

DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA



SEEKING
GREATER
CIVILIAN
CAPACITY
IN U.S.
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

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ABOUT REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises. Based on our on-the-ground knowledge of key humanitarian emergencies, Refugees International successfully pressures governments, international agencies and nongovernmental organizations to improve conditions for displaced people.

Refugees International is an independent, non-profit humanitarian advocacy organization based in Washington, DC. We do not accept government or United Nations funding, relying instead on contributions from individuals, foundations and corporations. Learn more at www.refugeesinternational.org.

U.S. service members construct a school in Wanrarou, Benin, June 14, 2009. The school project was being conducted as part of a combined U.S.-Beninese military training exercise with humanitarian projects scheduled to run concurrently.

Credit: U.S. Marine Corps/Master Sgt. Michael Q. Retana

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<p style="text-align: center;">Soldiers are conducting development and public diplomacy tasks because there simply aren't enough civilians.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</p> <p>When former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote of “the Eclipse of the State Department” in a 1971 article for <i>Foreign Affairs</i>, he could not have been more prescient towards the position of the Department in 2009. Dwarfed by the Department of Defense in terms of budget, personnel and capacity, State and the Agency for International Development (USAID) have atrophied nearly to the point of irretrievability. This paper describes the causes and effects of the lack of human capital and capacity at State and USAID and offers suggestions on how to rebuild these capacities.</p> <p>Yet the world we live in is more complex than ever, and our engagement with the world more dependent on capturing what Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called the full strength of the American people. The American military is engaged in direct combat in two wars and yet finds itself repeatedly tasked with conducting soft-power activities best suited to civilian executive agencies. This situation is wasteful, reduces America’s foreign policy efficacy, and leaves us open to complaints of militarism.</p> <p>The eclipse that Secretary Acheson wrote about has been a long slow decline. Through the last half of the 20th century, the Department of Defense maintained its stature in terms of budget and authorities while the State Department remained in a kind of stasis. The Agency for International Development has dodged many silver bullets from Congress, but gradually lost 75% of its staffing. The U.S. Information Agency wasn’t so lucky and disappeared, most of its programs and people subsumed into the Department of State.</p> <p>The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted the weaknesses of the Department of State and USAID. When State couldn’t fill 350 civilian positions in Iraq and 300 positions in Afghanistan, Defense filled the gaps. In lower profile missions, particularly strategic counter-terrorism operations in Africa, Defense has again been asked to step into the breach because of structural weaknesses on the civilian side of the enterprise.</p> <p>Across the Sahel and Maghreb soldiers are conducting development and public diplomacy tasks because there simply aren’t enough civilians. Yet, the soldiers often lack the specific knowledge necessary to properly accomplish the tasks. As one exasperated officer queried, “How do I, as a military professional, know what’s best for the development of this country? USAID is trained for that.” But there is no USAID mission in that country.</p> <p>In the midst of a flailing reconstruction mission in Iraq, the Bush administration dramatically reversed field from its early position of avoiding the distractions of state building to call for the creation of a U.S. government coordinator of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Pentagon, keenly aware of the need for integrated diplomatic and development actions to complement its kinetic operations, issued a directive placing these activities on equal footing with combat operations and instructed the service chiefs to create capacity within the services for reviving private sector economic activity and developing representative government institutions.</p> <p>The Congress granted Defense authorities and funding to conduct stabilization operations, including activities which under the moribund 1961 Foreign Assistance Act were reserved for State and USAID. These authorities and funding streams further weakened the civilian agencies’ ability to conduct development and diplomacy. Further, this action placed the military at the forefront of foreign policy implementation to the point that Congressional reporting showed concern that foreign nations would believe the military implemented U.S. foreign policy.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">i</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

<p>But things have begun to improve. A sheaf of recent commentaries and in-depth reports on the problem laid out specific needs. The Bush administration put in place programs and policies to begin to repair the capabilities of the civilian foreign affairs enterprise.</p> <p>The State Department now hosts the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability which oversees the Civilian Reserve Corps. The CRC is a planned 4,250-strong band of civilian experts ready to deploy alongside the military. Only a few dozen of the civilian responders are actually on staff and trained, though. Congress needs to fully fund this program and to create a civilian National Security University to train the civilian expeditionary force.</p> <p>However, hiring and training the civilian responders won't address the enormous personnel shortages at State and USAID. The CRC is an expeditionary force created for the most part out of existing capacity. Congress needs to increase the size of State and USAID by hiring nearly 5,000 Foreign Service Officers. Once the personnel are in place and trained, Congress can then return the authorities and funding for development and security assistance activities to the Department of State. Until that time, Congress should allow DoD to maintain limited authorities in these areas, but should continue to deny requests to make these authorities permanent.</p> <p>Department of Defense personnel on long-term assignment to U.S. embassies should be assigned under the authority of the chief of mission rather than the regional combatant commander. In most countries, specifically those in which there is not a massive U.S. combat deployment, DoD should limit its activities to direct military-to-military engagement. This will reduce the chance that DoD will use its civil affairs operations as cover for intelligence operations, a practice that should stop.</p> <p>Managing whole-of-government actions like major stabilization and reconstruction operations will require unheard of and, sadly, unlikely levels of inter-agency cooperation. The fledgling Interagency Management System is untested and, we believe, unlikely to prove successful in its current form. Inter-agency squabbling and turf battles have erupted in the development process of the IMS. Getting this right will require executive oversight above the cabinet level — at the National Security Council or, perhaps, within the Office of the Vice President.</p> <p>A root cause of the problems outlined in this report is a lack of trust among Congress, the Pentagon and the Foreign Service. Congress, having underfunded the civilian parts of the enterprise for generations, lacks confidence in civilian capacity to get the job done. The Pentagon, USAID and the Department of State must earn each others' trust through better communication and exchanges — of both ideas and of personnel. Trust and patience are often in short supply in Washington. Both are necessary if America's foreign policy enterprise is to reach its full strength.</p>	<p>Hiring and training the civilian responders won't address the enormous personnel shortages at State and USAID.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>ii</p>

**DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA
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INTRODUCTION

In the sprawling, isolated Sahara town of Nema, 1,100 kilometers away from the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott, the U.S. Department of Defense financed the construction of a medical clinic for the town. In principle, here at the end of the Road of Hope, the name of the bitumen road between Nouakchott and Nema, the residents should welcome a medical clinic. And they would, were it operational. However, the clinic sits unused on land controlled by the Ministry of Defense — a military zone into which access is tightly controlled. According to a senior Department of State official and officers at U.S. Africa Command, the soldiers who organized the construction worked through their contacts at the Ministry of Defense, but failed to coordinate the activity with the Ministry of Health to insure there would be doctors, other staff and supplies.¹ Thus, civilians in need of medical assistance cannot get to the clinic, and the Ministry of Health doesn't provide what is needed to operate it.

Ideally, development construction would be overseen by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and integrated with the Agency's country development planning. But the troops could not coordinate their activities with the USAID officer in Nouakchott because USAID had no mission in Mauritania, one of the world's poorest countries² and an important partner in the United States Government's counter-terrorism strategy for the Sahel and Maghreb.

Since 2005, the United States' strategy to defeat terrorism and terrorist ideology in the Sahel has been managed through the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Program (TSCTP). The program is, according to the State Department, "a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist

organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States."³

A senior development official at USAID described the program design as "your basic three-legged stool," with diplomacy, development and defense each having a role. The U.S. Africa Command calls TSCTP, "a State Department-led initiative specifically developed to address potential expansion of operations by terrorist and extremist organizations across West and North Africa."⁴

All of these descriptions are accurate. The program is designed to operate under what many strategists call the whole-of-government approach, where United States Government (USG) policies and programs are viewed and managed from the macro level rather than allowed to play out piecemeal. In order to function correctly, each element of engagement must be complementary and should be carried out by the appropriate department, agency or office. But this is where the TSCTP begins to break down: the Department of State and USAID simply do not have the capacity to pull their weight in this type of activity. So, the Department of Defense (DoD) has to pick up the load.

The medical center in Nema is a harbinger of systemic weakness in the American foreign policy enterprise. The issue isn't that some soldiers failed to fully coordinate their activities. The issue is that they were unable to coordinate their activities because the Department of State and USAID don't have enough people to fill positions in places like Mauritania.

Ideally, development construction would be overseen by USAID and integrated with the agency's country development planning.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy rightly notes that international and indeed national security is not a result of military prowess alone. “Economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people,” are essential ingredients to fostering secure and peaceful nations.⁵ Ultimately, it is important to note that helping other nations alleviate poverty, strengthen democratic structures and build capable state institutions are soft power jobs that should be performed by civilians not by soldiers.

As this report was being finalized for production, the State Department’s Inspector General issued an inspection report⁶ of the Department’s Bureau of African Affairs which cited many of the same shortcomings we note below and validated several of our recommendations. Of particular note are these two comments by the Inspector General: “The U.S. Military is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and public diplomacy,” and “[e]mbassy platforms are collapsing under the weight of new programs and staffing without corresponding resources to provide the services required by new tenants and requirements.”

Refugees International’s interest here is in the promotion of stability and the prevention of conflicts that create refugees. We believe that the atrophy of civilian capacity, and the resultant inability of the U.S. government to globally project elements of soft power, place an unfair burden on our military, present the wrong image of America to the world, and reduce our effectiveness in promoting international security, thus making America and the world less secure.

Our objective in this paper is to describe the causes and effects of the lack of human capital and capacity at State and USAID and offer suggestions on how to rebuild these capacities. The author uses TSCTP as an example for several reasons. Principal among them is that TSCTP has the potential to be a template for USG inter-agency cooperation and coordination in pursuit of a national policy. There is also a surfeit of available published research on U.S. Africa Command and TSCTP, which the author used as one of three elements of his research, the others being in-country direct observation and personal interviews.



U.S. soldiers carry school equipment in eastern Mali in November 2006. U.S. special forces were training Malian soldiers in counter-terrorism tactics, while the army’s civil affairs team carried out projects such as building schools and clinics.

