



**Australian Government**  
**Refugee Review Tribunal**

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# Country Advice

## Chad

Chad – TCD38688 – Saudi resident permits – Chadian civil war – Gorane and Zaghawa ethnic groups – Attack on Adre in April 2006 – Chadian refugees in Cameroon – Current security situation in Chad

3 June 2011

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**1. Please confirm that all new residents to Saudi Arabia have fingerprints taken on first entry.**

Saudi Arabia requires all non-Saudi residents to be fingerprinted in order to obtain residence permits (*Iqamas*), to transfer sponsorship and to request other passport services. This requirement was introduced in May 2008.<sup>1</sup> The Saudi Embassy in Washington DC website advises that fingerprints of new arrivals are taken at entry points such as airports and sea ports.<sup>2</sup> Sources located on expatriate forums indicate that fingerprints are taken electronically.<sup>3</sup> Holders of *Iqamas* already resident in Saudi Arabia were required to attend designated centres (or mobile fingerprinting units) to have their fingerprints taken.<sup>4</sup>

**2. Are there any reports of the fingerprinting system being compromised/bribery occurring?**

No information was located specifically relating to the compromising of the Saudi fingerprinting scheme by corrupt officials. It is noted that the Saudi government, in addition to external observers, has acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in Saudi Arabia.<sup>5</sup> In 2011, the Saudi government established an anti-corruption commission to investigate instances of corruption.<sup>6</sup>

The September 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by anti-corruption coalition Transparency International, placed Saudi Arabia as the most corrupt Gulf country

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<sup>1</sup> Aziz S. 2009, 'Huge rush for fingerprinting as school holidays near', *The Saudi Gazette*, 21 May <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009052138555> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 1.

<sup>2</sup> Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington D.C. 2010, 'Finger printing required for residence permits beginning April 15' 19 March [http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest\\_news/news03191001.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news03191001.aspx) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 2.

<sup>3</sup> British Expats Forum 2009, 'Iqama Requirement' 30 October <http://britishexpats.com/forum/showthread.php?p=8059730> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 3.

<sup>4</sup> Humaidan M. 2009, 'Saudi Arabia: More mobile units eyed to ease fingerprinting rush', *Arab News*, 27 May, Menafn.com website [http://www.menafn.com/qn\\_news\\_story\\_s.asp?StoryId=1093250719](http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093250719) - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 4.

<sup>5</sup> Trust Law, undated, *Anti-corruption profile - Saudi Arabia*, <http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/country-profiles/good-governance.dot?id=d8f340e0-8849-4e3b-9c8d-97292748753e> - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 5.

<sup>6</sup> Abdul Ghafour P. 2011, 'Kingdom intensifies war on corruption', *Arab News website*, 7 May <http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article386460.ece> - Accessed 31 May 2011 – Attachment 6.

with a score of 3.4. The index ranks the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and country analysts between zero and 10, with 10 being the least corrupt.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Information about residency permits in Saudi Arabia for Chad Nationals? What is the usual term? Would it expire if a Chad national had left Saudi Arabia for over six months?

No information was found indicating that residency permit regulations were different for Chadian nationals in comparison to other foreigners; nonetheless, sources indicated that Chadian nationals were treated differently to other expatriates resident in Saudi Arabia. In September 2006, Human Rights Watch published a report stating that the Saudi government had stopped renewing the residency permits of all Chadian citizens in Saudi Arabia.<sup>8</sup> This report further noted that under Saudi naturalisation laws, “it is nearly impossible for Chadians to acquire Saudi citizenship because they generally do not fulfil the educational and financial requirements.”<sup>9</sup>

Residency permits for Saudi Arabia (*Iqama*) are issued through the Ministry for the Interior.<sup>10</sup> The Saudi government portal advises that the *Iqama* is valid for either one or two years.<sup>11</sup> According to the Saudi government portal, a number of requirements must be met for an *Iqama* to be issued for the first time. These are:

1. The Passport (for Non-Saudi) bearing a visa issued by a Saudi embassy abroad.
2. Copy of The Passport (for Non-Saudi)
3. 2 Colour Personal Photos for Beneficiary
4. Business License
5. A Copy of Business License
6. A Medical Report for service professions (cookers & Drivers)
7. Payment of the Charges
8. Filling the Residences (Iqama) Application form
9. The personal attendance

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<sup>7</sup> Transparency International 2007, *2007 Corruption Perceptions Index*, undated, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 7.

<sup>8</sup> Human Rights Watch 2006, *Saudi Arabia: Chadians Barred From Schools, Hospitals*, 6 September <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/09/06/saudi-arabia-chadians-barred-schools-hospitals> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 8.

<sup>9</sup> Human Rights Watch 2006, *Saudi Arabia: Chadians Barred From Schools, Hospitals*, 6 September <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/09/06/saudi-arabia-chadians-barred-schools-hospitals> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 8.

