Gunaleela and Others v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Others

The applicants held Sri Lankan passports. They arrived at Sydney airport having been refused entry into Fiji. They held reservations on an on-going flight to Kuala Lumpur. Instead of catching that flight they remained in the transit area and presented themselves at the passport examination line where they presented incoming passenger cards indicating that they were migrating to Australia. At the time of their arrival their passports did not contain visas for Australia. They subsequently indicated that they sought refugee asylum in Australia because they were Tamils. Refugee status in Australia was eventually refused.

Held:

(i)         Decisions that each of the applicants did not have the status of refugees within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees were not made under s 6A(1)(C) of the Migration Act. The applicants entered Australia without temporary entry permits. Accordingly they are deemed not to have entered Australia: s 36A(8) of the Act. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the decisions that the applicants did not have the status of refugees were made under s 6A(1)(C). They were decisions which lay within the discretion of the executive and were not decisions within the meaning of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

(ii)         Assuming that the applicants had the right to receive natural justice, it had not been shown that breaches of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of decisions not to recognise them as refugees.

(iii)        There was no substance in the argument that the applicants were denied natural justice because they were not afforded the opportunity to present material and submissions on the question whether the Department's Instruction No PC1330 in relation to Sri Lankan case management should be applied to their situations.

Osman-Lloyd v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (French J, 5 June 1987, unreported), followed.

(iv)        Decisions made pursuant to s 36A(4) of the Act to serve requirements under that sub-section on the airline which had carried the applicants to Australia in relation to each of the applicants, and to keep the applicants in custody Pursuant to the provisions of s 36A(3) were authorised by the Act.

(v)         A notice under s 36A(4), once served, does not create immediate obligations on the carrier. At any time within 48 hours after they were taken into custody, the authorised officer was empowered to give the appropriate notice in writing to the requiring it to remove the applicants from Australia at no charge to the commonwealth. The powers under s 36A are not limited to the swift "turn around" power.

(vi)        Even assuming the court had jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Minister that the applicants did not have the status of refugees, none of those decisions had been shown to have been an improper exercise of the power to make them either on the basis that the Minister took into account a number of irrelevant considerations when making them, or that the decisions were so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made them. The matters which are relevant to a consideration whether a person has the status of a refugee for the purposes of Art 1A fall within a very broad spectrum.

(vii)       It was not shown that the decision-maker failed to take into account the applicants' claims to refugee status and that this circumstance was relevant to the question whether they should be granted entry permits. The decision-maker took into account all the material before him and reached the conclusions that none of the applicants had satisfied him that they were refugees.

(viii)       The decisions to refuse to grant entry permits were reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act but were not shown to have involved breaches of the rules of natural justice. It is doubtful whether the decision-maker was required to afford them natural justice before deciding their applications for entry permits.

Kioa v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 159 CLR 550; 62 ALR 321, followed.

Applications

Four applications were made for orders of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).

Morling J. These are four applications for orders of review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the Judicial Review Act). The applicants, who are all citizens of Sri Lanka, seek orders quashing or setting aside decisions made in connection with their applications for entry permits so as to enable them to enter Australia. They also seek orders setting aside decisions which they claim to have been made by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (the Minister) under s 6A(1)(C) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) that they do not have the status of refugees as referred to in that section.

The applicants hold Sri Lankan passports. They arrived at Sydney airport on a Continental Airlines flight shortly before 11 am on 26 April 1987, having been refused entry into Fiji. They held reservations on an on-going flight to Kuala Lumpur departing at 12 noon on the same day. Instead of catching that flight they remained in the transit area and presented themselves at the passport examination line at about 3 pm. They presented incoming passenger cards indicating that they were migrating to Australia. At the time of their arrival their passports did not contain visas for Australia.

