


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Thailand Burma Border Consortium

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# DISPLACEMENT AND POVERTY

in South East Burma/Myanmar



2011

**Thailand Burma Border Consortium**

**2011**

**DISPLACEMENT AND POVERTY  
IN SOUTH EAST BURMA / MYANMAR**

**With Field Assessments and Situation Updates by:**

**Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People  
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Front cover photo : Post-election displacement, Hpapun Township, 2011, CIDKP

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\* 'Burma' and 'Myanmar' are used interchangeably in this report, as are the corresponding place names for other towns, states and regions. The 'South East' terminology is more precise than previous TBBC reports about 'eastern Burma/Myanmar', but covers a similar geographic area and again excludes Kachin State.

\* The '*Tatmadaw*' is the national armed forces.

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*In the post-independence period, national races (have been) involved in armed conflicts among them for about five decades due to dogmatism, sectarian strife and racism instead of rebuilding the nation. In consequence, the people were going through the hell of untold miseries....*

*Therefore we will give top priority to national unity. Lip service and talks are not enough to achieve national unity. So, it is required to build roads, railroads and bridges to overcome the natural barriers between regions of national races; to improve the education and health standards; and to lay economic foundations to improve the socio-economic status of national races...*

*In addition to material development, we will try to ensure the flourishing of Union Spirit, the fundamental requirement of national solidarity.*

//

President Thein Sein, Inaugural address to Union Parliament,  
Naypidaw, 30 March 2011

2011

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# Executive Summary

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Conflict-induced Displacement,  
Kawkareik, 2011, CIDKP

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A new government in Burma/Myanmar offers the possibility of national reconciliation and reform after decades of conflict. Every opportunity to resolve grievances, alleviate chronic poverty and restore justice must be seized, as there remain many obstacles to breaking the cycle of violence and abuse. Militarisation continues to pose the greatest threat to human security in the south eastern states and regions, with more people forced to flee from their homes during the past year than any other since the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) and ethnic community based organizations started documenting displacement in 2002. Providing a protective environment by stopping human rights abuses, ensuring accountability and ending impunity will be essential for conflict transformation.

Poverty alleviation has been recognised by the new government as a strategic priority for human development. While official figures estimate that a quarter of the nation live in poverty, this survey suggests that almost two thirds of households in rural areas of South East Burma/Myanmar are unable to meet their basic needs. Impoverishment is particularly severe in the conflict-affected townships of Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin in Pegu/Bago Region and Thandaung in Karen/Kayin State. Comparative analysis with household surveys conducted by the World Food Program suggest that that standards of living in rural areas of the South East are similar to conditions in Northern Rakhine State and far worse than those those reported from the central Dry Zone.

This report seeks to increase awareness about the scale of poverty and displacement in rural areas of South East Burma/Myanmar at a critical juncture in the nation's history. During the past two years, apart from interviewing key informants in fifty townships to assess the scale of forced displacement, poverty assessments have been conducted with over 2,600 households in fourteen townships. Estimates of displacement were guided by international standards and the poverty assessment was developed in consultation with humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon/Yangon to ensure that vulnerability indicators are standardised.

The paradox of democratic reform coinciding with an escalation of conflict in border areas during the survey period has been due to both domestic attempts to expand the national armed forces' (the *Tatmadaw's*) command structure and regional interests in resource extraction. Ceasefire agreements in Karen, Shan, Mon and Kachin States collapsed due to orders for non state armed groups to give up their political aspirations and transform into Border Guard Forces under the *Tatmadaw's* control. Major economic deals have simultaneously been negotiated with Asian neighbours for mega-development projects in ethnic areas, but the lack of transparency and consultation with local communities has aggravated tensions.

TBBC's partner agencies have documented the destruction, forced relocation or abandonment of more than 3,700 civilian settlements in South East Burma/Myanmar since 1996, including 105 villages and hiding sites between August 2010 and July 2011. This survey estimates at least 112,000 people were forced to leave their homes during the past year. While some fled into Thailand and others returned to former villages or resettled elsewhere, over 450,000 people currently remain internally displaced in the south eastern region. This is not a cumulative figure of everyone who has been displaced in the past decade, but rather a conservative estimate of the current scale of internal displacement covering the rural areas of 50 townships.

The highest rates of displacement during the past year were recorded in central Karen State's border areas with Thailand, central Shan State and the northern Karen areas. A breakaway faction of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) resumed armed resistance in November 2010, and the resulting conflict led to the displacement of over 27,000 people from Myawaddy and surrounding townships. After the *Tatmadaw* broke a 22 year ceasefire agreement and resumed military offensives against the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) in March 2011, over 31,000 civilians fled from their homes across 10 townships. A further 28,000 civilians have been displaced from northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Region as a result of hydro-electric dams and counter-insurgency operations targeting civilians to undermine the Karen National Union (KNU).

As a result of protracted conflict and militarization, the majority of subsistence livelihoods in South East Burma/Myanmar are not sustainable and disposable income levels are too small to adequately supplement food supplies. A quarter of households reported having no cash income during the previous month while only one in six households have reliable sources of income. Food security indicators suggest that two out of three households have poor access to food, an inadequate diet and were in debt primarily due to food shortages. These outcomes correlate with limited access to agricultural land and productive assets and reflect the collapse of household economies.

This survey found that coercive military patrols, forced labour and forced displacement each disrupted the livelihoods of at least one in ten households during the previous six months. These and other shocks contributed to food shortages for three out of four households during the month prior to the survey. Rather than being temporary gaps, more than half the households will have bought, borrowed or bartered for rice to cover at least three months consumption in order to avoid food shortages leading up to the current harvest. Households primarily cope by buying cheaper and poorer quality food, buying food on credit, relying on family and friends and reducing consumption by eating rice soup. Villagers are incredibly resilient but their coping strategies need support so they can break free from the poverty trap.

It remains to be seen how quickly and effectively the new government will be able to tackle poverty, but there has not yet been any relaxation of restrictions on humanitarian access into conflict-affected areas. In this context, the vast majority of foreign aid continues to be channelled into areas not affected by armed conflict such as the Irrawaddy/Ayeyarwady Delta, the Dry Zone and Rakhine State. While responding to demonstrated needs, such engagement is building trust with authorities and supporting advocacy for increased humanitarian space throughout the country. Until this confidence building process translates into access, cross-border aid will continue to be vital to ensure that the needs of civilians who are affected by conflict in the South East and cannot be reached from Rangoon are not further marginalised.

The opportunity for conflict transformation will similarly require greater coherence between humanitarian, political, development and human rights actors. Diplomatic engagement with the Government in Naypidaw and the non state armed groups will be critical in promoting national reconciliation. Third party mediation may be necessary to break the stalemate between the Government, who so far are insisting on a series of State-based negotiations, and the ethnic armed opposition, who are suspicious of 'divide and rule' tactics and are calling for nationwide talks. The international community, including the United Nations, ASEAN, and neighbouring countries, has a responsibility to support national reconciliation and address regional insecurity.



//

*The situation of ethnic minority groups in the border areas presents serious limitations to the Government's intention to transition to democracy. Violence continues in many of these areas. Systematic militarization contributes to human rights abuses. These abuses include land confiscation, forced labor, internal displacement, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. They are widespread, and they continue today, and they remain essentially unaddressed by the authorities.*

*I am concerned that the Government is not finding a political solution to solve the ethnic conflicts.*

//

Tomas Ojea Quintana, United Nations Human Rights Council Special  
Rapporteur on the Situation in Myanmar, Bangkok, 23 May 2011

# Methodology

Assessing acute malnutrition,  
Yebyu, 2011, MRDC



## 1.1 DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

TBBC has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations (CBOs) to document the characteristics of internal displacement in South East Burma since 2002.<sup>1</sup> While profiling internally displaced persons was relatively untested just a few years ago, TBBC's experience has contributed to the development of methodological advice for humanitarian agencies around the world.<sup>2</sup> Since 2010, apart from assessing the scale of displacement across fifty townships, household poverty assessments have also been conducted in fourteen townships.

The survey framework for 2011 was designed with the participation of CBO partners, and in consultation with humanitarian agencies based in Yangon. It incorporated a quantitative and spatial survey to assess displacement, militarization and development at the township level as well as a questionnaire to assess household poverty.<sup>3</sup> This was supplemented by interviewing and documenting personal testimonies relating to issues of poverty and human rights.

A multi-stage, geographically-based cluster-sampling method was utilized for the household poverty survey. A target of 200 households in each township was established so that the results could be compared with other townships in Burma. Given unreliable baseline population data, each township was divided into geographic quadrants and the survey teams sought to interview 50 households in villages closest to the center of each quarter. Households were randomly selected at the village level, with a maximum cluster of 25 households in one village.

45 field staff from participating CBOs were specifically trained in surveying techniques. This included sampling and interviewing methods, informed consent protocols, mid-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC) measurements and participatory assessments. As occurred in 2010, field data was collected during May and June 2011 at the beginning of the wet season, and staff returned for data entry, verification and analysis to be conducted during July and August.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from 50 townships to compile estimates of the internally displaced population. This report includes field estimates of displacement from eight townships in northern Shan State, which have not previously been surveyed. The displaced population estimates are generally considered conservative as it has not been possible to include urban areas. The estimates were guided by meeting all of the following criteria, which reflect international standards recognising internally displaced persons:

- People have been forced to leave or flee from their homes by armed conflict, natural disasters or human rights abuses.
- They remain in Burma and have not crossed an international border.
- They have not been able to return to live in their former village in safety and dignity.
- They have not been able to resettle in another village in safety and with dignity.

Comparative analysis for the household poverty survey has been based on national statistics published by the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development<sup>4</sup> and regional assessments conducted by the World Food Program (WFP)<sup>5</sup>. The government data was compiled from interviews conducted with 18,660 households during December-January 2009-10 and May 2010 across all states and regions. WFP's surveys were conducted in October 2010 at the end of wet season and beginning of the rice harvest with 700 households in Northern Rakhine State and 630 households in the Dry Zone. While all sample sizes are statistically significant to facilitate comparisons, it should be noted that the surveys were conducted at different times of the agricultural calendar.

<sup>1</sup> Annual surveys can be accessed from [www.tbbsc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps](http://www.tbbsc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps) (accessed 20/9/11)


<sup>2</sup> OCHA and Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2008, *Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons*, Geneva, pp 37, 66-67, <http://procaponline.unocha.org/docs/library/Guidance%20on%20Profiling%20IDPs.April%2008.pdf> (accessed 4/10/11)

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 4

<sup>4</sup> IHLCA Project Technical Unit, 2011, *Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar (2009-10) : Poverty Profile*, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, UNDP and UNICEF, Yangon, <http://www.mm.undp.org/ihlca/index.html> (accessed 16/09/11)

<sup>5</sup> WFP, 2011, *Food Security Assessment in Northern Rakhine State Myanmar*, Yangon, [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full\\_Report\\_288.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_288.pdf) (accessed 16/09/11); WFP, 2011a, *Food Security Assessment in the Dry Zone Myanmar*, Yangon, <http://www.wfp.org/content/myanmar-food-security-assessment-dry-zone-february-2011> (access 16/9/11)


Map 1 : Household Poverty Survey Sample, 2010-11



## 1.2 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SAMPLE


The 2011 household poverty survey consisted of interviews with 1,472 households representing 8,682 people spread across 111 villages and 8 townships. This year's survey supplements a comparable assessment conducted with 1,200 households in six different townships during 2010.<sup>6</sup> The distribution of the combined sample size of 2,672 households in fourteen townships spread across six states and regions is represented on Map 1 and in Chart 1. Survey results for South East Burma in 2010 and 2011 should not be utilised for trend analysis as the surveys were conducted in different townships.

**Chart 1 : Poverty Survey Sample by State and Region**



The demographic composition of respondents to the household survey was representative of the general population. Chart 2 indicates that there was a fair gender balance as well as religious diversity in the sample. Respondents were not asked to identify a household head as part of the survey as it is not clear whether this perpetuates patriarchy rather than promoting gender sensitivity. Government data does not suggest that female-headed households are significantly poorer in Burma,<sup>7</sup> but in any case all answers were analysed by the respondent's gender and any significant differences have been noted in this report.

**Chart 2 : Poverty Survey Respondents by Sex and Religion**




Ethnic diversity is also a feature of the sample population, as documented in Chart 3. The prominence of Sgaw Karen respondents reflects the surveys reach into 4 townships of Karen/Kayin State, 2 townships in eastern Bago Region and 2 townships in Tanintharyi Region. The targeting of two additional townships for the Karen partner CBOs in 2011 was due to their enhanced capacity and the desire to increase the reach of this survey as quickly as possible. Apart from the six main ethnic groups identified in Chart 3, respondents from the Lahu, PaO, Burman, Tavoyan and Monnepwa ethnic groups were also surveyed.

<sup>6</sup> TBBC, 2010, Protracted Displacement and Chronic Poverty in Eastern Burma/Myanmar, [www.tbcc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps](http://www.tbcc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps) (accessed 1/10/11)


<sup>7</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 34.

**Chart 3 : Poverty Survey Respondents by Ethnicity**



Sampling for the household poverty assessment was conducted independently of targeting processes for the distribution of aid. Chart 4 illustrates that three out of four households surveyed were not beneficiaries of aid delivered by the participating CBOs during the previous year. This reflects positively on the representative nature of the sampling method.

**Chart 4 : Poverty Survey Respondents as Aid Beneficiaries in the Past Year**



### 1.3 LIMITATIONS

Restrictions on access and insecurity due to the ongoing armed conflict are the two biggest limitations for most humanitarian responses in Burma, and this survey was no exception. In particular, access into the north and west of Monghsat, Shan State, was constrained by insecurity. Similarly, the geographically based sampling method was challenged in areas where there are no longer any villages left such as in Shadaw, Kayah State, between the Salween River and the Thailand border.

The lack of credible data for baseline and comparative analysis is another general limitation that this survey is attempting to address. Official surveys about poverty in Burma face the same constraints on access into sensitive areas as others. As government data is only disaggregated to the State and Regional level, pockets of extreme vulnerability are not taken into account and statistics tend to disguise the extent of impoverishment.

The capacity of TBBC and CBO partners to design and conduct surveys can also be improved. For example, nuances in the questionnaire may have been lost in translation or during the training of field staff. During data collection, the target sample sizes were not reached in Yebyu and Monghsat due to time and security constraints respectively. Some children aged between 6 and 59 months did not accompany the household respondent at the point of survey, and so MUAC surveys were not comprehensively conducted. Similarly, households in Monghsat were only asked which food items had been eaten during the previous week and not the frequency and so food consumption assessments could not be analysed in comparison with other townships.