<sup>10</sup> Pinoy Abroad website 2003, *Saudi Arabia Overview*, 19 June, [http://www.pinoy-abroad.net/img\\_upload/9bed2e6b0cc5701e4cef28a6ce64be3d/Saudi\\_Arabia\\_OVERVIEW.pdf](http://www.pinoy-abroad.net/img_upload/9bed2e6b0cc5701e4cef28a6ce64be3d/Saudi_Arabia_OVERVIEW.pdf) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 9.

<sup>11</sup> Saudi National Government e-Portal, undated, *General Department of Passport: Iqama*, [http://www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c5/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3iTmGenYE8TIwMLt0BzA89gIyMfVw8TI39TY6B8JJK8u6-jBVA-OCQwMNDd0MDQnBLdRhTpDjYgRrcBDuCIqhvVbHcLE7x2g-Tx2x0OCmf84YZP3oiAPMjvIHk8vvPzyM9N1S\\_IDQWCCINMT11HAPm2Pug!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfNFZDQINJNDIwR01BODBJU1NUUVFRRzFHODQ!/?orgid=General+Department+of+Passport&srvid=Iqama&catid=Search](http://www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3iTmGenYE8TIwMLt0BzA89gIyMfVw8TI39TY6B8JJK8u6-jBVA-OCQwMNDd0MDQnBLdRhTpDjYgRrcBDuCIqhvVbHcLE7x2g-Tx2x0OCmf84YZP3oiAPMjvIHk8vvPzyM9N1S_IDQWCCINMT11HAPm2Pug!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfNFZDQINJNDIwR01BODBJU1NUUVFRRzFHODQ!/?orgid=General+Department+of+Passport&srvid=Iqama&catid=Search) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 10.

10. An authorization on ordinary paper

11. An authorization on sample form<sup>12</sup>

It is noted that personal attendance at the applicant's local embassy is mandatory for the issuance of an *Iqama*.

A holder of an *Iqama* wishing to leave Saudi Arabia must have approval to leave from their sponsor, obtain an exit/re-entry visa, and return to the country within (a maximum of) seven months.<sup>13</sup> The validity of a re-entry visa may be shorter than seven months and the duration is at the discretion of the business sponsor, and any extension up to the seven month maximum must be approved in writing by the sponsor. The duration of an exit-re-entry visa is measured from the date of the initial exit from Saudi Arabia.<sup>14</sup>

#### 4. General information about Chad such as demographics, current government, and security situation.

##### General Information

The CIA world factbook gives the following information on Chad.

Population: 10,758,945 (July 2011 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Sara 27.7%, Arab 12.3%, Mayo-Kebbi 11.5%, Kanem-Bornou 9%, Ouaddai 8.7%, Hadjarai 6.7%, Tandjile 6.5%, **Gorane 6.3%**, Fitri-Batha 4.7%, other 6.4%, unknown 0.3% (1993 census)<sup>15</sup>

##### Chadian Civil War

The current Chadian civil war began in 2005. Previously civil wars had been fought from the early 1960s to 1982 and from 1998 to 2002. At other times Chad had been involved in conflict with neighbours including Libya and Sudan. During the current civil war, the Chadian government has come under sustained military threat, particularly in the April 2008 attack on N'Djamena which almost resulted in a combined force of two rebel armies taking the capital. A multi-national UN taskforce named MINURCAT<sup>16</sup> was based in Chad from 25 September 2007 until 31 December 2010 when the mission was not renewed, primarily due to a lack of support from President Idriss Déby.

##### Security

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<sup>12</sup> Saudi National Government e-Portal, undated, *General Department of Passport: Iqama*, [http://www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal!/lut/p/c5/04\\_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3iTMGenYE8TIwMLt0BzA89gIyMfVw8TI39TY6B8JJK8u6-jBVA-OCQwMNDd0MDQnBLdRhTpDjYgRrcBDuClqhvVbHcLE7x2g-Tx2x0OCmf84YZP3oiAPMjvIHk8vvPzyM9N1S\\_IDQWCCINMT11HAPm2Pug!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfNFZDQINJNDIwR01BODBJU1NUUVFRRzFHODQ!/?orgid=General+Department+of+Passport&srvId=lqama&catid=Search](http://www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal!/lut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3iTMGenYE8TIwMLt0BzA89gIyMfVw8TI39TY6B8JJK8u6-jBVA-OCQwMNDd0MDQnBLdRhTpDjYgRrcBDuClqhvVbHcLE7x2g-Tx2x0OCmf84YZP3oiAPMjvIHk8vvPzyM9N1S_IDQWCCINMT11HAPm2Pug!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfNFZDQINJNDIwR01BODBJU1NUUVFRRzFHODQ!/?orgid=General+Department+of+Passport&srvId=lqama&catid=Search) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 10.

<sup>13</sup> Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington D.C. undated, 'Exit / Re-Entry Visa', [http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/exit\\_re\\_entry Visa.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/exit_re_entry Visa.aspx) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 11.

<sup>14</sup> Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington D.C. undated, 'Exit / Re-Entry Visa', [http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/exit\\_re\\_entry Visa.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/exit_re_entry Visa.aspx) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 11.