They subsequently indicated that they sought refugee asylum in Australia because they were Tamils. The second respondent, Mr Sant, who is a senior immigration inspector of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and an authorised officer for the purposes of ss 36A(3) and 6(2) of the Act, interpreted the applicants' request to mean that they sought refugee status in Australia, and proceeded on that basis. After discussing the matter with senior officers of the Department in Sydney and in Canberra he gave the applicants the opportunity to complete applications for refugee status. These applications appear to have been completed during the evening of 26 April. It was apparent to Mr Sant that the applications for refugee status would not be resolved that night. At about 11 pm he refused to grant entry permits to the applicants and gave directions pursuant to s 36A(3) of the Act that they be held in custody.

The applicants were interviewed at Villawood Detention Centre on 27 April. They had the assistance of a Tamil interpreter. They were informed that the purpose of the interview was to obtain from them information which would be placed before the Determination of Refugee Status Committee (the DORS Committee), which would consider all relevant facts and make a recommendation to the Minister. This committee is made up of representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Attorney-General and Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its function is to advise the Minister on applications for refugee status. The applicants were informed that they should provide the interviewing officer with all the details which they considered relevant to their applications.

Each of the applicants made lengthy statements in support of their applications. According to Premanaerthan Gunaleela's statement she was born near Jaffna. She is a Tamil. She claimed that since 1984 the army had regularly harassed persons in her village and arrested young people on suspicion of association with militant organisations. She said that her 15 year old son was arrested in 1984 but was released after a payment was made to some soldiers. In August 1986 she sent her son to Norway to be with one of her other sons. Her husband lives in Canada. During visits to her village by the army the villagers would run away and the army would destroy or take their possessions. She said that in late 1986 her house had been destroyed by a bombardment. Neither she nor any members of her family have ever been members of any political organisation, nor have they had any contact with the Tamil Tigers or other militant organisations opposed to the Government of Sri Lanka. She obtained her passport in 1986, left her two remaining children in the local mission and convent, and went to India in February 1987. She found it difficult to live in India and when she approached the Indian authorities concerning refugee status they instead gave her a temporary visa. She said that she did not wish to return to Sri Lanka as she had no place to live there and the army continued to undertake atrocities against residents of her village. She also claimed that the authorities would want to know why she had left Sri Lanka.

Chelliah Gunaranji is also a Tamil from the Jaffna area. According to her statement, in 1986 her father, who was a police officer, was shot dead when caught up in a battle between the army and a group which she described as "the boys". After her father's death she moved with her mother and sister to another village. She said that her sister was raped by a soldier when the army visited the area. She herself, on another occasion, was taken by the army from the house in which she was living and assaulted and questioned as to the whereabouts of her brother. She was asked whether he was involved with the Tamil Tigers. She said that the house in which she was previously living in her home village had been destroyed in 1986. Neither she nor any member of her family had any connections with the militants in Sri Lanka, but sometimes the militants would call at her village and give the inhabitants food. At other times the inhabitants had to provide food in return to the militants. She has a brother who has been living in Canada since 1986. She obtained a passport in early 1986 and had intended to go to India so that she could do higher studies, and because her mother wished her to leave Sri Lanka for her safety. She arrived in India in February 1987, but knew no-one in that country. She does not wish to return to Sri Lanka as she has no place there in which to live nor does she have any money. She said that the army had destroyed most of her village.

According to Anthony Karunakaran, his home and fishing business (consisting of his boats, nets and other equipment) had all been destroyed by the army. He owned 15 acres of paddy fields, but the land had been taken over by Sinhalese people because the army had forced all the people in his village to leave it while they were searching for terrorists. He said he moved to another village where he also owned a house. However, in October 1986 he had been assaulted on several occasions by the army while at that village. Up to July 1986 he had supported himself by working as a fisherman for a friend, but he then decided that he should leave Sri Lanka. He then sold some of his land and his mother's jewels. He travelled to Colombo and left for India in January 1987. He has never been a member of any political organisation nor helped any of the militant movements. Some of his relatives were involved in the militant movement, but they are now all dead. He did not apply for refugee status in India. His original intention in leaving India was to go to Canada with his sister. He said he could not now return to Sri Lanka as he has nowhere to stay. He claimed that he feels he will be arrested at the airport if he returns.