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*Since the DKBA started its activities in our area, skirmishes occur regularly. Whenever there are skirmishes, the Tatmadaw fire mortar shells into villages. Sometimes even though there is no fighting, the Tatmadaw will fire mortar shells into villages at night while we are asleep and we have to run into our bunker. Until now, we dare not sleep in our houses. As the night falls, we have to gather under our house and listen to the situation. When we hear the sound of artillery shells exploding, we rush into our bunker. It is hard for the children and elderly. A woman with a small child from our village was killed by a mortar shell fired by Tatmadaw. The shell exploded close to her house and the shrapnel hit her directly on the head. She died right away.*

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Karen female, Kawkareik Township, CIDKP interview, June 2011

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# Trends in South East Burma/Myanmar

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After the ceasefire collapsed,  
Tangyan, 2011, SHRF



## 2.1 PROTRACTED CONFLICT

The past year has witnessed both democratic reform and an increase in militarization and conflict in border areas. This has been due to both domestic interests in military control and regional investments in resource extraction. The Government's Border Guard Force (BGF) and militia-building policy has been justified by the Constitutional requirement that all armed groups must be under the command of the *Tatmadaw*. However, this attempted expansion of the *Tatmadaw* has been resisted by ethnic political opposition groups. Major economic deals have simultaneously been negotiated with Asian neighbours for mega-development projects in ethnic minority areas, but excluded consultation with local communities about the social and environmental impacts.

The main threats to human security in South East Burma are related to militarization. The *Tatmadaw's* deployment of troops into eastern Burma has approximately doubled during the past twenty years. Counter-insurgency operations continue to target the civilian population in a widespread and systematic manner. Direct threats to safety and security associated with militarisation include indiscriminate artillery attacks and landmines. Indirect threats to livelihoods, such as forced labour, restrictions on movements and extortion, are more widespread impacts of militarisation due to the *Tatmadaw's* so-called "self-reliance" policy for frontline troops.<sup>8</sup>

A series of ceasefire agreements in the 1990s did not lead to any political settlements for the ethnic minorities. Similarly, 15 years of participation in the National Convention did not lead to a federal system of governance being enshrined in the 2008 Constitution. However, life imprisonment of senior Shan political party leaders for alleged sedition in 2005 signaled a new era of repression. Political aspirations amongst the ceasefire groups were further marginalized when they were ordered to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or militia units under *Tatmadaw* command. A political party affiliated with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of the largest ceasefire groups resisting the BGF transformation order, was then rejected from registering for the 2010 elections.<sup>9</sup>

As a result, there has been a resurgence of armed hostilities in Karen, Shan and Kachin states during the post-election period. This is in addition to the residual low-intensity conflict between the *Tatmadaw* and various armed opposition groups which has been ongoing for decades. As has been noted by the International Crisis Group, systematic abuses against civilians continue with impunity and the "brutal tactics and behavior of the *Tatmadaw* in these areas are mostly unchanged."<sup>10</sup>

Map 2 illustrates militarization and contested areas where ethnic opposition forces continue to exert influence, even though they no longer control fixed territory. Corresponding documentation for the *Tatmadaw's* chain of command is recorded in Appendix 3. According to the Government spokesman, 20 out of the 25 armed groups previously with ceasefire agreements have at least partially transformed into BGF or militia units while armed groups in Kachin State (KIO), Mon State (NMSP), Shan State (UWSA and NDAA/Mongla) and Karen State (KNU-Peace Council) have officially protested.<sup>11</sup> In addition, significant elements of armed groups in Karen State (DKBA) and Shan State (SSA-N) have broken away from newly established BGF and militia forces while protracted armed resistance continues in Karen State (KNU), Shan State (SSA-S) and Kayah State (KNPP).

Amongst the armed groups who refused the transformation, the KIO, SSA-N and DKBA have resumed armed resistance against the *Tatmadaw*. However, there has not been a resumption of fighting in former ceasefire areas administered by NMSP and the KNU/KNLA-Peace Council and after months of tension the UWSA and NDAA/Mongla managed to negotiate a new temporary ceasefire agreement with the *Tatmadaw* early in September 2011.


<sup>8</sup> TBBC, 2009, Protracted Displacement and Militarisation in Eastern Burma, pp30-35, [www.tbcc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps](http://www.tbcc.org/resources/resources.htm#idps) (accessed 1/10/11)

<sup>9</sup> Transnational Institute, June 2011, "Conflict or Peace: Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma", Burma Policy Briefing #7 <http://www.tni.org/briefing/conflict-or-peace-ethnic-unrest-intensifies-burma> (accessed 04/10/11)

<sup>10</sup> International Crisis Group, 22 September 2011, "Myanmar: Major Reform Underway", Asia Briefing #127, page 6 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/B127-myanmar-major-reform-underway.aspx> (accessed 04/10/11)

<sup>11</sup> Kyaw Hsan, Minister of Information, 12 August 2011, "Press briefing on the Government's Efforts to transform national armed groups in accordance with the State Constitution after the adoption of the Constitution", Naypidaw

**Map 2 : Militarisation and Contested Areas in South East Burma/Myanmar**



In South East Burma, the combined strength of UWSA and NDAA/Mongla is estimated to be around 31,000 troops while the joint force of other armed groups opposing the Tatmadaw is approximately 18,000 active personnel. The *Tatmadaw's* current strength in border areas has been estimated at around 70,000 troops plus an estimated 10,000 BGF and militia personnel.<sup>12</sup> The *Tatmadaw's* advantages extend beyond troop numbers to logistical coordination across large geographic areas and new weapons systems, primarily from China. The armed ethnic opposition groups do not appear capable of a military victory over the *Tatmadaw*, but have proven capacities to withstand offensives and consistently call for political problems to be solved through political means.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, conflict resolution is a matter of urgency and a number of models for peace processes have been proposed. The government has announced that non state armed groups should initially negotiate with their respective State or Regional Assemblies.<sup>14</sup> However, the armed ethnic groups are wary of being isolated by “divide and rule” tactics again and are proposing a nationwide ceasefire and peace negotiations between the Government and the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). Then, despite previously insisting that the BGF transformation was non-negotiable, the *Tatmadaw* renewed temporary ceasefire agreements with the UWSA and NDAA/Mongla on terms which are comparable to the previous status quo.<sup>15</sup> The implications of this about-turn on the BGF for other non state armed groups remain unclear, as is the significance of a standing committee on peace and stability recently formed by the Union Parliament's Upper House.

However, with the Government insisting on a series of negotiations based on the 2008 Constitution, and the UNFC holding firm to a national peace deal based on the Union spirit of Panglong, third party mediation may be key to breaking the stalemate. Ethnic groups have reiterated long-standing calls for the international community, including the United Nations, ASEAN and Burma's neighbours, to help facilitate a process of national reconciliation.<sup>16</sup>

## 2.2 RESOURCE CURSE AND DEVELOPMENT

It is likely more than coincidence that a resurgence of conflict in border areas has occurred just as plans for gas and oil extraction, hydro-electric dams, a deep sea port and trans-border economic zones in the ethnic States are gathering pace.<sup>17</sup> The situation in Burma seems a classic example of ‘resource curse’ in which the incentive of large revenues from natural resources in a poorly regulated context promotes cronyism and corruption while undermining good governance and poverty alleviation.<sup>18</sup>

Map 3 illustrates the main large scale investments planned for South East Burma, as well as some of the development projects which have been associated with human rights abuses during the past year. The experience of local communities with infrastructure development, resource extraction and commercial agriculture has generally been negligible in terms of poverty alleviation, but costly with regards to the influx of troops as security personnel. There is often “a combination of coercive measures, such as forced labour, extortion and land confiscation, which drive down incomes to the point that the household economies collapse and people have no choice but to leave their homes.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Jan Zawelski, June 2011, “Borderline Disorder: Low-intensity conflict prevails in Myanmar”, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Volume 23, Number 6, pages 28-34.

<sup>13</sup> For example, Office of the Supreme Headquarters, Karen National Union, 4 April 2011, “KNU Statement on New Military Government and Concerns of Ethnic Nationalities”, AND Ethnic Nationalities Conference, 13 June 2011, “Statement : The 6<sup>th</sup> Ethnic Nationalities Conference”

<sup>14</sup> Union Government Announcement 1/2011, (18 August 2011), published in the *New Light of Myanmar*, 19 August 2011,

<sup>15</sup> Shan Herald Agency for News, 09/10/11, “Wa, Mongla sign new ceasefire agreement”, [http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=4022:wa-mongla-sign-new-ceasefire-agreement&catid=85:politics&Itemid=266](http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4022:wa-mongla-sign-new-ceasefire-agreement&catid=85:politics&Itemid=266) (accessed 04/10/11)


<sup>16</sup> United Nationalities Federal Council, 8/10/11, Appeal of UNFC to the people and international community, [www.shanland.org/images/docs/unfc-statement.pdf](http://www.shanland.org/images/docs/unfc-statement.pdf) (accessed 10/10/11)

<sup>17</sup> National Geographic, August 2011, “Land of Shadows”, Vol. 220, No. 2, Washington DC, pp96-119

<sup>18</sup> Sean Turnell, 2009, “Burma's Economy 2009: Disaster, Recovery... and Reform?”

<sup>19</sup> Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 7 March 2008, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, A/HRC/7/18, para 75, [http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage\\_e.aspx?m=89](http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=89)

**Map 3 : Development Projects in South East Burma/Myanmar**



The formation of state governments and legislatures should enhance political representation and local participation in decision-making. However, preliminary agreements were already approved for most of these mega-development project proposals prior to changes in the governance structures, and the impacts will be significant. Local community organizations and ethnic media groups have provided extensive documentation on the progress of these infrastructure projects, as well as the social and environmental impacts for local communities.<sup>20</sup> The lack of accountability and transparency in the planning process has raised concerns that local communities will suffer a heavy burden of the costs but the benefits will largely be enjoyed by neighbouring countries and corrupt generals.<sup>21</sup>

International financial institutions can be both agents of reform and repression in fragile states such as Burma. As the World Bank has recognised in regards to conflict transformation, “strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence”.<sup>22</sup> The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has not provided bilateral loans to Government since the crackdown on peaceful protests in 1988. However, it is believed to have played a significant role in mobilising private sector investment for the TaHsang dam on the Salween River and the Asia Highway as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region economic cooperation programme.<sup>23</sup> Regional investment in agricultural businesses has been strongest in Tanintharyi Region, where contract farming and teak, palm, and rubber plantations have been established on confiscated land.

However, human development in South East Burma will require much more than the cessation of hostilities and investments in infrastructure. Widespread and systematic human rights abuses need to be stopped and prevented from reoccurring. As Aung San Suu Kyi and the United Nations Special Rapporteur have emphasised, independent investigations into these abuses and remedial procedures will be required to end impunity and promote truth, justice and accountability.<sup>24</sup> To facilitate the eventual, and much anticipated, voluntary repatriation of refugees from Thailand in safety and with dignity, at the very least informed consent and humanitarian access need to be negotiated, landmines demarcated and support for rehabilitation and reintegration secured.

## 2.3 FORCED DISPLACEMENT

TBBC’s partner agencies have documented the destruction, forced relocation or abandonment of more than 3,700 civilian settlements in South East Burma since 1996, including 105 villages and hiding sites between August 2010 and July 2011. Field reports from previous years have been independently verified by high resolution commercial satellite imagery.<sup>25</sup> The names and locations of villages displaced during the previous 12 months are documented in Appendix 2 and Map 4. All settlements displaced since 1996 are available in a geographic information system (GIS).

The destruction and forced displacement of civilian settlements has been a cornerstone of the Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency strategy for decades. This strategy has aimed to undermine the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies and finances by forcibly relocating villages away from contested areas into government controlled areas. Civilians who do not comply with the orders are considered sympathetic to the rebels, and subsequently targeted in contravention of international humanitarian law.

<sup>20</sup> For example, Shwe Gas Movement, September 2011, “Sold Out: Launch of China pipeline project unleashes abuse across Burma” <http://www.shwe.org/campaign-update/sold-out-new-report/> (accessed 04/10/11)  
Karenni Development Research Group, March 2011, “Stop the Dam Offensive against the Karenni”, [www.burmariversnetwork.org](http://www.burmariversnetwork.org) and [www.salweenwatch.org](http://www.salweenwatch.org)

<sup>21</sup> Transnational Institute, May 2011, “Burma’s New Government: Prospects for Governance and Peace in Ethnic States”, <http://www.tni.org/report/burmas-new-government-prospects-governance-and-peace-ethnic-states> (accessed 04/10/11)


<sup>22</sup> World Bank, 2011, “World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development”, Washington DC, page 2 <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext> (accessed 04/10/11)

<sup>23</sup> S. Bourne, April 2011, “The ADB in Burma: Behind the Scenes”, NGO Forum on ADB, <http://www.forum-adb.org/inner.php?sec=2&id=37> (accessed 04/10/11)

<sup>24</sup> Tomas Ojea Quintana, 23/05/11, “Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar”, Bangkok, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11046&LangID=E> (accessed 04/10/11)

<sup>25</sup> Science and Human Rights Program, 2007, *High Resolution Satellite Imagery of the Conflict of Burma*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC, <http://shr.aaas.org/geotech/burma/burma.shtml> (accessed 18/10/10)

**Map 4 : Displaced Villages in South East Burma/Myanmar (1996-2011)**



This year's survey estimates at least 112,000 people were forced to leave their homes in South East Burma between August 2010 and July 2011. Such a large scale of displacement is indicative of ongoing conflict and human rights abuses, and yet this is a conservative estimate as it only covers the rural areas of 50 townships. As the scope of the survey was restricted to South East Burma, the displacement estimates exclude up to 25,000 civilians in northern Burma who have been displaced by the resumption of conflict in Kachin State after the collapse of a 17 year ceasefire agreement.<sup>26</sup>

Recent rates of forced displacement in South East Burma have averaged around 75,000 people per year, but estimates for the past year are the highest in a decade. This reflects the increased instability that has been induced by the order for non-state armed groups formerly with ceasefire agreements to transform into Border Guard Force battalions under the Tatmadaw's command. Recent displacement is disaggregated to the township level and documented in Appendix 1.

Armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and three non state armed groups has induced high rates of displacement in central Karen State's border areas with Thailand, northern Shan State and the northern Karen State areas. A breakaway faction of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) resumed armed resistance in November 2010, and the resulting conflict led to the displacement of over 27,000 people from Myawaddy and surrounding townships. Over 31,000 people have fled from their homes since March 2011 after the Tatmadaw broke a 22 year ceasefire agreement and resumed military offensives against the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). A further 28,000 civilians have been displaced from northern Karen State and eastern Bago Region as a result of flooding related to the KyaukNaGa dam and the counter-insurgency operations against the Karen National Union (KNU).

At least 450,000 internally displaced persons are currently estimated to remain in rural areas of South East Burma, as documented in Appendix 1 and represented spatially in Map 5. These estimates have been based on field surveys conducted by TBBC's partners and cross-checked against trends reported by independent community agencies. This is not a cumulative figure of everyone who has been displaced in recent years. Displaced persons who have fled into Thailand, returned to former villages or resettled elsewhere in Burma have been excluded from the estimates. People who were already internally displaced and have been forced to migrate again during the previous year were not double counted. The distribution of internally displaced persons is represented in Map 5.

