



CHAD:

Prevailing insecurity blocking solutions for IDPs

A profile of the internal displacement situation 2 July, 2010

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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

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CONTENTS

OVERVIEW	6
PREVAILING INSECURITY BLOCKING SOLUTIONS FOR IDPS	6
RÉSUMÉ DU PROFIL EN FRANÇAIS	11
L'INSECURITE BLOQUE LA REALISATION DE SOLUTIONS DURABLES POUR LES PERSONNES DEPLACEES	11
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND	19
BACKGROUND POLITICAL HISTORY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACE AGREEMENTS SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT GENERAL TENSIONS BETWEEN CHAD AND SUDAN INSECURITY DUE TO INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE OVERVIEW OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS GENERAL	19 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 24 25 25
IDP POPULATION FIGURES	26
Number of IDPs, disaggregated by age and sex where data are available General Location of IDP populations IDP locations	26 26 26
IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS	29
PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT GENERAL	29 29
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY	31
PHYSICAL SECURITY, DIGNITY, MENTAL AND MORAL INTEGRITY GENERAL	31 31

PHYSICAL SECURITY THREATS TARGETING DISPLACED CHILDREN VIOLENCE AGAINST DISPLACED WOMEN AND GIRLS	32 33
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	34
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT LIMITED BY INSECURITY	34
BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE	36
FOOD AND WATER	36
FOOD	36
WATER	39
SHELTER AND HOUSING	41
GENERAL	41
MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION	43
HEALTH AND NUTRITION	43
Sanitation	47
PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL A	ND
CULTURAL RIGHTS	49
LAND AND PROPERTY	49
GENERAL	49
PRIMARY EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES	49
GENERAL	49
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSIT	Y) 52
GENDER - WOMEN AND MEN	52
GENERAL	52
BOYS, GIRLS AND ADOLESCENTS	53
GENERAL	53
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT	
ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)	<u>55</u>
_	
DOCUMENTED RETURNS, SETTLED LOCALLY AND SETTLED ELSEWHERE	55
GENERAL	55
PROSPECTS FOR AND OBSTACLES TO VOLUNTARY RETURN, LOCAL SETTLEMENT AND	
SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE	57
GENERAL	57
SUPPORT FOR RETURN INTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION	58
GENERAL	58
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	59
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW FRAMEWORK INCLUDING	
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT	59

GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW	59
CHAD'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS	60
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS ON CHAD (2006 – 2010)	64
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT	64
NATIONAL RESPONSE	65
GENERAL	65
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND ASSISTANCE	66
GENERAL	66
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	67
GENERAL	67
RECOMMENDATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES	68
GENERAL	68
LIST OF SOURCES USED	70

OVERVIEW

Prevailing insecurity blocking solutions for IDPs

Around 170,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Chad and living in 38 camps in mid-2010, as a result of internal armed conflict, inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians. The majority of internally displaced people (IDPs) had little or no means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital. Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR.

Ongoing protection monitoring of IDP camps has found the main protection risks of IDPs to be insecurity, circulation of small arms in camps, and violence against women including domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Displaced children have also faced a range of threats. In IDP camps they have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling. In June 2010, Chad was one of six African countries that signed the N'Djamena Declaration to end the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups.

Since 2008, more than 30,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin. However, most have been forced to return by lack of access to land and lack of income-generating activities in IDP camps. While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.

The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées (CNAPD), but it has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.

Background and causes of displacement

Of the 11.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Africa, three million live in the regional "conflict triangle" of eastern Chad, Darfur, and northern Central African Republic (CAR). The triangle is characterised by inter-related armed conflicts, high levels of insecurity despite the presence of international peacekeeping troops, widespread availability of small arms, and forced displacement within and across borders. In 2010, Chad, Sudan, and CAR were included in the list of the world's ten most failed states, with Chad at number two after Somalia (The Fund for Peace, 21 June 2010).

From 2004, the war in neighbouring Darfur caused an influx of 270,000 refugees into eastern Chad. It also brought Darfuri rebels from the same Zaghawa ethnic group as Chad's President Idriss Deby. His willingness to let them operate from bases inside Chad spurred the government of Sudan to allow Chadian rebels to operate from within Darfur. The two governments have accused each other of harbouring and funding the other's armed opposition groups (OCHA, 21 June 2009). They have waged a proxy war in which these groups have carried out the actual fighting (Small Arms Survey, April 2008).

With these tensions as a backdrop, internal armed conflict erupted in Chad in 2006 after Deby changed the constitution in order to run for a third term. Chadian rebels based in Darfur accused him of limiting government and military posts to members of his minority ethnic group, and of using oil revenues to bolster the armed forces, instead of investing in social services and infrastructure to develop the country (ICG, 26 August 2009). Deby was re-elected in 2006, but the results were contested by the political opposition which boycotted the election, and which had never accepted the legitimacy of Deby's initial rise to power by means of a military coup in 1990. Attempted coups in 2006, 2008, and 2009 highlighted the failure of efforts to consolidate peace in Chad (OCHA, 21 June 2009).

Inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians have also caused internal displacement in eastern Chad. Sudanese Janjaweed militias carried out cross-border raids against Chadian villages in 2006 and 2007, exploiting long-standing land disputes among ethnic groups. They perpetrated human rights abuses including massacres, rape, looting and burning of villages, and were referenced as the primary cause of displacement (HRW, June 2009). Chad's military strategy of concentrating troops at key entry points along the border left villages within Chad without protection (AI, 28 June 2006).

While inter-ethnic violence has decreased considerably since 2007, it has been replaced by widespread attacks against civilians, including IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers, by bandits and criminal gangs known as "coupeurs de route" who have acted with total impunity. These criminal attacks have multiplied despite the presence of European Union forces, UN peacekeeping troops, and Chadian police units tasked with protecting civilians.

Notwithstanding the deployment of international troops and the signing of various peace agreements aimed at resolving the country's internal armed conflict, the causes of internal displacement have not ended. With UN peacekeeping troops scheduled to withdraw by the end of 2010, a worsening food security crisis that has already affected two million people in Chad (WFP, 22 June 2010), severe limits to the access and capacity of humanitarian organisations, and a government committed to military spending rather than social development, it is unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return, integration or resettlement of IDPs will be in place in the near future.

Peacekeeping operations

In response to growing levels of insecurity and human rights abuses in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of MINURCAT, the UN Mission in CAR and Chad, in 2007. It was mandated to help improve Chad's justice system and monitor the human rights situation. At the same time the European Union (EU) deployed a force known as EUFOR to protect Chadian IDPs and Sudanese refugees, safeguard humanitarian operations, and help restore stability.

EUFOR was largely unable to ensure security in the absence of government forces (HRW, June 2009), and ill-equipped for the task of combating criminal gangs (IRIN, 16 May 2008). EUFOR was replaced in March 2009 by MINURCAT troops with an extended one-year mandate (UNSC, 14 January 2009). However, despite authorisation to deploy 5,200 troops, MINURCAT never reached more than half operational capacity (UNSC, 14 October 2009). This was due to lack of funds and problems in the acquisition and transportation of equipment by troop-contributing countries.

MINURCAT was also commissioned to train a specialised Chadian police force, known as the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* or DIS, to provide security in IDP and refugee camps and patrol main towns in eastern Chad. As of September 2009, MINURCAT had trained over 800 DIS officers (UNSC, 14 October 2009). To better address issues of gender-based violence, the DIS

recruited and trained a group of 80 female officers (OCHA, 30 November 2009). However, a lack of capacity and resources resulted in permanent DIS posts being set up only in refugee camps. This left most IDP camps unpatrolled, and called into question the impact of the group of female DIS officers on the safety of displaced women and girls (PHR, May 2009). Furthermore, humanitarian organisations have voiced serious concerns about the conduct of DIS officers in light of reported abuse (AI, September 2009).

In early 2010, President Deby called for the replacement of MINURCAT's military component by national security forces that would take responsibility for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad (ISN, 18 May 2010). Deby stressed that the force had been slow to deploy and had failed to protect civilians or build promised infrastructure projects. In May 2010, in adopting Resolution 1923, the UN Security Council approved the withdrawal from Chad of all MINURCAT troops and civilian components by the end of 2010.

Peace agreements

Facilitated by the EU, the Government of Chad and the political opposition signed an electoral reform agreement in August 2007 to oversee the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 2010. In July 2009, the Government and a coalition of three rebel groups signed a peace agreement in Tripoli under the sponsorship of the Libyan government (ReliefWeb, 26 July 2009). In both cases, the agreements excluded certain armed insurgents. Critics have highlighted the need for inclusive political negotiation between the Government and all opposition groups, both armed and unarmed, if the internal political crisis and armed conflict are to be resolved (Enough, February 2008).

International observers have increasingly expressed concern about Libya's strong influence over Chad's affairs, despite welcoming its involvement in the past. President Gaddafi has publicly opposed the EU and UN peacekeeping presence in Chad and is thought to be supporting several rebel groups (ICG, 23 March 2010).

Sudan and Chad have broken diplomatic ties on more than one occasion, and none of the numerous peace agreements which they have agreed have succeeded. The two most recent were the Dakar Agreement of March 2008 and the Doha Agreement of May 2009. Relations between the countries have improved since a meeting of the presidents in January 2010, when Deby traveled to Khartoum for the first time in six years. The countries agreed to stop arming or sheltering each other's insurgent groups, and to deploy a joint force along their common border to end the presence of rebels on each other's territories (ReliefWeb, 17 June 2010).

Following this pledge, the Government of Sudan signed a truce with the most powerful Sudanese rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement or JEM (UNSC, 29 April 2010). It was brokered by the Government of Chad in N'Djamena and formally signed in Doha (Irish Times, 22 Feb 2010). Chad's participation in the talks is significant, as Deby has been accused of supporting JEM, whose members are from his Zaghawa ethnic group. Further steps to normalise relations between Sudan and Chad have included the reopening of the border between the two countries and renewed commitment to security arrangements and border monitoring.

Food security crisis

The World Food Programme estimates that two million Chadians, including IDPs, are facing severe food shortages. Changing weather patterns led to a serious drought in 2009, crippling local farmers and resulting in a 34 per cent fall in agricultural production and the loss of 780,000 cattle during the year (WFP, 2 March 2010). The UN has predicted that food insecurity will affect up to 18 per cent of the population (Reuters, 25 February 2010), with a potential to initiate new displacements in the country (IRIN, 9 March 2010).

A nutrition survey of children under the age of five conducted by Action Against Hunger (ACF) in December 2009 found 29 per cent underweight. This is almost double the emergency threshold set by the World Health Organization at 15 per cent (IRIN, 9 March 2010). UNICEF has requested an additional \$9.5 million to respond rapidly and adequately to children affected by malnutrition (OCHA, 4 June 2010).

In January 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated US\$3.8 to humanitarian organisations in Chad to respond to the food and nutrition crisis (CERF, April 2010).

Latest displacement figures

As of July 2010, there were around 170,000 IDPs (OCHA, 4 June 2010) living in 38 camps in eastern Chad (UNSC, 29 April 2010). The majority of IDPs have little or no means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital (OCHA, 30 November 2009). The number had fallen slightly from the highest number of IDPs reported to date by the UN: 185,000 in mid-2008 (OCHA, 9 June 2008). These figures translate roughly into one in five of the local population in eastern Chad being internally displaced (Oxfam, April 2009). No new internal displacements were reported in 2009 or to date in 2010.

Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR (UNHCR, 2010).

Protection and assistance needs of IDPs

Ongoing protection monitoring of IDP camps conducted by UNHCR and partner NGOs found the main protection risks of IDPs to be insecurity, circulation of small arms in camps, and violence against women including domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Domestic violence and FGM were the two most frequent types of violence against women in IDP camps (OCHA, 4 May 2009). MINURCAT also documented cases of women and girls facing rape and other forms of sexual violence by members of the Chadian army and other armed groups, including militias (UNSC, 29 April 2010). However, the lack of comprehensive data and information makes it difficult to determine whether this is a systematic feature of the conflict in Chad (UNSC, 13 April 2010).

Displaced children have also faced a range of threats. In IDP camps they have had limited access to primary education and no chance of further schooling. One of the main problems is the lack of qualified school teachers. UNICEF and partners including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and *Première Urgence* (PU) have trained teachers from displaced communities to fill this gap, but displaced parents have been unable to pay their wages, making the process unsustainable. UNICEF has continued to lobby the government to employ qualified teachers to work in IDP camps (OCHA, 20 April 2009).

As required by Security Council Resolution 1612, the UN country team in Chad has established a task force on children and armed conflict, co-chaired by MINURCAT and UNICEF. The task force visits IDP and refugee camps to monitor the recruitment of children by armed groups. In June 2010, six African countries signed the N'Djamena Declaration, a binding legal document on ending the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups (HDPT, 14 June 2010). Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan also pledged to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). Chad and Sudan have signed and ratified the OPAC. Cameroon and Nigeria have signed, but have not yet ratified. CAR and Niger have neither signed nor ratified (SOS Children's Villages, 6 June 2010; UNICEF, 6 June 2010).

UN Security Council Resolution 1923 on the withdrawal from Chad of UN peacekeeping troops require Deby's government to submit a plan of action to the Council by the end of July demonstrating how it will undertake protection of civilians and ensure ongoing support for a new Chadian police force and the existing DIS. Although the Council acknowledged the Government of Chad's commitment to take full responsibility for the protection of civilians (UNSC, 25 May 2010), other UN officials have warned that Chad's security forces lack the training, leadership, and technical capacity to ensure security (Turtle Bay, 26 May 2010). Analysts have noted that national security forces are more likely to focus their attention on potential offensives by Chadian rebel groups than on protecting IDPs and refugees (Diplomacy and Power, 6 February 2010).

Issues of return

Since 2008, more than 30,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin (OCHA, 4 June 2010). However, they have gone back to unstable conditions, forced to return by lack of access to land and lack of income-generating activities in IDP camps.