Credit: Reuters/Luc Gnago

<p>There are numerous reasons for State's diminished stature, but cuts to budget and personnel strength are seminal.</p>	<p>PART I: "THE ECLIPSE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT"</p> <p><i>For over a decade it has been received as accepted truth in the highly charged political atmosphere of Washington that the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily declined.</i></p> <p>– Dean Acheson, July 1971⁷</p> <p>Things haven't gotten any better in the 38 years since Acheson wrote his article. In fact, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development have atrophied in size and scope — and some would add relevance — significantly. There are numerous reasons for State's diminished stature, but cuts to budget and personnel strength are seminal. Further, growth at the Department of Defense has amplified State's weaknesses. This has been an ongoing process.</p> <p>President Richard Nixon told Henry Kissinger that he was determined "to ruin the Foreign Service."⁸ George Schulz's refusal to ask Congress for authority to hire more staff to open embassies in the new nations created in the dissolution of the Soviet Union stretched the Foreign Service wafer-thin. James Baker distrusted the career professionals in the Foreign Service and deliberately put them on the sidelines.⁹ Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed the dissolution of USAID.¹⁰</p> <p>Simultaneously, across the river at the Pentagon, John Lehman dreamed of a 600 ship Navy as President Reagan engaged in the biggest build-up of the U.S military in generations.¹¹ In Washington's think tanks two important strains of thought emerged. Military officers returned from Vietnam with the idea that America's military must not be used higgledy-piggledy in small wars. The predominant thinking among the expert military leaders was that America must only go to war when vital national interests are involved, when the military can muster overwhelming force, and when all other elements of power have been exhausted.¹² The</p> <p>opposing view, developed among civilian, neo-conservative thinkers posited the ideas that soft-power was generally feckless and America should use its unparalleled military capacity to enact its policies abroad using force more often than not. These strategies, though opposed, had an important implication in common: the military would need to be vast and to have unparalleled capabilities.</p> <p>Defense doctrine as described by Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell emphasized the use of overwhelming force and had the unintended consequence of diminishing the size and capacity of the Foreign Service at State and USAID.¹³ The United States Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were dismembered and subsumed into State, and USAID shrank by 75%.¹⁴ New countries emerged and new congressionally-mandated requirements were levied on the Department, but the Foreign Service remained in stasis.</p> <p>Efforts to strengthen Defense and weaken State continue: a professor of strategy at the Air War College suggested that the Secretary of Defense give DoD civilians bigger staffs and budgets to increase their "awareness and influence over American policy ... (and)...put a civilian face on American engagement with the world."¹⁵</p> <p>In a landmark study of the problem, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center recommended an increase of 4,735 direct hire personnel into State and USAID.¹⁶ This increase in personnel strength would enable the Department of State and USAID to carry out the president's agenda in what the authors considered four critical competencies: core diplomacy, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction. At the Department's current pace of growth, the earliest it could reach this number would be 2016, assuming no one retires or otherwise leaves service, a zero attrition rate.</p> <p>In February of 2009 <i>Foreign Affairs</i> again served as a platform for a call to rebuild the</p>
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<p>Foreign Service. Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, a past-president of the American Foreign Service Association,¹⁷ wrote that the Foreign Service “has no surge capacity at all.” Continuing, Holmes said the vacancy rate of jobs in embassies “is 21 percent; in Africa it is 30 percent.” He called for the current administration to “double the number of FSOs at State,” and “boost USAID’s Foreign Service staff by 150 percent.”¹⁸ This would require hiring 8,900 new FSOs. At State’s current rate of growth, about 700 FSOs annually, it would be at least 2022 before State reached full operating capacity, again assuming no one retires.</p> <p>But these assumptions are unrealistic and the pace of growth is far too slow. Congress and the administration should work together to increase the size of the Foreign Service (at State and AID) at a minimum along the lines laid out in the AAD/Stimson report.</p> <p><i>The Canary in the Coalmine</i></p> <p><i>How we manage the roles of Defense, State and USAID in steady state environments is changing; TSCTP in Chad is the canary in the coalmine that we should all be watching.</i></p> <p>– Senior Department of Defense Official.</p> <p>The American embassy in N’Djamena Chad is a small, two-story building behind a high wall and a pair of heavy steel gates. It was once a residence and retains a little of that ambience, but only a little. Inside the building, through the heavy security doors known as fifteen-minute doors (because it should take someone fifteen minutes with an ax to break through), past the U.S. Marine guard and up a flight of stairs is the office of the American ambassador. This is the office into which a rocket propelled grenade crashed through the wall on February 3, 2008. The wall is now patched, but you can still see the path the grenade took, blasting through the outer wall and passing through an inner wall, before it disintegrated in a center hallway. In Chad, even embassy row is a tough neighborhood.</p> <p>Embassy N’Djamena has a staff of about seventeen State Department personnel.¹⁹ As late as February 2008, the time of the rebel assault, this team was augmented with about the same number of military personnel from U.S. European Command.²⁰ The DoD team included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Planning and Assistance Team (JPAT), in this case Navy SEALs overseeing training for a Chadian counter-terrorism force known locally as the PSI battalion;²¹ • Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) of U.S. Army Civil Affairs specialists; • Military Information Support Team (MIST) of army Psychological Operations specialists; • Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) to manage the group’s activities and serve as liaison to the embassy; • Military Liaison Element (MLE); • Navy Seabees to help keep the team house running. <p>This group of special operations soldiers and sailors — the military component of TSCTP in Chad — were at the embassy on what DoD terms “enduring presence” tours, temporary duty tours of four to six months. They were occasionally augmented by Marines teaching marksmanship skills to the PSI battalion, by Navy doctors and Army veterinarians assessing the Chadian military and providing advice and services, and by U.S. Air Force pilots and technicians assessing the needs and capacity of the Chadian air force and of Chadian airfields. At times during 2007 the number of DoD troops in Chad soared to over 120.²²</p> <p>The tiny embassy staff could easily have been overwhelmed with administrative and support requirements for the DoD teams. So the ambassador suggested that DoD and State call a “strategic pause” to evaluate the program and the way forward. It was</p>	<p>At State’s current rate of growth, it would be at least 2022 before State reached full operating capacity, again assuming no one retires.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>4</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">Unless the U.S. chooses to implement its foreign policy solely with a bayonet, these civilian assets must be established, developed and exercised.</p>	<p>at about this point that the rebels reached N'Djamena and the embassy was forced to draw down. The TSCTP military elements were withdrawn and have not yet returned, although both State and DoD want to re-start the program.</p> <p>Embassy N'Djamena's staffing illustrates the overwhelming imbalance between civilian and military elements available to the President in foreign affairs. In raw numbers: the Department of Defense has over 2,300,000 uniformed service members, about 1,400,000 in the active components.²³ Department of State has fewer than 6,800 Foreign Service Officers.²⁴ At USAID, there are just over 1,400 Foreign Service Officers.²⁵ Department and agency budgets are so disparate they are hardly comparable, but the President's 2010 Budget Request would provide DoD \$533.7 billion while all civilian foreign affairs activities would share \$51.7 billion.²⁶ ²⁷ These figures do not include supplemental requests for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.</p> <p>Unquestionably the personnel and budget requirements of the Defense Department in a time of war are substantial. Yet, one should question the paucity of human capital resources the President has at hand to complement the United States military, e.g., the civilians who, in the example of TSCTP, would "promote democratic governance, ... expand public diplomacy outreach programs, ... counter the development of extremism, and support democratic and economic development."²⁸</p> <p>Why Are the Civilians Important?</p> <p><i>"I would have accomplished a lot more on the development side with a couple of recent Peace Corps Volunteers assigned to my embassy and living in country for three years than I did with rotating teams of Special Forces soldiers who came in for a few months at a time."</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">– Former Deputy Chief of Mission at a U.S. Embassy in West Africa</p> <p>The U.S. needs a range of options to engage the world and a range of tools with which to affect that engagement. If on one end of</p> <p>a continuum we place the violent use of the American military with its unparalleled reach and power, and at the other end we place complete isolationism, in between the two points are opportunities to use our diplomatic, information, and economic resources — our civilian elements of power. Unless the U.S. chooses to implement its foreign policy solely with a bayonet, these civilian assets must be established, developed and exercised.</p> <p>Congress recognizes this and grants authorities for diplomatic, development and defense tasks to appropriate departments and agencies. Charter to conduct various activities overseas is codified in U.S. Code. Title 22 USC codifies diplomatic and development activities under the broad category of Foreign Relations and Intercourse.²⁹ Title 10 USC covers The Armed Forces.³⁰ Title 50 USC covers War and National Defense, including intelligence activities.³¹ Logically, Title 22 activities are within the provenance of the Department of State; Title 10 and Title 50 activities fall within the provenance of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. Principal among the authorizing statutes of interest for this paper are the longstanding Foreign Assistance Act,³² and the annual State, Foreign Operations Appropriations Act³³ and National Defense Authorization Act.³⁴</p> <p>The fundamental objective of American development assistance is, according to the Foreign Assistance Act: "To help the poor majority of people in developing countries to participate in a process of equitable growth through productive work and to influence decisions that shape their lives, with the goal of increasing their incomes and their access to public services which will enable them to satisfy their basic needs and lead lives of decency, dignity, and hope."³⁵</p> <p>The U.S. provides security assistance in order "to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of</p>
<p>5</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political progress.”³⁶

Within the Foreign Assistance Act framework, both development and security assistance fall under the direction of the State Department. Most development assistance activities are carried out by USAID and most security assistance activities are carried out by the Defense Department. The State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs oversees program funding accounts like Foreign Military Financing and Sales (FMF/FMS), Individual Military Education and Training (IMET) and Peacekeeping (PKO)³⁷ many of which are principally administered by Defense through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)³⁸ and by Security Assistance or Defense Attaché Offices embedded in U.S. Embassies.

Officials at DoD complain that these traditional security assistance funding mechanisms lack flexibility, take too long to develop and are managed and directed from Washington rather than in the field. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and the subsequent Global War on Terror, these traditional relationships, and their underpinning authorities and appropriations, have changed in a number of ways. First, field commanders have been given access to huge sums of cash for reconstruction projects in pursuit of tactical objectives. Second, the military has accepted reconstruction and stabilization operations as a core mission and has attempted to make temporary authorities granted by Congress permanent.

