Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Kenya

Overview: Kenya is a strong counterterrorism partner of the United States throughout East Africa. Kenya faces an ongoing terrorist threat from the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab, against which the Kenya Defense Forces have engaged in military operations in Somalia since 2011 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Kenya remained a target of al-Shabaab terrorist attacks, most of which occurred along the northern border region with Somalia. ISIS also claimed responsibility for at least one attack that occurred in Nairobi. Kenyan security services expanded efforts to counter terrorist threats to urban and rural areas in Kenya, some resulting in the reported arrests of suspected operatives associated with al-Shabaab and ISIS. Reports of violations of human rights by Kenya's police and military forces during counterterrorism operations continued, including allegations of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture.

Kenyan officials cooperated closely with the United States and other partner nations on counterterrorism, including investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases. Kenya is one of six countries participating in the President's Security Governance Initiative (SGI), focusing on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level. In Kenya, SGI program priorities include border security and management, administration of justice, and police human resource management, with countering violent extremism (CVE) a cross-cutting issue for all three focus areas.

The Kenyan government worked to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, including Kenyan nationals, attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS in Iraq, Libya, or Syria.

2016 Terrorist Incidents: Kenya experienced multiple terrorist incidents, including small-scale, but high-profile, attacks in Mombasa on September 11 and in Nairobi on October 27, the first terrorist incidents in Kenya's two largest cities in more than a year.

• In May, on Kenya's southern coast, there were separate incidents in Kwale County in which presumed al-Shabaab gunmen killed one former al-Shabaab member and three community policing officers working with returned al-Shabaab fighters.

• In June, al-Shabaab attackers killed five police officers escorting a passenger bus in Mandera.

• In July, another al-Shabaab attack killed at least six bus passengers in Mandera County.

• In September, police killed three women who attacked officers at Mombasa's central police station.

• In October, al-Shabaab carried out two separate attacks in Mandera, killing at least six people at a workers dormitory and at least 12 people at a hotel.

• In October, a police officer stationed outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi shot and killed a man who attacked the officer with a knife. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, but it is unknown if the perpetrator was, in fact, ISIS-affiliated.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kenya's 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act together provide a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA) altered 20 laws to strengthen Kenya's legislative framework to fight terrorism, including: criminalization of participating in terrorist training; establishing a framework for a coordinated border control agency; strengthening the mandate of Kenya's National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC); and broadening evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions.

The Kenyan judiciary continued to demonstrate independence, exemplified by the High Court's actions in 2015, when it struck down some provisions of the SLAA as unconstitutional and demonstrated capacity to handle cases related to terrorism. The judiciary remained hampered, however, by insufficient procedures to effectively use plea agreements, cooperation agreements, electronic evidence, and undercover investigative tools. Allegations of corruption in the judiciary, including in the High Court, have persisted.

Government counterterrorism functions were divided among the three branches of the National Police Service – the Kenya Police (including the paramilitary General Service Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit), and the Administration Police (including the Rural Border Patrol Unit) – as well as non-police agencies, such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces. In May, the government relocated NCTC, NIS, and the National Security Council to the Office of the President. Interagency coordination improved, particularly in information sharing; however, shortages in resources and training, corruption among some personnel, and unclear command and control hindered operational effectiveness. The government continued, with donor support, to work on a single crisis response command center – a result of lessons learned from the 2015 attack at Garissa University College in which al-Shabaab terrorists killed at least 147 people.

Kenyan officials participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored capacity-building programs funded and implemented by the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. Programs included training in crisis response, border operations, investigations, and prosecutions. Notable among these was the Department of State's third annual East Africa Joint Operations Capstone exercise, a month-long crisis response training series hosted in Kenya for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan law enforcement personnel. The exercise culminated in a large-scale simulated response to a terrorist incident in multiple locations over a 20-hour period, and included community engagement and human rights-related issues, as well as a senior-level tabletop exercise.

Border security remained a challenge for Kenya due to vast, sparsely populated border regions and largely uncontrolled land borders. This was exacerbated by security agency and other government resource gaps and corruption at multiple levels.