In January 2010, UNDP brought together 150 participants for a two-day workshop to define ways of promoting the peaceful co-existence of conflict-affected communities in eastern Chad, and the sustainable integration of displaced populations returning to their areas of origin (UNDP, 5 January 2010). The workshop included military, religious and community leaders from the Department of Dar Sila, home to nearly 95 per cent of all IDPs (UNHCR, 2008).

Despite such initiatives, return is not yet a viable option for most IDPs in eastern Chad. Some are still traumatised by the violence of forced displacement, while others cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return (HRW, June 2009). While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.

National and international responses to internal displacement

National response

Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the port of Kribi (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its increased oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions.

Deby has continuously responded to violent attacks by armed groups by prioritising Chad's military spending, which has soared from US\$14 million to US\$315 million since 2000 (SIPRI, 2 June 2010). In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009). It is estimated that arms imports to Chad from countries including Ukraine, Libya, Belgium, China, USA, Israel, Switzerland, Serbia, and Portugal, were five times higher between 2004 and 2008 than between 1999 and 2003 (SIPRI, August 2009).

The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the *Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées* (CNAPD), but CNAPD has limited resources and staff,

and has delivered only sporadic assistance. In 2008, the government also set up the CONAFIT committee to coordinate humanitarian activities with MINURCAT, EUFOR and the humanitarian organisations working in Chad. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.

In October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legally binding regional instrument to protect the rights of IDPs. The Convention cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 15 African States. Chad has signed but not ratified the Convention. While the number of IDPs in Chad is not as high as in other African countries, ratification of the Convention by Chad would show its commitment to protecting the rights of IDPs and achieving their durable return, resettlement or reintegration. By ratifying the Convention, Chad could act as a positive example for the region, given its strategic geo-political position between CAR and Sudan.

International response

The UN's humanitarian response is led by the Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the UNDP Representative, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has overall responsibility to coordinate the requests for funding of humanitarian organisations through a consolidated appeals process (CAP). More than 70 international humanitarian organisations provide assistance to displaced communities in eastern Chad, including IDPs and refugees from Darfur. The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad, including the protection cluster.

As of May 2010, the consolidated appeal for Chad is 43 per cent funded (OCHA, 4 June 2010). The 2010 appeal is for \$458 million to support emergency relief activities while emphasising programmes that increase self-sufficiency of displaced communities. In March 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recognised that Chad was an underfunded emergency, and allocated \$7 million for life-saving assistance programmes targeting approximately 800,000 people (CERF, April 2010). The mid-year review of the 2010 consolidated appeal for Chad emphasised the urgent need for additional funds to respond to the developing food security crisis (OCHA, 25 May 2010).

RÉSUMÉ DU PROFIL EN FRANÇAIS

L'insécurité bloque la réalisation de solutions durables pour les personnes déplacées

En milieu d'année 2010, l'Est du Tchad comptait environ 170 000 personnes déplacées réparties dans 38 camps. Ces personnes ont été déplacées à cause de conflits armés internes, de violences interethniques pour l'accès aux terres et aux ressources naturelles, et d'attaques contre les civils par des bandes armées. La majorité des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays (personnes déplacées) a peu ou pas de moyens de subvenir à ses besoins, ce qui rend l'aide humanitaire indispensable. Le Tchad accueille également 270 000 réfugiés soudanais dans 12 camps situés le long de la frontière orientale avec le Soudan, et 81 000 réfugiés centrafricains dans 11 camps situés le long de la frontière Sud avec la RCA.

Le suivi continu de la situation dans les camps de personnes déplacées a montré que les principaux risques relatifs à la protection sont l'insécurité, la circulation d'armes légères et la violence contre les femmes, y compris la violence domestique, le mariage précoce et/ou forcé et

les mutilations génitales féminines (MGF). Les enfants déplacés sont également exposés à un éventail de menaces. Dans les camps de déplacés, ils ont un accès limité à l'enseignement primaire et aucune chance de poursuivre leur scolarité au-delà du primaire. En juin 2010, le Tchad a été l'un des six pays africains à signer la Déclaration de N'Djamena contre le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants soldats.

Depuis 2008, plus de 30 000 personnes déplacées ont regagné leurs villages d'origine. Cependant, la plupart ont été contraintes de rentrer parce qu'elles n'avaient pas accès à des terres ou à des activités génératrices de revenus dans les camps. On s'attendait à des mouvements de retour importants en 2010. Cependant, le retrait programmé des troupes de maintien de la paix de l'ONU au Tchad rend peu probable que les conditions propices au retour durable des personnes déplacées soient en place dans un futur proche.

Le gouvernement a pris des mesures pour répondre à la situation des personnes déplacées, mais leur impact reste limité. En 2007, il a créé un comité national chargé d'aider les personnes déplacées, le Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées (CNAPD), mais ce Comité dispose de ressources budgétaires et humaines limitées et il n'a livré en définitive qu'une aide sporadique. Le gouvernement n'a pas encore adopté une législation nationale pour protéger les personnes déplacées.

Contexte et causes des déplacements

Sur les 11,6 millions de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays (personnes déplacées) en Afrique, trois millions vivent dans le « triangle des conflits » régional formé par l'Est du Tchad, le Darfour et le Nord de la République Centrafricaine (RCA). Le triangle est caractérisé par des conflits armés interdépendants, des niveaux d'insécurité élevés malgré la présence des troupes internationales de maintien de la paix, la présence généralisée d'armes légères et des déplacements forcés à l'intérieur et au-delà des frontières. En 2010, le Tchad, le Soudan et la RCA ont été classés parmi les dix pays les plus « faillis » du monde, le Tchad, arrivant en deuxième position juste après la Somalie (Fund for Peace, Failed States Index, 21 juin 2010).

A partir de 2004, la guerre au Darfour a causé un afflux de 270 000 réfugiés dans l'Est du Tchad. Elle a également amené des rebelles du Darfour appartenant à l'ethnie Zaghawa, le même groupe ethnique que le président Idriss Déby du Tchad. La volonté de celui-ci de les laisser mener des opérations à partir de bases situées à l'intérieur du Tchad a incité en retour le gouvernement soudanais à permettre aux rebelles tchadiens d'agir à partir de l'intérieur du Darfour. Les deux gouvernements se sont mutuellement accusés de donner refuge et de financer les groupes armés de l'opposition (Bureau des Nations Unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires, OCHA, 21 juin 2009). Ils ont en fait mené une guerre par procuration laissant les groupes armés participer aux combats réels (Small Arms Survey, avril 2008).

En 2006, avec ces tensions comme toile de fond, la guerre civile a éclaté au Tchad suite à la modification de la Constitution introduite par le Président Déby pour lui permettre de briguer un troisième mandat. Les rebelles tchadiens basés au Darfour l'ont accusé de limiter les postes gouvernementaux et militaires aux membres de son groupe ethnique minoritaire, et d'utiliser les revenus du pétrole pour soutenir les forces armées, au lieu d'investir dans les services sociaux et les infrastructures pour développer le pays (International Crisis Group, 26 août 2009). Idriss Déby a été réélu en 2006, mais les résultats ont été contestés par l'opposition politique qui avait boycotté le scrutin. L'opposition n'a jamais accepté la légitimité de son arrivée au pouvoir suite à un coup d'État militaire en 1990. Les tentatives de coup d'État intervenues en 2006, 2008 et 2009 ont montré l'échec des efforts pour consolider la paix au Tchad (OCHA, 21 juin 2009).

La violence interethnique pour l'accès aux terres et aux ressources naturelles, et les attaques contre des civils par des bandes armées sont également à l'origine de déplacements internes

dans l'Est du Tchad. En 2006 et en 2007, les milices soudanaises Janjaweed ont effectué des raids de l'autre côté de la frontière contre des villages tchadiens, exploitant des conflits fonciers de longue date entre les groupes ethniques. Elles ont perpétré des violations des droits de l'Homme, y compris des massacres, des viols, des pillages et des incendies de villages, et elles ont été considérées comme la première cause de déplacement (Human Rights Watch, juin 2009). Le Tchad a adopté une stratégie militaire consistant à concentrer les troupes aux points d'entrée principaux le long de la frontière qui a eu pour conséquence de laisser sans protection les villages de l'intérieur du Tchad (Amnesty International, 28 juin 2006).

Si la violence interethnique a considérablement diminué depuis 2007, elle a été remplacée par des attaques généralisées contre les civils, y compris les personnes déplacées, les réfugiés et les travailleurs humanitaires, par des bandes armées et des gangs criminels connus sous le nom de «coupeurs de route" qui agissent en toute impunité. Ces attaques criminelles se sont multipliées, malgré la présence des forces de l'Union européenne, des troupes de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies, et des unités de la police tchadienne chargée de protéger les civils.

Les causes de déplacements internes demeurent inchangées malgré le déploiement de troupes internationales et la signature de plusieurs accords de paix visant à mettre fin à la guerre civile. Plusieurs facteurs rendent peu probable que les conditions d'un retour durable, de l'intégration ou de la réinstallation des personnes déplacées soient réunies dans un futur proche. Parmi eux, le retrait des forces de maintien de la paix des Nations unies programmé pour la fin 2010, la crise alimentaire qui a déjà touché deux millions de personnes au Tchad et qui ne fait que s'aggraver (PAM, 22 juin 2010), les obstacles dans l'accès des organisations humanitaires, et enfin un gouvernement qui est plus tourné vers les dépenses militaires que vers le développement social.

Opérations de maintien de la paix

En réponse à l'augmentation de l'insécurité et des violations des droits de l'Homme dans l'Est du Tchad, le Conseil de sécurité a autorisé en 2007 la création de la MINURCAT, la Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad. La MINURCAT a été chargée de contribuer à l'amélioration du système judiciaire du Tchad et de surveiller la situation des droits de l'Homme. Dans le même temps, l'Union européenne (UE) a déployé une force connue sous le nom d'EUFOR pour protéger les personnes déplacées tchadiennes et les réfugiés soudanais, garantir le bon déroulement des opérations humanitaires, et contribuer à rétablir la stabilité.

En l'absence des forces gouvernementales, l'EUFOR s'est avérée incapable d'assurer la sécurité (HRW, juin 2009), et mal équipée pour lutter contre les bandes criminelles (IRIN, 16 mai 2008). L'EUFOR a été remplacée en mars 2009 par les troupes de la MINURCAT avec un mandat prolongé d'une année (Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, 14 janvier 2009). Cependant, malgré l'autorisation de déployer 5 200 soldats, la MINURCAT n'a jamais atteint plus de la moitié de ses capacités opérationnelles (Conseil de sécurité, 14 octobre 2009). Cela est dû au manque de ressources et à des problèmes dans l'acquisition et le transport de matériel par les pays fournissant des troupes.

La MINURCAT était également mandatée pour former une force de police tchadienne spécialisée, connue sous le nom de Détachement Intégré de Sécurité ou DIS afin qu'elle assure la sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées et qu'elle patrouille dans les principales villes de l'Est du Tchad. En septembre 2009, la MINURCAT avait formé plus de 800 agents du DIS (Conseil de sécurité, 14 octobre 2009). Afin de mieux traiter la violence basée sur le genre, le DIS a recruté et formé un groupe de 80 agents de sexe féminin (OCHA, 30 novembre 2009). Cependant, en raison du manque de capacités et de ressources, seuls ont été mis en place des postes permanents du DIS dans les camps de réfugiés. En conséquence, la plupart des camps de personnes déplacées sont restés dans surveillance, remettant en question l'impact de la création du groupe d'agents féminins du DIS pour garantir la sécurité des femmes et des

filles déplacées (PHR, mai 2009). En outre et face à des cas d'abus signalés, les organisations humanitaires ont exprimé de graves préoccupations concernant la conduite des agents du DIS (AI, septembre 2009).

Début 2010, le Président Déby a demandé le remplacement de la composante militaire de la MINURCAT par des forces de sécurité nationale qui assumeraient la responsabilité de la protection des civils dans l'Est du Tchad (ISN, 18 mai 2010). Le Président Déby a souligné que la force avait mis longtemps à se déployer et n'avait pas réussi à protéger les civils ou à construire les projets d'infrastructure promis. En mai 2010, la Résolution 1923 du Conseil de sécurité a décidé le retrait du Tchad de toutes les troupes de la MINURCAT ainsi que sa composante civile pour la fin de l'année 2010.

Accords de paix

En août 2007 le gouvernement du Tchad et l'opposition politique ont signé un accord de réforme électorale facilité par l'UE, prévoyant la supervision des élections présidentielles et des élections législatives prévues pour le mois de novembre 2010. En juillet 2009, le gouvernement et une coalition de trois groupes rebelles ont signé un accord de paix à Tripoli, sous le parrainage du gouvernement libyen (ReliefWeb, 26 juillet 2009). Dans les deux cas, les accords excluent certains groupes armés. Les critiques ont souligné la nécessité d'une négociation politique inclusive entre le gouvernement et tous les groupes d'opposition armés ou non armés, pour mettre un terme à la crise politique et à la guerre civile (Enough, février 2008).

Alors qu'ils l'avaient approuvée dans le passé, les observateurs internationaux ont exprimé leur préoccupation de plus en plus vive face à forte influence de la Libye sur les affaires du Tchad. En effet, le président Kadhafi s'est publiquement opposé à la présence de troupes de maintien de la paix de l'UE et des Nations Unies au Tchad et il est soupçonné de soutenir plusieurs groupes rebelles (ICG, 23 mars 2010).

Le Soudan et le Tchad ont rompu leurs relations diplomatiques plus d'une fois, et aucun des nombreux accords de paix qu'ils ont signé n'a réussi à mettre un terme au conflit. Les deux tentatives les plus récentes ont été l'Accord de Dakar de mars 2008 et l'Accord de Doha de mai 2009. Les relations entre les deux pays se sont améliorées depuis une rencontre entre les Présidents qui a eu lieu en janvier 2010, lorsque le Président Déby s'est rendu à Khartoum pour la première fois en six ans. Les deux pays se sont engagés à cesser d'armer ou de servir de refuge aux groupes d'insurgés agissant sur leurs territoires respectifs et à déployer une force conjointe le long de leur frontière commune pour mettre fin à la présence des rebelles (ReliefWeb, 17 juin 2010).

