



## Security Council

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### Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) until 31 December 2010 and called upon me, *inter alia*, to complete the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian MINURCAT components other than those required for the Mission's liquidation by that date. The report covers developments since the issuance of my previous report on MINURCAT, dated 14 October 2010 (S/2010/529). It provides an assessment of the security and humanitarian situations in eastern Chad and the security situation in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, progress towards the fulfilment by the Government of Chad of the tasks and benchmarks set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1923 (2010), the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, including preparations for and completion of its withdrawal, and an assessment of key lessons learned in the context of MINURCAT.

#### II. Security

2. The general security situation in Chad remained relatively calm. There were, however, a number of isolated incidents. On 6 November, five unidentified armed men attacked two trucks belonging to a local MINURCAT contractor 55 kilometres north of Goz Beida (Dar Sila) and shot one of the drivers dead. On 9 November, a *Détachement intégré de sécurité* (DIS) team investigating the theft of a refugee's motorbike in the vicinity of the Gaga refugee camp near Abéché (Ouaddai) by two armed individuals in uniform were engaged in a firefight with two suspects. One DIS officer and the suspects were killed.

#### III. Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian needs in eastern Chad are immense. In that region, some 70 humanitarian organizations continued to provide assistance to some 255,000 refugees, more than 137,500 internally displaced persons and about 43,000 returnees, as well as a host population of 150,000. The destruction of more than 104,000 hectares of crops during the rainy season rendered the population vulnerable in



southern, central and eastern Chad. Across the Sahelian belt in Chad, an estimated 1.6 million people now face food insecurity and malnutrition. Areas particularly affected in the east include Assoungha, Djourf Al Ahmar, Kimiti and Ouaddai

4. Humanitarian actors and MINURCAT mobilized resources to help the Government alleviate the situation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released emergency stocks of non-food items at refugee sites and surrounding villages affected by the floods. The Mission's logistical support facilitated the delivery of around 10 tons of humanitarian aid to the internally displaced persons in Loboutique (Dar Sila). Similar assistance was provided to humanitarian assessment missions deployed to Mongororo, Kerfi, Am Timan, Tiero and Marena, and humanitarian staff and cargo were provided to Daha and Haraze, which were accessible only by helicopter.

#### **IV. Responsibility of the Government of Chad for the protection of civilians and United Nations and humanitarian organization personnel and assets**

5. The Government continued to implement its plan for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad as outlined in the letter to the President of the Security Council dated 7 September 2010 (S/2010/470). It entails three pillars: the national army garrisoned along the border and the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force; the territorial gendarmerie with the Chadian Garde nationale et nomade and the joint disarmament force; and, at the core, DIS.

6. The national plan for the sustainment of DIS was revised. In October, the Government shared the updated plan and revised budget estimates with the Council (S/2010/536) and with representatives of the diplomatic community and partner organizations in N'Djamena. Of particular note is the provision for the establishment of a dedicated DIS administrative and management unit from January 2011 with approximately 130 personnel and 2011 budgetary requirements of some \$21 million. The Government has committed to funding all DIS personnel costs (salaries, stipends and various allowances), estimated at approximately \$7 million, or 33 per cent of the budget. It is, however, seeking \$14 million in donor assistance to support logistical requirements (estimated at \$12.6 million) and the above-mentioned national facilitation structure (estimated at \$1.4 million). Furthermore, the Government has requested assistance from the United Nations for the mobilization and management of donor funds, as well as additional technical assistance to DIS and its support structure. This assistance entails the recruitment of expert advisers in police oversight and logistics. DIS remains fragile, however. In order to maximize the sustainability of DIS, MINURCAT has endeavoured to transfer the bulk of its DIS mentoring, administration and logistical support programmes to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR.

7. The Government has indicated that Coordination nationale d'appui au déploiement de la force internationale à l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT), established as the Mission's primary national interlocutor, will cease its functions once the Mission withdraws from Chad on 31 December 2010. It intends to establish a new structure, the Coordination nationale pour le soutien aux humanitaires et au DIS, to interact with humanitarian partners and other key actors. The mandate of and arrangements for this new body and the modalities of its work are being finalized by the

Government. In the east, coordination with humanitarian actors on security issues, joint analysis and escorts is provided by the Government's recently established Bureaux de sécurisation et des mouvements, now functioning in 12 locations.

