CHAD:

IDPs in east facing continuing violence and hardship

A profile of the internal displacement situation

21 December, 2009

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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

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OVERVIEW

IDPs in east facing continuing violence and hardship

Around 168,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Chad in September 2009, as a result of conflict and human rights abuses related to tensions between Chad and Sudan, internal armed conflict, and inter-ethnic attacks against civilians. This number had fallen slightly from a 2008 high of 185,000, about one fifth of the population of eastern Chad. A profiling report showed in 2008 that 95 per cent of these internally displaced people (IDPs) were located in the Department of Dar Sila, and that almost 60 per cent were women between the ages of 15 and 40.

Despite the presence of United Nations and European Union peacekeepers, and repeated attempts to resolve internal and international conflicts, the causes of displacement have not ended, and widespread attacks by criminal gangs on civilians including IDPs and humanitarians have made eastern Chad extremely insecure. Since 2008, between 20,000 and 25,000 people have returned to their villages in the face of food insecurity and a lack of sources of income in IDP sites, but they have gone back to very unstable conditions. For most IDPs in eastern Chad, return is not yet a viable option.

Food insecurity and the lack of access to agricultural land and to natural resources such as water and firewood have been among the main concerns of IDPs. Meanwhile, they have faced arbitrary arrest, punitive fines, and various forms of gender-based violence. Internally displaced children have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling, while the army has continued to recruit them despite a 2007 demobilisation agreement with UNICEF.

With the government committed to military investment rather than social development, and national and international protection agencies hamstrung by access and capacity limitations, it remains unlikely that conditions in eastern Chad will permit durable solutions for IDPs in the foreseeable future.

Background and causes of displacement

Since 2005, up to 185,000 people have been displaced in eastern Chad as a result of conflict-related violence and human rights abuses. The main causes are tensions between Chad and Sudan, internal armed conflict in Chad, and inter-ethnic attacks against civilians; the three are also intricately linked.

The war in neighbouring Darfur caused a large influx of refugees over the border into eastern Chad. It also brought Darfuri rebels from the same Zaghawa ethnic group as Chad's President Idriss Deby. His willingness to allow them to operate from bases inside Chad spurred the government of Sudan to respond in kind by letting Chadian rebels operate from Darfur. Since then, the two governments have accused each other of harbouring and funding the other's armed opposition (OCHA, 21 June 2009). They have waged what has been described as a proxy war in which each other's rebels have carried out the actual fighting (Small Arms Survey, April 2008). The two countries have broken diplomatic ties on more than one occasion, and signed numerous peace agreements that have yet to succeed.

With these tensions as a backdrop, internal armed conflict erupted in Chad in 2006, after Deby reformed the constitution in order to run for a third term in office. Chadian rebels based in Darfur accused him of limiting government posts to members of his ethnic group, and of using oil

revenues to buy arms and bolster the government, instead of investing in social services and infrastructure to develop the country (ICG, 26 August 2009). Presidential elections were held in May 2006, and Deby won 65 per cent of the vote (IRIN, 29 May 2006). The results were contested by the political opposition which boycotted the election, and which had never accepted the legitimacy of Deby's initial rise to power by means of a military coup in 1990. An attempted coup preceded the 2006 election, and a second coup attempt in February 2008 and attacks in May 2009 have highlighted the failure of efforts to consolidate peace (OCHA, 21 June 2009).

Inter-ethnic attacks against civilians have also caused internal displacement in eastern Chad. Sudanese Janjaweed militias carried out cross-border raids against Chadian villages in 2006 and 2007, exploiting long-standing land disputes between ethnic groups. They perpetrated human rights abuses including massacres, rape, looting and burning of villages, and the forced internal displacement of up to 185,000 people who fled to camps (HRW, June 2009). It is widely believed that Chad's military strategy of concentrating troops at key entry points along the border left villages within Chad without protection and open to attacks (AI, 28 June 2006). While civilians may not be the intended targets of rebel attacks against government forces, the fighting has killed hundreds of people, and levels of insecurity have escalated in the wake of each confrontation.

Inter-ethnic violence has decreased considerably since 2007, only to be replaced by widespread attacks against civilians including internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and humanitarian workers, by bandits and criminal gangs known as "*coupeurs de route*" who have acted with almost total impunity. These criminal attacks have multiplied despite the presence of European Union forces, UN peacekeeping troops, and international and Chadian police units tasked with protecting IDPs, refugees, and humanitarian workers.

Peacekeeping operations and peace agreements

Peacekeeping operations

In 2007, in response to the growing levels of insecurity and human rights abuses in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of MINURCAT, the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), among the objectives of which was to help build up Chad's justice system and monitor the human rights situation; and the deployment of European Union (EU) troops known as EUFOR to protect Chadian IDPs and Sudanese refugees, safeguard humanitarian operations, and help restore stability. EUFOR was largely unable to ensure security in the absence of government forces (HRW, June 2009), and ill-equipped for the task of combating criminal gangs (IRIN, 16 May 2008).

EUFOR was replaced by UN peacekeeping troops in March 2009, and the mission's mandate was extended for one year (UNSC, 14 January 2009). Despite authorisation to deploy 5,200 troops, MINURCAT is currently working at half operational capacity with only 2,600 troops on the ground (UNSC, 14 October 2009). This is due to a lack of funding and to problems in the acquisition and transportation of military equipment by troop-contributing countries.

MINURCAT is also mandated to train a specialised Chadian police unit, known as the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* or DIS, to provide security in IDP sites and refugee camps and to patrol main towns in eastern Chad. As of September 2009, MINURCAT had trained over 800 DIS officers (UNSC, 14 October 2009). However, permanent DIS posts have only been set up in refugee camps, and patrolling all 38 IDP sites is said to be impossible due to lack of capacity and resources. Furthermore, humanitarian organisations have expressed grave concerns about abuses committed by DIS members.

MINURCAT has been unable to significantly improve the security situation in eastern Chad. UN officials have said that without its planned complement of troops and equipment, MINURCAT will

be unable to protect IDPs, refugees, and humanitarian workers (UN, 12 November 2009), or to create a secure environment conducive to the safe return of IDPs. The force's operational mandate also prevents it from being deployed to the border, thereby allowing Chad and Sudan to continue intervening freely in each other's internal crises (European Security Review, March 2008); and it has no political mandate to promote an inclusive peace process between the government and all parties concerned, including armed insurgents (ICG, 15 April 2009).

Peace agreements

Facilitated by the EU, the government and the political opposition signed an electoral reform agreement in August 2007 to oversee the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for 2010. Some progress has been made in implementing the agreement, such as the completion of a general population census. However, the agreement excludes armed insurgents from any negotiations or dialogue, and critics have highlighted the urgent need for a political dialogue between the government and opposition groups, both armed and unarmed, which focuses on the situation in eastern Chad rather than Darfur (Enough Project, February 2008).

In July 2009, the government and a coalition of three rebel groups known as the National Movement (*Mouvement national*) signed a peace agreement in Tripoli under the sponsorship of the Libyan government (ReliefWeb, 26 July 2009). However, the Union of Forces for the Resistance (*Union des forces de la resistance*), the main insurgent coalition bringing together eight rebel groups, remains outside the framework of any peace agreement. The internal political crisis and armed conflict in Chad will not be resolved without the participation of all rebel groups in negotiations.

Chad and Sudan have signed numerous agreements to end the support of each other's rebel groups, but none of these have been respected. The two most recent were the Dakar Agreement of March 2008 and the Doha Agreement of May 2009. A contact group (including representatives of Libya, the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Gabon, Eritrea, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union) was created to monitor the implementation of the Dakar Agreement, but the group has not met since November 2008; the implementation of the Doha Agreement has yet to begin (UNSC, 14 October 2009).

Latest displacement figures

Since 2007, UNHCR and its partners have conducted several profiling exercises to determine the number and location of IDPs and provide disaggregated data on their age and sex. A profiling report showed in 2008 that 95 per cent of IDPs were located in the Department of Dar Sila, and that almost 60 per cent were women between the ages of 15 and 40 (UNHCR, November 2008).

As of September 2009, there were over 168,000 IDPs living in 38 IDP sites in eastern Chad (OCHA, September 2009). The majority have little or no means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital (OCHA, 30 November 2009). The highest number of IDPs reported to date by the UN has been 185,000 in mid-2008 (OCHA, June 2008). This translates roughly into one in five of the local population in eastern Chad being internally displaced (OI, April 2009). No new internal displacements were reported in 2009.

Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR (UNHCR, December 2009).

Protection and assistance needs of IDPs

In 2009, the protection monitoring of IDP sites conducted by UNHCR and its partners found the main protection risks of IDPs to be insecurity, circulation of small arms in IDP sites, arbitrary arrest, punitive fines, theft of property, and violence against women including domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Domestic violence and FGM were the two most frequent types of violence against women observed by protection monitors in IDP sites (OCHA, 21 April – 4 May 2009).

The humanitarian community has established a referral system which allows victims of human rights abuses to seek medical, psychosocial, and legal assistance. Medical and psychosocial referrals are handled by international humanitarian organisations such as COOPI and HIAS, while legal assistance is provided by APLFT (*Association pour la promotion des Libertés Fondamentales au Tchad*), a national organisation of lawyers funded by the UN to provide free legal services (OCHA, 11-23 February 2009). While the referral system is an important and welcome step towards the protection of IDPs, it has many gaps that must still be addressed. One clear example is that APLFT is constrained by the limitations of the Chadian legal system. As there are no working courts in areas of displacement, victims must wait for the presence of roving courts once or twice a year to pursue legal action. Other problems are cultural and relate to the reluctance of most victims of sexual violence to seek assistance for fear of stigmatisation or reprisals from their communities.

Displaced children have also faced a range of threats. In IDP sites they have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling. One of the main problems is the lack of qualified school teachers. UNICEF and its partners, including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and *Première Urgence* (PU), have trained teachers from displaced communities to fill this gap, but displaced parents have been unable to pay their wages, making the process unsustainable. UNICEF continues to lobby the government to deploy and pay qualified teachers to work in IDP sites (OCHA, 26 March – 20 April 2009).

Government armed forces have continued to recruit children, despite a May 2007 agreement with UNICEF to demobilise children from the army and integrated rebel groups. Some of these children have fled from government training camps and returned to the IDP sites from where they were recruited, and they have reported severe abuses (UNSC, 7 August 2008). In September 2007, the UN identified the need to disarm, demobilise and rehabilitate between 7,000 and 10,000 children used in combat and non-combat roles by government forces and rebel groups (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008).

As required by Security Council Resolution 1612, the UN country team in Chad has established a task force on children and armed conflict, which is in December 2009 co-chaired by MINURCAT and UNICEF. The task force visits IDP sites and refugee camps to monitor the recruitment of children by armed groups. In August 2009, MINURCAT completed the rehabilitation of a transition centre where demobilised child soldiers are housed prior to being reunited with their families (UNSC, 14 October 2009).

Food insecurity, the lack of access to agricultural land, and the lack of natural resources such as water and firewood are three main concerns for IDPs in eastern Chad. In October 2009, the World Food Programme (WFP) declared that 40 per cent of the estimated 11 million population of Chad were suffering from food insecurity (OCHA, 2-16 October 2009). This was due to the poor distribution of rains in 2009, resulting on the one hand in droughts, a poor harvest, and a significant shortage of the staple millet crop, and on the other hand in floods and the destruction of food stocks (FEWSNET, 25 November 2009).

Issues of return

Since 2008, between 20,000 and 25,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin (OCHA, 25 June 2009). However, they have gone back to very unstable conditions, and without the support from traditional leaders that is needed to resolve the inter-ethnic conflicts that may have caused their displacement in the first place (OI, April 2009). They have been forced back by food insecurity, lack of access to land, and lack of income-generating activities in IDP sites.

UNHCR and its partner humanitarian agency Intersos have implemented a project to assess and profile villages of return. The idea is to provide reliable information on living conditions, population movements, gaps in social services, and possible returns. While this is a fundamental step towards determining whether return is possible, a new security grading system raises questions about the consistent protection of returnees. Villages are colour-coded as red, yellow, or green, according to how safe it is for IDPs to return. People from "safe" areas classified as green will no longer be considered as IDPs or receive food or non-food items such as sleeping mats, kettles and jerry cans. However, they will be allowed to remain in IDP sites and use schools, health services and water distribution points there (IRIN, 22 October 2009). This system should be carefully reviewed by the UN, as return is not the only durable solution and IDPs should not be forced to return to villages of origin just because these have been deemed safe.

For most IDPs in eastern Chad, return is not yet a viable option; however the UN has included the return of IDPs to their areas of origin in a series of benchmarks for evaluating MINURCAT's performance. Humanitarian agencies have expressed concern that using return as a measure of success might encourage MINURCAT to put pressure on IDPs to return prematurely (HRW, June 2009). Some are still traumatised by the violence of forced displacement, while others cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return.

National and international responses to internal displacement

National response

Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions. In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more money on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009).

The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the *Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées* (CNAPD), but it has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. In 2008, the government also set up the CONAFIT committee to coordinate humanitarian activities with MINURCAT, EUFOR and the humanitarian organisations working in Chad. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.

In October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legally binding regional instrument to protect the rights of IDPs. The Convention cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 15 African States. While the number of IDPs in Chad is not as high as in other African countries, ratification of the Convention by Chad would show its commitment to protecting the rights of IDPs and achieving

their durable return, resettlement or reintegration. By ratifying the Convention, Chad could act as a positive example for the region, given its strategic geo-political position between CAR and Sudan.

International response

The UN humanitarian response is led by a Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the UNDP Representative**,** while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has overall responsibility to coordinate the requests for funding of humanitarian organisations through a consolidated appeals process (CAP). More than 70 international humanitarian organisations provide assistance to displaced communities in eastern Chad, including IDPs and Sudanese refugees. The cluster system was introduced in Chad in July 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Chad was chosen as one of five pilot countries because of the complexity of its humanitarian crisis and the marked failings of the international community's response to IDPs (FMR, December 2007). These failings were characterised by an inability to maintain refugee camps in a stable environment while also responding to the needs of thousands of IDPs in a region with a sudden rise of insecurity.

13 clusters are now operational in Chad: protection, food security, health, nutrition, camp management/shelter/non-food items, water and sanitation, education, emergency telecommunications, early recovery, logistics, coordination and support services, security of staff and operations, and multi-sector activities for IDPs and refugees. Each cluster works closely with government counterparts, and meetings of the clusters are often co-chaired by government officials as a way to involve the government as an operational partner.

As of 25 November 2009, 68 per cent of the $400 million requested in the 2009 CAP was funded; however clusters had received widely varying percentages of their initial requests: nutrition was 93 per cent funded and coordination and support services 74 per cent, while multi-sector activities for IDPs and refugees were 53 per cent funded, water and sanitation 42 per cent, protection 40 per cent, health 28 per cent, education 15 per cent and agriculture only 14 per cent (OCHA, 18 November – 10 December 2009). The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recognised that Chad was an underfunded emergency, and allocated $5.5 million for life-saving assistance programmes to IDPs there (CERF News, October 2009).

The consolidated appeal for 2010 is for $451 million, to fund programmes to provide emergency relief including food aid and assistance to IDPs and to increase the self-sufficiency of displaced communities (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

Humanitarian access

Humanitarian organisations have been increasingly targeted in eastern Chad, and were facing an average of 25 attacks a month by 2009 (OI, 13 March 2009). In the first nine months of 2009, there were 192 serious attacks on humanitarian workers (UNSC, 14 October 2009), including killings and abductions; the number of security incidents has doubled since 2008 (VOA, 13 November 2009). In May 2008, the Head of Mission for Save the Children UK was shot and killed by bandits while travelling in a convoy near the border with Sudan (BBC, 1 May 2008). On average, UNHCR has two vehicles stolen a day, and the town of Abeche, a hub for humanitarian operations in Chad, has the highest-ever rates of crime against aid agencies (IRIN, 7 December 2009).

The delivery of aid has thus been repeatedly interrupted, leaving displaced communities whose lives are already precarious without assistance. According to the UN, at least 96,000 people are at risk of deteriorating living conditions due to continued suspensions or reduction of operations (UN News, 1 December 2009). High levels of insecurity have also prevented the access of

humanitarian agencies to IDPs living with host communities in areas closer to the border with Sudan, rendering needs assessments and the delivery of aid particularly difficult.

Criminal gangs in eastern Chad have started kidnapping aid workers. A French staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was abducted in early November and remains in captivity (VOA, 24 November 2009). The US Department of State issued a travel warning to Chad, emphasising that neither UN peacekeeping troops nor the government of Chad has been able to control criminal gangs attacking humanitarian workers (USDoS, 23 November 2009). While the travel warning highlights a situation that humanitarian organisations are well aware of, it underlines the fact that humanitarian space is shrinking at rapidly alarming rates.

Although UN peacekeeping troops and DIS police officers have provided military escorts for humanitarian workers, many agencies are unwilling to use escorts so as not to risk compromising their perceived neutrality. For some humanitarian agencies, the solution is rather to secure the roads on which aid convoys must travel (IRIN, 16 May 2008). This need is highlighted by a November 2009 attack against a convoy of UN agency vehicles that was being escorted by DIS, showing that even armed escorts are vulnerable to criminal gangs (OCHA, 18 November – 10 December 2009).

A meeting on humanitarian space in Chad is scheduled to bring together government officials and security forces, UN peacekeeping troops, UN agencies, and humanitarian organisations in the capital N'Djamena in late January 2010. An important subject for discussion will be the impact that the arrival of international aid organisations has had on the local population. According to Groupe URD, a French think tank, humanitarian organisations have driven up the cost of living significantly, generating resentment among the local population and encouraging the view that attacks against them are a form of justice (IRIN, 7 December 2009).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

Chronology of key events (1880s - May 2009)

BBC, 25 June 2008:

	Colonialism
1883-93	Sudanese adventurer Rabih al-Zubayr conquers the kingdoms of Ouadai, Baguirmi and Kanem-Bornu, situated in what is now Chad
1900	France defeats al-Zubayr's army
1913	French conquest of Chad completed; Chad becomes a colony within French Equatorial Africa
1946	Chad becomes a French overseas territory with its own territorial parliament and representation in the French National Assembly
1883-93	Sudanese adventurer Rabih al-Zubayr conquers the kingdoms of Ouadai, Baguirmi and Kanem-Bornu, situated in what is now Chad
	Independence
1960	Chad becomes independent with a southern Christian, Francois - later Ngarta - Tombalbaye, as president
1963	The banning of political parties triggers violent opposition in the Muslim north, led by the Chadian National Liberation Front, or Frolinat
1966	Northern revolt develops into a fully-fledged guerrilla war
1973	French troops help put down the northern revolt, but Frolinat continues guerrilla operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s with the help of weapons supplied by Libya
	Libyan intervention
1975	Tombalbaye deposed and killed in coup led by another southern Christian, Felix Malloum
1977	Libya annexes the northern Chadian Aouzou strip
1979	Malloum forced to flee the country; a coalition government headed by a Muslim northerner, Goukouni Oueddei, assumes power
1980	Libya sends in troops to support Oueddei in his fight against the Army of the North, led by a former prime minister, Hissene Habre
1981	Libyan troops withdraw at Oueddei's request
1982	Habre's troops capture the capital, N'Djamena
1983	The Organisation of African Unity recognises Habre's government, but Oueddei's forces continue resistance in the north with Libyan help
1987	The combined troops of Frolinat and the Chadian Government, with French and US assistance, force Libya out of the entire northern region apart from the Aouzou strip and parts of Tibesti
	First democratic elections
1990	Habre toppled after his army is defeated by rebels of the Sudan-based and Libyan-backed Patriotic Salvation Movement, led by a former Habre ally, Idriss Deby
1993	National democracy conference sets up a transitional government with Deby as interim president and calls for free elections within a year

1994	International Court of Justice rejects Libyan claims on Aouzou and rules that Chad had sovereignty over the strip
1996	Deby wins Chad's first multi-party presidential election
1997	Deby's Patriotic Salvation Movement triumphs on legislative elections
1998	The Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, led by Deby's former Defence Minister, Youssouf Togoimi, begins armed rebellion against the government
2000	July - Rebels of the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) say they have captured the key government garrison town of Bardai in the north
2001	20 March - Court of appeal in Senegal upholds ruling that former Chadian President Habre should not be made to stand trial in Senegal, where he is in exile. It decided that Senegal's courts do not have the jurisdiction to try Habre on torture charges during his eight years in power in Chad
2001	May - Deby declared winner in 20 May presidential election. Six unsuccessful presidential candidates are picked up for questioning by police but are released an hour later
2001	June - Chad's highest court confirms Idriss Deby's re-election even though results from 25% of polling stations were cancelled because of irregularities
2001	August - President Deby sworn in for a second five-year term
	Peace deals
2002	January - Government and Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) rebels sign Libyan-brokered peace deal intended to end three-year civil war
2002	May - MDJT rebels and government forces clash in the far north; 64 are killed in the first outbreak of fighting since January's peace accord
2003	January - Government signs peace deal with National Resistance Army (ANR) rebels, active in the east
2003	October - Chad becomes an oil exporter with the opening of a pipeline connecting its oil fields with Cameroon
2003	December - MDJT, government sign another peace accord. MDJT hardliners reject deal
	Darfur impact
2004	January-February - Thousands of Sudanese refugees arrive in Chad to escape fighting in Darfur region of western Sudan
2004	April-May - Chadian troops clash with pro-Sudanese government militias as fighting in Sudan's Darfur region spills over the border
2005	June - Voters back constitutional changes which allow the president to stand for a third term in 2006
2005	November - Former president, Hissene Habre, is arrested in Senegal over allegations of crimes against humanity
2005	December - Rebels attack the town of Adre, near the Sudanese border. Chad accuses Sudan of being behind the incident
2006	January - President Deby backs a law to reduce the amount of oil money spent on development. The move angers the World Bank, which suspends loans and orders the account used to collect oil revenues to be frozen
2006	March - Government says an attempted military coup has been thwarted
	Rebel attacks
2006	April - Rebels seeking to oust President Deby battle government forces on the outskirts of the capital. Hundreds of people are killed. Chad cuts diplomatic ties with Sudan, accusing it of backing the rebels
2006	May - President Deby is declared the winner of presidential elections. The main opposition parties boycott the poll
2006	January-June - Thousands of refugees flee eastern areas as marauding Arab Janjaweed militia from Sudan's Darfur region penetrate deeper into Chad
2006	July - Parliament approves the establishment of Chad's first state oil company, the Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT), which is expected to give Chad greater

	control over its energy assets
2006	August - President Deby threatens to expel US energy giant Chevron and Malaysia's Petronas for failing to honour tax obligations, but relents after coming to an agreement with the companies
2006	October - The army puts tanks on the street of the capital in anticipation of an apparent rebel advance
2006	November - State of emergency imposed in eastern areas bordering Sudan's Darfur region after a spate of ethnic violence
2006	December - Private newspapers stop publishing and several radio stations alter their programming to protest against state censorship under the state of emergency
2007	February - UN refugee agency warns that violence against civilians in Chad could turn into a genocide; it says killing tactics from neighbouring Darfur in Sudan are being used in eastern Chad
2007	May - Chad and Sudan agree to stop conflict spilling across their borders but critics fear the agreement is unlikely to reduce the violence
2007	August - Government, opposition agree to delay parliamentary elections by two years to 2009
2007	September - UN Security Council authorises a UN-European Union peacekeeping force to protect civilians from violence spilling over from Darfur in neighbouring Sudan
2007	October - Emergency declared along eastern border and in the desert north. Scandal as French charity tries to airlift a group of 100 "orphans" to Europe in what Chad describes as a smuggling operation
2007	December - Six French aid workers are convicted of child-trafficking and sentenced to eight years' hard labour, but are then repatriated to serve their sentences at home
2008	January - European Union approves a peacekeeping force for Chad to protect refugees from violence in Darfur
2008	February - Rebel offensive reaches the streets of Ndjamena, coming close to the presidential palace; France sends extra troops. Rebels are repulsed in fighting that leaves more than 100 dead
2008	March - The presidents of Chad and Sudan sign an accord in Senegal aimed at halting five years of hostilities between the two countries
2008	May - Violence between Chadian and Sudanese militias flares up, leading to Sudan cutting diplomatic relations and Chad responding by closing its border and cutting economic ties
2008	July - Security forces say they killed more than 70 followers of Muslim spiritual leader Ahmat Israel Bichara, who had threatened to launch a holy war, in fighting in southeast Chad
2009	January - Eight rebel groups unite to form new rebel alliance, the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), with Rally of Democratic Forces leader Timan Erdimi as its leader
2009	March - European Union peacekeepers in eastern Chad hand over to a new, larger UN force known as MINURCAT
2009	May - UN Security Council condemns a major anti-government rebel offensive in the east

Civil war in Chad (June 2008)

ARI, 6 June 2008:

"When Idriss Deby seized power in 1990 by ending the dictatorship of Hissein Habre, he raised the hope that Chad would break with its long tradition of politico-military rule. His first steps towards opening up the political system were rather promising in a country deeply traumatised by the tyranny of his predecessor, with which Deby was also prominently associated as a former Chief of Staff. He reintroduced a multi-party system, authorised the emergence of pluralist media and allowed for the adoption of a new democratic constitution in 1996. However, the first presidential (1996) and legislative elections (1997) rapidly indicated that the ruling party and its leader were still caught in the logic of the one-party system. This impression was confirmed in the second set of elections (2001 and 2002) that proved even more chaotic in terms of organisation and popular participation and which led to its boycotting by the main political parties. In reaction to the mostly negative statements about his re-election, Deby made the promise to abide by the constitution and to step down in 2006.

The direct trigger of the current political crisis in Chad is to be found in Deby's decision in 2004 to amend the constitution and run for a third term. This has not only alienated important parts of his inner circle and ethnic group, who reproached him for monopolising the country's resources for his own clan's benefit but also radicalised the already existing tendency towards the militarisation of political entrepreneurs. In the absence of democratic institutions to manage elite competition, armed rebellion remains the only way to express political grievances. As soon as he announced his will to run for a third term, Deby antagonised large factions of his close entourage, with some of them joining the rebellion. In fact, two of the main rebel movements in Chad are currently led by former close collaborators of President Deby, who changed sides and thereby confirmed the thin line between government and rebellion. The defection of these two leaders was just the most visible point of a much greater number of defections that significantly affected Deby's legitimacy. Although rebel movements are known for their incapacity to form sustainable political platforms, they generally manage to build *ad-hoc* coalitions aimed at seizing power. In that respect, the February 2008 coup attempt was almost identical with another similar coup in 2006 that also failed because of decisive French involvement on Deby's side, the only difference being that the April 2006 coup attempt was organised by another coalition of rebel movements led by Mahamat Nour –not to be confused with Mahamat Nouri– who subsequently became Defence Minister in the Government after Libyan-led negotiations.

Although Deby's constitutional changes are by no means exceptional in Africa, their impact on a weakly institutionalised political system such as Chad's is much more destructive. The concomitance of the constitutional amendment and the beginning of the exploitation of oilfields has added to the fragility of Chad's situation. Unlike his predecessors, who did not enjoy this essential privilege, Deby is heading a country with newly discovered oil wealth. This significantly increases his possibilities for patronage and his ability to co-opt opposition leaders by offering them government positions in exchange for their collaboration. It is likely that the prospects of ruling over newly acquired oil wealth played a significant role in Deby's change of mind regarding the constitution. His own clan within the Zaghawa ethnic group (the Bideyat) have particularly profited from the President's largesse. As a minority group (around 3% of the population) they have gained a political and economic importance that is reflected in their over-representation in government, administrative and army positions. The increased oil revenues particularly enhanced Deby's ability to further militarise his regime by (mis)using the terrorist metaphor and attracting international support. By describing his political opponents as terrorists, Deby is not only postponing necessary democratic reforms but he is also trying to secure military support from countries like France and the US.

To summarise, it can be argued that the concentration of power in Deby's hands, increased corruption, the militarisation of his regime and the systematic repression of opposition leaders do constitute a serious threat to sustainable peace in Chad. But most worrying of all is the President's adamant refusal to find a negotiated political solution to the country's problems through negotiations with both civilian parties and rebel movements. Deby's strategy has always

consisted in signing separate agreements with civilian opposition groups and armed movements. By doing so he seeks to avoid the creation of a platform of all opposition groups against him. Part of this attitude is due to the strong support the President receives from important international actors. The outcome is that he is sowing the seeds of the further institutionalisation of coups as a political instrument in his country."

GRIP, 12 February 2008:

"Les conflits du Darfour, du Tchad et de la République Centrafricaine comportent quatre caractéristiques communes :

1. La gestion non équitable du pouvoir et des ressources nationales semble être une des causes principales de ces conflits. Elle crée un cercle vicieux à travers la marginalisation d'une partie de la population ou des régions du pays, qui à son tour donne lieu à une insurrection réprimée par le pouvoir et finalement à la perpétuation de la violence. Dans ce contexte, certains leaders n'hésitent pas à instrumentaliser les appartenances communautaires, ethniques, régionales voire religieuses pour mobiliser des partisans. Il est dès lors important pour les intervenants extérieurs, de ne pas perdre de vue qu'aussi longtemps que ce cercle vicieux n'est pas rompu, les interventions ne font qu'alimenter les causes de l'instabilité.

2. L'absence de volonté politique de certains protagonistes pour assurer un retour à la paix ou le non-respect des engagements pris entre les gouvernements des trois pays et leurs oppositions armées respectives n'offre pas un terrain favorable à des opérations de paix classiques.

3. Les difficultés de gérer la sécurité transfrontalière qui nécessiterait de coopérer avec les voisins et de développer des infrastructures spécifiques dans chaque pays concerné. Or, ces zones sont souvent marginalisées par le pouvoir, deviennent incontrôlables et sont le lieu de tous les trafics.

4. Le rôle parfois ambigu des grandes puissances guidées par des intérêts géostratégiques. Prises entre la volonté de ne pas déplaire aux partenaires qui disposent des matières premières (pétrole, minerais, bois) et la promotion effective des principes démocratiques et de bonne gouvernance, leurs politiques peuvent varier considérablement et brouiller les cartes de la résolution des conflits."