Suite à cet engagement, le gouvernement Soudanais a signé une trêve avec le groupe de rebelles soudanais le plus puissant du Darfour, le Mouvement pour la justice et l'égalité ou MJE (Conseil de sécurité, 29 avril 2010). Négocié par le gouvernement du Tchad à N'Djamena, l'accord a formellement été signé à Doha (Irish Times, 22 février 2010). La participation du Tchad dans les pourparlers de paix est importante, parce que le Président Déby avait auparavant été accusé de soutenir le MJE, dont les membres appartiennent à la même ethnie que lui, l'ethnie Zaghawa. La réouverture de la frontière entre les deux pays et l'engagement renouvelé en faveur de mesures de sécurité et de surveillance des frontières ont constitué de nouvelles étapes dans la normalisation des relations entre le Soudan et le Tchad.

Crise de la sécurité alimentaire

Le Programme alimentaire mondial estime que deux millions de Tchadiens, y compris les personnes déplacées, sont confrontés à des pénuries alimentaires. Les changements climatiques ont conduit à une grave sécheresse en 2009, paralysant l'agriculture locale et entraînant une

chute de 34 pour cent de la production agricole et la perte de 780 000 bovins au cours de l'année (PAM, 2 mars 2010). D'après ONU, l'insécurité alimentaire affectera jusqu'à 18 pour cent de la population (Reuters, 25 février 2010), et risque de provoquer de nouveaux déplacements dans le pays (IRIN, 9 mars 2010).

En décembre 2009, Action contre la Faim a mené une enquête nutritionnelle auprès d'enfants de moins de cinq ans qui a révélé que 29 pour cent d'entre eux souffraient d'insuffisance pondérale. C'est presque le double du seuil d'urgence établi par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé à 15 pour cent (IRIN, 9 mars 2010). L'UNICEF a demandé une rallonge budgétaire de 9,5 millions de dollars pour répondre rapidement et adéquatement à la situation des enfants touchés par la malnutrition aiguë (OCHA, 4 juin 2010).

En Janvier 2010, le Fonds central d'intervention d'urgence a alloué 3,8 millions de dollars aux organisations humanitaires au Tchad pour répondre à la crise alimentaire et à la malnutrition (CERF, avril 2010).

Dernières données sur le déplacement

En Juillet 2010, il y avait environ 170 000 personnes déplacées (OCHA, 4 Juin 2010) réparties dans 38 camps dans l'Est du Tchad (Conseil de sécurité, 29 avril 2010). La majorité des personnes déplacées a peu ou pas de moyens de subvenir à ses besoins, ce qui rend l'aide humanitaire indispensable (OCHA, 30 novembre 2009). Le nombre de personnes déplacées a légèrement diminué par rapport aux 185 000 personnes identifiées par les Nations Unies mi-2008 (OCHA, 9 juin 2008). Si l'on rapporte ces chiffres à la population globale dans l'Est du Tchad, une personne sur cinq est une personne déplacée (Oxfam, avril 2009). Aucun nouveau déplacement n'a été signalé en 2009 ou à ce jour en 2010.

Le Tchad accueille également 270 000 réfugiés soudanais dans 12 camps situés le long de la frontière orientale avec le Soudan, et 81 000 réfugiés centrafricains dans 11 camps situés le long de la frontière du Sud avec la RCA (HCR, 2010).

Besoins de protection et assistance des personnes déplacées

Le suivi continu par le HCR et les ONG partenaires de la situation dans les camps de personnes déplacées a montré que les principaux risques liés à la protection des personnes déplacées sont l'insécurité, la circulation d'armes légères et la violence contre les femmes, y compris la violence domestique, le mariage précoce et/ou forcé et les mutilations génitales féminines (MGF). La violence domestique et les mutilations génitales féminines ont été les deux types les plus fréquents de violence contre les femmes dans les camps de personnes déplacées (OCHA, le 4 mai 2009). La MINURCAT a également documenté les cas de femmes et de filles ayant subi des viols ou d'autres formes de violence sexuelle de la part des membres de l'armée tchadienne et d'autres groupes armés, y compris les milices (Conseil de sécurité, 29 avril 2010). Toutefois, en l'absence de données et informations complètes, il est difficile de déterminer s'il s'agit d'une caractéristique généralisée du conflit au Tchad (Conseil de sécurité, 13 avril 2010).

Les enfants déplacés sont également exposés à un éventail de menaces. Dans les camps de déplacés, ils ont un accès limité à l'enseignement primaire et aucune chance de poursuivre leur scolarité au-delà du primaire. L'un des problèmes principaux est l'absence d'enseignants qualifiés. L'UNICEF et plusieurs partenaires y compris le Service Jésuite des Réfugiés (JRS) et Première Urgence (PU) ont formé des enseignants dans les communautés déplacées pour combler cette lacune. Le processus s'est cependant avéré peu durable parce que les parents déplacés ont été dans l'impossibilité de payer les salaires. L'UNICEF a continué de faire pression sur le gouvernement pour qu'il recrute des enseignants qualifiés pour travailler dans les camps de personnes déplacées (OCHA, 20 avril 2009).

Conformément à la résolution 1612 du Conseil de sécurité, le Bureau des Nations Unies au Tchad a mis en place un groupe de travail sur les enfants et les conflits armés, co-présidé par la MINURCAT et l'UNICEF. Le Groupe de travail effectue des visites dans les camps de personnes déplacées et de réfugiés pour surveiller le recrutement d'enfants par des groupes armés. En juin 2010, six pays africains ont signé la Déclaration de N'Djamena, un document juridiquement contraignant visant à mettre fin au recrutement et à l'utilisation d'enfants soldats par des forces et groupes armés (HDPT, 14 juin 2010). Le Cameroun, la RCA, le Tchad, le Niger, le Nigeria et le Soudan se sont également engagés à signer le protocole facultatif à la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant concernant l'implication d'enfants dans les conflits armés (OPAC). Le Tchad et le Soudan ont signé et ratifié l'OPAC. Le Cameroun et le Nigeria l'ont signé, mais n'ont pas encore ratifié. La RCA et le Niger n'ont ni signé ni ratifié (Villages d'Enfants SOS, 6 juin 2010; UNICEF, 6 juin 2010).

Conformément à la résolution 1923 du Conseil de sécurité sur le retrait des soldats de la paix de l'ONU au Tchad, avant fin juillet le gouvernement Tchadien doit présenter un plan d'action devant le Conseil. Ce plan devra montrer comment il entend protéger les civils et comme et garantir un soutien continu pour la nouvelle force de police tchadienne et le DIS déjà mis en place. Bien que le Conseil ait reconnu l'engagement du gouvernement du Tchad à assumer l'entière responsabilité de la protection des civils (Conseil de sécurité, 25 mai 2010), d'autres autorités de l'ONU ont souligné que les forces de sécurité du Tchad n'avaient ni la formation, ni l'autorité ni la capacité technique pour assurer la sécurité des civils (Turtle Bay, 26 mai 2010). D'après les observateurs, il est plus probable que les forces de sécurité nationales concentrent leur attention sur de potentiel offensives de la part des groupes rebelles tchadiens que sur la protection des personnes déplacées et des réfugiés (Diplomacy and Power, 6 février 2010).

Questions liées au retour

Depuis 2008, plus de 30 000 personnes déplacées ont regagné leurs villages d'origine (OCHA, 4 Juin 2010). Cependant, ces personnes sont retournées vers des conditions instables, la plupart ayant été contraintes de rentrer parce que dans les camps elles n'avaient pas d'accès aux terres et à des activités génératrices de revenus.

En Janvier 2010, le PNUD a réuni 150 participants pour un atelier de deux jours ayant pour objectif de définir les moyens de promouvoir la coexistence pacifique des communautés touchées par le conflit dans l'Est du Tchad, et l'intégration durable des populations déplacées retournant dans leurs régions d'origine (PNUD, 5 janvier 2010). L'atelier a réuni des militaires ainsi que des chefs religieux et communautaires du département de Dar Sila, où vivent près de 95 pour cent de toutes les personnes déplacées (HCR, 2008).

Malgré ces initiatives, le retour n'est pas encore une option viable pour la plupart des personnes déplacées dans l'Est du Tchad. Certaines sont encore traumatisées par la violence des déplacements forcés, tandis que d'autres citent comme obstacles majeurs à leur retour : l'insécurité persistante, la perte des terres et des biens et l'absence de services de base dans les villages d'origine (HRW, juin 2009). Alors qu'on s'attendait à des mouvements de retour importants en 2010, du fait du retrait programmé des troupes de maintien de la paix de l'ONU du Tchad il est peu probable que les conditions propices au retour durable des personnes déplacées soient en place dans un futur proche.

Réponses nationales et internationales au déplacement interne

Réponse nationale

Alors qu'il s'agit d'un pays producteur de pétrole, le Tchad est classé 175e sur 182 pays par l'indicateur de développement humain 2009 (PNUD, 2009). La Banque mondiale a financé la construction d'un oléoduc allant du Tchad au port de Kribi et passant par le Cameroun avec pour objectif de réduire la pauvreté au Tchad et d'améliorer la gouvernance grâce à une meilleure utilisation des revenus du pétrole (BM 20 novembre 2009). Six années se sont écoulées depuis que l'oléoduc est devenu opérationnel. Au lieu d'investir dans les services sociaux, de réduire la pauvreté et d'améliorer la gouvernance, autant d'éléments essentiels pour la protection et l'assistance aux personnes déplacées et la réalisation de solutions durables, le Tchad a utilisé les revenus pétroliers supplémentaires pour acheter des armes et lutter contre les groupes d'insurgés.

Le Président Déby a toujours répondu aux attaques violentes des groupes armés en donnant la priorité aux dépenses militaires du Tchad, qui sont passées de 14 à 315 millions de dollars depuis 2000 (SIPRI, 2 juin 2010). En 2007, les dépenses pour les forces armées ont été 4,5 supérieures aux dépenses de santé, d'éducation, et d'autres dépenses sociales prises ensemble (AlterNet, 2 décembre 2009). On estime que les importations d'armes au Tchad en provenance de pays comme l'Ukraine, la Libye, la Belgique, la Chine, les Etats-Unis, Israël, la Suisse, la Serbie et le Portugal, ont été cinq fois plus élevées entre 2004 et 2008 qu'entre 1999 et 2003 (SIPRI, août 2009).

Le gouvernement a pris des mesures pour répondre à la situation des personnes déplacées, mais leur impact reste limité. En 2007, il a créé un comité national chargé d'aider les personnes déplacées, le Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées (CNAPD), mais ce Comité a des ressources budgétaires et humaines limitées et il n'a livré en définitive qu'une aide sporadique. En 2008, le gouvernement a également mis en place le comité CONAFIT pour coordonner les activités humanitaires avec la MINURCAT, l'EUFOR et les organisations humanitaires travaillant au Tchad. Le gouvernement n'a pas encore adopté une législation nationale pour protéger les personnes déplacées.

En Octobre 2009, l'Union africaine a adopté la Convention sur la Protection et l'Assistance des personnes déplacées en Afrique, le premier instrument régional juridiquement contraignant pour protéger les droits des personnes déplacées. La convention ne peut entrer en vigueur qu'après avoir été ratifiée par 15 États d'Afrique. Le Tchad a signé la Convention mais ne l'a pas ratifiée. Même si le nombre de personnes déplacées au Tchad est moins élevé que dans d'autres pays africains, la ratification de la Convention par le Tchad serait un signe de son engagement envers la protection des droits des personnes déplacées et la réalisation de leur retour durable, de leur réinstallation ou de leur réinsertion. En ratifiant la Convention, le Tchad pourrait servir d'exemple positif pour la région, compte tenu de sa position géopolitique stratégique entre la RCA et le Soudan.

Réponse internationale

La réponse humanitaire de l'ONU est dirigée par le Coordonnateur résident/Coordonnateur humanitaire qui est également le Représentant résident du PNUD. Le Bureau de coordination des affaires humanitaires (OCHA) est responsable de la coordination des demandes de financement des organisations humanitaires à travers un processus d'appels consolidés (CAP). Plus de 70 organisations humanitaires internationales fournissent une assistance aux communautés déplacées dans l'Est du Tchad, y compris les personnes déplacées et des réfugiés du Darfour. Le système de groupes sectoriels (clusters) a été introduit au Tchad en 2007 pour améliorer la protection et l'assistance aux personnes déplacées par les agences humanitaires. Treize groupes sont maintenant opérationnels au Tchad, y compris le groupe de protection.

En mai 2010, l'appel consolidé pour le Tchad était financé à hauteur de 43 pour cent (OCHA, 4 juin 2010). L'appel pour 2010 s'élève à 458 millions de dollars pour appuyer les activités de

secours d'urgence tout en mettant l'accent sur des programmes qui augmentent l'autonomie des communautés déplacées. En mars 2010, le Fonds central d'intervention d'urgence a reconnu que le Tchad se trouve dans une situation d'urgence sous financée, et a alloué 7 millions de dollars pour des programmes d'assistance de survie ciblant environ 800 000 personnes (CERF, avril 2010). L'examen à mi-parcours de l'appel global 2010 pour le Tchad a souligné le besoin urgent de fonds supplémentaires pour répondre à la crise de la sécurité alimentaire qui est en train de se développer (OCHA, 25 mai 2010).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

Political history

Chad is a country in the Sahel bordering Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, the Central African Republic (CAR) to the south, and Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger to the west. The country is divided into 22 regions, including the capital, N'Djamena. Over 200 ethnic groups compose Chad and deep-seated practices and customs coexist with three major religions—Islam, Christianity, animism. French and Arabic are the two official languages (UN HRC, 16 February 2009).