<sup>15</sup> CIA World Factbook 2011, *Chad*, 17 May <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 12.

<sup>16</sup> Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad)

An October 2010 UN report, written under the auspices of the MINURCAT task force, noted an overall improvement in security in Chad over the previous three months.<sup>17</sup> This was attributed to a range of factors including an unusually heavy rainy season, an improvement in the performance of Chadian military and security forces, and better relations between Chad and Sudan. At the end of 2010 MINURCAT completed its mandate and UN-sponsored troops were withdrawn from Chad. A May 2011 update noted that despite the ending of the MINURCAT mission, security in eastern Chad had not had an adverse effect on the security situation which, according to the report, had improved.<sup>18</sup> The report cited the under-secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, commenting that no armed conflict had occurred in eastern Chad since April 2010.<sup>19</sup> Despite this, the report noted that opposition groups were still armed and continued to pose a threat to civilians and the Chadian government.

Foreign armed forces continue to play a significant role in the Chadian security environment despite the withdrawal of Libya as an active participant. Chad continues to be affected by the ongoing security problems emanating from Sudan, in particular, the Darfur region which borders Chad. The former colonial ruler France continues to maintain a military presence in Chad and has been an important factor in Déby holding power.<sup>20</sup>

**5. What is the position of a member of the Gorane ethnic group in Chad? Who is also suspected association with the rebels in opposition to the Chad government? Please provide information about the Zaghawa ethnic group.**

The Gorane and Zaghawa are tribal groups originally from the northern part of Chad. Both moved to eastern Chad during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to escape severe drought conditions in the north. Between them, they have dominated Chadian national politics since 1982 with the last two presidents being Gorane (Hissène Habré from 1982-1990) and Zaghawa (Idriss Déby since 1990). Zaghawa tribal members supported Habré for much of his term as president. The two clans are made up of a number of sub-clans.

The Gorane

The Gorane (also known as the Goran and the Daza) are based mainly in eastern Chad, specifically the Biltine department of Wadi Fira Province.<sup>21</sup> According to a 1993 Jeune Afrique report, the Gorane ethnic group originates from the Kanem region in northern Chad.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> United Nations Security Council 2010, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*, 1 December, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/658/36/PDF/N1065836.pdf?OpenElement> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 13.

<sup>18</sup> ‘Security situation improves in eastern Chad, but concerns remain – UN official’ 2011, *United Nations News Service*, 13 May <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38381&Cr=Chad&Cr1> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 14.

<sup>19</sup> ‘Security situation improves in eastern Chad, but concerns remain – UN official’ 2011, *United Nations News Service*, 13 May <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38381&Cr=Chad&Cr1> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 14.

<sup>20</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.20 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx) - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>21</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>22</sup> Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994, *TCD16816.E - Chad: Information on whether members of the Gorane tribe are being persecuted by the current government*, 1 March, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,,IRBC,,TCD,3ae6acd418,0.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 16.

A large proportion of the Gorane clan moved from northern to eastern Chad in the 1980s to escape a devastating drought.<sup>23</sup> A 1993 census indicated that the Gorane made up 6.3% of the population of Chad.<sup>24</sup>

The Gorane achieved a position of control in Chad in 1982 when Hissène Habré became president in a coup against the government of Goukouni Oueddei, partly through the assistance of the Zaghawa clan who were also based in eastern Chad. Habré had previously held the post of Prime Minister in the government he ousted. Following the overthrow of Habré in 1990, the Gorane lost their position of influence. Some Gorane joined rebel groups opposed to the regime; a 2009 HRW document stated that the Gorane are associated with the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) rebel group.<sup>25</sup> No sources were located to indicate that the Gorane are unified as a tribal group in attempting to win control of government, nor did any sources state the Gorane were specifically targeted by the government. Notwithstanding this, one source was located (a 2009 Human Rights Watch article) which stated that members of ethnic groups associated with rebel groups were targeted by the government in 2009. This article did not however provide any specific examples.<sup>26</sup>

### The Zaghawa

The Zaghawa are a relatively small tribal group, making up less than 1% of the Chadian population,<sup>27</sup> traditionally located on the border between the east of the country and Sudan's western province of Darfur.<sup>28</sup> Current Chadian President Idriss Déby is a member of a Zaghawa sub-clan called the Biday (or Bideyat).<sup>29</sup> Like the Gorane, the Zaghawa clan were originally based in northern Chad, and relocated to eastern Chad in large numbers during the 1980s due to a harsh drought.<sup>30</sup> A 2009 International Crisis Group (ICG) paper notes that the Zaghawa and Gorane were allies under the leadership of Habré until the overthrow of Habré in 1990.<sup>31</sup> This alliance was a key factor in Habré's successful 1982 coup and Déby was one

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<sup>23</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.2  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>24</sup> CIA World Factbook 2011, *Chad*, 17 May <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 12.

<sup>25</sup> Human Rights Watch 2009, 'The Risk of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in Eastern Chad', 19 June <http://www.hrw.org/node/83873> - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 17.