Bevary Sundaralingan is single. She said that the army had destroyed most of her family's belongings. The contents of her house were destroyed in 1984 and later in the same year the house itself was destroyed by mortar fire. She said that she and her father had been assaulted by the army when their house was attacked. Neither she nor her family has any association with political organisations in Sri Lanka. She lived with relatives after her father's property was destroyed. Her father was still running a shop when she left for India in 1986. She spent nine months in India, leaving in April 1987 intending to go to Canada to join her fiance. She heard on the radio in India that her village had been destroyed and she does not know her father's current circumstances. She obtained her passport in 1984 as she wished to leave Sri Lanka due to the problems there. She did not apply for refugee status while in India or Fiji. She does not wish to return to Sri Lanka due to the continuing activities of the army.

On 27 April, Mr Davidson, the third respondent, who is the acting director of the immigration branch of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in Sydney and an authorised officer for the purposes of s 36A(4) of the Act, decided to serve on the station manager of Continental Airlines requirements under that section. He directed an officer of the Department to serve the requirements on the airline, and this was done at about 10 pm on 28 April. Mr Davidson considered that a notice under the section should be made within 48 hours of the applicants being taken into custody. He took into account the fact that the applications for refugee status were still under consideration. He also took the view that, should those applications ultimately prove unsuccessful, the Department should be in a position to give effect to the decisions to refuse entry permits to the applicants and to preserve its position whereby it could require Continental Airlines to remove the applicants from Australia at no cost to the Commonwealth.

The applicants' claims for refugee status were considered by the DORS Committee on 1 May 1987. The meeting of the committee was attended by a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but he did not have a vote. The committee unanimously recommended that the applicants be not recognised as refugees within the terms of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. These documents are more particularly described in s 6A(1)(C) of the Act. In Art 1A of the 1951 Convention a refugee is defined as "any person who, ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence ..., is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

Mr Dennis Richardson is the delegate of the Minister for the purpose of the determination of refugee status. He received the DORS Committee's recommendation and accepted it and refused to grant refugee status to the applicants. When making his decisions, Mr Richardson had regard to the application forms filled out by the applicants, the transcript of their interviews on 27 April, the minutes of the DORS Committee meeting of 1 May and a submission from the DORS Secretariat.

Counsel for the applicants conceded that, if one of the applications failed, they would all fail. Accordingly, I shall refer only to the reasons given by Mr Richardson for his decision in respect of Chelliah Gunaranji's application. His reasons included the following:

"(7)       I noted that the applicant's father was a police officer but that the applicant and her family had no political associations. Her father's death appears to have been accidental, while the other incidents affecting her family I did not consider were directed specifically towards the applicant or her family, but rather to have been random incidents and part of the army's general harassment in the area.

"(8)       I considered then that the applicant had no political or other profile that would make her of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, nor had she suffered persecutory treatment within the meaning of the Convention. In this context, I noted that she had been able to obtain her passport and apparently leave Sri Lanka with no difficulty.

"(9)       I accepted the views of the committee members that the applicant had achieved effective protection in India, and had left for apparent economic reasons and a secondary desire to reach Canada.

"(10)     I considered that the applicant's claimed fear of return to Sri Lanka was based on the general situation in Sri Lanka, and did not amount to a well-founded fear of persecution.

"(11)     I concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution should she be returned to Sri Lanka. Accordingly, I determined she was not a refugee within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol."

In order to understand the arguments presented on behalf of the applicants it is necessary to set out some of the relevant provisions in the Act:

"6(1)     A non-citizen who, not being the holder of an entry permit that is in force, enters Australia thereupon becomes a prohibited non-citizen.

"(2)       An officer may, in accordance with this section and at the request or with the consent of a non-citizen, grant to the non-citizen an entry permit.

"(3)       An entry permit shall be in a form approved by the Minister and shall be expressed to permit the person to whom it is granted to enter Australia or to remain in Australia or both.

...