8. To promote a shared understanding on the part of the Government and the various stakeholders of their respective responsibilities for the protection of civilians, the second in a series of forums was conducted by CONAFIT, in collaboration with MINURCAT, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP and UNHCR, with Government representatives and humanitarian actors on 11 October in N'Djamena. In Abéché and Hadjer-Hadid (Ouaddai), similar forums were held on 12 and 13 November on the subjects of humanitarian space and sustainable solutions for internally displaced persons. A fourth forum took place on 28 November in Goz Beida (Dar Sila) on the issue of early recovery. A fifth forum is scheduled to be held in N'Djamena in December to summarize the outcomes of the previous four.

#### **A. Security and protection of civilians in danger**

9. From 24 September to 12 November, DIS reports having conducted 1,964 day and night patrols in and around all refugee camps, some sites for internally displaced persons sites and in towns in eastern Chad where humanitarian actors operate. DIS recorded 72 infractions of the law and arrested 27 suspects. Twelve suspects were transferred to the local gendarmerie for referral to the justice system.

10. On 25 October, a two-month induction training of 200 new DIS officers, including 16 women, commenced in N'Djamena. These are the first recruits for whom training is entirely provided by Chadian DIS instructors, under the general supervision of MINURCAT police. On completion of this training, the overall strength of DIS is expected to reach some 1,000 personnel.

#### **B. Facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel**

11. DIS report having conducted 1,477 security escorts for humanitarian actors over the past two months. There was one carjacking of a vehicle belonging to an international non-governmental organization (NGO) on the road between N'Djamena and Ati some 280 kilometres west of Abéché. No one was harmed and Chadian authorities have since recovered the vehicle.

12. In a development cited as being unrelated to the withdrawal of MINURCAT, two international non-governmental organizations have announced their intention to depart the Dar Sila region by December, which they attributed to a combination of the reprioritization of programmatic activities to other locations in Chad and the lack of resources. One NGO suspended its activities in Adé near the border with the Sudan because of insecurity there.

#### **V. Progress by the Government of Chad towards benchmarks established by the Security Council**

13. With the Mission's operations winding down, the ability to independently verify any progress made by the Government towards attaining the benchmarks

established by the Security Council for the protection of civilians is extremely limited. The Mission is no longer in a position to visit the majority of refugee camps and sites for internally displaced persons or to observe the performance of the national security institutions, including DIS, providing protection for civilians. Accordingly, my observations necessarily comprise the accounts of humanitarian actors, as well as national and local authorities. These accounts illustrate the efforts of the Government of Chad towards achieving the benchmarks established by the Security Council, as outlined below.

#### **A. Voluntary return of internally displaced persons in secure and sustainable conditions**

14. In early November Chad ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (the Kampala Convention). The Convention imposes legal obligations on signatory States with regard to internally displaced persons in their respective territories.

15. Prior to the 2010 rainy season, some 43,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their villages of origin in the Dar Sila region and in the Assoungha department in the Ouaddai region. Subsequently there have been no significant returns. In recent months Chadian authorities, notably CONAFIT, have expressed confidence that the causes of displacement in the east have been addressed successfully and have stated their intention to support, together with the international community, durable solutions for internally displaced persons, namely voluntary return, local integration or relocation elsewhere in the country.

16. Internally displaced persons at several major sites have expressed apprehension over the possibility of returning to their places of origin. In most cases they cited concerns over security, as returning would involve movement to areas in close proximity to the Sudanese border and to locations where intercommunity tensions still remain. During an intercommunity dialogue organized by the Government on 28 October in Hadjer-Hadid (Ouaddai) (with support from UNHCR, a local NGO partner, Eirene, and MINURCAT), leaders of internally displaced persons stated that further returns to their places of origin were conditional on the Government providing assurances of security and sustained development assistance.

#### **B. Demilitarization of refugee camps**

17. Since the deployment of the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force in the early months of 2010, UNHCR has consistently reported fewer sightings of armed elements moving within the camps.

#### **C. Security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect to international human rights standards**

18. According to assessments by humanitarian actors and government authorities, the overall security situation in refugee camps and sites for internally displaced persons has remained relatively calm. Incidents of recruitment of children by armed

elements were relatively few (see para. 26), but UNHCR received regular reports of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, many related to the use of alcohol.

19. DIS maintained operations in and around all refugee camps. Its gender units, however, have yet to become fully operational at all sites. During the reporting period, training was provided to 29 DIS instructors on international humanitarian law by the International Committee of the Red Cross and to 108 DIS officers on children's rights in emergency situations by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). On 25 October, 26 DIS officers received training from the Mission in Iriba on human rights, specifically on the protection of women and children.