## 2.4 POVERTY AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Chronic vulnerability is widespread across Burma, with even government figures estimating that a quarter of the population live in poverty and are unable to cover their basic needs.<sup>27</sup> Decades of military rule were characterized by gross economic mismanagement, massive under-investment in social services and an environment where human rights are abused with impunity. These problems are exacerbated by protracted armed conflict and ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access in South East Burma.<sup>28</sup>


The poverty assessments conducted by TBBC and community-based organisations across 14 townships during the past two years suggest that almost two thirds of households in rural areas of South East Burma are unable to meet their basic needs. This estimate is derived from the average of findings for five key indicators of the standard of living and well-being. These indicators are access to safe drinking water, improved sanitation, adequate shelter, food security and indebtedness. As documented in Table 1 and Map 6, impoverishment is particularly severe in the conflict-affected areas of Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin Townships in Bago Region and Thandaung Township in Kayin State.

<sup>26</sup> Kachin Womens Association of Thailand, October 2011, "Burma's covered up war: Atrocities against the Kachin People" [www.kachinwomen.com](http://www.kachinwomen.com)

<sup>27</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *Op. Cit.*, pages 12-13,

<sup>28</sup> Charles Petrie, 2008, "End of Mission Report : UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative for Myanmar 2003-2007"

**Map 5 : Internal Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar, 2011**





**Table 1 : Household Poverty Indicators for South East Burma/Myanmar (2010-11)**

Township, State / Region	Lack access to safe drinking water	Lack access to improved sanitation	Lack access to adequate shelter	Inadequate food consumption	Debt induced by food shortages	Composite poverty indicator
Mongton, Shan (2010)	80%	8%	59%	13%	25%	37%
Monghsat, Shan (2011)	82%	10%	99%	n/a	48%	60%
Hpasawng, Kayah (2010)	100%	96%	97%	85%	20%	80%
Shadaw, Kayah (2011)	79%	21%	83%	62%	31%	55%
Thandaung, Kayin (2011)	99%	90%	73%	98%	65%	85%
Hpapun, Kayin (2010)	96%	88%	96%	67%	38%	77%
Kawkareik, Kayin (2011)	60%	37%	57%	33%	27%	43%
Kyain Seikgyi, Kayin (2011)	84%	34%	55%	46%	24%	49%
Kyaukgyi, Bago (2010)	51%	99%	99%	99%	92%	88%
Shwegyin, Bago (2011)	98%	88%	99%	94%	56%	87%
Ye, Mon (2010)	83%	11%	81%	37%	32%	49%
Yebyu, Tanintharyi (2011)	65%	9%	72%	74%	52%	54%
Palaw, Tanintharyi (2010)	82%	88%	99%	57%	39%	73%
Tanintharyi, Tanintharyi (2011)	77%	3%	90%	33%	26%	46%
Average	81%	49%	83%	61%	41%	63%

After decades of neglect, the new government has raised hopes that poverty alleviation will become a political priority. President Thein Sein's economic reform policy statements in his inaugural address to the Union Parliament, the appointment of a respected economist as Presidential Advisor and poverty alleviation forums with a range of stakeholders have all been positive developments. The President's recognition of the need to "reduce the economic gap between the rich and the poor, and the development gap between urban and rural areas"<sup>29</sup> represents a significant departure from previous rhetoric. Similarly, the Chief Economic Advisor's calls for transparent and accountable governance to tackle widespread corruption, get rid of overvalued official exchange rates, promote agricultural credit and land reform, and protect the village commons are unprecedented.<sup>30</sup>


It remains to be seen how quickly and effectively the new government will be able to tackle poverty, but there has not yet been any relaxation of restrictions on humanitarian access into the conflict-affected areas of South East Burma. Sustained efforts by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has resulted in limited access to prisons, but not detainees, being granted by the authorities. However, restrictions imposed on ICRC in 2005 with regard to accessing conflict-affected areas remain in place and no tangible progress has been made. An official request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to open an operational base for field activities in the South East was also recently rejected.

In this context, the vast majority of foreign aid continues to be channelled into areas not affected by armed conflict such as the Irrawaddy/Ayeyarwady Delta, the Dry Zone and Rakhine State. While responding to demonstrated needs, such engagement is building trust with authorities and supporting advocacy for increased humanitarian space throughout the country. Until this confidence building process translates into access, cross-border aid will continue to be vital to ensure that the needs of civilians who are affected by conflict in the South East and cannot be reached from Yangon are not further marginalised.

<sup>29</sup> New Light of Myanmar, 31 March 2011, "President U Thein Sein delivers inaugural address to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw", Naypitaw, <http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-03-31.pdf> (accessed 21/9/11)

<sup>30</sup> U Myint, "Reducing Poverty in Myanmar: the Way Forward", Presented to the Workshop on Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation in Myanmar, 20-21 May 2011, Naypidaw, <http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/5314-poverty-in-burma-economist-u-myint.html> (accessed 21/9/11)

Map 6 : Poverty Incidence in South East Burma/Myanmar, 2010-11



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*It is nearly 30 years since I first fled from the Tatmadaw. In that time, they burned down my house nearly 20 times. Three of those houses were wooden and the rest were small bamboo huts. In 2000, the Tatmadaw troops shot and killed one of my sons and my daughter in-law. This year when we got information that troops were patrolling near our hiding site, I asked my other son to go and hide our rice paddy elsewhere. As he reached our farm, my son saw the Tatmadaw troops were approaching so he ran away. The troops fired at him but missed. They burned down my barn with all the paddy inside and a few days later they burned down all our houses, including a school and boarding house. ...*

*Some people fled to the Thailand border and some moved into relocation sites. For me, I will never go to Thailand or the border or a relocation site. As long as I have enough space in my turtle shell, I will continue living here.*

//

Karen male, Tanintharyi Township, CIDKP interview, July 2011

# Poverty Profile




### 3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE

The relationship between poverty and demography in South East Burma has been analysed by exploring the population structure, average household sizes and personal identity documentation. Findings indicate a significantly higher proportion of dependents and larger household sizes in South East Burma than government statistics suggest, and that almost half of the population cannot prove their citizenship status. All three of these characteristics reflect how demographic pressures increase vulnerability to poverty and restrict capacities to cope with, and recover from, livelihood shocks.

Demographic dependency refers to the social burden of caring for young children and the elderly. The demographic dependency ratio compares the number of household members less than 15 and over 59 years of age relative to those between the ages of 15 and 59, with a higher ratio thus representing a larger burden on the average household. Based on responses collected by TBBC’s partners in South East Burma over the past two years, Chart 5 compares the age structure for each state and region with the official data from the Government of Myanmar. The data collected by TBBC’s partners suggests that vulnerability due to demographic dependency in eastern Burma is on average 30% higher than government statistics imply, and 50% higher than the official nationwide average. In other words, it appears significantly more children and elderly are dependent on less working age adults in South East Burma than the government realizes.

**Chart 5 : Demographic Dependency in South East Burma/Myanmar<sup>31</sup>**



The demographic structure of the population surveyed in South East Burma during 2011 is disaggregated by age and sex to the township level in Table 2. Despite significant variance with government data, the findings are comparable to previous surveys conducted by TBBC, with 39% of the population aged under 15 years reflecting high birth rates.

While females constitute 51% of the overall population, this proportion increases to 52.4% in the 15-44 year age group before decreasing to 47.7% of the population aged over 45 years. This reflects how working age men are more likely to be conscripted into an armed force, become a casualty of war, or migrate in search of income to support their families. However, it also suggests women have a lower life expectancy due to the indirect causes of conflict such as malnutrition and the disruption of health care services.


<sup>31</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *Op. Cit.* pages 31-32,

**Table 2 : Demographic Structure in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

		Under 5	5-14	15-29	30-44	45-59	Over 60	Total	Sample
Monghsat	Male	13%	27%	20%	16%	18%	5%	100%	314
	Female	12%	28%	15%	22%	18%	5%	100%	339
Shadaw	Male	18%	29%	21%	14%	16%	2%	100%	607
	Female	18%	30%	21%	20%	11%	2%	100%	599
Thandaung	Male	5%	24%	30%	20%	13%	7%	100%	570
	Female	8%	29%	28%	17%	15%	2%	100%	589
Shwegyin	Male	13%	19%	22%	22%	19%	5%	100%	778
	Female	11%	18%	25%	23%	17%	6%	100%	750
Kawkareik	Male	15%	28%	18%	20%	12%	8%	100%	612
	Female	12%	28%	20%	19%	13%	9%	100%	663
Kyain Seikgyi	Male	13%	20%	26%	19%	16%	6%	100%	509
	Female	13%	24%	23%	22%	16%	3%	100%	561
Yebyu	Male	13%	25%	22%	17%	20%	3%	100%	346
	Female	13%	29%	30%	21%	7%	1%	100%	378
Tanintharyi	Male	20%	28%	23%	16%	11%	2%	100%	518
	Female	20%	22%	29%	15%	12%	2%	100%	546
Total	Male	14%	25%	23%	18%	15%	5%	100%	4,254
	Female	13%	25%	24%	20%	14%	4%	100%	4,425

Household size is another indicator which is commonly found to directly correspond with higher poverty levels. Government data suggests an average household size nationally of 5 members, with 6 persons in the average 'poor' household and an average of 4.7 persons in 'non-poor' households. Data collected by TBBC's partners during the past two years indicates an average household size in South East Burma of 6.2 members. These findings are disaggregated by State and Region and compared with official data in Chart 6. Household sizes between the two surveys are generally comparable, with the exception of a large discrepancy between the data for Eastern Bago Region. This reflects field reports from this area that families often merge into one household to decrease exposure to the imposition of forced labour and extortion orders which are levied on a household basis.


**Chart 6 : Average Household Size in South East Burma/Myanmar<sup>32</sup>**



National registration cards are essential for proof of identity and long distance travel within Burma for all adults. While the process for obtaining documentation of citizenship is relatively simple in theory, decades of conflict in South East Burma have resulted in almost half of the population not being able to verify their identity. Chart 7 indicates that discrimination against the Rohingyas in Northern Rakhine State is an even greater obstacle than protracted conflict to obtaining a national registration card.

<sup>32</sup> IHLCA, *op. cit.* page 29.

**Chart 7 : Access to Citizenship in South East Burma & Northern Rakhine State<sup>33</sup>**



Access to proof of citizenship appears to vary widely across South East Burma, as illustrated by Table 3. High rates of documentation were recorded in Shadaw and Yebyu, which is consistent with field reports that voter registration and the distribution of identity cards was particularly prevalent in these townships prior to the 2008 referendum. Extremely low levels were reported from Monghsat, Shwegyin and Kyain Seikgyi, which may reflect the reluctance to deal with authorities in the former and the significance of household registration documents as a substitute in the latter. There is also a significant gender dimension as 57% of men have a valid citizenship card, but only 49% of women. This is consistent with the stereotypical division of labour in which women take more responsibilities for domestic chores while men are expected to travel more to search for income.

**Table 3 : Identity Verification in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**


	Monghsat	Shadaw	Thandaung	Shwegyin	Kawkareik	Kyain Seikgyi	Yebyu	Tanintharyi	Overall
Citizenship card	6%	98%	75%	24%	45%	13%	87%	64%	53%
House registration	2%	98%	0%	0%	67%	45%	21%	36%	36%
Nothing	85%	1%	25%	63%	21%	42%	3%	28%	31%

## 3.2 WATER, SANITATION AND SHELTER

Household access to safe drinking water, improved sanitation and durable shelter are key determinants in regard to assessing the standard of living and well-being. This survey found that domestic living conditions in rural areas of South East Burma are similar to conditions in Northern Rakhine State and far worse than those those reported from the central Dry Zone. Only a fifth of households live under adequate shelter and have access to protected water sources, while almost half don't have access to a sanitary latrine.

Safe drinking water can be accessed from protected water sources, such as deep tube wells, stone-lined wells, rain-water tanks and fenced natural springs. While official data reports that 69% of households across Burma, including 65% in rural areas, have access to safe drinking water, this survey found just 19% of families in South East Burma access protected water sources. As illustrated in Chart 8, this represents a significantly higher vulnerability to water borne disease than has been recorded by independent household surveys in the Dry Zone and Northern Rakhine State.

**Chart 8 : Access to Safe Drinking Water in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>34</sup>**



<sup>33</sup> Citation of the internal survey from Northern Rakhine State withheld upon request.

<sup>34</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 63, and WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 22; and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.* page 27


Survey results for 2011 are disaggregated by township in Table 4 and suggest that there is virtually no access to protected water sources in the rural areas of Thandaung and Shwegyin and only limited access in the other townships. The extent to which households mitigate against water borne diseases by boiling water was not surveyed, but public health education about water treatment practices could be a relatively easy preliminary intervention. While the dependence on rivers, streams, unlined wells and unfenced springs is a concern, field reports suggest that the quality of drinking water accessed may be acceptable even if not protected. This is because villagers commonly utilize bamboo pipes to divert water from upland springs and streams which are relatively unpolluted.

**Table 4 : Access to Safe Drinking Water in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

Monghsat	Shadaw	Thandaung	Shwegyin	Kawkareik	Kyain Seikgyi	Yebyu	Tanintharyi
18%	21%	1%	2%	40%	16%	35%	23%

The risk of water borne disease is also exacerbated for households who do not have access to improved sanitation, which in this rural context refers to wet latrines and covered pit latrines (also referred to as fly-proof dry latrines). Chart 9 reflects how access to improved sanitation in South East Burma is comparable to the living conditions experienced in Northern Rakhine State, but significantly worse than the best available statistics from the Dry Zone and the national average.

**Chart 9 : Access to Improved Sanitation in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>35</sup>**



The 2011 data for South East Burma is disaggregated by township and the type of latrine used in Table 5. Access to improved sanitation appears most limited in Thandaung and Shwegyin, where only one in ten households reported regularly using a wet latrine and/or a covered pit. Given that access to safe drinking water is also most limited in these two townships, the risk of water borne disease seems particularly high. Both of these townships include remote mountainous territory which has been the backdrop to protracted armed conflict between the KNLA and the Burmese Army. As the counter-insurgency strategy directly targets civilian settlements in contested areas, it is not surprising that domestic living conditions are particularly poor. Easy access to upland forest areas and a lack of public health awareness are also likely to perpetuate unsanitary habits.

**Table 5 : Household Access to Latrines in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Wet latrine	Dry latrine / Covered pit	Uncovered pit	No latrine
Monghsat	14%	76%	8%	2%
Shadaw	27%	53%	0%	20%
Thandaung	4%	6%	1%	89%
Shwegyin	2%	10%	78%	10%
Kawkareik	55%	8%	5%	33%
Kyain Seikgyi	23%	43%	10%	24%
Yebyu	70%	21%	0%	9%
Tanintharyi	10%	87%	3%	1%
Total	25%	36%	14%	25%


<sup>35</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 66; and WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 20; and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 15.