"(5)       An entry permit may be granted to a non-citizen either upon his arrival in Australia or, subject to section 6A, after he has entered Australia (whether or not that entry took place before, or takes place after, the commencement of this Part).

"(6)       An entry permit that is intended to operate as a temporary entry permit shall be expressed to authorize the person to whom it relates to remain in Australia for a specified period only, and such a permit may be granted subject to conditions.

"6A(1)   An entry permit shall not be granted to a non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless one or more of the following conditions is fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say -

(c)        he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and the Minister has determined, by instrument in writing, that he has the status of refugee within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 or of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at New York on 31 January 1967;

(e)        he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and there are strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of an entry permit to him."

"36A(1) ...

...

"(3)       Where a person, not being a person exempted, by instrument under the hand of the Minister, from the requirements of Division 1A, who travels by aircraft from a place outside Australia to a proclaimed airport has sought and been refused an entry permit at that airport or at any other airport in Australia at which he has called in the course of that travel, he may, if an authorized officer so directs, be taken into custody at that first-mentioned airport by an officer and kept in such custody, either at that first-mentioned airport or elsewhere, as an authorized officer directs until such time as he is removed from Australia in accordance with sub-section (4) or until such earlier time as an authorized officer directs.

"(4)       Where a person is taken into custody under sub-section (1), (2) or (3), an authorized officer may, at any time within 48 hours after the person is so taken into custody, by notice in writing served on the master, owner, agent or charterer of the aircraft on which he travelled to Australia, require the master, owner, agent or charterer to remove the person from Australia at no charge to the Commonwealth.

"(8)       A person shall not, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have entered Australia by reason only of his having been taken from a proclaimed airport for the purpose of being kept in custody at a place outside a proclaimed airport in pursuance of sub-section (1), (2) or (3)."

The first ground upon which the applicants seek relief is based upon the propositions that decisions were made under s 6A(1)(c) of the Act in respect of each of them that they did not have the status of refugees within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol, that such decisions were decisions within the meaning of the Judicial Review Act, and that breaches of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decisions. Notwithstanding the careful arguments presented by counsel for the applicants I am not persuaded that any of these propositions are correct. The only reference in the Act to a person having the status of refugee is found in s 6A(1)(C). The opening words of that provision make it plain that it applies only to non-citizens after their entry into Australia. Where a person is the holder of a temporary entry permit issued under the Act and the Minister makes a decision that he does not have the status of refugee referred to in s 6A(1)(C) that decision entitles the person in respect of whom it is made to invoke the provisions of the Judicial Review Act: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290; 61 ALR 609. However, in the present cases, the applicants entered Australia without temporary entry permits. Accordingly they are deemed not to have entered Australia: see s 36A(8) of the Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the decisions that the applicants did not have the status of refugees were made under s 6A(1)(c). They were decisions which lay within the discretion of the executive. Neither the Convention nor the Protocol forms part of the municipal law of Australia, although, of course, they are treaties which create international obligations binding on Australia. The Act does not give any rights to refugees as such, although in cases where persons have lawfully entered Australia a decision made under s 6A(1)(c) is reviewable under the Judicial Review Act.

In my opinion, even if I be wrong in what I have so far written, it has not been shown that breaches of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of those decisions. The applicants were given ample opportunity to place before the DORS Committee and the Minister all the material upon which they relied in support of their cases that they should be recognised as refugees. I have already referred to the circumstances that when they were interviewed on 27 April, the applicants were informed that they should provide the interviewing officer with all material that they considered relevant to their applications. They were informed that the purpose of the interview was to place before the DORS Committee all relevant material prior to it making a recommendation to the Minister. They took advantage of the opportunity afforded to them. In doing so, they were assisted by interpreters. It is true that, after they had put their cases to the committee, their solicitor requested the committee to postpone its final consideration of the applications. But I do not think that the refusal of this request constituted a denial of natural justice. Counsel for the applicants was unable to specify any additional facts which might have been taken into account in deciding the applications if the applicants had been given further time to present their cases. Assuming that the applicants had the right to receive natural justice in the making of the decisions, that right was not infringed.