## **VI. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad**

20. During the reporting period, the Mission took the final steps towards consolidating and transferring the support of its civilian activities, where feasible, to the Government, the United Nations country team and other relevant actors. On 15 October, the military component of MINURCAT ceased its operational activities and assumed responsibility for the static protection of United Nations personnel, premises and assets; situational awareness of the Mission's locations; and the provision of limited escorts to United Nations convoys undertaking enabling functions, and provided limited support for the extraction and medical evacuation of United Nations personnel.

### **A. Support to the *Détachement intégré de sécurité***

21. MINURCAT is in the final stages of the consolidation of support to DIS and the handover of functions to the Government of Chad. The Mission has focused on enhancing the skills of DIS in the essentials of driving, basic car mechanics and communications: 87 DIS officers have been trained in the use of HF radio; 60 in the use of office computer software; 29 in basic car mechanics; and, 70, including 20 women, in driving skills. As at 24 November the strength of the United Nations police stood at 87 officers in N'Djamena and 7 in Abéché.

### **B. Rule of law**

22. UNDP, together with MINURCAT, facilitated, with funding from the Government of Germany, the establishment of three pilot legal aid clinics in eastern Chad (Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana and Abéché). UNDP completed the competitive selection process for national NGOs to operate these pilot legal aid clinics.

23. The Mission also logistically supported the deployment of newly appointed judges and prosecutors to the Court of Appeals in Abéché. Through quick-impact projects, MINURCAT has constructed courthouses in Adré, Goz Beida and Hadjer-Hadid, and the courthouse in Goz Beida, as well as the first instance tribunal of Iriba, has been equipped with furniture and office material.

24. MINURCAT continued to offer on-the-job training and mentoring to national prison officials on international standards in prison management and administration

and general prison development strategies in N'Djamena, Abéché, Adré, Iriba and Goz Beida, as well as prison headquarters. The Iriba prison rehabilitation project is proceeding on course, and the new facility was expected to be ready for use by the end of November 2010. MINURCAT, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, delivered essential drugs and equipment to Adré prison for the purpose of operating an infirmary there.

### **C. Human rights**

25. During the reporting period, MINURCAT assisted the Government in its efforts to finalize its national action plan for human rights and establish mechanisms for the implementation of the outcome of the universal periodic review and the recommendations of human rights treaty bodies. It also provided mentoring to civil society organizations in eastern Chad and to the regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties.

### **D. Child protection**

26. DIS reported the arrest of a group of 11 persons on suspicion of involvement in child recruitment in the Goz Amer refugee camp (Dar Sila). Five suspects, allegedly the ringleaders, were transferred to the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force. The recruitment activity, which took place in September, was reportedly politically motivated and utilized youth organizations to target boys and girls. The Government of Chad suspended the activities of the organizations implicated.

### **E. Gender**

27. The Minister of Social Action and the Vice-President of the National Assembly, with assistance from MINURCAT and UNICEF, participated in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) in New York. MINURCAT continued to assist the Ministry in finalizing a national strategy for conflict resolution within the framework agreed upon in the national forum held in September. The Mission also assisted in the organization of national sexual and gender-based sensitization events in Hadjer-Hadid in October and in Arkoum and Adré in November.

### **F. Civil affairs**

28. MINURCAT continued to consolidate its reconciliation activities in anticipation of handing them over to Chadian authorities and other partners. In the Ouaddai region, MINURCAT and UNHCR sponsored intercommunity dialogue on 28 October in Hadjer-Hadid, south of Farchana, to build confidence and promote voluntary returns of internally displaced persons. MINURCAT handed over an administrative building, refurbished through a quick-impact project, to the local authorities in Hadjer-Hadid, as well as two wells in the resettlement communities of Khomme and Dewer.

## **G. HIV/AIDS**

29. MINURCAT consolidated its efforts to mainstream HIV/AIDS awareness and prepared to hand over its activities to the United Nations country team. An HIV sensitization programme, funded by a quick-impact project and implemented with UNHCR, sensitized some 11,907 refugees and internally displaced persons in Goz Beida, Goz Amer, Koukou Angarana and Farchana (Djabal, Trejine, Brejine and Gaga). In Abéché, 90 religious leaders, including 30 women, were trained as focal points to raise awareness about HIV.

## **H. Mine action**

30. In preparation for the withdrawal of MINURCAT, the number of mine action survey and clearance teams was reduced from four to three (now located in Abéché, Farchana and Goz Beida). A public awareness campaign on landmines and explosive remnants of war, as well as the supporting reporting hotline, has been maintained. Posters and flyers to raise awareness of the danger of handling landmines and explosive remnants of war were handed over to CONAFIT and the Chadian National Demining Centre for further circulation to schools, markets, public places and local authorities.