As housing has such a fundamental role in providing shelter from the elements, the construction materials used for roofing and walls are a good proxy indicator of living standards. For the comparative purposes of this report, adequate roofing is distinguished by the main construction materials consisting of pieces of tin, zinc, corrugated galvanized iron and/or wooden tiles, whereas temporary roofing is characterized by the predominant use of grass or leaf thatch, bamboo and / or tarpaulins. While official figures suggest that 53% of households in Burma have adequate roofing, the surveys TBBC and partners have conducted in 14 townships of South East Burma over the past two years have found only 20% of households use durable roofing materials.

Chart 10 disaggregates these results by state and, although TBBC's figures cannot be considered representative of each State and Region, the differences in comparison to official statistics are striking. Such significant discrepancies are an indication of the lack of reliable data about household poverty levels throughout the country, and particularly in the South East. Insecure and displaced households are less likely to invest in more durable shelters, and are more likely to be excluded from the sample populations for government surveys.

**Chart 10 : Access to Adequate Roofing in South East Burma/Myanmar<sup>36</sup>**



The results from South East Burma for 2011 are disaggregated to the township level in Table 6 and additional information about access to durable walls is provided. There is widespread use of bamboo and grass or leafing thatch which is readily available, with access to more durable shelter materials especially limited in Monghsat and Shwegyin.

**Table 6 : Access to Adequate Shelter in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Durable Roofing (mainly tin, wooden tiles, or corrugated iron)	Durable walls (mainly wood, brick, or stone)
Monghsat	1%	2%
Shadaw	17%	17%
Thandaung	41%	14%
Shwegyin	0%	2%
Kawkareik	35%	51%
Kyain Seikgyi	29%	61%
Yebyu	17%	40%
Tanintharyi	11%	8%
Total	20%	25%


<sup>36</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 62.

### 3.3 EDUCATION AND MALNUTRITION STATUS OF CHILDREN

Healthy and educated children are not only positive human development outcomes in their own right, but also indicative of prospects for the next generation's capacities to cope with future shocks to livelihoods. This survey's assessment of primary school attendance rates found significantly lower retention rates than government statistics suggest. The findings related to acute malnutrition amongst children are less conclusive with almost one in five children categorised as thin or wasting, although the severity was less than previous surveys have indicated.

Official figures suggest that the average national enrolment rate for primary school aged children is 88%, with the rates in South East Burma ranging from 85% in Tanintharyi Region up to an incredible 96% in Kayah State.<sup>37</sup> However, these figures include children who have either dropped out or are not attending school regularly. Localized surveys have found primary school attendance rates of 58% in Northern Rakhine State<sup>38</sup> and 67% in the Dry Zone,<sup>39</sup> while this survey in South East Burma over the past two years found 64% of primary school aged children were attending school regularly. Findings from South East Burma in 2011 are disaggregated to the township level in Chart 11.

**Chart 11 : Primary school attendance rates in South East Burma**



In 2011, the highest rate of absenteeism recorded by this survey was in Monghsat, and Table 7 indicates that this was primarily because of the distance to the nearest school. While the lack of government schools in remote areas is a widespread problem, this finding is consistent with the relatively smaller number of schools supported through cross-border aid in southern Shan State compared to the Karen, Karenni and Mon areas. The high proportion of dropouts attributed to insecurity in Kawkareik probably reflects the recent outbreak of conflict since a local DKBA battalion broke away from the newly established Border Guard Force.

**Table 7 : Reasons for Primary School Dropouts in South East Burma (2011)**

	Fees & Costs	Required to Work	Illness	Access / Distance	Insecurity
Monghsat	15	12%	9%	54%	9%
Shadaw	41	33%	4%	4%	3%
Thandaung	52	35%	0%	2%	10%
Shwegyin	29	59%	3%	0%	3%
Kawkareik	16	4%	16%	0%	56%
Kyain Seikgyi	50	15%	10%	0%	0%
Yebyu	18	9%	36%	0%	18%
Tanintharyi	2	10%	57%	12%	0%
Total	27	23%	16%	13%	11%

<sup>37</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 92

<sup>38</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 26


<sup>39</sup> WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 29

Measuring acute malnutrition (or wasting) levels amongst children captures recent weight loss and is widely accepted as a proxy for monitoring the wider population's risk of morbidity and mortality. While measuring the weight-for-height status of children is the preferred indicator, a mid-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC) survey is an independent criterion for acute malnutrition and is one of the best predictors of mortality. Recently revised guidelines for MUAC tests recommend screening children aged between 6-59 months, with results categorised according to standard cut-off rates.<sup>40</sup>

Given the logistical difficulty of carrying measuring equipment across remote areas and a complex emergency, MUAC tests have been conducted as a rapid assessment mechanism in South East Burma. However, this survey was based on previous guidelines which recommended testing children aged between 12-59 months.<sup>41</sup> Another problem is that there is very limited comparative data available in relation to acute malnutrition rates in Burma. Most surveys have measured height-for-age status to assess chronic malnutrition (or stunting) which is associated with long term growth factors, or weight-for-age status as a composite indicator of chronic and acute malnutrition.

Chart 12 compares the results of three recent MUAC surveys of acute malnutrition in South East Burma. The findings from TBBC's surveys over the past two years suggest significantly lower levels of wasting amongst children than the findings from a more exhaustive household survey conducted by community health workers that was published in 2010. However, TBBC's partners did not screen all children within the sample population, partly because of design error related to age and partly because not all children were with the household respondent at the time and point of surveying. TBBC's data is thus likely to understate the actual prevalence of acute malnutrition amongst children. According to standard indicators for interpretation, the combined result of these independent surveys suggest that public health in South East Burma is in a "poor" and possibly "serious" state.

**Chart 12 : Acute Child Malnutrition in South East Burma/Myanmar<sup>42</sup>**



### 3.4 AGRICULTURAL LAND AND ASSETS

In rural economies, access to farming land and agricultural assets are key factors contributing towards food security and sustainable livelihoods. The results of this household survey suggest that only one third of households in South East Burma have access to sufficient land to meet subsistence levels of cultivation. Only one in six households have access to irrigated fields, which indicates the high dependence on shifting cultivation. Low levels of access to draught animals and farm machinery reflect the labour-intensive and subsistence nature of agricultural livelihoods in South East Burma.

By the government's own reckoning, 24% of agricultural households across Burma are landless<sup>43</sup> and this survey found a similar rate across South East Burma. Chart 10 illustrates that significantly higher rates of landlessness have been reported from Northern Rakhine State and the Dry Zone. However, the World Food Program has noted that access to at least two acres of farming land is required for farming

<sup>40</sup> The Sphere Project, 2011, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, page 221. [www.sphereproject.org](http://www.sphereproject.org) (accessed 16 September 2011)

<sup>41</sup> The Sphere Project, 2004, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, p183.

<sup>42</sup> BPHWT et al, 2010, Diagnosis Critical: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, <http://www.backpackteam.org/?p=730> (accessed 16 September 2011)

<sup>43</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 43.

households in Burma to cultivate enough rice for subsistence needs.<sup>44</sup> Only 35% of households in South East Burma meet this threshold, compared to 48% in the Dry Zone and just 18% in Northern Rakhine State. The regional differences reflect lower population density rates, less reliance on flatlands for wet paddy cultivation and the government’s limited capacity to regulate land use in South East Burma.

Low levels of access to farming land are exacerbated by limited access to irrigation which increases vulnerability to seasonal rains. Chart 13 indicates that access to irrigation is significantly higher in the Dry Zone than in South East Burma or Northern Rakhine State. Despite the lowest rates of irrigation, three quarters of households with agricultural land in Northern Rakhine State cultivate wet paddy fields to produce both rice and potato crops each year.<sup>45</sup> The rates of access to rain-fed cultivation on flatlands and double cropping are lower in South East Burma where shifting cultivation on hillsides is the more prevalent agricultural practice. Shifting cultivation is only sustainable if there is enough land to rotate cultivation over a 4-7 year period so that secondary vegetation can regenerate nutrients in the soil prior to the next round of ‘slash and burn’ to prepare fields again.

**Chart 13 : Access to Agricultural Land in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>46</sup>**




Table 8 disaggregates data related to access to agricultural land in South East Burma by township. While there were divergences between results for landlessness, over half of the households surveyed in all township were either landless or had access to less than two acres. The greatest access to land was recorded in Thandaung which is consistent with the prevalence of long term betel but, durian and cardamon orchards. However, the significance in terms of food security in Thandaung is mitigated because there is virtually no access to irrigation. Households in Shwegyin reported the greatest constraints to accessing agricultural land and irrigation, which reflects the insecurity of communities who are on the ‘frontline’ of conflict and hence subject to both government regulations as well as the Tatmadaw’s counter-insurgency measures.

**Table 8 : Access to Agricultural Land in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Landless	Access to less than 2 acres	Access to Irrigation
Monghsat	12%	55%	23%
Shadaw	8%	55%	34%
Thandaung	1%	48%	1%
Shwegyin	31%	64%	0%
Kawkareik	55%	10%	16%
Kyain Seikgyi	32%	52%	25%
Yebyu	39%	21%	26%
Tanintharyi	19%	32%	5%
Total	23%	42%	15%


<sup>44</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 7, and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 6.

<sup>45</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 11

<sup>46</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 21, and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 25.

Chart 14 compares findings from South East Burma over the past two years in regards to household access to productive assets with the results from a similar survey conducted in Northern Rakhine State. The lack of capital assets in both regions reflects a dependence on simple farming tools and manual labour to make ends meet. Access to farm machinery is significantly higher in Northern Rakhine State, while draught animals are more prominent in South East Burma.

**Chart 14 : Access to Productive Assets in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar (2010-11)<sup>47</sup>**



Apart from the widespread use of simple agricultural tools, Table 9 indicates a couple of anomalies when data is disaggregated to the township level. Access to draught animals and farm machinery was most significant in Kawkareik and Kyain Seikgyi, which is consistent with the distribution of lowland fields throughout these townships and the widespread forced procurement of mini-tractors in Kawkareik a few years ago. Handicraft tools, and specifically looms or backstraps for weaving, were common assets in Shwegyin but virtually nowhere else, which possibly reflects the cultural heritage of the Sgaw Karen.

**Table 9 : Access to Productive Assets in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Draught Animals	Farm Machinery	Farming tools	Handicraft Tools
Monghsat	7%	8%	90%	1%
Shadaw	4%	4%	74%	0%
Thandaung	1%	5%	99%	0%
Shwegyin	1%	1%	99%	48%
Kawkareik	26%	35%	99%	0%
Kyain Seikgyi	35%	2%	89%	0%
Yebyu	5%	5%	87%	0%
Tanintharyi	22%	3%	74%	0%
Total	17%	8%	92%	6%

### 3.5 HOUSEHOLD INCOME, EXPENDITURES AND DEBT

Indicators of cash income and expenditures have been supplemented with assessments of livestock assets and debts in order to summarise the vulnerability and resilience of household economies in South East Burma. A quarter of households reported having no cash income at all during the previous month while only one in six households have reliable sources of income. Around half of the monthly household expenditures are allocated towards food which is relatively low, but 65% of household debt was induced by food shortages which is relatively high. This suggests that subsistence livelihoods are not self-reliant, but that disposable income levels are too small to supplement food supplies.


Chart 15 compares the main sources of household income recorded in selected areas of Burma. Casual labour is the most important source of income reported in all three areas, which is consistent with national trends and suggests a high rate of vulnerability to seasonal employment.<sup>48</sup> There were also a significant

<sup>47</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 25.

<sup>48</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 37

proportion of households in Northern Rakhine State and South East Burma who reported reliance on collecting forest products such as firewood which is also an indicator of livelihood vulnerability. More reliable sources of income, such as agricultural crops and petty trade, were a main source of income for 59% of households in the Dry Zone, 40% of households in Northern Rakhine State and just 17% of households in South East Burma. While it appears that virtually all households in Northern Rakhine State and the Dry Zone earn at least some cash income, 24% of households South East Burma received none during the month prior to being surveyed.

**Chart 15 : Main Sources of Income in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>49</sup>**



2011 survey results are disaggregated by township in Table 10, and indicate that income generation opportunities are most limited in Thandaung. This is consistent with the escalation of restrictions on travel and trade between the lowland areas around Taungoo and the upland areas of Thandaung since 2006, but may also reflect the greater reliance on orchards which are generally harvested in July and August. In the townships most integrated into cash-based economies, there remained a high dependence on casual labour in Monghsat and Yebyu while collecting forest products was the main source of cash income in Shwegyin. The sale of livestock was significant in Tanintharyi and Shadaw, however it is unclear whether this is a sustainable source of income or a depletion of assets.

**Table 10 : Main Sources of Household Income in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**


	Casual labour	Collect forest products	Agricultural crops	Sale of livestock	Petty trade	No cash income in past month
Monghsat	65%	2%	21%	0%	4%	1%
Shadaw	51%	18%	1%	12%	6%	13%
Thandaung	4%	1%	5%	0%	4%	86%
Shwegyin	5%	80%	1%	2%	4%	0%
Kawkareik	33%	10%	14%	7%	14%	5%
Kyain Seikgyi	20%	4%	7%	4%	19%	43%
Yebyu	59%	0%	4%	4%	11%	1%
Tanintharyi	23%	10%	8%	18%	14%	22%
Total	30%	16%	7%	6%	10%	23%

Livestock assets are a common store of wealth in subsistence agrarian economies, and household ownership rates in South East Burma and Northern Rakhine State appear generally comparable, as presented in Chart 16. The main difference is that ownership of pigs is far less common in Northern Rakhine State, which is due to the larger Moslem population there. The substantial ownership of small animals in South East Burma is indicative of the cultural importance of breeding chickens and pigs to share as food at social events such as weddings and funerals.

Breeding poultry and pigs is common practice across all of the townships surveyed in eastern Burma, as reflected in Table 11. However, the negligible ownership of cattle in Shwegyin, Thandaung and Monghsat is consistent with high rates of displacement in these townships. In the face of displacement, cattle are often sold rather than relocated and the cost of purchasing replacements upon arrival at a new location is often prohibitive.

<sup>49</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 9; and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 11.

**Chart 16 : Livestock Assets in South East Burma/Myanmar and Northern Rakhine State<sup>50</sup>**




**Table 11 : Average Livestock Assets per Household in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Poultry	Cattle	Goats	Pigs
Monghsat	81%	6%	1%	68%
Shadaw	91%	46%	0%	68%
Thandaung	75%	1%	3%	48%
Shwegyin	92%	0%	8%	48%
Kawkareik	70%	44%	7%	32%
Kyain Seikgyi	89%	31%	7%	67%
Yebyu	93%	21%	0%	30%
Tanintharyi	87%	36%	22%	64%
Total	84%	24%	6%	53%

It has been typically assumed that the proportion of household expenditures on food decreases as poverty is alleviated. Official figures indicate that the average household in Burma allocates 68% of monthly expenditures towards food, but government data no longer supports the theory that there is a direct relationship between poverty and expenditures on food.<sup>51</sup> Independent surveys also challenge this assumption. As illustrated in Chart 17, the burden of food expenditure has been reported at less than the national average in both South East Burma and Northern Rakhine State although other indicators suggest these are amongst the most vulnerable and impoverished areas of Burma.