<sup>26</sup> Human Rights Watch 2009, *Chad: Events of 2009*, undated <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87451> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 36.

<sup>27</sup> Human Rights Watch 2007, "They Came Here to Kill Us", 8 January, Section 13.  
<http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11075/section/13> - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 18.

<sup>28</sup> Prunier G. 2007, 'Chad's tragedy', Open Democracy website, 7 September  
[http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/chads\\_tragedy](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/chads_tragedy) - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 19.

<sup>29</sup> Prunier G. 2007, 'Chad's tragedy', Open Democracy website, 7 September  
[http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/chads\\_tragedy](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/chads_tragedy) - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 19;

Miles, W 1995, 'Tragic Tradeoffs: Democracy and Security in Chad', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, March, pp. 53-65, JSTOR website <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161545.pdf> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 20.

<sup>30</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.5  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>31</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

of Habré's most successful and trusted military leaders during the 1980s.<sup>32</sup> The alliance ended when Habré attempted to have Déby murdered as the latter's rising power and influence militarily emerged as a potential threat to Habré's rule.

### Relationship between the Gorane and Zaghawa ethnic groups

The relationship between the Gorane and Zaghawa ethnic groups is complex, and is influenced by historical events, shared ambition, and personal rivalry. Prominent Chadians of Gorane and Zaghawa ethnicity have been allied both in government and in rebel alliances. Zaghawa military commanders were a major component of the presidency of Hissène Habré (a Gorane) and a major rebel group, the UFDD, contains Gorane and Zaghawa factions working together to overthrow the government of Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa.

The Gorane and Zaghawa are historically rival clans who were both based in northern Chad and then, following a mass migration to escape the drought of the early 1980s, in eastern Chad. From independence in 1960 until the late 1970s, government in Chad was dominated by southern Chadians. In 1982 the Gorane and Zaghawa united in a coup that toppled the government and brought Hissène Habré to power. The despotic<sup>33</sup> ruler of Chad from 1982 to 1990, Habré, was a member of a subgroup (the Anakaza), of the Gorane ethnic group.<sup>34</sup> During the majority of Habré's rule, the Gorane and Zaghawa were allies and the ascension of Habré was seen as a takeover of power by northern Chadians at the expense of southern Chadians.<sup>35</sup> Habré's regime was alleged to have committed acts of ethnic cleansing against several ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. Other sources indicate that although Gorane troops committed acts of violence against Zaghawa at a local level, genocide was not a policy pursued by Habré at a national level.<sup>36</sup> This view is supported by the fact that Zaghawa-led military groups were a key part in Habré achieving and maintaining power.

In 1990 Habré was deposed by the current president, Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa, who had been one of Habré's most effective military commanders. The ICG reported that after Déby became president, members of the Zaghawa ethnic group began to behave aggressively towards other groups, including the Gorane, at a local level.<sup>37</sup> The ICG stated that this

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<sup>32</sup> Atlas P. & Licklider R. 1999, 'Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 1, January, pp. 35-54, JSTOR website <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/451103.pdf?acceptTC=true> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 21.

<sup>33</sup> Human Rights Watch, undated, 'The Case Against Hissène Habré, an "African Pinochet"', <http://www.hrw.org/africa/chad> - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 22;

Atlas P. & Licklider R. 1999, 'Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 1, January, pp. 35-54, JSTOR website <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/451103.pdf?acceptTC=true> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 21.

<sup>34</sup> World Directory of Minorities, Undated, 'Chad Overview', <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4901&tmpl=printpage> - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 22;

International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>35</sup> International Crisis Group 2008, *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*, 24 September, Africa Report No. 144, p.16 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment – Attachment 24.

<sup>36</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.3 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>37</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

behaviour consisted of “condescension, contempt and acts of violence that became increasingly humiliating for the victims.”<sup>38</sup> Other sources including William Miles<sup>39</sup> indicated that at a broader level, Déby’s strategy was to bring opposing groups into his government and that while Déby overtly favoured his own Bideyat sub-clan, he did not target civilians based on their tribal background.<sup>40</sup> Pierre Atlas and Roy Licklider<sup>41</sup> writing in 1999 went further in suggesting Déby’s attempts at inclusiveness had actually angered Zaghawa clan members who felt they were being sidelined.<sup>42</sup>

One major rebel group, the UFDD contains prominent members from both the Gorane and Zaghawa clans. This group began in 2006 as a union of smaller Gorane and Arabic forces under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri, a Gorane (from the Anakazza clan, like Hissène Habré), and a former defence minister in Déby’s government. Later in 2006, Zaghawa factions (including the RFC<sup>43</sup> and RPJ<sup>44</sup>) allied themselves with the UFDD and both Gorane and Zaghawa troops participated in the unsuccessful 2008 coup attempt against the Zaghawa president Déby.<sup>45</sup>