Since independence from France in 1960, Chad has experienced ongoing political turmoil and upsurges of violence and human rights violations primarily ignited by rebel groups in their struggles against centralized power. During Hissein Habre's dictatorship in the 1980s, over 40,000 civilians were tortured and killed at the hands of his feared political police. In 1990, Habre was overthrown by his Chief of Staff, Idriss Deby, who attempted a transition to democracy through multi-party elections held in 1996 and 2001. Deby spurred the emergence of a pluralist media and approved a new democratic constitution in 1996. These changes were conducive to a society in which fundamental human rights and liberties as detailed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were protected and promoted (UN HRC, 23 February 2009). However laudable, the implementation of human rights standards under Deby's leadership was short lived. Internal ethnic politics inspired social fragmentation among the major ethnic groups and tensions with Sudan have compounded instability (UN HRC, 16 February 2009).

The first elections hinted that Deby and his ruling party were still entrenched in single-party politics, fully evidenced by the boycott of the second set of elections by major political parties. Deby responded to growing dissent with a promise to comply with constitutional guidelines and step down in 2006, a pledge that he breached after unjustly removing constitutional term limits in 2005 in order to run for a third term in office.

Deby's re-election provoked the current political crisis in which opposition factions retaliate against his monopoly of power through militarised violence, inciting insecurity and internal armed conflict. Given the lack of democratic avenues for dissent, the practice of militarised opposition is ingrained in Chad's internal power politics (UN HRC, 16 February 2009). Rebel groups, typically formed along ethnic lines but shifting for convenience of the situation, include defections from Deby's government and military ranks. This in turn has motivated Deby's unwillingness to negotiate with political and armed opposition groups. The result is that centralized power remains within Deby's Zaghawa ethnic group, over the remaining 97% of the population.

This repressive environment earned Chad a rank of 173 out of 180 on the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International (2009) and a standing of 166 out of 167 countries on the Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index, ahead only of North Korea (Enough Project, July 2009). In 2010, Chad was included in the list of the world's top ten failed states—ranked number two after Somalia (The Fund for Peace, 21 June 2010).

Peacekeeping operations

In response to growing levels of insecurity and human rights abuses in eastern Chad, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1778 which authorised the creation of MINURCAT, the UN Mission in CAR and Chad, in 2007. It was mandated to help improve Chad's justice system and monitor the human rights situation, including gender-based violence and the recruitment of child soldiers (UN HRC, 11 March 2009). At the same time, the European Union (EU) deployed a force known as EUFOR to protect Chadian IDPs and Sudanese refugees, safeguard humanitarian operations, and help restore stability. EUFOR had a Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter which allowed it to take military action to restore peace and security.

EUFOR was largely unable to ensure security in the absence of Chadian government forces (HRW, June 2009), and ill-equipped for the task of combating criminal gangs (IRIN, 16 May 2008). Under Resolution 1861, EUFOR was replaced in March 2009 by MINURCAT troops with an extended one-year mandate (UNSC, 14 January 2009). However, despite authorisation to deploy 5,200 troops, MINURCAT never reached more than half operational capacity (UNSC, 14 October 2009). This was due to lack of funds and problems in the acquisition and transportation of equipment by troop-contributing countries.

MINURCAT's operational mandate also prevented it from being deployed to the border, thereby allowing Chad and Sudan to continue intervening freely in each other's internal crises (European Security Review, March 2008); and it had no political mandate to promote an inclusive peace process between the government and all parties concerned, including armed insurgents (ICG, 15 April 2009). Also, the UN had included the return of IDPs to their areas of origin in a series of benchmarks for evaluating MINURCAT's performance. Humanitarian agencies expressed concern that using return as a measure of success might encourage MINURCAT to put pressure on IDPs to return prematurely (HRW, June 2009). Despite these shortcomings, MINURCAT's contribution to the stability of the region has been cited regularly by human rights organizations.

MINURCAT was also commissioned to train a specialised Chadian police force, known as the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* or DIS, to provide security in IDP and refugee camps and patrol main towns in eastern Chad. As of September 2009, MINURCAT had trained over 800 DIS officers (UNSC, 14 October 2009). To better address issues of gender-based violence, the DIS recruited and trained a group of 80 female officers (OCHA, 30 November 2009). However, a lack of capacity and resources resulted in permanent DIS posts being set up only in refugee camps. This left most IDP camps unpatrolled, and called into question the impact of the group of female DIS officers on the safety of displaced women and girls (PHR, May 2009). Furthermore, humanitarian organisations have voiced serious concerns about the conduct of DIS officers in light of reported abuse (AI, September 2009).

In early 2010, President Deby called for the replacement of MINURCAT's military component by national security forces that would take responsibility for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad (ISN, 18 May 2010). Deby stressed that the force had been slow to deploy and had failed to protect civilians or build promised infrastructure projects. He had always seen the international presence as an infringement on Chad's sovereignty (Diplomacy and Power, 6 February 2010). In May 2010, in adopting Resolution 1923, the UN Security Council approved the withdrawal from Chad of all MINURCAT troops and civilian components by the end of 2010.

The international community has predicted that the withdrawal of UN troops will result in the deterioration of the safety of the 500,000 refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad and increase the region's volatility and propensity to human rights abuses (AI, 24 May 2010). In response, Chad has cited a "new context" in eastern Chad of improved relations with Sudan (Reuters, 1 March

2010). While Principle 3 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states that "national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction," MINURCAT's withdrawal has been called "unacceptable" (AI, 24 May 2010) and "a profound mistake" (Diplomacy and Power, 6 February 2010).

UN Security Council Resolution 1923 requires Deby's government to submit a plan of action to the Council by the end of July demonstrating how it will undertake protection of civilians and ensure ongoing support for a new Chadian police force and the existing DIS. Although the Council acknowledged the Government of Chad's commitment to take full responsibility for the protection of civilians (UNSC, 25 May 2010), other UN officials have warned that Chad's security forces lack the training, leadership, and technical capacity to ensure security (Turtle Bay, 26 May 2010). Analysts have noted that national security forces are more likely to focus their attention on potential offensives by Chadian rebel groups than on protecting IDPs and refugees (Diplomacy and Power, 6 February 2010). Moreover, Chadian authorities and UN officials have done little to involve the displaced or local populations in discussions about their livelihoods and survival after the withdrawal of UN troops (AI, 24 May 2010). The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, stated: "whatever our preference might have been, humanitarian actors must prepare themselves to work in a context without an international force" (OCHA, 23 May 2010).

Peace agreements

Facilitated by the EU, the Government of Chad and the political opposition signed an electoral reform agreement in August 2007 to oversee the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 2010. Some progress has been made in implementing the agreement, such as the completion of a general population census, the second in 16 years, in May/June 2009. The 1993 census counted the country's population at 6.3 million but the October 2009 count was nearly double at 11.2 million (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

In July 2009, the Government and a coalition of three rebel groups signed a peace agreement in Tripoli under the sponsorship of the Libyan government (ReliefWeb, 26 July 2009). However, this agreementexcluded the main insurgency coalition, the Union of Forces for Resistance (*Union des forces de la resistance*), representing eight rebel groups. In both cases, the agreements excluded certain armed insurgents. Critics have highlighted the need for inclusive political negotiation between the Government and all opposition groups, both armed and unarmed, if the internal political crisis and armed conflict are to be resolved. International observers have increasingly expressed concern about Libya's strong influence over Chad's affairs, despite welcoming its involvement in the past. President Al-Gaddafi has publicly opposed EU and UN peacekeeping presence in Chad and is thought to be supporting several rebel groups (Enough, February 2008; ICG, 23 March 2010).

Sudan and Chad have broken diplomatic ties on more than one occasion, and none of the numerous peace agreements which they have agreed have succeeded. The two most recent were the Dakar Agreement of March 2008 and the Doha Agreement of May 2009. The Dakar agreement establishment a contact group consisting of foreign ministers and representatives from Libya, the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Gabon, Eritrea, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union. It was charged with monitoring the implementation of the agreement; to cease supporting the activities of armed groups; and to ensure that the signatories' respective territories were not used for the destabilization of one or the other country. Congolese President, Denis Sassou Nguesso, head of

the contact group, visited Khartoum in July 2008 to reiterate the necessary normalization of relations between Sudan and Chad as a critical criterion for regional stability (UNAMID, 2008). However, the group has not met since November 2008, jeopardising the agreement's call for regional stability. The Doha agreement less than 48 hours. Other agreements include the Tripoli agreement of 8 February 2006, the Khartoum agreement and its additional protocols of 28 August 2006, the Cannes Declaration of 15 February 2007 and the Riyadh agreement of 3 May 2007.

Relations between the countries have improved since a meeting of the presidents in January 2010, when Deby traveled to Khartoum for the first time in six years. The countries agreed to stop arming or sheltering each other's insurgent groups, and to deploy a joint force along their common border to end the presence of rebels on each other's territories (ReliefWeb, 17 June 2010). Following this pledge, the Government of Sudan signed a truce with the most powerful Sudanese rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement or JEM (UNSC, 29 April 2010). It was brokered by the Government of Chad in N'Djamena and formally signed in Doha (Irish Times, 22 February 2010). Chad's participation in the talks is significant, as Deby has been accused of supporting JEM, whose members are from his Zaghawa ethnic group. Further steps to normalise relations between Sudan and Chad have included the reopening of the border between the two countries and renewed commitment to security arrangements and border monitoring.

Socio-economic context

Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the port of Kribi (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its increased oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions.

President Deby has continuously responded to violent attacks by armed groups by prioritising Chad's military spending, which has soared from US\$14 million to US\$315 million since 2000 (SIPRI, 2 June 2010). In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009). It is estimated that arms imports to Chad from countries including Ukraine, Libya, Belgium, China, USA, Israel, Switzerland, Serbia, and Portugal, were five times higher in 2004-2008 than in 1999-2003 (SIPRI, August 2009). Although France reported no arms exports to Chad during 2003-2005, it maintains 1,200 troops on the ground and offers reconnaissance, intelligence, and logistical support.

China has long been thought to supply Chad's rebel groups with arms through Sudan, and Beijing has been criticised for being too diplomatically passive in light of human rights abuses (Harvard International Review, 2009). UN experts have recommended that the UN arms embargo on Darfur be expanded to include Chad, as arms and related military material delivered to Chad are diverted into Darfur and fuel the conflict. However, the UN Security Council has yet to extend the sanctions—a move that would likely to be opposed by veto-holding China and Russia (Reuters, 18 November 2008).

Compounding these problems is a worsening food and malnutrition crisis. The World Food Programme estimates that two million Chadians, including IDPs, are facing severe food

shortages. Changing weather patterns led to a serious drought in 2009, crippling local farmers and resulting in a 34 per cent decrease of agricultural production and the loss of 780,000 cattle during the year (WFP, 2 March 2010). The UN has predicted that food insecurity will affect up to 18 per cent of the population (Reuters, 25 February 2010), with a potential to initiate new displacements in the country (IRIN, 9 March 2010).

A nutrition survey of children under the age of five conducted by Action Against Hunger (ACF) in December 2009 found 29 per cent underweight. This is almost double the emergency threshold set by the World Health Organization at 15 per cent (IRIN, 9 March 2010). UNICEF requested an additional \$9.5 million to respond rapidly and adequately to children affected by malnutrition (OCHA, 4 June 2010). In January 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated US\$3.8 to humanitarian organisations in Chad to respond to the food and nutrition crisis (CERF, April 2010).

Causes of displacement

General

Since 2005, up to 185,000 people have been displaced in eastern Chad as a result of conflict-related violence and human rights abuses. The main causes are tensions between Chad and Sudan, internal armed conflict in Chad, inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians. These causes are intricately linked and need to be addressed in tandem for the implementation and success of durable solutions (IDMC, 21 December 2009).

A 2008 UNHCR study of IDPs in 14 camps revealed an increase in displacement between 2007 and 2008 with the following trends:

- Attacks by Janjaweed constituted the principal reason for displacement (94.6%)
- Inter-communal conflicts (2.9%)
- Insecurity due to clashes between rebels and government forces (1.1%)
- Other causes (4%)

Leading causes of displacement in eastern Chad (percentage)

Camp	Principal cause for displacement	Respondents
	Village attacks by Janjaweed	Neighboring inter-communal conflicts
		Insecurity due to clashes between rebels and government forces Other
Arkoum	94,5	4,40,01,2344
Goundiang	80,0	16,70,03,330
Alacha-alentours	82,1	14,32,41,284
Adé	95,2	0,60,93,4352
Dogdoré	94,7	0,93,31,11027
Aradib	96,2	2,30,80,7608
Habilé	94,8	2,60,71,91346
Gourounkoun	96,7	2,00,60,6491
Koubigou	93,5	4,50,21,8444
Koloma	91,3	4,73,20,8253
Gassiré	95,4	3,10,41,0483
Kerfi	93,1	5,10,21,6432

Gannachour	96,9	3,10,00,097
Sannour	92,9	0,00,07,128
Total	94,6	2,91,11,46019

Source: UNHCR 2008

Tensions between Chad and Sudan

Beginning in 2004, the war in neighbouring Darfur caused an influx of 270,000 refugees into eastern Chad. It also brought Darfuri rebels from the same Zaghawa ethnic group as Chad's President Idriss Deby. His willingness to let them operate from bases inside Chad spurred the government of Sudan to allow Chadian rebels to operate from within Darfur. The two governments have accused each other of harbouring and funding the other's armed opposition groups (OCHA, 21 June 2009). They have waged a proxy war in which these groups have carried out the actual fighting (Small Arms Survey, April 2008). While civilians may not be the intended targets of rebel attacks against government forces, the fighting has killed hundreds of people, and levels of insecurity have escalated in the wake of each confrontation.

Insecurity due to internal armed conflict

With these tensions as a backdrop, internal armed conflict erupted in Chad in 2006 after President Deby changed the constitution in order to run for a third term. Chadian rebels based in Darfur accused him of limiting government and military posts to members of his minority ethnic group, and of using oil revenues to bolster the armed forces, instead of investing in social services and infrastructure to develop the country (ICG, 26 August 2009). Deby was re-elected in 2006, but the results were contested by the political opposition which boycotted the election, and which had never accepted the legitimacy of Deby's initial rise to power by means of a military coup in 1990. Attempted coups in 2006, 2008, and 2009 highlighted the failure of efforts to consolidate peace in Chad (OCHA, 21 June 2009).