Conflict between Chad and Sudan (April 2008)

Small Arms Survey, April 2008:

"The current far-reaching conflict in Darfur extends well beyond the borders of Sudan, particularly into Chad. Efforts by the Chadian government to avoid taking sides in the conflict were shattered in 2003–04 by the arrival of some 200,000 Sudanese refugees across the border and the establishment of rear bases in eastern Chad by Darfurian rebel groups. The rebels were strengthened by their membership of cross-border ethnic groups, including the Beri (Zaghawa and Bideyat), to which the Chadian president Idriss Déby belongs. Déby's inability to control his Beri kinsmen, including those closest to him, brought an end to more than ten years of good relations with the Sudanese regime of Omar al-Bashir. Subsequently, violence similar to that in Darfur began emerging in eastern Chad: attacks on villages, mainly non-Arab ones, by militias known as the *janjawid*, who recruit largely (though not solely) from nomadic Arab groups. This has caused the internal displacement of more than 170,000 Chadian civilians.

Some of the perpetrators of this violence have links with Darfur: some of the *janjawid* active in Chad appear to be the same as those active on the western border of Darfur, who are supported by the Sudanese government and recruit from both Sudanese and Chadian Arab groups. But more than the *janjawid* in Darfur, those in Chad also recruit from non Arab communities, whose motivation comes mostly from local conflicts for land with other non-Arabs, which are similar but not related to the land conflicts in Darfur. The violence in eastern Chad has roots in the aggravation of these local conflicts between communities, as well as in the weakness of Chadian institutions and the Chadian people's widespread frustration with the country's unequal wealth distribution—particularly its oil wealth—and lack of democracy. The same factors have also led to an increase in the power of the rebel groups in Chad, who, thanks to the cooling in Chad–Sudan relations, have been supported directly by Khartoum since 2005."

MRG, March 2008:

"The conflict in the east of the country has several different dimensions, all overlapping. There is an internal dimension, related to the autocratic nature of Déby's regime, as well as personal and sub-tribe rivalries. This has driven members of the president's own family, and his own Zaghawa tribe to take up arms. One of the main rebel groups, the RFC, for example, is led by the president's uncle. Another important factor is ethnic tensions, which spread across borders and run back decades, if not longer. In the simplest terms, the Sudanese government accuses the Chadian authorities of offering support to the Darfur rebels – particularly those from the Zaghawa ethnic group – to fight against Khartoum. Although a minority in Chad (estimated at 1–2 per cent of the population), the Zaghawa form the political elite in the country. By contrast, in Sudan, the Zaghawa are a marginalized group, excluded from political power by the Arab elite concentrated in Khartoum. Chadian Zaghawa have provided vital support, including funds and weaponry, to their Darfur kinsmen, in their struggle against the central government.

On the other side, Déby has accused Khartoum of allowing Chadian rebels to use Darfur as an operational base. In the Chadian context, this fact has special significance – as both Déby and his predecessor Habré launched their successful coups from rear bases in Darfur. There are several rebel groups ranged against Déby. One of the most important has been the FUC – fighters hailing from the Tama ethnic group, which has had a longstanding rivalry with the Zaghawa. This group – led by Mahamet Nour Abdelkarim – almost toppled Déby in 2006. But a Libyan-brokered peace deal saw Nour appointed defence minister, and a promise to integrate FUC into the main armed forces. However, by late 2007, this deal had unravelled, with ex-FUC fighters taking up arms again and Nour seeking refuge in the Libyan embassy in N'jamena. The breakdown in the FUC agreement coincided with the collapse of another Libyan-backed peace initiative between the Chad government and four rebel groups: the UFDD, CNT, RFC and UFDD-Fondamental. This lasted just a month. By late 2007, these groups were reported to have embarked on a fresh offensive against the government, with correspondents reporting the fiercest fighting in the east for months.

The turmoil in the east has also become further complicated by the involvement of the Sudanese government-backed Janjaweed militia. Amnesty International (*Sowing the Seeds of Darfur,* June 2006) has documented the cross-border attacks from this Arab militia targeting 'African' tribes along the border. The causes of these attacks are partly criminal – theft of cattle and assets, and partly strategic. As Amnesty notes, the militia attacks communities that are left unguarded when the Chadian army is otherwise engaged with the rebels. The goal is to spread mayhem and insecurity, and thereby increase pressure on Déby. However, there are also disturbing racial overtones to the attacks, as it is 'African' tribes that are targeted. Amnesty reports victims being racially abused while being attacked, with comments from Janjaweed attackers such as 'This land is ours' – meaning it belongs to Arabs. The export of the racially motivated warfare, which is a defining feature of the Darfur conflict and which has led to accusations of genocide, is an extremely worrying dimension to the growing disorder and insecurity in the east."

HRW, January 2007:

"The root causes driving the crisis in eastern Chad are multiple. They include conflict over land and natural resources, particularly water, in an area of environmental extremes where rain failure can seriously disrupt access to pasture and the success of agriculture. Beyond resource conflict, the destabilizing impact of the broader political tensions in Chad, the influence of the numerous armed groups in the region, many linked to the Darfur conflict, and the manner in which the Chadian government has responded to the insecurity are all driving conflict."

Overview of armed groups (April 2008)

U.S. DOS, 11 March 2008:

"The Chadian National Army (ANT), Republican Guard, Gendarmerie, National Police, Nomadic Guard (GNNT), and National Security Agency (ANS) are responsible for internal security. The ANT, Gendarmerie, and GNNT report to the Ministry of Defense; the National Police report to the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration; and the Republican Guard and ANS report to the president. The Ministry of Defense is under the direction of the presidency."

Safer Access, March 2008:

Chadian National Army (Armée National du Tchad - ANT)

The ANT has approximately 30,000 men, including the Gendarmerie. As can be expected from a land-locked state, the Chadian National Army dominates the armed forces. The formerly autonomous *Force d'Intervention Rapide* (FIR), which acts as the President's personal guard, was merged into the National Army in late 2005. As a whole, the ANT is too large, under-trained and under-funded. A small air force operates a handful of aircraft, largely providing logistics support to the Army. There are also two civilian intelligence agencies active in the country, both with reputations for brutality.

Armed opposition groups

1) Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD) is led by Mahamat Nouri, a former Minister of Déby's government. The UFDD was founded and is supported by the Sudanese government. It is probably the best structured rebel group in Chad. Most of its members are Goran and are based in Sudan.

2) UFDD 'Fondamentale' is a splinter group that separated from the UFDD in September 2006. It is led by Abdelwahid Aboud and mainly operates in northeastern Chad.

3) Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC) is an alliance of eight rebel groups, all of whom share the stated goal of overthrowing the current Chadian regime. The FUC is led by Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim (not to be confused with Mahamat Nouri of UFDD), who signed a peace agreement with the government in December 2006, becoming Minister of Defense. He was later dismissed and rejoined the FUC in December 2007.

4) Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (RFC) was formerly known as *Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques* (RaFD). It is a mainly a Zaghawa rebel group, led by Tom and Timan Erdimi, Déby's nephews. Like most Chadian rebel groups, they are based in Sudan.

Small Arms Survey, April 2008:

"*Janjawid*

This term is mainly used to refer to the militias that are auxiliary to the Sudanese government. The *janjawid* are recruited mostly among nomadic Arab groups known as the 'Abbala' (camel herders), and among Arab groups originating in Chad (such as the Rizeigat Abbala, Beni Halba, and Misirya) who moved to Darfur, especially during the 1980s, because of droughts and conflicts in their homeland. Khartoum has also encouraged non-Arab populations to join the militias by exploiting rivalries between these communities in West Darfur, in particular calling upon the Gimir and the Tama (these latter originating in Chad) to take up arms. In Chad, the term *janjawid* has a different meaning, closer to the one it had originally in Darfur when it appeared in the 1990s: it refers to largely autonomous militias, often involved in livestock lootings, and recruiting among Arabs (both Sudanese and Chadian) and non- Arabs, mainly Ouaddaïans. In Sudan, the *janjawid* have been drawn more and more into the Sudanese paramilitary forces—the Popular Defense Forces and Border Intelligence Guards—which explains why they often wear Sudanese uniforms."

For more detailed information on armed opposition groups in Chad, see:
"Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia", Gérard Prunier, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), February 2008.

Causes of displacement

Internal armed conflict in Chad (December 2009)

OCHA, 21 June 2009:

"Instability in Chad stems from the internal political crisis in the country and incorporates a regional dimension brought about by a proxy war between Sudan and Chad in which both governments accuse each other of harbouring and supporting each other's armed opposition groups. The fighting in May 2009 in eastern Chad between Government forces and Chadian armed opposition groups are a clear indication of the tense relations between Chad and Sudan and highlight the slow progress in efforts to consolidate peace, most recently with the signing of the Doha agreement of 3 May 2009 and the Dakar agreement of 13 March 2008. The failure of Chad and Sudan to implement mutual agreements and commitments has contributed to transforming eastern Chad into a theatre of persistent insecurity. Under such conditions, humanitarian agencies have been compelled to apply more rigorous and restrictive security measures, including the occasional evacuation of aid workers from some localities. This in turn disrupts the delivery of essential humanitarian services to affected populations in eastern Chad."

UNHCR, May 2008:

"The sporadic influxes and displacement have been triggered by increasing insecurity along the Chad-Sudan border involving skirmishes between Chadian rebel movements and the Chadian national army, incursions of armed militias from Sudan and inter-ethnic violence, causing Chadian local populations to become internally displaced …"

Enough Project, November 2007:

"… the Chadian government and its rebel opponents are engaged in a seething civil conflict marked by occasional eruptions of intense violence. Politics in Chad have traditionally been a winner-takes-all affair—political elites have politicized ethnicity, and strongmen from various ethnic groups constantly vie for the ability to plunder state resources.

The most dangerous conflict right now is the power struggle between President Deby, a Zaghawa, and Defense Minister Mahamat Nour, a Tama. Nour led a Khartoum-backed rebel group called the United Front for Change, or FUC, and launched a 2006 coup attempt that nearly ousted Deby from power. With help from the French government and Sudanese rebel groups, Chadian forces held their ground in N'Djamena. Nour fell out of favor with Khartoum and, lacking a patron, signed a deal with Deby early in 2007. But each man interprets the details of the agreement differently: While President Deby has tried to weaken the former rebels by disarming and redeploying them in small groups to barracks around the countryside, Nour had anticipated that his forces would be fully integrated into the Chadian army with their weapons and ranks intact. Unwilling to accept Deby's terms, many FUC units have refused to disarm. Nour has accused the Zaghawas—and by extension Deby—of being the aggressors, and tensions are now escalating … Once again the victims of unchecked political violence, civilians on both sides of the border are fleeing the growing conflict."

HRW, 9 January 2007:

"The conflict in Chad can be defined as an internal armed conflict, albeit a conflict with international dimensions.

… Chad plunged into civil war not long after it had gained independence from France in 1960, and has been intermittently wracked by internal and international conflicts ever since. Armed opposition to Chad's current leader, President Idriss Déby, increased in intensity in late 2005 when waves of defections from the Chadian national armed forces reinforced several Chadian rebel movements."

AI, 28 June 2006:

"Faced with such [rebel] threat, the government of Chad withdrew its armed forces to defend the strategic entry points from western Sudan, effectively denuding some areas along the eastern border of troops and leaving the civilian population to fend for themselves. These areas were then subjected to larger and more prolonged Janjawid attacks, causing thousands of civilians to flee their homes and become internally displaced."

Proxy war between Chad and Sudan (April 2008)

Enough Project, November 2007:

"There are three layers of violence that have led to the displacement of over 180,000 Chadian civilians in little more than a year. The first is the proxy war between Chad and Sudan. Each government is supporting rebels fighting against the other. The Sudanese government has been and continues to encourage Janjaweed attacks across the border into Chad as part of its strategy to regionalize the Darfur crisis and punish Chadian President Idriss Deby for supporting Darfur's rebel groups … Quite clearly, the crisis emanating from Sudan has dramatically intensified conflict within Chad."

Small Arms Survey, April 2008:

"In 2004, and particularly from the end of 2005, Khartoum began actively to support various groups of Chadian rebels based in Darfur. In April 2006, one of the groups, the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC), sometimes also called the Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (FUCD), attempted a first lightning raid on N'Djamena, which the Chadian government only halted at the last minute with French support. Since then, tensions between the two states have continued to rise. In April 2007, the Chadian Army itself entered Sudanese territory and confronted troops from Khartoum. And in January 2008, Chadian planes bombed Chadian rebel positions in West Darfur. Throughout 2006 and 2007, however, it was mainly the rebel groups in Darfur who, on several occasions, fought rebel groups from Chad alongside the Chadian Army, in Chadian territory. Sudan and Chad have thus become embroiled in a proxy war through various rebel movements and auxiliary militias."

GRIP, 12 February 2008:

"Depuis 2005, le Tchad et le Soudan s'accusent mutuellement de soutenir leurs rébellions respectives : le Soudan soutiendrait les rebelles tchadiens basés à l'Est du pays alors que le Tchad est accusé de soutenir les rebelles du Darfour. Malgré les multiples médiations menées par l'Union africaine et la Libye, les relations politiques entre les deux pays ont continué à se détériorer depuis 2005 lorsque le Tchad s'est déclaré en « *état de belligérance* » avec le Soudan après l'attaque des rebelles tchadiens sur la ville d'Adré, à la frontière du Soudan.

Par ailleurs, le Tchad subit plus que les autres pays voisins, les conséquences humanitaires, politiques et sécuritaires du conflit du Darfour. En effet, 500.000 personnes se sont réfugiées ou déplacées à l'est du Tchad à cause des exactions commises au Darfour."

Africa Research Bulletin, December 2007:

"Rebels in both Chad and Sudan have profited from their poor relations. Darfur rebels have bases in N'Djamena and a Reuters witness has seen Chadian rebel camps on the Sudan-Chad border. Chadian army deserters have told Reuters that they supported Darfur rebels in 2003, when mostly non-Arab insurgents took up arms accusing Khartoum of neglecting the remote region."

Inter-communal violence in Chad (December 2009)

Human Rights Watch (HRW), June 2009:

"Dar Sila, an administrative district in southeast Chad, was the scene of widespread paramilitary violence between 2005 and 2007 that left hundreds of civilians dead, an outbreak of bloodletting known locally as "La Guerre Ethnique." The proximate cause of violence was not so much ethnic animus as a confluence of interests between Sudanese Janjaweed militias, Chadian rebel groups, and communities in Dar Sila with exploitable grievances."

Small Arms Survey, April 2008:

"The Dar Sila region of south-eastern Chad has been raided by *janjawid* militias since the conflict in Darfur began in 2003. The raids intensified at the end of 2005 when the international community became aware that Chad might become 'contaminated' by Darfur's violence. Fighting has taken place between these militias and the rebels in Darfur, for whom Dar Sila is one of their rear bases in Chad. But as in Darfur, the *janjawid* mostly attack the non-Arab civilians in the

region, particularly the Dajo, who hold the sultanate of Dar Sila. And as in Darfur, villages are burnt, cattle and goods stolen, and the civilian population forced to flee from their lands. By February 2008 more than 170,000 people had been displaced inside Chad, mainly in Dar Sila, in fewer than two years and are now dependent on international humanitarian aid."

US DOS, 11 March 2008:

"IDPs were driven from their villages by a combination of attacks by Janjaweed-like mounted raiders from Sudan, Chadian rebels, and Chadian ethnic militias, both Arab and non-Arab. These attacks occurred mostly in the area south of the Abeche-Adre road in the Dar Assongha and Dar Sila departments."

GRIP, 12 February 2008:

"En outre, des milices armées venant du Soudan attaquent les camps de réfugiés sur le territoire tchadien et terrorisent les populations. Selon les observateurs et les organisations humanitaires présentes sur le terrain, elles utilisent les mêmes modes opératoires que ceux observés au Darfour : viols, meurtres et exactions sans distinction, y compris sur les enfants."

Enough Project, November 2007:

"Also inter-communal, the third layer of violence is stoked by the cooperation between Sudanese Janjaweed and some Chadian Arab militias. Arab attacks on non-Arab communities in eastern Chad have led to widespread displacement and, in some cases, retaliation against local Arab populations. As in Darfur, the traditional structures that might have resolved these and other conflicts have broken down in eastern Chad. In the absence of any mechanism for resolving these disputes before they spin out of control, the growing politicization of ethnicity is stoking a cycle of displacement and revenge attacks. Battle lines are drawn on ethnic lines, and small arms flooding into the region are feeding increased bloodletting."

HRW, January 2007:

"Relations in Dar Sila [eastern Chad] between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups have been characterized by longstanding grievances over land and access to water, but inter-communal relations deteriorated dramatically in 2006, as militia attacks against civilians became increasingly commonplace, with dozens of villages looted and burned, leaving civilian areas alternately depopulated and overflowing with internally displaced persons."

Attacks by criminal gangs and banditry (December 2009)

ICG, 15 April 2009:

While insecurity in the Chadian East in 2005-2006 was due to the attacks of the Janjaweed and other armed groups, by 2008 the most important problem was the growth of banditry and criminality.

As a result EUFOR-MINURCAT has failed to curb the banditry, inter-community conflicts or inter-ethnic violence manipulated by the main Chadian players. In regards to serious banditry, EUFOR's role was confined to a deterrent presence. It had no judicial powers to arrest suspects, a task that remained solely within the legal competence of the Chadian authorities.

OCHA, 30 November 2009:

The security environment in Chad remains volatile and incidents have continuously increased. Crimes in and around towns in the east and violent acts of banditry throughout the country, in particular in eastern Chad, present significant challenges to humanitarian actors in implementing their work.

Reuters, 29 July 2009:

The slow deployment of United Nations peacekeepers in Chad and the Central African Republic has limited their ability to deal with the poor security situation in both countries, a UN official said on Tuesday. The UN special envoy to the countries, Victor Angelo, told the 15-nation Security Council the situation in north-eastern Central African Republic "has been extremely insecure over the last three months and continues to be of serious concern as armed groups and bandits continue to operate in the area.

Reuters, 3 December 2008:

Recruitment by Darfur rebel groups in camps in eastern Chad and worsening banditry in the area are threatening aid supplies to hundreds of thousands of refugees, the U.N. humanitarian chief said on Wednesday.

Peacekeeping operations

European Union troops unable to ensure security (December 2009)

- UN Security Council resolution 1778 authorised the deployment of European Union troops to eastern Chad.

HRW, June 2009:

"In response to widespread rights violations in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council approved MINURCAT in September 2007. A European Union bridging force (EUFOR) appears to have deterred a resumption of mass killings, but it was largely unable to fill the security vacuum left by the lack of government presence in the east. In January 2009, the UN Security Council replaced EUFOR with UN peacekeeping troops, and established a set of benchmarks to evaluate the success of the mission that included the return of IDPs to their areas of origin. In March 2009, the UN took control of the military component of the mission from EUFOR."

IRIN, 16 May 2008:

"Faced with frequent armed robberies, many aid groups in eastern Chad say the European Union Force (EUFOR), deployed there since February, is not doing its job of protecting them. At the same time, many of those same aid groups say they do not want to jeopardise their neutrality by being associated with the armed force."

UN troops replace European Union Force (EUFOR)

UN SC 14 January 2009:

"Authorizes the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR in both Chad and the Central African Republic at the end of its mandate … to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas."

Peace efforts

Peace agreements between Chad and Sudan (July 2008)

- There is a history of failed peace agreements between Chad and Sudan.
- Both countries have accepted the creation of a monitoring group and mediation by President of Congo Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso.

UN SG, 8 July 2008:

"Only a real political dialogue between the Government of Chad and the armed and non-armed opposition groups, as well as a mending of the relationship between Khartoum and N'Djamena can provide a lasting solution to the conflict in Chad. Once again, I urge the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to fully implement the 13 March Dakar agreement and take steps towards the normalization of their relations. The United Nations stands ready to work together with the African Union and other partners in supporting efforts to restore lasting peace and security along the Chad-Sudan border."

UNAMID, July 2008:

"The Head of the Dakar Contact Group and President of Congo Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso, paid an official visit to Khartoum from 2 to 3 July to discuss with his Sudanese counterpart, President Umar Hassan Ahmad Al- Bashir, the implementation of the Dakar Agreement between Sudan and Chad and means of reducing tension between the two countries.

During a joint press conference, held at the Presidential Palace in Khartoum on 3 July, the Congolese President said the normalization of relations between Sudan and Chad was crucial to the stability of the region. President Al-Bashir, on his part, confirmed Sudan's acceptance of President Nguesso's mediatory role.

UNAMID Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada said, ‘he situation in Darfur has no doubtsuffered due to the growing tensions between Chad and Sudan. The security of civilians and IDPs, especially those across the border, was further compromised, and so was the delivery of humanitarian relief.’ e expressed full support for President Nguesso’s initiative adding that he was very hopeful the situation would improve, ‘ow that Sudan has accepted his mediatory role.’"

UN SG, 1 April 2008:

"On 13 and 14 March 2008 … President Deby and President Al-Bashir signed a new agreement under the auspices of President Wade of Senegal. The parties agreed to reconcile, normalize their relations and contribute to peace and stability in the two countries and in the region. After recalling all previous agreements (the Tripoli agreement of 8 February 2006, the Khartoum agreement and its additional protocols of 28 August 2006, the Cannes Declaration of 15 February 2007 and the Riyadh agreement of 3 May 2007), the parties asked the international community to take all necessary measures to put in place a ‘peace and security force’ in order to ‘guarantee and observe the mixed operations aimed at securing their common border’. In addition, the parties agreed to the establishment of a contact group aimed at monitoring the implementation of the agreement, to cease supporting the activities of armed groups and to ensure that their respective territories were not used for the destabilization of one or the other State.

[...]

While the international community can assist the parties in settling their internal and bilateral differences through constructive means, in the final analysis the parties themselves must demonstrate the political will and commitment necessary to resolve the underlying political and security challenges in the area."

Safer Access, March 2008:

"Chad-Sudan Peace Agreement - 13 March 2008: This is the sixth peace agreement to be signed between Chad and Sudan in the past five years. The current treaty, known as the Dakar Agreement, does not include any of the rebel groups as signatories, which likely indicates that it will fail to produce any real change.

Both sides of the agreement are obligated by its terms to *‘inhibit all activities of armed groups and prevent the use of our respective territories for the destabilisation of one or the other of our states.’* In addition, a monitoring group composed of Foreign Ministers from a number of African states is to be formed to ensure compliance with the agreement.

This agreement is undoubtedly a response to the intense international pressure that has been placed on both sides, rather than any real desire for reconciliation. Even as it was being signed, reports of rebel movement in the border region continued. Although a marginally hopeful development, it is very unlikely toy signal any change in the situation on the ground."

Enough Project, February 2008:

"In the past, the international community has ceded mediation between the Chadian government and armed opposition to Libya, which acted independently and with negli-gible results. Al-Gaddafi strives to maintain influ-ence over Chad’s affairs, opposes the deployment of U.N. and EU forces to protect civilians, and has at times supported rebel groups on all sides of the conflicts in Darfur and Chad.

This time, the AU has asked al-Gaddafi and Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou-Nguesso to mediate between President Deby and the rebels. It is critical to start this process on the right

foot by taking steps to include other actors—particularly the United States, EU, France, China, and the United Nations—in efforts to secure a ceasefire. The State Department should send additional political officers to N'Djamena to support this initiative and base a full-time diplomat in eastern Chad. The EU, France, China, and the United Nations should also devote more diplomatic resources."

Political dialogue between Chadian government and opposition groups (April 2008)

- Political dialogue in Chad will only succeed if all opposition groups are included—armed and unarmed.
- An Independent Commission for Inclusive Dialogue (CIDI) was created in Paris in March 2008.
- The process of political dialogue must be supported by high-level diplomatic engagement.
- Political dialogue must also address inter-communal violence.

Enough Project, February 2008:

"The international community must quickly build on a ceasefire by pressing for genuine political dialogue between the Chadian government and opposition groups—armed and unarmed. Right now, the EU is supporting political dialogue between the government and unarmed political opposition. Although those talks have yielded some minor breakthroughs, such as a basic agreement on steps to reinforce democratic institutions, Deby's recent moves to suppress non-violent political opposition threaten to scuttle this process. Moreover, the talks lack the consistent high-level diplomatic engagement that would yield results. Conflict-based politics are the root cause of the crisis in Chad, and the interna-tional community must press for radical political reform to break this cycle.

The EU-led process should be expanded to include *all* opposition and civil society groups, including armed groups currently fighting in the East. The first objective should be for armed groups to transition themselves into unarmed political parties, with appropriate security guarantees from President Deby. Political negotiations should not focus on doling out ministries to rebel leaders and political strongmen, but genuine political reform and laying a foundation for free-and-fair elections. The United States should work with the EU, AU, France, Libya, and other regional states to broaden the political process, and urge China to support political reform. Such reforms should include a new constitution with a bicameral legislature (two chambers) that gives space for Chad's many factions political, ethnic, and geographic—to have a greater say in the critical issues facing the country.

So, *is* anyone serious about ending the crisis in Chad?
The answer right now is "no": the United States, France, the EU and the AU are all guilty of putting band-aids over gaping wounds, and China remains unswerving in its stated policy of non-interference with internal politics. To help end the cycle of conflict and begin to stabilize the region, the international community needs to get serious about peacemaking in Chad. A failure to do so condemns Chadians to a continuing cycle of conflict and pov-erty, increasing the likelihood that crimes against humanity will continue to wrack the region."

CIDI, April 2008:

"L'objectif de la CIDI est très simple : œuvrer dans le but de rassembler les tchadiens pour arriver à un dialogue politique susceptible d'ouvrir les voies vers une paix définitive au Tchad. Il s'agit

d'impliquer toutes les parties en conflit, tous les acteurs politiques, la société civile et tous les groupes armés afin de d'explorer les pistes de solutions aux problèmes du Tchad. La finalité du processus étant d'arriver à des élections libres et transparentes, ne soufrant d'aucune contestation. La CIDI est ouverte à tous ceux ou celles qui sont soucieux du devenir du pays."

GRIP, 12 February 2008:

"Le principal défi de la paix au Tchad réside dans les positions très volatiles des acteurs politiques. On constate que les différents accords de paix signés sont rarement mis en œuvre et les principes de gestion équitable des ressources du pays (notamment le pétrole depuis 2003) restent, selon les observateurs, de la rhétorique.

A titre d'exemple, le gouvernement tchadien et les quatre principaux groupes rebelles opérant à l'Est du pays ... avaient signé, le 3 octobre 2007 à Tripoli (Libye), un accord qui prévoyait la participation des rebelles dans la gestion des affaires de l'État et le cantonnement de leurs combattants sur des sites définis de commun accord. Cet accord a volé en éclat avec l'attaque de la coalition des trois mouvements sur N'Djamena début février 2008. La vague d'arrestations des opposants qui a suivi le nouvel échec des rebelles réduit à néant une initiative pourtant soutenue par l'Union européenne."

Enough Project, November 2007:

" … a comprehensive political strategy must include a focus on and meaningful investments in local conflict resolution. For example, this should be a central non-military component of the EU force's mandate and operations. Conflict resolution forums to address inter-communal violence will be essential. If not addressed, the inter-communal dimension of the conflict, fuelled by other factors, could be the Achilles heel of the EU mission. One has only to observe what happened with the U.N. missions in eastern Congo and Darfur to see the disastrous consequences when protection missions are weakened, and sometimes endangered, and when local dynamics are overlooked or ignored.

The inclusion of political officers in the EU mission, perhaps provided by the United Nations, would allow for the resuscitation of the traditional mechanisms for resolving inter-communal conflict, in cooperation with the Chadian government. Experienced political officers could facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue on local problems and also, and importantly, inform national political deliberations.

Other steps should also be taken in support of inter-communal reconciliation. Both humanitarian and development initiatives can be designed to promote inter-group cooperation through the rehabilitation of markets; support for agricultural production and trade; assistance to pastoralist communities; ensuring increased access to water resources; and the opening of schools and health clinics—all in ways that help to bring communities together for mutual benefit and survival. Support for the rule of law, through state institutions of justice and in coordination with support for traditional reconciliation processes and actors, is also a critical element."

General human rights overview

Human rights commitments

- Table of international human rights commitments made by Chad

- Table of regional human rights commitments made by Chad

International human rights commitments made by Chad:

Instruments	Entry into force	Signature	Ratification / Accession
Charter of the United Nations (1945)	24 Oct 1945	(Joined the UN 20 Sep 1960)	
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)	10 Dec 1948		
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949)	21 Oct 1950		Accession 5 Aug 1970
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949)	21 Oct 1950		Accession 5 Aug 1970
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949)	21 Oct 1950		Accession 5 Aug 1970
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949)	21 Oct 1950		Accession 5 Aug 1970
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	12 Jan 1951		
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	22 Apr 1954		Accession 19 Aug 1981
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	4 Oct 1967		Accession 19 Aug 1981
Internal Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)	4 Jan 1969		Accession 17 Aug 1977
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	3 Jan 1976		Accession 9 Jun 1995
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	23 Mar 1976		Accession 9 Jun 1995
Minimum Age Convention / ILO No. 138 (1973)	19 Jun 1976		21 Mar 2005
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977)	7 Dec 1978		Accession 17 Jan 1997
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977)	7 Dec 1978		Accession 17 Jan 1997
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)	3 Sep 1981		Accession 9 Jun 1995

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	26 Jun 1987		Accession 9 Jun 1995
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	2 Sep 1990	30 Sep 1990	2 Oct 1990
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention / ILO No. 182 (1999)	19 Nov 2000		6 Nov 2000
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (2000)	18 Jan 2002	8 May 2002	28 Aug 2002
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000)	12 Feb 2002	3 May 2002	28 Aug 2002
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)	1 Jul 2002	20 Oct 1999	1 Nov 2006

Regional human rights commitments made by Chad:

Instruments	Entry into force	Signature	Ratification / Accession
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969)	20 Jun 1974	10 Sep 1969	12 Aug 1981
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981)	21 Oct 1986	29 May 1986	9 Oct 1986
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)	29 Nov 1999		30 Mar 2000
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998)	25 Jan 2004	6 Dec 2004	
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women In Africa (2003)	25 Nov 2005	6 Dec 2004	
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons	(Adoption expected end 2008; entry into force expected 2009 or 2010)		

Human rights reports (2009)

- Amnesty International (AI), No place for us here: Violence against refugee women in eastern Chad, September 2009.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW), The Risk of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in Eastern Chad, June 2009.

- Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Nowhere to Turn: Failure to Protect, Support and Assure Justice for Darfuri Women, May 2009.
- US Department of State (USDoS), Human Rights Report: Chad, 25 February 2009.

Human rights reports (2006 - 2008)

- Amnesty International (AI), No protection from rape and violence for displaced women and girls in eastern Chad, 2007.
- Amnesty International (AI), Are we citizens of this country?: Civilians in Chad unprotected from Janjawid attacks, 2007.
- Amnesty International (AI), Sowing the seeds of Darfur: Ethnic targeting in Chad by Janjawid militias from Sudan, 2006.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW), Early to war: Child soldiers in the Chad Conflict, 2007.
- Human Righst Watch (HRW), "They came here to kill us": Militia attacks and ethnic targeting of civilians in eastern Chad, 2007.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW), Violence beyond borders: The human rights crisis in eastern Chad, 2006.
- International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR), Darfur and eastern Chad: "We want security, we want justice", 2007.
- U.S. Department of State, Chad Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2008.
- United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Chad, 2005.

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

168,467 IDPs (December 2009)

OCHA, September 2009:


Eastern Chad - IDPs Figures
168,467 IDPs (As of September 09)
OCHA
IDPs sites
Refugees Camps
Returnees' villages
Returnees
Regions capitals
Major places
Populated places
Roads & Tracks
Regions boundaries
International boundaries
OUADDAI Region name
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CHAD
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WADI FIRA
BILTINE
ABECHE
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WEST DARFUR
Guereda
Ouaddo 2600
Hile Sheikh 4400
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Gozbeida 2171
Kolonge 6121
Guereda 844
Abdi 17720
Guereda 27459
Kerfi 4482
Mouraba 800
Mouraba 488
Merkia
Kerfi
Kiskir
Kolonge
Kaoboru
Gozbeida
Gozbeida
Gozbeida

166,000 IDPs (April 2009)

UN SC, 14 April 2009:

"Eastern Chad continues to face a grave humanitarian crisis. More than 50 humanitarian aid agencies continue to provide urgently needed food, water/ sanitation, health care, protection and education to approximately 250,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps and 166,000 internally displaced persons living in 38 sites, as well as 700,000 among the local population."

UNHCR, January 2009:

Location (Sub-Prefecture / Place)	IDP estimate (number by district)
SP AM ZOER	
Kekerke	870
SP MABRONE	
Goundo	2,500
SP ADRE RURAL + Borota	4,400
SP HADJER-HADID	
Alacha et alentours	1,805
Arkoum, Goudiang	7,689
SP BOROTA	
Goungour	9,157
SP ABDI	
Abdi	5,856
SP GOZ BEIDA	
Gassire	17,899
Gouroukoun	17,563
Kerfi, Koloma, Koubigou, Sanour, Ganachour	26,301
SP KOUKOU-ANGARANA	
Habile	33,506
Aradib	17,720
Tiero, Marena	0
SP ADE	
Ade	16,785
SP DAGUESSA	
Dogdore/Tour	27,450
Daguessa	600
SP AM TIMAN	
Ideter	1,516
Ardo, Badine, Al Kouk, Maka	5,386
SP HAOUICH	500
Haouich I-II, Amtalata I-II, Binedir, Wizine, Mirer	6,203
Sarafaye, Tinaye, Am Sit	6,830
TOTAL	166,718

185,000 IDPs (June 2008)

UN OCHA, June 2008:

Country	Dates	Causes of Displacement	General Trends
Chad	December 2007 179,900 June 2008 185,300	Inter-ethnic conflicts between government forces and rebel groups, and rebel attacks against civilian supplies.	Increase by 5,400 following clashes in N'djamena in early 2008.

Graph shows IDP trends over the last 1.5years

IDP figures below 400,000



180,000 IDPs (March 2008)

UNHCR, 31 March 2008:

Place (SP = Sous-Prefecture)	Estimate of IDPs
DAR-TAMA	
SP AM ZOER	
Kekerke	870
ASSOUNGHA	
SP MABRONE	
Goundo	2,500
SP ADRE RURAL + Borota	4,400
SP HADJER-HADID	
Alacha and surrounding areas	5,856
Arkoum, Goudiang	15,904
SP BOROTA	
Goungour	9,157
OUARA	
SP ABDI	
Abdi	5,856

GOZ BEIDA	
SP GOZ BEIDA	
Gassire	10,741
Gouroukoun	12,469
Kerfi, Koloma, Koubigou, Sanour	18,687
SP KOUKOU-ANGARANA	
Habile	28,804
Aradib	11,799
Tiero, Marena	0
SP ADE	
Ade, Karoub-Tawa	9,543
SP DAGUESSA	
Dogdore/Tour	27,500
Daguessa	600
BAHR AZOUM	
SP AM TIMAN	
Ideter	1,516
Ardo, Badine, Al Kouk, Maka	5,386
DJOROUF AL AHMAR	
SP HAOUICH	500
Haouich I-II, Amtalata I-II, Binedir, Wizine, Mirer	(6,203)
Sarafaye, Tinaye, Am Sit	6,830
TOTAL	178,918

US DOS, 11 March 2008:

"The number of IDPs increased from 112,000 in January [2007] to 180,000 in August [2007]. The IDPs were largely the former residents of villages along the eastern border with Sudan. Some IDPs were forcibly displaced two or three times."

UNHCR, 30 November 2007:

"In addition, an estimated 180,000 Chadian nationals have been displaced in the border area with Sudan following attacks on villages by armed militia and mostly interethnic tensions and fighting."

170,000 IDPs (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"Although humanitarian organisations agree that the number of IDPs has been increasing continuously since April 2006, there is no common understanding of the current scope of the displacement situation, and the estimates of the number of IDPs differ. While some organisations have reported a figure of 105,000 to 120,000, other agencies have proposed a range of between 140,000 and 165,000. However, a profiling exercise undertaken in 14 IDP sites by Intersos, IFORD, UNHCR and ICRC in April 2007 estimated the total number of IDPs in the Dar Assoungha and Dar Sila departments of Ouaddai region at 146,896. This figure still needs to be validated by humanitarian agencies. It does not, however, cover all IDP sites or areas which are currently inaccessible to humanitarian organisations. Moreover, people continue to be forcibly displaced, with around 1,000 newly displaced reported around Guereda in Wadi Fira region in

May 2007. (UNICEF, 15 May 2007; WFP, 16 May 2007; UNICEF 11 June 2007) As of mid-June 2007, UNHCR estimates that there are more than 172,600 IDPs in eastern Chad. (UNHCR, 17 June 2007)."

140,000 IDPs (May 2007)

- Humanitarians organisations estimate 140,000 civilians displaced over 18-month period.
- Majority of IDPs are located in Dar Sila and Dar Assongha.
- IDP sites: 9 major sites; 17 smaller, scattered sites.

UN OCHA: May 2007

“Military operations and intercommunity violence have resulted in a steady deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Humanitarian organisations estimate that 140,000 Chadians have been internally displaced over the past 18 months, mainly in the Dar Sila and Dar Assongha departments. While most IDPs are from Dadjo and Massalites origins, attacks on 'Arab' communities have recently been on the rise and additional displacements could still happen before the rainy season, particularly in areas bordering Darfur. At this stage, prospects for the return of IDPs appear limited.”

Concentrated sites
Humanitarian partners identified 9 major IDP sites:

Sites	Estimated number of IDPs
Gassire	16,000
Gourounkoun	13,000
Koubigou	7,000
Koloma	7,600
Habile	9,000
Aradip	8,500
Dogdore	23,000
Ade	12,000
Goz Bagar/Arkoun	9,000
Total	105,100

Disseminated sites
To avoid increased concentration of IDPs in large sites, special attention will be paid to 17 smaller scattered sites:

Sites	Estimated number of IDPs
Goudiang	3,000
Alacha	4,100
Adre	4,400
Goungour	6,000
Goundou	120
Ouadjye	150
Bredjil	100
Goundo	2,500

Abdi	6,500
Daguessa/Arday	650
Daguessa Centre	700
Marena	NA
Tiero	NA
Ganachour	1,600
Kerfi	3,000
Ideter	1,400
Ardo/Badine/Al Kouk	1,300
Total	29,670

112,000 IDPs (January 2007)

UNHCR, 5 January 2007:

" … the deteriorating security situation in eastern Chad had resulted in the displacement of up to 20,000 Chadians over the past two weeks … More than 100,000 Chadians are now displaced within their own country."

IDPs	
SUB-PREFECTURE (SP) / Village	Estimated number of IDPs
Kounoungou	1,861
Mabrone	2,500
SP ADRE	
Adre	800
SP HADJER-HADID	
Alacha et alentours	4,119
(Goz Bagar, Goudiang...)	11,280
SP BOROTA	
Goungour	6,441
Borota	4,007
SP ABDI	
Abdi	3,000
SP GOZ BEIDA	7,448
Gassire	11,800
Gouroukoun	10,600
Sanour, Koubigou, Kerfi	3,510
SP KOUKOU-ANGARANA	
Habile, Aradib	11,324
Marena	3,000
Tiero	4,400
SP ADE	
Ade	8,000
SP DAGUESSA	
Dogdore/Tour	13,786
Daguessa	1,310
SP AM TIMAN	
Am Timan et alentours	3,500
TOTAL	112,686

90,000 IDPs (November 2006)

UNHCR, 24 November 2006:

"UNHCR now estimates that more than 90,000 people are displaced in eastern Chad, including at least 15,000 since the beginning of November in the south-east of the country near the border with Sudan's troubled Darfur region. Some 7,000 of them have gathered in the outskirts of Goz Beida, where they have sought shelter under trees or wherever they can get it."

66,000 IDPs (October 2006)

UNHCR Protection, October 2006:

IDPs	
SUB-PREFECTURE (SP) / Village	Estimated number of IDPs
Kounoungou	50
Mabrone	1,200
SP ADRE	
Adre	800
SP HADJER-HADJID	
Alacha et allentours	4,800
SP BOROTA	
Goungour	6,500
Borota	4,000
SP ABDI	
Abdi	2,000
SP GOZ BEIDA	
Gouroukoun	10,505
Sanour, Koubigou, Abchour	2,865
SP KOUKOU-ANGARANA	
Habile, Aradib	3,649
Marena	1,391
Tiero	4,427
SP ADE	
Koloye	7,771
SP DAGUESSA	
Dogdore	15,000
Daguessa	1,310
TOTAL	66,268

56,000 IDPs (August 2006)

UNHCR Protection, August 2006:

IDPs	
SUB-PREFECTURE (SP) / Village	Estimated number of IDPs
SP ADRE	
Adre	800
SP HADJER-HADID	
Adjiz, Ridjilita	1,500
Goz Bagar	350
SP BOROTA	
Goungour	4,800
Borota	3,000
SP ABDI	
Abdi	3,000
SP GOZ BEIDA	
Gouroukoun	9,000
Sanour, Koubigou	2,865
SP KOUKOU-ANGARANA	
Habile, Aradib	2,163
Marena	1,391
Tiero	4,427
SP ADE	
Koloye	6,400
SP DAGUESSA	
Dogdore	15,000
Daguessa	1,310
TOTAL	56,006

40,000 IDPs (May 2006)

FEWS NET: 31 May 2006:

"As of the beginning of May, the size of the displaced population is estimated to be approximately 35,000 to 40,000 individuals scattered throughout the Sila and Assongha Departments, with women and children accounting for 70% of this group."

Geographical distribution

IDPs located in Assoungha and Sila (May 2008)

Interagency mission, 7 May 2008:

Geographical distribution of IDPs in Dogdore (Sila)

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] A Dogdoré, il n'y a pas un site dénommé Dogdoré mais un ensemble de petits sites tout autour de Dogdoré. On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour."

URD, 26 April 2008:

" … le déplacement forcé de quelques 180,000 tchadiens … essentiellement dans les régions de l'Assounga et du Sila, en raison d'une montée de l'insécurité dans leurs zones d'origine. La concentration d'un grand nombre d'individus (ex: 60,000 personnes concentrées autour de Goz Beida, 70,000 autour de Goz Amer) sur des surfaces relativement limitées dans une région où traditionnellement les villages ne dépassent que très rarement 3,000 âmes …

L'Assoungha

A part dans sa partie Nord, où les confrontations entre nomades et autres groupes sont d'occurrence fréquente et entraînent des déplacements temporaires, le contexte ethnico-sociale de l'Assoungha n'a pas entraîné de tensions graves entre les communautés. Le problème principal, notamment dans l'Assoungha Sud, est celui des intrusions d'éléments armés venant du Soudan et pratiquant le raid et le rezzou contre les villages Massalit. La sécurisation d'une bonne partie de l'Assoungha sud durant la saison des pluies par la crue du Ouadi Kaja semble être suffisamment réelle pour que les mouvements durant la période de culture soient assez importants. Les efforts de patrouilles en cours par l'EUFOR, alors que les zones sont encore accessibles, semblent être bien perçus par les populations, ce qui pourrait encore accentuer les mouvements des prochaines semaines vers les zones d'origine.

Le Sila

Le Sila est une zone beaucoup plus complexe du fait de sa composition ethnique, des interactions entre agriculteurs et éleveurs et d'une équation particulière de la violence dont une partie est héritée de problématiques plus politiques et de changements dans les alliances des mouvements de l'opposition armée tchadienne. Il y a manifestement deux zones à problématiques assez différentes, pour lesquelles les facteurs de différenciation sont d'une part la présence ou l'absence de grands transhumants ou des pasteurs dotés d'une mobilité plus limitée sur les terroirs villageois et d'autre part le traumatisme lié à la brutalité des actions conduites par des éléments extérieurs qui semblent hélas avoir été soutenus par des acteurs locaux. Les villages abandonnés de l'ouest Sila comportent presque tous des traces de mise en culture active durant la dernière saison des pluies et, pour certains, de premières réinstallations pour la période de culture 2008, tandis que ceux de l'est de l'axe Nord Sud passant par Koukou restent désespérément vides. Rien de significatif n'aura lieu néanmoins dans la zone sans un effort important et conjoint des autorités traditionnelles et administratives. Les défis qui les attendent sont nombreux :

- recréer la confiance entre des communautés entre lesquels le sang a coulé au delà de ce que les mécanismes traditionnels savent normalement gérer ;
- assurer qu'une culture d'impunité ne se met pas en place, et n'encourage ainsi l'émergence d'un climat de vendetta. Le mélange des systèmes de compensation traditionnels (dya, accords intervillageois), de justice transactionnelle et de justice moderne sera complexe à établir."

FEWS NET, May 2006:

"As of the beginning of May, the size of the displaced population is estimated to be approximately 35,000 to 40,000 individuals scattered throughout the Sila and Assoungha Departments, with women and children accounting for 70% of this group. The host villages for the country's displaced population are:

• Allacha, Borota, Goungour and Amlyouna in Assongha Department
• Koukou, Koloye, Daguessa, Moudeina, Dogdoré and Gouroukoun in Sila Department."

Most IDPs have moved away from the border towards Goz Beida (July 2006)

UN OCHA, 14 July 2006:

"Most of the internally displaced who moved westwards away from the border –some 10-15,000 people– went to the Goz Beida area where there are two Sudanese refugee camps and where UNHCR and a number of NGOs have a presence.

The Chadian government and humanitarian organizations have agreed on the need to avoid setting up 'camps' for the internally displaced, so as not to create a pull-factor for all those desperate for humanitarian aid. Most of the internally displaced are therefore living with host families and are being assisted mainly through community-based programmes. Where settlements cannot be avoided, the policy is to select sites close to host villages to which humanitarian organizations have access and where they can have adequate water, land for cultivation and protection. In the Goz Beida area, Chadian authorities and UNHCR remain locked in negotiations with displaced people who refuse to move to new sites despite the fact that their current location is prone to flooding and does not meet the agreed criteria."

Disaggregated data

IDP figures in Dogdore and surrounding sites (June 2008)

UNHCR, 30 June 2008:

Cantons	Population (30/05/08)	Women	Men
Dogdoré	1,328	740	588
Barh Azoum	5,321	2,927	2,394
Barh Azoum Ambrouin	5,977	3,385	2,592
Waddi kadja	8,448	4,798	3,650
Signar Dadjo	1,798	1,039	759
Signar	4,354	2,526	1,828
Total	27,226	15,415	11,811

Disaggregation by sex (November 2007)

UNHCR, November 2007:

La population dénombrée est à majorité féminine : environ 56% contre 44,2% des hommes, soit un rapport de masculinité de 80. Cette structure est presque la même que celle obtenu lors du RGPH de 1993 dans la région du Ouaddaï où le poids relatif des femmes était de 55,1%.

Cette répartition varie selon le site comme le montre si bien le graphique 1.2. En effet, le sureffectif des femmes est relativement moindre (poids de femmes en dessous à 55% ou rapport de masculinité au dessus de 85) dans trois sites à savoir Habile, Aradib, Koloma, Koubigou et dans une moindre mesure Abdi (graphique 1.2).

Graphique 1.2 : Poid relatif des femmes dénombrées selon le site:



Disaggregation by ethnicity (November 2007)

UNHCR, November 2007:

"Le tableau 1.7 met en évidence la composition ethnique des enquêtés. On constate, au niveau global, une grande diversité des groupes ethniques en présence. Les Dadjos et les Massalits constituent les groupes majoritaires de l'ensemble de la population enquêtée. Sept enquêtés sur dix, tant chez les hommes que les femmes, sont Dadjos. Le second groupe ethnique bien représenté (un enquêtés sur cinq) est Massalit (19,5%). Les autres groupes sont minoritaires. Il s'agit principalement des Maba (3,9%), des Kadjaksé (2,0%) et des Moubu (2,4%).

Tableau 1.7. Répartition (en %) de la population enquêtée selon l'ethnie et par sexe :

Ethnie de l'enquêté site	Masculin	Féminin	Ensemble
Maba	4,0	3,8	3,9
Massalit	14,7	21,1	19,5

Tribus arabes	0,1	0,2	0,2
Hadjara	0,1	0,0	0,0
Zagawa	0,1	0,1	0,1
Dadjo	73,0	69,0	70,4
Kadjaksé	2,5	1,7	2,0
Moubou	2,5	2,3	2,4
Autre	3,0	1,8	2,2
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

On peut relever l'absence quasi-totale des personnes déplacées se réclamant des ethnies suivantes : Tribus arables, Hadjara et Zagawa.

Les différences de structure selon l'ethnie entre les hommes et les femmes s'observe au niveau de trois ethnies : Massalits (14,7% chez les hommes contre 21,1% chez les femmes), Dadjo (73,0% chez les hommes contre 69,0% chez les femmes) et dans une moins mesure Kadjaksé (2,5% chez les hommes contre 1,7% chez les femmes). L'avantage des femmes chez les Massalits semble avoir été compensé par leur désavantage chez les Dadjo et les Kadjaksés.

La structure des enquêtés ayant le statut de chef de ménage selon l'ethnie suit présente exactement la même structure que celle de l'ensemble des enquêtés sans distinction de statut dans le ménage."

UNHCR, May 2006:

" … [IDPs] are mainly from the following tribal groups: Ouaddaian, Massalit, Arabs, Fur and Dadjo. The majority of the IDPs come from Bir Sale, Hillket, Goz Merem, Diniese, Mourmondji, Langata, Hadjer Beid and Modeyna. They live in makeshift shelters that afford them limited protection from the harsh conditions in Borota, Koloy, Goungour, Dogdore/Tur and Goz Beida."

Disaggregation by causes of displacement (November 2007)

UNHCR, November 2007:

" … les enquêtés évoquent plusieurs causes dont les plus importantes sont consignées dans le tableau 2.3. Il ressort que l'attaque des villages par les Janjaweeds est la cause qui rassemble à elle seule 89% de l'ensemble des opinions émises. Elle est de loin suivie par les conflits intercommunautaires (6,6%) et, dans une moindre mesure, les dispositions préventives prises par une partie de la population pour se mettre à l'abri d'un conflit présupposé imminent dans leur village d'origine ou de première installation (2,5%). L'insécurité créée par le conflit entre les forces gouvernementales et d'opposition n'est citée que par une infime minorité des personnes interviewées (1,6% des réponses recueillies), comme d'ailleurs d'autres causes non reprises dans le tableau 2.3 (l'exaction d'éléments des forces gouvernementales, la décision des autorités administratives ou militaires et enfin le souci de réunification familiale). Par contre, aucun enquêté n'a cité les rasions économiques pour justifier son déplacement vers le site d'installation."

Tableau 2.3 : Répartition des enquêtés par site selon les principales causes de leur déplacement du lieu de résidence antérieur

Site de l'enquête	Attaque du village	Conflit avec les	Dispositions préventives prises	Insécurité créée par les affrontements entre les

	par les Janjaweeds	communautés voisines	pour échapper à un conflit imminent	forces gouvernementales et d'opposition
Abdi	46,9	30,6	19,7	2,0
Alacha	86,8	7,2	1,8	4,2
Goungour	98,1	0,5	0,0	1,4
Goz Bagar	96,4	1,4	0,0	1,9
Kerfi	77,5	12,8	9,8	0,0
Aradib	92,0	5,8	1,7	0,6
Gassiré	86,2	12,1	1,5	0,2
Gouroukoun	90,9	7,4	1,7	0,0
Habile	90,9	3,4	2,4	2,8
Koloma	87,3	8,6	1,5	2,2
Koubigou	92,9	4,3	1,4	0,7
Goundiang	90,9	9,1	0,0	0,0
Ensemble	89,1	6,6	2,5	1,6

70% of IDPs are women and children (May 2006)

FEWS NET, May 2006:

"As of the beginning of May, the size of the displaced population is estimated to be approximately 35,000 to 40,000 individuals scattered throughout the Sila and Assongha Departments, with women and children accounting for 70% of this group."

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Displacement patterns by causes of displacement (May 2008)

Inter-Agency mission, 7 May 2008:

Patterns of displacement in Dogdore (Sila)

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. Trois vagues de mouvement de population se distinguent à savoir la première vague qui se situe au premier semestre de 2006 liée aux attaques des supposés «Janjawids» dans la localité de Modoyna. La seconde tendance a eu lieu en décembre 2006 suite aux conflits intercommunautaires tandis que le troisième mouvement de populations qui s'est passé en avril 2007 est lié aux attaques des villages Marena et Tiero."

Intersos, December 2007:

"Bien que toutes les raisons de déplacement avancées soient liées à la sécurité, on peut distinguer deux typologies de flux. Une première liée directement aux attaques (attaque, conflit ethnique), actuellement décroissante, et une deuxième due plutôt à une perception générale d'insécurité (manque de sécurité, prévention, raisons économiques) qui donne origine à des mouvements préventifs.

En règle générale, lors des interviews les Arabes ont la tendance à désigner comme *Toro Boro* toutes les personnes qui directement ou indirectement les ont attaqués, tandis que les groupes noirs appellent tous les attaquants *Djandjawid,* sans effectuer de distinction. Si on met en évidence les rapports existants entre groupes ethniques et raisons du déplacement, il est intéressant de remarquer comment les mouvements des Dadjo et des Kadjaske ont été pour la plupart liés aux raisons d'insécurité (attaques ou manifestations d'hostilité) tandis que les mouvements des Arabes et des Ouaddaiens sont plutôt causés par des raisons de prévention ou bien de conflit ethnique (peur liée aux représailles). La peur de la rétorsion est très ressentie par les Arabes et leurs alliés, les Ouaddaiens et les Mimi, qui ont été victimes d'agressions très violentes après les attaques dont ils étaient considérés comme directement ou indirectement responsables."

Causes de déplacement



Displacement patterns by ethnicity (December 2009)

HRW, June 2009:

"Militia attacks on civilians in Dar Sila have produced two distinct patterns of internal displacement. Dajo, Massalit, and other non-Arab IDPs generally fled to the periphery of large towns where government soldiers and humanitarian workers maintain an active presence. At least 110,000 IDPs are concentrated in and around the towns of Goz Beida, Koukou-Angarana, and Dogdoré, the vast majority of them non-Arab. Fearing retaliation Arabs, Ouaddaïens, and other groups associated with the Chadian Janjaweed have tended to seek refuge in rural and remote areas, leaving many outside the reach of humanitarian agencies. Members of this group are sometimes referred to aid workers as the 'unofficial' or 'invisible' displaced."

Intersos, December 2007:

"Pour ce qui concerne la direction des déplacements, si l'on croise les données ethniques soit avec les lieux de déplacement, soit avec les villages d'accueil, on peut en tirer certaines remarques intéressantes :

1) Les Dadjo se sont dirigés vers les zones de Goz Beida et de Koukou Angarana : en direction soit des sites officiels des déplacés soit vers des villages juges plus surs ;

2) Les Arabes se sont déplacés vers la zone d'Abéché ; la zone de Kerfi et Amtimane, où il existe une route migratoire ; vers la zone proche du Bar Azoum, pour la présence de points d'eau ; vers

la zone de Goz Beida, où restent de nombreux fericks pendant la saison pluvieuse et enfin vers le Soudan ;

3) Les Ouaddaiens se sont déplacés surtout vers la zone d'Abéché, de Daguessa et de Dogdoré. La zone d'Abéché est considérée leur zone d'origine: ils étaient partis vers le Sila il y a 30 ans à cause de la famine des années 1984/85. Maintenant, pour éviter l'insécurité générale sur le territoire, ils ont décidé de retourner chez eux ;

4) Les Sygnar sont partis vers le Soudan : il serait intéressant de confronter cette affirmation avec les associations humanitaires présentes au Soudan, pour vérifier s'il y a des réfugiés de cette ethnie."

Overview of patterns of displacement (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"While more than 45,000 Chadians have taken refuge in Darfur, the majority of displaced people have moved westward and taken refuge in the Assoungha, Bahr Azoum, Dar Sila, Dar Tama and Ouara departments. The more than 100,000 IDPs who are hosted in the Dar Sila are mainly concentrated around the villages of Goz Beida, Goz Amer and Dogdoré. Others have moved close to refugee camps and humanitarian actors in the hope of finding security and assistance. Most IDPs are concentrated in nine major sites and 17 scattered smaller sites where security is not always guaranteed, while many other displaced people have remained in the most insecure border areas, south of Goz Amer, where humanitarian access is limited. IDPs to the north of Goz Bagar have been displaced at least twice since 2005. In Abdi, IDPs started to arrive at the beginning of 2007 and continue to arrive at the sites.

While the Darfur crisis started in 2003 and brought about the flow of more than 230,000 Sudanese refugees to eastern Chad, the internal displacement crisis in this region only started at the end of 2005 and developed in three main waves. The first wave took place between the end of 2005 and mid-2006, when some 53,000 civilians (UN OCHA, November 2006) were forced to flee the south-eastern border with Sudan's Darfur. From February to April 2006, several villages near the border were attacked, forcing the residents to move to what they thought would be safer areas. There they were attacked and displaced again. Some 12,000 civilians were reported to be concentrated in the area of Goz Beida, while the rest remained closer to their villages (UNHCR, February 2007).

The second wave of displacement started at the end of 2006 along with a significant deterioration of the security situation. In November 2006, following a wave of inter-ethnic violence between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups, some 50 villages south-east of Goz Beida were raided and at least 30 burned and destroyed. Over 250 people were killed and hundreds wounded. The attacks resulted in the displacement of some 25,000 civilians who gathered in the outskirts of Goz Beida, near Koukou Angarana, and in Koloy/Ade area (MSF, 22 November 2006; UNHCR, 24 and 28 November 2006; AI, 1 December 2006; IRIN, 11 December 2006). Between December 2006 and January 2007, the situation deteriorated further and another wave of attacks in the Koukou-Angarana area left 30 people dead and displaced an estimated 20,000 Chadians. More than 10,000 were displaced as a result of cross-border attacks, allegedly by Janjaweed militia, in the region of Borota. Another 10,000 from more than 20 villages fled inter-communal hostilities and gathered in the village of Gassire, 8 km north of the town of Goz Beida, while other displaced moved towards Goz Amir refugee camp (MSF, 18 December 2006; UNHCR, 5 January and 27 February 2007).

The third wave started on 31 March 2007 when, following brutal attacks on the villages of Tiero and Marena 45 km east of the village of Koukou-Angarana, more than 9,000 civilians from 31 villages were forced to flee. Between 200 and 400 people were killed and at least 80 wounded. The people displaced, who took refuge in the new Habilé site for IDPs, blamed the attacks on Janjaweed militiamen on horses and camels assisted by Chadian rebels with heavy weaponry and vehicles (UNHCR, 10 April 2007; OXFAM, 20 June 2007). At the time of writing, displacements continue."

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

General protection issues

Protection Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Organisations working on protection of IDPs: ACF, APLFT, COOPI, HIAS, ICRC, Intersos, IRD, LWF, MSF-H, OXFAM GB, PU, UNICEF, UNHCR.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad
Who does What Where - Protection - As of July 09

Issued: 24 July 09



Protection response to IDPs (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

Achievements The main achievements in the protection cluster during the first half of 2008 have included: • Following a major profiling exercise conducted between April and May 2007, a general head counting took place in Dogdoré in March 2008. The exercise covered 28,000 IDPs, and preparatory activities are underway to cover the Goz Beïda and Koukou IDP sites; • A common protection monitoring and response system has been developed and adopted in April 2008, in order to ensure that protection incidents are reported, and analytical reports are being shared with all relevant actors in order to ensure adequate response and activities; • Trainings and awareness campaigns on GBV have been conducted, and standard operating procedures were developed, for prevention and response; • A survey of female genital mutilation has been conducted in refugee camps and surrounding areas in eastern Chad. In the domain of child protection specifically, major achievements included: • A total of 512 children have been released from various armed groups and rehabilitated, from the beginning of 2007 to June 2008. Reinsertion of children released in 2007 has continued in the first half of 2008, while advocacy is ongoing for the release of more children; • Child friendly spaces have been established in all IDP sites in Dar Sila department. More than 55 child wellbeing committees have been created, and are monitoring grave child rights violations; • Awareness campaigns on child trafficking have been conducted in IDP sites.
Gaps • The weak judiciary system does not allow proper legal response to cases of human rights violations and protection incidents; • Advocacy remains poor, and needs to be strengthened in order to address the issues identified. • Impunity is widespread; • More work needs to be done, in order to maximise the involvement of national authorities in creating an environment conducive to durable solutions; • Coordination of GBV initiatives remain insufficient and reporting mechanism are weak.
Response Plan Protection activities for the second half of 2008 will focus on: • Facilitating favourable conditions for durable solutions, by strengthening inter-community dialogue, onflict resolution and peaceful co-existence programmes; • Conducting IDP profiling in all sites as well as in major returning areas; • Promoting advocacy for the capacity building of the judiciary system, and fight against impunity; • Promoting stronger responses to child trafficking; • Strengthening coordination and reporting mechanism in the domain of GBV and related activities; • Improving the response to individual cases of human rights violations identified through the protection monitoring network.