31. The outstanding tasks — surveying more than 3,000 kilometres of road, clearing 32 battlefield areas and completing more than 150 general mine action assessments — cannot be completed before year's end. Those activities will be handed over to the Chadian National Demining Centre. Discussions are under way with the Centre regarding its assumption of responsibility for the completion of the remaining tasks. In this context, the Centre continued to receive technical advisory, resource mobilization and programmatic support from UNDP on the implementation of projects, including a large-scale technical survey that will help to determine the extent of the remaining contamination and the resources required to address it.

## **I. Military mandate of the Mission**

32. Pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010), on 15 October the Mission's military component entered a recovery and repatriation phase in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Mission's withdrawal plan provides for the repatriation of the entire Force in four groups by 17 December. In addition to the military component's camp closures reported in the previous period, MINURCAT has now closed Koukou Angarana (Sector South), Iriba (Sector North) and Birao (in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic) on 31 October and 14 and 15 November, respectively. Subsequently, Goz Beida (Sector South) was closed on 27 November and Farchana (Sector North) on 30 November. At the time of publication, United Nations military elements were present only in Abéché and N'Djamena.

## **VII. Central African Republic**

33. During the period under review, the security situation in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic remained stable, yet fragile. In anticipation of the withdrawal of MINURCAT, I requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

to conduct a threat assessment of the area of operations in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, the key findings of which were shared orally with the Security Council in its closed consultations on 20 October. In brief, the risks posed in the area are attributable to a variety of governance issues (ethnic, economic and political). The attacks in September and October against villages in the MINURCAT area of operations by unidentified armed elements may have been perpetrated by a single group of 40 to 60 members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Despite the notorious menace of LRA, the threat posed by this single group is not assessed to be as significant as other internal factors. The major source of insecurity comes from banditry and transients who bring arms to sell, but the most urgent threat stems from armed internal political opposition groups (especially the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)).

34. In anticipation of the Mission's withdrawal, the Government of the Central African Republic made it clear that it was not in favour of the presence of an international force. It expressed its intention to reinforce its own military in the north-east, but the national forces lack basic equipment and training. The Government made a number of approaches to possible bilateral partners to provide capacity-building support to its national forces.

35. As noted in paragraph 32 above, MINURCAT completed its withdrawal from Birao on 15 November 2010, when it transferred its two campsites to the Government of the Central African Republic. Work on the main road between the airstrip and the town of Birao was completed, and the landing strip was left in good order and is unlikely to require significant maintenance until the 2011 rainy season. The Government of the Central African Republic reportedly reinforced the presence of its national forces garrisoned in Birao to a total strength of approximately 150 troops. On 24 November, however, CPJP allegedly attacked the positions of the national security forces in Birao with the intention of seizing equipment and supplies. The national authorities announced the withdrawal of its forces from the town, leaving CPJP in control. At least four soldiers were killed.

## **VIII. Mission support**

36. MINURCAT, on the closure of its camps in its forward bases in eastern Chad (Farchana, Goz Beida, Guéréda and Iriba) and in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic (Birao), transferred to the Governments of the two countries camp infrastructure as well as some assets, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. This transfer is intended to contribute to the continuation of activities related to the protection of civilians and humanitarian actors. Following the closure of the camps in Goz Beida and Farchana on 27 and 30 November, respectively, the Mission has consolidated its presence in N'Djamena and Abéché to prepare for liquidation.

37. Since the end of the rainy season, road conditions have improved in the area of operations, which has enhanced the Mission's capacity to extract and move United Nations- and contingent-owned equipment. The Mission's drawdown of civilian staff has progressed on schedule, with the number expected to decrease to 130 international staff, 240 national staff and 50 United Nations Volunteers by the end of December.



38. Detailed planning is well advanced for the mission liquidation period, which is scheduled to last until 30 April 2011. The main challenges during the period will include the completion of the DIS support infrastructure projects mandated by Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), the transfer out or local disposal of the remaining United Nations-owned equipment, the termination of MINURCAT support contracts and the phase-out of the MINURCAT civilian establishment. The successful achievement of these tasks will call for careful management by the mission liquidation team.