It was further submitted that the applicants were denied an opportunity of making submissions on the question whether the Department's Instruction No PC1330 in relation to Sri Lankan case management should be applied to their situations. French J held in Osman-Lloyd v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (5 June 1987, unreported) that this instruction did not apply to non-citizens who, like the applicants, had not been granted temporary entry permits. I agree with his Honour's decision. Nor do I see any substance in the argument that the applicants were denied natural justice because they were not afforded the opportunity to present material and submissions relevant to a reconsideration of their application in the light of other aspects of the decision in Osman-Lloyd v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.

It was next submitted that the decisions made pursuant to s 36A(4) of the Act to serve requirements in relation to each of the applicants and to keep the applicants in custody pursuant to the provisions of s 36A(3) were not authorised by the Act. It was argued that s 36A is intended to be a "turn around" power and has no application in a context where lengthy consideration may be required before a person's claim to refugee status is finally determined. It was further submitted that a notice under s 36A(4), once served, creates immediate obligations on the carrier, and that there is no express power to waive or suspend such obligations. In support of this argument counsel referred to other provisions in the Act (for example, ss 18, 20 and 21) pursuant to which the applicants and other persons who enter Australia under similar circumstances could be removed from this country.

I do not think this argument can succeed in the light of the clear words of s 36A. Upon their arrival in Australia each of the applicants fell clearly within the provisions of s 36A(3). Each had travelled by aircraft from a place outside Australia to a proclaimed airport. Each sought and was refused an entry permit. None of them had obtained the exemption referred to in s 36A(3). In these circumstances it was plainly open to the authorised officer to direct that they be taken into custody until they were removed from Australia in accordance with s 36A(4). At any time within 48 hours after they were taken into custody, the authorised officer was empowered to give the appropriate notice in writing to the carrier requiring it to remove the applicants from Australia at no charge to the Commonwealth. It would be an odd construction of the Act if, notwithstanding the clear terms of s 36A, a person who is caught by its provisions may enter Australia without an entry permit. Such a person would, by virtue of s 27, be guilty of an offence against the Act and be liable to arrest under s 38(1). It is true that s 36A authorises the swift removal from Australia of a non-citizen who has arrived at an airport without an entry permit. However, the inclusion in s 36A(5) of the provision to grant an extension of time for compliance with a notice served under s 36A(4) is a clear indication that the powers under the section are not limited to the swift "turn around" power contended for by the applicants' counsel. In my opinion it has not been shown that the making of the decisions under s 36A were unauthorised.

It was also submitted that the decisions that the applicants did not have the status of refugee were improper exercises of the power to make those decisions because the Minister took into account a number of irrelevant considerations when making them. These irrelevant considerations were said to include the position of the applicants when they were in India and their reasons for leaving that country, that they did not have political profiles making them of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, that the harassment they had suffered at the hands of the Sri Lankan army had not been directed specifically at them or their families, that their fears of returning to Sri Lanka were based on the general situation in that country, that they were able to leave Sri Lanka by regular means, that they had not applied to the governments of other countries to be recognised as refugees and that there was no obstacle to their return to India. These same matters were relied upon as establishing that the decisions were so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made them. I do not think there is substance in any of these submissions. Leaving on one side the question whether the decisions are reviewable under the Judicial Review Act, the matters which are relevant to a consideration whether a person has the status of a refugee for the purposes of Art 1A fall within a very broad spectrum. It was relevant to consider whether the applicants were outside Sri Lanka owing to their well-founded fears of being persecuted for reasons of their race, religion or membership of a particular social group. It was also necessary to consider whether they were unable, or owing to any such well-founded fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their native country. In my opinion it was not impermissible for the Minister to have regard to all the matters which he took into account. For instance, it was relevant to consider whether the real reason for the applicants wishing to enter Australia was to improve their economic position. In considering that matter, it was not irrelevant to consider their economic circumstances whilst they were living in India, and their reasons for leaving that country. It is unnecessary to deal individually with all the matters said to have been wrongly taken into account. It is sufficient to say that it has not been shown that, assuming this court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Minister that the applicants do not have the status of refugees, any of those decisions have been shown to have been an improper exercise of the power to make them.