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"Il ressort des études effectuées par le groupe sectoriel chargé de la protection des déplacés que de janvier à juin 2008 quelque 181 cas incidents portant atteinte aux droits des déplacés (dont 30

dans l'Assoungha, 59 dans la zone de Goz Beida et 92 dans celle de Koukou) ont été recensés à l'est. Toutefois, il est à noter que ces cas renseignent plus sur la situation de la protection que sur l'ampleur des incidents du point de vue statistique. En réalité le nombre de cas recensés est assez modeste au regard de la taille de la population des déplacés qui sont estimés à près de 180 000 personnes. Selon le groupe de travail pour la protection des IDPs l'objectif du monitorage de la protection des déplacés est de faire connaitre à la population le soutien que représente l'action de protection et surtout de suivre et trouver des solutions aux problèmes identifiés. Les incidents documentés montrent que les abus les plus courants sont: les violences sexuelles et sexistes dont les excisions -qui sont pourtant interdites par la loi-; les viols ou tentatives de viol ; les recrutements d'enfants dans les troupes et les groupes armés; les assassinats et menaces de mort; les attaques à mains armées; et les violations relatives à l'accès à la terre."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007 l'ONG Save the Children UK s'occupe du programme de protection de l'enfance et l'encadrement scolaire mais a récemment arrêté ses activités suite à de nombreux incidents de sécurité culminant avec le meurtre de son chef de mission le 1er mai à Farchana.

De façon générale, il y a actuellement peu d'activités en matière de protection, sauf dans le domaine de la protection de l'enfance – même si celles-ci restent suspendues pour l'instant. Peu de données sont donc disponibles sur les principales tendances et sur d'autres types d'incidents de protection.

Toutefois les principaux problèmes de protection constatés sur le terrain sont liés à la situation alimentaire, qui oblige les familles – surtout femmes et enfants – à aller de plus en plus loin en brousse à la recherche de fagots et de paille à revendre afin d'avoir un revenu leur permettant d'acheter de quoi se nourrir. Lors de ces sorties en brousse de l'autre côté du ouadi Bahr Azoum, ces personnes courent le risque de se faire braquer, maltraiter ou d'être victime de violence sexuelle. Si les déplacés ont dans un premier temps parlé de « djandjawids » comme auteurs de ces attaques, ils ont convenu à la fin qu'il s'agissait plutôt de bandits tchadiens ou soudanais.

Recommandations : protection
1. Mettre en place un mécanisme de suivi et de documentation des cas de protection en général, avec un accent particulier sur les violations des droits de l'enfant et des femmes et également les enfants associés aux groupes armés.
2. Coordonner avec le CICR afin de savoir s'il compte lancer des activités en matière de protection à Dogdoré.
3. Si les consignes de sécurité le permettent, refaire une mission d'évaluation à Dogdoré dans le domaine de la protection, avec une méthodologie de travail plus adaptée, en organisant des discussions et entretiens avec les bénéficiaires."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

Données collectées (protection)

Site	Situation protection
Hidal-Assad	Avis mitigé de retour car la situation sécuritaire est évoquée Intention de rester sur le site car accès a la terre et sécurité garantit. Les déplaces évoquent un retour dans leurs village d'origine si la paix se rétablit Intégration excellente avec la population hôte Situation sécuritaire calme sur le site Les ethnies rencontrées sur le site sont : Kadjeské, Kibet, Birguid, Kinana, Moubi
Al Jazeera	L'hypothèse d'un retour est exclue car les personnes sont intégrées dans le milieu et partagent les mêmes contraintes que les populations hôtes 100 à 200 ménages comprenant les Moubi, Kadjeské, Ouaddaï, Salamat, Kibet, Mouro, Birgit Situation sécuritaire calme sur le site
Am-Sieb	Bonne collaboration avec les populations hôtes, intégration favorable Cependant, ils évoquent un possible retour chez eux si la paix se rétablit Certains IDPs n'ont pas accès à la terre, site sépare des terres cultivables par une zone marécageuses empêchent l'accès Relations avec Administration : indifférence de l'administration face a la présence des IDP Sont rencontrés sur ce site les Massalit, Moubi, Kadjeské, Dadjo, Salamat, Birgit et Ouaddaï
Mirer	Réintégration dans leur terroir, recherche des moyens pour se réinstaller Ils n'ont pas l'intention de repartir. Ce sont des « retournes ». Ils ont des parents au sein de la population hôte. Ils vivent en parfaite harmonie avec leurs frères hôtes En saison des pluies, tensions avec éleveurs autour des ouadis Arrivée de 75 nouveaux ménages en provenance de Kerfi
Amtalata I	Population intégrée dans la communauté d'accueil La plus part des déplacés ont des parents parmi la population hôte. Deux tendances: 1) si sécurité est assurée dans village d'origine, ils repartiront ; 2) Les IDPs ont été traumatisés par les violences et ne veulent plus rentrer Cette tendance est la plus marquée et généralisée Les deux communautés vivent l'une à cote de l'autre en parfaite harmonie. Les différents et conflits se règlent de manière traditionnelle généralement Ils ont eu recours au chef de canton lors de conflits avec des éleveurs La relation avec l'administration se passe plus ou moins bien Développement des mécanismes d'adaptation en cours Arrivée de 250 nouvelles personnes de Kerfi
Binédir	Retournés et population hôte sont tous des Kadjeské mis à part quelques Moubi complètement intégrés et les activités se mènent conjointement Bonne intégration et les activités se mènent conjointement 15 ménages venus de Kerfi ont rejoint leurs parents Absence notable d'hommes sur le site

Al-Hambol	Notons que ce sont des populations nomades ayant rejoint les leurs à la demande du Chef de Damré qui est allé les chercher Tous ne sont pas originaires du terroir Le village n'est fondé qu'en 2002, c'est un Damré de nomades Khozam Pas de problèmes inter-communautaires Parfaite intégration

Recommandations (protection)

1. Renforcer le monitoring sur les types de violence auxquelles les personnes sont confrontées
2. Promouvoir le mouvement associatif et l'établissement des cadres de concertation
3. Faire le monitoring pour savoir ce que les jeunes hommes, les bras valides sont devenus étant donné leur absence dans les sites
4. Désenclaver la zone de Haouich par l'aménagement d'une piste d'atterrissage pour faciliter le travail des humanitaires et les évacuations sanitaires
5. Organiser une mission d'évaluation en matière de protection. Les contraintes temporelles ne nous ont pas permis de procéder à un monitoring approfondi des problèmes de protection

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 1

1. Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced.

Principle 4

2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs.

Physical security

Human rights violations perpetrated with impunity (August 2008)

- Armed groups present in IDP sites.
- Chadian government unable to ensure protection of civilians and humanitarian workers.
- Human rights violations perpetrated in a climate of impunity.

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"In many refugee camps and IDP sites of eastern Chad, armed elements are reportedly present, thereby compromising the civilian character of the locations. Reports are numerous, of attacks against IDPs in particular, as well as other civilians — including cases of murder, abuses against the physical integrity or dignity of individuals, as well as looting and theft from the most vulnerable.

With the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/CAR, two entities with a mandate to support humanitarian objectives by promoting security for civilians, there are hopes that human rights violations may decrease."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"Chad's rebels, however, do not represent the most immediate threat to civilians, as they are relatively well trained and disciplined. Traditionally these groups have been careful to respect international humanitarian law and generally do not attack refugee camps or sites for internally displaced people.

The greatest threat to civilians and humanitarian operations is banditry. Bandit groups, which sometimes involve local authorities, the Chadian military, and moonlighting police or gendarmerie, act with almost complete impunity in the eastern part of the coun-try. This is particularly true for members of the Zaghawa ethnic group, who enjoy de facto immunity from the law.

These bandits are responsible for chronic car-jackings (specifically the theft of 4x4s belonging to humanitarian actors) and the violent looting of humanitarian workers and local civilians throughout the east. The threat becomes particularly acute in the wake of a rebel attack, when bandits capitalize on the chaos and the absence of local authorities.

The 'malfaiteurs' are often well known to the authorities, but the lack of a functioning justice sector creates a security vacuum. This is further complicated by the fact that traditional forms of justice and authority have been weak-ened by years of conflict, ethnic tensions, and the com-munity breakdown that has recently resulted from inter-nal displacement."

UN OCHA, 9 May 2007:

"The Government has acknowledged its lack of capacity to ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers in eastern Chad. In the absence of effective administrative and military authorities, violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights law continue to be perpetrated, with internally displaced persons (IDPs), host communities, and refugees becoming targets in a climate of total impunity. Discussions on the deployment of a United Nations multidimensional presence to help restore security in eastern Chad are yet to yield concrete results. In this context, humanitarian workers often appear as the sole actors trying to cope with the situation."

HRW, 9 January 2007:

"Various militia groups including Janjaweed groups based in Darfur and Arab militias based in Chad and Darfur have raped and killed Chadian civilians, have looted and burned Chadian villages and stolen livestock and other property. Community-based Chadian self-defense groups have killed Chadian civilians. Self-defense groups and government of Chad-supported Sudanese rebel movements with bases in Chad have been responsible for the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The government of Chad has failed to take adequate action to protect civilians, has

failed to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice, and has allowed a climate of impunity to persist in eastern Chad. The government of Chad bears responsibility for abuses carried out by entities that receive its support or sponsorship, including Sudanese rebel groups and community-based self-defense militias."

Continued attacks against IDPs (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"In eastern Chad, civilians face serious security risks related both to ongoing fighting between various armed groups and attacks on villages and IDP sites. Acts of violence against civilians are committed by the Sudanese and Chadian rebel and militia groups and sometimes by soldiers of the ANT. There are reports of deliberate targeting of civilians, especially women and children (UN OCHA, November 2006; AI, 1 December 2006). IDPs are exposed to a range of threats to their personal security and integrity, including when they are in IDP sites. There have been cases of arbitrary killings, including by burning alive, and of rapes and mutilation. Moreover, the displaced often have their houses and other property destroyed or taken away. The attacks are of varied intensity and range from the theft of cattle to setting whole villages on fire. Hundreds upon hundreds of homes have been burned to the ground and their inhabitants have lost all their assets, including livestock and food supplies (Fews Net, May 2006; UNHCR, 10 April 2007). Attacks on humanitarian aid workers and cases of theft of humanitarian personnel's vehicles are also reportedly on the rise (UN OCHA, November 2006).

An important risk factor stems from the fact that some combatants of the so-called Toroboro – members of Sudanese rebel groups and Chadian militias fighting alongside the ANT – live among the civilian population. This exposes civilians to further attacks by groups opposed to the government. Undisciplined and drunk Toroboro combatants pose further threats to civilians, for example by harassing adolescent girls (UN OCHA, November 2006).

Finally, the increased number of armed men and the circulation of small arms, including in IDP sites, have led to an increase in highway banditry. This, in turn, has reduced the flow of goods such as food in the affected regions (IDMC interviews with traditional leaders, 26 April 2007 in Goz Beida). Extortion and racketeering are rampant (WFP, 2 May 2007).

Forced displacement, human rights and humanitarian law violations and abuses in eastern Chad continue. The immediate challenge is to ensure the physical security of civilians and humanitarian operations. Although the government is responsible for the protection of civilians, Chadian security forces have failed to prevent cross-border raids by militia groups from Sudan, and have been unwilling or unable to control the activities of armed groups operating within Chad. Given the weak presence of state institutions in the conflict-affected areas and the absence of functioning law enforcement structures, crimes by all sides have been committed with total impunity (UN OCHA, May 2007).

No mechanism is in place to systematically monitor, document and follow up on violations and abuses of IDPs' human rights."

Security situation deteriorates dramatically (March 2007)

- Darfur crisis and deterioration of relations between Chad and Sudan gravely affecting civilians.

- Cross-border attacks have worsened in scale and nature, causing death, destruction and more displacement.
- Civilians more vulnerable to attacks since withdrawal of government troops from rural areas.
- Attacks on aid workers on the rise.

UNHCR, 10 April 2007:

"HABILE CAMP, Chad,– Some 9,000 Chadians have arrived in UN refugee agency trucks and on their own at the Habile site for internally displaced persons after brutal attacks on two villages left houses torched and the ground strewn with dead.

A United Nations team headed by UNHCR reached the burnt out villages of Tiero and Marena on Sunday, a week after the March 31 attacks. Survivors blamed the attacks on janjaweed militiamen on horses and camels, assisted by Chadian rebels with heavy weaponry and vehicles. Decomposing bodies still lay on the ground and smoke hung in the air from the last of the fires that had destroyed their houses

Estimates of the death toll have risen to between 200 and 400, although the exact number may never be known. With improved security, friends and relatives have returned to bury the dead. Victims were buried where they fell, often in common graves. Many who survived the attacks – particularly the elderly and young children – died in subsequent days from exhaustion and dehydration, often while fleeing. About 80 additional people were wounded.

The attacks on the villages 45 kilometres east of the UNHCR sub-office in the village of Koukou-Angarana were far worse than initially thought. An estimated 8,000 local residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs) had been living in Tiero and Marena. Residents of other villages in the area also fled.

More than 9,000 Chadians from 31 villages have now arrived at the new Habile site for IDPs in UNHCR vehicles or by themselves. They joined another 9,000 who had fled earlier attacks in the region, especially last November and December when inter-communal violence left more than 200 dead and many wounded. The precise number of new IDPs remains unclear, and additional names are being presented to aid agencies daily. Many new arrivals had already been displaced several times in the past year."

UN OCHA, 14 July 2006:

"The security situation in eastern Chad has deteriorated significantly over the last six months. Incursions by armed groups from Sudan have been intensifying, attacks on civilians have been increasing and ethnic tensions are rising. The withdrawal of Chadian government troops from rural areas has left civilians more vulnerable to attack than before. Over 50,000 Chadians have already been forced to flee their homes, most of them now being internally displaced in Chad, but some having fled across the border into Darfur. Attacks on aid workers are also increasing. A UNICEF staff member was shot in the arm in May and there have been numerous other security incidents since then.

The Emergency Relief Coordinator visited eastern Chad in early June, followed by a UN Security Council mission. Both have highlighted the need for urgent political action to deal with the deteriorating security situation. Unless this happens, there is a real risk that the situation may deteriorate further in the months ahead.

[…]

Most of the 50,000 internally displaced in eastern Chad remain in insecure border areas to which humanitarian organizations have limited access."

HRW, June 2006:

"The Darfur crisis and the deterioration of Chad-Sudan relations over the past nine months has had a three-fold effect on civilians:

First, the fighting between Chadian rebel and Chadian government forces has had both direct and indirect effects on civilians. While civilians do not appear to have been specifically targeted by Chadian rebel forces, there have been civilian casualties during the fighting, particularly in N'djamena. There are concerns that Chadian government forces have been implicated in a variety of abuses against civilians and captured rebels in connection with the Chadian rebel incursions.

Second, abuses by Darfur rebel groups operating in Chad, including the forced recruitment and mistreatment of Sudanese refugees in Chad, appear to be increasing and linked to the Chadian government's efforts to secure its border from further incursions from Sudan.

Third, the cross-border attacks by Sudanese Janjaweed militias based in Darfur are worsening in both scale and in nature. Not only are these attacks penetrating deeper inside Chad and displacing tens of thousands of Chadian civilians, but they also appear to be drawing on alliances with Chadian civilians and potentially affecting the relations between different ethnic groups in eastern Chad."

Children and armed conflict

Forced recruitment of children into armed forces (August 2008)

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"All parties to the conflict reportedly continue to recruit and use children. This issue remains particularly difficult to address in the context of Chad. Only 10 per cent of child births are registered. There are cultural issues related to the concepts of boyhood and manhood which exacerbate the recruitment and use of children. Lack of access to education and employment opportunities also provides additional incentives for children to join armed forces and groups.

The recruitment and use of child soldiers in Chad is also very much related to the regional dimension of the conflict. It is extensively perpetrated by the Toroboro or Sudanese armed groups allied with the Government of Chad. Toroboro reportedly recruited children in two refugee camps at Treguine and Breidjing during the rainy season. Heavy recruitment also occurs on the basis of needs in Darfur. The Sudanese rebel movement JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) continues to recruit in and around refugee camps, notably Oure Cassoni (Bahai), the second largest camp operated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the one closest to the Sudanese border. Both adults and children have been recruited, by force as well as voluntarily.

Recruitment and use of children within the Chadian armed forces have been reported. Recruited children have fled from Government training camps, returning to the internally displaced person

sites from where they were recruited to report heavy abuses. The testimonies of those children have been very useful in raising awareness within communities about child rights. Most of the children who were released to UNICEF for reintegration programmes were associated with the Front uni pour le changement and very few (35) with the Chadian armed forces. However, young people in uniform can regularly be seen both in N'Djamena and in the countryside. Despite the acknowledgement by Government officials that children are associated with the armed forces, the Government provided a written guarantee to the Government of France that that was not the case, as a prerequisite to the deployment of the European Union-led military force (EUFOR).

Girls associated with armed forces have been observed, notably in the area around Guéréda (eastern Chad). It has however proved very difficult to obtain access to them and to date no girls have been officially released from armed forces or groups within the official framework. In 2007, the presence of girls in a battalion in the region of Guéréda was reported. The female commander of that battalion uses female guards, some of whom are under 18. Early in 2008, the battalion was still in Guéréda; it was later redeployed to Moussoro and integrated into other parts of the Chadian national army."

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"With renewed civil warfare, recruitment of children by belligerent parties has reportedly increased. There are now believed to be between 7,000 and 10,000 children associated with armed forces and groups, with recruitment ongoing in several parts of the country's east. Following advocacy on this issue as well as commitments by relevant parties, a modest number of children have been released, but a lot of work remains to be done."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"As members of militias and armed groups move into refugee camps and IDP sites, refugee and displaced children are particularly vulnerable to child recruitment and forced labor. Children as young as nine years old are being forcibly and/or volun-tarily recruited into armed forces. The Chadian national army, militias supported by the Chadian government, and Chadian rebel groups have been recruiting within IDP sites and host communities."

Coalition, 20 May 2008:

"Children were known to have been recruited and used in the ANT [Chadian army] as of mid-2007. One official told Human Rights Watch that boys between the ages of 12 and 15 were deployed to make tea, find water, collect firewood and mind goats. Another senior ANT official stated that "child soldiers are ideal because they don't complain, they don't expect to be paid, and if you tell them to kill, they kill". Civilians were reportedly recruited en masse in late 2006 at a time of ANT losses, and included children as young as 14, who were rapidly organized into units to defend the capital, and issued uniforms and weapons. The ANT reportedly held captured armed opposition-group child soldiers as young as 13 in the same facilities as adult soldiers."

CRS, 30 January 2008:

"According to U.N. estimates, there may be as many as 10,000 children used in combat and non-combat roles by Chadian rebel groups, paramilitary forces, and its national army. The government denied the existence of child soldiers in its army until May 2007, when it signed an agreement with UNICEF to end recruitment of persons under age 18 and begin demobilization of those already within its security forces. According to Human Rights Watch the government continues to limit access by international child protection officials to military installations to verify demobilization efforts. Humanitarian officials have expressed serious concerns regarding the

recruitment of children by rebel groups and local self-defense militias in and around refugee camps."

For more information on child soldiers in Chad, see:
Human Rights Watch, *Early to War: Child Soldiers in the Chad Conflict*, July 2007.

DDR - Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (August 2008)

- Since the DDR agreement signed in 2007, 512 child soldiers have been released to UNICEF.
- Most demobilised children were associated with non-government groups; the government of Chad has yet to release child soldiers from its armed forces.
- Some demobilised children have been re-recruited into armed forces.
- Following visit of SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict, government agreed to release children in detention and allow verification visits to military camps and military training institutes.

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"The beginning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities in Chad is a very positive step in addressing violations of child rights. It follows the agreement between UNICEF and the Government of Chad, signed on 9 May 2007, to ensure the release and sustainable reintegration of all children associated with armed forces and groups in Chad. This protocol follows the signature by Chad on 6 February 2007 of the Paris Commitments. Since the agreement, 512 child soldiers have been released to UNICEF, which provided support at five transit centres. So far 265 have voluntarily returned to or been reunited with their families, and 220 have been placed in schools and 85 in professional activities. Profiling the remaining children at the transit centres is now a priority, to determine what is best for each, and negotiations are under way for their placement in professional training institutions (including in livestock) as well as in income-generating activities. CARE Canada, the Christian Children's Fund, and Jesuit Refugee Services are the partners of UNICEF currently working on the reintegration programme.

A seminar on child rights held in N'Djamena on 22 and 23 October 2007 pointed out the shortcomings of the Government of Chad on the protection of child rights, such as the lack of respect of international standards regarding child recruitment and use of children in armed forces. It should be reiterated that, to date, most of the demobilized children were associated with non-governmental armed groups. Very few children reportedly associated with the Chadian armed forces have been released.

Another major issue in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration remains cross-border reunification. Of the 512 children released in Chad, 32 require reunification with their communities in the Sudan. ICRC is currently trying to locate families on the basis of information provided by 22 of the children.

The encouraging start of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities in Chad is likely to lead to the release of another estimated 2,500 children associated with armed forces and groups over the coming months (out of an estimated total of 7,000 to 10,000 children). The cost of continuing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities is estimated at $3 million.

[...]

On 27 June 2008 nine children were released from the gendarmerie in N'Djamena. Among them, five were formerly associated with the Front uni pour le changement and had been re-recruited by the national gendarmerie. One of them, 14 years of age, had previously benefited from the child disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and spent six months in a transit care centre while attending school. In February 2008, the gendarmerie recruited him and the others and gave him a monthly salary of FCFA 60,000 (US$ 142). Other children, despite being demobilized and taken care of by the comprehensive child disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, have also reported that they continued to receive pay from their former military leaders for several months."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"Efforts to engage the government of Chad have only been partially successful. On May 9, 2007, UNICEF and the government signed an agreement for the demobilization of child soldiers throughout the country. However, the Chadian government has not fully abided by this agreement. UNICEF and other partners were not allowed to visit government military and training camps. In addition, UNICEF and its partners have not received consent from the government to engage with all non-state actors currently recruiting in Chad. Following the recent visit of the Secretary General's Special Representative for children in armed conflict, the government of Chad agreed to let UN agencies visit army camps and training centres. However, there is still no commitment to allow agencies to access children recruited by non-state armed groups."

SRSG on Children and Armed Conflict, 31 May 2008:

"Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict ... welcomed the decision of the Government of Chad to release children associated with armed groups held in detention. The Government also committed to allow UN led teams to verify the presence of children in military camps, instruction centers and detention facilities. They will also establish an inter-ministerial task force to coordinate and ensure effective reintegration of children.

During her visit, Ms. Coomaraswamy continued to raise with Governments and non state actors the issue of girls in the context of armed conflict and the specific problem of sexual violence. She stressed the critical need for assistance for victims of sexual violence. She reiterated that there must be a sustained fight against impunity and that all those who commit grave violations against children should be prosecuted."

Coalition, 20 May 2008:

"In September 2007 an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 children, used in combat and non-combat roles, were identified by the UN as needing DDR from armed forces and groups. The government and UNICEF signed an agreement on 9 May 2007 to begin the demobilization of children from the ANT and integrated FUC forces. By July 2007, 425 boys – ex-FUC members – had been released from government military installations. However, despite promises from the government, UNICEF had by July been granted access to only one government military installation, at Mongo in south central Chad, where they identified 383 child soldiers, some as young as eight, in May 2007. Evidence suggested that ANT personnel were concealing children to prevent them from registering for demobilization. Children who were demobilized could not be reunited with their families because of ongoing hostilities."

1612 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (December 2009)

UNSC, 14 October 2009:

"MINURCAT and UNICEF continued to co-chair the Chadian Task Force on children in armed conflict, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). Task Force members, including MINURCAT, UNICEF, UNHCR and UNDP, continue to conduct verification visits in refugee camps and internally displaced person sites and to support Government efforts to eradicate the recruitment of children by armed groups. Late in August, MINURCAT completed a project to support the rehabilitation of the Centre de transit et d'orientation in Abéché, where demobilized child soldiers are ho used prior to being reunited with their families."

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"The Government of Chad is strongly urged to fully cooperate with the work of the United Nations Task Force in accordance with resolution 1612 (2005). United Nations teams should be allowed to conduct verification in detention centres, military facilities and training camps. A focal point should also be appointed within the presidency to follow up on child protection issues, to coordinate related actions and to liaise with the Task Force.

While I welcome the positive steps taken by Chad and the signing of the agreement with UNICEF, I urge the Government to continue to do its utmost to protect children's rights throughout the territory. The Government is responsible for ensuring that children's rights are respected by all armed groups present in its territory and facilitating, by all means necessary, the implementation of concrete, time-bound action plans in line with resolution 1612 (2005) to release children from these groups."

Watchlist, January 2008:

"In July 2005, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1612. In addition to calling for other important measures to protect children, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General establish a mechanism to monitor and report on violations of children's rights in situations of armed conflict. Since 2005, interagency Taskforces on monitoring and reporting have been formally established in at least eleven countries, and the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC) has used the information submitted by the MRM to issue conclusions on the situations of armed conflict in seven of these countries [including Chad]."

The Monitoring and Rreporting Mechanism (MRM) focuses specifically on six grave violations of the rights of children in armed conflict:
1. Killing or maiming of children
2. Recruitment or using child soldiers
3. Attacks against schools or hospitals
4. Rape or other grave sexual violence against children
5. Abduction of children
6. Denial of humanitarian access for children

See UN Security Council Resolution 1612 below for specific MRM provisions.

Police trainings on child protection (July 2008)

UN SG, 8 July 2008:

"Bearing in mind the specificities of women and children, MINURCAT developed training modules on child rights and child militarization as well as a child victim-witness protocol with a view to sensitizing United Nations police and DIS [Détachement Integré de Sécurité / national police force] personnel on the specific conditions and needs of children in refugee camps and communities of internally displaced persons."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 13
1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or permitted to take part in hostilities.

Gender-based violence (GBV)

IDP women suffer rape and other forms of sexual violence (December 2009)

OCHA, 30 September 2009:

"Despite the deployment in significant numbers of Government forces, a climate of impunity endures (a key finding of previous consolidated appeals). In most cases, those responsible for human rights violations, whether against civilians or others, are not found, arrested and punished. These violations include forced recruitment of children and adults by armed groups, sexual and gender-based violence (GBV), militarization of refugee camps and sites hosting IDPs, and attacks on humanitarian staff and property."

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"Rape and other grave sexual violence are common in Chad, girls being the major victims. Both armed groups and community members are being reported as perpetrators of such violations. Most reported cases concern attacks and rapes of girls working in household activities outside of internally displaced persons camps. Cases are usually dealt with through local arrangements, such as financial compensation, under the authority of community chiefs and village heads. Because of the taboo surrounding sexual crimes in Chad, perpetrators are rarely, if ever, brought to justice. The climate of impunity and stigmatization of girls and women who have been raped discourages victims from reporting cases to authorities. To date, the Government has not been able or willing to prevent rape and ensure child protection against sexual violence.

During the reporting period several girls were victims of sexual violence in the eastern part of the country as a direct consequence of the conflict between the Government forces and the rebel groups, in addition to the assaults carried out by the Janjaweed in Chadian villages along the

Chad/Sudan border. The number of such reported cases requiring hospital care is increasing on a daily basis. The problem is also aggravated by the fact that victims are mainly displaced people, always on the move, and not able to receive long-term hospital care."

UN SG, 8 July 2008:

"Human rights officers also received reports of sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence against women, including rape, in and outside refugee camps and displaced persons sites and in several villages. Corroborated information from various sources, including United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, also confirmed that at least four girls, including one minor, were raped by nine FANT [Chadian army] soldiers as they were on their way to Were village situated 20 kilometres east of Abéché."

AI, January 2008:

"Sexual violence against women and girls remained prevalent in Chad. In eastern Chad, women continued to face rape and other forms of sexual violence at the hands of militias, armed groups and Chadian government soldiers. Displaced women and girls were particularly vulnerable to attack when they ventured outside their camps to collect firewood or other essentials. In almost all cases, the perpetrators of these abuses, whether they were state or non-state actors, went unpunished."

Female genital mutilation and forced marriage practiced in IDP sites (December 2009)

OCHA, 4 May 2009:

"Les acteurs intervenant dans le secteur de la protection continuent les exercices d identification, de documentation et de référence des cas de violation des droits des déplacés à l'est (Dar Sila) à l'exception de la zone de l'Assoungha faute d'escorte. Les incidents répertoriés incluent les vols de biens, les détentions arbitraires, les amendes arbitraires, les problèmes liés à l'exploitation des terres, les violences domestiques, les mariages précoces et/ou forcés et les mutilations génitales féminines (FGM). Il est à noter que les violences sexo-spécifiques (VSS) restent les cas les plus fréquents dans les sites des déplacés et plus particulièrement les violences domestiques et les mutilations génitales féminines. Au cours du mois de mars, l'UNFPA a organisé des ateliers sur l élaboration d'un plan intégré de communication contre les VSS à Abéché, Goz Beida et Koukou afin de remédier à cette situation."