Inter-ethnic violence

Inter-ethnic violence over land and natural resources, and attacks by bandits against civilians have also caused internal displacement in eastern Chad. Sudanese Janjaweed militias carried out cross-border raids against Chadian villages in 2006 and 2007, exploiting long-standing land disputes among ethnic groups. They perpetrated human rights abuses including massacres, rape, looting and burning of villages, and were referenced as the primary cause of displacement (HRW, June 2009). Chad's military strategy of concentrating troops at key entry points along the border left villages within Chad without protection (AI, 28 June 2006).

While inter-ethnic violence has decreased considerably since 2007, it has been replaced by widespread attacks against civilians, including IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers, by bandits and criminal gangs known as "coupeurs de route" who have acted with total impunity. These criminal attacks have multiplied despite the presence of European Union forces, UN peacekeeping troops, and Chadian police units tasked with protecting civilians.

Overview of displaced populations

General

As of July 2010, there were around 170,000 IDPs in eastern Chad (OCHA, 4 June 2010). IDPs live in 38 camps with varying levels of humanitarian assistance, or are being supported by host communities in remote areas with little to no humanitarian assistance (UNSC, 29 April 2010). The majority of IDPs lack means of sustaining themselves, making humanitarian assistance vital (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

The number of IDPs had fallen slightly from the highest number reported to date by the UN: 185,000 in mid-2008 (OCHA, 9 June 2008). This translates roughly into one in five of the local population in eastern Chad being internally displaced (Oxfam, April 2009). No new internal displacements were reported in 2009 or the first half of 2010.

Chad also hosts 270,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 camps along the eastern border with Sudan, and 81,000 Central African refugees in 11 camps along the southern border with CAR (UNHCR, 2010).

IDP POPULATION FIGURES

Number of IDPs, disaggregated by age and sex where data are available

General

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Since 2007, UNHCR and its partners have conducted several profiling exercises to determine the number and location of IDPs and provide disaggregated date on their age, sex, ethnicity, and village of origin. A 2008 profiling exercise reported that 60 per cent of IDPs surveyed were women between the ages of 15 and 40 and that 95% of IDPs live in the Department of Dar Sila (UNHCR, November 2008). The 2009 consolidated humanitarian appeal for Chad reported 78,519 males and 89,948 females among the IDP population (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

Location of IDP populations

IDP locations

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Locations of IDPs


Department	Sub-prefecture	= ·· •	Estimation department	by
DAR-TAMA (Guereda)	Am Zoer	Kerkere	870 ZR*	

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ASSOUNGHA (Adre)	Mabrone	Goundo	2,500 ZR
	Adre Rural	Borota	4,400 ZR
	Hadjer-Hadid	Alacha and surroundings	1,805
		Arkoum, Goudiang	7,689
	Borota	Goungour	9,157 ZR
OUARA (Abeche)	Abdi	Abdi	5,856 ZR
KIMITI (Goz Beida)	Goz Beida	Gassire	17,899
		Gouroukoun	17,563
		Kerfi, Koloma, Koubigou, Sanour,	26,301
		Ganachour	
	Koukou-	Habile	31,506
	Angarana		
		Aradib	17,720
		Tiero, Marena	0
	Ade	Ade, Karoub-Tawa	16,251
	Daguessa	Dogdore/Tour	27,450
		Daguessa	600 ZR
BAHR AZOUM (Am Timan)	Am Timan	Ideter	166
		Ardo, Able, Badina, Al Kouk, Sihep	4,117
DJOROUF AL AHMAR (Am Dam)	Haouich	Haouich I-II, Amtalata I-II, Binedir, Wizine, Mirer	6,203 ZR
,		Sarafaye, Tinaye, Am Sit	6,830 ZR
TOTAL (excluding those marked as ZR*)	168,467		,

Source: OCHA, 30 November 2009 (ZR = areas of return / zones de retour)

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IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS

Patterns of movement

General

Forced internal displacement began in Chad at the end of 2005, causing 45,000 Chadians to take refuge across the border in Darfur and more than 185,000 to relocate away from the Chad-Sudan border in three major waves.

The first wave of internal displacement took place from end-2005 to mid-2006 (OCHA, November 2006). Chadian villages near the border with Darfur were attacked, forcing residents to flee to what they thought were safe areas, only to be attacked and displaced again. During the first wave, 12,000 civilians were reported displaced near Goz Beida, while the others remained closer to their villages (UNCHR, 27 February 2007).

The second wave of internal displacement was triggered at the end of 2006 by a wave of interethnic violence between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups which claimed the lives of at least 250 people, wounded hundreds more, and displaced more than 25,000 people to the outskirts of Goz Beida. Fifty villages southeast of Goz Beida were raided, with 30 of those burned and destroyed (MSF, 22 November 2006; UNHCR, 24 and 28 November 2006; AI, 1 December 2006; IRIN, 11 December 2006).

In early 2007, the situation further degenerated and another wave of attacks in the Koukou-Angarana area killed 30 people and displaced another 20,000 civilians. Another 10,000 were displaced due to cross-border violence at the hands of Janjaweed militia in Borota. Internal-communal hostilities forced another 10,000 Chadians to leave more than 20 villages and gather in Gassire. Some IDP groups moved closer to refugee camps in hopes of finding security and assistance from humanitarian organisations (MSF, 18 December 2006; UNHCR, 5 January and 27 February 2007).

A third wave of displacement began on 31 March 2007 when attacks by Janjaweed militia assisted by Chadian rebels killed up to 400 people, wounded 80 and forced more than 9,000 civilians to flee from 31 villages. IDPs found refuge in Habile camp, joining 9,000 already there. UNHCR officials noted that many of them had already been displaced several times in the preceding year (UNHCR, 10 April 2007).

More recently, two displacement patterns due to militia attacks on civilians in Dar Sila have been reported. First, IDPs of Dajo, Massalit, and other non-Arab groups generally move to the perimeters of large towns where government soldiers and humanitarians are present. At least 110,000 IDPs, mostly non-Arab, are concentrated around the towns of Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana, and Dogdore. The second pattern is of Arabs, Ouaddaiens, and other groups affiliated with Chadian Janjaweed militia who flee to rural and remote areas, prompting the reference of "unofficial" or "invisibly displaced." They seek refuge beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies for fear of retaliation (HRW, June 2009).

In May 2010, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, visited IDP camps in eastern Chad, including Gourounkoun IDP camp located 7

kilometres north of Goz Beida. This camp houses around 17,000 Chadians from 26 villages near the border with Darfur. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator reported that "most of the IDPs clearly want to return home as soon as possible. However, they are waiting to be sure that security conditions are favorable and that basic services such as schools and health clinics are available ... Many fear that those who attacked their villages in 2006 are still around" (OCHA, 24 May 2010).

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator also visited the village of Marena, where about 6,000 IDPs have returned since 2009. Both women and men returnees conveyed their concerns about restarting their agricultural livelihoods, given the lack of basic services including potable water, schools, teachers, and health care. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator suggested that "durable solutions for some of the displaced are increasingly feasible" but that funding must be offered for early recovery activities and reconciliation processes. Marena returnees are part of an estimated 35,000 returnees in the past year and a half (OCHA, 24 May 2010).

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY

Physical security, dignity, mental and moral integrity

General

A lack of physical security from several sources is the primary cause of mass displacements in eastern Chad. Physical insecurity, fear, threats, and disrespect of human dignity have continued, if not worsened, for a large number of IDPs whether they are in IDP camps or host communities. Although civilians have not necessarily been the specific targets of Chadian rebel forces, they have been caught in the crossfire and many have lost their lives.

Another important source of physical insecurity are the so-called Toroboro. These are members of Sudanese rebel groups and Chadian militias fighting alongside the Chadian national army (ANT), who live among the civilian population. Drunk Toroboro pose regular threats to civilians, for example by harassing adolescent girls (OCHA, 30 November 2006). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report a general targeting of civilians, especially women and children (AI and HRW, 7 December 2006). Refugees International reports: "the greatest threat to civilians and humanitarian operations is banditry. Bandit groups, which sometimes involve local authorities, the Chadian military, and moonlighting police or gendarmerie, act with almost complete impunity" particularly if they are members of the Zaghawa ethnic group "who enjoy de facto immunity from the law" as kinsmen of President Deby (RI, 24 July 2008). Bandits are notorious for carjackings, especially of humanitarian vehicles, and violent lootings in the wake of a rebel attack when civilians and humanitarians are at their most vulnerable. Finally, IDPs within camps can be victimized by their fellow displaced Chadians. Domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (FGM) have all been observed by protection monitors in IDP camps (OCHA, 4 May 2009).

Various international agencies report cases of rape, mutilation and arbitrary killings. IDPs have had their houses destroyed by fire and their property stolen, including livestock and food supplies (FewsNet, 31 May 2006; UNHCR, 10 April 2007). Violence has increased the circulation of small arms, including in IDP camps, and an increase in banditry, looting, and kidnapping. Chadian rebel groups and government of Chad-supported Sudanese rebel movements with bases in Chad have been responsible for the recruitment and use of child soldiers (HRW, 9 January 2007). Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and land mines remain a threat in some areas, particularly around Goz Beida. The Mine Action Unit identified 36 new casualties resulting from mines and explosive remnants of war in the Wadi Fira, Quaddai, Salamat, and Sila regions (UN SG on Children and Armed Conflict, 13 April 2010; IRIN, 18 June 2010).

The humanitarian community has established a referral system that allows victims of human rights abuses to seek medical, psychological, and legal assistance. Medical and psychosocial referrals are handled by international humanitarian organisations such as COOPI and HIAS (OCHA, 11-23 February 2009). Although the referral system is an important and welcome step towards the protection of IDPs, it has many gaps that must still be addressed. As there are no working courts, victims must wait for the presence of roving courts once or twice a year to pursue legal action. Other problems are cultural and correlate with the reluctance of most victims of sexual violence to seek assistance for fear of stigmatisation or reprisals from their communities.

Physical security threats targeting displaced children

Principle 4, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs.

Principle 13, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or permitted to take part in hostilities.

Displaced children have also faced a range of threats from physical insecurity and attacks upon their moral integrity and dignity as human beings. In IDP camps, they have had limited access to primary education and little chance to further schooling. One of the main problems is the lack of qualified school teachers. UNICEF and partners including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and *Première Urgence* (PU) have trained teachers from displaced communities to fill this gap, but displaced parents have been unable to pay their wages, making the process unsustainable. UNICEF has continued to lobby the government to employ qualified teachers to work in IDP camps (OCHA, 20 April 2009).

This lack of structure and activity has made children an easy target for armed forces. The proximity of the camps to the war zones was a particular problem (ReliefWeb, 9 June 2010), as well as acute poverty, which makes inscription attractive (UNICEF, 9 June 2010). The issue of child soldiers is difficult to address as only 10 per cent of childbirths are registered, and cultural issues related to boyhood and manhood exacerbate the recruitment of children (UN SG, 2008).

An AFP correspondent in 2009 found child soldiers fighting for both government and rebel forces (ReliefWeb, 9 June 2010). Children as young as nine years old within IDP camps and host communities have been forcibly and/or voluntarily recruited for combat and non-combat roles by the Chadian national army, militias supported by the Chadian government, and Chadian rebel groups (RI, 24 July 2008). Some of these children have fled from government training camps and returned to IDP camps from where they were recruited and reported severe abuses (UNSC, 7 August 2008).

In 2007, the UN identified the need to disarm, demobilise, and rehabilitate between 7,000 and 10,000 children used in combat and non-combat roles by government forces and rebel groups (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Chad and UNICEF agreed in May 2007 to demobilise children from the army and integrated rebel groups; 512 child soldiers were released to UNICEF, which provided support at five transit centres (UN SG, 7 August 2008). Of those, 265 voluntarily returned to or have been reunited with their families, 220 have been placed in schools and 85 in professional activities. These numbers represent UNICEF's access to only one government military installation, at Mongo in south-central Chad.

As required by Security Council Resolution 1612, the UN country team in Chad has established a task force on children and armed conflict, which is co-chaired by MINURCAT and UNICEF. The task force visits IDP and refugee camps to monitor the recruitment of children by armed groups. MINURCAT also developed training modules on child rights, child militarization, and child victim-witness protocol in order to sensitize UN police and DIS officials on the conditions and needs of IDP children (UN SG, 8 July 2008). In 2009, MINURCAT also completed the reconstruction of a transition centre where demobilised child soldiers are housed prior to being reunited with their families (UNSC, 14 October 2009). In accordance with the Paris Principles, under-age armed

youth enter a UNICEF-sponsored rehabilitation process when members of Chadian rebel groups are captured or when the groups sign peace deals with the government. The Government also pays about \$830 to each rebel fighter who demobilizes. Demobilized youth receive psychological counselling and learn skills to help them reintegrate in interim care centres run by CARE International (UNICEF, 28 May 2010).

In June 2010, six African countries signed the N'Djamena Declaration, a binding legal document on ending the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups (HDPT, 14 June 2010). Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan also pledged to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). Chad and Sudan have signed and ratified the OPAC. Cameroon and Nigeria have signed, but have not yet ratified. CAR and Niger have neither signed nor ratified (SOS Children's Villages, 6 June 2010; UNICEF, 6 June 2010). UNICEF called the N'Djamena Declaration "a new beginning in Africa, a firm step towards giving all children in the region the dignity of a childhood they've so often been deprived of by decades of conflict" (UNICEF, 9 June 2010).

Violence against displaced women and girls

Principle 4, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs.

Principle 11, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 2. Internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be protected in particular against:
- (a) Rape, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
- (b) Slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, sexual exploitation, or forced labour of children.

Domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) were the two most frequented types of violence against women observed by protection monitors in IDP camps (OCHA, 4 May 2009). FGM has a 45% prevalence rate across Chad and in IDP camps due to existing cultural norms, among girls between the ages of 6 and 10. Forced and early marriage remains an issue that requires monitoring and documentation (UN SG, 7 August 2008).

Rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered "common" with girls being the main victims and both armed groups and community members reported as perpetrators in IDP camps (UN SG, 7 August 2008). Displaced women and girls were also vulnerable to attack by government forces, rebel groups, and Janjaweed when they ventured outside their camps to collect firewood or other essentials (AI, January 2008).

MINURCAT has created comprehensive training materials towards gender mainstreaming, in order to help staff respond effective to, investigate, and prevent incidents of gender-based violence, specifically in refugee and IDP settings (UN SG, 8 July 2008). However, cases are usually managed through local arrangements under the authority of the village heads. Due to the taboo surrounding sexual crimes, climate of impunity, and stigmatization of girls and women,

perpetrators in Chad are rarely, if ever, brought to justice, let alone reported. Amnesty International calls women, who make up the majority of the IDP population, the "forgotten victims of the ongoing armed conflict" (AI, 27 July 2007).

Liberty and freedom of movement


Freedom of movement limited by insecurity

Principle 14, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence.
- 2. In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements.

Freedom of movement remains limited due to the volatility of the security situation in eastern Chad. Movement outside of camps for the collection of firewood or water puts IDPs at risk, particularly women and children, exposing them to attacks, gender-based violence, and inscription in combatant groups. This restriction of movement limits IDPs' access to resources and denies them of their only known source of income (IDMC, 11 July 2007).

Around 30,000 IDPs have returned to home villages in the past year, although to financial uncertainty and insecurity. The 170,000 IDPs remaining in camps or living with host communities are unable and unwilling to return to villages of origin due to the continued presence of armed groups in areas of return.



BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE

Food and water

Food

Principle 18, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
- 2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:
 (a) Essential food and potable water.

Overall in Chad, statistics suggest that one in five persons is in need of food assistance; one in two children suffers from malnutrition; there has been a 24% decrease in agricultural production compared to 2009; and there is a 31% livestock death rate at the end of 2009 (OCHA, 28 May 2010).

Food insecurity and lack of access to agricultural land and to natural resources such as water and firewood remain among the main concerns of IDPs in eastern Chad. Although 90% of IDP households are engaged in farming activities, adverse weather conditions, inadequate sustainable access to markets, insufficiency of seeds and tools, and insecurity near crop-growing areas at the start of season, have caused food insecurity. This in turn deepens the dependency on food aid in many IDP camps (OCHA, 2008 August; FEWS NET, 7 July 2008).

The erratic rainfalls and drought have aggravating the environmental destruction already underway. Chad's Minister of the Environment stated: "For so long, it [the environment] was a problem for rich countries, but now our land has been denuded, cattle are dying, water is shrinking, it is our problem, too" (IRIN, 17 June 2010).

The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad. The food security cluster is lead by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It determined that IDPs in eastern Chad will continue to require food assistance during 2010, which will be needs based. WFP will continue providing school meals to 88,000 pupils and take-home rations to encourage education of girls (OCHA, 30 November 2009).


The food security cluster also identified the following challenges: the self-sufficiency capacity of IDPs is low and needs to be addressed through enhanced access to land, agricultural inputs, or income-generating activities, land and natural resources are degraded and need natural resource management, vulnerable population lack capacities, livelihood, organization and infrastructures to reach sustainable food security, nomadic populations and herders need to be integrated into projects. The establishment of a logistics and trucking hub in Faya-Largeau, northern Chad, has greatly helped the delivery of food aid to needy locations in eastern Chad (USAID, 27 June 2008).

IDPs have noted that food distribution in camps is often irregular and inadequate, not to be relied upon as the sole source of sustenance. In Goz Beida and Koukou-Angarana, the World Food Program (WFP) stopped food distributions in IDP camps from September 2008 to March 2009. WFP distributed two months of rations in July 2008, and in November 2008, a month's ration to

Gassiré and Kerfi IDP camps, identified as vulnerable. NGOs warned that this breakdown in food distribution could cause severe food insecurity in IDP households with limited access to land, and could provoke a rise in malnutrition (Oxfam, April 2009).

The World Food Programme estimates that two million Chadians, including IDPs, are facing severe food shortages. Changing weather patterns led to a serious drought in 2009, crippling local farmers and resulting in a 34 per cent decrease of agricultural production and the loss of 780,000 cattle during the year (WFP, 2 March 2010). The UN has predicted that food insecurity will affect up to 18 per cent of the population (Reuters, 25 February 2010), with a potential to initiate new displacements in the country (IRIN, 9 March 2010).

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Water

Principle 18, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement


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(a) Essential food and potable water.

The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad. The water, sanitation, and hygiene cluster (WASH) is led by UNICEF.

The WASH cluster determined that water supply in some camps does not reach the required minimum Sphere standard; only four to five litres per day experienced in some camps, especially in Ganachour, Sanour and Allacha; possibilities for safe water storage and treatment for individual households are very limited, exacerbating waterborne diseases for individuals and families; school water and sanitation coverage has not been achieved and some of the schools still have no water or latrine, putting children at risk of water borne diseases (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

OCHA's Emergency Relief Coordinator visited IDP camps in eastern Chad in May 2010 and reported that in some camps people have access to only four or five litres of water per person per day (OCHA, 18 May 2010). One priority in the humanitarian response to the IDP crisis includes the improvement of water and sanitation infrastructures in all camps, in order to reach Sphere standards of 10-15 litres of water per person per day.



Shelter and housing

General


Principle 18, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
- 2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: (b) Basic shelter and housing.

The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad. The camp management/shelter/NFI cluster is led by UNHCR. One of the sector objectives for 2011 is that families of persons with special needs (an estimated 20% of the camp population as well as 10,000 persons who have returned to their home villages) receive NFIs and emergency shelter material by UNHCR and adequate housing by UN Habitat (OCHA, 30 November 2009). Most IDPs living in camps in eastern Chad are still living in tents (IRIN, 22 October 2009).

In the 2010 consolidated appeal for Chad, the camp management/shelter/NFI cluster proposed the following activities: agree and implement camp management coordination mechanisms; agree and implement a strategy of community participation in camp management; strengthen women's leadership; provide leadership training to IDP community leaders; agree and implement integrative programmes aiming at promoting peaceful coexistence between IDP/returnee/relocated and host populations; provide household fuel, goods and sanitary materials to beneficiaries including persons with special needs; provide shelter maintenance tool kits and materials to beneficiaries including persons with special needs (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

In past years, insecurity has been an important obstacle for this sector. Looting of humanitarian resources during clashes between government forces and rebel groups has negatively impacted the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, during the February 2008 attempted coup by armed opposition groups, a large quantity of non-food items (NFIs) including tents, mats, blankets, plastic sheeting sheets, and plastic rolls, were stolen from their stockpiles in N'Djamena. This resulted in less than 30% of the intended beneficiaries receiving various NFIs (OCHA, August 2008).



Medical care and sanitation

Health and nutrition

Principle 18, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
- 2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: (d) Essential medical services and sanitation.

Principle 19, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. All wounded and sick internally displaced persons as well as those with disabilities shall receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention they require, without distinction on any grounds other than medical ones. When necessary, internally displaced persons shall have access to psychological and social services.
- 2. Special attention should be paid to the health needs of women, including access to female health care providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as well as appropriate counseling for victims of sexual and other abuses.


When the displacement crisis began in 2006, only 10% of IDPs had access to emergency health care (UNICEF, 1 October 2006). The humanitarian community responded with services for child vaccinations, Vitamin A supplements, de-worming agents to ward off malnutrition and illness, the creation of therapeutic feeding and health centres, the distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets for pregnant women and children, and the monitoring of at risk women and child for nutritional deficiencies. Yet, insecurity has remained a primary impediment to the delivery of health care to IDPs. Several humanitarian organizations, including Doctors without Borders, Pharmacists Without Borders, and International Medical Corps (IMC) have decreased or withdrawn their presence in eastern Chad despite the grave need for medical attention. There has been no replacement of their services (OCHA, 30 November 2009). Health centers in villages that were attacked, looted and abandoned have to be rehabilitated. To date, only three health centers have been rehabilitated in the return areas by UNHCR, but are not yet functioning.


Since the scant and erratic rainfall of 2008 and the drought of 2009, attention in the humanitarian community has turned to malnutrition. Prior to the drought, the nutritional status of children among IDPs and host populations in the regions of Batha, Guera, Kanem, and Ouaddai showed a Global Acute Malnutrition rate of 21.4% and a severe acute malnutrition rate of 2.6%. These numbers will only increase with the worsening food crisis in Chad. IMC reported in June 2010 that it was running 11 mobile clinics, serving nearly 80,000 IDPs around Am Dam; yet it was the only NGO working in that area (IMC, 3 June 2010).

Outbreaks of disease have thwarted regular health care delivery to IDPs. An outbreak of hepatitis E in Dogdore IDP camp affected almost 800 people, killing eight, in the first eight months of 2008 (WHO, 17 August 2008). In March 2010, UNICEF reported 69 cases of polio in Chad, as well as the re-exposure of polio to several countries surrounding Chad (UNICEF, 8 March 2010). IRIN reported that poor financial banking, inept management, and lack of political will were allowing the re-emergence of the disease: "the main reason Chad had not been able to wipe out an outbreak after almost two years was lack of money and corruption…only 60 per cent of funds for polio vaccination campaigns were used to fight polio" (IRIN, 10 March 2010).

Malaria remains a significant threat to children, as the number one killer of children under five across the country. OCHA recently allocated significant funding for a meningitis and measles outbreak (OCHA, 1 April 2010). The long distances between health centres and district hospitals impede referrals and follow-ups. The lack of transportation between camps contributed to very high maternal and infant mortality rates in Chad, currently 1,500/100,000 births/year and 209/1,000 births/year for under-fives.

The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad. The health cluster is led by the World Health Organisation (WHO); the nutrition cluster by UNICEF. The health cluster has identified a need for provision of critical reproductive health services, including basic and comprehensive obstetric emergency care, clinical management of sexual violence and HIV/AIDS prevention, and response activities according to the Minimum Initial Services Package for Reproductive Health (MISP). Accessibility to and availability of quality basic and obstetrical emergency care remain problematic in the eastern Chad, and are responsible for the high maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality (OCHA, 30 November 2009).





Sanitation

Principle 18, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement


- 1. All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living.
- 2. At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to:

(d) Essential medical services and sanitation.

The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad. The water, sanitation, and hygiene cluster (WASH) is led by UNICEF. It determined that IDPs in eastern Chad

The WASH cluster determined that sanitation coverage is still low in some areas: 250/person/latrine; in Dogdore and Haouich; open air defecation is still widely practiced in villages; improved hygiene behaviour such as hand washing with soap at critical moments, e.g. after defecation, changing babies and handling food, is not practiced widely; school water and sanitation coverage has not been achieved and some of the schools still have no water or latrines, putting children at risk of water borne diseases (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

OCHA's Emergency Relief Coordinator visited IDP camps in eastern Chad in May 2010 and reported that in some IDP camps there is only one latrine per 250 people (OCHA, 18 May 2010). One priority in the humanitarian response to the IDP crisis includes the improvement of water and sanitation infrastructures in all camps, in order to reach Sphere standards.



PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Land and Property

General

In eastern Chad, access to agricultural land is one of the most important survival elements for IDPs, as 60% of them are farmers. Lack of access to land and to natural resources such as water and firewood have been among the main concerns of IDPs. Many cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return.

Tensions between IDPs and host communities regarding land access have been reported, due to incidents of IDPs renting arable land from host communities and receiving suboptimal plots, and of local leaders renting or selling land abandoned by IDPs (USAID, 11 April 2008). A UNHCR study in 2008 reported that one of three interviewed IDPs was a recipient of a parcel of land from the host community. The study also proved that the sharing of harvested food with host communities is limited with only 44% of IDPs confirming a share in the harvest (UNHCR, November 2008).

It is particularly difficult for women to gain access to land since traditions reserve this right for men. Traditional leaders may overlook women's land rights when faced with scarcity of land, specially the land rights of widows trying to obtain land following the death of a spouse (Wikigender, 23 June 2010).

Occupation of land abandoned by IDPs is also of serious concern in eastern Chad. In some areas, militias have taken control of areas they now claim as their own. In other cases nomads have used violence and threats of violence to deter returns to areas that they have no intention of occupying. Returnees have also faced land occupation by other IDPs who have taken temporary possession of abandoned areas while assessing security conditions in their villages of origin (HRW, June 2009).

Primary education and educational programmes

General

Principle 23, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. Every human being has the right to education.
- 2. To give effect to this right for internally displaced persons, the authorities concerned shall ensure that such persons, in particular displaced children, receive education which shall be free and compulsory at the primary level. Education should respect their cultural identity, language and religion.


- 3. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full and equal participation of women and girls in educational programmes.
- 4. Education and training facilities shall be made available to internally displaced persons, in particular adolescents and women, whether or not living in camps, as soon as conditions permit.

Education has been severely under-funded by donors and is one of thirteen clusters forming the humanitarian response to the displacement crisis in eastern Chad. At the peak of the displacement crisis in 2008, OCHA reported that between 33 and 39 per cent of school-aged displaced children were enrolled in school (OCHA, 9 June 2008). Although this was a notable increase from 11 per cent reported in October 2007, the reach of humanitarian agencies remains a challenge. Construction, reinforcement, and maintenance of additional classrooms, as well as the training of community teachers, establishment of parent-teacher associations and the provision of school materials are priority activities that require support.

A troublesome challenge is the availability of teachers from within the IDP community as nearly 95 per cent of the IDPs are either illiterate or have only a first grade education (IRIN, 13 March 2008). Teachers can often make more money working for NGOs. Humanitarian organisations have urged government officials to take serious responsibility for paying those teachers who do come to work within IDP camps. Beyond the meagre salary, insecurity in the region thwarts many teachers from taking jobs in eastern Chad.