**Chart 17 : Household Expenditures in South East Burma & Northern Rakhine State<sup>52</sup>**



One explanation for this apparent discrepancy between theory and reality is that consumption expenditure analysis is not necessarily applicable to subsistence livelihoods which are based around barter exchange.

<sup>50</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 25.

<sup>51</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 18.

<sup>52</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 25.


This explanation is supported by the data for South East Burma when it is disaggregated to the township level, as represented in Table 12. The highest burden of food on expenditure was recorded in Yebyu and Shwegyin, which are also two of the townships most integrated into the national market economy. Similarly, low ratios of food expenditure in Kawkareik and Kyain Seikgyi may reflect increased restrictions on movement and reduced access to trade since the DKBA breakaway group resumed conflict against the Tatmadaw rather than lower levels of poverty.

**Table 12 : Average Household Expenditures for Previous Month in South East Burma (2011)**

	Food	Health care	Utilities	Shelter	Debt	Education
Monghsat	49%	10%	13%	11%	7%	1%
Shadaw	36%	15%	18%	17%	4%	9%
Thandaung	47%	13%	8%	3%	12%	5%
Shwegyin	66%	11%	9%	5%	1%	3%
Kawkareik	35%	20%	26%	0%	1%	6%
Kyain Seikgyi	33%	10%	12%	2%	6%	5%
Yebyu	72%	4%	5%	2%	5%	5%
Tanintharyi	33%	22%	11%	4%	4%	4%
Total	46%	13%	12%	6%	5%	5%

The phenomenon of indebtedness in South East Burma also suggests that the relative burden of food expenditure is not an appropriate indicator of poverty in South East Burma. Debt is not necessarily bad, and indeed access to credit can smooth consumption patterns during shocks to livelihoods and stimulate income generation to escape from poverty. However, the accumulation of debt to meet basic needs is not sustainable. As Chart 18 indicates, the proportion of households in debt across South East Burma is double the reported national average and the rates of indebtedness appear even higher in Northern Rakhine State and the Dry Zone.

**Chart 18 : Indebtedness in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>53</sup>**




The problem is that household debt in South East Burma is primarily fuelled by food shortages. Chart 19 reflects that 64% of households surveyed during the past two years reported that food was their main reason for borrowing. That is considerably higher than has been reported from elsewhere in Burma. Investments in agricultural inputs to increase productivity were significant in the Dry Zone, but not in South East Burma. This suggests that subsistence livelihoods in South East Burma are not meeting basic needs for a substantial proportion of households. Debt is primarily being accumulated to smooth consumption patterns and as a last resort to avoid the collapse of household economies.

Data about the prevalence and reasons for debt in South East Burma amongst households surveyed in 2011 are disaggregated to the township level in Tables 13 and 14 respectively. The highest prevalence of debt was recorded in Yebyu, although this was also the township that reported the highest rates of accessing credit for investment in agriculture and small business assets. From a food security perspective, the greater concern is in Thandaung and Shwegyin where over 60% of households surveyed reported accumulating debt in order to cope with food shortages. This is consistent with the cumulative effects of prolonged counter-insurgency operations targeting civilian populations as a means of undermining the armed opposition.

<sup>53</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 49; and WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 13; and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 18.



**Chart 19 : Reasons for Household Debt in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>54</sup>**



**Table 13 : Prevalence of Household Debt in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

Monghsat	Shadaw	Thandaung	Shwegyin	Kawkareik	Kyain Seikgyi	Yebyu	Tanintharyi
52%	54%	74%	65%	60%	49%	86%	55%

**Table 14 : Reasons for Household Debt in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Food	Health care	Agriculture / small business	Education
Monghsat	92%	3%	3%	0%
Shadaw	58%	18%	8%	11%
Thandaung	87%	7%	0%	6%
Shwegyin	86%	12%	0%	2%
Kawkareik	45%	24%	5%	4%
Kyain Seikgyi	50%	22%	19%	6%
Yebyu	61%	16%	21%	2%
Tanintharyi	48%	32%	4%	5%
Total	65%	17%	7%	5%

### 3.6 FOOD SECURITY

Food security encompasses a sufficient availability of food supplies; adequate food access through own production, market mechanisms or other sources; and appropriate utilization of food to meet nutritional requirements. In South East Burma, despite high levels of subsistence cultivation, access to food is poor. More than half of households will need to buy, borrow or barter for at least three months rice supply in order to avoid facing food shortages prior to the next harvest. Food consumption patterns indicate that only one out of three households have an adequately nutritious diet.

As indicated in Chart 20, own cultivation is the main source of rice in South East Burma, which is a positive indicator of subsistence productivity. In comparison, the high dependence on purchasing rice supplies in Northern Rakhine State reflects the significantly higher rates of landlessness and reliance on casual labour rather than agriculture. However the reliability of own cultivation as a source of rice is directly related to access to agricultural land. This survey found that two out of three households in South East Burma have access to less than two acres of agricultural land. According to WFP classifications for Burma,<sup>55</sup> that is equivalent to a poor level of food access for households whose main source of rice is from their own fields.

<sup>54</sup> IHLCA, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 49; and WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 13; WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 18.

<sup>55</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 6, and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 7.

**Chart 20 : Main Rice Sources in South East Burma and Northern Rakhine State<sup>56</sup>**




Table 15 disaggregates responses from South East Burma in 2011 to the township level, and indicates that the main exceptions to the general trend are in Yebyu, Kawkareik and Thandaung. In Yebyu and Kawkareik, most households buy their rice from markets and it has already been established that on average 72% and 35% of household expenditure is allocated to food respectively. WFP classifies the dominant dynamic in Yebyu as constituting a medium level of access to food, while most households in Kawkareik are categorised as having good access to food. In Thandaung, a classification for food access relating to the 40% of households who depend on borrowing to acquire rice cannot be determined without knowing whether they will be able to repay debts within two months.

**Table 15 : Main Household Sources of Rice in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Own rice crop	Purchased with Cash	Borrowed / bartering
Monghsat	45%	9%	38%
Shadaw	58%	29%	13%
Thandaung	28%	31%	40%
Shwegyin	61%	19%	19%
Kawkareik	26%	70%	2%
Kyain Seikgyi	68%	25%	5%
Yebyu	11%	83%	4%
Tanintharyi	61%	30%	5%
Total	46%	37%	15%

As this household survey was conducted during May and June, and the wet season rice crop is harvested around November, subsistence farmers required at least six months of rice stocks in order to be self-reliant until the harvest. As Table 16 indicates, only 8% of households surveyed reported a sufficient availability of rice supplies and 83% have less than 3 months of rice stocks on hand. This is not necessarily an obstacle to food security for the 37% of households who primarily purchase rice. However, it means that more than half of the households in eastern Burma are facing rice shortages for at least three months prior to the harvest, unless they can buy, borrow or barter for additional rice.

**Table 16 : Household Rice Stocks in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	None	1-30 days	1-3 months	4-6 months	Over 6 months
Monghsat	15%	64%	17%	3%	2%
Shadaw	2%	28%	45%	20%	6%
Thandaung	6%	62%	31%	1%	1%
Shwegyin	5%	73%	18%	0%	5%
Kawkareik	1%	34%	40%	23%	1%
Kyain Seikgyi	4%	26%	41%	10%	19%
Yebyu	5%	85%	10%	0%	0%
Tanintharyi	1%	32%	36%	6%	25%
Total	4%	48%	31%	9%	8%

<sup>56</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 6.


Food consumption analysis was conducted to assess the diversity, frequency and nutritional value of food consumed during the previous week, based on standard guidelines.<sup>57</sup> The scores for each household were categorized into groups using the same thresholds as in other parts of Burma. The average number of days that each food was consumed during the previous week is documented for each consumption group in Table 17. A poor diet in South East Burma is characterized by the consumption of rice every day, vegetables every other day and fruit twice a week. Households with a borderline diet consume vegetables and fruits more regularly, and sources of protein twice a week. Households with an acceptable diet are more diverse and consume protein 4 times a week.

**Table 17 : Mean Food Consumption Scores in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Rice	Cereals	Roots / tubers	Pulses	Vegetables	Fruits	Meat	Eggs	Fish	Dairy	Oil / fat	Sugar	Condiments
Poor	6.4	1.2	0.5	0.2	4.0	1.9	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.0	3.4	2.2	6.6
Borderline	6.9	1.9	2.1	0.9	5.9	2.7	1.0	1.0	1.4	0.6	2.5	2.4	6.8
Acceptable	7.0	2.5	2.1	1.9	6.1	3.8	1.3	1.9	2.7	2.5	3.3	3.4	6.9
Average (max. 7 days)	6.9	2.0	1.8	1.2	5.7	2.9	1.0	1.25	1.75	1.2	2.9	2.7	6.8

This survey has identified 38% of households as having acceptable food consumption, 49% with borderline but unacceptable food consumption and 13% with poor food consumption. These results are situated in a comparative context in Chart 21, which demonstrates that food consumption patterns in South East Burma are worse than those in the Dry Zone but slightly better than those reported from Northern Rakhine State.

**Chart 21 : Food Consumption Patterns in Selected Areas of Burma/Myanmar<sup>58</sup>**



The food consumption patterns recorded in 2011 are disaggregated by township in Table 18 and indicate that the utilization of food is most problematic in Thandaung and Shwegyin. This is consistent with the findings relating to access to agricultural land, remaining rice stocks and indebtedness due to food shortages in these townships. Kawkareik and Tanintharyi Townships recorded the best food consumption scores, which indicate relatively high rice stocks, low expenditures on food and low rates of debt caused by food shortages.

<sup>57</sup> WFP, 2008, Food Consumption Analysis : Calculation and the use of food consumption score in food security analysis, Technical Guidance Sheet, Rome.

<sup>58</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 5; and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 6.

**Table 18 : Food consumption patterns in South East Burma/Myanmar (2011)**

	Poor	Borderline, but inadequate	Acceptable
Monghsat	n/a	n/a	n/a
Shadaw	7%	55%	38%
Thandaung	38%	60%	2%
Shwegyin	40%	55%	6%
Kawkareik	5%	28%	67%
Kyain Seikgyi	15%	31%	54%
Yebyu	1%	73%	26%
Tanintharyi	3%	30%	67%
Total	16%	46%	38%

### 3.7 LIVELIHOOD SHOCKS AND COPING STRATEGIES

The severity of exposure to economic shocks, natural hazards and human rights abuses, as well as the capacity of households to cope with the impact of these shocks, directly affects the sustainability of food security. This survey found that coercive military patrols, forced labour and forced displacement each disrupted the livelihoods of at least one in ten households during the previous six months. These and other shocks contributed to food shortages for three out of four households during the previous month. Households primarily coped by buying cheaper and poorer quality food, buying food on credit, relying on family and friends and reducing consumption by eating rice soup.

The main shocks to livelihoods experienced by households in South East Burma during the six months prior to the survey are portrayed in Chart 22. Natural hazards such as floods, unseasonal rains and drought were the most prevalent shock but it is the frequency of human rights abuses which differentiates the situation from elsewhere in Burma. Whereas low wages and underemployment were the most prominent difficulties reported earlier this year from comparable surveys conducted elsewhere in Burma<sup>59</sup>, just 1% of the households in South East Burma identified this as one of their main problems. This highlights the extent to which ongoing armed conflict and the associated human rights abuses continue to exacerbate vulnerability and poverty in South East Burma.

**Chart 22 : Shocks to Livelihoods in South East Burma (2011)**




Table 19 disaggregates the main shocks in South East Burma by township, and illustrates variations in local conditions as well as interconnections between shocks. For example, unseasonal rains particularly disrupted shifting cultivators in the upland areas of Shadaw, Thandaung and Shwegyin. Military patrols and/or armed conflict appear especially prominent in the contested areas of Monghsat, Thandaung, Kawkareik and Tanintharyi but this may understate the impact of roving troops in Shwegyin where restrictions on movement were also significant. Forced displacement was also most significant in the townships where shocks induced by military operations were most prominent. On the other hand, economic shocks such as inflation and extortion were only highlighted as the main threats in Yebyu but not prioritized as concerns in townships where shocks induced by military operations were prominent.


<sup>59</sup> WFP, 2011, *op. cit.*, page 16, and WFP, 2011a, *op. cit.*, page 21.

**Table 19 : Shocks to Livelihoods in South East Burma (2011)**

	Monghsat	Shadaw	Thandaung	Shwegyin	Kawkareik	Kyain Seikgyi	Yebyu	Tanintharyi	Total
Restrictions on movement	0%	1%	34%	18%	1%	1%	3%	0%	8%
Extortion	3%	0%	0%	11%	0%	0%	51%	12%	8%
Armed conflict	10%	8%	0%	3%	33%	1%	5%	14%	9%
Forced displacement	50%	0%	7%	22%	20%	0%	5%	1%	11%
Pests / Rats	5%	22%	1%	35%	1%	11%	1%	27%	13%
Sickness	3%	33%	4%	11%	8%	10%	8%	30%	14%
Inflation	0%	18%	0%	3%	0%	34%	70%	2%	15%
Forced labour	24%	22%	28%	21%	0%	1%	25%	8%	15%
Military patrols	54%	13%	56%	3%	46%	2%	9%	38%	27%
Natural hazards	0%	68%	50%	46%	1%	39%	2%	17%	30%

The main mechanisms of coping with these shocks, as determined by TBBC's household surveys in South East Burma over the past two years, are represented in Chart 23. Over 70% of households reported using at least one of these coping mechanisms to deal with food shortages during the month prior to being surveyed in both years, which indicates a high and protracted level of stress on livelihoods. Buying cheaper food and taking out loans were reported as the most common coping mechanisms in both years. The importance of social capital for withstanding shocks to livelihoods is highlighted by the proportion of households who rely on family and friends. 15% of households reported reverting to extreme coping strategies such as skipping entire days without eating and reducing daily food consumption by eating rice soup.

**Chart 23 : Coping Mechanisms for Food Shortages in South East Burma/Myanmar (2010-11)**



Kyain Seikgyi, Tanintharyi and Kawkareik recorded the least food shortages during the previous month, as documented in Table 20, and not surprisingly these were also the three townships with the best food consumption scores. Conversely, over half of the households in Shwegyin had reduced their daily food intake by eating rice soup and two out of three households in Thandaung had accumulated debt in response to food shortages. These responses are consistent with the findings about poor food consumption patterns in Shwegyin and Thandaung.