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"Other issues relating to gender-based violence in Chad need to be raised. Female genital mutilation, for instance, is widely practised mainly because of prevailing cultural norms, including in sites occupied by internally displaced persons, in particular among girls aged between 6 and 10. Finally, forced and early marriage in camps of internally displaced persons remains an issue that needs to be better monitored and documented."

Gender mainstreaming to protect IDP women (July 2008)

UN SG, 8 July 2008:

"MINURCAT [UN Mission to CAR and Chad] has undertaken to promote gender mainstreaming in its activities, especially in the context of policing. Comprehensive training materials have been developed to help staff respond effectively to, investigate and prevent incidents of gender-based violence, especially in settings involving refugees and internally displaced persons."

National laws prohibiting gender-based violence (January 2005)

- Female genital mutilation (FGM) and all forms of gender-based violence are prohibited by the reproductive health law.
- Prevalence of FGM is 45%.

CHR, 27 January 2005:

"Article 9 of Act No. 006/PR/2002 on the promotion of reproductive health prohibits all forms of violence such as female genital mutilation, early marriage, domestic violence and sexual abuse of individuals. [...] Rape and prostitution are forbidden by law, but sexual harassment is not. The law prohibits trafficking in persons, for which the Criminal Code imposes a prison term of 20 years (see E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1, paragraphs 145-149)."

Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000:

Country	Prevalence rate	Prohibition (specific FGM laws or regulations)
Chad	45%	Reproductive health law

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 11
2. Internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be protected in particular against:
(a) Rape, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(b) Slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, sexual exploitation, or forced labour of children.

Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"Freedom of movement remains severely limited by the volatile security situation. The limitations are often due to the high risks involved in moving outside IDP sites. When IDPs do leave to look for resources such as firewood, they expose themselves to attacks by armed groups and individuals; there have also been reports of women being raped or beaten by host communities when they ventured too far from the site. Inability to move freely deprives the displaced people of access to resources, mainly water and land, and denies them their livelihoods (UN OCHA, 9 May 2007).

The displaced are afraid to return to their villages because armed groups are still controlling many areas in the region. There is no systematic mechanism for disseminating information on the situation in their villages of origin and locations of attacks. Some displaced people have tried to return to salvage their belongings and, in the process, they have been killed (UNHCR, 24 November 2006). As there are no sure guarantees of an end to the displacements, there is also no possibility of safe return."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 14

1. Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence.
2. In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements.

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Food

Food Security Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations providing food / food security services to IDPs: ACF, CNAPD, CWW, FTC, ICRC, Intermon Oxfam, IRD, PU, World Concern, WFP.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad

Who does What Where - Food Security - As of July 09

Issued: 23 July 09



Needs and humanitarian response (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"Among IDPs in eastern Chad, 90% of households are engaged in farming activities. An inter-agency emergency food security assessment conducted by WFP in December 2007 concluded that most farming households among IDPs were in a position to obtain reasonable harvests, and recommended that general food distribution should gradually be replaced by targeted food distribution for vulnerable groups, while promoting food self-reliance.

However, due to a combination of adverse weather conditions, insufficiency of seeds and tools, and insecurity, many IDP households will not harvest in 2008, and food self-reliance in some areas will be harder than expected to achieve. For this reason, general food distributions will continue in the IDP sites of Aradib, Gassiré, Gourounkoun, Habilé, Koloma, and Koubigou. In the other IDP sites however, where conditions are sufficiently conducive to self-reliance, general food distributions are being gradually discontinued — which is also expected to encourage households to return, once they feel that is safe for them to do so.

In those locations of eastern Chad where general food distributions continue, levels of food provided during the months of March and April were lower than planned, due to insecurity and other logistical obstacles."

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"Les distributions de vivres reprendront dans les sites de déplacés après la saison des pluies. Des rations de trois mois ont été distribuées dans certains sites pour couvrir les besoins des déplacés durant la période de soudure."

FEWS NET, 7 July 2008:

"The resumption of hostilities on June 11th between loyalist Chadian troops and rebels heightened civil unrest in the eastern part of the country, restricted the mobility and response capacity of humanitarian workers, and slowed the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to crop-growing areas at the start of the 2008/09 growing season. The renewed fighting comes at the same time as an increase in basic food prices after two consecutive years of poor harvests. These factors are curtailing food availability and access for the country's refugee population and IDPs and, more importantly, increasing IDPs' dependence on food aid between now and September 2009. The combination of the escalating conflict and high prices, recent attacks against humanitarian organizations, the rise in the number of admissions to IDP camps and the April cut in food rations has jeopardized the food security of the 370,000 IDPs and refugees in eastern Chad. Additional emergency food and non-food assistance will be needed to meet the requirements of these populations, plus an additional estimated 3,000 IDPs, should security conditions deteriorate over the course of the 2008/09 season (through September 2009)."

USAID, 27 June 2008:

"WFP's establishment of a logistics and trucking hub in Faya-Largeau, northern Chad, has greatly augmented capacity to deliver food aid to key locations in eastern Chad. To date, more than 10,000 MT of food aid transited through the Faya hub to affected areas. Despite the success of the Faya hub, logistical bottlenecks remain, particularly along the corridor from Douala,

Cameroon to N'Djamena, where approximately 4,000 MT of commodities remain in transit. Competition between MINURCAT and EUFOR for limited port access and ground transport has added to the delivery delays of humanitarian supplies. WFP is currently working to preposition sufficient stocks of food aid in eastern Chad to continue meeting needs through September, before seasonal rains cut off road access to a large percentage of the vulnerable population.

According to the U.N., the food-insecure population in eastern Chad faces several challenges, including poor availability of quality agricultural inputs, resource-related competition between groups, and inadequate sustainable access to markets. In addition, the U.N. estimates that more than 90 percent of IDPs are farmers who would benefit from international assistance to engage in successful farming activities. With funding from USAID, WFP provides seed protection rations to affected IDPs in eastern Chad to prevent farmers from consuming the seeds that would otherwise be used for planting."

ICRC, 8 April 2008:

"The ICRC is trying to adapt its assistance and protection activities to the situation on the ground. While it is true that in some regions like Assoungha people have started to return to their villages, this does not mean that all displaced people can go home … ICRC teams in eastern Chad are getting ready to distribute seed and food to cover the needs of farming communities during the three-month period leading up to the harvests in October or November. We will assist displaced families in Assoungha and Dar Sila, and around 3,000 families who have returned to the Borota region and 1,400 others who went back to Kawa in northern Assoungha. In total, nearly 57,000 people will receive seed, farming tools, cereals, beans, oil, sugar and salt."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Les réponses humanitaires apportées sur le site de Dogdoré depuis 2007 ont été mises en oeuvre par le CICR qui a assuré la distribution alimentaire, le programme maraicher et la distribution de semences pluviales jusqu'en fin mars 2008 avant de passer certaines de ces activités à ACF.

Le CNCAPD a déposé une quantité de 100 tonnes de céréales depuis le début de l'année mais ces denrées ne sont jusque là pas partagées car les autorités attentent un complément de 200 tonnes avant de procéder à la distribution pour ne pas faire des mécontents en raison de la quantité initiale insuffisante.

Recommendations: sécurité alimentaire
1. Organiser dans la seconde quinzaine du mois de mai, une distribution générale de vivres couvrant une période de 45 jours. Cela est nécessaire pour soulager davantage les IDP déjà engagés ou, se préparant à s'investir dans des dures labeurs consécutives à la saison culturale.
2. Encourager le CNCAPD à fournir 2000 sacs de céréales en complément aux 1000 sacs déjà disponibles sur le site de Dogdoré depuis la fin du mois de janvier pour une distribution générale au mois de juin.

3. Appuyer/encourager les autorités (chef de canton et sous-préfet) dans leurs démarches auprès des populations locales pour l'obtention des terres de cultures à partager aux IDPs.
4. Demander à FAO d'appuyer les efforts de ACF à pré-positionner et distribuer dans un meilleur délai les semences et outils aratoires aux bénéficiaires ciblés.
5. Faire un plaidoyer auprès de PAM afin de prendre des dispositions pour pré positionner courant juin, les quantités de vivres comme ration de protection de semences, nécessaires pour couvrir 45 jours pendant la période de soudure
6. Envisager avec MSF-F la possibilité de distribuer de la nourriture supplémentaire (Prémix) aux femmes allaitantes, femmes enceintes et enfants malnutris pendant les 3 mois d'intenses activités champêtres.
7. Envisager avec PAM des activités de Vivre Contre Travail pour lancer des initiatives de reboisement avec la plantation d'arbres fruitiers et fertilisant pour diversifier les sources d'alimentation des IDP et renforcer les capacités productives des sols."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

Données collectées (sécurité alimentaire)

Site	Situation sécurité alimentaire
Hidal-Assad	· Accès à la terre et à l'eau de ouadis · Présence des oiseaux granivores · 2 distributions générales de vivres (CCNAPD et PAM) · Pas de stocks propres ni de bétails · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones · Réduction du nombre de repas (1à 2 repas/jour) · Achats des aliments sur le marché d'Amdam · Travaux agricoles et non agricoles · Vente des équipements domestiques · Vente de bois de chauffe, tiges de mil et paille
Al Jazeera	· Accès à la terre et à l'eau de waddis · Présence des oiseaux granivores · Pas de stocks propres ni de bétails · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones · Réduction du nombre de repas (1à 2 repas/jour) · Achats des aliments sur le marché d'Amdam · Travaux agricoles et non agricoles · Vente des équipements domestiques · Vente de bois de chauffe, tiges de mil et paille
Am-Sieb	· Accès à la terre et à l'eau de waddis · Présence des oiseaux granivores · Pas de stocks propres ni de bétails · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones · Réduction du nombre de repas (1à2 repas/jour) · Achats des aliments sur le marché d'Amdam · Travaux agricoles et non agricoles

	· Vente des équipements domestiques · Vente de bois de chauffe, tiges de mil et paille
Mirer	· Accès à la terre et à l'eau de waddis · Présence des oiseaux granivores · Deux distributions générales de vivres (CCNAPD et PAM) · Pas de stocks propres ni de bétails · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones · Travaux agricoles et non agricoles · Vente des équipements domestiques · Vente de bois de chauffe, tiges de mil et paille
Amtalata I	· Accès à la terre et l'eau de waddis · Présence des oiseaux granivores · Deux distributions générales de vivres (CCNAPD et PAM) · Pas de stocks propres ni de bétails · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones · Travaux agricoles et non agricoles · Vente des équipements domestiques · Vente de bois de chauffe, tiges de mil et paille
Binédir	· Facilité d'accès à la terre pour l'agriculture · Présence des oiseaux granivores. Marché 2/semaine le lundi et vendredi. Les femmes mènent des AGR mais il manque de débouchés
Al-Hambol	· Facilité d'accès à la terre pour l'agriculture · Présence des oiseaux granivores · Deux distributions générales de vivres (CCNAPD et PAM) · Partage de nourriture avec les autochtones

Recommandations (sécurité alimentaire et développement des moyens de subsistance)

En général du point de vue de la sécurité alimentaire, la situation des retournés pour la plupart et populations d'accueil n'est pas alarmante mais le besoin en nourriture est exprimé dans tous les sites. Ces besoins se justifient par l'inexistence des stocks propres et de bétails tout comme la vente des équipements domestiques distribués par les partenaires et la consommation des produits de cueillette. On note aussi la vente de bois de chauffe de la paille issue des récoltes et l'exercice des activités domestiques ou champêtres rémunérées. Il est rapporté la prévalence depuis une décennie, la présence des oiseaux granivores qui font leur apparition à l'approche des récoltes. Face à cet environnement quelque peu hostile, la mission recommande à qui de droit de :

1. Vulgariser les techniques de lutte contre les oiseaux granivores et les ennemis de culture pluviale
2. Faire un appui en outils aratoires, en semences de culture pluviale et en semences maraîchères
3. Organiser des activités de Vivre Contre Travail et Vivre Pour la Formation pour susciter des initiatives communautaires fédératives : construction des latrines, construction des hangars pour les salles de classe, puits d'eau potable et maraîchers, greniers communautaires, ouvrages hydro agricoles (cordons pierreux, diguettes, zaï forestier), production de compost
4. Soutenir des activités de formations et alphabétisations des adultes par le programme de Vivre pour la Formation
5. Favoriser l'installation des cantines scolaires
6. Soutenir les initiatives économiques des femmes (transformation des produits alimentaires et non alimentaire ; artisanat, etc.)

7. Alléger le travail par l'installation des unités de mouture

Agricultural calendar for eastern Chad (August 2008)

FEWS NET, September 2007:



FEWS NET, February 2008:



Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 18

1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:
(a) Essential food and potable water.

Nutrition

Nutrition Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations providing nutrition services to IDPs: COOPI, MSF-CH, MSF-F, MSF-H, PSF, UNICEF, WFP.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad
Who does What Where - Nutrition - As of July 09

Issued: 24 July 09



Needs and humanitarian response (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"The scarcity of food leads to persistent malnutrition. The latest data available, covering IDPs and the host populations in some areas (Batha, Guéra, Kanem and Ouaddaï), indicate a global acute malnutrition rate of 21.4%, and severe acute malnutrition at 2.6%, among children aged six to 59 months. Due to scarcity of natural resources and insecurity, the nutritional status in Chad is believed to be unstable, thereby requiring regular monitoring."

USAID, 27 June 2008:

"According to the U.N., humanitarian agencies plan to conduct surveys among IDPs to confirm increased admissions to nutrition centers and respond appropriately. In addition, USAID/OFDA funding will support immediate nutrition surveys and increased surveillance.

According to a U.N. report released in late May, scarce resources, insecurity, and the annual hunger period are fueling increasing malnutrition rates in eastern Chad. As of May 30, the U.N. reported that approximately 12 percent of eastern Chad's 180,000 IDPs in Abdi, Goungour, Karoub, and part of Am Dam lacked access to emergency nutrition programs. In the coming months, humanitarian agencies plan to coordinate efforts to increase coverage; however, international relief efforts face challenges due to inadequate staffing and a volatile security situation."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007, MSF France mène des activités en matière de santé. ACF assure la distribution de NFI, la promotion de l'hygiène, des activités de réhabilitation des points d'eau, un programme de santé mentale et des activités de sécurité alimentaire.

Recommandations : Santé, nutrition et WASH
1. Renforcer le système de surveillance épidémiologique et nutritionnelle
2. Appuyer les efforts de ACF en matière de WASH afin de garantir la qualité et la quantité d'eau potable et de juguler la recrudescence du Syndrome ictérique aigu.
3. Renforcer le programme d'assainissement et de promotion d'hygiène pour augmenter le nombre de latrines familiales (normes sphères : 1 latrine pour 20 personnes) et améliorer la salubrité dans les sites
4. Assurer la distribution du savon et garantir la régularité dans le temps selon les normes à raison d'un savon de 250 g par personne et par mois."

Lack of nutrition services in IDP-affected zones (October 2006)

- In eastern Chad, the rate of malnutrition among children under five is as high as 49%.
- Nutrition assistance strategy: expand the capacity of existing therapeutic feeding centres, monitor the nutritional status of children and women and distribute high energy biscuits at the first sign of need.

UNICEF, 1 October 2006:

Overview
The Chadian government, humanitarian organizations and UN agencies are working together to provide urgent health and nutrition assistance to IDPs and host communities in four IDP-affected zones. Lack of access to adequate health services and essential medicines, and to water and sanitation facilities, make this assistance all the more necessary. In eastern Chad, where malaria is the number one cause of death among children under five, only 10% of the population has access to health centers, and the rate of malnutrition among children under five is as high as 49%. Another risk factor for the spread of epidemics among both IDPs and host communities is the sudden rise in population density due to displacement.

Health and Nutrition Strategy
The assistance strategy for the health and nutrition sector is (1) to vaccinate children from 6 months to 15 years of age against deadly diseases such as measles and meningitis, (2) to provide Vitamin A and de-worming medicines to help children ward off malnutrition and illness, (3) to expand the capacity of existing therapeutic feeding centres and health centres to ensure that displaced families and host communities have adequate access to essential medicines and services, (4) to distribute insecticide-treated mosquito nets to children and pregnant women to reduce the incidence of malaria, and (5) to monitor the nutritional status of children and women and distribute high energy biscuits at the first sign of need.

Zone 1: Adre, Borota, Allacha, Goungour	Zone 2: Ade, Koloye
Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-H, MSF-F, Première Urgence	Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence
Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated.	Numbers of IDPs: 10,000 estimated
Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Adre: [to be determined]; Borota, Allacha, Goungour: Children vaccinated against measles (MSF-F, Ministry of Health); distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence).	Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Ade: none [to be verified; problem of ongoing insecurity] Koloye: Distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence).
Health centers and mobile clinics Adre: 1 health center (MSF-F); Borota, Allacha: 1 mobile clinic (MSF-H), which uses emergency health kits provided by UNICEF.	Health centers and mobile clinics Ade: none [to be verified; problem of ongoing insecurity] Koloye: 1 mobile clinic (MSF-F)

Planned actions MSF-H vaccination campaign (measles, polio, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms) in September - October. Problems and gaps in assistance Need for mosquito nets, K-Otab tablets for treatment of mosquito nets, BP5 high protein biscuits, calcium hypochlorite antiseptic.	Planned actions [to be determined] Problems and gaps in assistance Ade: [to be determined] Koloye: need for tetanus, tuberculosis, polio vaccines, soap, jerry cans, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, and hygiene promotion against Hepatitis E.
Zone 3: Daguessa, Dogdore, Tour, Tiero, Marena Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, COOPI, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 22,000 estimated Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Dogdore: children received measles and polio vaccines, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms (provided by UNICEF, implemented by MSF-F and Ministry of Health). Tour, Tiero: distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC). Health centers and mobile clinics Daguessa: 1 health center, lacks essential medicines Dogdore: 1 health center (MSF-F, COOPI) Planned actions [to be determined] Problems and gaps in assistance Dogdore: need for tetanus, tuberculosis, polio vaccines, soap, jerry cans, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, and hygiene promotion against Hepatitis E.	Zone 4: Goz Beida , Koukou-Angarana Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence, COOPI, InterSOS, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Goz Beida, Koukou-Angarana: children received measles and polio vaccines, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms (provided by UNICEF, implemented by COOPI and Ministry of Health); Gouroukoun: distribution of NFIs (MSF-F). Koubigou, Sanour, Habile: distribution of blankets, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, BP5 high protein biscuits (InterSOS). Abdi: distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence). Health centers and mobile clinics Koukou-Angarana: 1 health center, assisted by COOPI, which uses emergency health kits provided by UNICEF. Gouroukoun, Koubigou, Sanour: 1 mobile clinic (COOPI) Planned actions Abdi: vaccination campaign (measles, polio, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms) to be implemented by Première Urgence. Problems and gaps in assistance [to be determined]

Health

Health Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations providing health services to IDPs: ACF, COOPI, ICRC, IMC, Ministere de la Sante, MSF-CH, MSF-F, MSF-H, UNICEF.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad

Who does What Where - Health Cluster - As of July 09

Source: 24 July 09



Needs and humanitarian response (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"New health needs have emerged during the first half of 2008. The influx of over 25,000 new refugees from Darfur and CAR, as well as the progressive spontaneous return of approximately 4,000 IDPs to their villages of origin (Arata and Loboutigué in particular) has increased the need for health care in many areas, and has led to renewed risks of epidemics in the areas affected by population movements. While needs and new challenges are great, increased insecurity has led to numerous obstacles, including the following:

• The withdrawal of *Médecins sans Frontières - Espagne* (Doctors without Borders - Spain or MSF-E) from three IDP sites (Am Sieb, Sarafaye, and Tinaye), where they provided health care to 6,000 people;
• The frequent interruptions of *Médecins sans Frontières - Hollande* (Doctors without Borders - Holland or MSF-H) activities in favour of 8,000 IDPs;
• Reductions in the activities of the International Medical Corps (IMC) in IDP sites, due to lack of funds;
• The planned withdrawal of MSF-H in July 2008 from three IDP sites (Alacha, Goudiang, and Goz Baggar), where they currently provide health care to 22,000 individuals.

Outbreaks of diarrheal diseases and hepatitis E are feared during the imminent rainy season, especially in the IDP sites of Dogdoré, Goz Beïda, and Koukou. The lack of resources has led to insufficient hygiene and sanitation facilities in these sites, increasing people's exposure to these diseases."

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"L'ONG Pharmaciens Sans Frontières Comité International (PSF) a annoncé le lancement de son projet pour l'amélioration de l'accès aux soins de santé primaire des populations déplacées et des communautés hôtes dans le district de l'Assoungha notamment dans les centres de santé d'Alacha, Arkoum, Borota, Goundiang et Goungour. La durée du projet est de six mois à compter du 1er août 2008. Ce projet couvre des activités de réhabilitation des centres de santé de Alacha, Goundiang et Goungour; l'approvisionnement en médicaments, consommables et matériel médical des cinq centres de santé couverts; le recrutement, la formation et la prise en charge des primes du personnel; et la supervision des activités sanitaires en collaboration avec le District Sanitaire de l'Assoungha."

WHO, 17 August 2008:

<u>Events</u>
The outbreak of hepatitis E in Dogdore IDP site has affected 791 people and killed eight between 1 January and 10 August. In the same camp, 14 cases of neonatal tetanus were reported between 21 January and 10 August. The rise in notified cases is probably due to better detection and reporting.

<u>Actions</u>
In Dogdore, WHO, UN and NGO partners are working to improve hepatitis E surveillance and control, with special focus on early detection and management of cases, sensitization of health workers and communities, chlorination of water sources and rehabilitation and construction of

latrines. A vaccination campaign against tetanus for women of childbearing age is planned for 19 August.

USAID, 27 June 2008:

"To date, implementing partners report that insecure conditions continue to impact emergency health programs and general operations in the east. […] The U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) and other health partners also expressed concern regarding a 10 percent decrease in health coverage in the Am Dam area, which hosts approximately 14,000 IDPs. […] WHO estimates that an additional 22,000 IDPs in areas of Goz Bagar, Goundiang, and Alacha will be without coverage by the end of July."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007, MSF France mène des activités en matière de santé. ACF assure la distribution de NFI, la promotion de l'hygiène, des activités de réhabilitation des points d'eau, un programme de santé mentale et des activités de sécurité alimentaire.

Recommandations : Santé, nutrition et WASH
1. Renforcer le système de surveillance épidémiologique et nutritionnelle
2. Appuyer les efforts de ACF en matière de WASH afin de garantir la qualité et la quantité d'eau potable et de juguler la recrudescence du Syndrome ictérique aigu.
3. Renforcer le programme d'assainissement et de promotion d'hygiène pour augmenter le nombre de latrines familiales (normes sphères : 1 latrine pour 20 personnes) et améliorer la salubrité dans les sites
4. Assurer la distribution du savon et garantir la régularité dans le temps selon les normes à raison d'un savon de 250 g par personne et par mois."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

<u>Données collectées (santé)</u>

Site	Situation santé
Hidal-Assad	· Population laissée pour compte ne bénéficiant pas des soins de santé depuis le départ de MSF-E. · Prévalence des maladies liées au manque d'eau surtout de type urinaires.

	· Les accouchements se font dans le village par les matrones. · La dernière vaccination date de novembre 07.
Al Jazeera	· Population n'a pas d'accès au sois de santé. Les patients sont référés par charrette à l'hôpital de Am Dam ou les soins sont gratuits. · Il n'ya ni séances de vaccination de routine. · Les accouchements sont réalisés par une matrone.
Am-Sieb	· Les populations se soignent à l'hôpital d'Am Dam. · les références se font à l'aide de charrette. · Les soins sont gratuits à l'hôpital de Am Dam.
Mirer	· IMC fait la clinique mobile tout comme les séances de vaccination de routine. · Il est évoqué des cas de pathologies liées à la qualité de l'eau, des infections respiratoires et oculaires surtout chez les enfants. · Les références se font à l'hôpital de Am Dam pour une prise en charge gratuite
Amtalata I	· IMC fait la clinique mobile tout comme les séances de vaccination de routine. · Il est évoqué des cas de pathologies liées à la qualité de l'eau · Les accouchements se font dans le village · Les références se font à l'hôpital de Am Dam pour une prise en charge gratuite
Binédir	· Pas de structure sanitaire et les populations pratiquent l'automédication avec les produits achetés sur le marché mais utilisent la pharmacopée.
Al-Hambol	· Clinique mobile une fois par quinzaine réalisée par IMC, · En cas de maladie, transfert à dos d'âne à Haouich. · Prévalence de la conjonctivite chez les enfants.

Recommandations (santé)

Notons au passage que MSF-E s'est retiré des sites autour de Am-Dam en fin janvier 2008 sans qu'il y ait une nouvelle organisation qui se soit installée. Lors du passage de la mission, il est constaté la prévalence de la conjonctivite sur le site de Al-Hambol et de Mirer. Tenant compte de la situation d'ensemble la mission recommande de :

1. Favoriser l'accès aux soins de santé par la mise en place d'une clinique mobile
2. Organiser des campagnes de vaccination pour les groupes vulnérables
3. Œuvrer pour la poursuite de la gratuité des soins à tous les niveaux
4. Organiser des cliniques mobiles prenant en compte les zones délaissées par MSF-E
5. Mener des screenings nutritionnels couvrant plus de sites/villages
6. Organiser le système de référence/contre référence des malades
7. Faire des sensibilisations sur l'hygiène et l'assainissement ainsi que le VIH/SIDA
8. Faire un plaidoyer pour attirer de nouveaux partenaires (ONG) ouvrant dans la santé

Lack of health services in IDP-affected zones (October 2006)

- Health problems in eastern Chad: only 10% of population has access to health centers and malaria is the main cause of death in children under five.
- Health assistance strategy: vaccinations against deadly diseases, Vitamin A and deworming treatments, and distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets.

UNICEF, 1 October 2006:

Overview
The Chadian government, humanitarian organizations and UN agencies are working together to provide urgent health and nutrition assistance to IDPs and host communities in four IDP-affected zones. Lack of access to adequate health services and essential medicines, and to water and sanitation facilities, make this assistance all the more necessary. In eastern Chad, where malaria is the number one cause of death among children under five, only 10% of the population has access to health centers, and the rate of malnutrition among children under five is as high as 49%. Another risk factor for the spread of epidemics among both IDPs and host communities is the sudden rise in population density due to displacement.

Health and Nutrition Strategy
The assistance strategy for the health and nutrition sector is (1) to vaccinate children from 6 months to 15 years of age against deadly diseases such as measles and meningitis, (2) to provide Vitamin A and de-worming medicines to help children ward off malnutrition and illness, (3) to expand the capacity of existing therapeutic feeding centres and health centres to ensure that displaced families and host communities have adequate access to essential medicines and services, (4) to distribute insecticide-treated mosquito nets to children and pregnant women to reduce the incidence of malaria, and (5) to monitor the nutritional status of children and women and distribute high energy biscuits at the first sign of need.

Zone 1: Adre, Borota, Allacha, Goungour	Zone 2: Ade, Koloye
Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-H, MSF-F, Première Urgence	Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence
Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated.	Numbers of IDPs: 10,000 estimated
Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Adre: [to be determined]; Borota, Allacha, Goungour: Children vaccinated against measles (MSF-F, Ministry of Health); distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence).	Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Ade: none [to be verified; problem of ongoing insecurity] Koloye: Distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence).
Health centers and mobile clinics Adre: 1 health center (MSF-F); Borota, Allacha: 1 mobile clinic (MSF-H), which uses emergency health kits provided by UNICEF.	Health centers and mobile clinics Ade: none [to be verified; problem of ongoing insecurity] Koloye: 1 mobile clinic (MSF-F)
Planned actions MSF-H vaccination campaign (measles, polio, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms) in September - October.	Planned actions [to be determined]
Problems and gaps in assistance Need for mosquito nets, K-Otab tablets for	Problems and gaps in assistance Ade: [to be determined] Koloye: need for tetanus, tuberculosis, polio vaccines, soap, jerry cans, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, and hygiene promotion against

treatment of mosquito nets, BP5 high protein biscuits, calcium hypochlorite antiseptic.	Hepatitis E.
Zone 3: Daguessa, Dogdore, Tour, Tiero, Marena Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, COOPI, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 22,000 estimated Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Dogdore: children received measles and polio vaccines, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms (provided by UNICEF, implemented by MSF-F and Ministry of Health). Tour, Tiero: distribution of essential medicines to unassisted health centers, distribution of NFIs (ICRC). Health centers and mobile clinics Daguessa: 1 health center, lacks essential medicines Dogdore: 1 health center (MSF-F, COOPI) Planned actions [to be determined] Problems and gaps in assistance Dogdore: need for tetanus, tuberculosis, polio vaccines, soap, jerry cans, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, and hygiene promotion against Hepatitis E.	Zone 4: Goz Beida , Koukou-Angarana Humanitarian organizations providing health & nutrition ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence, COOPI, InterSOS, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Goz Beida, Koukou-Angarana: children received measles and polio vaccines, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms (provided by UNICEF, implemented by COOPI and Ministry of Health); Gouroukoun: distribution of NFIs (MSF-F). Koubigou, Sanour, Habile: distribution of blankets, insecticide-treated mosquito nets, BP5 high protein biscuits (InterSOS). Abdi: distribution of NFIs (ICRC); distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, promotion of hygiene awareness (Première Urgence). Health centers and mobile clinics Koukou-Angarana: 1 health center, assisted by COOPI, which uses emergency health kits provided by UNICEF. Gouroukoun, Koubigou, Sanour: 1 mobile clinic (COOPI) Planned actions Abdi: vaccination campaign (measles, polio, vitamin A supplementation, treatment against intestinal worms) to be implemented by Première Urgence. Problems and gaps in assistance [to be determined]

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 18

1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.

2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:
(d) Essential medical services and sanitation.

Principle 19
1. All wounded and sick internally displaced persons as well as those with disabilities shall receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any grounds other than medical ones. When necessary, internally displaced persons shall have access to psychological and social services.
2. Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women, including access to female health care providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as well as appropriate counselling for victims of sexual and other abuses.