Despite the work required to ensure universal education in IDP camps, it is promising to note that IDP youth have a greater chance of receiving education as displaced civilians, than those who are not displaced. Approximately 10% of Chadian youth are in schools (IRIN, 13 March 2008). The Jesuit Refugee Services observed that the large majority of uprooted youth did not know what a school was, and did not have one in their villages of origin (JRS, 18 June 2008). Moreover, the educational efforts have consequential influence for Chadian girls who, across the country, have little to no access to schools due to housework and cultural norms. Because of these entrenched practices, displaced girls typically take more time to enrol in and appear at schools. There is a notable lack of understanding of the importance of schooling and education throughout Chadian society, resulting in the sale of IDP school materials in informal markets (IRIN, 13 March 2008). The World Food Programme continues to provide school meals to 88,000 pupils and take-home rations in order to encourage education of girls (OCHA, 30 November 2009).

Schools and other educational opportunities in IDP camps offer protection, psychosocial well-being, and economic training. This lack of educational structure and activity has made children an easy target for all armed factions, from the government ANT forces to the rebel groups. The proximity of the camps to the war zones was a particular problem (ReliefWeb, 9 June 2010) as well as acute poverty, which makes inscription attractive (UNICEF, 9 June 2010). The issue of child soldiers is difficult to address as only 10 per cent of childbirths are registered, and cultural issues related to boyhood and manhood exacerbate the recruitment of children (UN SG, 1 April 2008). Recruitment and inscription of children into combatant and non-combatant roles has been internationally condemned. Chad recently took a significant step to ending this human rights violation by signing the N'Djamena Declaration with five of its neighbours. It is a binding regional instrument on ending the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups (UNICEF, 9 June 2010).



PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY)

Gender - Women and Men

General

Principle 4, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs.

Principle 11, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 2. Internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, shall be protected in particular against:
- (a) Rape, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault:
- (b) Slavery or any contemporary form of slavery, such as sale into marriage, sexual exploitation, or forced labour of children.

While the Chadian Penal Code of 1967 prohibits rape which is punishable by hard labor, rape and sexual abuse are widespread problems with little police intervention and limited legal recourse against abuse in the courts. Legal gaps such as a lack of implementing decrees for laws that have been passed, and the prevailing tendency for impunity mean that the perpetrators of this violence are almost never prosecuted (IRIN, 3 April 2009). While the Reproductive Health Law of 2002 prohibits forms of violence such as female genital mutilation (FGM), early and forced marriage, and domestic violence, these continue to be widespread and deeply rooted in tradition (ECOSOC, 27 January 2005). Women receive little to no education, are unable to own or inherit land, and are forced early into marriage and pregnancy despite being the largest part of the country's labour force. Both the Government and NGO community have conducted active and sustained public education campaigns against FGM. Because families profit from gifts from their communities when the act is conducted, it is likely to continue (ECOSOC, 27 February 2003).

Domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) were the two most frequented types of violence against women observed by protection monitors in IDP camps (OCHA, 4 May 2009). FGM has a 45% prevalence rate across Chad and in IDP camps due to existing cultural norms, among girls between the ages of 6 and 10. Forced and early marriage remains an issue that requires monitoring and documentation (UN SG, 7 August 2008).

Rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered "common" with girls being the main victims and both armed groups and community members reported as perpetrators in IDP camps (UN SG, 7 August 2008). Displaced women and girls were also vulnerable to attack by government forces, rebel groups, and Janjaweed when they ventured outside their camps to collect firewood or other essentials (AI, January 2008).

MINURCAT has created comprehensive training materials towards gender mainstreaming, in order to help staff respond effective to, investigate, and prevent incidents of gender-based violence, specifically in refugee and IDP settings (UN SG, 8 July 2008). However, cases are usually managed through local arrangements under the authority of the village heads. Due to the taboo surrounding sexual crimes, climate of impunity, and stigmatization of girls and women, perpetrators in Chad are rarely, if ever, brought to justice, let alone reported. Amnesty International calls women, who make up the majority of the IDP population, the "forgotten victims of the ongoing armed conflict" (AI, 27 July 2007).

Boys, girls and adolescents

General

Principle 4, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs.

Principle 13, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1. In no circumstances shall displaced children be recruited nor be required or permitted to take part in hostilities.

Displaced children have also faced a range of threats from physical insecurity and attacks upon their moral integrity and dignity as human beings. In IDP camps, they have had limited access to primary education and little chance to further schooling. One of the main problems is the lack of qualified school teachers. UNICEF and partners including the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) and *Première Urgence* (PU) have trained teachers from displaced communities to fill this gap, but displaced parents have been unable to pay their wages, making the process unsustainable. UNICEF has continued to lobby the government to employ qualified teachers to work in IDP camps (OCHA, 20 April 2009).

This lack of structure and activity has made children an easy target for armed forces. The proximity of the camps to the war zones was a particular problem (ReliefWeb, 9 June 2010), as well as acute poverty, which makes inscription attractive (UNICEF, 9 June 2010). The issue of child soldiers is difficult to address as only 10 per cent of childbirths are registered, and cultural issues related to boyhood and manhood exacerbate the recruitment of children (UN SG, 2008).

An AFP correspondent in 2009 found child soldiers fighting for both government and rebel forces (ReliefWeb, 9 June 2010). Children as young as nine years old within IDP camps and host communities have been forcibly and/or voluntarily recruited for combat and non-combat roles by the Chadian national army, militias supported by the Chadian government, and Chadian rebel groups (RI, 24 July 2008). Some of these children have fled from government training camps and returned to IDP camps from where they were recruited and reported severe abuses (UNSC, 7 August 2008).

In 2007, the UN identified the need to disarm, demobilise, and rehabilitate between 7,000 and 10,000 children used in combat and non-combat roles by government forces and rebel groups (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Chad and UNICEF agreed in May 2007 to demobilise children from the army and integrated rebel groups; 512 child soldiers were released

to UNICEF, which provided support at five transit centres (UN SG, 7 August 2008). Of those, 265 voluntarily returned to or have been reunited with their families, 220 have been placed in schools and 85 in professional activities. These numbers represent UNICEF's access to only one government military installation, at Mongo in south-central Chad.

As required by Security Council Resolution 1612, the UN country team in Chad has established a task force on children and armed conflict, which is co-chaired by MINURCAT and UNICEF. The task force visits IDP and refugee camps to monitor the recruitment of children by armed groups. MINURCAT also developed training modules on child rights, child militarization, and child victim-witness protocol in order to sensitize UN police and DIS officials on the conditions and needs of IDP children (UN SG, 8 July 2008). In 2009, MINURCAT also completed the reconstruction of a transition centre where demobilised child soldiers are housed prior to being reunited with their families (UNSC, 14 October 2009). In accordance with the Paris Principles, under-age armed youth enter a UNICEF-sponsored rehabilitation process when members of Chadian rebel groups are captured or when the groups sign peace deals with the government. The Government also pays about \$830 to each rebel fighter who demobilizes. Demobilized youth receive psychological counselling and learn skills to help them reintegrate in interim care centres run by CARE International (UNICEF, 28 May 2010).

In June 2010, six African countries signed the N'Djamena Declaration, a binding legal document on ending the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups (HDPT, 14 June 2010). Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan also pledged to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). Chad and Sudan have signed and ratified the OPAC. Cameroon and Nigeria have signed, but have not yet ratified. CAR and Niger have neither signed nor ratified (SOS Children's Villages, 6 June 2010; UNICEF, 6 June 2010). UNICEF called the N'Djamena Declaration "a new beginning in Africa, a firm step towards giving all children in the region the dignity of a childhood they've so often been deprived of by decades of conflict" (UNICEF, 9 June 2010).

DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)

Documented returns, settled locally and settled elsewhere


General

Since 2008, more than 30,000 IDPs have returned to their villages of origin (OCHA, 4 June 2010). However, they have gone back to very unstable conditions, and without the support from traditional leaders that is needed to resolve the inter-ethnic conflicts that may have caused their displacement in the first place (Oxfam, April 2009). They have been forced back by food insecurity in places of displacement, lack of access to land, and lack of income-generating activities in IDP camps.

IDP returns in eastern Chad by area of return

Zone	Men	Women	Total
Assoungha	2,702	3,607	6,309
Goz Beida & Kerfi	5,011	5,050	10,061
Koukou	2,250	2,151	4,401
Totals	9,963	10,808	20,771

Source: OCHA, 30 November 2009



Prospects for and obstacles to voluntary return, local settlement and settlement elsewhere

General

Principle 15, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Internally displaced persons have:

(d) The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

Principle 28, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1. Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.

UNHCR and its partner humanitarian agency Intersos have implemented a project to assess and profile villages of return. The idea is to provide reliable information on living conditions, population movements, gaps in social services, and possible returns. While this is a fundamental step towards determining whether return is possible, a new security grading system raises questions about the consistent protection of returnees. Villages are colour-coded as red, yellow, or green, according to how safe it is for IDPs to return. People from "safe" areas classified as green will no longer be considered as IDPs or receive food or non-food items such as sleeping mats, kettles and jerry cans. However, they will be allowed to remain in IDP camps and use schools, health services and water distribution points there (IRIN, 22 October 2009). This system should be carefully reviewed by the UN, as return is not the only durable solution and IDPs should not be forced to return to villages of origin just because these have been deemed safe.

Despite such initiatives, return is not yet a viable option for most IDPs in eastern Chad. Some are still traumatised by the violence of forced displacement, while others cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return (HRW, June 2009). While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.

A profiling exercise conducted in 2008 found that 66.7 % of interviewed IDPs had no intention of ever returning to their village of origin, while 77% of those who desired to return cited insecurity as the main obstacle (UNHCR, November 2008). More recent findings are from the UN Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator who reported that "most of the IDPs clearly want to return home as soon as possible. However, they are waiting to be sure that security conditions are favorable and that basic services such as schools and health clinics are available. Many fear that those who attacked their villages in 2006 are still around ... We need to do a lot more, with the Government, to create the conditions for sustainable returns of the displaced. They need acceptable living conditions, as well as security, if we are to see the large scale returns everyone wants to see" (OCHA, 24 May 2010).

IDPs are aware of their right to request support for their return. For example, a group of IDP representatives living in Tandulti, a town near the Chadian border with Sudan, contacted Chadian government officials in the region in early June 2010 and expressed their desire to return to their villages of origin. The IDP representatives reported that approximately 12,000 IDPs from 24 village communities were seeking the support of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies in order to return, but their villages of origin were currently in ruins (MINURCAT, 7 June 2010).

Support for return integration and reintegration

General

In January 2010, UNDP brought together 150 participants for a two-day workshop to define ways of promoting peaceful co-existence among conflict-affected communities in eastern Chad, and the sustainable integration of displaced populations returning to their areas of origin (UNDP, 5 January 2010). The workshop included military, religious and community leaders from the Department of Dar Sila, home to nearly 95 per cent of all IDPs (UNHCR, 2008). Discussions focused on ways for all parties to "create a culture of peace and mutual acceptance in order to reduce tensions between the IDPs, the host communities, pastoralists and other settled populations" (UNDP, 5 January 2010). This event is part of UNDP's Early Recovery Programme in the eastern Chad region, aimed at strengthening rule of law, access to justice, security, local governance, and socio-economic recovery and development in order for displaced populations to return to their areas of origin.

Despite such initiatives, return is not yet a viable option for most IDPs in eastern Chad. Some are still traumatised by the violence of forced displacement, while others cite ongoing insecurity, loss of land and property, and lack of basic services in villages of origin as major obstacles to their return (HRW, June 2009). While significant return movements were expected in 2010, the scheduled withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops from Chad makes it unlikely that conditions for the sustainable return of IDPs will be in place in the near future.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

International human rights and humanitarian law framework including references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

General human rights overview

Principle 5, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

All authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.

In 1994, Chad created a National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR) tasked with submitting opinions to the Government concerning human rights and freedoms, including the status of women, the rights of children, and the rights of persons with disabilities (ECOSOC, 27 February 2003). An individual who claims a violation can take his/her case to the court of general jurisdiction, and on to the National Commission if the court fails to act. Since 2000, the Commission has remained accredited with an "A status with reserve" by the International Coordinating Committee. International treaties ratified by Chad take effect in and precedent over domestic law once published (UN HRC, 11 March 2009).

Several human rights issues remain of grave concern, especially regarding women and children. Sexual violence, domestic violence, and societal discrimination against women are common, although statistics are unavailable. While the Chadian Penal Code of 1967 prohibits rape which is punishable by hard labor, rape and sexual abuse are widespread problems with little police intervention and limited legal recourse against abuse in the courts. Legal gaps such as a lack of implementing decrees for laws that have been passed, and the prevailing tendency for impunity mean that the perpetrators of this violence are almost never prosecuted (IRIN, 3 April 2009). While the Reproductive Health Law of 2002 prohibits forms of violence such as female genital mutilation (FGM), early and forced marriage, and domestic violence, these continue to be widespread and deeply rooted in tradition (ECOSOC, 27 January 2005). Women receive little to no education, are unable to own or inherit land, and are forced early into marriage and pregnancy despite being the largest part of the country's labour force. Both the Government and NGO community have conducted active and sustained public education campaigns against FGM. Because families profit from gifts from their communities when the act is conducted, it is likely to continue (ECOSOC, 27 February 2003).

In 2001, the Government cosponsored a series of workshops and radio broadcasts with UNICEF in order to raise awareness of the abuses of child labour and to advocate against the worst forms of child abuse. The Government has also sponsored educational campaigns directed at parents in an attempt to prevent human trafficking. As of June 2009, Chad was on Tier III status, the worst possible classification in the US system of identifying human trafficking hotspots (Enough Project, 2009). In 2008, the Government established the Directorate for Children within the Ministry of Social Action and the Family as the body responsible for the implementation of children's policies.

An independent expert on human rights in Chad noted that overall the Constitution protects all human rights and contains all of the necessary elements for a sound rule of law but is implemented on the basis of local customs (ECOSOC, 27 February 2003). In April 2004, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2004/85 in order to appoint an independent expert who would facilitate cooperation between the Government and the OHCHR for the promotion and protection of human rights in Chad. The mandate was discontinued one year later but followed by the deployment of a Human Rights Adviser to the United Nations Country Team with the objective of strengthening national legislative, judicial, academic, and civil society capacities in the field of human rights (UN HRC, 16 February 2009). The MINURCAT mandate of 2009 included a human rights and rule of law component which tasked the mission with monitoring, promoting, and protecting human rights with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence. The mission's responsibilities also included recommending action to authorities, fighting impunity, supporting efforts to put an end to recruitment of child soldiers.