In 2003, as Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed, U.S. ground forces in Iraq discovered huge stockpiles of U.S. dollars — over \$762 million.³⁹ The Departments of Defense, Treasury and State determined this money to be the property of the Ba’athist regime and thus under the control of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which



USAID expedites the shipment of nearly 24,000 metric tons of food aid to help millions of people in need of assistance in the Horn of Africa.

Credit: USAID

<p style="text-align: center;">The National Defense Strategy says the nation must reinvigorate “other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply... the full strength of the American people.”</p>	<p>authorized military commanders to use the money as a “Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People.”⁴⁰ This evolved into the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in 2004. In Iraq and Afghanistan, CERP funds are used by field unit commanders to implement projects in support of U.S. tactical objectives. The rapidity of action in CERP projects — often a matter of weeks from proposal to commencement — is unique among U.S. government development or humanitarian assistance programs and hugely beneficial to implementers.</p> <p>DoD published in November 2005 Directive 3000.05, titled <i>Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations</i>, which placed stability and reconstruction operations as a core U.S. military mission equal to that of combat operations. In a dramatic and ironic reversal of the Bush administration’s original position of avoiding the distractions of nation building, the directive instructs the service chiefs to create capacity within the U.S. military to “Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment; Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; [and] Develop representative governmental institutions.”⁴¹ These tasks reveal DoD’s acceptance of the nation building mission and clearly infringe on State Department and USAID primacy on democracy building, development and economic assistance.</p> <p>Defense Secretary Robert Gates is often lauded for his public calls for increased civilian capacity. However, in October 2007 at a meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Gates laid down his marker on DoD’s expanded role: “All these so-called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.”⁴² And in 2008, the National Defense</p> <p>Strategy says the nation must reinvigorate “other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply ... the full strength of the American people.” But it also states the DoD “will institutionalize and retain these capabilities.”⁴³</p> <p>In its 2006 budget request, the Department of Defense requested authority and funding to train and equip foreign military forces to conduct counter-terrorism operations or to participate in reconstruction and stability operations. Congress provided DoD with the authority in section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the program has been known as Section 1206 funding ever since. In 2007, DoD requested that Congress make the authorities permanent, but Congress did not. In 2008, DoD again requested the authorities be made permanent, Congress again refused.⁴⁴ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee strongly rejected this encroachment by DoD on the State Department’s authority, finding that “section 1206 funding is not addressing threats to the United States that are so immediate it cannot be included in the normal budget processes. The Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included in his/her authority.”⁴⁵</p> <p>It is clear that DoD has the will to conduct security assistance and the civilian aspects of stability and reconstruction activities with limited input from State. There is concern at State that DoD may seek expanded, permanent authorizations for development assistance, but based on recent comments from Hill staffers, and Congressional refusals to institutionalize the security assistance authorities, it does not appear Congress will permanently grant them to DoD. Regardless, the military’s increased role in the application of soft power in non-combat areas (what DoD often calls “steady state” environments) is enormously increased, and the effects are dramatic.</p> <p>CERP, 1206 funding and Directive 3000.05 are all encroachments on traditional civilian authorities. Congress gave the authorities to</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">7</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

DoD, in the view of several analysts, because Congress has had little confidence in the Department of State's capacity to manage security assistance.⁴⁶ Further, DoD needed the authorities because the gestation period of standing security assistance programs is far too long.

Current funding mechanisms and authorities for security and development funding are poorly structured and unwieldy. Programs take far too long to come to fruition and there is insufficient control at the country team level. Ambassadors and combatant commanders should have joint oversight responsibility and allocation authority over security and development assistance funds. These senior leaders should be able to develop, fund and implement programs using pooled funds, possibly through a contingency funding mechanism in the Foreign Military Funding account.

Perception is Reality

"What are we to think when a general arrives in a private jet while the Assistant Secretary for Africa comes with Air France?"

– Senior West African Government Official

A recent report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that DoD's encroachment on development and diplomacy activities risks "undermining State Department leadership in international affairs."⁴⁷ A senior State Department official with many years service in Africa said, "One of our strategic objectives should be the demilitarization of states like Chad, Rwanda and Nigeria. But it's hard to convince governments that we're serious when our engagement is so heavily militarized."

Certainly, in Chad and Mauritania, one would expect the United States to pressure the governments to demilitarize at the top.⁴⁸ Yet, our image — and the perception that logically springs from it — is one of a highly militarized foreign engagement apparatus. In the early days of TSCTP, the military contingents in U.S. embassies in Sahelian

Africa were often larger than all civilian agencies combined.⁴⁹

DoD's ability to project its assets (the most visible evidence of American power in many cases) is substantial and highly visible. In February 2008, United States Air Force aircraft made so many fuel stops in Nouakchott in support of three concurrent military training team visits,⁵⁰ a presidential visit to Africa and the drawdown of personnel from the embassy in N'Djamena that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested to the American embassy that the country was running out of jet fuel.⁵¹

In interviews with West and Central African officials the same questions were asked with some regularity. Why does the platform for U.S. engagement with African nations need to be a military command and why is Africa different? These questions presuppose (1) that Africa Command actually is the platform for U.S. engagement with African nations, and (2) that this differs in other regions of the world.

Is it? Does it? The answer to both questions is no. However, that the questions were posed with such regularity exposes a perception among some African diplomatic representatives and government officials that the answer is yes.

Of course, the platform for USG engagement with any foreign nation is the American embassy. The American ambassador is the president's representative to the host nation and the Department of State is statutorily the lead agency for diplomatic and development activities, and for the planning and oversight of many military engagement activities. Why then do so many African leaders sense that the Department of Defense has such a dominant role in U.S. foreign policy?

There is no single answer. However, African diplomats and government officials over and over took note that soldiers (and here I mean active duty service members from any branch of service) are implementing U.S. policy in lieu of civilians in numerous

Our image — and the perception that logically springs from it — is one of a highly militarized foreign policy apparatus.

African countries. Frankly, many are unconcerned. They apparently feel that having been so long ignored, any attention from the U.S. is welcomed. “Honestly,” a Chadian official said, “we are happy to have the help no matter the source.”

But not every opinion of Africom is so benign. The creation of U.S. Africa Command created a maelstrom of controversy including anti-Africom websites and Facebook pages,⁵² academic papers, even a U.S. intelligence community assessment. And these were just in the United States.

African pundits and politicians debated the meaning of the Command and its timing, voicing concerns over America’s history of good relations with authoritarian rulers and whether or not the command represented a return to colonialism.⁵³ One African writer, speaking to the BBC, worried that the United States would “look at all its development efforts through the lens of the Pentagon. That’s a truly dangerous dimension. We don’t need militarisation of Africa, we don’t need securitisation of aid and development in Africa.”⁵⁴

A West African Brigadier General posed the question (speaking of Africa Command), “Why are you creating a CINC (sic) to do the work of USAID and some NGOs?”⁵⁵

One could take this question two ways: why would the U.S. waste billions of dollars to have soldiers do the work of development professionals, or what is the hidden purpose of the Africa Command? Neither question is particularly heartening when considering America’s image. The perception that, in Africa at least, U.S. foreign policy is implemented by the Department of Defense is inescapable.

The perception among other highly developed, western nations is that in Africa the United States is clumsily competing for influence – competing particularly with France, China and Iran – while lacking a thoughtful, coordinated strategy. A European diplomat said, “It quite often seems that America views other nations as mortal enemies rather than as friends competing for political influence.”⁵⁶ American diplomats in the region said the French believe America is being “rolled” by African host nations because the security assistance program managers – they were speaking of the military operators in country – are ignorant of the region’s culture and history. It is worth noting here that the Department of State, not the Department of Defense is statutorily charged with the management of security assistance.

A U.S. Marine Corps Major briefs his unit and Beninese army soldiers before they fire their weapons during Exercise Shared Accord. The exercise is a scheduled combined U.S.-Benin military exercise that includes humanitarian and civil affairs projects.

Credit: U.S. Marine Corps / Master Sgt. Michael Q. Retana



PART II: “THERE IS A PLACE AND WORK FOR MANY TALENTS HERE”⁵⁷

Otherwise, there is no guarantee the mix of civilian and military assistance will be effectively balanced to meet the terrorist threat.

– Embassies as Command Posts Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2006

Defense, Diplomacy and Development are the three principal charters within the foreign policy apparatus.⁵⁸ Each is a clearly defined and specialized field of endeavor. One cannot imagine tasking a USAID health officer with implementing a strategy to train a host nation’s forces in foreign internal defense. But with the current deficit of Foreign Service Officers at State and USAID, we regularly task U.S. special operations forces with implementing development and public diplomacy tasks.⁵⁹ The results are often imperfect.

The Nema medical center in Mauritania is a telling example. Special Forces soldiers operating in support of the Defense Attaché didn’t coordinate fully their activities with the relevant Government of Mauritania ministry to insure the Mauritanians could support the clinic. According to officers at U.S. Africa Command, the soldiers involved were not trained Civil Affairs specialists, but rather line Special Forces soldiers. The soldiers coordinated with the appropriate ministry for military activities (Defense) but not for their development activities (in this case, Health). Had there been a USAID officer at the embassy, it is reasonable to assume that the coordination with the Health Ministry would have taken place given the logical programmatic links intrinsic between USAID and the Ministry of Health.

But don’t blame the soldiers. Even had these troops been Civil Affairs specialists, the result may have been the same. U.S. Army Civil Affairs units are “designed to prevent civilian interference with tactical operations, to assist commanders in discharging their responsibilities toward the civilian population, and to provide liaison with civilian government agencies.”⁶⁰ These are not devel-

opment tasks. USAID, on the other hand, “joins diplomacy and defense as one of three key pieces of the nation’s foreign policy apparatus... promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries.”⁶¹

The shortage of qualified U.S. Foreign Service Officers creates a vacuum that the U.S. is forced to fill with soldiers. And that shortage of civilians affects American missions around the world.