Water and sanitation

Water and Sanitation Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations providing water and sanitation services to IDPs: ACF, Acted, CARE, ICRC, Intermon OXFAM, MSF-F, MSF-H, OXFAM GB, PU, UNICEF, World Concern.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad

Who does What Where - Watsan Cluster - As of July 09

Issued: 24 July 09



Needs and humanitarian response (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"Mid-year achievements of the water and sanitation cluster:

Output	Planned in original CAP Appeal	Achieved as of mid-year
Number of affected individuals with continued access to safe water	200,000	160,000
Number of IDPs with adequate access to sanitation facilities	120,000	70,000
Percentage of schools with school hygiene education programmes	80%	10%
Number of affected individuals who received awareness on hygiene promotion	200,000	130,000

Activities in the [water and sanitation] cluster for the second half of 2008 will focus on four priorities:
• Ensure the functioning of the water and sanitation infrastructures for all sites, in order to maintain current Sphere Project standards (10-15 litres of water per person per day);
• Improve basic sanitation coverage of IDP sites in Habilé;
• Improve the water provision of the IDP border sites of Am Dam, Dogdoré, and Haouich;
• Promote the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of drinking water for returnees from the IDP sites of Kerfi and Loboutigué.

Awareness activities on the risk of malaria and vector-related diseases will be reoriented towards waterborne diseases and environmental sanitation through hygiene promotion, in order to prevent outbreaks of waterborne disease such as hepatitis E and diarrhea."

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"A la suite des affrontements interethniques et attaques contre les humanitaire à Kerfi, le 8 juillet, l'accès à l'eau reste une préoccupation à Kerfi (Dar Sila). Les points d'eau existants sont monopolisés par les populations autochtones et les déplacés utilisent l'eau des Ouaddi pour leurs besoins. OXFAM–GB est en contact avec les autorités pour la résolution de ce problème."

USAID, 27 June 2008:

"During the last few months, humanitarian agencies participated in interagency missions to Habile, a low-lying area that hosts approximately 40,000 IDPs. Because of Habile's location in a flood plain, latrine construction is shallow and newly constructed latrines last less than one year. USAID staff report a ratio of 64 persons to one latrine, the lowest coverage rate for any IDP site in eastern Chad. Improving the site's sanitation is crucial due to concerns regarding outbreaks of Hepatitis E and water-borne diseases. In June, WHO reported alarming hygiene and sanitation indicators in Habile and identified the camp as one of the most vulnerable locations for a possible diarrheal outbreak during the upcoming rainy season. The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) sent a local water and sanitation engineer to Habile and is mobilizing local contractors and NGOs to

address the issue, and USAID is considering additional means to support emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions in the area."

URD, 26 April 2008:

"La concentration d'un grand nombre d'individus (ex: 60,000 personnes concentrées autour de Goz Beida, 70,000 autour de Goz Amer) sur des surfaces relativement limitées dans une région où traditionnellement les villages ne dépassent que très rarement 3,000 âmes, pose un certain nombre de difficultés à commencer par l'approvisionnement en eau.

EAU

La question de la gestion des ressources en eau à l'Est du Tchad est une parfaite illustration de la nécessité de faire le lien entre urgence, réhabilitation et développement. Malheureusement, force est de constater que la réponse de la communauté internationale autour de cet enjeu reste insuffisante.

Les solutions proposées suivent, dans la plupart des camps de réfugiés, le même schéma. Réalisation d'une série de forages sur un espace donné (ex : station de pompage), généralement situé à proximité d'un ou de plusieurs ouadis, le ou lesquels se trouvent à la périphérie du camp. Tous les forages sont équipés de pompes immergées, alimentées par un groupe électrogène (un ou plusieurs générateurs en chaîne). L'eau est ainsi pompée et envoyée soit directement au niveau d'un château d'eau, où elle est chlorée puis distribuée au niveau de rampes de distributions réparties dans le camps, soit envoyée dans un réservoir intermédiaire où elle est chlorée puis renvoyée vers le château d'eau d'où elle sera distribuée selon le principe énoncé précédemment. Il existe encore quelques systèmes d'approvisionnement en eau par camion, tel que dans le camp d'Am Nabak.

Au niveau des sites de déplacés les solutions proposées sont variées. On trouve des systèmes relativement élaborés comme ceux mis en place au niveau des camps de réfugiés (système d'adduction d'eau par gravitation), des réseaux de pompes manuelles (généralement de type India Mark II), ainsi que des puits ouverts dits « puits traditionnels », ou encore des systèmes d'approvisionnement par camions qui alimentent des réservoirs souples (bladers) reliés à une ou deux rampes de distribution.

Les quantités d'eau potable ainsi distribuées varient énormément d'un endroit à l'autre (ex : moins de 8 l/pers/jour dans le camp d'Iridimi ; 19 L/pers/jour dans le camp de Djabal). L'eau est utilisée pour couvrir non seulement les besoins alimentaires et domestiques (vaisselle, lessive, hygiène corporelle), mais sert aussi pour les animaux, l'agriculture et la construction. Selon le HCR, les chiffres présentés par les acteurs humanitaires ne reflètent pas la réalité dans la mesure où les collectes d'informations ne sont pas standardisées et dans la mesure où il est extrêmement difficile pour les différents partenaires de contrôler l'exactitude des données.

ASSAINISSEMENT

La réponse apportée aux questions d'assainissement est une réponse de type classique en situation d'urgence. Que ce soit dans les camps de réfugiés ou dans les camps de déplacés, tous sont équipés de latrines classiques simples (fosse creusée dans le sol et recouverte d'une dalle). Le nombre d'usagers par latrines varie d'un camps à l'autre. Nous trouvons aussi bien des latrines familiales utilisées par peu de personnes (6 en moyenne) que des latrines publiques utilisées, elles, par un nombre supérieur d'individus (entre 15 et 30 en moyenne). La forme des latrines, le choix des matériaux, la profondeur de la fosse, la qualité de la dalle, varient d'un camp de réfugiés ou d'un site de déplacés à l'autre. Certaines latrines publiques ont été conçues pour séparer les matières solides des matières liquides. Une tentative intéressante sur laquelle nous

reviendrons plus tard, mais qui, malheureusement, n'a pas été mise en œuvre dans les règles de l'art. Le manque d'espace pour creuser les latrines commence déjà à se faire sentir et aura tendance à devenir de plus en plus problématique si les réfugiés et déplacés devaient demeurer dans les camps encore de longues années.

HYGIENE

Les stratégies mises en place en matière de promotion de l'hygiène et de la santé sont classiques. Mise en place de comité de salubrité, de promotion de l'hygiène, d'assainissement, les noms varient d'un site à l'autre, mais globalement les structures mises en place sont similaires. La variable la plus visible étant le degré de mobilisation de l'ensemble de l'équipe responsable de ces questions. Lequel degré de mobilisation se traduit par la présence sur le terrain des membres des comités au coté des réfugiés, le niveau de collaboration qui existe entre le centre de santé et l'équipe d'encadrement des comités d'hygiène, par le niveau de connaissance des bénéficiaires des quelques messages clés véhiculés par les équipes de promoteurs et le niveau de mobilisation de la population vivant sur le site. Ce niveau de mobilisation se traduit à son tour par le niveau de salubrité du camp et le niveau de propreté des aires de distribution d'eau et des aires de lavage.

Selon les observations réalisées au cours de l'étude, le « curseur » oscille entre une absence totale de mobilisation sociale sur les questions d'hygiène et de gestion de l'eau, comme ce fut le cas à Dogdoré avec MSF-France, et un vrai travail de fond qui se traduit par un camp bien entretenu, des aires de distribution clôturées, gardées et propres et des bénéficiaires relativement bien informés des quelques règles d'hygiène de base comme cela a pu être observé dans le camp de Djabal où Oxfam Intermon effectue un très bon travail de fond."

Problems with water and sanitation cluster and humanitarian response (April 2008)

URD, 26 April 2008:

Une réponse humanitaire incomplète autour de la problématique de l'eau

Une réponse humanitaire qui ne consisterait qu'à répondre aux besoins humains sans tenir compte de la réalité sociale et culturelle serait notoirement inadaptée. Pour une population composée essentiellement d'agriculteurs et d'éleveurs possédant du bétail et tentant de développer une activité agricole, aussi modeste soit-elle, l'eau est nécessairement multi-usage. Ne pas vouloir prendre en compte cette réalité revient à ne traiter qu'une partie du problème.

Quelle est la priorité des humanitaires au Tchad ? Est-ce de répondre aux standards Sphère, tel que le mode de fonctionnement du « Cluster WASH » animé par l'UNICEF semble l'encourager, ou de répondre aux besoins réels de la population, de façon stratégique et durable ? Est il pertinent de vouloir fournir absolument une quantité donnée d'eau potable quand on sait déjà qu'une partie sera consommée par du bétail, sera utilisée pour la production de briques pour la construction ou pour l'agriculture ? Ne serait il pas plus approprié de se concentrer sur une réflexion stratégique sur la diversification des sources d'approvisionnement plutôt que sur la seule quantité d'eau potable distribuée ? Si les humanitaires ont déployé de grands efforts, dans un contexte parfois très difficile, pour fournir plus d'eau potable aux populations qu'elles n'en consomment réellement, ils n'ont en revanche pas répondu aux besoins en eau brute pourtant essentiels.

Des choix techniques parfois discutables

Si dans la plus part des cas, les choix techniques peuvent parfaitement se justifier, quand bien même les options retenues (systèmes d'adduction d'eau motorisés) représentent une véritable charge financière et technique (qualification, main d'œuvre, pièces détachées, carburant, etc.), certains choix techniques surprennent.

La mise en place de pompes manuelles de type India Mark II munies d'un mécanisme métallique galvanisé dans des zones, comme c'est le cas dans certains camps de réfugiés de RCA au sud du Tchad, où la teneur en fer de l'eau accélère le phénomène de corrosion, conduit à des casses précoces et multiples et, à terme, à un abandon pur et simple de l'installation. Le choix fait par le WASH Cluster Lead (UNICEF) d'imposer la pompe India Mark II, pour laquelle le système de maintenance et d'approvisionnement en pièces détachées est largement déficient, pose question. Il y a au Tchad une bonne implantation d'un type de pompe à pied fiable testée dans la durée dans des projets d'hydraulique villageoise par le MPH, l'AFD et la Commission européenne. Cette pompe est très performante à grande profondeur (60, 80 mètres), solide (moins de pièces d'usure) et dispose d'un réseau de distribution de pièces détachées bien développé et structuré dans le pays. La multiplication des différents modèles de pompe représente à terme un vrai problème pour le Ministère en charge. Cette problématique illustre clairement le cloisonnement qui prévaut entre acteurs d'urgence et de développement. La pompe India Park II étant celle que l'on retrouve quasi systématiquement sur tous les projets « eau » réalisés par les humanitaires et la pompe Vergnet étant celle que l'on retrouve sur les projets de développement. Quelques ONG, comme Solidarités et ACF ont décidé d'opter pour la pompe Vergnet, pour les mêmes raisons que celles invoquées plus haut et ceux en dépit des résistances opposées par l'UNICEF. D'après les informations collectées au cours de la mission, il semblerait que d'autres ONG, telles qu'Intermon Oxfam, souhaiteraient prendre la même direction, mais ne le font pas en raison de la position adoptée par UNICEF sur cette question.

Repenser le groupe sectoriel « eau et assainissement » (Cluster WASH)

La coordination du secteur eau et assainissement est divisée en deux avec d'un coté le UNHCR pour les camps de réfugiés et de l'autre l'UNICEF pour le reste (populations déplacées et autochtones) des personnes assistées. Or les problématiques liées à la gestion de la ressource « eau » et à l'assainissement sont les mêmes sur les sites de déplacées et dans les camps de réfugiés. Les réflexions et expériences des uns pourraient tout à fait profiter aux autres. Cette situation a des effets pervers, surtout pour les partenaires qui travaillent avec les différents groupes de population. La multiplication des réunions autour d'un même thème dans un environnement où les ressources humaines sont limitées constitue un frein à la bonne coordination. De plus, certaines problématiques communes (ex : choix du type de latrines dans un espace restreint, question eau potable / eau brute, rapprochement avec acteurs de développement, respect du code de l'eau et du schéma directeur, etc.) qui devraient faire l'objet de discussions communes au niveau du groupe sectoriel, sont finalement gérées au niveau des partenaires qui, parfois, doivent apporter des réponses différentes à des problèmes communs en fonction des populations avec lesquelles ils travaillent.

Les groupes sectoriels « eau et assainissement » fonctionnent plus sur un mode comptable (accent sur le quantitatif, pourcentage d'atteinte des indicateurs SPHERE alors que ces derniers sont par ailleurs remis en question par la plupart des acteurs du secteur au Tchad) plutôt sur les enjeux qualitatifs. Les réunions devraient plus se concentrer sur les enjeux stratégiques rencontrés au niveau de la gestion de l'eau et de l'assainissement (définition de standards techniques adaptés au contexte hydrogéologique et socio-économique, des stratégies alternatives pour faire face aux risques sur la ressource) sous peine d'accentuer un sentiment de frustration assez perceptible chez de nombreux participants à ces réunions.

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007, MSF France mène des activités en matière de santé. ACF assure la distribution de NFI, la promotion de l'hygiène, des activités de réhabilitation des points d'eau, un programme de santé mentale et des activités de sécurité alimentaire.

Recommandations : Santé, nutrition et WASH
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2. Appuyer les efforts de ACF en matière de WASH afin de garantir la qualité et la quantité d'eau potable et de juguler la recrudescence du Syndrome ictérique aigu.
3. Renforcer le programme d'assainissement et de promotion d'hygiène pour augmenter le nombre de latrines familiales (normes sphères : 1 latrine pour 20 personnes) et améliorer la salubrité dans les sites
4. Assurer la distribution du savon et garantir la régularité dans le temps selon les normes à raison d'un savon de 250 g par personne et par mois."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

Données collectées (eau/assainissement)

Site	Situation eau/assainissement
Hidal-Assad	Les populations s'approvisionnent dans les puits traditionnels et dans le ouadi Il n'y a pas de latrines dans le village. Les gens défèquent en plein air Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008
Al Jazeera	Les populations s'approvisionnent dans les puits traditionnels Il n'y a pas de latrines dans le village. Les gens défèquent en plein air Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008
Am-Sieb	Les populations s'approvisionnent dans les puits traditionnels Il n'y a pas de latrines dans le village. Les gens défèquent en plein air Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008
Mirer	Les populations s'approvisionnent dans les puits traditionnels Il n'y a pas de latrines dans le village. Les gens défèquent en plein air Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008

Amtalata I	Les populations s'approvisionnent dans les puits traditionnels Il n'y a pas de latrines dans le village. Les gens défèquent en plein air Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008
Binédir	Il manque de points d'eau dans le village tout comme les latrines Prospection géophysique faite IRW mais il reste à réaliser les forages
Al-Hambol	L'eau est rare Les gens s'approvisionnent à une vingtaine de km du village Des études géophysiques ont été réalisées par IRW et des forages sont prévus courant mars 2008

Recommandations (eau/assainissement)

1. Améliorer la capacité d'accès à l'eau pour la consommation des ménages et pour le bétail ainsi que les cultures maraîchères
2. Promouvoir des campagnes d'hygiène et former des promoteurs endogènes (pairs éducateurs)

Lack of watsan services in IDP-affected zones (October 2006)

- Problems in eastern Chad: only 34% of population has access to safe drinking water, only 1% of families use latrines, overcrowding in host villages and lack of natural resources can lead to disputes between IDP and host communities and to high risk of epidemics.
- Assistance strategy: drill boreholes and wells, establish water management committees, build latrines, and promote hygiene education.

UNICEF, 1 October 2006:

Overview
The Chadian government, humanitarian organizations and UN agencies are working together to provide water and sanitation assistance to IDPs and host communities in four IDP-affected zones. This is of particular urgency given the lack of water and sanitation facilities in the region: only 34% of Chad's population has access to safe drinking water and less than 1% of families in rural areas use latrines. The danger to communities already facing such difficulties has been the sudden rise in population density with the arrival of IDPs. Overcrowding can lead to disputes over limited resources between IDPs and host communities and to a high risk of epidemics from use of contaminated water and inadequate sanitation facilities.

Water and Environmental Sanitation Strategy
The assistance strategy for the water and environmental sanitation sector is (1) to establish new safe water sources in communities that can host IDPs, (2) to establish water point management committees in each host community to oversee functioning and maintenance of new water sources, (3) to build family and community latrines for IDPs and host communities, (4) to promote hygiene education programs, and (5) to support IDPs with improved water sources and sanitation facilities when security allows them to return to their villages of origin.

Zone 1: ~~Abdi, Adre,~~ Borota, Allacha, Goungour	Zone 2: Ade, Koloye

Humanitarian organizations providing water & sanitation Abdi: Première Urgence; Adre: none [to be verified]; Borota: ICRC, MSF-H; Allacha, Goungour: MSF-H, Première Urgence Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Water & sanitation situation before arrival of IDPs Abdi: 1 water tower (not functional); Borota: 1 well (dry most of the year, needs rehabilitation); Allacha: 1 well (drying, needs rehabilitation); Goungour: 1 well (drying, needs rehabilitation). [all to be verified] Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Borota: 1 MSF-H jetted borehole (dry). Planned actions 10 boreholes with hand pumps (UNICEF) to be drilled starting in September 2006. Problems and gaps in assistance Water: [to be determined]. Sanitation: [to be determined].	Humanitarian organizations providing water & sanitation Ade: none (MSF-F is no longer present due to insecurity) Koloye: ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence Numbers of IDPs: 10,000 estimated Water & sanitation situation before arrival of IDPs Ade: unknown [to be verified]; Koloye: 1 well Defecation in open areas without latrines, common Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Koloye: 2 MSF-F jetted boreholes (each yields 7 l/p/d); MSF-F treating water with UV rays; UNICEF provided chloride and soap to MSF-F. Planned actions ICRC plans needs-assessment before new assistance is provided; MSF-F to jet 2-3 more boreholes; 7 boreholes with hand pumps (UNICEF) to be drilled starting in September 2006. Problems and gaps in assistance Koloye: 1 ICRC well (dry); 2 MSF-F jetted boreholes near riverbed (dry). Sanitation: [to be determined].
Zone 3: Daguessa, Dogdore, Tour, Tiero, Marena Humanitarian organizations providing water & sanitation Daguessa: none [to be verified]; Dogdore, Tour: ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence; Tiero: ICRC, MSF-F, Première Urgence; Marena: none [to be verified] Numbers of IDPs: 22,000 estimated Water & sanitation situation before arrival of IDPs Daguessa: 3 wells (1 poor quality); Dogdore, Tour: 4 wells (1 dry); Tiero: no wells (water source Bar Azoum riverbed); Marena: no wells (water source Bar Azoum riverbed). Defecation in open areas without latrines, common. Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Dogdore: 3 ICRC wells; 3 MSF-F jetted boreholes yield 90,000 l/d; MSF-F treating water with UV rays; UNICEF provided chloride, soap, 2 water bladders (5,000 litres each), and 20 plastic latrine slabs to MSF-F. Tour: 4 ICRC wells Planned actions	Zone 4: Goz Beida , Koukou-Angarana Humanitarian organizations providing water & sanitation Goz Beida and Koukou-Angarana: InterSOS, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities 4 water pumping stations in Koubigou, Sanour, Abchour and Habile, each yielding 15 l/p/d (UNICEF); 12 boreholes with hand pumps (UNICEF) in surrounding villages; family water kits, sanitation kits and soap distributed; water management committees and hygiene promotion programs established; 160 family latrines (InterSOS) constructed. Planned actions Chadian government, UNHCR, Oxfam and UNICEF agree on approach to provide 9,000 IDPs with water (construction to begin mid September); InterSOS is building 142 family latrines; 21 boreholes with hand pumps (UNICEF) to be drilled

Dogdore, Tour: 2 MSF-F jetted wells still pending; MSF-F to distribute soap and jerry cans end August; MSF-F to study building durable boreholes in October; 21 boreholes with hand pumps (UNICEF) to be drilled in Zones 3 and 4 starting in September 2006. Problems and gaps in assistance Sanitation: [to be determined]	in Zones 3 and 4 starting in September 2006. Problems and gaps in assistance Tcharow: 1 MSF-F jetted borehole (not operational); Gassire: 1 MSF-F jetted borehole (dry); Gouroukoun: 1 MSF-F jetted borehole (dry).

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 18
1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:
(a) Essential food and potable water;
(d) Essential medical services and sanitation.

Shelter and non-food items

Shelter & NFI Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations distributing non-food items to IDPs: APLFT, CNAPD, Concern Worldwide, COOPI, ICRC, IMC, Intersos, Intermon OXFAM, IRD, LWF, MSF-F, PU, UNHCR, UNICEF.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad
Who does What Where - Shelter & Non Food Items - As of July 09

Issued: 24 July 09



Site Management Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Humanitarian organisations providing site management services to IDPs: ACF, Concern Worldwide, IRD, LWF, MSF-F, OXFAM GB, UNHCR.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad

Who does What Where - Site Management - As of July 09

Source: 24 July 09



NFI distribution problems (Ausgust 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"During the offensive launched against the Chadian Government by armed opposition groups in February, a large quantity of non-food items (NFIs) (tents, mats, blankets, plastic sheets, plastic rolls, and other items), which were stocked in N'Djamena in order to be transferred to the east, were looted. A limited stock of NFIs in the eastern town of Abéché was then used to respond to some of the most urgent needs of vulnerable households. As a result, less than 30% of the intended beneficiaries received NFIs (with the exception of soap, which was distributed regularly)."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007, ACF assure la distribution de NFI, la promotion de l'hygiène, des activités de réhabilitation des points d'eau, un programme de santé mentale et des activités de sécurité alimentaire. S'agissant des abris et des non-vivres, ACF prépare une distribution générale de ces articles à l'approche de la saison des pluies.

Recommandations : abris et NFI
Distribuer les bâches et autres NFI pour améliorer les conditions de vie."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

Données collectées (abris et NFI)

Site	Situation abris et NFI
Hidal-Assad	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, ustensiles de cuisine, outils agricoles, outils agricoles, moustiquaires)
Al Jazeera	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires, habits)
Am-Sieb	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires, habits)
Mirer	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires, habits)

Amtalata I	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires,
Binédir	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires, habits)
Al-Hambol	Distribution de Non Food Items (bâche, seau, nattes, ustensiles de cuisine, moustiquaires, habits)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 18

1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:
(b) Basic shelter and housing.

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Education Cluster: Who does what where (December 2009)

- Organisations providing education services to IDPs: APLFT, Concern Worldwide, FTC, IRD, Intersos, JRS, Ministere de l'Education, PU, UNICEF.

UN OCHA, July 2009:

OCHA Chad Field Office

IDPs Sites in Eastern Chad
Who does What Where - Education - As of July 09

Issued: 24 July 09



Overview of education situation for IDP children (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"Available data indicates that between 33% and 39% of school-aged IDP children in the departments of Assoungha, Dar Sila, and Ouara (excluding the Dogdoré area) are enrolled in school. This represents a sharp increase from the figure of 11% reported in October 2007 at the beginning of the current school year.

In the departments of Assoungha, Dar Sila, Djourouf Al Amar and Ouara, where approximately 185,000 IDPs live, an estimated 46,000 to 55,000 IDP children (25% to 30% of the IDP population) are in need of primary education. In most cases, access to education has been supported during the first half of 2008 through the construction, reinforcement and maintenance of additional classrooms, the training of community teachers, the establishment of parent-teacher associations, as well as the provision of school materials."

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"A Dogdoré, il prévu que l'ONG Save the Children reprendra ses activités en octobre 2008. Environ 9.000 enfants vont pouvoir aller à l'école dans cette zone avec le retour de Save the Children qui avait suspendu ses activités pour des raisons sécuritaires en mai. Au total, 20 hangars avaient été construits par SCF-UK avec l'appui de l'UNICEF pour accueillir les enfants du primaire.

L'ONG Feed the Children compte effectuer à partir du 18 août une mission d'évaluation des besoins pour le programme des cantines scolaires dans l'Assoungha. Feed the Children prévoit de réactualiser la liste des écoles devant bénéficier du programme des cantines scolaires en 2008-2009. Dans le Dar Sila, Feed the Children est en discussions avec les partenaires afin d'ouvrir des cantines scolaires dans les sites de déplacés et villages de retours de Koukou, Dogdore, Kerfi et éventuellement Abdi."

JRS, 18 June 2008:

"Tens of thousands of Chadian children have been displaced from their home villages in the last two years by fighting among a variety of rebel groups, government armies and ethnic militias. The youngsters are crowded with their families into sweltering camps managed by the UN. Yet Catholic educators say there's an upside for the uprooted kids: They get to go to school. 'The huge majority of the displaced had no schools in their villages of origin. They didn't know what a school was, because their villages were so poor and little,' said Jesuit Father Maurice Joyeux, who directs the JRS Chad teacher training programme in a small desert town in the east of the country that sits amid three camps for displaced Chadians and Sudanese refugees.

'This region had been abandoned. People are just now discovering what a school is, and it portends a significant historical change for the region's people.' Since 2006 UNICEF has sponsored work by JRS and other nongovernmental organisations to establish an education system for displaced children in eastern Chad. JRS supports schools at 12 sites. Given the desert region's isolation and difficult living conditions, Fr Joyeux said it is difficult to get teachers from other parts of the country to work in eastern Chad. So JRS staff members focus on training teachers nominated by the refugee and displaced communities while fostering the development of parent associations to support the schools.

'Through the schools we are protecting the children, whose economic level is very poor. There's a big temptation to join the war, simply because they're hungry, without thinking which camp they're joining. If they are better educated, they won't be so willing to go easily to war,' he said. 'Girls need a little more courage to come to class, because they have the additional burden of housework, but many girls have been recognised as the best students, and they're proud to be there.'"

UN OCHA, 9 June 2008:

"For the first time since the beginning of the crisis, IDP children have completed a full school year program through joint efforts of UNICEF in support of the Ministry of Education and together with its implementing partners JRS and PU (Jesuit Refugee Services : Department Dar Sila - Koukou, Goz Beida; Premiere Urgence: Departments of Ouara and Assoungha). No children at school yet in the Dogdore area (Save the Children - UK), as well as Am Dam/Haouish (Islamic Relief Worldwide - IRW).

Among IDPs in eastern Chad, the number of school-age children is estimated at over 50,000 or 30% of the total displaced population. The vast majority of these children have not been enrolled in school or have not completed their school year, and need to be provided with the opportunity to continue their education. UNICEF and its partners face and are currently addressing several challenges in this endeavour: lack of teachers among IDPs (up to 95% of the IDP population is estimated to be illiterate), the precarious nature of school infrastructure, and shortages in school materials and equipment. UNICEF is funding three NGOs – Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), Premiere Urgence (PU), and Save the Children UK (SCUK) – to work towards the strengthening of teachers' capacities.

Since the beginning of 2006, construction of 120 classrooms has been completed in IDP sites, with construction of classrooms in Dogdoré still underway, under the leadership of UNICEF and through the employment of local labour. The distribution of school supplies for the new school year 2007/2008, provided by UNICEF, was completed in December 2007, benefited a total of more than 22,000 children in ten IDP sites throughout the departments of Ouara, Assoungha and Dar Sila. Each establishment received equipment/ furniture such as blackboards, plastic mats, desks and chairs for teachers etc., as well as teaching and learning materials such as the *school in a box* and recreation kits."

Assessment of IDP sites in Dogdore (May 2008)

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Depuis 2007 l'ONG Save the Children UK s'occupe du programme de protection de l'enfance et l'encadrement scolaire mais a récemment arrêté ses activités suite à de nombreux incidents de sécurité culminant avec le meurtre de son chef de mission le 1er mai à Farchana.

Il est ressorti des entretiens qu'il existe un nombre important d'enfants soit environ 5000 mais les écoles ne sont pas fonctionnelles sur l'ensemble des sites. Les interlocuteurs ont exprimé leur

souhait de voir les salles construites avec des matériaux durables surtout les toitures des classes qui sont en pailles et peu enclin aux intempéries (vent, pluie et soleil).

Recommandations : éducation
1. Finaliser avec des matériaux appropriés (toiture en tôle) avant la prochaine rentrée scolaire la construction des salles de classe.
2. Veiller à ce que la prochaine rentrée scolaire soit effective.
3. Rendre effectif les cantines scolaires à la prochaine rentrée scolaire."

Assessment of IDP sites in Am-Dam and Haouich (March 2008)

- Inter-agency assessment mission conducted in March 2008.
- Assessment of 7 IDP sites, 8,000 IDPs.