39. Regarding the Council-mandated construction of DIS stations, including the drilling of wells and work on the police academy, progress was reviewed at the fourth meeting of the Government of Chad/United Nations High-level Working Group convened in N'Djamena on 10 November. The Working Group considered the report of an earlier site inspection conducted by its representatives.

40. The first phase of construction at the police academy in N'Djamena is complete. MINURCAT has not been able to initiate the second phase, the construction of 11 training classrooms, because of lack of funding. The construction of 6 police stations and 11 police posts is projected to be completed in early 2011. The procurement process for the construction of the DIS posts in the Touloum and Iridimi refugee camps has been completed, and construction is projected to be finished by the end of April 2011. A contractor has commenced the drilling of wells for DIS in Abéché and will soon begin drilling in all 16 locations. All work is to be completed before the end of April, and a further inspection is scheduled for early December 2011.

## **IX. Completion and transfer of key Mission activities to the Government of Chad, the United Nations country team and other partners**

41. The following proposed post-MINURCAT arrangements and tasking of responsibilities was taken up in November at the monthly meeting of the High-level Working Group. Final agreement is expected to be reached in the Group's December meeting.

### **A. Programmes**

42. Pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT initiated a series of exchanges with the Government and the United Nations country team, as well as many other key actors, to identify means for the continuation of the Mission's critical civilian activities related to the protection of civilians and early recovery, as well as their sustainability. Activities were carried out in the areas of justice and prisons, sexual and gender-based violence, child protection, human rights monitoring, promotion and reporting and mine action. In addition, local reconciliation initiatives were carried out in eastern Chad. Discussions focused on the workplans of the individual MINURCAT civilian units with a view to identifying activities that could be completed by 31 December and those that needed to continue. The selection of activities to be continued was guided largely by the priorities set out in the Government's Programme global de relance à l'est du Tchad,

which was developed with support from development partners. The programme focuses on addressing the challenges facing internally displaced persons and host communities in the areas of return, relocation or reintegration in eastern Chad.

43. The Government has undertaken to continue the Mission's activities in support of the justice and prisons sectors in eastern Chad within the framework of its existing justice programme (Programme d'appui à la justice au Tchad), which is supported by the European Union and the Government of Germany and implemented in coordination with UNDP. The Government and civil society organizations have also undertaken to ensure the continuation of the Mission's human rights activities in eastern Chad, particularly through the regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and civil society organizations, such as Le Cercle des ONG. In accordance with the findings of the needs assessment mission conducted in July 2010 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in which the Government, civil society actors and other partners urged support for Chad on human rights issues, the Government will continue to support local reconciliation initiatives previously undertaken jointly with MINURCAT. Activities aimed at fighting against sexual and gender-based violence will continue under the leadership of the United Nations Population Fund in collaboration with UNICEF and UNHCR. Mine action activities will be taken over in April 2011. Regarding HIV/AIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS will take over activities undertaken by MINURCAT and ensure sustainability of the achievements reached. Local reconciliation activities will be continued and sustained through the UNDP programme on local governance. Since the 2011 transition plan is intended to bridge the gaps created by the departure of MINURCAT, all these activities will be further sustained through the 2012-2015 United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

## **B. Détachement intégré de sécurité**

44. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT has been intensively consolidating its support to DIS, which will be transferred to the Government by 31 December. As at 15 October, the police component necessarily ceased accompanying DIS on patrols and escorts. All administrative tasks, such as training, discipline, payroll and budget preparation, were transferred to DIS in October. Since then, DIS has prepared its own payroll, which has been endorsed by MINURCAT before processing.

45. As reported in paragraph 6, in October the Government of Chad presented an updated plan for the sustainment of DIS. UNDP and UNHCR continue to work closely with the relevant national authorities to establish a mechanism for the mobilization and management of donor support after 1 January. UNDP and UNHCR have designed a package of additional technical assistance and operational support for DIS in 2011. It is, however, not feasible to replicate the same level of support provided by MINURCAT.

46. Under the proposed package, UNDP will administer a "basket fund" in support of DIS; establish a technical assistance programme for the DIS administrative and financial section; carry out procurement for the operational aspects of DIS (fuel, spare parts and maintenance, information and communications technology equipment); and provide technical and administrative support to the Government

institutional oversight and management structure. UNHCR will provide support to DIS for day-to-day operations, such as management and maintenance of the vehicle fleet, maintenance of radio equipment, upkeep of facilities (police stations and posts, water wells), and the construction of four new police stations in the Salamat and Gore areas.