The ICG has noted that the recent strategy of the Déby government has been to portray its struggle as one against Sudanese interference arising from the conflict in the Darfur region located on Chad’s eastern border. This strategy has had two aims; firstly to appeal to international supporters who fear Chad becoming a (radical Islamist) Sudanese client, and secondly to appeal to a sense of nationalist support from the various Chadian ethnic groups.<sup>46</sup> In portraying his government as the protector of “black” (as opposed to Arabic) people, Déby has sought to diminish any notion of his government as being exclusively Zaghawa.<sup>47</sup>

#### Position of a Gorane ethnic group member aligned to the rebels

The numerous rebel groups active or formerly active in Chad are comprised of a number of different ethnic groups. Although some tribal groups are often associated with particular rebel forces, no sources were found to indicate that rebel groups were purely ethnically driven. The predominance of certain tribes in rebel groups was seen as more the result of the location of

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<sup>38</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>39</sup> Associate Professor of Political Science, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts

<sup>40</sup> Miles, W 1995, ‘Tragic Tradeoffs: Democracy and Security in Chad’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, March, p.59, JSTOR website <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161545.pdf> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 20.

<sup>41</sup> Faculty members of the Department of Political Science, Rutgers University

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/451103.pdf?acceptTC=true> p.46

<sup>43</sup> *Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques*, or ‘Assembly of the Forces for Change’. The group is led by Timane Erdimi, a Zaghawa of the Bideyat sub-clan and the nephew of President Déby (see

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> p.12)

<sup>44</sup> ‘Popular Rally for Justice’ led by Abakar Tollimi, a Zaghawa of the Borogate sub-clan.

<sup>45</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>46</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.15

<sup>47</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>47</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.1

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

the rebel's base. The New York Times in 2008 noted that the armed groups opposed to the government were drawn from a variety of ethnic groups, including Déby's Zaghawa clan.<sup>48</sup> On this basis, any problems faced by a Chadian Gorane linked to the rebels would be caused by their perceived opposition to the government by their membership of a rebel faction rather than their ethnicity.

Among the many sources consulted, none stated that the government or its forces specifically target Gorane based solely on their ethnicity, notwithstanding the incidents of local harassment outlined above. Although, as noted above, in 2009 Human Rights Watch stated that ethnic groups associated with rebel forces were subject to subject to "arbitrary arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance at the hands of Chadian government security forces."<sup>49</sup> It is noted that the RFC, which was allied with Gorane-led UFDD in the 2008 attack on N'Djamena, is led by Timane Erdimi, a nephew of Déby's and a member of the president's Zaghawa/Bideyat sub-clan, while another group who became part of the UFDD, the RPJ, is led by a Zaghawa of the Borogate sub-clan.<sup>50</sup>

## **6. Please provide information about rebel attacks in Adre in April 2006 and the current Chadian civil war.**

Several sources including the African Union and UN Security Council noted that Adre was the scene of fighting during the attempted rebel takeover of the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, on 13 April 2006.<sup>51</sup> Reliefweb reported that heavy artillery fighting was reported from aid workers at dawn;<sup>52</sup> IRIN cited un-named sources as stating that gunfire was heard in the town during the afternoon.<sup>53</sup> A Reuters news story reported that both the government and rebels claimed to be in control of Adre following the 13 April fighting.<sup>54</sup> According to some reports, Adre at the time was being held by the rebel faction United Front for Change (FUCD) and, according the FUCD, was bombed by French aircraft.<sup>55</sup> This claim was subsequently denied by the French.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Polgreen L. 2008, 'Chad's Leader Survives, but Dissidents' Peril Grows', *New York Times*, 12 February <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/africa/12chad.html> - Accessed 30 May 2011 – Attachment 25.

<sup>49</sup> Human Rights Watch 2009, *Chad: Events of 2009*, undated <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87451> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 36.

<sup>50</sup> International Crisis Group 2008, *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*, 24 September, Africa Report No. 144, pp.12-16 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment – Attachment 24.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Security Council 2006, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council - The situation in Chad and the Sudan', 25 April <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20SPRST200619.pdf> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 26.

<sup>52</sup> 'Chadian army, rebels battle on outskirts of capital' 2006, *AFP*, 13 April, Reliefweb website [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb\\_pdf/node-205172.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-205172.pdf) - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 27.

<sup>53</sup> 'Chad: UN agencies scaling back in east as insecurity grows' 2006, *IRIN News*, 13 April <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=58744> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 28.

<sup>54</sup> 'President 'in control' after fighting in Chad' 2011, *Reuters*, 13 April, Financial Times website <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/827e63a0-cae5-11da-9015-0000779e2340.html#axzz1NEzyRS4n> - Accessed 2 June – Attachment 29.

<sup>55</sup> 'Conflicting reports on fighting for Chad capital' 2006, *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 13 April, monstersandcritics website [http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article\\_1155067.php/Conflicting\\_reports\\_on\\_fighting\\_for\\_Chad\\_capital](http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1155067.php/Conflicting_reports_on_fighting_for_Chad_capital) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 30.