Getting the Job Done, Somehow

We are pleased to have resources to accomplish Mission objectives and the source or implementing agency is a lesser concern in the mix.

– Deputy Chief of Mission at a U.S. Embassy in West Africa

Managing United States foreign policy isn’t a solitary activity either personally for an ambassador or for a department or agency. Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission manage their section chiefs and agency heads as part of a country team insuring a coordinated effort that focuses all USG activities on meeting American strategic objectives toward the individual country and the region.

At least this is how things are supposed to work. But personnel shortages and unfilled positions mean that positions are often filled with inexperienced or unqualified officers, civil servants on what are called excursion tours, and spouses of officials assigned to post.

Refugees International chose Chad as representative of the challenges facing the American foreign policy enterprise for a number of reasons. Chad participates in TSCTP and has since the program was known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative. Among sub-Saharan nations Chad ranks fifth in exports to the United States.⁶² There is an active insurgency in the east that sometimes arrives in the capital. Chad hosts over 300,000 refugees from

Managing United States foreign policy isn’t a solitary activity either personally for an ambassador or for a department or agency.

Darfur and the Central African Republic as well as a substantial internally displaced population. Chad ranks number 170 of 179 countries and territories on the United Nations Development Program's human development indices.⁶³

Yet, the American embassy in N'Djamena is effectively 'one-deep' everywhere: it has one officer in each specialized position. There is one officer to do the political and economic analysis and reporting, one officer to manage the public diplomacy portfolio, one consul, one general services officer, one financial management officer and one management officer. In the Foreign Service, political and economic reporting are considered "substantive," consular and management functions are not. So in Chad there is one officer doing substantive work under the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission; the remainder of the staff are in what are considered support functions.

A recent Inspector General's report noted that officers assigned to Embassy N'Djamena have regularly been insufficiently trained and under-qualified for their jobs.⁶⁴

A senior Foreign Service Officer in Washington said that embassies like N'Djamena or Nouakchott are forced to accept DoD's psychological operations and civil affairs soldiers to carry out TSCTP actions because there simply aren't USAID and State Department public diplomacy personnel on staff to do the work.

During the Department-wide (temporary) restructuring program to designate positions to be transferred to Embassy Baghdad, known inside the Department as "the Iraq tax," Chad lost a position for an entry-level economic reporting officer. Further, an entry-level public diplomacy officer position is unfilled.⁶⁵

Refugees from Darfur carry water back to their huts in a refugee camp in Chad. Chad hosts some 300,000 refugees from Darfur and the Central African Republic, and ranks 170 of 179 countries on the UN Development Program's human development indices.

© Refugees International/
Erin Weir



<p>Embassies like Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania are notoriously hard to staff despite substantial salary incentives.^{66,67} Foreign Service posts are determined to be “historically difficult to staff” if 50% of personnel vacancies receive no more than 3 bids for three out of four years. Chad is in this category.</p> <p>Secretary of State Colin Powell recognized the need for a larger and better trained Foreign Service. Profiting from his strong, positive relations with the U.S. Congress he expended a great deal of political capital to win approval for his Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which introduced over 1,000 new Foreign Service Officers into the service.⁶⁸</p> <p>The DRI program increased the number of entry-level officers in the Foreign Service but did nothing to address the dramatic shortages in the mid-level ranks. A Government Accountability Office report noted that many mid-level positions in embassies worldwide are filled with junior officers.⁶⁹ The GAO report highlighted the American Embassy in Nigeria where it reported that only three of 800 assigned personnel were members of the Senior Foreign Service.^{70, 71}</p> <p>According to the AAD/Stimson study, the staff increases at State have been primarily focused on consular and diplomatic security functions rather than core diplomacy, leaving the deficits, “in effect, at 2000 levels.”⁷²</p> <p>At the Country Team level, almost without exception, inter-agency relations are excellent. People work together to get things done. USAID officers in the field actually complimented the DoD humanitarian action programs as nimble and pragmatic. In fact one of the principal complaints about State-managed security assistance programs and development activities was that both lack flexibility and both have long program maturation periods. This isn’t new.</p> <p>In 1995, when the USAID mission in Chad was closing, then-Ambassador Lawrence Pope wrote a cable back to Washington titled</p> <p>“An Obituary for AID in Chad” in which he commented that “AID projects have an incredibly long gestation period.” Pope further complained that his AID team had “been turned into contract managers losing contact with village realities,” and that their programs had “an ever increasing reliance on expensive contractors and consultants.”⁷³ Things certainly aren’t better today with only 1,400 FSOs at USAID.</p> <p>Simultaneously, military officers complained of being “stretched thin,” calling the estimated 20% of their time spent on humanitarian assistance projects “ridiculous.” One exasperated officer plausibly queried, “How do I, as a military professional, know what’s best for the development of this country? USAID is trained for that.” But there is no USAID mission in that country.</p> <p>In early 2007, the Department of State requested that DoD fill 350 diplomatic positions in Iraq.⁷⁴ In 2009, DoD once again began looking for personnel to fill up to 300 positions that State could not fill as part of the Administration’s civilian surge.⁷⁵ The Department of State is also forced to fill positions overseas with family members, usually spouses of Foreign Service Officers and Specialists; as of November 2008, there were 2,324 family members filling embassy positions.⁷⁶</p> <p>Thus, the underlying fault, the inability of State and USAID to field sufficient staff, forces DoD to take over the missions, reduces effectiveness and lessens American influence. In embassies in the Sahel, State makes do with staffing gaps and unfilled positions, and embassy country teams integrate military personnel as effectively as possible. Occasionally gaffes like the Nema medical center occur, but more often the result is simply a less effective implementation of United States foreign policy. Top priority tasks are usually met, secondary and tertiary priorities fall away unmet. Plainly stated, the Foreign Service is too small to effectively implement U.S. policy and American foreign engagement suffers for it.</p>	<p>The Department of State is also forced to fill positions overseas with family members, usually spouses of Foreign Service Officers and Specialists.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>12</p>

Capacity Building

Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail.

– A Planner’s Adage

Undoubtedly, the United States needs an increased civilian expeditionary capability. But numbers of new hires aren’t sufficient to develop the President’s ability to project civilian power globally. A whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stability operations requires expertise in a wide variety of activities from banking to the judiciary to agriculture to education. The Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS) at the State Department has identified six broad areas requiring civilian specialization: planning, operations and management; criminal justice and policing; economic recovery; essential services; diplomacy and governance; and security. Some of these are not traditional, core diplomatic activities. So the Department of State will have to train its officers in many of these tasks, but help is also needed from other departments and agencies like the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, Health and

Human Services, Commerce, Treasury, and Homeland Security.⁷⁷

Congress has given DoD the authority to conduct activities that are inherently civilian in nature because State lacks the capacity not just to conduct the operations, but to plan and manage them as well. The AAD/Stimson report noted repeatedly that State lacks capacity in “program management skills.”⁷⁸ Among these skills, the most in need of development in the civilian workforce is planning. This is an art that Defense has nurtured among officers for generations.

At Fort Leavenworth, Quantico, Maxwell Air Force Base and Newport, mid-level officers spend up to a year in intensive classroom study to master the operational art and science of planning. In programs with names like the School of Advanced Military Studies and the School of Advanced Warfighting, majors and lieutenant commanders learn to “integrate campaigns and plans, theater strategies, national military strategy, and national security policy and strategy.”⁷⁹ These courses, offered as a second year of

A U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel greets a young boy after passing out soccer balls to local children during exercise Flintlock 2007 in Mali. The exercise, which is meant to foster relationships of peace, security and cooperation among the Trans-Sahara nations, is part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

*Credit: U.S. Air Force/
Tech. Sgt. Roy Santana*



<p>training beyond the services' Intermediate Leadership Schools (once known as Command and General Staff Officer's Course), serve as the military's premier graduate schools. All of the programs offer accredited masters degrees; at least one of the schools requires students to hold a masters degree before applying.⁸⁰ The core abilities developed in these courses, according to curriculum developers and professors, are complex problem solving skills.</p> <p>There is no equivalent course of instruction in the United States government for civilians, principally because within the civilian foreign affairs agencies there are no designated planners. The Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff (S/P) is the strategic planning cell at State. This office is staffed by a mix of Foreign Service Officers and political (non-career) appointees and comprised recently of 18 people whose "mission is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values."⁸¹ These are not planners, but rather thinkers. Both skills are critical to the development and implementation of policy, but planners simply haven't been a part of State's structure, and there is as yet no course of instruction to remedy this.</p> <p>The State Department's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) was scheduled to begin offering a course in planning for members of the emerging Civilian Response Corps in July 2009. Known as the basic planner's course, it will become a requirement for all members of the Civilian Response Corps. Civilian Response Corps leadership hopes to develop a "level II" planner's course in coming years that will be a rough equivalent of the military planners' courses.</p> <p>Training on interagency processes is also essential to improving U.S. government effectiveness in foreign affairs. The U.S. Institute of Peace recently opened the Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding to provide training <i>a la carte</i></p>	<p>to staff of the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations and U.S. Government workers. However, there will be no emphasis on U.S. government interagency processes. That specific training will be developed at USIP with the Foreign Service Institute at some undetermined time in the future.</p> <p>The National Defense University publication "Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations" discusses, <i>inter alia</i>, the need for a civilian equivalent to the military's century-plus old Professional Military Education system. The proposed program looks exceedingly similar to the military's professional education structure: branch specific basic course at entry; advanced specialization about five years later; intermediate operational art and science at about ten years of service; and strategic view with a heavy liberal arts base at 18 years or so.⁸²</p> <p>The report highlights the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) claim that the Department of Defense will "transform the National Defense University ... into a true National Security University, tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security profession."⁸³ Those needs are substantial.</p> <p>In order to advance the incremental progress of this piecemeal approach, the current administration should direct the creation of a National Security University which will serve as the interagency equivalent of the military's senior service colleges. The university should be created and led by civilians rather than developed from existing military structures as envisioned in the 2006 QDR. The university should also create a mid-level course of instruction and a follow-on planner's course that develops in the civilian expeditionary force skills that are comparable and complementary to those developed at the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies or the Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting. All of these courses should take place in a multi-national framework, thus creating an <i>international</i> professional devel-</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>14</p>

Planners simply haven't been a part of State's structure, and there is as yet no course of instruction to remedy this.