47. With regard to donor support for DIS, encouragingly, several existing donors have expressed an interest in continuing their financial contributions in 2011. In addition, UNDP and UNHCR have jointly submitted a proposal, endorsed by the Government, to access funding under the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund. This funding, if approved, could be used to continue DIS operations for the first months of 2011, pending the mobilization and disbursement of critical donor support.

## **X. Lessons learned in the context of the Mission**

48. In paragraph 27 of its resolution 1923 (2010), the Security Council requested that I provide an assessment of lessons learned in the context of MINURCAT. The assessment focused on the following areas: the establishment of a mission in the framework of tenuous host-Government consent; the necessity for a common, shared understanding of the concept of protection of civilians; knowledge of the context, planning and management of a peacekeeping mission; DIS sustainability; and communication and the management of expectations. The study entailed a desk review of documents and reports related to MINURCAT, extensive interviews with Government officials at local and central levels, civil society organizations, community leaders, members of the diplomatic community in Chad, officials of the United Nations country team and current and former MINURCAT and Secretariat personnel. The key findings of the study are outlined below.

### **A. Sustainable consent**

49. Concerned by the serious and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur and eastern Chad and its impact on the security and safety of civilians and on regional stability, the Security Council authorized, in its resolution 1778 (2007), the deployment of MINURCAT and an international military force in eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, providing for a European bridging force for one year. Prior to that point, the Government of Chad consistently voiced serious reservations about accepting the presence of an international military component. Chad repeatedly expressed its strong preference that any international presence be civilian in nature, that it assist in the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons and that it contribute to economic development in the east. The Secretariat conveyed this view to the Council, and in so doing emphasized its conclusion, based on assessment missions, that the conditions necessary for the deployment of a peacekeeping force were not present. It was only in late 2007, just prior to the adoption of the above-mentioned mandate, that the Government of Chad accepted the presence, for a duration of one year, of an international bridging force to be known as the European Union force in Chad and the Central African Republic.

50. Lingering reservations in the Government with regard to an international military presence once again came to the fore in 2008, during discussions on the

United Nations military component relieving the interim European Union force. There were protracted discussions, as the Government sought to determine the mandate, size, location and rules of engagement of a United Nations force. This delayed the Security Council's decision, in its resolution 1861 (2009), until 14 January 2009. The troop strength initially recommended to the Council by the Secretariat was ultimately reduced in size, but no reduction of the area of operations was authorized. The force's capability, therefore, was vested in a concept of operations heavily dependent on military helicopters to ensure mobility.

51. With the transfer of authority from the European Union to the United Nations set for 15 March 2009, the Secretariat had two months, rather than the minimum established requirement of six months, to obtain firm commitments from Member States for the necessary troop deployments. The short time frame allowed little time for potential troop contributors to secure the necessary equipment and enabling forces. In the early months of deployment, the multiple problems that plagued troop deployments challenged the Mission's effectiveness and credibility on the ground. This was brought more sharply into focus in May 2009 by the Government's utilization of its newly acquired and significant military assets to decisively defeat an incursion by a Chadian armed opposition group. This action, coupled with the incipient improvement in the relations between Chad and the Sudan and the continuing slow deployment of the military component of the Mission, prompted some actors, internally and in the region, to question the continued relevance of the United Nations military force in eastern Chad.

52. Furthermore, the establishment of MINURCAT was characterized by a discrepancy between the expectations and requests of the host Government and the actual structure and purpose of the Mission. In order to address the Government's reservations about an operation whose mandate was not in accordance with its wishes and objectives, the Mission resorted to a number of coping and mitigating strategies. These included committing to substantial projects that at times proved difficult, or even impossible, to carry out, thereby further undermining the trust and confidence of the host Government. In addition, MINURCAT, both before and after the establishment of its military component, invested heavily in DIS with a view to its assumption of a portion of the security responsibilities entrusted to the international military forces the deployment of which faced delays. Finally, the Mission agreed to provide, within existing resources, a level of support to DIS that will be difficult to sustain after the departure of MINURCAT.

53. The following lessons can be drawn: even when freely given, the consent of a host Government should be nurtured in order to ensure sustainability. Consent is reversible, especially when the conditions in the country and/or the subregion change significantly during the life of the mission. The weight of regional considerations in host Government consent should not be underestimated. Neither should the consistency of the support of key Member States that help to secure the host Government's initial consent. An operation such as MINURCAT, conceived and deployed under stress, in disregard of the foregoing observations, can become hostage to pressures and contradictions that will distract it from its intended objectives, impair its overall performance and erode its credibility.