<sup>56</sup> 'Conflicting reports on fighting for Chad capital' 2006, *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 13 April, monstersandcritics website [http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article\\_1155067.php/Conflicting\\_reports\\_on\\_fighting\\_for\\_Chad\\_capital](http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1155067.php/Conflicting_reports_on_fighting_for_Chad_capital) - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 30.



Prior to April 2006, the US Institute of Peace reported that on 31 March 2006 a fight took place between government forces and the rebel groups Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL) and FUCD in which a Chadian senior army commander (and nephew of President Déby) was killed.<sup>57</sup> It is noted that in December 2006, the FUCD signed a peace deal with the Chadian government and the majority of the FUCD rebel fighters were incorporated into the Chadian national army.<sup>58</sup>

Adre is located on the border between Chad and Sudan and is described by IRIN as the main crossing point from Darfur into Chad.<sup>59</sup> Its location makes it extremely vulnerable to attack by Chadian rebel groups based in the Darfur region of Sudan.<sup>60</sup> A Reuters article in February 2007 noted that border towns like Adre were “exposed to random raids in a cat-and-mouse war in which the rebel strategy appears to be lightning surprise assaults and equally rapid retreats.”<sup>61</sup> The report noted that the involvement of Sudanese-based groups was suspected by both the government and rebels. An April 2006 Reliefweb article noted that Adre had been the scene of heavy fighting in December 2005 when elements of the FUCD had attempted to capture the town.<sup>62</sup>

### Background information on rebel groups in the current Chadian civil war

The current Chadian civil war began in 2005 between the Chadian government of President Déby and a range of opposition groups jointly referred to as ‘rebels’. These rebel groups which further incorporate further smaller groups included:

- United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD<sup>63</sup>) – an alliance of eight rebel groups<sup>64</sup>
- Rally of Democratic Forces (RFC) – A mainly Zaghawa faction opposed to Déby but reluctant to support a coup that would result in a non-Zaghawa president. It is led by a nephew of Déby.
- Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) – Commanded by Gorane clan member and former Déby government member Mahamat Nouri.

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<sup>57</sup> Campbell K. 2006, ‘Sudanese-Chadian Relations: A New Dimension to the Conflict in Darfur?’, *United States Institute of Peace*, April <http://www.usip.org/publications/sudanese-chadian-relations-new-dimension-conflict-darfur> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 31.

<sup>58</sup> Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2009, *TCD103079.FE – Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front uni pour le changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the signatories to the peace agreement with the government; the positions they were offered in the government; FUC members who joined splinter groups, also known as the United Front for Change (FUC)*, 29 April, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,TCD,,4b20f02e3c,0.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 32.

<sup>59</sup> ‘Chad: UN agencies scaling back in east as insecurity grows’ 2006, *IRIN News*, 13 April <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=58744> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 28.

<sup>60</sup> Human Rights Watch 2006, *Violence Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad*, June <http://www.hrw.org/background/africa/chad0606/chad0606.pdf> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 33.

<sup>61</sup> ‘Chad’s army fights cat-and-mouse war in desert east’ 2007, *Reuters*, 5 February, Sudan Tribune website <http://www.sudantribune.com/Chad-s-army-fights-cat-and-mouse,20113> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 34.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Chadian army, rebels battle on outskirts of capital’ 2006, *AFP*, 13 April, Reliefweb website [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb\\_pdf/node-205172.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-205172.pdf) - Accessed 2 June 2011 - Attachment 27.

<sup>63</sup> Chadian groupings are known by their French abbreviations, e.g. **F**ront **u**ni pour le **C**hangement (**D**émocratique). The FUCD is sometimes referred to as FUC.

<sup>64</sup> Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2009, *TCD103079.FE – Chad: Leadership of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front uni pour le changement, FUC) in 2005-2006; the signatories to the peace agreement with the government; the positions they were offered in the government; FUC members who joined splinter groups, also known as the United Front for Change (FUC)*, 29 April, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,TCD,,4b20f02e3c,0.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 32.

Although mainly comprised of Gorane and Arab members, the UFDD also contains Zaghawa fighters following the incorporation of RPJ forces.

- Union of Forces for Democracy and Development-Fundamental (UFDD-F) – A splinter group from the larger UFDD.
- Janjaweed – An Arabic faction based in Sudan and accused by the Chadian government of receiving support from Sudanese authorities.
- Chadian National Concord Movement (CNT) – Chadian Arab group.<sup>65</sup>

These groups had fluctuating levels of cooperation with each other and varied in size. Various attempts aimed at co-ordinating the operations of rebel groups have been undertaken but generally failed due to mistrust among group leaders. For example, the 2008 attack on N'Djamena involving a joint RFC/UFDD attack came close to overthrowing Déby but was ultimately undermined by disagreement on who would become president.<sup>66</sup> Since this failed 2008 attack, the majority of these groups have formed the National Alliance under Nouri's leadership. The Zaghawa dominated RFC has not joined the alliance.<sup>67</sup>

The lack of a ceasefire agreement and ongoing presence of armed troops both in Chad and neighbouring countries means that, although presently inactive, Chad is still recognised as being in a state of civil war. As noted above, a combination of advantageous weather and an improved performance from Chadian government troops has reduced the rebels' fighting capabilities. The US DOS Human Rights Report on events in Chad during 2010 noted that the government's defeat of rebel forces had impeded the rebels' ability to operate within Chad and this had resulted in a dramatic decrease in human rights abuses.<sup>68</sup>

## **7. What was the Chadian authorities view on civilians who buried the dead after conflict? Were they suspected of supporting the rebels? Did people disappear around this time?**

No information was located concerning the Chadian government's view on people burying the victims of fighting during the civil war.