**Table 20 : Coping Mechanisms for Food Shortages in South East Burma**

	Monghsat	Shadaw	Thandaung	Shwegyin	Kawkareik	Kyain Seikgyi	Yebyu	Tanintharyi	Total
No shortage in past month	0%	3%	25%	2%	61%	50%	3%	56%	27%
Skip entire days without eating	2%	1%	0%	3%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Sold assets	1%	20%	0%	0%	0%	3%	5%	17%	6%
Reduce consumption	6%	4%	0%	54%	0%	1%	1%	6%	9%
Rely on family & friends	3%	26%	0%	1%	12%	37%	3%	13%	12%
Buy food on credit	20%	49%	65%	0%	19%	8%	48%	22%	29%
Buy cheaper, poor quality food	50%	40%	9%	92%	28%	63%	66%	10%	43%

# South East Burma/Myanmar Situation Update



Hiding in the forest, Kehsi, 2011, SHRF

## 4.1 SHAN STATE <sup>60</sup>

*“Even though we have some civilian representatives for Shan State in parliament, they cannot do much for us. The Tatmadaw soldiers have not stopped their oppression of villagers in remote areas. Sometimes they confiscate our trolley (mini-tractor) for their patrols or for transporting their rations. They don’t ask permission and they don’t return unless we follow them and reclaim our property.”*

Shan male civilian, Mongnai Township, SRDC interview, June 2011

Many people are pleased to have civilian representatives from Shan State in parliament to challenge the regime. However, without the protection of political freedoms, the parliamentarians cannot effectively represent the people. The *Tatmadaw’s* operations against armed opposition groups have increased and continue to target ordinary villagers. So far, none of the political parties have been able to persuade the military to stop the attacks against civilians.

Despite twenty two years of a ceasefire agreement, the Tatmdaw resumed military offensives against the Shan State Army-North in March after most of the SSA-N refused to transform into a Border Guard Force. While in pursuit of the armed resistance, the Burmese Army patrols have committed numerous atrocities against civilians across nine townships in central Shan State including indiscriminate artillery attacks, summary executions, gang rape, and torture. Over 31,000 villagers have subsequently fled from home, with the majority hiding in nearby forests but some leaving for the Wa-controlled areas along the China border and others heading for the Thailand border.<sup>61</sup> New arrivals in Thailand have verified the reports of violence and abuse.

The Tatmadaw has also increased its deployment of troops closer to the Thailand border and is building new command centers in Kunhing, Namzarng and Mong Ton Townships. This suggests that preparations are under way for intensifying attacks against the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S). This has already resulted in land confiscation in Namhsan and Kunhing, as well as forced relocations in Mong Ton Township in order to sustain the deployment of additional troops.

Rather than forming into Border Guard Forces, some of the smaller Lahu, Shan and Akha armed groups have transformed into ethnic militia units. These essentially remain proxy forces of the Tatmadaw, and the lack of accountability to local communities has resulted in the committal of widespread human rights abuses. The imposition of forced labour by militia forces has been particularly harsh along the road between Mongkaung/ Mong Kung, Laikha and Namhsan/ Namzarng.


There was also a major earthquake which measured 6.8 on the Richter scale on March 24 near Tachilek in eastern Shan State. At least 74 people were killed over 18,000 others were affected across 90 villages. Shifts in the underground water table polluted wells and natural springs, causing a lack of access to clean drinking water sources. There was also significant damage to infrastructure and shelter. Local communities shouldered much of the burden for providing assistance.

In this climate of instability, over 52,000 people are estimated to have been forced from their homes during the past twelve months. While some previously displaced persons have fled to Thailand or resettled elsewhere in Shan State, over 145,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are estimated to remain in the southern and central Shan State regions.

<sup>60</sup> Compiled by the Shan Relief and Development Committee

<sup>61</sup> Shan Women’s Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation, 10 August 2011, “Press Release : Over 30,000 displaced by Burma Army attacks face humanitarian crisis in northern Shan State”, [www.shanwomen.org](http://www.shanwomen.org) and [www.shanhumanrights.org](http://www.shanhumanrights.org)

Map 7 : Southern and Central Shan State





## 4.2 KAYAH / KARENNI STATE <sup>62</sup>

*“Our livelihood depends on going all the way back from Shadaw to our former village to grow rice and vegetables. But we are only given permission to travel for a limited period of time, so we are constantly worried about not making it back on time. If we return late and are only fined, it’s a relief. But when we are interrogated, unless we can give a smart answer, the chances are that we will be beaten up. A leaf will tear regardless of whether it is cut by a thorn or falls on top of one. Our life is just like that leaf.”*

Karenni female civilian, Shadaw Township, KSWDC interview, June 2011.

Despite being small in size and population, and having a relatively weak armed opposition movement, the Tatmadaw deploys fifteen battalions across Karenni State. Ten battalions are commanded from Loikaw, while another five battalions have been deployed from neighbouring Pekhon. These troops were reinforced in 2010 by the transformation of the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) into two Border Guard Force battalions in Bawlakhe and Mese / Mehset Townships. Although rumours of discontent amongst rank and file members of the BGF and smaller militia forces continue, there have not been any significant defections. Armed opposition from the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) is most active in Shadaw, Hpasawng / Pasaung and Hpruso Townships.

Land confiscation continues under the guise of the Burmese Army’s so-called “self-reliance” policy, in which troops need to supplement their rations with local produce. In May 2011, Hpruso Township authorities confiscated 2,700 acres of agricultural land from nine villages in order to support the construction of a new military training center. The landowners petitioned the new Kayah State Chief Minister that compensation of 50,000 kyat (US\$60) each was insufficient for the loss of ancestral lands, but have not received a response.

There has been no indication that the imposition of forced labour is decreasing, and the abuse of civilians to transport military rations remains widespread. In Shadaw Township, village leaders are routinely ordered to provide porters to carry the rations to remote outposts for 7-10 days a month, at the expense of their own livelihoods.


Villages also continue to be forcibly evicted out of contested areas and relocated into areas under the government’s control as part of the counter-insurgency operations. Four villages were ordered by the LIB 428 in April to move away from a mountainous area in Hpruso Township where skirmishes had often taken place in the past, and to relocate along the main road. Despite promises of electricity and improved water supply, the villagers did not want to move away from their existing sources of livelihood and closer to Tatmadaw patrols.

In 2010, the state-owned Datang Corporation of China signed a memorandum of understanding with the national government to build three hydro-electric dams in Karenni State, with the largest site at YwaHtit on the Salween River and supplementary dams on the Pawn and Thabet tributaries. The imposition of forced labour has already been reported to clear forests surrounding the Pawn River site and provide security around YwaHtit. Landmines killing livestock on the perimeter of the Thabet River site have also been documented in 2011. These reflect concerns about the dams fuelling conflict, lacking transparency, and not accounting for broader environmental and social impacts.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Compiled by the Karenni Social Welfare and Development Committee

<sup>63</sup> Karenni Development Research Group, March 2011, “Stop the dam offensive against the Karenni”, [www.burmariversnetwork.org](http://www.burmariversnetwork.org) and [www.salweenwatch.org](http://www.salweenwatch.org)

Map 8 : Karenni / Kayah State



### 4.3 NORTHERN KAYIN / KAREN AREAS <sup>64</sup>

“Due to the dam, all of my orchards and agricultural fields have been flooded. I have no land to work on now so I have to forage for forest products day by day to earn my living. In addition the Tatmadaw always force us to work for them and demand money from us. So we are in debt now, and it is very hard to repay the loan. We are only just surviving by eating rice soup.”

Karen male, Shwegyin Township, CIDKP interview, June 2011

The mountainous areas of northern Karen State and eastern Pegu/ Bago Region have long been characterised by armed conflict and remain beyond the control of the Burmese Army in 2011. Most of the population in the upland areas do not expose themselves to the *Tatmadaw*. They have been displaced for years and dare not return to their original villages, but rather have formed new communities which move between temporary shelters. The location of temporary settlements depends primarily on the security situation and the availability of land for cultivation. While the scale of the Tatmadaw's military offensive decreased during the past year, the threat of artillery attacks targeting upland Karen communities is ongoing. Meanwhile, human rights abuses escalated in the low land areas where villagers deal with the Burmese authorities on a daily basis.

Whenever Burmese troops launched patrols, the villagers retreated from their fields and hide in the forests. Once the patrols have passed, the villagers try to come back to their homes and tend to their fields if possible. Military patrols in late 2010 reduced access to fields during the main rice harvest last year while patrols at the beginning of 2011 and the onset of an early wet season have limited capacities to cut and burn fields for this year's crop. Even if settlements have not been destroyed, the threat of landmine pollution is always present after troops have passed. Six more hiding sites were burnt in Hpapun Township by LIB #209 in January, and 13 others were abandoned as a result of ongoing harassment.


The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) has generally not had a strong presence in northern Karen areas, with the exception of southern Hpapun Township. After the first DKBA battalion revolted against the Tatmadaw's orders to convert into a Border Guard Force in November 2010, villagers as far north as the confluence of the Moei and Salween Rivers were displaced by fears of conflict. The defection of three more battalion commanders based near the former DKBA headquarters at MyaingKyingu has induced further instability since June 2011.

As the majority of the Tatmadaw's troops are based in low land areas, the surrounding communities are generally subjected to human rights abuses more regularly than those in upland areas. Extortion is a common threat and forced labour has been especially harsh in Kyaukkyi Township during the construction of Hgo Poe military camp during the past year. Restrictions on movement and trade between lowland and upland communities continue to be central to counter-insurgency operations in northern Karen State and eastern Bago Region.

Land confiscation and forced labour are widely associated with government-sponsored resource extraction projects, with the KyaukN'Gar dam on the Shwegyin River being the latest example. Approximately 10,000 people have been displaced by the KyaukN'Gar dam since 2010 because their village, fruit plantations or agricultural fields have been flooded by the reservoir. A new dam on the Kyaukkyi River is also being built, and the local Tatmadaw commanders have ordered villagers to carry construction materials from Kyaukkyi town without compensation for their labour.

<sup>64</sup> Compiled by the Karen Office of Relief and Development and the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People

Map 9 : Northern Karen State and Eastern Pegu Region



	Tatmadaw Regional Command		International Boundary	<b>Development Projects Associated with Human Rights Abuses</b>	
	Tatmadaw Battalion Headquarters		State/Region Boundary		Logging
	BGF/Militia Headquarters		River		Dam
	Tatmadaw Outpost		Roads		Mine
	BGF/Militia Outpost		Railroad		Road Construction
	Displaced Village, 2011		Protracted Armed Resistance (KNU, KNPP)		
	IDP Camp		Resumed Armed Resistance Area (DKBA)		
	Refugee Camp				

## 4.4 CENTRAL KAREN / KAYIN STATE <sup>65</sup>

*“The Tatmadaw always have activities in and around our village. Whenever they are attacked they come in and arrest villagers and force us to go with them to protect themselves from another ambush. Even though we don’t want to go or are afraid to go, we must go. They take everyone they see including men, women and children. They force us to go in front and in between them as cover so that if they are attacked all of us will die. When we were taken back to their camp, the children were all crying along the way. The KNLA saw the Tatmadaw troops but didn’t attack since there were also villagers, including women and children.*

Karen female, Kawkareik Township, CIDKP interview, June 2011.

After years of relative peace, armed conflict resumed on a large scale in the border areas of central Karen State in November 2010. Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) troops who refused to transform into Border Guard Force (BGF) battalions seized a police station and control of Myawaddy town on Election Day. 15,000 people fled across the border into neighbouring Mae Sot, Thailand, although the majority of them returned within a week after DKBA retreated. Armed conflict has escalated in the rural areas however, and subsequently displaced another 8,000 civilians into temporary shelters in Thailand while 4,000 others fled to hide in forests in Karen State.<sup>66</sup>

While the rebel DKBA battalion has a military alliance with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), there remain some differences in regards to political aspirations and perspectives on humanitarian obligations. Regardless, another three DKBA battalions near MyaingKyiNgon in northern Hlaingbwe Township deserted the BGF in June and are collaborating with the KNLA to fight back against the Tatmadaw.

Armed conflict has been widespread and regular in many parts of Kawkareik, Myawaddy, Kyain Seikkyi Townships during 2011. Indiscriminate heavy artillery shelling by the *Tatmadaw* has killed at least 5 civilians and injured many more, not to mention livestock and damages to property. Six entire villages accused of supporting KNLA and DKBA were forcibly relocated by Tatmadaw forces in Kawkareik Township, while seven villages were abandoned in Myawaddy Township as the result of the ongoing fighting.


As the conflict and attacks against civilians have intensified, the associated human rights abuses have become more prominent. Forced labour, arbitrary arrest and extortion are common, but the consequences are more threatening for villagers ordered to be landmine sweepers or human shields walking with the *Tatmadaw* soldiers. The ongoing conflict as well as restrictions on civilian movement imposed by the *Tatmadaw*, have undermined access to agricultural fields and capacities for an early recovery in the year ahead.

Unseasonal rains and natural disasters have also contributed to increased vulnerability in 2011. The wet season started months earlier than usual, which is fine for paddy farmers with irrigated fields, but means that upland farmers did not have time to cut and burn their hillside fields. In April, there was also a storm along the western Dawna Range in Kawkareik and Kyain Seikkyi which destroyed long term fruit and nut orchards. The combined result of conflict and natural disasters is that many villagers in central Karen State will face food shortages in the year ahead.

<sup>65</sup> Compiled by the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People

<sup>66</sup> See also Backpack Health Workers Team, 31 August 2011, “Situation Update : Conflict and Displacement in Burma’s border areas”, [www.backpackteam.org](http://www.backpackteam.org)

Map 10 : Central Karen / Kayin State



	Tatmadaw Regional Command		Refugee Camp	<b>Development Projects Associated with Human Rights Abuses</b>	
	Tatmadaw Light Infantry Division		International Boundary		Logging
	Tatmadaw Military OPS Command		State/Region Boundary		Dam
	Tatmadaw Battalion Headquarters		Roads		Mine
	BGF/Militia Headquarters		Railroads		
	Tatmadaw Outpost		Protracted Armed Resistance (KNU)		
	BGF/Militia		Resumed Armed Resistance (DKBA)		
	Displaced Village, 2011		Former Ceasefire (NMSP)		

## 4.5 SOUTHERN MON AREAS <sup>67</sup>

*"We are afraid of landmines, so we do not dare to go hunting in the forest or even walk to our fields for farming anymore. We stay at home in fear, worrying about when we will have to run again because there is regularly fighting near our village. Even when there's no fighting, the Tatmadaw are always ordering villagers to guide them along local paths."*

Mon male civilian, Kyain Seikgyi Township, MRDC interview, July 2011

Tensions in the Mon majority areas of southern Kyain Seikgyi, Ye and Yebyu Townships have increased after New Mon State Party (NMSP) rejected the transformation of its armed wing into a BGF in 2010. Although there was not an outbreak of fighting, communications broke down between NMSP and the Tatmadaw's Southeast Command. The DKBA's breakaway faction and the ongoing hit-and-run resistance of various small Mon splinter groups also contributed to instability.

The breakaway DKBA group occupied Three Pagoda Pass and resumed fighting against the Tatmadaw immediately after the November 2010 elections. 3,000 displaced persons, including daily migrant workers who could not go home and refugees, were provided temporary shelter and assistance in Thailand for a few days until the DKBA retreated. The refugees were pushed back as soon as fighting close to the border stopped, but conflict continued in the surrounding areas.