54. Sustained consent by and effective cooperation with a host Government remains essential in order for a mission to implement its mandate and attain its

objectives. The manner in which it is secured and maintained must not serve to erode the principles of the Organization.

## **B. Shared understanding of the protection of civilians**

55. MINURCAT was established primarily for the purpose of contributing to the protection of civilians and did not have a political mandate. Its deployment took place at a time when there was no common understanding of the protection of civilians in the context of a United Nations peacekeeping environment. Consequently, each actor on the ground had different expectations and interpretations of what protection should entail, based largely on the perspective of their organizational goals rather than on a shared understanding.

56. The lack of a shared understanding notwithstanding, within the Mission, the mandate was clearer with regard to the respective protection roles of its military and police components. The policing of refugees in the camps and key towns was achieved through the provision of support to DIS, while the military provided an enabling security environment by patrolling a wide area. This enabling environment allowed humanitarian actors to enhance their respective activities for the protection of civilians. Furthermore, the Mission's civilian activities to strengthen human security were generally well regarded by national partners, including local beneficiaries and the Government.

57. The following lessons can be drawn: a shared and practical understanding of the protection of civilians must be developed and the contributions of key partners identified in an integrated strategy that is clearly elaborated during the predeployment planning phase. Once a mission is deployed, such a strategy should be routinely reviewed on the ground with the host Government and the United Nations country team to take into account local developments without jeopardizing organizational values and norms.

## **C. Knowledge of context, planning and management**

58. The Mission suffered from operational and logistical constraints owing to the harsh physical environment. This was compounded by an initial support structure arrangement that was not ultimately endorsed and by subsequent efforts to redress logistical constraints that similarly suffered from lack of agreement on support structures. The difficult environmental conditions challenged the Mission's capability to attract personnel and achieve sufficient staffing levels, notably in such key support areas as engineering. The Mission also committed to projects or timelines for delivery that were largely impossible to meet given the physical conditions on the ground.

59. Remoteness, harsh terrain, extreme climate and the virtual absence of infrastructure and appropriate support structures should be taken fully into account in the planning and management of a mission, especially during its start-up phase.

## **D. Sustainability of the *Détachement intégré de sécurité***

60. DIS has been an experiment testing the ability of the United Nations to design and build a sustainable national security structure in accordance with international norms and standards in close cooperation with a host Government. The

Government's command and control over DIS posed a unique challenge. Originally envisaged as purely a community police force, the DIS concept evolved to incorporate more robust tasks (particularly the provision of security escorts), owing in part to operational necessities, Chadian preferences and the slow deployment of the military component. Furthermore, as outlined above, circumstances led the Mission to invest heavily in DIS and pay heed to demands by the Government for a high level of support.

61. While DIS is viable from an operational perspective, its sustainability following the departure of MINURCAT warrants considerable and continued attention. There has been widespread concern over the readiness of the unit to fully assume its responsibility on 1 January 2011, even with some continuing international support.

62. One of the lessons to be drawn from the DIS experience thus far is that sustainability requirements and plans for such a force should be prepared from the first stage of conception and the principle stringently adhered to throughout development.

## **E. Communication and the management of expectations**

63. MINURCAT suffered from the lack of a communications strategy and was therefore unable to properly manage the expectations of the Government and to some extent humanitarian actors. An effective communication strategy should have been central to enhancing confidence and reducing misunderstandings as to the Mission's role and purpose in Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic. Instead, the mandate was not clearly understood, and the Government desired and expected support from the Mission for economic recovery and development in the eastern part of Chad, which was clearly outside the remit of the Mission.

64. It is evident that in the case of MINURCAT, the absence of a communications strategy impaired the Mission's ability to narrow the gap between expectations and reality. The main lesson learned is that such a strategy must be developed at the initial stage of a mission's deployment.

## **F. Achievements**

65. Notwithstanding the comments set out above, during the study there was near unanimity among the interviewees on the following observations:

(a) In contrast with the tenuous consent by the Government for the military component, authorities accepted the civilian component of the Mission, and the extension of its mandate with solely that component was suggested as a possible option. Many interviewees expressed their appreciation for the positive impact of the civilian activities of the Mission. The Mission is also leaving behind a pool of skilled and trained national professionals whose experience with MINURCAT should benefit the development of the country;

(b) The deployment and conduct of operations in difficult, remote and landlocked areas such as eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic is itself an achievement. The areas are vast, the terrain is harsh

and the climate is mostly unforgiving. Infrastructure is virtually nonexistent outside of the main cities and supply lines are extremely long. Notwithstanding the severe environmental and operational challenges, the MINURCAT force and DIS have managed to provide a measure of security for refugees, internally displaced persons and humanitarian actors. Local populations and beneficiaries of humanitarian aid generally expressed a positive view of DIS. Interviews highlighted the fact that the MINURCAT force built the trust of the population, especially women, in “uniformed men”.