Sources indicate that although examples were located of civilians, particularly young males, were taken from their homes and forced to join military groups, no specific cases were located where civilians were 'disappeared' in the sense of being abducted and murdered. The abovementioned 2009 Human Rights Watch report stated that "civilians suspected of harbouring sympathies for Chadian rebels, and members of ethnic groups associated with rebel groups, were subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance at the hands

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<sup>65</sup> International Crisis Group 2008, *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*, 24 September, Africa Report No. 144, pp.42-43 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 24.

<sup>66</sup> International Crisis Group 2008, *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*, 24 September, Africa Report No. 144, p.15 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 24.

<sup>67</sup> International Crisis Group 2008, *Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework*, 24 September, Africa Report No. 144, p.15 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 24.

<sup>68</sup> US Department of State 2011, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 – Chad*, 8 April, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154338.htm> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 35.

of Chadian government security forces” but does not elaborate.<sup>69</sup> A March 2008 Human Rights Watch report quoted President Déby as stating that the rebels were to blame for the death or disappearance of more than 400 civilians, including the leaders of political parties.<sup>70</sup> No sources were found citing specific examples of either side ‘disappearing’ civilians<sup>71</sup> suspected of supporting a rival group aside from forced military recruitment. It is also noted that a significant proportion of the Chadian population were displaced from their homes during the civil war.

The forced recruitment of civilians has been alleged to have been undertaken by government and rebel armed forces.<sup>72</sup> A January 2006 Reuters article quoted un-named sources as stating that young men were abducted by the Chadian army and taken into Sudan to fight rebel armies.<sup>73</sup> These abductees were totally removed from their families/villages and unable to communicate with them. A BBC news story from May 2009 cites a case where a 17 year old boy captured by the Chadian Army was re-united with his family, three years after being ‘disappeared’ and forced to join the UFR rebel group.<sup>74</sup>

## 8. Is it easy for someone from Chad to cross into Cameroon and remain there undetected?

News reports indicate that the Chadian-Cameroon border is frequently crossed by refugees fleeing fighting in Chad. Close to 40,000 refugees crossed over a bridge between the Chadian capital N’Djamena and the Cameroonian town of Kousseri in the early months of 2008.<sup>75</sup> These reports did not indicate any barriers in making the crossing; news photos of the event (see photo 1) indicate that the crossings were orderly, open (people left over a bridge), and monitored by NGOs.

**Photo 1 – People fleeing the Chadian capital N’Djamena crossing the bridge between Chad and Cameroon in Kousseri on 4 February 2008. Note the Red Cross official in front of picture.**

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<sup>69</sup> Human Rights Watch 2009, *Chad: Events of 2009*, undated <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87451> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 36.

<sup>70</sup> Human Rights Watch 2008, ‘Chad: Opposition Leader Ibni Still Missing’, 4 March <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/04/chad-opposition-leader-ibni-still-missing> - Accessed 3 June 2011 - Attachment 37.

<sup>71</sup> Human Rights Watch (4 March 2008 cited above) and others note the disappearance of prominent Chadian opposition leaders during this time. All but one were subsequently released or charged by the government.

<sup>72</sup> Hancock S. 2006, ‘Youths in Chad seized, forced to fight on border’, *Reuters*, 19 January, reliefweb website <http://reliefweb.int/node/197404> - Accessed 30 May 2011 – Attachment 38.

<sup>73</sup> Hancock S. 2006, ‘Youths in Chad seized, forced to fight on border’, *Reuters*, 19 January, reliefweb website <http://reliefweb.int/node/197404> - Accessed 30 May 2011 – Attachment 38.

<sup>74</sup> Hicks C. 2009, ‘UN team meets Chad child soldiers’ *BBC News*, 31 May <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8075653.stm> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 39.

<sup>75</sup> United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009, *World Refugee Survey 2009 - Cameroon*, 17 June, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher.USCRI..4a40d2a162.0.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 40.