<p style="text-align: center;">While the ambassador may be the president's representative in a country, the regional combatant commander can still deploy his forces in that country without the ambassador's approval.</p>	<p>opment college. Attendance at these schools must be made career enhancing within the civilian workforce and graduation from the international security university should be a requirement for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, Senior Executive Service or Senior Intelligence Service for national security professionals.</p> <p>Questions of Authority and Approval</p> <p><i>All U.S. Government employees (other than personnel under command of a U.S. area military commander) must obtain country clearance from the chief of mission (COM) before entering or transiting their country.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">– Foreign Affairs Manual⁸⁴</p> <p>Chiefs of Mission posted to bilateral missions under diplomatic rules established by the Treaty of Vienna are generally given the title ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. That is quite a mouthful, and in conjunction with Senate confirmation and a letter of instruction from the President of the United States,⁸⁵ is presumed to give the ambassador the status of the personal representative of the president and the American people to the host nation. But while the ambassador may be the president's representative in a country, the regional combatant commander can still deploy his forces in that country without the ambassador's approval.</p> <p>Even in a time of peace between two nations, when relations are good, a regional combatant commander (CoCom) at European or Southern or Pacific or Africa Command, can send military forces into a country without the approval of the ambassador, and those troops will remain under the general's command and control. The terms of art here are Chief of Mission (COM) control or CoCom control. Department of Defense forces under CoCom control do not need COM approval — called country clearance — to enter and operate in country.</p> <p>The current system allowing military forces to operate in foreign countries without prior permission of the U.S. ambassador can be seen as a relic of the Cold War. When the</p> <p>U.S. had huge numbers of military forces in Germany, Italy, Spain and England, it would have been unimaginable for the U.S. ambassador to consider individual requests for country clearance and to maintain authority over hundreds of thousands of troops and their families. So Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) were negotiated with the host nations determining the rights, privileges and immunities of the military forces and granting the military commands authority to maintain and regulate their forces.</p> <p>In countries like Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso this sort of arrangement is unneeded and excessive. Keeping track of the limited number of military forces in country at any one time, and directing their activities, is manageable for the ambassador. This is also necessary in order to maintain a consistent policy course with a small staff on hand.</p> <p>While the U.S. should develop a SOFA with any country where American troops will operate, developing a separate military operating system and authorities would create an unnecessary burden on the military by forcing the combatant command to establish administrative procedures and in-country capacity for interacting with host nation immigration and customs, the financial, legal and corporate sectors, etc., in addition to maintaining its operational forces. Since the civilian agencies operating in country through the embassy already have these structures, this redundancy would be enormously wasteful.</p> <p>Special Operations Command-Europe appeared willing to take this approach in 2007 when their numbers in Chad were soaring. With embassy administrative staff struggling to keep up with the amount of financial documentation needed to keep the military operations afloat, the command offered to take their activities completely off-line, in effect to create a separate U.S. government operating system in Chad, just as exists in Germany, where the command is based. Fighting between Chadian government</p>
<p>15</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

forces and attacking rebels in N'Djamena displaced the American troops before the program could be implemented, and the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs refused to allow the forces to return after the fighting ceased.⁸⁶

Embassies are staffed according to a complex calculus which accounts for the level of engagement between the U.S. and the host nation, the history of engagement, availability of personnel and other resources, and cost. The mechanism for authorizing personnel positions to an embassy is defined under National Security Decision Directive 38, known as NSDD-38.⁸⁷

Once an agency or department determines that it wishes to establish a position or positions in an embassy, a request is sent to the Undersecretary of State for Management for consideration.⁸⁸ If the position or positions is determined to increase the administrative workload at the embassy beyond accepted norms, additional support positions may need to be added. In the day-to-day opera-

tion of the embassy, having DoD personnel working on TSCTP assigned under NSDD-38 would mean to the ambassador that he or she would have adequate support staff from the State Department — general services, financial management, facilities maintenance — to manage the increased workload created by their presence. It would also allow for (actually demand) better harmonization of security arrangements and integration of operational missions.

In the case of Embassy N'Djamena, the DoD TSCTP contingent was not represented on the staffing roster of the embassy to Washington, so no additional support personnel were authorized and the administrative staff of the embassy were forced to manage with their limited resources.

A Defense Department official reasoned that the current system of maintaining CoCom authority over deployed forces, even those deployed for long-term programs like TSCTP, is logical because NSDD-38 is limited to U.S. government diplomatic activi-



A U.S. Navy sailor cuts framework for a new primary school in Djibouti as part of a construction battalion attached to Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa.

*Credit: U.S. Air Force/
Master Sgt. Loren Bonser*

<p style="text-align: center;">Refugees International received several credible reports that U.S. Special Forces Operational Control Elements operated in Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia without the knowledge of the relevant U.S. Ambassador.</p>	<p>ties and that forces under CoCom authority are operational, not diplomatic.⁸⁹ While this logic may be sound in some situations, it fails with TSCTP because the program is, according to U.S. Africa Command, “a State Department-led initiative,” and thus an inherently diplomatic activity.⁹⁰</p> <p>The traditional image of military officers assigned to embassies remains that of service attachés. In these cases, service members are assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Attaché Service from their branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.), and then onwards to their post at an embassy into positions authorized under the NSDD-38 process. Personnel assigned to security assistance roles⁹¹ are assigned to the combatant command and then down to the embassy. These officials are assigned under the NSDD-38 process, but those under programs like TSCTP are not.</p> <p>Thus, security cooperation is directed by the American ambassador by exercising day-to-day oversight over officers sent to the embassy by the combatant commander. This, coupled with Africa Command’s decision to request country clearance for all DoD personnel working on TSCTP, means that in effect, the CoCom assets are already working under COM direction, but without appropriate documentation or effective personnel and management support, which would be provided if the troops were assigned through the NSDD-38 process.</p> <p>Placing the core personnel of the TSCTP mission under the authority of the Chief Of Mission through the NSDD-38 process would grant the ambassador direct authority over their actions as well as provide the embassy with the support staff (budget and fiscal staff, general service officers, human resources officers, etc.) required to maintain efficient service across all sections of the embassy. It would have the added benefit of better integrating the personnel into the country team and deepening their understanding of the host nation and our relations with it by lengthening their tours.</p> <p><i>In Sheep’s Clothing</i></p> <p><i>When NGO programs are confused with efforts supported by the military, we face even greater security risks.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">– Nancy Lindborg, President Mercy Corps International</p> <p>Allowing U.S. forces to operate in foreign nations without the expressed approval of the American ambassador can be an embarrassment to the nation but also dangerous for civilians on the ground. Refugees International received several credible reports that U.S. Special Forces Operational Control Elements (OCEs) operated in Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia without the knowledge of the relevant U.S. Ambassador. U.S. Special Operations Command acknowledged the existence of these small teams in 2006, but only after the New York Times reported on their existence.⁹² Senior military officers conceded that teams had been in Kenya without approval, but would not comment on OCE presence in Ethiopia or Nigeria.⁹³ It is also clear that the teams, now known as Military Liaison Elements (MLEs), operate in conjunction with humanitarian assistance teams and have indentified themselves as humanitarian assistance/civil affairs soldiers while conducting activities unrelated to humanitarian assistance or development.</p> <p>According to the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service, these units operate using tradecraft and clandestine methodologies that by any reasonable standard must be considered wholly incompatible with humanitarian work.^{94, 95} A powerpoint presentation created by the Army’s 95th Civil Affairs Brigade lists “support to MLE targeting and access” as a strategic objective of the brigade’s civil-military engagement.⁹⁶</p> <p>It is precisely this type of activity, Special Forces operators and intelligence collectors masquerading as humanitarian actors, that has justifiably outraged humanitarian non-governmental organizations and, more importantly, endangered the lives of aid workers. According to the Congressional Research Service, “when military personnel</p>
<p>17</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

<p>are directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance and other humanitarian acts, military assistance can be viewed as jeopardizing the lives and work of NGO personnel by stigmatizing them as participants in a military effort.”⁹⁷</p> <p>A Senior Foreign Service Officer with long experience in West Africa reported that the DoD operational and intelligence elements working under CoCom authority often failed to coordinate their activities with the embassy and regularly reported to their headquarters outside of embassy approval channels. This clearly undermines the authority of the president’s representative to the host nation.</p> <p>By all accounts, U.S. Africa Command has ceased the practice of allowing troops to operate anywhere on the continent without the relevant ambassador’s approval and now requests embassy country clearance for all military activities. Efforts like this have led to greatly improved relations between U.S. Africa Command and the Africa Bureau at the State Department in the first months of 2009 over those of 2008.</p> <p>Nonetheless, the practice of civil affairs teams providing operational cover for intelligence collection apparently continues. This should be stopped. DoD officials did not comment on the practice when queried by the author in June.⁹⁸</p> <p>Rules of Engagement</p> <p><i>You can’t have two U.S. government operating systems in the same country.</i></p> <p>– Senior Department of State Official</p> <p>In any country or region, all U.S. government actors must harmonize their actions and authorities. This is particularly critical when the use of deadly force is involved. In January 2008, militants armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades attacked the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Coincidentally, several U.S. special operations forces personnel were in a bar next door. Once the gunfire erupted, two Special Forces (SF)</p> <p>soldiers organized the patrons of the bar and got everyone out of the building to safety. The troops then drove to the American embassy where their weapons were stored and armed themselves in case militants staged an attack on the U.S. embassy.⁹⁹</p> <p>The soldiers’ fast action and cool heads likely saved lives in the bar. But once back at the embassy, their clearly laudable actions exposed a gap in USG coordination. The SF soldiers were in country under CoCom authority and control not COM authority. Their Rules of Engagement (ROE) — the step-by-step procedures on when the use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized — wasn’t harmonized with the ROE of the U.S. Marines who protect the embassy under the leadership of the Department of State’s Regional Security Officer. In effect, there were two armed U.S. military forces operating in Mauritania under different command and control structures and with different ROE.</p> <p>Harmonizing issues like ROE is handled on a case-by-case basis between embassy leadership and the Command. According to Africom personnel, there is no standardized operating procedure for Africa Command activities under TSCTP/OEF-TS.¹⁰⁰ In some cases, draft Memoranda of Agreement or of Understanding (MOA, MOU) between the command and individual embassies exist but have remained unsigned for several years.¹⁰¹ Placing the majority of these forces under COM authority through NSDD-38 will address but not solve this problem. For forces remaining under CoCom authority there should be a standing Memorandum of Agreement between State and DoD covering rules of engagement.</p>	<p>The practice of civil affairs teams providing operational cover for intelligence collection apparently continues. This should be stopped.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>18</p>

Towards a Civilian Response Capability

I am committed to restoring a significant role for the State Department.

– Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Speech before the Council
on Foreign Relations, July 2009

In the days following the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s military forces in Iraq it became clear that the Pentagon had planned well for the combat but, assuming that the American occupation would be welcomed by the Iraqis, had failed to develop a strategy for stabilization and reconstruction. In 2004, the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 instructing the Department of State to: “Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.”¹⁰²

In response, State created the Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS). Tasks given to S/CRS included “coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts” and “ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations.” Specifically, S/CRS was instructed to “lead USG development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms and resources needed to ensure that the U.S. has civilian capabilities necessary for R&S activities.” This last tasking is significant. It requires the Department of State to create civilian response capacity and allows it to retake control of the authorities and mechanisms of reconstruction and stability — including, one surmises, security and development assistance.

The strategy for developing civilian response capacity centers on a three-tiered structure of experts making up the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). Atop the structure is the CRC-Active component of 250 direct hire

USAID workers load food assistance from a warehouse in Houston, Texas for a ship bound for the Horn of Africa.

Credit: USAID



<p>Americans from eight executive branch departments and administrations working in six broad areas described above in Section II.¹⁰³ A second tier is made up of the CRC-Standby of 2,000 civilian employees who attend training with S/CRS but remain in their regular jobs until called up. The final, third tier, would be a group of 2,000 CRC-Reserve responders who are brought into the U.S. government when needed. As of June, S/CRS had 35 CRC-Active officers. Congress has funded the Active and Standby components, but not funded the Reserve corps.</p> <p>There are other obstacles. Current legislation requires that all CRC employees be American citizens. This excludes Foreign Service Nationals or other locally engaged staff employees of the Department who would bring enormous linguistic and cultural advantages to the corps. American citizens who volunteer to serve in the reserve are not automatically granted re-employment guarantees as are military reservists.¹⁰⁴ The Department should be allowed to recruit foreign nationals into the civilian response corps and to guarantee re-employment rights for CRC reservists who are mobilized.</p> <p><i>Herding Kittens</i></p> <p><i>The principal value of the IMS is that it creates unity of purpose through an agreed comprehensive government planning and management process.</i></p> <p>– Ambassador John Herbst Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Congressional Testimony, February 2008</p> <p>Organizing and managing a stability operation under a whole-of-government approach will require coordination rarely seen inside the USG. The newly approved Interagency Management System (IMS) is designed for just this purpose. According to an S/CRS document, the IMS “Provides policymakers with the tools to plan and conduct integrated whole-of-government responses to highly complex crises affecting U.S. national interests, drawing on the</p>	<p>expertise, staff and resources of all relevant departments and agencies.”¹⁰⁵</p> <p>The system comprises three distinct elements or organizations at different levels of government. Atop the structure is a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). The CRSG is Washington-based and jointly chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State, the S/CRS Coordinator and a Senior Director from the National Security Council. The Integration Planning Cell is organized at the regional combatant command headquarters and includes planners and subject matter experts. Finally, the Advance Civilian Team is in the field directly supporting the Chief of Mission. The IMS was approved by the National Security Council and by the USG-wide Deputies Committee in 2007, but difficulties remain.¹⁰⁶</p> <p>Officials at State and DoD said that IMS has not been fully tested and never exercised in a real-world scenario. A senior DoD official said that at a recent war game the CoCom staff refused to cede “authority” to S/CRS officers. State Department officers confirmed there is substantial resistance to the structure of the CRSG from the regional bureaus, where the Assistant Secretary would share management authority with the S/CRS chief.</p> <p>Perhaps the solution is to vest the authority in the National Security Council (NSC) or the Office of the Vice President through the creation of a standing crisis management office to take the reins of any operation where the IMS is instituted. This need not be a permanent structure. Once the operation is underway, the White House would likely designate a Special Envoy or other senior official to lead the whole-of-government mission. Finally, the IMS must be exercised and tested. Although the IMS is designed to be implemented in the advent of “highly complex” crises, the NSC should institute IMS in smaller crises rather than wait for another Kosovo or Afghanistan in order to exercise the system in the real world.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEEINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>20</p>

Organizing and managing a stability operation under a whole-of-government approach will require coordination rarely seen inside the U.S. government.

<p style="text-align: center;">It is in the inter-agency process where the cultures clash and where the two organizations need to better understand each other.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ON CULTURE</p> <p><i>Within American government, there are few corporate cultures as different as the Departments of Defense and State. Individually, Foreign Service Officers and soldiers share many common traits – patriotism, self-confidence, high competence in their chosen fields, and high intelligence among them. But as organizations, the two Departments attract, hire and shape these individuals to different ends, and rightly so.</i></p> <p><i>Each organizational model has evolved over generations to best suit the mission and structure of the organization. Both organizations regularly attempt to re-invent themselves. State has undergone several court-mandated changes in the generation just past helping it evolve from a very white-male dominated organization to one that is more representative of America. DoD is often accused of preparing to fight the last war. During the present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has been evolving rapidly to develop a more nimble, more culturally aware force.</i></p> <p><i>It is in the inter-agency process where the cultures clash and where the two organizations need to better understand each other. New initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq have helped bring State, USAID and the military incrementally closer. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are, in theory, inter-agency approaches to stability operations. In fact, the inter-agency elements of the PRTs look and feel more like embedded diplomats. One or two diplomats operating with an Army brigade or Marine regiment do not an inter-agency approach make.</i></p> <p>OLD BIASES DIE HARD...</p> <p><i>Old-think at the Defense Department holds that diplomats are “a collection of striped-pants fuddie-duddies, excessively internationalist in outlook, soft in defense of the national interest, and a contributory cause of our difficulties abroad as agents of their resolution,^{m07} who can and will refuse to work in challenging environments. That State has easily filled all of its positions in the embassies and PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq is evidence that this is untrue.</i></p> <p><i>Old-think at State is that the Department must have the lead in all foreign affairs activities and that all other government agencies must be brought to heel. The reality is that State cannot lead many activities because it lacks sufficient numbers of personnel and in many cases the personnel lack the specialized capabilities present within other government agencies. And further, no single Department or Agency can be the lead in all foreign affairs activities under a whole-of-government approach.</i></p> <p>BUT SOME REALITIES ENDURE...</p> <p><i>The Foreign Service exam remains the principal gate through which aspiring FSOs must pass. The written exam is considered by many to be the ne plus ultra of formalized testing, and surmounting it and the day-long oral has been a crucible for FSOs. But the process bred arrogance and was used as a method for keeping the Foreign Service an old-boys club for far too long. The process is undergoing a much needed evolution.</i></p> <p><i>Winning a war demands many things of the men and women in uniform. The demand for precision – in movements ranging from squad drill and ceremony to synchronizing an air assault – can breed rigidity and a disdain for ambiguity. The military works at teaching its leaders to be flexible, but there remains room for improvement in accepting outsiders and outside ideas.</i></p> <p><i>Organizationally, there are structural problems that hinder integration. State’s approach is based on a bilateral model: the United States has direct relations with another nation represented by the</i></p>
<p>21</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

embassies the two nations exchange. Across the river, DoD takes a regional approach: the U.S. Central Command or Africa Command is the entry point for military-to-military contact.

The new reality is that the world is growing more complex daily and foreign relations require such deep specialization in a multitude of tasks and skills that our interactions with other nations must be through a whole-of-government approach managed through a functional inter-agency process.

The path to functionality in the inter-agency will be long and treacherous. The military learned this in the wake of the Grenada assault and subsequent legislated evolution toward joint doctrine and inter-operability. Re-building America's civilian foreign engagement capacity and integrating the civilian structures with the military structures will be no simpler.

PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS

Resolving the imbalance between civilian and military capacity will require that Congress and the Administration continue on the path laid out in National Security Presidential Directive 44 while funding a large number of new hires and creating new institutions and practices. There are costs involved to be sure. But this new spending and these new structures won't immediately resolve the deep rooted issues we have raised above. We cannot simply wave a spending wand and erase a couple generations of bad policy.

Of the recommendations and policy prescriptions sprinkled through this paper, two stand out as vital: (1) increase the size of the Foreign Service and (2) maintain DoD's security and development assistance authorities only until the civilian capacity to manage these programs is rebuilt. Taken as a whole, our recommendations fall into three broad categories: personnel, authorities and funding, and policies.

Personnel

Nothing is more crucial to the development of a strong foreign affairs enterprise than creating a strong, capable civilian workforce. This is the fundamental first step, and the critical need.

- **Congress should increase State Department and USAID staffing in line with the American Academy of Diplomacy/Stimson Center recommendations, a minimum of 4,735 Foreign Service Officers.**

As a part of this expansion, the Civilian Response Corps must be fully staffed and trained. Of course, this alone won't resolve the longer term personnel shortages at State and USAID. The response corps personnel are an expeditionary force created primarily from existing capability, so these officers do not represent increased permanent staffing. Currently, the Civilian Response Corps remains a hollow structure with only a few dozen of a planned 4,250 positions filled.

- **Fund and hire the full Civilian Response Corps of 4,250.**

Under existing regulations the Civilian Response Corps cannot hire foreign nationals. This policy unreasonably excludes staff who bring native linguistic and cultural knowledge to the Corps.

