Tajikistan: Government resorts to repression and intimidation

Nazar Nazarov 4/29/05

Authorities in Tajikistan are resorting to repression and intimidation as they try to contain what they view as the Kyrgyz contagion.

Tajik leaders are clearly concerned that the political upheaval which engulfed Kyrgyzstan in March – when popular discontent over rigged parliamentary elections culminated in the overthrow of Askar Akayev's administration – could spread to other countries in Central Asia. Tajikistan held parliamentary elections the same day as Kyrgyzstan's legislative vote. As in Kyrgyzstan, the Tajik voting results were criticized by Western observers and opposition supporters as flawed in favor of the incumbent administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Following the Tajik election, opposition leaders threatened to stage protests unless their complaints were redressed. Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov, however, has remained defiant. In his April 16 state-of-the-nation address, Rahmonov summarily dismissed election fraud complaints. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rather than admit any wrongdoing and seek to defuse tension through dialogue, Rahmonov has gone on the political offensive.

A central element to the Tajik government's strategy appears to be an effort hamper the ability of foreign diplomats and international aid workers to interact with local non-governmental organization activists and independent journalists. On April 14, the Tajik Foreign Ministry announced that foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations must provide prior notice of public contacts with Tajik citizens who are affiliated with political parties, NGOs and mass media outlets.

Observers in Dushanbe say the government's action appears driven by the belief that outside actors played major roles not only in Kyrgyzstan's revolution, but also in those in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004. Administration critics contend that Rahmonov wants to significantly reduce communications between Tajik democracy activists and foreign embassies and international organizations. (EurasiaNet operates under the auspices of the New York-based Open Society Institute, which also has an affiliated foundation operating in the Tajik capital Dushanbe).

"Due to recent events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan's government has decided to take the situation under control," said Shokirjon Khakimov, deputy head of the Tajik Social-Democratic Party. "Such [actions] are intended to prevent repetition of [revolutionary] events in Tajikistan." Rahmonov is especially keen to keep the lid on dissent these days, given that he will be running for re-election in 2006, Khakimov added.

A Foreign Ministry official insisted the new rule was intended to prevent "the spread of propaganda." The official suggested that some opposition politicians, NGO representatives and independent journalists of distorting information gleaned from contacts with foreign embassies and other officially registered entities.

The diplomatic response to the Foreign Ministry announcement has been generally restrained, with representatives of various embassies using rhetoric seemingly designed to reassure Tajik officials. US diplomats, for example, stressed that long before the announcement of the new rule, the lines of communication between the American Embassy and the Tajik government were open and strong.

Despite the muted American response over the new rule, there is evident tension in the US-Tajik relationship, connected in part to the perception among many officials in Dushanbe that the US government was a behind-the-scenes player in the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Washington has adamantly denied direct involvement in the revolutions. Such denials did not prevent several government newspapers from publishing a document, subsequently proven to be fraudulent, purporting that the United States provided financial assistance to Akayev opponents prior to the March 24 revolution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The US Embassy on April 20 issued a sharply worded denial, saying American officials were "surprised and dismayed" that official Tajik mass media outlets would disseminate such a "crude fabrication." The embassy statement called on the Tajik government to disassociate itself from the claims contained in the forged document. "Such irresponsible 'journalism' is not conducive to promoting regional stability and to building the strong bilateral US-Tajikistan relations that both President Bush and President Rahmonov have called for," it said.

Meanwhile, Rahmonov's administration is clamping down on its domestic political opponents. On April 27, Tajik Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov announced that the leader of the Democratic Party, Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, was being held in Dushanbe on charges of engaging in subversive activity.

Iskandarov originally had been taken into custody in Moscow, and held by Russian authorities for months as they considered a Tajik government extradition request. In a surprise decision on April 3, Russian officials freed Iskandarov, citing a lack of evidence. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Upon his release, the Democratic Party leader said the charges against him were politically motivated, and vowed to return to Tajikistan to promote democratic change in the country.

About a week after his release in Moscow, Iskandarov disappeared from public view. How he ended up in a Dushanbe detention center remains a mystery. Bobokhonov said that authorities arrested Iskandarov on April 22, but provided no details on where he was taken into custody. Some local observers believe that Iskandarov may have been effectively kidnapped in Moscow and returned to Dushanbe.

Editor's Note: Nazar Nazarov is a pseuodonym for a writer who specializes in Tajik affairs.

Posted April 29, 2005 © Eurasianet