## **XI. Observations and recommendations**

66. In conformity with the spirit and the letter of resolution 1923 (2010), the drawdown of the MINURCAT staff and assets is significantly advanced. The closure and handover of camps in its areas of operations have commenced in earnest. In this regard, I wish to commend the Governments of both Chad and the Central African Republic for the cooperation they have thus far extended to facilitate the process. I trust that the Government of Chad will continue to extend its full support for the orderly dismantling of the remaining camps in the country from now until the end of the liquidation.

67. With regard to the Central African Republic, I am concerned by the limited capacity of the security forces in Birao to fend off potential attacks on their positions now that MINURCAT has departed, as borne out by the recent attack by an armed opposition group, which resulted in the withdrawal of national security forces from Birao. I therefore again urge bilateral partners to respond positively to the request by the Government of the Central African Republic for assistance.

68. As outlined in the present report, the overall environment for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad continued to improve, particularly with regard to the physical aspects of protection. Fears that widespread criminal activities and insecurity would resume immediately after the rainy season have so far proven to be unfounded. The Government of Chad has assumed full responsibility for the security of civilians and humanitarian workers and has demonstrated over the past months its commitment to continue. The general perception is that eastern Chad is a more secure environment than it was in 2007. How much of this improvement is attributable to the deployment of MINURCAT and how much to the action of the Government and to the evolving local and subregional political and security dynamics is hard to evaluate at this stage.

69. The challenges are, nevertheless, immense. More than half a million refugees and internally displaced persons remain in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Although internally displaced persons increasingly express interest in returning to their areas of origin or opt for other durable solutions, residual insecurity, the weakness of local governance structures and the absence of the most basic services discourage large-scale and enduring movements. The plight of the refugees will remain unresolved as long as instability and strife in their places of origin are not fully addressed.

70. This already fragile subregion is about to embark on multiple and nearly simultaneous electoral processes in early 2011. It is important that, following the withdrawal of MINURCAT, eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central

African Republic remain on the international agenda and that the Governments receive appropriate support and attention from international partners.

71. In this regard, the efforts of the United Nations country team in Chad to reinforce its planning, advisory and coordination capacity are encouraging. This should provide it with a surge capacity to support the Government in preserving the momentum in eastern Chad achieved in recent years, to which MINURCAT has contributed.

72. In addition to the immediate need for donors to provide the resources necessary to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees and internally displaced persons in the east, there is equally a need for their support for programmes promoting durable solutions for them. For the foreseeable future, DIS will have a critical role to perform. I therefore encourage Member States to ensure that the necessary donor funds are made available to meet the programmed budgetary requirements for 2011.

73. MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate. It has gone through the stages of planning, deployment and withdrawal in the short span of less than four years, enduring adversities in each. It is my earnest hope that the few lessons outlined in the present report will be of assistance to the Security Council when it considers the evolution of peacekeeping as a whole and contemplates mandates for peacekeeping operations providing for the protection of civilians.

74. Notwithstanding the difficulties faced, the Mission successfully contributed to enhancing security in eastern Chad, particularly among the most vulnerable segment of the population. The Mission's substantive programmes have left their mark in eastern Chad. DIS, despite some shortcomings, is a relatively successful experiment of a nationally owned and internationally supported security structure for the protection of civilians. Recent steps taken by the Government of Chad and the United Nations country team, with the support of MINURCAT, have laid a good foundation for its consolidation and sustainability. The key to the durability of DIS ultimately rests with the Government, which has given firm assurances in this regard.

75. The MINURCAT military component worked hard to reach a critical mass by the end of 2009. Through its security escorts, patrols and visible presence, as well as civilian outreach programmes, it has made undeniable contributions to the security of humanitarian space and the protection of civilians. This credit must also go to the troop-contributing countries and to the leadership of the force.

76. Finally, I would like to thank my Special Representative, Youssef Mahmoud, in assuming the leadership of the Mission during a period of uncertainty over its future, which he did most ably, and for seeing it through the delicate period of consolidation and withdrawal. I also wish to extend my deep appreciation to the men and women of MINURCAT, national and international, civilian and uniformed, for their unwavering commitment to duty in the service of the United Nations.