- **Open the Standby Response Corps and Reserve Response Corps to as broad a population as possible including Foreign Service Nationals and other locally engaged staff.**

Civilian members of the Reserve Response Corps who are mobilized for service are not currently guaranteed re-employment when they return.

- **Congress should create a civilian equivalent to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act that will guarantee full reemployment rights.**

We cannot simply wave a spending wand and erase a couple generations of bad policy.

<p>Current funding mechanisms and authorities for security and development assistance are poorly structured and unwieldy.</p>	<p>Increased capacity in specialties like planning is also needed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a National Security University that offers training at the intermediate and senior levels for interagency professional education. The university should include a specialized civilian planner's course for select students that is a civilian equivalent to the military's advanced planning schools. <p>Authorities and Funding</p> <p>Until the Department of State and USAID have full capacity to manage security and development assistance, Congress should allow DoD to maintain limited authorities in these areas through mechanisms like 1206 and CERP, but continue to deny DoD requests to make permanent these temporary authorities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to grant DoD limited authorities until the civilian agencies have sufficient capacity to fulfill their statutory requirements. <p>Current funding mechanisms and authorities for security and development assistance are poorly structured and unwieldy. Programs take far too long to come to fruition and there is insufficient control at the country team level. These authorities and funding streams should be de-centralized and pushed down to the country team level whenever possible. One way to quickly implement this is to fund Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund coffers equal to those of CoCom CERP funds.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ambassadors and regional combatant commanders should have joint oversight responsibility and allocation authority over Security and Development Assistance funds. These senior leaders should be able to develop and implement programs in country using pooled funds, possibly a contingency fund with the Foreign Military Funding account. <p>Ambassadors are the President's representative to the host nation and should have full authority of all U.S. government activities undertaken in the country. Placing all USG</p> <p>personnel under the NSDD-38 process will ensure that the Department of State will provide sufficient management section personnel to support the entire USG staff. In countries where the U.S. military has large formations of troops either in permanent bases or engaged in combat operations, these forces should remain under the regional Combatant Commander's authority.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In nations where we are not at war, all U.S. government personnel should be under Chief of Mission authority through the NSDD-38 process. <p>Policies</p> <p>DoD's use of Civil Affairs activities as cover for intelligence operations risks endangering legitimate humanitarian aid workers and compromises humanitarian principles.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD should disallow civil affairs and humanitarian assistance activities serving as cover for intelligence operations. <p>In most countries, those in which civilian actors can operate freely, DoD should not unilaterally conduct Humanitarian Assistance actions. When necessary, such as in natural disasters, DoD should make available its unmatched logistic capability, but this should be the exception, not the norm.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In environments where civilian actors can operate freely, DoD should restrict its activities to direct military-to-military engagement. <p>Managing Reconstruction and Stability operations requires new management tools and methods. The Interagency Management System is a good first step, but it remains untested.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Put the complete Interagency Management System to use in smaller crises before it is tested in a major crisis. <p>Further, throughout the development of the IMS turf battles erupted and, we expect, will continue to erupt. The leadership should</p>
<p>23</p>	<p>DRAWING ON THE FULL STRENGTH OF AMERICA: SEEKING GREATER CIVILIAN CAPACITY IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS</p>

<p>be at the White House level, either in the National Security Council or at the Office of the Vice President.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a standing crisis management capability at the NSC to take the reins of any operation where the IMS is instituted. <p>In activities not requiring the implementation of the Interagency Management System lack of ownership breeds lack of clarity and weakens unity of purpose.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In major programs like TSCTP, one agency (indeed one office) should have primacy of leadership and ownership. For TSCTP, this office should be at USAID. <p>A FINAL WORD</p> <p>Strengthening America’s civilian expeditionary capacity and restoring civilian primacy to our foreign affairs enterprise will change the way America engages with the world. The idea that American military power alone is sufficient to keep America secure or to influence others is wholly discredited. America has the world’s finest and most powerful military. But in the days since the September 2001 attacks it has been severely taxed and pushed into missions it should not have been given.</p> <p>The recommendations posited above offer a path to reducing some of the stresses on the military. But they also point the way to a position of greater capability and broader strength from which we might re-build our image among the community of nations after a period marked by a number of gaffes and of eroding solidarity among even our closest friends. Our foreign affairs enterprise – our face to the world – should be fully representative of our society and should present the world with the best America has to offer both in and out of uniform.</p> <p>Even if all of these recommendations are met, the system may still lack an essential element: trust. The dark secret of the enterprise is the lack of trust and confidence among Congress, the Foreign Service and</p>	<p>Our foreign affairs enterprise should be fully representative of our society and should present the world with the best America has to offer both in and out of uniform.</p>
<p>WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG</p>	<p>24</p>

GLOSSARY

AFRICOM: United States Africa Command

CERP: Commander's Emergency Relief Program

CJCS: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMSE: Civil Military Support Element, an Army Civil Affairs team

CoCom: Combatant Commander

DCM: Deputy Chief of Mission, second most senior officer at an embassy

DoD: U.S. Department of Defense

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EUCOM: United States European Command

FSI: The Foreign Service Institute

FSO: Foreign Service Officer

HA: Humanitarian Assistance

JPAT: Joint Planning and Assessment Team

JSOTF: Joint Special Operations Task Force

MIST: Military Information Support Team, an Army Psychological Operations team

MLE: Military Liaison Element, a special operations team conducting intelligence operations and operational preparation of the environment

MOA, MOU: Memorandum of Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NSDD-38: National Security Decision Directive number 38

OCE: Operational Control Element, out of usage term for a special operations team (See MLE)

OEF-TS: Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahel

OPB/OPE: Operational Preparation of the Battlefield/Environment; interchangeable term for some specialized intelligence activities undertaken by U.S. Special Forces (See Also OCE or MLE)

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSI: Pan-Sahel Initiative; a precursor program to TSCTP

ROE: Rules of Engagement

S/CRS: Office of the Coordinator for Re-Construction and Stability (at State)

SEAL: Navy Commandos trained to operate from Sea, Air and Land

SF: Special Forces, Army Green Berets

SOCAFRICA: Special Operations Command-Africa (Part of AFRICOM)

SOCCE: Special Operations Command and Control Element

SOCEUR: Special Operations Command-Europe (Part of EUCOM)

SOF: Special Operations Forces (generic term encompassing all unconventional warfare forces)

SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement

TSCTP: Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

USG: United States Government

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The author conducted interviews with subjects in Washington DC, N'Djamena, Nouakchott, Niamey, Bamako, Carlisle Barracks, Norfolk, Fayetteville, and Stuttgart. All interviews were conducted "on background" or "on deep background" according to the U.S. Department of State, *Ground Rules for Interviewing State Department Officials*. Accessed April 13, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/17191.htm>.
- ² Mauritania ranks number 140 out of 177 in the UN Development Program, *Human Development Index*. Accessed June 2, 2009. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf.
- ³ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports: Africa Overview*, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, April 20, 2007. Accessed on April 16, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82730.htm>.
- ⁴ U.S. Africa Command, *Program Overview*, The Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership. Accessed on April 16, 2009. <http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp>. Hereafter US Africa Command/TSCTP.
- ⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy 2008*, June 2008. p. 17. Accessed on July 24, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf>.
- ⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Report of Inspection, Bureau of African Affairs*. Accessed on August 13, 2009. <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/127270.pdf>.
- ⁷ Dean Acheson, *The Eclipse of the State Department*, Foreign Affairs, July 1971.
- ⁸ Associated Press, *Documents Show Former President Nixon Wanted to Ruin the Foreign Service*, Fox News Online, January 4, 2007. Accessed on June 2, 2009. <http://origin.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,241479,00.html>.
- ⁹ Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie: *Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service*. Georgetown University Press, 2009, p. 90.
- ¹⁰ Population Research Institute. *It is Time for USAID to Go*, Weekly Briefing, January 2001. Accessed on June 3, 2009. <http://www.pop.org/20010112483/it-is-time-for-usaid-to-go>.
- ¹¹ Greg Schneider and Renae Merle, *Reagan's Defense Build-up Bridged Military Years*, The Washington Post, June 9, 2004, p. E01. Accessed on June 3, 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26273-2004Jun8.html>.
- ¹² Broadly, this line of thinking is known as the Powell Doctrine, after General Colin L. Powell.
- ¹³ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick J. Cronin, eds. *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, December 2008, National Defense University, Executive Summary, p V.
- ¹⁴ J. Anthony Holmes. *Where are the Civilians?*, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009, p. 151.
- ¹⁵ Gary Schaub, *Really Soft Power*, The New York Times, January 26, 2009. Accessed on April 22, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/opinion/27schaub.html?_r=1&ref=opinion.
- ¹⁶ The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*. October, 2008, page 2. Hereafter, AAD/Stimson.
- ¹⁷ The American Foreign Service Association serves as both a union and a professional association for the Foreign Service, representing Foreign Service Officers from State, USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, plus Foreign Service Specialists.
- ¹⁸ Holmes, 160.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Embassy staff, May 15, 2009.
- ²⁰ This was prior to U.S. Africa Command reaching full operational capability and taking on the mission. According to staff officers at Africa Command and to embassy staff in N'Djamena, Special Operations Command-Africa assumed the TSCTP/OEF-TS mission from Special Operations Command-Europe on May 15, 2009.
- ²¹ PSI was the acronym for the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the predecessor program to TSCTP.
- ²² Direct observation of the author.
- ²³ Department of Defense, *Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade*, February 28, 2009. Accessed on 18 April, 2009. <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg0902.pdf>; See also: U.S. Congress, *NDAA 2009*, May 12, 2008. Accessed on June 22, 2009. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s3001pcs.txt.pdf.
- ²⁴ Email from Department of State Human Resources bureau, May 28, 2009.
- ²⁵ Email from USAID Public Affairs Office. June 4, 2009.
- ²⁶ Jonathan Weisman, *Obama Presents Hard Choices Budget*, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2009. Accessed on April 18, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123564748462081261.html#articleTabs%3Dinteractive>.