Inter-Agency mission, March 2008:

Données collectées (éducation)

Site	Situation éducation
Hidal-Assad	Environ 400 enfants, déplacés et population hôte en âge scolarisable (6-12 ans) ont accès à l'école Pas des cours pour les préscolaires (3-5 ans) 2 maîtres communautaires (un arabe et un francophone), payés par l'APE, qui font le double shift (enseignent le matin et le soir) L'école comprend 3 classes Pas de fournitures scolaires ni de matériels didactiques Il existe une cantine scolaire depuis le 15 Janvier 2008 (il y a des vivres en stock, mais il reste pas beaucoup) Une latrine à l'école mais ce sont seulement les garçons qui la fréquente
Al Jazeera	Il y a une école et 1 enseignant pour 200 élèves en âge scolarisable (6 à 12 ans) l'école est mixte pour les enfants des communautés hôtes et les déplacés L'enseignant a reçu une formation de Prodabo Il n'y a pas une cantine scolaire
Am-Sieb	Il y a une école mixte pour la pop hôte et déplacée 3 enseignants, arabophone et francophone Les parents doivent payer 50 FCFA /élève/mois pour aller a l'école (cotiser par l'APE pour payer les enseignants) – c'est difficile de trouver les moyens pour payer les maîtres Il y a 3 salles de classes mais pas de latrines L'école a reçu du soutien de l'Etat concernant la formation des enseignants et quelques matériels (ardoises, livres ; parents achètent les cahiers eux-mêmes pour les enfants) Les participants de l'APE sont de la population hôte seulement, pas des représentants des déplacés et pas des femmes Les enfants déplacés ont eu accès a l'école dans d'ou ils sont venus La plupart des adultes est jamais aller a l'école ; au site d'ou ils sont venus des cours d'alphabétisation étaient organises Il y a une cantine scolaire, mais la bouillie n'est pas bien préparée et très légère Le plus grand problème pour la population déplacée et hôte est la faim influence sur la capacité d'apprendre dans l'école

	Les parents obligent les enfants d'aller a l'école ; les hommes disent que la plupart des enfants vont pas a l'école, il doivent aider leurs parents avec des travaux a la maison ; d'après les femmes il y a seulement peu d'enfants qui sont pas a l'école (40 enfants enregistre de l'age scolarisable) Il n'y a pas des cours pour les pré-scolaires (3-5 ans) Les femmes constantes qu'il y a beaucoup des orphelins, quelque fois 2-3 par familles, et plus de 70 en totale
Mirer	Une école avec 80 élèves, 1 MC (arabophone), 1 APE, pas de cantine scolaire, 1 salle de classe
Amtalata I	Existence d'une école (1 hangar) avec 2 maîtres communautaires, 300 élèves, APE existant (mixte pop hôtes et déplacée) 85% des enfants sont entre 7-14 ans Il y a deux classes Pas de cantine scolaire Pas de matériel didactique et pas de fourniture Existence d'une école avec 2 maîtres communautaires, 300 élèves, APE existant
Binédir	Il y a une école mixed (pop hôtes/déplacées) avec une salle de classe et 186 élèves avec 1 seul niveau (CP1) Ecole créée en 2004, fermée puis rouverte en 2006. 2 maîtres (arabophone et francophone ; double shift ; 7-11 h francophone, 11h-12 h arabophone) Cotisation de 100 cfa/élève/mois, cotise par l'APE Pas de fournitures scolaire ; quelques livres et ardoisent étaient distribue par le Ministère de l'Education Nationale, mais pas assez (ca. 1 livre pour 3-4 enfants) Pas de cantine scolaire Les maîtres ont propose d'établir un jardin scolaires, mais il leurs faut les matériels (semences etc.) Le plus grand problème est le manque de matériel Il n'y a pas des latrines Beaucoup d'orphelins
Al-Hambol	Ecole comprenant 3 niveaux, en arabe (CP1, CP2, CM1) Ecole créée en 2002 3 maîtres communautaires Tous les enfants a l'age scolarisable (6-12 ans) ont accès à l'école ; il n'y a pas des cours pour les pré-scolaires (3-5 ans) Plus de 60 enfants a l'école Quelques enfants doivent aider a la maison, mais plutôt après l'école Cotisation de 100 à 150 cfa/mois/élève Pas de latrines dans l'école Pas de fourniture Pas de matériel didactique, les cahiers sont achetés par les parents sur le marche voisine L'école comprend 60% de filles Pas de cantine scolaire Il y a une école coranique

<u>Recommandations (éducation)</u>

1. Affectation et prise en charge des maîtres intégrés et communautaires par le Ministère de l'Education et l'APICED (standard Tchadien : 50 élèves par salle de classe)
2. Formation et suivi des maîtres et des Associations Parents Elèves (APEs)

3. Construction/Maintenance des structures scolaires, y compris des latrines séparées pour les garçons et les filles et l'accès à l'eau potable plus « hand-washing facilities »
4. Dotation des écoles de matériel didactique et récréatif (pour les maîtres et les enfants) et des fournitures scolaires
5. Doter les écoles avec des cantines scolaires (y compris la construction des magasins pour les vivres)
6. Développement de la capacité des personnes responsables pour l'Education (Délégué Régional, Inspecteurs Départemental etc.)
7. Mettre en place des projets intersectoriels et établir des « Ecoles Amis Enfants » (par exemple : Eau & Assainissement : Sensibilisation de l'hygiène ; Santé & Nutrition : « Deworming » ; HIV/SIDA : Sensibilisation ; Protection pour l'enfant ; ajouter des cours Life Skills au Curriculum etc.)
8. Alphabétisation pour les adultes

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 23
1. Every human being has the right to education.
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities concerned shall ensure that such persons, in particular displaced children, receive education which shall be free and compulsory at the primary level. Education should respect their cultural identity, language and religion.
3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women and girls in educational programmes.
4. Education and training facilities shall be made available to internally displaced persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as soon as conditions permit.

Obstacles to education

Lack of qualified school teachers (December 2009)

OCHA, 20 April 2009:

"De façon générale, le secteur de l'éducation reste confronté à l'insuffisance des maîtres dans les écoles à l'est. Dans les zones de Louboutigué et d'Arangou, le manque de maîtres francophones limite la fréquentation de l'école par les enfants. Dans les sites de déplacés, la motivation des maîtres communautaires constitue une préoccupation; les rendements des activités génératrices de revenus gérées par les associations des parents d'élèves ne suffisent pas pour les payer.

L'UNICEF et ses partenaires continuent le plaidoyer auprès des autorités pour le déploiement de maîtres qualifiés à l'est."

Difficulty of providing education services for IDPs (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"In the first months of 2008, in parallel to worsening insecurity, an increase was reported in the number of school-aged children in eastern Chad, mainly due to new population movements. Difficulties in responding were however numerous, including delays in the construction of school infrastructure in the area of Dogdoré, and difficulties in obtaining food for school canteens in the department of Dar Sila. In the areas of Am Dam and Haouich, no education activities have yet started for the current school year, due to the delayed arrival of funding."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"Ensuring education for internally displaced and refugee children, particularly girls, is of vital importance since it greatly reduces their exposure to recruitment. Access to education is difficult for all children in eastern Chad. The limited schools available are in rudimentary shelters, with teachers who have little or no formal training and students who lack learning materials. In refugee camps, IDP sites, and host communities, children and young adolescents lack access to secondary school and there are very few alternatives available."

Lack of education services in IDP-affected zones (November 2006)

- Problems in eastern Chad: lack of classrooms, teachers with little or no formal training, lack of learning materials.
- Assistance strategy: construction of classrooms, distribution of learning materials, training of community based teachers, and support of parent-teacher associations.

UNICEF, 1 November 2006:

Overview
The Chadian government, humanitarian organizations and UN agencies are working together to provide education assistance to IDPs and host communities in four IDP-affected zones. This is of vital importance in eastern Chad, where most of the schools are rudimentary shelters, with teachers who have little or no formal training and students who lack learning materials. Because conflict and displacement present particular threats for children, such as separation from their families, targeted violence, or recruitment by fighting forces, education is one of the most important protection tools for children as it greatly reduces their exposure to such threats. Even in emergencies, education is a fundamental human right of every child.

Education Strategy
The assistance strategy for the education sector is (1) to expand the quality and physical capacity of primary schools for displaced children and children from host communities through the construction of classrooms, (2) to provide displaced children and children from host communities with “School-in-a-Box” kits, plastic mats for sitting, black boards and other learning materials and equipment, (3) to train community-based teachers, and (4) to strengthen parent - teacher associations (PTAs).

Zone 1: Abdi, Borota, Allacha, Goungour	Zone 2: Ade, Koloye

Humanitarian organizations providing education Première Urgence, UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Education situation before arrival of IDPs Abdi: 1 primary school, 1 secondary school Borota: 1 primary school, no teachers Goungour: 1 primary school, no teachers Allacha: 1 primary school [all of the above to be verified] Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities None Planned actions Première Urgence to supervise construction of 106 classrooms throughout Zone 1, to preposition 160 "School-in-a-Box" kits, to train community-based teachers, to strengthen PTAs. Problems and gaps in assistance [to be determined]	Humanitarian organizations providing education None [problem of ongoing insecurity] Numbers of IDPs: 10,000 estimated Education situation before arrival of IDPs [to be determined] Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities None Planned actions [to be determined] Problems and gaps in assistance Ongoing insecurity in eastern Chad has prevented NGOs from working in the zone.
Zone 3: Daguessa, Dogdore, Tour, Tiero, Marena Humanitarian organizations providing education None [problem of ongoing insecurity] Numbers of IDPs: 22,000 estimated Education situation before arrival of IDPs Daguessa: 1 primary school Dogdore: no schools Tour: no schools Tioro: 1 primary school, no teachers Marena: 1 primary school, no teachers [all of the above to be verified] Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Census conducted by UNICEF identified 531 school aged children. Planned actions Dogdore: UNICEF to estimate number of teachers. Problems and gaps in assistance Ongoing insecurity in eastern Chad has prevented NGOs from working in the zone.	Zone 4: Goz Beida , Koukou-Angarana Humanitarian organizations providing education UNICEF Numbers of IDPs: 13,000 estimated Education situation before arrival of IDPs Goz Beida: 4 primary schools, 1 secondary school Koukou-Angarana: 3 primary schools Assistance provided to date to IDPs & host communities Gouroukoun, Koubigou, Sanour, Habile: census conducted by UNICEF identified 5,000 number of school aged children; construction of 19 classrooms underway; educational materials distributed; 54 community-based teachers trained; PTAs encouraged and strengthened. Planned actions Start school; continue monitoring number of school aged children throughout school year, with special attention to schooling of girls; construct 13 additional classrooms due to new IDP movements in November. Problems and gaps in assistance [to be determined]

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Self-reliance of IDPs compromised (July 2008)

Pawlitzky and Jánszky, July 2008:

" … IDPs rely heavily on humanitarian aid because the security situation precludes their return, and because their mechanisms of solidarity and survival presently are severely compromised. The presence of the displaced populations in the IDP sites results in pressure on the area's already scarce natural resources, enhances tensions between displaced and host communities, and leads to a high demand for assistance."

Access to land

IDPs face difficulties in accesing arable land (July 2008)

FEWS NET, 7 July 2008:

"For the 9,000 IDPs slowly beginning to return to their native villages in Dar Silla, the continued violence, water shortage, and excessively high levies imposed by the Forestry Service for the cutting of fuelwood are curtailing their access to cropland and fostering a continued dependence on humanitarian aid for the upcoming 2008/09 season."

AFP, 14 May 2008:

"Visuellement, la différence est criante entre les villages anciens, les villages de déplacés où les gens se sont agglutinés de manière anarchique et les camps de réfugiés, préparés à l'avance et aux rues tracées au cordeau.

'En caricaturant, les camps de réfugiés c'est le Club Med, par rapport aux villages de déplacés' analyse un humanitaire. 'Dans les camps de réfugiés, on a de quoi vivre voire bien vivre. Chez les déplacés, on a de quoi survivre', ajoute-t-il.

Les réfugiés bénéficient d'une aide alimentaire qui leur permet de revendre des produits, contrairement aux déplacés qui ont une aide moindre ne couvrant souvent pas leurs besoins. Les villageois, qui peuvent cultiver leurs terres, n'en ont pas du tout. Les déplacés cultivent aussi mais il leur faut souvent se contenter de terres situées loin de leurs camps ou peu fertiles, les villageois de la région exploitant logiquement depuis longtemps les terres les plus productives."

USAID, 11 April 2008:

" … USAID staff report increased tension regarding land access, including incidents of IDPs renting arable land from host communities and receiving suboptimal plots."

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Family unity

Displacement has forced IDP families to separate (June 2008)

CARE, June 2008:

"Fait inquiétant, de nombreuses personnes déplacées ont indiqué que le manque d'aide forçait leurs familles à se séparer pour trouver des moyens de subsistance. Il nous a été rapporté que des adolescents étaient partis vers les villes et que des femmes et des enfants avaient déménagé à proximité des camps de réfugiés où la rumeur courait que l'aide alimentaire était plus importante. De plus, malgré les risques potentiels, des familles envoyèrent certains de leurs membres à leurs villages d'origine pour tenter de s'occuper de leurs champs abandonnés. Trop souvent, ces mécanismes de survie ne firent qu'accroître les difficultés de protection et la vulnérabilité des personnes déplacées."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 17

1. Every human being has the right to respect of his or her family life.
2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, family members who wish to remain together shall be allowed to do so.
3. Families which are separated by displacement should be reunited as quickly as possible. All appropriate steps shall be taken to expedite the reunion of such families, particularly when children are involved. The responsible authorities shall facilitate inquiries made by family members and encourage and cooperate with the work of humanitarian organizations engaged in the task of family reunification.

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return prospects

Return prospects (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"The deployment of a multi-dimensional international presence, composed of the United Nations Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) and the European Union Force in Chad and CAR (EUFOR Chad/CAR) … has been delayed due to insecurity. Neither entity is fully operational at this time. Once both are fully established, they will pursue their mandate to protect civilians, as well as to ensure the safety of humanitarian staff and operations. This, in turn, is expected to be favourable to the return of IDPs."

Pawlitzky and Jánszky, July 2008:

"Presently only the displaced populations originating from villages in the Kerfi area, and to a lesser extend from villages around Koukou-Angarana, indicate a will to return. IDPs originating from the border region of Wadi Kadja as well as those having fled from villages south of Wadi Bahr Azoum currently do not consider returning, given the still tense security situation and the presence of armed groups in their regions of origin."

CARE, June 2008:

"La MINURCAT et certains pays contribuant à l'EUFOR ont toutefois manifesté leur intérêt à encourager un retour rapide et ceci est particulièrement inquiétant. Bien qu'il y ait de façon compréhensible une pression politique considérable pour que le déploiement de l'EUFOR au Tchad soit une réussite, le meilleur indicateur pour en évaluer le succès ne devrait pas être le nombre de personnes déplacées retournant à leur village d'origine, mais plutôt le nombre de zones sécurisées pour le retour des populations. Nous craignons que l'utilisation de projets à impact rapide (PIR) dans les zones de retour, en l'absence d'un cadre global de solutions durables, soit contre-productive à long terme et puisse conduire les personnes retournées prématurément dans des zones dangereuses à une nouvelle victimisation et à de nouveaux déplacements."

Inter-agency mission, 7 May 2008:

"Les sites autour de Dogdoré qui comptent à ce jour 30 000 personnes déplacées se sont progressivement constitués suite aux mouvements de population dans la Région du Sila en 2006 et en 2007. […] On dénombre ainsi 8 sites à savoir : Bassou, Haya Djabal, Modoyna Zaghawa, Kadjeské, Domboli, Guindessa, Angoussa et Tour.

Concernant le mouvement d'intention de retour, selon le sous-préfet seuls les villages du canton Syniar manifestent le désir de rentrer dans la zone de Daguessa, localité sécurisée à cause de la présence continue de militaires depuis bientôt une année. Toutefois, les représentants des déplacés ont indiqué qu'il n'aurait pas de grand mouvement de retour de Dogdoré pour l'instant à cause de l'insécurité dans les villages d'origine. Selon eux, seuls des petits groupes d'hommes

sont susceptible d'effectuer un retour temporaire afin de cultiver. En plus des questions de sécurité, le retour est conditionné par la précarité d'accession aux vivres tant pour leur alimentation quotidienne que pour leur survie afin de démarrer les cultures."

UNHCR, November 2007:

"Les données de l'enquête révèlent que dans l'ensemble, 44,4 % des enquêtés chez les personnes déplacées à l'Est du Tchad ont l'intention de retourner dans leurs villages d'origine. D'après le graphique 2.5, la plus grande proportion s'observe à Koubigou où 62% expriment cette intention de rentrer au village d'origine. Viennent ensuite les sites comme Gouroukoun (57,1%) et Habile (51,6%). C'est à Abdi qu'une faible proportion des enquêtés a déclaré avoir l'intention de retourner dans leurs villages d'origine."

Graphique 2.5 : Proportion des enquêtées qui ont l'intention de retour dans leur village d'origine selon le site.



UN SC, 25 September 2007:

"The Security Council,
1. Approves the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic ... of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas."

Profiling villages of origin for return (May 2008)

- In 2007, Intersos and Premiere Urgence conducted a profiling exercise of villages of origin of IDPs in eastern Chad.
- The profiling exercise was designed to gather information on both the current and pre-conflict situations of villages of origin.
- An interactive database known as WebSIG was created using the results of the return-oriented profiling exercise.The purpose is to share information that supports durable solutions such as voluntary return.

UNHCR, May 2008:

"A protection strategy was established early 2007 comprising profiling and counting of IDPs; assessment of the situation in their villages of origin; protection monitoring in the IDP sites and villages of settlement; survey on root causes for displacement; training and capacity building; monitoring of population movements; and eventual return of IDPs if conditions allow.

The results from the Village Assessment in the zones of origin, jointly carried out with Intersos in Dar Sila and Premiere Urgence in Assoungha, have been shared with all partners in the humanitarian and the development communities and will serve as an important tool in the pursuit of durable solutions for the IDPs in south-eastern Chad."

The assessment can be accessed on-line at: http://websig-tchad.intersos.org

Intersos, December 2007:

"A partir du mois de juin 2007 et jusqu'à la fin de décembre INTERSOS, en tant que partenaire de UNHCR, a mené un exercice de profilage des villages situés dans le département du Sila, à l'Est du Tchad, d'où proviennent la quasi-totalité des déplacés installés dans les sites des Sous Préfectures de Goz Beida et Koukou Angarana. Dans l'ensemble, 329 villages ont été évalués par INTERSOS dans la zone du Sila, et 78 autres dans l'Assoungha par Première Urgence.

Conclusion :

Evaluation des conditions prévalant dans les villages d'origine : le Village Assessment a mis en évidence la carence de nombreuses infrastructures : en premier lieu l'eau, inaccessible pour presque la moitié des ménages rencontrés; les logis, puisque beaucoup de personnes vivent encore dans des abris d'urgence et enfin les écoles et les structures sanitaires. De plus, de nombreux villages sont difficilement accessibles même pendant la saison sèche et d'autres sont tout à fait inaccessibles pendant la saison pluvieuse. Cet isolement empêche la possibilité des communautés locales de bénéficier des services éventuellement présents auprès d'autres villages, ce qui détermine parfois un second déplacement après le retour.

Analyse des mouvements des populations : le Village Assessment a mis en évidence comment le déplacement des communautés sur le territoire s'est traduit, dans certains cas, en forme de repositionnement des différents groupes tribaux sur le territoire, en altérant les équilibres entre groupes sédentaires d'agriculteurs et groupes nomades pastoraux.

Les déplacements enregistrés vers les anciens lieux de provenance, comme dans le cas des Ouaddaiens partis vers la zone d'Abéché ; ou la recherche de pâturages en dehors des traditionnels couloirs de transhumance pour la composante nomade, devraient être attentivement étudiés et monitorés. Leur impact sur les communautés locales risque, dans un cadre de fragilité des liens sociaux, d'engendrer, par les conflits et le repositionnement des groupes, l'émergence de nouvelles crises. De plus, si la présence des PDI sur le territoire peut être source d'un

renforcement des formes de soutien intercommunautaire, à plus long terme elle pourrait susciter l'émergence de conflits pour l'allocation de ressources limitées.

Cette situation produit déjà quelques antagonismes qui, ajoutés à la permanence de poches de conflit dus à la crise de 2005-2006, conduisent au maintien de la perception d'un sentiment d'insécurité. Ce sentiment, encore très présent au sein de l'ensemble de la population comme (surtout dans les cantons du Bar Azoum et du Koloye), freine la décision de regagner les zones de provenance.

Constitution d'une base de données : la plateforme WebSIG pour le suivi des zones humanitaires à l'Est du Tchad devrait permettre le renforcement de la coordination.

Les données recueillies à travers le Village Assessment, brièvement exposées dans ce rapport, soulèvent des nombreuses questions qui concernent aussi bien la protection des personnes déplacées que l'identification de possibles enjeux affectant la possibilité du retour.

En ce qui concerne le premier point, les données mettent en évidence l'existence d'un flux de déplacements qui ne se dirige pas seulement vers les sites, mais aussi vers des villages d'accueil dans des zones du territoire perçues comme étant sures. Il en résulte un éparpillement des PDI sur le territoire qui en rend difficile l'identification, la possibilité de leur garantir la sécurité et de leur apporter un soutien.

Cette considération est encore plus valable si on tient compte de nombreuses personnes rencontrées appartenant à différentes catégories de vulnérabilité, surtout dans les cas où leur fragilité est une conséquence directe du conflit. La condition des mineurs séparés et des non accompagnés, aussi bien que des femmes seules, peut causer de nombreuses atteintes à leur intégrité soit pendant le prolongement de la crise (enrôlement forcé ou violences de genre) mais aussi au retour de la paix à cause de leur fragilité socio-économique.

Les quelques mouvements de retour identifiés -bien que saisonniers- et le flux des déplacements qui n'est pas tout à fait arrêté, nécessitent d'être constamment monitorés à la lumière des enjeux soulevés plus haut. Malgré les difficultés d'analyse et de compréhension qu'une situation encore si volatile implique, il est absolument nécessaire de poursuivre le travail de monitorage, afin d'identifier toute condition qui puisse permettre aux personnes de regagner leur terre d'origine, dans des conditions de sécurité, dignité et respect."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 15
Internally displaced persons have:
(d) The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

Principle 28
1. Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.

Obstacles to return

Lack of services in villages of origin (December 2009)

Oxfam International, April 2009:

"Humanitarian assistance, brought by NGOs and UN agencies, provides basic needs in terms of water, health, food, and education. Such basic services were already noticeably lacking in villages of origin and are now only available in IDP sites. Many IDPs interviewed mentioned the lack of basic services in the villages of origin as an obstacle to long-term returns. They now want to get the same level of assistance in their villages of origin, as is provided in sites."

Oxfam, February 2008:

"The question of when—and if—displaced people will return to their villages is a complex one, says Poul Brandrup, Oxfam's country program manager in Chad. There are many factors people weigh in making that decision.

'They need to be convinced that they will be able to re-establish sustainable livelihoods,' says Brandrup. 'Safety is important. So are primary health services and water. And we are increasingly hearing their strong wish for their children to be able to attend school.'

One of the realities is that the temporary settlements in which people can now access those essential services are, in fact, 'artificial,' says Brandrup. They offer limited possibilities for people to establish and maintain themselves over the long-term. For instance, without Oxfam's assistance, communities could not sustain the kind of water systems—with deep boreholes and expensive diesel-powered pumps—on which they now rely.

'The displaced understand that it will not be possible for all to stay in the current sites,' Brandrup adds. 'At the same time, many villages have been destroyed and land taken over by others so return in those cases is no longer an option.'

Economic and social development for rural villages may play a key role in some people's willingness to return. 'It is not possible to drill thousands of boreholes to replace the existing water systems,' says Brandrup. 'But people can learn to develop traditional open wells better and to ensure that water is not contaminated by animals or unsafe practices. This is, in most cases, the way to go when and if the displaced people can return to their villages.'"

IRIN, 29 January 2008:

"In addition to questions of security, the people from Louboutigué say they will only return if humanitarians can help them install water, health and education infrastructure in their villages of origin, as they did in the site for the displaced.

'Some of them have lived for more than a year in a quality of life superior to that which they had in their villages of origin,' UNHCR's Shinkinda Musonda said. 'They do not want to start over again, which is legitimate.'

The European Commission recently gave 10.1 million euros (US$14.8 million) to help support the stabilisation of eastern Chad.

At a press conference in N'djamena on 22 January, European Union commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel, said the international community will have to move fast if 90,000 displaced are to move home before July.

'We have a big job of support mechanisms ahead of us to prepare all this,' he said. 'We have to be able to bring them back to where they come from. But for that, we need to establish security in their home villages. We have to foresee all the preparatory work involved in building schools, hospitals, etc, and identifying what they will need.'

Still, the issue has raised eyebrows among some humanitarians, who see the provision of such infrastructure in all villages of origin as beyond their mandate and capacity.

Pierre Mara, interim head of the UNHCR office in Koukou-Angarana, told IRIN: 'We do not see these small spontaneous returns as a sign that the possibility of return exists for everyone.'"

Lack of security (December 2009)

Oxfam International, April 2009:

"According to the groups surveyed in the four IDP sites of Habilé, Aradip, Gouroukoun, and Gassiré, insecurity is the main obstacle mentioned by IDPs to not going back to their villages of origin. Banditry is a major threat for civilians: small groups or individuals, heavily armed, occupy abandoned areas and take advantage of the absence of the national authorities to circulate and operate in total impunity, attacking those willing to go back to their fields.

The Chadian State does not have the capacity to provide protection in such a vast territory, and by focusing on the border to prevent rebel incursions; the Chadian forces have left many areas with no protection."

IRIN, 29 January 2008:

"Many displaced people told IRIN they would not return en masse until the government can guarantee their security.

As a first step to achieving that, the government has promised to create a national police post in Koukou-Angarana to stabilise the sub-prefecture, according to Bradin Tahir Saleh, the government's local representative.

Local authorities, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and displaced people say the planned deployment of a European Union military force (EUFOR) and a UN peacekeeping mission - now scheduled for February after months of delay - will also intervene if people face problems upon their return.

But Aldric Kodja, OCHA humanitarian affairs officer based in Goz Beida, said improved security is not the only necessary condition. 'The EUFOR's arrival is good,' he told IRIN in Goz Beida, the administrative centre of the Dar Sila department that houses several sites for displaced people, including Habilé. 'But there are other factors involved in ensuring durable peace in the region.'

'The problems at the root of the displacement of people must be solved,' Kodja said, pointing to inter-communal violence, and conflicts over arable land and water as being at the heart of peoples' grievances."

Lack of conflict resolution/reconciliation (December 2009)

Oxfam International, April 2009:

"Local conflict resolution mechanisms were traditionally used to address tensions between nomads and agriculturalists around scarce resources. Increasingly these have disintegrated, and conflicts are now resolved with Kalashnikovs. A vast area of eastern Chad has become a no-man's land where self defence and the use of weapons rule.

The proliferation of arms leads in some areas to armed conflict resolution, which can result in lethal consequences. For example, in November 2008, violent disputes erupted between Tama and Zaghawa around cattle stealing in Birak (north-eastern Chad, a few kilometres from the Sudan border), which resulted in more than 50 civilian deaths and many injured. Houses were burnt and more than 700 families were forced to flee their homes towards the highly insecure border area.18 In July 2008, unprecedented violence in the Kerfi IDP sites between Moros and Dadjos resulted in the death of at least one man and injuries to several people, forcing humanitarian organisations to pull out of Kerfi due to the danger, and to rethink their operational strategies.

There is none, or very little dialogue between communities, and therefore there is the potential for a violent upsurge in conflicts between communities, if there are no conflict resolution mechanisms set up to facilitate long-term returns."

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"A successful initiative by UNHCR to gather 100 traditional leaders to discuss peace demonstrates the potential that exists to resolve conflict in the country. The full deployment of a multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic pursuant to resolution 1778 would also greatly contribute to ensuring a bottom-up approach to dialogue and reconciliation mechanisms, contribute to restoring traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, particularly with regard to the return of internally displaced persons, and create favourable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"Reconciliation between communities is key to ensuring a sustainable return for internally displaced people in eastern Chad. ... Many of them come from border villages where they fled inter-ethnic violence, and have seen their property looted, their villages burned to the ground, and some family members killed. The perpetrators of these acts have occupied their lands in total impunity. UNHCR and its partners have been facilitating a dialogue between the leaders of the displaced communities and those of villages of origin, including traditional and religious leaders. However, such initiatives have been on a small scale. These initiatives need to be revitalised and understood as an integral part of a broader reconciliation process that will re-establish trust among the different communities and set the stage for future durable returns."

EIS, 21 May 2008:

"The European Commission considers - as do all the national and international players in Chad - that the 'voluntary and sustainable return of civilian populations cannot result solely from the deployment of a temporary multinational force in Chad,' but will require a long and complex process of reconciliation led by Chad's authorities, involving all the parties to the conflict."

IRIN, 29 January 2008:

"In October 2007 a UNHCR meeting gathered local authorities, sultans (the traditional representatives of Muslim communities in Chad) and village chiefs from different ethnic and tribal groups across Chad's eastern region, aiming to start a dialogue between different communities in conflict, such as Arabs and non-Arabs and warring ethnic groups such as the Zaghawas and Tamas.

UNHCR spokesperson Annette Rehrl said the same Arab nomads who allowed their cattle to graze in farmers' fields - leading to deadly confrontations - were coming forward with proposed solutions. 'It is a very encouraging initiative,' she told IRIN, adding that efforts to dialogue have continued at the local level.

But others are not so optimistic. In the small town of Adé, along the border with Sudan, a grouping of over 35 chiefs of displaced villages told IRIN they had not participated in any reconciliatory activities, nor were they prepared to. 'Would you reconcile with someone who killed [your people]?' asked farmer Aktib Anour Hamid, chief of Moudeina 1, a village in southeastern Chad that was attacked in late 2005.

'There has been progress, but I don't think that all the underlying problems are solved,' Nicholai Panke, deputy head of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Chad, told IRIN. 'There are still a lot of inter-communal problems that are not settled.'"

Return movements

Up to 25,000 IDPs have returned to villages of origin (December 2009)

OCHA, 30 November 2009:

"Between 20,000 and 25,000 people have returned home from 2008 to date.

While the search for durable solutions, particularly for IDPs, has previously formed part of the strategic objectives, it is now emerging as a priority. There is a new emphasis on the need to orient humanitarian assistance towards supporting as much as possible IDPs who have returned to their areas of origin, or wish to integrate in their area of displacement, and the communities who host them. The outlook for IDPs' return remains unclear, but if, when and where it does happen, it must be supported in order for it to be sustainable."

HRW, June 2009:

"An estimated 40,000 IDPs returned to their villages in 2008, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), an accounting that includes those who returned on a temporary basis. Revised, provisional figures released by OCHA in March 2009 placed the number of permanent returns, exclusive of seasonal returns, at approximately 27,000. The majority of this return has been to areas far from the border and close to humanitarian hubs

such as Kerfi, Goz Beida, and Koukou Angarana, the scene of fighting in May 2009. However, Chadian authorities, MINURCAT, UN agencies, and NGOs should not consider these returns to be indicative of an environment conducive to safe returns. In many cases, prevailing insecurity compels IDPs to send some members of the family to cultivate crops in home villages while others remain in the safety of the camps."

Oxfam Interntational, April 2009:

"Several studies assessing return areas show discrepancies in the numbers of returns reported. The actual numbers of returnees are difficult to measure due to the complexity of returnees' movements. Data collected on numbers of returns needs to be updated frequently in order to get the most accurate picture possible.