I have already stated my conclusion that the applicants do not fall within the provisions of s 6A(1)(C) of the Act because they are deemed not to have entered Australia. Nevertheless, it is plain that decisions were made refusing to grant them entry permits, and those decisions are reviewable under the Judicial Review Act. The decisions would be susceptible of being set aside if it could be shown that the decision-maker failed to take into account the circumstance that the applicants were refugees (if that had been established) and that this circumstance was relevant to the question whether they should be granted entry permits. However, it is plain that in arriving at his decision to refuse to grant entry permits to the applicants, Mr Davidson took into account their claims to refugee status, that the DORS Committee had recommended against acceptance of their claims and that their claims had been rejected.

The decisions to refuse to grant entry permits to the applicants were attacked on the ground, inter alia, that the decision-maker misconstrued the definition of the term "refugee" in the Convention. It was said that the misconstruction arose because the decision-maker read into the meaning of "persecution" on the ground of race a requirement that the relevant acts of persecution be directed specifically at the person claiming refugee status. I think this submission also fails. What the decision-maker did was to take into account all the material before him and reach the conclusions that none of the applicants had satisfied him that they were refugees.

The decisions to refuse to grant entry permits were also attacked on the ground that breaches of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of them. It is necessary, when considering this submission, to have regard to the course of events leading up to the making of the applications. Upon their arrival in Australia the applicants did not make any formal applications for entry permits. However, the officer who interviewed them dealt with them on the basis that they were applying for entry permits. In a letter dated 29 April 1987 the applicants' solicitor submitted "that the appropriate action would be to grant temporary entry permits of some month's duration to the applicants". Mr Davidson responded to this letter in a telephone conversation with the applicants' solicitor on the afternoon of 1 May, using words which indicated that temporary entry permits would not be granted. When the applications to this court came before Einfeld J on 29 May there was apparently some uncertainty as to whether applications for entry permits had been made and refused. So as to ensure that there would be no uncertainty on the matter when the applications came on for final hearing, Einfeld J made it clear to the parties that the matter should be put beyond doubt so that clear cut decisions on all the relevant applications could be made. During the course of the proceedings on 29 May, counsel for the respondents stated, in effect, that if formal applications were made for entry permits they would be dealt with promptly. Accordingly, on 1 June 1987 the applicants' solicitor wrote to the Department requesting that decisions be made "as to the grant or refusal to the applicants of temporary entry permits pursuant to s 6(2) and of further entry permits pursuant to s 6A(1)(c) and (e) ..". In response to this letter, further decisions appear to have been made by Mr Davidson on 15 June refusing to grant entry permits. It is these decisions that the applicants seek to attack in the present proceedings, since the earlier refusals of entry permits have been overtaken by subsequent events.

I do not think that any ground has been made out for setting aside the decisions made on 15 June. It is doubtful whether the decision-maker was required to afford them natural justice before deciding their applications for entry permits: see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 587; 62 ALR 321 at 348, where Mason J said: "The grant of an entry permit is a matter of discretion. Indeed, the cancellation of a temporary entry permit is expressed to be a matter of absolute discretion: s 7(1). In the ordinary course of granting or refusing entry permits there is no occasion for the principles of natural justice to be called into play. The applicant is entitled to support his application by such information and material as he thinks appropriate and he cannot complain if the authorities reject his application because they do not accept, without further notice to him, what he puts forward." The applicants were given the opportunity of supporting their applications with any material they thought might be relevant and availed themselves of that opportunity. It must have been apparent to their solicitor that it was open to his clients to furnish further material to the Minister before he made final decisions determining their applications on 15 June. I am satisfied that their failure to do so was occasioned only by the circumstance that the applicants knew that they had already furnished all material which would support their cases.

In the result, I do not think that any ground has been made out for the relief sought. The applications must therefore be dismissed.