Kenyan officials emphasized the importance and challenges of border security in their discussions with U.S. counterparts. SGI-supported exchange visits with U.S. border security officials helped to improve Kenyan interagency coordination efforts and refinement of a country border control strategy, as well as legislative changes. Gaps in border security and national identification systems hampered law enforcement agencies' ability to identify and detain potential terrorists entering and leaving Kenya. Terrorist screening watchlists, biographic and biometric screening, and other measures were largely in place at major Kenyan ports of entry, but screening procedures were sometimes inconsistently or minimally applied, particularly at smaller border posts and airports. Kenya continued its partnership with the United States to strengthen traveler screening using the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) at major ports of entry.

The Kenyan government worked to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, including Kenyan nationals attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS and those returning from fighting with these groups abroad. In October, Kenyan prosecutors obtained the first conviction under the 2015 SLAA, which criminalized travel to receive terrorist training. Under the ruling, a Kenyan man was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment after being arrested in Somalia and returned to Kenya.

Kenyan security services detected and deterred terrorist plots during 2016 and responded to dozens of claimed, or presumed, terrorism-related incidents. Kenyan law enforcement did not repeat the widely criticized large-scale security operations of 2014 that appeared to target certain communities. Nonetheless, there were numerous allegations in 2016 that the government or its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings, particularly of known or suspected criminals, including terrorists. We refer you to the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ for further information.

Kenya's Independent Policing Oversight Authority continued to make progress in fulfilling its mandate by investigating multiple cases of police misconduct and referring cases to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

At the end of 2016, several major terrorism cases were ongoing, including the trial of four Kenyans and one Tanzanian citizen charged in connection with the 2015 Garissa University College attack. That trial resumed in January after an administrative postponement in 2015, but was suspended again in October after the Tanzanian defendant was found mentally unfit to stand trial. The trial of British terrorist suspect Jermaine Grant on explosives charges continued. Grant was sentenced in 2015 in a separate trial to nine years imprisonment on charges related to trying to obtain Kenyan citizenship illegally.

The Kenyan government cooperated with the United States to investigate the October 27 attack on a police officer outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and to increase security at the embassy. Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked with regional organizations and the broader international community, including the United States, to increase their counterterrorism capacity and to secure land, sea, and air borders.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Kenyan government implements relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including 1373 and the ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida sanctions regime. It has made progress on its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime since its June 2014 removal from review by the FATF for strategic deficiencies.

Kenya's financial intelligence unit, the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), continued to build its capacity to monitor the formal financial system. The government has not yet appointed a permanent director to the FRC, which remained hampered by a lack of essential resources and faced challenges meeting minimum staffing, physical security, and information technology requirements. The FRC also lacked an electronic reporting system for analyzing suspicious transactions. The Central Bank of Kenya continued to encourage Kenyan citizens and residents to use the formal financial sector, which is subject to regulatory oversight, to increase overall financial transaction integrity through greater financial inclusion, but the use of unregulated informal financial mechanisms, including hawalas, continued.

Non-governmental organizations are required to report suspicious transactions to the FRC, but compliance is not always enforced.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Countering Violent Extremism: In September, Kenya's president launched the government's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. Among other priorities, the strategy highlighted the importance of engagement with civil society and development of county-level countering violent extremism (CVE) action plans. The Lamu, Kwale, and Mombasa county governments established county-level CVE strategies in 2016.

Kenya's government increased its efforts and coordination with international partners to advance CVE, including counter-radicalization to violence, counter-messaging, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighter returnees. The government continued some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters, facilitators, and sympathizers, but efforts were constrained by the lack of a clear legal framework and supportive public messaging. The national CVE strategy identified this as a key area of importance. Kenya's second-largest city, Mombasa, is an active member of the Strong Cities Network. Kenyan civil society organizations worked to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, often with assistance from the United States and other international partners.

International and Regional Cooperation: Kenya is an active member of the African Union, including on the Peace and Security Committee, and is a troop-contributing country to AMISOM. Kenya remains engaged with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and hosted several consultative meetings on IGAD's development of a regional CVE strategy during the year. Kenya is also a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. Although not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Kenya is an active participant in relevant GCTF activities and is participating in the GCTF-endorsed International CT/CVE Clearinghouse Mechanism as a pilot country, which is being developed as a means to help countries and donors optimize civilian counterterrorism and CVE capacity-building programs.