The deteriorating security situation has included bomb blasts targeting government infrastructure and private transport agencies that failed to pay extortion fees. The Burmese Army has responded by increasing troop deployments, artillery attacks against civilian settlements, setting up more checkpoints to restrict movements into government controlled areas, and restricting trade into NMSP or supposedly "rebel" influenced areas. For instance, the Tatmadaw's Ye River bridge checkpoint prohibited traders from transporting more than three sacks of rice per truck out of Ye and towards the former ceasefire areas.


In southern Ye and northern Yebyu Townships, some small Mon splinter groups continued their armed resistance against the Burmese authorities but also continued to commit human rights abuses against the local communities. The Tatmadaw troops responded with their standard counter-insurgency strategy of targeting civilians to uproot the rebel forces. Although the Mon State government has been formed, the parliamentarians cannot protect civilians from human rights violations. Land confiscation and forced labour, including the forced recruitment of civilian porters to carry military rations, remain widespread.

Land continued to be confiscated by both private companies and the Tatmadaw's self-reliance scheme. The Zekaba Company confiscated about 800 acres of land in Kyaikmayaw Township to build a cement factory and, even after a petition had been written to Naypidaw, the financial compensation offered to farmers was still less than market land prices. In Yebyu Township, the Navy also confiscated 1,000 acres from villagers on KyweThoNyima Island. The commander of Navy Unit 43 said they confiscated the lands to build a military training school and barracks, and that another 3,000 acres was still needed.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Compiled by the Mon Relief and Development Committee

<sup>68</sup> See also Human Rights Foundation of Monland, June-July 2011, "Burma's Navy Attacks Civilian Livelihoods", <http://rehmonnya.org/>

**Map 11 : Southern Mon and Karen States and Northern Tenasserim Region**





## 4.6 TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI REGION <sup>69</sup>

*“There are about 100 Tatmadaw troops from IB# 556 active in this area. Every year our villagers have to carry their supplies to the Thailand Burma border. We have to spend more than 10 days to just reach to their outpost at the border. Apart from carrying their rations, we have to take our own food as well. They do not provide anything to us. Whoever cannot go to carry their supplies is fined 40,000 kyat. We villagers here have to pay fees to the Tatmadaw troop regularly. Whenever and whatever they demand from us, we have to pay. If we cannot afford it, we still have to borrow from others and pay.*

Karen male, Tanintharyi Township, CIDKP interview, June 2011.

Although elections were in November 2010 and the Tenasserim Regional Assembly was convened in March 2011, plans for regional development have not yet been discussed. However, the *Tatmadaw's* Coastal Region Command's control remains decisive with three Military Operation Commands, Tactical Commands, Artillery battalions, Anti Aircraft battalions and Infantry battalions stretching across all the main towns and strategic locations. Militia units have also been formed to reinforce the *Tatmadaw's* control by forcing villagers to provide food and salaries.

Human rights violations committed primarily by the *Tatmadaw* remain widespread, especially in contested areas. Every dry season, villagers living along the lower Tenasserim River bank in Tenasserim Township and Mergui/ Myeik Township are forced to transport military supplies and ammunition to the Burma Army's outposts along the border with Thailand. Non-compliant villagers are fined, just as villagers continue to be extorted and have property and livestock confiscated by the military authorities regularly.

While there is a relatively low-level of armed conflict in the Region, skirmishes and attacks against civilians continue. A combined column of *Tatmadaw* troops from LIB 17, LIB 224, and LIB 594 entered Manoerone area in Bokpyin Township during January. 200 civilians hiding in the area fled as the troops approached, but their houses, a makeshift school and a boarding house were burnt down.


Land confiscation by companies granted agricultural concessions by the former military government remains rampant. These companies are mostly owned by high ranking and retired military officers or influential businessmen and are primarily rubber, teak and palm tree plantations in Tenasserim and Tavoy Townships. One 30 year concession was granted to a retired General for a teak plantation covering over 30,000 acres in the Ban Chaung area, east of Tavoy. The companies have not generally paid any compensation to customary landowners and have logged all timber in the areas before establishing the plantations.

In accordance with the agreement between the Thai and Burmese governments for the Tavoy/ Dawei Development Project, Ital-Thai Development Company started surveys and soil investigations for the road and rail link along the Tenasserim river to the border near Kanchanaburi. The company also began construction surveys for the Dawei Deep Sea Port and Industrial Estate project. More companies are now trying to negotiate logging, mining and agricultural cash crop investments in this area of ongoing low-intensity conflict. The KNU has protested against these infrastructure projects and disrupted road construction in Myitta sub-township during July 2011.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Compiled by the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People

<sup>70</sup> Karen News, 19 July 2011, “KNU Stops Tavoy Road Construction”, <http://karennews.org/2011/07/knu-stops-tavoy-road-construction.html/>

Map 12 : Tenasserim / Tanintharyi Region



	Tatmadaw Regional Command		Refugee Camp	<b>Development Projects Associated with Human Rights Abuses</b>	
	Tatmadaw Military OPS Command		International Boundary		Gas Drilling Site
	Tatmadaw Battalion Headquarters		State/Region Boundary		Agricultural Projects
	Tatmadaw Outpost		River		Proposed Deep Sea Port
	BGF/Militia Outposts		Roads		Gas Pipeline
	Displaced Village, 2011		Railroads		Road Construction
			Protracted Armed Resistance (KNU)		Proposed Railroad Extension

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*On February 12<sup>th</sup> this year the Tatmadaw Battalion 48 led by commander Myo Khaing Tun arrested my father in our garden. They took him away and two days later we heard that my father had been killed. My father was an ordinary villager but he was tortured and killed by the Tatmadaw for no reason. Since then, my mother, three sisters and brother have faced all sorts of difficulties. My younger brother and sisters stopped going school as we couldn't afford their school fees. I started carrying betel leaf and betel nut to sell in Thandaung town. I only earn a little bit, but it helps cover some basic needs and rice for my family. I have even saved a little for school fees. But my mother is the main one coping with the difficulties of getting enough food and raising her children.*

//

Karen female, Thandaung Township, KORD interview, May 2011

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# Appendices

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Post-election displacement at  
Three Pagodas Pass, 2010, TBBC



## APPENDIX 1 : INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION ESTIMATES (2011)

States, Regions and Townships	Population displaced in past 12 months	Total IDPs
<b>SHAN STATE</b>	<b>52,700</b>	<b>145,600</b>
Mawkmai	2,000	3,300
Mongkaung/Mong Kung	1,500	3,700
Laikha	2,000	17,000
Loilem / Loilen	1,000	1,900
Namzarng / Nansang	3,000	6,800
Kunhing	4,500	8,000
Monghsat	1,000	31,000
Mongton	1,500	30,000
Mongpan	1,500	4,000
Kehsi / Kyethi	11,700	14,900
Langkher / Langkho	1,200	2,000
Mongnai	1,800	3,000
MongHsu	4,300	4,300
MongYai	4,100	4,100
Hsipaw	5,100	5,100
Lashio	1,800	1,800
Namhkan	500	500
Namhsan	400	400
Kyawkme	500	500
Tangyan / Tanyan	3,300	3,300
<b>KARENNI STATE</b>	<b>1,300</b>	<b>35,100</b>
Shadaw	200	1,200
Loikaw	100	3,300
Demawso / Demoso	100	9,500
Pruso / Hpruso	800	5,900
Bawlakhe	0	2,000
Pasaung / Hpasawng	100	8,700
Mehset / Mese	0	4,500
<b>PEGU / BAGO REGION</b>	<b>19,300</b>	<b>44,900</b>
Taungoo	n/a	n/a
Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi	12,800	33,700
Shwegyin	6,500	11,200
<b>KAREN STATE</b>	<b>36,100</b>	<b>106,800</b>
Thandaung	800	16,000
Papun / Hpapun	7,400	41,000
Hlaingbwe	1,000	5,500
Myawaddy	22,000	6,000
Kawkareik	2,300	2,300
Kyain Seikgyi	2,600	36,000
<b>MON STATE</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>40,000</b>
Ye	600	40,000
<b>TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI REGION</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>77,600</b>
Yebyu	900	28,200
Tavoy / Dawei	500	7,600
Thayetchaung	0	4,000
Palaw	200	13,700
Mergui / Myeik	0	6,300
Tenasserim / Tanintharyi	200	14,400
Bokpyin	200	3,400
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>112,000</b>	<b>450,000</b>

## APPENDIX 2 : DESTROYED, RELOCATED OR ABANDONED VILLAGES (AUGUST 2010 – JULY 2011)

### SHAN STATE

#### Mongton Township

Wan Kaw Maw  
Wan Sup Ba  
Wan Loi Jaw  
Wan Wa

#### Namzarng Township

Pa Ngup  
Naung Kwai  
Loi Khaw  
Naung Hai

#### Kunhing Township

Na Loi  
Loi len  
Ho Na  
Nam Tawt  
Pang Pao  
Ho Hoh  
Mak Ow  
Mong Luem  
Mak Hong Kang

#### MongHsat Township

Wan Nan  
Wan Ho Khang  
Wan Kok Tai  
Wan Pang Khai  
Wan Na Khra

#### Mawkmai Township

Naung Kham Nua

### KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

#### Hpruso Township

DawThae/DawDu

DawSheeKhu

TarNawKlaw

### KAREN / KAYIN STATE

#### Hpapun Township

Kyo Lo  
Hi Poe Tha Khee  
Htee Gay Blay Khee  
Ban Boe  
Hto Ta Lay Kho  
Maw Lo  
Wall Kwai  
Mae Pa Bo Lo  
Ma Mu  
Tha Kot To Baw  
Tha Dah Der  
Tay Mu Der  
Ta Oh Der

Pla Law Tae  
Htee Moo Hta  
Ler Klah  
Tae Neh  
Haw La Hta  
Tae Bo Hta  
Htoo Pu Hta  
Paw Ku Nwe Khee  
Bler Gaw  
Yu Gaw Lo Der  
Ma Peh  
Paw Kho Khee  
Ka Neh Mu Der

#### Kawkareik Township

Lower Bo Teh  
Ye Kyaw Kyi  
Ta Mile Gone  
Kaw Ngweh  
Ta Nay Moo Hta  
Middle Bo Teh

#### HlaingbweTownship

Noeday  
Say Baw Klo  
Wah Bwe Tu  
Ler Pan Dan  
Ter Daw Kyo Boe  
Hgaw Htee Per  
Oo Moo Khi

#### Myawaddy Township

Plaw Hta  
Kwi Ta Eu  
Kwi Ta Hoe  
Pau Baw Hta  
T'Naw Hta  
Maw K'Nuh Kho  
Po Kler Khi  
Ka Nae Thay Poe Lay  
Sukali  
Bler Doh

### PEGU / BAGO REGION

#### Shwegyin Township

Htee Thoo Hta  
Doo Baw  
Ler Hta Kwee  
Ka Hsaw Wah Kwee  
Nya Mu Kwee  
Ta Nay Pah  
Su Mu Hta  
Ler Paw Thah  
Htee Hser Hta  
Aung Ta Ru

Wyai Myo  
Mae Aung Ger  
Htee Kay Hta  
Ler Per Yo  
Saw Law Hta  
Blaw Lo Klo  
Poh Loe  
Hgaw Hgar Loh  
Maw Thah Mee Ser  
Than Pa Day

#### Kyaukgyi Township

Kwih Lah  
Per Poe Khi  
Paw Ler Kho

### TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI REGION

#### Palaw Township

Pookatkee  
Awpukee  
Nawsayheikee

#### Tanintharyi Township

Laylawkate  
Hteeoemekeh  
Bakwakee  
Lahpaitkee

## APPENDIX 3 : TATMADAW COMMAND IN SOUTH EAST BURMA/MYANMAR (2011)

### REGIONAL COMMANDS

Triangle Area Command	-Kengtung / Keng Tong, Shan State	South East Command	-Moulmein / Mawlamyine, Mon State
Eastern Command	-Taunggyi, Shan State	Coastal Command	-Mergui, Tenasserim Region
Southern Command	-Taungoo, Pegu Region	North East Command	-Lashio, Shan State

### LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIDs)

LID - 11	-Rangoon, Rangoon / Yangon Region	LID - 55	-Kalaw, Shan State
LID - 22	-Pa-an / Hpa-an, Karen / Kayin State	LID - 77	-Pegu, Pegu / Bago Region
LID - 44	-Thaton, Mon State	LID - 99	-Meiktila, Mandalay Region

### REGIONAL & MILITARY OPERATIONAL COMMANDS (ROC or 'DaKaSa' and MOC or 'SaKaKha')

ROC	-Mongpyak, Shan State	MOC - 12	-Kawkareik, Karen / Kayin State
ROC	-Loikaw, Karenni / Kayah State	MOC - 13	-Bokpyin, Tenasserim / Tanintharyi Region
MOC - 2	-Kehsi / Kyehti, Shan State	MOC - 14	-Monghsat, Shan State
MOC - 6	-Pyinmana, Mandalay Region	MOC - 17	-Mongpan, Shan State
MOC - 7	-Pekon, Shan State	MOC - 19	-Ye, Mon State
MOC - 8	-Tavoy / Dawei, Tenasserim / Tanintharyi	MOC - 20	-Kauthaung, Tenasserim Region

### BATTALIONS BY STATES, REGIONS AND TOWNSHIPS

Infantry Battalion (IB); Light Infantry Battalion (LIB); Artillery Battalion (AB); Border Guard Force (BGF)

#### SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

<b>Mongnai</b>	<b>Langkher / Langkho</b>	<b>Mongton</b>	<b>Mawk Mai</b>
IB-248	IB-99	IB-65	IB-132
LIB-576	LIB-525	IB-133	<b>Nam Zarng / Nansang</b>
LIB-518	LIB-578	IB-277	IB-247
LIB-569	<b>Monghsat</b>	IB-225	IB-66
LIB-574	IB-49	LIB-519	AB-359
AB-336	IB-278	AB-386	LIB-516
	LIB-527	BGF-1007	<b>Hsihseng</b>
<b>Kunhing</b>	LIB-579	<b>Laikha</b>	LIB-423
IB-246	LIB-580	IB-64	LIB-424
IB-296	LIB-333	LIB-515	LIB-425
LIB-524		<b>Loilem / Loilen</b>	<b>Mongpyak</b>
AB-335	<b>Kehsi / Kyehti</b>	IB-9	IB-221
<b>Mongpan</b>	IB-132	IB-12	LIB-329
IB-294	IB-287	LIB-513	LIB-330
IB-295	IB-286		LIB-335
LIB-575	<b>Mong Kung / Mongkaung</b>	<b>Taunggyi</b>	LIB-570
LIB-332	LIB-514	IB-94	<b>Yatsauk</b>
LIB-520	<b>Pekon</b>	LIB-510	IB-292
LIB-517	LIB-336	<b>Panglong / Pinlaung</b>	LIB-508
LIB-598	LIB-421	IB-249	LIB-509
LIB-577	LIB-422	LIB-511	<b>Mongkhet</b>
<b>Kalaw</b>	<b>Mongyawng</b>	LIB-512	IB-227
IB-3	LIB-311	<b>Tachileik</b>	LIB-327
IB-7	LIB-334	LIB-331	LIB-328
LIB-18	LIB-573	LIB-359	<b>Kengtung</b>
LIB-112	LIB-553	LIB-526	IB-244
LIB-117	BGF-1008	LIB-529	IB-245
<b>Matman</b>	<b>Mong Ping</b>	BGF-1009	LIB-314
BGF-1010	IB-43		
	LIB-360		
	LIB-528		

#### KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

<b>Loikaw</b>	<b>Pruso / Hpruso</b>	<b>Bawlakhe</b>	<b>Deemawso / Demoso</b>
IB-54	LIB-428	LIB-337	IB-102
IB-72	LIB-531	LIB-429	LIB-427
IB-261	<b>Pasaung / Hpasawng</b>	LIB-430	<b>Maeset / Mese</b>
IB-250	IB-134	BGF-1005	BGF-1004
LIB-530	IB-135		
AB-360			

**BATTALIONS BY STATES, REGIONS AND TOWNSHIPS (continued)**

Infantry Battalion (IB); Light Infantry Battalion (LIB); Artillery Battalion (AB); Border Guard Force (BGF)

**KAREN / KAYIN STATE**

<b>Papun / Hpapun</b>	<b>Hlaingbwe</b>	<b>Kyain Seikgyi</b>	<b>Myawaddy</b>
LIB-19	IB-28	IB-32	IB-275
LIB-340	LIB-338	IB-283	LIB-355
LIB-341	LIB-339	IB-284	LIB-356
LIB-434	<b>Kawkareik</b>	LIB-202	LIB-357
<b>Thandaung</b>	IB-97	<b>Pa-an / Hpa-an</b>	LIB-547
IB-124	IB-230	LIB-201	BGF-1017
IB-603	IB-231	LIB-203	BGF-1019
<b>Hlaingbwe</b>	LIB-545	LIB-204	BGF-1018
BGF-1015	LIB-546	LIB-205	BGF-1020
BGF-1016	LIB-548	LIB-310	BGF-1022
	LIB-549		
	BGF-1021		

**PEGU / BAGO REGION (EAST)**

<b>Taungoo / Toungoo</b>	<b>Shwegyin</b>	<b>Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi</b>	<b>Phyu</b>
IB-26	IB-57	IB-60	IB-35
IB-39	LIB-350	LIB-599	<b>Pegu / Bago</b>
Tantabin	LIB-349	LIB-590	IB-30
IB-73	LIB-589	LIB-351	LIB-440

**MON STATE**

<b>Thaton</b>	<b>Kyaikhto</b>	<b>Ye</b>	<b>Thanbyuzayat</b>
IB-24	LIB-2	IB-31	IB-62
LIB-1	LIB-207	IB-61	LIB-209
LIB-9	LIB-208	IB-106	<b>Mudon</b>
LIB-118	<b>Moulmein / Mawlamyine</b>	LIB-583	LIB-210
LIB-206	IB-81	LIB-586	LIB-202
<b>Bilin</b>	LIB-102	LIB-587	
IB-2	LIB-104	LIB-343	
IB-8		LIB-591	
IB-96		LIB-299	
LIB-3		LIB-588	
		AB-316	

**TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI REGION**

<b>Yebyu</b>	<b>Palaw</b>	<b>Bokpyin</b>	<b>Kawthaung</b>
IB-273	IB-280	IB-224	IB-288
IB-282	IB-285	LIB-585	IB-262
LIB-410	AB-309	LIB-559	LIB-597
LIB-408	<b>Theyetchaung</b>	LIB-560	LIB-594
LIB-409	LIB-403	LIB-358	LIB-595
LIB-406	LIB-404	LIB-432	LIB-596
LIB-407	LIB-405	LIB-581	LIB-342
LIB-498	AB-201	LIB-593	LIB-431
AB-304	<b>Mergui / Myeik</b>	LIB-555	LIB-582
AB-307	IB-17	LIB-592	AB-303
<b>Launglon</b>	IB-103	LIB-584	AB-305
IB-104	IB-101	AB-308	<b>Tenasserim</b>
IB-267	IB-265	AB-501	LIB-556
<b>Tavoy / Dawei</b>	LIB-433		LIB-557
IB-25	AB-301		LIB-558
LIB-402	AB-401		LIB-561
LIB-401			AB-306
AB-302			



## APPENDIX 4 : 2011 SURVEY GUIDELINES

### INTERVIEWS ABOUT DISPLACEMENT AND CONFLICT

Township name (on maps of Burma) : .....

Background about key informants : .....

.....

1. How many villages have been completely destroyed, relocated or abandoned during the past 12 months? Where were these villages?
2. How many people have fled or been forced to leave their homes and moved elsewhere due to armed conflict, human rights abuses or natural disasters during the past 12 months?
3. How many people have been forced to leave their homes by armed conflict, natural disasters or human rights abuses; remain in Burma; and have not been able to return or resettle elsewhere in safety and with dignity?
4. Where are the locations of SPDC outposts and battalion headquarters?
5. Where are the locations of Border Guard Force outposts and battalion headquarters, and pro-government militia bases?
6. Where do armed opposition groups who formerly had had ceasefire agreements but have resisted transformation into a Border Guard Force claim authority over the population?
7. Where do armed opposition groups fighting against the national government claim authority over the population?
8. What type of, and where are, development projects which have caused human rights abuses during the past 12 months?
9. What type of human rights abuses have been committed in relation to each of these development projects in the past 12 months?

### HOUSEHOLD POVERTY SURVEY

Field staff's name & organisation : .....

State or Division : .....

Township : .....

Village : .....

*"Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_. I work for \_\_\_\_\_. My organization would like to learn more about how your household is surviving by asking you some questions. I do not need to know your name, and all of your specific responses will be kept confidential. You will not be paid for participating in this survey, and there are no promises that you will receive aid in the future. Please be completely honest with your answers. Are you willing to take some time to answer these questions today?"*

**1. Sex?**

1. Male  2. Female

**2. What is your religion?**

1. Animist  2. Buddhist  3. Christian  
 4. Moslem  5. None  6. Other

**(Mark one box only)**

**3. What is your ethnic group?**

1. Sgaw Karen  2. Pwo Karen  3. Kayah  
 4. Kayaw  5. Paku  6. Kayan  
 7. Shan  8. Palaung  9. Pa-O  
 10. Lahu  11. Mon  12. Burman  
 13. Other:.....

**(Mark one box only)**

**4. Please record the number of people currently living in your household according to age and sex.**

**(Insert number of people in all relevant boxes)**

Age	Male	Female
Under 5 years		
5 – 14 years		
15 - 29 years		
30 – 44 years		
45 – 59 years		
Over 60 years		

**5. How can you prove you are a citizen of Burma?**

1. Birth registration documents  2. Valid Burmese Identity card  
 3. Approval letter from local authorities  4. House registration documents  
 5. No proof  6. Other (specify) :.....

**(Mark all relevant boxes)**

**6. Has your household received cash or food aid from my organization during the past 12 months?**

1. Yes  2. No

7. What is the main source of water used by your household for drinking? (Mark one box only)
1. Protected water source (eg, deep tube wells, stone-lined wells, and fenced natural springs)
2. Unprotected water source (eg, surface water from rivers or ponds, and unlined wells)

8. What are the main construction materials currently used for your house's roofing? (Mark one box only)
1. Thatch / leaf / bamboo roofing       2. Tarpaulin roofing       3. wooden tiled roofing
4. Tin / Zinc / iron roofing       5. No roofing
6. Other (please specify) .....

9. What are the main construction materials currently used for your house's external walls? (Mark one box only)
1. Thatch / leaf walls       2. Bamboo walls       3. tarpaulin walls
4. rudimentary wood walls       5. brick or stone walls       6. No walls
7. Other (please specify) .....

10. What type of latrine does your household normally use? (Mark one box only)
1. Wet latrine       2. Covered pit, dry latrine       3. Uncovered pit, dry latrine
4. No latrine       5. Other (Specify) .....

11. Does your household include children between 5 years and 13 years old who do not regularly attend school? (Mark one box only)
1. Yes (*Go to Question 11a*)       2. No (*Go to Question 12*)

- 11(a). What is the main reason your child / children do not regularly attending school? (Mark one box only)
1. illness or handicap       2. cannot afford the cost
3. no teacher and no school available       4. security situation is not safe
5. child required to work       6. child not interested in school
7. other (please specify) .....

12. If children between 12 months and 5 years old are present, conduct a MUAC test and record the results.

	Child #1	Child #2	Child #3	Child #4
MUAC number				

13. What kind of agricultural land does your household use for cultivation? (Mark all relevant boxes)
1. No access to land for farming       2. small kitchen garden only
3. less than 2 acres, with no irrigation       4. less than 2 acres of irrigated land
5. between 2 and 5 acres, with no irrigation       6. between 2 and 5 acres of irrigated land
7. between 5 and 10 acres, with no irrigation       8. between 5 and 10 acres of irrigated land
9. over 10 acres, with no irrigation       10. over 10 acres of irrigated land

14. Does your household currently own any of these agricultural assets? (Mark all relevant boxes)
1. Machinery (tractors, mini-tractors etc)       2. Simple tools (machete, hoe, etc)
3. draught animals (cows, buffalos)       4. No agricultural assets
5. Other (Please specify).....

15. Does your household own any other assets to help earn income? (Mark all relevant boxes)
1. weaving loom / backstrap       2. boat with engine
3. boat without engine       4. car
5. Motorbike       6. No assets owned
7. Other (please specify) .....

16. How many animals does your family currently own? (indicate number in boxes)
1. buffalo or Ox       2. cow
3. horse or mule       4. pig
5. goat       6. chicken, duck, goose or other poultry
7. fish, prawn or crab farm       8. other (Please specify).....

17. Where has most of the rice your household has consumed during the past month come from? (Mark one box only)
1. own rice crop       2. purchased with cash
3. borrowed and need to repay       4. gift from family or friends
5. exchanged for labour       6. exchanged with other goods
7. aid from an organization       8. other (Please specify).....

18. What was your household's main source of cash income during the past month? (Mark one box only)
1. Daily wages (casual labour)       2. salary job
3. sale of agricultural crops       4. sale of small animals & livestock
5. petty trade / small retail store       6. fishing / hunting
7. collecting firewood or forest products       8. Aid or remittances
9. no cash income in past month       10. Other (please specify) .....

19. In the past month, approximately what proportion of your total expenditures has been on food and other basic needs?  
(Identify all expenditures, then use 10 stones to estimate proportions)

Expenditures	% expenses
No expenditures at all.	
Food	
Clothing & shelter	
Household goods (soap, kerosene, candles, etc)	
Health care / medicine	
Education	
Transport	
Farming / business investments	
Debt Repayment	
Other (specify)	
Total	100%

20. What have been the main difficulties or shocks to your livelihood during the past six months?  
(prioritise no more than two boxes)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. loss of employment / income                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. floods / heavy rains / drought / landslides |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. rats / pests damaged crops                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Military patrols                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. sickness / health care costs                | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. commodity price increases                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. restrictions on travel to fields or markets | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. limited availability of land                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. landmines                                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. Armed conflict                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. forced labour                              | <input type="checkbox"/> 12. Extortion or arbitrary taxation            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13. forced displacement                        | <input type="checkbox"/> 14. No shocks to livelihoods                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 15. Other (please specify) .....               |   |

21. During the past week, how many days have each of these types of food been eaten in your household?  
(Write the number of days each food was eaten)

Food item	# days eaten in past 7 days
Rice	
Other cereals (eg bread / maize / wheat noodles)	
Roots / tubers (eg potatoes)	
Pulses, beans, lentils, nuts, tofu	
Fish (excluding fish paste)	
Eggs	
Red meat (cow, goat, pig)	
Poultry (chicken, duck)	
Vegetable oil, fats	
Milk, cheese, yoghurt	
Vegetables (including leaves)	
Fruits	
Sweets, sugar	
Condiments (salt, chilli, fish paste)	
Other (describe) .....	

22. How long will your current rice stocks last? (Mark one box only)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. No rice stocks remaining                | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. less than 7 days    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. More than a week, but less than a month | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. one to three months |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. four to six months                      | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. over six months     |

23. Do you currently have an outstanding debt to repay? (Mark one box only)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Yes (Go to Question 23a) | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No (Go to Question 24) |
|--|--|

23a. What was the main reason for borrowing? (Mark one box only)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. food                                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. health care                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. education                            | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. social events / ceremonies     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. to invest in agriculture or business | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. to buy or rent land or housing |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. taxes or fines                       | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (please specify) .....   |

24. If your household has had food shortages during the past month, how has your household coped with food shortages?  
(Mark all relevant boxes)

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. No food shortages in past month    | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. buy cheaper, poor quality food          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. eat rice soup / reduce consumption | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. skip entire days without eating         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. support from friends and relatives | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. purchase food on credit and incur debts |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. sold assets                        | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. received aid from charities             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. migrated in search of income       | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. Other (please specify) .....           |

Thank you.

## APPENDIX 5 : ACRONYMS AND PLACE NAMES

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BGF	Border Guard Force
CIDKP	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
IB	Infantry Battalion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IHLCA	Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment
KIO	Kachin Independence Organisation
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU	Karen National Union
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KNU/KNLA-PC	KNU / KNLA Peace Council
KORD	Karen Office of Relief and Development
KSWDC	Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
LIB	Light Infantry Battalion
LID	Light Infantry Division
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
NDA	National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla)
NGO	non government organisation
NMSP	New Mon State Party
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNLO	PaO National Liberation Organisation
SHRF	Shan Human Rights Foundation
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSA-N	Shan State Army – North
SSPP	Shan State Progressive Party
SNPLO	Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation
SRDC	Shan Relief and Development Committee
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWSA	United Wa State Army
WFP	World Food Program

### **BURMA PLACE NAMES**

Irrawaddy Region  
 Karenni State  
 Karen State  
 Kyaukgyi  
 Moulmein  
 Mergui  
 Paan  
 Papun  
 Pasaung  
 Pegu Region  
 Salween River  
 Sittaung River  
 Tavoy  
 Tenasserim Region  
 Taungoo  
 Rangoon

### **MYANMAR PLACE NAMES**

Ayeyarwady Region  
 Kayah State  
 Kayin State  
 Kyaukgyi  
 Mawlamyine  
 Myeik  
 Hpa-an  
 Hpapun  
 Hpasawng  
 Bago Region  
 Thanlwin River  
 Sittoung River  
 Dawei  
 Tanintharyi Region  
 Toungoo  
 Yangon



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## Thailand Burma Border Consortium

*Working with displaced people of Burma*

**27 years**

### **Mission**

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self-reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.