In November 2008, based on the profiling exercise carried out by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and its implementing partners in Dar Sila and Ouaddai, OCHA reported that since the beginning of the crisis, about 40,000 IDPs managed to return to their villages of origin or settle in new locations (Louboutigue, Borota, Goungour, Abdi, and Haouich). However, this number was later retracted and OCHA acknowledged that these returns were often only temporary or from earlier displacement (e.g. Haouich) due to drought in the area of Am Dam.

In March 2009, the latest figures provided by OCHA based on UNHCR data, report that about 27,000 IDPs returned to their home areas, including the districts of Assoungha (11,827), Koukou (4,281), Goz Beida (1,929), Kerfi (8,192 permanent returnees after drought in the area of Am Dam), and Modeina (786 households). But these figures are not completely up-to-date, and agreed numbers do vary: for example, the study carried out by the NGO InterSOS in the same area (Ouadi Khadja, area of Modeina), shows that the data provided by OCHA are higher and that about only 500 households have returned temporarily and permanently from Sudan and surrounding areas."

Tentative return of IDPs underway (August 2008)

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"Among internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Chad, tentative spontaneous return movements have occurred, and humanitarian actors are starting to assist these movements at the request of concerned IDPs. However, no massive movements are expected to be possible during the second half of 2008. Humanitarians believe that IDP returns, once they happen, could be significantly conducive to peace by reducing the extent of inter-community tensions in the country."

RI, 24 July 2008:

"Some 5,000 IDP families have started returning home to areas they deem to be relatively safe. Others re-turned to work their lands before the rainy season, but will observe how the security situation evolves before taking the final decision to return home. Refugees International met a number of internally displaced in sites in Goz Beida who said that if the violence in their areas of origin subsides, they will still require schools, health clinics, and the pres-ence of local authorities before they would consider returning."

UN SG, 8 July 2008:

"Although the conditions for the return of refugees to Darfur and the Central African Republic are yet to be created, small spontaneous return movements are being observed among internally displaced persons. Humanitarian agencies are starting to plan for the potential voluntary return of internally displaced persons to certain locations, especially around the Goz Beida area, once their security, basic needs and reconciliation can be addressed. On 17 May, the voluntary return of internally displaced persons was discussed at the first meeting of CONAFIT with EUFOR, MINURCAT, and the diplomatic and humanitarian communities. It was decided that there would be no return as long as all the necessary conditions were not in place."

UN OCHA, 9 June 2008:

"New vague of returns are observed in the field and humanitarian actors plan to conduct surveys in order to collect quantitative data for need assessment and response plan. The challenge of the humanitarian actors, in close collaboration with the Government and other partners, is to create conditions for sustainable returns. In this purpose, a framework for sustainable voluntary returns has been adopted in May 2008."

ICRC, 8 April 2008:

"The security situation in the east is still volatile. Despite this, some people have opted to return home, either temporarily, as they move to and fro between sites for the displaced and their villages, or permanently. However, many displaced people clearly do not want to return home, or cannot do so, mainly because of the danger involved. Displaced people who will not be able to go home any time soon will have to find a way of settling in their new communities and meeting their needs without relying on humanitarian aid."

Intersos, December 2007:

"Le monitorage des villages a mis en évidence l’existence des premiers phénomènes de retours : soit stable (1 204 ménages en 24 installations), soit saisonniers (1 221 familles en 22 villages). Les retours saisonniers, qui regardent surtout les Dadjo installés dans les sites, sont souvent liés à la disponibilité limitée des terres et le retour est donc finalisé à la reprise des activités agricoles. Les retours avec des intentions de stabilité ont concerné, au contraire, surtout Arabes et Ouaddaiens ne provenant pas des sites officiels."

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Humanitarian workers targeted; aid suspended temporarily (December 2009)

VOA, 13 November 2009:

"The United Nations reports six aid agencies in eastern Chad have temporarily suspended their humanitarian activities following some serious security incidents in the past couple of weeks.

The United Nations warns serious acts of banditry in eastern Chad over the last two weeks is jeopardizing humanitarian operations in the region. Two serious security incidents have cast doubt over the viability of these operations.

In one case, an international staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross was kidnapped. And, in the other case, a national staff member working for the non-governmental organization Solidarite was killed."

OI, 13 March 2009

"Civilians in Chad are still facing high levels of banditry and danger as the European force (EUFOR) hands over to a UN force later this week.

Humanitarian organizations have become a deliberate target, Oxfam says. Some agencies have had to stop work and leave people without help as a result of attacks on their staff and operations. Aid agencies have received an average of 25 attacks a month since last November and more than 10 humanitarian workers have been physically attacked since the beginning of 2009. Several NGOs have been forced to temporally suspend their activities due to this high-level of insecurity."

Humanitarian activities threatened by insecurity and lack of access (August 2008)

UN SG, 7 August 2008:

"A significant number of incidents targeting humanitarian personnel and assets by parties to the conflict continue to be reported. In most cases such attacks take place at night. They increased during the reporting period in the region of Goz Beida-Koukou. Increasingly force is employed in these attacks, which are characterized by the use of assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, mainly to steal money and assets. Since foreign humanitarian workers are perceived to have both, they are particularly targeted. The local military authorities and gendarmerie rarely intervene. Some of the perpetrators are even thought to belong to the Chad armed forces. Vehicles belonging to humanitarian agencies were particularly targeted by thieves.

In 2008 alone, 40 cases of attacks targeting humanitarian personnel and assets in eastern Chad have been registered, including five deadly attacks. As a result of increasing insecurity, by the end of May, MSF-Luxembourg totally suspended its activities in the area of Iriba. The non-governmental organization was working in refugee camps at Touloum and Iridimi which host around 53,000 refugees. With the suspension of MSF-Luxembourg activities, humanitarian agencies raised concern about the health coverage among refugees and surrounding local communities. The World Health Organization also expressed concern over a 10 per cent decrease in health coverage in the district of Am Dam with the pullout of non-governmental organizations active in an area hosting 14,000 internally displaced persons. A similar lack of health coverage might occur in the areas of Goz Bagar, Goundiang and Alacha, which host 22,000 internally displaced persons."

UN OCHA, August 2008:

"In the present climate of political uncertainty, the second half of 2008 will be critical for determining whether security and stability improves or worsens. Stability is an essential condition for the Government and humanitarian actors not only to continue providing life-saving assistance to those in need, but also to gradually start reversing the trend of an unceasing humanitarian crisis — a crisis that may turn into a disaster, should aid operations be interrupted for any reason.

Humanitarian work in Chad is becoming increasingly dangerous. Access to some areas is limited. [...] Insecurity also poses obstacles to humanitarian operations. [...] Since January, 107 security incidents affecting humanitarians have been recorded, and two humanitarian workers have been murdered.

An international presence in Chad, established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1778, and which includes a military component, has yet to become fully operational. The next six months will show whether this will indeed lead to improved scope for humanitarian assistance."

USAID, 27 June 2008:

“Humanitarian agencies … continue to experience insecurity and threats to staff and operations. According to the U.N., between January and May 2008, assailants in eastern Chad carried out approximately 40 attacks against relief agencies, including five fatal incidents. Due to increased insecurity, implementing partners have scaled back or suspended programs since April, particularly in and around Iriba, Bahai, and Farchana. On May 1, unidentified armed men killed Save the Children/UK’s (SCF/UK) head of mission who was traveling in a convoy headed from Farchana towards Adre. The incident occurred just weeks after a SCF/UK driver was killed. As a result, SCF/UK immediately suspended relief activities in eastern Chad.“

ICRC, 8 April 2008:

“… the non-international armed conflict between the government and armed opposition groups affects fewer civilians than the regular, very localized inter-community violence in the east, for example in the Dar Sila region and parts of northern Assoungha. National security forces are often absent from these regions, and dangerous conditions limit access for humanitarian organizations. This makes it difficult to ensure that people affected by fighting have access to adequate humanitarian assistance.”

UAB, 15 January 2008:

Main obstacles to humanitarian action in 2007:

Problems	Consequences	Scenarios

Insecurity and lack of protection	Attacks against humanitarian staff Looting of aid Reduction or indefinite suspension of aid Withdrawal of organisations and humanitarian staff Heightening of the lack of protection of the population affected by the crisis	Afghanistan, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Myanmar, Niger, DR Congo, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan

Logistical problems hamper humanitarian activities (August 2008)

UN OCHA, 22 August 2008:

"Les opérateurs des vols humanitaires ont signalé le mauvais état des pistes d'atterrissage de Koukou et Guéréda. Des travaux urgents sont nécessaires au niveau de ces deux pistes pour la reprise normale des vols. Avec la saison des pluies, la plupart des routes sont actuellement impraticables et l'accès par voie aérienne reste la seule option pour relier certaines zones comme Koukou et Guereda."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 24
2. Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons shall not be diverted, in particular for political or military reasons.

Principle 25
3. All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced.

Principle 26
Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport and supplies shall be respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or other acts of violence.

Principle 30
All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate for international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in their return or resettlement and reintegration.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National Response

National response (December 2009)

IDMC, 18 December 2009:

Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions. In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more money on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009).

The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the *Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées* (CNAPD), but it has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. In 2008, the government also set up the CONAFIT committee to coordinate humanitarian activities with MINURCAT, EUFOR and the humanitarian organisations working in Chad. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.

In October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legally binding regional instrument to protect the rights of IDPs. The Convention cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 15 African States. While the number of IDPs in Chad is not as high as in other African countries, ratification of the Convention by Chad would show its commitment to protecting the rights of IDPs and achieving their durable return, resettlement or reintegration. By ratifying the Convention, Chad could act as a positive example for the region, given its strategic geo-political position between CAR and Sudan.

PTPH: Chadian police for humanitarian protection (June 2008)

USAID, 27 June 2008:

"On June 3, the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) graduated 71 Chadian police and gendarmerie commanders from the U.N. program designed to ensure the safety and security of the refugees and IDPs. The officers will become part of the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS) and work in refugee camps, IDP camps, and towns in eastern Chad. The DIS commanders received training in law and order, respect for human rights, humanitarian

law, and other policing techniques. By October, MINURCAT plans for the DIS to be fully operational, with 850 personnel trained."

UN SG, 1 April 2008:

"In my report to the Security Council of 10 August 2007 I stated that the Chadian police element 'would assume exclusive law enforcement responsibility in carefully defined jurisdictions, centred on refugee camps and surrounding concentrations of internally displaced persons and associated towns'. Developments in eastern Chad have prompted the Government of Chad to suggest an increased coverage by PTPH of locations where internally displaced persons are residing. As this will present significant logistical and financial challenges for MINURCAT, I intend to recommend that the six-month review of MINURCAT and EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, which will be finalized in September, look closely at this issue and develop recommendations."

UN SC, 25 September 2007:

The UN Security Council

" … *Endorses* the police concept referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, including the provisions regarding the establishment of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad, and, in this regard, *encourages* the Government of Chad to establish the PTPH, *emphasizes* the urgent need to provide logistical and financial support to the PTPH and *requests* the Secretary-General to mobilize member States and institutional donors for this purpose …"

National Response (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"The Government of Chad bears the primary responsibility for ensuring the security of all civilians on its territory, including IDPs, and for the protection of their human rights. The main challenge at present is to secure the stronger engagement of central authorities and their cooperation with local and traditional authorities in areas affected and threatened by displacement.

So far, the government response to the displacement-related human rights, humanitarian and protection crisis has been minimal and inadequate, not least because both at the policy and operational levels there is little knowledge and experience in tackling such emergencies. In addition, there has been a lack of substantive action by the government at the central level; there is no clearly identified government institution responsible for the rights of IDPs and no national legal framework specifically directed towards their protection.. The government has created a Committee for Assistance to IDPs (*Comité Chargé d'Assistance aux Personnes Déplacées*) composed of representatives of civil society and of different ministries. This body is coordinated by the Ministry of Social Relations, Social Action and Family. At the same time, there is another inter-ministerial agency, the National Committee for the Reintegration of Refugees (*Comité National de la Réinsertion des Réfugiés*) under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, which has also been associated with IDP-related issues. As a result, there is confusion about which government agency is the focal point for IDPs.

The absence of a clear government focal point adds to and explains the lack of any concerted response to the displacement crisis and the lack of cooperation with humanitarian organisations in the capital and in the east. This results in parallel responses within uncoordinated and ineffective strategies. In the beginning of the year, the government released some $8 million for emergency assistance to IDPs. The Committee for Assistance to IDPs has started distributing food and non-food items to the displaced in certain IDP sites, as witnessed by IDMC in the Gassiré site. However, the extent to which these distributions meet IDPs' immediate emergency needs is not known.

While the government is intent on the return of IDPs to their areas of origin, it has not yet developed any strategy to address the root causes of inter-ethnic violence which have caused the displacement. A state of emergency was introduced for six months, but civilians continued to be displaced because of violence (IRIN, 25 May 2007). The situation has been compounded by the continuing absence of viable local administration and social services in many areas in the east, especially between Goz Beida and the frontier with Darfur, from which the government forces withdrew. There are also reasons to believe that the government is undermining the efforts of traditional leaders to find solutions to inter-communal violence. For instance, the government pressured the Sultan of Dar Sila, who was engaged in conflict mediation in the department, to resign.

Some local authorities have requested that the government provide military assistance to protect civilian areas from further attacks, and to prevent inter-communal violence. However, the authorities in N'Djamena have not always heeded these requests (IDMC interviews in Goz Beida and Koukou, 28 and 29 April 2007; IRIN, 7 June 2007).

Despite the fact that security is not yet restored, the overarching goal of the central government is the return of all displaced persons to their original homes. The strategy seems to be focused on the preservation of the government's stability and the integrity of the territory against Chadian rebels, but not necessarily on the security of civilians."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 3

1. National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.
2. Internally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities. They shall not be persecuted or punished for making such a request.

Principle 25

1. The primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.

International Response

International response (December 2009)

IDMC, 18 December 2009:

The UN humanitarian response is led by a Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the UNDP Representative**,** while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has overall responsibility to coordinate the requests for funding of humanitarian organisations through a consolidated appeals process (CAP). More than 70 international humanitarian organisations provide assistance to displaced communities in eastern Chad, including IDPs and Sudanese refugees. The cluster system was introduced in Chad in July 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Chad was chosen as one of five pilot countries because of the complexity of its humanitarian crisis and the marked failings of the international community's response to IDPs (FMR, December 2007). These failings were characterised by an inability to maintain refugee camps in a stable environment while also responding to the needs of thousands of IDPs in a region with a sudden rise of insecurity.

13 clusters are now operational in Chad: protection, food security, health, nutrition, camp management/shelter/non-food items, water and sanitation, education, emergency telecommunications, early recovery, logistics, coordination and support services, security of staff and operations, and multi-sector activities for IDPs and refugees. Each cluster works closely with government counterparts, and meetings of the clusters are often co-chaired by government officials as a way to involve the government as an operational partner.

As of 25 November 2009, 68 per cent of the $400 million requested in the 2009 CAP was funded; however clusters had received widely varying percentages of their initial requests: nutrition was 93 per cent funded and coordination and support services 74 per cent, while multi-sector activities for IDPs and refugees were 53 per cent funded, water and sanitation 42 per cent, protection 40 per cent, health 28 per cent, education 15 per cent and agriculture only 14 per cent (OCHA, 18 November – 10 December 2009). The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recognised that Chad was an underfunded emergency, and allocated $5.5 million for life-saving assistance programmes to IDPs there (CERF News, October 2009).

The consolidated appeal for 2010 is for $451 million, to fund programmes to provide emergency relief including food aid and assistance to IDPs and to increase the self-sufficiency of displaced communities (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

Peacekeeping operations (June 2008)

- UN Security Council Resolution 1778 established a dual-mission peacekeeping operation (two bodies, one mandate) in CAR and Chad.
- The UN mission, known as MINURCAT, consists of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers.
- The EU mission, known as EUFOR, consists of 3,700 troops and is authorised to use military force.
- Aid groups face dilemma: need for protection vs. loss of neutrality by being associated with EUFOR.

CRS, 30 January 2008:

"On September 25, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1778, approving the establishment of a multinational presence in Chad and the Central African Republic to (1) contribute to the protection of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and civilians in danger; (2) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and (3) create favorable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development. Based on Resolution 1778, two multinational bodies, a U.N. mission and a European Union (EU) military force, have been created under a single mandate."

MINURCAT

"The U.N. presence, known as the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), will be responsible for police training and reinforcing judicial infrastructure, and will work with Chadian forces to reinforce safety for refugees, IDPs, and aid agencies in the camps in the east."

EUFOR

"The EU force, known as EUFOR Chad/CAR, is expected to provide general security for civilians and facilitate the free movement of humanitarian assistance and personnel, and is authorized to use military force, whereas MINURCAT is not."

Some humanitarian officials have expressed concern that having two separate international missions in Chad may prove confusing for the local population and aid workers, as well for the region's various rebel groups. At least one rebel group has warned that it will consider the EU force a 'foreign occupation army,' because it will include French forces, whom the rebels do not see as neutral."

Small Arms Survey, April 2008:

"The international community's response to the crisis in Darfur and Chad has been to push for peacekeeping operations. The idea of an international force in Chad has been around since the beginning of 2006, particularly within the UN. At first, however, it was widely rejected as it did not seem suitable for such a complex situation, especially as there was a serious risk that it might be interpreted, especially in Chad, as a show of support by the international community for an undemocratic regime—one already benefiting from French military aid."

MINURCAT

" … will consist of 300 police and 50 military liaison personnel directly under UN control ... It will be focused primarily on the security of refugees and IDP camps."

EUFOR

" … [is] expected to include 3,700 troops tasked with taking 'all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic to protect civilians, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel'. All 'necessary measures' is widely interpreted as the possibility of engaging armed groups directly … estimates put the cost of the one-year mission at EUR 500 million (USD 725 million), but it may rise much higher."

IRIN, 16 May 2008:

Faced with frequent armed robberies, many aid groups in eastern Chad say the European Union Force (EUFOR), deployed there since February, is not doing its job of protecting them. At the

same time, many of those same aid groups say they do not want to jeopardise their neutrality by being associated with the armed force.

“There is in fact a dilemma that many aid organisations are facing here as attacks become more frequent,” the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)‘s deputy head in Chad, Nicholai Panke, told IRIN. He said the ICRC has not asked EUFOR or the government to provide protection.

EUFOR’s mandate is to protect humanitarian workers and civilian populations but several aid officials said they believe it is not equipped to do that.

“It came ready to fight the wrong kind of war,” CARE International’s programme director in the east, Alsy Burger, told IRIN. “EUFOR has all these heavy guns and armoured personnel carriers, expecting they would have major offensives but for EUFOR to protect humanitarian workers and vulnerable populations from the real threat of banditry it needs light weapons and more men on the ground.”

For some NGOs, the solution is not armed escorts from either EUFOR or the government but rather securing routes on which aid convoys must travel. “Securing all routes at all times would require more resources than EUFOR or the government are capable of mustering, but they could at least start by doing it two to four days a month, Burger, of CARE, said. “EUFOR could employ a helicopter and the government could set up checkpoints wherever ambushes are likely.”

ARI, 6 June 2008:

"Contrary to what is generally suggested, European peacekeeping operations in Eastern Chad and the North-Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR and MINURCAT) are not primarily aimed at bringing peace and stability in those countries but are rather directed towards stabilising some of the consequences of the Darfur conflict. This action without a strategy is characterised by the lack of a political solution, the absence of a viable peace agreement between all Chadian political actors (there is no peace to keep) and the evident reluctance of President Deby to open up the political sphere. Finally, the peacekeeping mission will –beyond its humanitarian objectives– also contribute to stabilise an authoritarian and increasingly militarised regime that exploits an alleged danger of islamisation as incarnated by Khartoum. By doing so, the unanswered question of the collision of French national interests in Chad with a more open European agenda will add to the confusion of a mission that is largely perceived by Chadians as additional support for a weakly legitimised President Deby."

Enough Project, November 2007:

"A nimble and rapid reaction capability that will allow the force to respond quickly and assertively to violence in the region is a critical ingredient for success. EU troops should deploy to, and must be able to patrol, the areas that the IDPs have abandoned in order to help create the secure conditions necessary for the safe and voluntary return of the displaced to their homes. The protection force—whether under EU or eventually U.N. command—should not withdraw until the peace agreements between Deby and Chadian rebels are implemented. Even then, it will be essential to consolidate peace and security by ensuring that infrastructure and other development needs are met and can enable Chad, and the East in particular, to jump-start local economies, foster trade, and provide social services."

UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (September 2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5748th meeting, on 25 September 2007:

The Security Council,

1. *Approves* the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 below and in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the Central African Republic, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas;

2. *Decides* that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (the acronym MINURCAT is to be used in all languages), with the following mandate in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, in liaison with the United Nations country team:

Security and protection of civilians
(a) To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire referred to in paragraph 5;
(b) To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;
(c) To liaise with the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border, and to provide to UNHCR, on availability and cost-reimbursable basis, logistical assistance for that purpose;
(d) To liaise closely with the Sudanese Government, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which will succeed it, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (FOMUC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;

Human rights and the rule of law
(e) To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;
(f) To support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society through training in international human rights standards, and efforts to put an end to recruitment and use of children by armed groups;
(g) To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;

3. *Decides* that MINURCAT shall include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to conclude status-of-forces agreements for MINURCAT as soon as possible, taking into account General Assembly resolution 59/47 on the scope of legal protection under the

Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, General Assembly resolution 60/42 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and
General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and notes that the model status-of-forces agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally pending the conclusion of such an agreement with one or other of the countries;

5. *Endorses* the police concept referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, including the provisions regarding the establishment of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad, and, in this regard, *encourages* the Government of Chad to establish the PTPH, *emphasizes* the urgent need to provide logistical and financial support to the PTPH and *requests* the Secretary-General to mobilize member States and institutional donors for this purpose;

6. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
(a) *Authorizes* the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation (hereinafter referred to as “the European Union operation”) aimed at supporting the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, and *decides* that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions, in accordance with the arrangement to be concluded between the European Union and the United Nations, in liaison with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic:
(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;
(b) *Authorizes* the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in subparagraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement, by means including fulfilment of the functions indicated in subparagraph a, and within the limits of its residual capacity;

7. *Invites* the European Union, as may be required for the proper execution of the mandate of its operation, to take part in the liaison and support activities referred to in paragraphs 2 (b) to 2 (d);

8. *Invites* the European Union operation to immediately take all appropriate measures to prepare its full operational capability and *requests* the Secretary- General to coordinate closely with the European Union particularly with regard to those arrangements required to ensure appropriate protection for United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure freedom of movement of United Nations staff;

9. *Requests* the European Union, the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to cooperate closely throughout the period of deployment of the European Union operation, until its complete disengagement;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to it, after due consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, six months from the date indicated in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, on the arrangements for following up the intended European Union operation which has been authorized for a one-year period, including a possible United Nations operation,

depending on the developments in the situation, and *notes* that, to that end, the United Nations and the European Union shall perform an evaluation of needs before the date in question;

11. *Invites* the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and the European Union to conclude status-of-forces agreements as soon as possible for the operation referred to in paragraph 6;

12. *Requests* the European Union to report to the Security Council, in the middle and at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, above, on how its operation will fulfil its mandate;

13. *Calls upon* all the parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of MINURCAT and the European Union operation, including by guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and associated personnel;

14. *Urges* all the Member States, particularly the States bordering Chad and the Central African Republic, to facilitate the delivery to Chad and the Central African Republic freely, without obstacles or delay of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, intended for MINURCAT and the European Union operation;

15. *Encourages* the respective Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic to ensure that their territories are not used to undermine the sovereignty of others and to cooperate actively with a view to implementing the Tripoli Agreement and other agreements aimed at ensuring security along their common borders;

16. *Encourages* the authorities and political stakeholders in Chad and the Central African Republic to pursue their efforts of national dialogue, with respect for the constitutional frameworks;

17. *Reaffirms* the obligation of all parties to implement fully the rules and principles of international humanitarian law, particularly those regarding the protection of humanitarian personnel, and furthermore *requests* all the parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with immediate, free and unimpeded access to all persons in need of assistance, in accordance with applicable international law;

18. *Takes note* of the measures already undertaken by the authorities of Chad to put an end to the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, *encourages* them to pursue their cooperation with United Nations bodies, particularly UNICEF, and *calls on* all the parties involved to ensure that children are protected;

19. *Exhorts* the donor community to redouble its efforts to address the humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs of Chad and the Central African Republic;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the liaison arrangements set out in OP2-b to 2-d above, and to report regularly on the security and humanitarian situation, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and the region, of progress towards the objective of helping to create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons and of the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, and to submit to it a report on that matter every three months;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

International Response (July 2007)

IDMC, 11 July 2007:

"At the international level, the response has been limited as it has suffered from a low level of preparedness, shortcomings in monitoring due in part to the unpredictable security situation, and constraints in human resources and information management. Coordination and communication between UN agencies, between UN agencies and NGOs and ICRC, and also between NGOs themselves, has been very weak, as disconnection between the capital and regional and local levels has prevented a shared and effective understanding of the scope of the displacement crisis and the overall response strategy to adopt. There is a need for more systematic, better-planned, more effective coordination, with clear roles and responsibilities.

Since the displacement crisis started, the UN agencies have been using an approach modelled on the cluster approach, with sectoral responsibility for coordinating the protection and assistance for IDPs delegated to the UNHCR Deputy Representative based in Abéché in the south-east. UNHCR, as at the global level, is the lead agency for three clusters: protection, site management and coordination, and shelter; WHO for health; UNICEF for nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene; and WFP for logistics and food security (UN OCHA, 30 November 2006). Since April 2006, the response strategy has consisted of building support where IDPs are located.

Yet the lack of the formal activation of the cluster approach made the coordination heavier, led to the confusion of roles, a lack of accountability and an absence of overall long term strategic planning on issues facing vulnerable groups including IDPs and host communities. Indeed the previous strategy started to fall apart when the security situation worsened and the number of IDPs drastically increased from some 40,000 in April 2006 to over 172,600 as of June 2007. Until February 2007, the UN Office of the Humanitarian Affairs was based only in the capital N'Djamena, and the response suffered from poor reporting and weak information management.

However, in February 2007 UN OCHA opened offices in conflict-affected eastern areas. The recruitment of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator is ongoing, although it has been suggested that this position will only help to improve coordination if a workable process is identified for the humanitarian agencies (including NGOs and the ICRC) with headquarters in the capital and operational offices in the east. Furthermore, the UN country team in June 2007 made a request to formally implement the cluster approach to enable clear leadership, accountability and predictability. In this process, clear cluster leads would be identified in N'Djamena and Abéché, within a system in which NGOs are considered as policy-making partners as well as implementing partners.

The appeals process has been fragmented. Since November 2006, there have been three funding appeals for programmes targeting IDPs' needs in Chad. The first was the 2007 UN Consolidated Appeal Process which requested some $170.7 million, most of it to fund refugee programmes and only a few millions targeting some 53,000 IDPs. The second, launched in February 2007, is a UNHCR supplementary appeal for $6.2 million for the protection and assistance to IDPs in Chad from January to December 2007; and in April 2007, the UN launched a revised appeal for $23.5 million to fund a 90-day programme of IDP Emergency Assistance (UNHCR, February 2007; UN OCHA, 9 May 2007). This latest appeal includes UNHCR's funding needs for protection and shelter, and non-food items already contained in the previous UNHCR appeal. NGOs expressed concern that the latest appeal does not match the overall IDP needs, and indeed donors are also confused over the co-existence of these different appeals. Looking ahead, accurate and comprehensive information and data are crucial in order to identify needs and gaps in assistance in order to design relevant appeals and plan relevant humanitarian

responses. The aforementioned profiling exercise undertaken in April 2007 aims at addressing this gap.

Further constraints hamper the response of international agencies to the needs of IDPs in eastern Chad. The operational capacity of humanitarian actors including the UN, ICRC and international NGOs currently active in eastern Chad (such as Intersos, Coopi, ACF, IRD, IRD, MSF-Holland and France, OXFAM UK and Intermon, Première Urgence, JRS, HIAS and Mentor Initiative) has reached its human resource limit. The difficult environment and the shortage of implementing partners further limit the capacity to deliver aid.

The deteriorating security environment has resulted in limited and sporadic access, thereby hampering humanitarian operations and creating an unpredictable situation which has not made it easy to plan ahead. Incidents including car hijacking and violent robberies have become major concerns to humanitarian workers who have also been physically threatened. Armed men from all parties to the conflict have attacked humanitarian premises and staff. Some vehicles belonging to humanitarian actors have been seen used by the ANT (UNOCHA, November 2006; OXFAM, 20 June 2007).

In line with Security Council Resolution 1706, the UN Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a “multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including in the internally displaced persons and refugee camps and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic” to address the humanitarian situation in the two countries and to stem the spill-over from Sudan’s Darfur conflict. The Chadian government, which had sought international help for months, has been reluctant to approve the deployment of the international force in the form in which it is currently proposed. In lieu of the multidimensional force, the government of Chad has requested a “civilian force”, and has argued that a UN military force should not be deployed in Chad on the basis that the government of Sudan had refused the deployment of such a force in Darfur (UN SG report, S/2007/97). There is also concern over the expected impact of the deployment of a peacekeeping force on the security of civilians and humanitarian operations in the current context if it is not in the framework of a credible regional and national peace process."

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998:

Principle 25

2. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance.

Principle 27

1. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors when providing assistance should give due regard to the protection needs and human rights of internally displaced persons and take appropriate measures in this regard. In so doing, these organizations and actors should respect relevant international standards and codes of conduct.

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A draft law for the protection and treatment of IDPs based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement was prepared by UNHCR in N'Djamena, in cooperation with the Chadian Ministry of the Interior. The *AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa,* which in large part reflects the Guiding Principles, will be used as a basis for the draft law in Chad.

Other references to the Guiding Principles

None

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

None

Trainings on the Guiding Principles

A training workshop on the protection of IDPs in Chad was held in Abeche from 22-25 October 2007. Organized by UNHCR, the workshop was jointly conducted with IDMC, and included sessions on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the international legal framework applicable to the protection of IDPs. Participants included UNHCR staff based in N'Djamena, Abeche and various field offices.

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