel. The driver was threatened by the Anti-Balaka but was not harmed. The rest of the bags were handed over to the Police in Boali and recuperated the next day by the service provider. The rest of the convoy arrived unharmed to the location. | UN |
| 103 | April | Ombella M'Poko | Anti-Balaka | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | On 30 April 2014, a PU-AMI convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through but one was held behind, the truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed. | PU-AMI; PU AMI Communique de Presse 2 May 2014; Panel Interview with INGO |

EXPLANTION OF TABLE HEADINGS

| Abbreviation | Definition |
|---------------------|--|
| ATT | Alleged Perpetrator |
| K | Number of Civilian Killings |
| W | Number of Civilians Wounded |
| D | Destruction of Property: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative |
| LT | Looting: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative |
| T | Torture: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative |
| Summary | Summary of Events |
| Source | Source of the information |


Annex 25: Graphs

Graph I – Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Graph II – Reported killings of aid workers from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Annex 26: Reported killings of civilians

Graph III – Reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per provinces.




Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Graph IV – Average reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating the alleged perpetrators.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 27: Reported killings of civilians from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating alleged perpetrators



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 28: Methodology

The Panel compiled a database of security incidents to that are potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and other crimes listed in resolutions 2127 and 2143. Other security related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.

Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of staff members of humanitarian organisations; attacks against humanitarian organisations; threats to humanitarian organisations or staff members and robberies.

The database does not contain all of the incidents that happen in the country in the period reported (From 05 December 2013 and on-going) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering / hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect mediate knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.

Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, incidents that are reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.

For the collection of primary source material the Panel met with Heads of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.

There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constrains as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.

The Panel also profited from cooperation with UN Agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.

A few methodological clarifications that apply to Chapters IV and V of the interim report of the UN Panel of Experts for the CAR are important to highlight:

1. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report¹, three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
2. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the CAR.

¹ See annex 24.

Annex 29: Case study III: Massacre in Guen (Mambéré-Kadei Province)

1. One of the most serious incidents documented in the period covered by this report was the massacre in the village of Guen in the Mambéré-Kadei province.
2. On 1 February 2014, the town of Guen came under attack of anti-Balaka forces seeking to drive out the former Seleka and associates among the Muslim population.

*Houses owned by members of the Muslim community destroyed and looted by anti-Balaka
(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)*



3. According to Muslim survivors, anti-Balaka leaders and local authorities interviewed, the attacking anti-Balaka forces came from the villages of Tedoa and Mbaina in the Nana Mambere province.¹ From 1 to 6 February 2014, approximately 75 civilians were killed.
4. The larger share of victims, 43 people, had, after the first spree of attacks, sought refuge in the house of a local resident. An allegation that this local resident was hiding a Seleka soldier set off the anti-Balaka to take the house under siege on 6 February and after killed 43 men. Women and children had sought refuge at the catholic mission after the first wave of attacks.

*House that came under siege by anti-Balakas during the attack on Guen
(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)*



¹ Panel interviews with Muslim survivors, local Anti-Balaka leaders and local government authorities, Guen, 25 April 2014.

5. The Panel's interlocutors in Guen claim that an anti-Balaka leader of the name of 'Edmond Beïna' from the village of Tedoa had ordered the attack. Villagers in Tedoa confirmed to the Panel the presence of Beïna,² but were unable to locate him in time for the Panel to interview him.³

² Edmond Beïna has also been mentioned by HWR as one of the perpetrators of the massacre. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages>; accessed on 24 May 2014.

³ Panel interviews with villagers, Tedoa, 17 April 2014.

Annex 30: Reported incidents of sexual violence¹

1. The Panel registered six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the CAR in the period covered by this report.
2. One case of rape was allegedly perpetrated by former Seleka elements in the town of Madja, Ouham Province.
3. Anti-Balaka forces are allegedly responsible for the rape of four women in two different incidents; on 2 January 2014 in Bossangoa two women were raped by Anti-Balaka armed men in the Liberte IDP site; furthermore on 6 February 2014 a group of Anti-Balaka armed men broke into a house in the Kokoro neighbourhood of Bangui and raped a 14 year old girl, and a 19 year old woman who were at the house at the moment of the attack, additionally the house was looted.
4. One case was reported in the village of Fode, Haut-Mbomou, where a woman was released after 18 years of LRA captivity, allegedly she was raped several times throughout her captivity.
5. One case of particular concern was reported in Bouca where allegedly a woman was gang-raped.
6. In addition UNICEF documented 26 cases of sexual violence in 25 IDP sites in Bangui during just one week in February 2014.

¹ All incidents have been extracted from the Panel Database of Incidents; see annex 28 on Methodology for details on collection of data of Sexual Violence.

Annex 31: Humanitarian presence in the Central African Republic

1. It is noteworthy that since December 2013 until today the number of humanitarian organisations present in the CAR has almost doubled. In December 2013, there were 47 humanitarian organisations operating in the CAR, by May 2014, 95 humanitarian organizations were undertaking operations or were in process of establishing themselves in the country. Most humanitarian operations are in Bangui, Ombella-Mpoko and Ouham provinces. The humanitarian presence has grown significantly, however, the population in need remains very high.¹
2. The grand majority of incidents have been documented in Bangui and the Ombella M’Poko provinces. This can be explained by the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian organisations operate and therefore coverage and presence is higher there than elsewhere in the country.²
3. See map below showing the current presence of humanitarian organizations in the country according to OCHA.³

¹ See <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info> for further details, accessed on 21 May 2014.

² See annex 25.

³ OCHA, Central African Republic (CAR) Situation Report No. 25 (as of 14 May 2014); accessed on 24 May 2014 at <http://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/30d02877-6777-42c3-8530-00ba35dbec72.pdf>