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Once in Cameroon, refugees from Chad were provided with support from aid agencies, including the UNHCR who established a camp 32km from the border.<sup>77</sup> This camp had a capacity of around 100,000 according to a 2008 UNHCR report.<sup>78</sup> In a June 2009 report, the UNHCR noted that, with the approval of the Cameroonian government, a system was in place whereby Chadians could apply for refugee status through UNHCR offices in Cameroon.<sup>79</sup> The same report stated that Cameroon did not punish asylum seekers who had come from a “country of threat” and who reported immediately to authorities. In addition, refugees registered with the UNHCR were free to travel throughout Cameroon and were able to seek employment.<sup>80</sup>

The June 2009 UNHCR report commented that Cameroonian authorities were known to extort money from unregistered refugees who moved around Cameroon, however, registered refugees were not harassed.<sup>81</sup>

## 9. Please provide information on the Hajj and the possibility of obtaining a travel permit.

The Hajj is the pilgrimage performed by Muslims to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and is one of the five pillars of Islam. All able-bodied Muslims, who can afford to, are required to make the Hajj.<sup>82</sup> Special travel permits are issued for pilgrims making the Hajj;

<sup>76</sup> Crumley P. 2008, ‘In Chad, Better the Devil You Know?’, *Time*, 5 February <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1710142,00.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 - Attachment 41.

<sup>77</sup> Central Emergency Response Fund, undated, ‘Cameroon - Facts and Figures’ <http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4017> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 42.

<sup>78</sup> Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) 2008, Chad-Cameroon-Nigeria: Refugees still fleeing Chad, 5 February, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRIN,,CMR,,47b46145c,0.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 43.

<sup>79</sup> United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009, *World Refugee Survey 2009 - Cameroon*, 17 June, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCRI,,4a40d2a162,0.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 40.

<sup>80</sup> United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009, *World Refugee Survey 2009 - Cameroon*, 17 June, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCRI,,4a40d2a162,0.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 40.

<sup>81</sup> United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009, *World Refugee Survey 2009 - Cameroon*, 17 June, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCRI,,4a40d2a162,0.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 40.

<sup>82</sup> Zahid I. (undated), ‘Five Pillars of Islam’, Islam101 website, <http://www.islam101.com/dawah/pillars.html> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 44.

these permits are strictly controlled by the Saudi government and are valid only for the purpose of making the Hajj.<sup>83</sup>

The number of pilgrims is restricted by a quota system established by the Saudi government that keeps the number at around 2 million or 2.5 million by issuing one Hajj visa for every 1,000 Muslims in any country.<sup>84</sup> The CIA world factbook states that 53.1% of Chad's 10,758,945 population are Muslims;<sup>85</sup> therefore with a Muslim population of 5,712,999, approximately 5,713 Chadian Muslims would be issued with Hajj visas annually.

## 10. What are the possibilities of relocation to other areas of Chad?

Almost all of Chad has been affected by the various conflicts that have taken place over the last 20 years and beyond. Some sources indicate that the capital, N'Djamena, is "relatively" safe although it is noted that the city has been the site of intense battles between government and rebel troops on at least two occasions in the last five years. UNHCR notes that internally displaced Chadian refugees tend to relocate to south-western Chad to escape fighting in other regions.<sup>86</sup> The ICG in 2009 stated that no rebel groups had been established in the south and west of Chad. The ICG report contrasts this relative stability with the north and eastern regions of Chad where the existence of armed groups is a common event.<sup>87</sup>

DFAT has a travel advisory warning against travel to Chad. The DFAT website provides the following information which is listed as current as of 3 June 2011:

The security situation throughout the country, including in the capital N'Djamena, is volatile and could deteriorate further without notice. Violent civil unrest and armed conflict between the army and rebel groups has occurred throughout the country and there could be further serious clashes. There is a high level of violent crime, including kidnapping, robbery and carjacking.<sup>88</sup>

Travel website *southtravels.com* provides the following advice on the current security situation:

[T]ravellers are currently able to visit the capitals of ancient desert kingdoms and other attractions in the country... Travellers should avoid the area bordering Sudan's conflict in Darfur, from which thousands of refugees are fleeing a humanitarian catastrophe. Rebel activity continues in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region in the country's north,

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<sup>83</sup> Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington D.C. undated, 'Hajj Requirements: Visas for 1432 Hajj' [http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/hajj\\_requirements.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/services/hajj_requirements.aspx) - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 45.

<sup>84</sup> Hays J. 2011, 'Hajj Numbers, Daily Life, Logistics, Infrastructure, Security', factsandfigures website, March <http://factsanddetails.com/world.php?itemid=1443&catid=55&subcatid=358> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 46.

<sup>85</sup> CIA World Factbook 2011, *Chad*, 17 May <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html> - Accessed 2 June 2011 – Attachment 12.

<sup>86</sup> UNHCR (undated), 'Chad and Sudan situation working environment', <http://www.unhcr.org/474ac8c911.pdf> - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 47.

<sup>87</sup> International Crisis Group 2009, *Chad: Powder Keg in the East*, 15 April, Africa Report No 149, p.4 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.ashx> - Accessed 30 May 2011 - Attachment 15.

<sup>88</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, 'Chad – safety and security update', 29 March, smart traveller portal, [http://www.smarttraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/travelbulletins/Chad-Security\\_Situation](http://www.smarttraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/travelbulletins/Chad-Security_Situation) - Accessed 3 June 2011 – Attachment 48.

which has been extensively landmined. The borders with Sudan and Libya are subject to closure without notice.<sup>89</sup>

## Attachments

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