²⁷ The civilian foreign affairs budget appears in the 150 account and includes operating expenses for State, USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Export-Import bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, as well as funds for child survival and health programs, development assistance, international disaster assistance, transition initiatives, the Peace Corps, economic support funds, foreign military financing, international military education and training, peacekeeping operations, the African and Asian Development Banks, the Global Environmental Facility, U.S. contributions to international organizations and to international peacekeeping activities, the National Endowment for Democracy, Food for Peace and Food for Education (PL 480), and over a dozen more activities. Source: U.S. Department of State, *Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Affairs Account Congressional Budget Justification*. Accessed on May 28, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2009cbj/>.

²⁸ U.S. Africa Command/TSCTP.

²⁹ *U.S. Code Title 22 – Foreign Relations and Inter-course*, Accessed on August 5, 2009. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/uscode_sup_01_22.html.

³⁰ *U.S. Code Title 10 - . Armed Forces*, Accessed on August 5, 2009. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/uscode_sup_01_10.html.

³¹ *U.S. Code Title 50 – War and National Defense*, Accessed on August 5, 2009. http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/uscode_sup_01_50.html.

³² Available here: Committee on International Relations/Committee on Foreign Relations, *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2002, Foreign Assistance Act (PL 87-195)*. <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf>.

³³ Available here: U.S. Department of State, *Division H – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009*. http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/2009_Con_Bill_DivH.pdf.

³⁴ Available here: U.S. Congress, *Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*, October 14, 2008. http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/2009NDAA_PL110-417.pdf.

³⁵ Committee on International Relations/Committee on Foreign Relations, Section 102.

³⁶ Committee on International Relations/Committee on Foreign Relations, Section 501.

³⁷ The PM bureau Security Assistance Team oversees FMF, IMET, PKO funding as well as coordinating DoD and State cooperation for activities under

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act and the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (aka Article 98). The Security Assistance Team is part of the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA). U.S. Department of State, *Bureau of Political and Military Affairs*. Accessed on June 10, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/>.

³⁸ More information is available at: Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Accessed on August 4, 2009. <http://www.dsca.mil/>.

³⁹ Mark Martins, *No Small Change*, Army Lawyer, February 2004. Accessed on June 15, 2009. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2004_Feb/ai_115695635/.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 30005.05*, November 28, 2005. Accessed on June 15, 2009. <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

⁴² U.S. Department of Defense, *Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 10, 2007*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), October 10, 2007. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181>.

⁴³ National Defense Strategy 2008, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Nina Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues and Options for Congress*. Congressional Research Service report RL-34639, December 9, 2008. Accessed on June 15, 2009. <http://wikileaks.org/leak/crs/RL34639.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*. December 15, 2006.

⁴⁶ Conversation between the author and several foreign affairs and defense analysts at U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, June 19, 2009.

⁴⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance*, January 2008.

⁴⁸ The President of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, is a former Chief of the General Staff, and often personally leads combat troops in operations against rebel factions. In 2007 and 2008 the governors of several Chadian states were serving military officers. In August 2008, Army commanders in Mauritania seized power from the first freely elected president and remained in power after contested elections in July 2009.

⁴⁹ This assessment is partly a result of direct observation by the author and partly based on comments made by State Department and U.S. Africa Command officials in interviews with the author.

⁵⁰ There were three concurrent JCETs (Joint Combined Exchange Training) teams in Mauritania according to officers at State and DoD.

⁵¹ Direct observation of the author and interviews with senior Department of State and Defense officials.

⁵² *Resist Africom*. Accessed on June 5, 2009. <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/0/1552/t/5717/signup.jsp?key=3094>; <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=15674637762>; <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=13122440070>.

⁵³ This commentary is fairly typical. Masu Fahnbulleh, *Pres. Sirleaf's advocacy of AFRICOM in Liberia, and the Progressive's propaganda*, *The Liberian Dialogue*, November 5, 2007. Accessed on August 5, 2009. <http://www.theliberiandialogue.org/articles/c110507tws.htm>.

⁵⁴ BBC World News online. *The Controversy over Africom*, October 3, 2007. Accessed on June 5, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7026197.stm>.

⁵⁵ The brigadier used the term CINC meaning Commander in Chief. Commanders of Unified Combatant Commands were referred to as Commanders in Chief until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered that the title be changed to Combatant Commander (COCOM) correctly noting that there is only one Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. Nonetheless, the term remains in limited use. Interview with the author, April 2009.

⁵⁶ Interview with the author, May 2009.

⁵⁷ Acheson, *op.cit.*

⁵⁸ One could add intelligence as well, but that is outside the scope of this paper.

⁵⁹ U.S. Army special operations forces include Special Forces soldiers, Rangers, and special operations aviation units, but also Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers and units as well as support units. Psyops and Civil Affairs training is conducted at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC.

⁶⁰ U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USA-SOC), *SOF Forces Primer*. Accessed on April 21, 2009. <http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/primer.html>.

⁶¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, *USAID Primer: What We Do And How We Do It*. Accessed on April 21, 2009. http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html.

⁶² According to the American embassy staff.

⁶³ United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Indices*. Accessed on May 25, 2009. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf.

⁶⁴ Recently, Embassy N'Djamena had at least two FSO positions filled by civil service officers on excursion tours.

⁶⁵ Niamey got its political officer position back in April 2009; the position is filled by a first-tour FSO.

⁶⁶ The Department provides "differential" pay to employees serving in posts "where conditions of environment differ substantially from conditions of environment in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive." This pay varies from 5 to 35 percent of the employee's base salary. U.S. Department of State, *Post Hardship Differential*, Department of State Standardized Regulations. Accessed on June 5, 2009. http://aoprals.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=260&menu_id=81.

⁶⁷ Danger pay is provided to employees "for service at places in foreign areas where there exist conditions of civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism or wartime conditions which threaten physical harm or imminent danger to the health or well-being of an employee. These conditions do not include acts characterized chiefly as economic crime." The pay varies from 15 to 35 percent of the employee's base salary depending on the level of danger. U.S. Department of State, *Chapter 650 Danger Pay Allowance*, Department of State Standardized Regulations. Accessed on June 5, 2009. http://aoprals.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=271&menu_id=81.

⁶⁸ AAD/Stimson, p. 3.

⁶⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps*, GAO-06-894, August 2006. Accessed on September 3, 2009. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do6894.pdf>.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ The Senior Foreign Service is an excepted career service that is rank equivalent to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the civil service, or flag and general officers in the military. There are four ranks in the Senior Foreign Service: Counselor, Minister Counselor, Career Minister and Career Ambassador. These are personal ranks, not diplomatic titles. The Senior Foreign Service was established by the U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Service Act of 1980*, Legislation on Foreign

Affairs through 1996. Accessed on June 5, 2009. <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/400/fsa.pdf>.

⁷² AAD/Stimson, p. 2.

⁷³ *An Obituary for USAID in Chad*. Department of State unclassified cable dated April 7, 1995.

⁷⁴ Thomas Shanker, *G.I.'s to Fill Civilian Gap in Afghanistan*, *The New York Times*, April 22, 2009. Accessed on April 23, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/asia/23military.html?_r=1&hpw.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Email from Department of State Family Liaison Office, June 10, 2009.

⁷⁷ Department of State, S/CRS, *Preventing and Responding to Conflict: A New Approach*. Powerpoint presentation, dated April 2009.

⁷⁸ AAD/Stimson, p. 4.

⁷⁹ United States Navy, *Building planners: U.S. Naval War College*. Joint Military Operations Naval Operations Planner Course. Accessed on April 22, 2009. <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/academics/courses/jmo/nop.aspx>.

⁸⁰ United States Air Force, *School of Advanced Air and Space Studies*. Accessed on April 22, 2009. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/saass/curriculum.asp>.

⁸¹ Department of State, *Policy Planning Staff: Mission Statement*. Accessed on April 21, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/s/p/>.

⁸² John Yaeger and Eric Kjonnerod, *Educating National Security Professionals for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Chapter 8, Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Hans Binnendijk and Patrick J. Cronin, eds.

⁸³ Yaeger and Kjonnerod, p. 135. See also: U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006. Accessed on August 5, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>.

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, 2 FAM 116.6-1, *Procedures for Requesting Country Clearance*, Foreign Affairs Manual. Accessed on June 1, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84388.pdf>.

⁸⁵ The letter from President Bush to American ambassadors included the paragraph: "As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in [name of country], regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the

staff of an international organization. Except for the activities of the personnel exempted above, you are in charge of all executive branch activities and operations in your Mission."

⁸⁶ Multiple conversations with State and Defense department officials confirmed this although no one was willing to address the reason on the record. This policy was overcome by events on January 21, 2009.

⁸⁷ NSDD-38 can be found here: U.S. Department of State, *NSDD-38: Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts*, June 2, 1982. <http://www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/45148.htm>.

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⁹⁰ U.S. Africa Command/TSCTP.

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⁹² Thom Shanker and Scott Shane, *Special Operations Troops Get Expanded Role in Intelligence*, *The New York Times*, March 8, 2006. Accessed on April 23, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/08/international/americas/08forces.html?pagewanted=print>

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⁹⁵ For more on Operational Preparation of the Environment, see also: Sean D. Naylor, *The Spec Ops*, *Armed Forces Journal*. Accessed on June 19, 2009. <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2166057/>.

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⁹⁷ Nina M. Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2008.

⁹⁸ Roundtable discussion among OSD, CJS, State, USAID and NGOs at USIP on June 19, 2009.

⁹⁹ Direct observation of the author and conversations with Department of State and DoD officials, 2007-2009.

¹⁰⁰ Conversation with U.S. Africa Command officers on May 13, 2009.

¹⁰¹ Direct observation of the author between 2004 and 2008; multiple conversations with State and DoD officials in 2009.

¹⁰² The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive 44*, accessed on July 13, 2009. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.

¹⁰³ Department of State, S/CRS, *Preventing and Responding to Conflict: A New Approach*. Power-point presentation, dated April 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Email from S/CRS staff member. July 2, 2009.

¹⁰⁵ S/CRS, *Preventing and Responding to Conflict: A New Approach*, April 2009.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Government document, *Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations*, March 29, 2007.

¹⁰⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, quoted in Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie, *Career Diplomacy*, Georgetown University Press, 2008, p. 92.

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