Despite the institutional and legal presence to promote and protect human rights in Chad (UN HRC, 16 February 2009), the Chadian Government has encountered significant constraints, including the constant armed conflict; a lack of awareness of human rights concepts through the Government and military; illiteracy of the population; socio-cultural and traditional obstructions; a dysfunctional and corrupt justice system; insufficient police training; and a weak civil society. Efforts made thus far, including the ratification and implementation of main human rights instruments and drafting of some mandatory reporting must be complemented by efforts assisted by the international community that entrench the concept of human rights in normal society and the daily lives of Chadians.

In summary, the principal grievances against President Deby showcase the leader's human rights violations and include: heightened political violence; preferential treatment of members of the Zaghawa group with positions awarded in the government and army; the embezzlement of oil revenues in light of mass malnutrition and poverty; the forced displacement of civilians; and recurring electoral fraud. The centralization of power in Deby's position through intensifying corruption, and the organized repression of opposition parties and personalities allow for such violations and continue to threaten a sustainable peace in Chad. Overall, the root causes driving Chad's current crisis are multiple and have direct incited the displacement of more than 185,000 Chadians since 2005 and the subsequent inability for the vast majority of them to return home.

Chad's human rights commitments

International human rights commitments made by Chad

Instruments	Entry into force	Signature	Ratification/ Accession
Forced Labour Convention/ International Labour Convention Number 29 (1930)	28 June 1930		Accession 10 November 1960
Charter of the United Nations (1945)	24 October 1945	(Joined the UN 20 September 1960)	
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Members of Armed Forces at Sea		
(1949)	04.0.4.1.4050	
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the Treatment of Prisoners of War		5 August 1970
(1949)		
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative		Accession
to the Protection of Civilian		5 August 1970
Persons in Time of War (1949)		
Convention Relating to the Status	22 April 1954	Accession
of Refugees (1951)		19 August 1981
Abolition of the Forced Labour	25 June 1957	Accession
Convention (1957)/ International		8 June 1961
Labour Convention Number 105		
(1961)		
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Refugees (1967)		19 August 1981
Internal Convention on the	4 January 1969	Accession
Elimination of all Forms of Racial		17 August 1977
Discrimination (1965)		
Convention for the Suppression of	26 January 1973	Accession
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of		12 July 1974
Civil Aviation (1971)		
Convention on the Reduction of	13 December 1975	Accession
Statelessness (1961)		12 August 1999
International Covenant on	3 January 1976	Accession
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Rights (1966)		
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Political Rights (1966)		9 June 1995
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Political Rights (1966)		
Minimum Age Convention/	19 June 1976	21 March 2005
International Labour Organization		
Number 138 (1973)		
International Convention on the	18 July 1976	23 October 1974
Suppression and Punishment of		
the Crime of Apartheid (1973)		
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva	7 December 1978	Accession
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and relating to the Protection of		
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of Victims of Non-International		
Armed Conflicts (1977)		
Convention on the Elimination of	3 September 1981	Accession
all Forms of Discrimination against		9 June 1995
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Women (1979)			
Convention Against Torture and	26 June 1987	4 February 1985	Accession
Other Cruel, Inhuman or			9 June 1995
Degrading Treatment or			
Punishment (1984)			
Convention on the Rights of the	2 September 1990	30 September	2 October 1990
Child (1989)		1990	
Worst Forms of Child Labour	19 November 2000		6 November 2000
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Optional Protocol to the	18 January 2002	8 May 2002	28 August 2002
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Instruments			
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the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1989)			
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International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992)			
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Palermo Protocol to Suppress and Punish the Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and			
Children (2000)			
Additional Protocol III to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption			
of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (2005)			
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007)			
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007)			
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (2007)			
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008) -			
(will enter into force when ratified by 10 parties – currently 32 signatories and no parties)			

Regional human rights commitments made by Chad

Instruments	Entry into Force	- 3	Ratification/ Accession
Constitution proclaims country's			(Adopted by
commitments to Human Rights as			referendum)

		31 March 1996
		Accession
		1971
20 June 1974	10 September	Accession
	1969	12 August 1981
21 October 1986	29 May 1986	Accession
		9 October 1986
29 November 1999		Accession
		30 March 2000
		Accession
		2004
		Accession
		2006
		Accession
		2006
	20 June 1974 21 October 1986 29 November 1999	20 June 1974 10 September 1969 21 October 1986 29 May 1986 29 November 1999

Regional Human Rights Commitments not Ratified by Chad

Instruments	Entry into Force	Signature	Ratification/ Accession
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998)	-	6 December 2004	
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women In Africa (2003)		6 December 2004	
Multilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children		2006	(ratification currently underway)
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons	after ratification by	24 June 2010	

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A draft law for the protection and assistance of IDPs based on the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* was prepared by UNHCR in collaboration with Chad's Ministry of the Interior. The *African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in*

Africa, which greatly reflects the *Guiding Principles*, was identified as the basis for the draft law in Chad (UNHCR, May 2008). The government has yet to enact the draft law.

A training workshop organized by UNHCR on the protection of IDPs in Chad was held in Abeche in October 2007. It was co-sponsored with IDMC and included sessions on the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* and the international legal framework applicable to the protection of IDPs.

National response

General

Principle 3, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

- 1. National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.
- 2. Internally displaced persons have the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities. They shall not be persecuted or punished for making such a request.

Principle 25, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1. The primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons lies with national authorities.

Despite being an oil-producing country, Chad ranked 175th out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). With a view to reducing poverty in Chad and improving governance through the best possible use of oil revenues, the World Bank financed the building of an oil pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the port of Kribi (WBG, 20 November 2009). In the six years since the pipeline became operational, Chad has used its increased oil revenues to buy weapons with which to fight insurgent groups, instead of investing in social services, reducing poverty and improving governance, all of which are essential components for protecting and assisting IDPs and achieving durable solutions.

President Deby has continuously responded to violent attacks by armed groups by prioritising Chad's military spending, which has soared from US\$14 million to US\$315 million since 2000 (SIPRI, 2 June 2010). In 2007, Chad spent 4.5 times more on the armed forces than it did on health, education, and other social spending combined (AlterNet, 2 December 2009). It is estimated that arms imports to Chad from countries including Ukraine, Libya, Belgium, China, USA, Israel, Switzerland, Serbia, and Portugal, were five times higher in 2004-2008 than in 1999-2003 (SIPRI, August 2009).

The government has taken steps to respond to the situation of IDPs, but their impact has been limited. In 2007, it established a national committee to assist IDPs, the *Comité national d'assistance aux personnes déplacées* (CNAPD), but it has limited resources and staff, and has delivered only sporadic assistance. In 2008, the government also set up the CONAFIT committee to coordinate humanitarian activities with MINURCAT, EUFOR and the humanitarian organisations working in Chad. The government has yet to enact national legislation to protect IDPs.

In October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first legally binding regional instrument to protect the

rights of IDPs. The Convention cannot enter into force until it is ratified by 15 African States. Chad signed the convention on 24 June 2010 but has yet to ratify. While the number of IDPs in Chad is not as high as in other African countries, ratification of the Convention by Chad would show its commitment to protecting the rights of IDPs and achieving their durable return, resettlement or reintegration. By ratifying the Convention, Chad could act as a positive example for the region, given its strategic geo-political position between CAR and Sudan.

Humanitarian access and assistance

General

Principle 24, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons shall not be diverted, in particular for political or military reasons.

Principle 25, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

3. All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced.

Principle 26, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport and supplies shall be respected and protected. They shall not be the object of attack or other acts of violence.

Principle 30, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate for international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandates, rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in their return or resettlement and reintegration.

Humanitarian organisations have been increasingly targeted in eastern Chad, and were facing an average of 25 attacks a month by 2009 (Oxfam, 13 March 2009). In the first nine months of 2009, there were 192 serious attacks on humanitarian workers (UNSC, 14 October 2009), including killings and abductions; the number of security incidents has doubled since 2008 (VOA, 13 November 2009). In May 2008, the Head of Mission for Save the Children UK was shot and killed by bandits while travelling in a convoy near the border with Sudan (BBC, 1 May 2008). On average, UNHCR has two vehicles stolen a day, and the town of Abeche, a hub for humanitarian operations in Chad, has the highest-ever rates of crime against aid agencies (IRIN, 7 December 2009).

The delivery of aid has thus been repeatedly interrupted, leaving displaced communities whose lives are already precarious without assistance. According to the UN, at least 96,000 people are at risk of deteriorating living conditions due to continued suspensions or reduction of operations (UN News, 1 December 2009). High levels of insecurity have also prevented the access of humanitarian agencies to IDPs living with host communities in areas closer to the border with Sudan, rendering needs assessments and the delivery of aid particularly difficult.

Criminal gangs in eastern Chad have started kidnapping aid workers. A French staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was abducted in early November and remains in captivity (VOA, 24 November 2009). The US Department of State issued a travel warning to Chad, emphasising that neither UN peacekeeping troops nor the government of Chad

has been able to control criminal gangs attacking humanitarian workers (USDoS, 23 November 2009). While the travel warning highlights a situation that humanitarian organisations are well aware of, it underlines the fact that humanitarian space is shrinking at rapidly alarming rates.

Although UN peacekeeping troops and DIS police officers have provided military escorts for humanitarian workers, many agencies are unwilling to use escorts so as not to risk compromising their perceived neutrality. For some humanitarian agencies, the solution is rather to secure the roads on which aid convoys must travel (IRIN, 16 May 2008). This need is highlighted by a November 2009 attack against a convoy of UN agency vehicles that was being escorted by DIS, showing that even armed escorts are vulnerable to criminal gangs (OCHA, 18 November – 10 December 2009).

With the scheduled withdrawal of MINURCAT troops starting on 15 July 2010, the security of aid workers, particularly those working with the UN and its local partners who are not authorised to travel without armed escorts, will be overseen by DIS (Reuters AlertNet, 27 May 2010). Two new kidnappings of aid workers were reported in June 2010: a dual Swiss-British national working for Oxfam was freed on 15 June 2010 after being taken hostage in Abeche and held for nine days; a French national worker was kidnapped on 27 June 2010 by armed men from the Oxfam compound in Koukou Angarana. She was released four hours later close to the Sudanese border (IOL, 28 June 2010).

International response

General

Principle 25, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

2. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith. Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance.

Principle 27, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

1. International humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors when providing assistance should give due regard to the protection needs and human rights of internally displaced persons and take appropriate measures in this regard. In so doing, these organizations and actors should respect relevant international standards and codes of conduct.

The UN humanitarian response is led by a Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is also the UNDP Representative, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has overall responsibility to coordinate the requests for funding of humanitarian organisations through a consolidated appeals process (CAP). More than 70 international humanitarian organisations provide assistance to displaced communities in eastern Chad, including IDPs and refugees from Darfur. The cluster system was introduced in Chad in 2007 to improve the protection and assistance of IDPs by humanitarian agencies. Chad was chosen as one of five pilot countries because of the complexity of its humanitarian crisis and the marked failings of the international community's response to IDPs (FMR, December 2007). These failings were characterised by an inability to maintain refugee camps in a stable environment while also responding to the needs of thousands of IDPs in a region with a sudden rise of insecurity.

Thirteen clusters are now operational in Chad: protection, food security, health, nutrition, camp management/shelter/non-food items, water and sanitation, education, emergency telecommunications, early recovery, logistics, coordination and support services, security of staff and operations, and multi-sector activities for IDPs and refugees. Each cluster works closely with government counterparts, and meetings of the clusters are often co-chaired by government officials as a way to involve the government as an operational partner (GPPI, April 2010).

As of May 2010, the consolidated appeal for Chad is 43 per cent funded (OCHA, 4 June 2010). The 2010 appeal is for \$458 million to support emergency relief activities while emphasising programmes that increase self-sufficiency of displaced communities. In March 2010, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) recognised that Chad was an underfunded emergency, and allocated \$7 million for life-saving assistance programmes targeting approximately 800,000 people (CERF, April 2010). The mid-year review of the 2010 consolidated appeal for Chad emphasised the urgent need for additional funds to respond to the developing food security crisis (OCHA, 25 May 2010).

Recommendations by international human rights bodies

General

The Chadian government must prioritize a new approach toward national reconciliation in order to achieve durable solutions to internal displacement. The international community must encourage a reconciliation process that simultaneously reforms the administrative and security sectors of the Chadian state and ends the armed insurgency. A concurrent regional process that addresses the longstanding disputes between Chad and Sudan and the use of rebels to engage in a proxy war must be strengthened and monitored by external actors. A multi-track process of dialogue is required that includes civil society actors in the broad decentralization of state power (track 1); armed insurgents in genuine, holistic negotiations (track 2); and top-level leaders of Sudan, Chad, and CAR to halt the regional conflict (track 3) (ICG, 24 September 2008).

President Deby must work to establish a national consensus on the management of oil revenues. The international community must illicit stronger control and oversight in order to cease political nepotism, favoritism, and corruption in the wake of vast poverty and malnutrition. The overemphasis on Chad's military robustness must end as it will not solve internal or external conflicts (ICG, 15 April 2009). In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Government should continue to take bold, decisive steps to bring immediate protection to civilians at risk. The Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict urged all parties to comply with international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population, specifically children, and prevent sexual crimes against women and gender-based violence (UN, HRC, 11 March 2009).

The United Nations Human Rights Council, understanding the promotion and protection of human rights as a long-term effort requiring significant resources, has advised the international humanitarian and human rights communities to assist Chad in the following:

- Building capacity of the Ministry in Charge of Human Rights and the Promotion of Liberty;
- Revitalizing the National Commission on Human Rights;
- Structurally strengthening civil society associations working for human rights;
- Building capacity for the administration of justice;
- Training and providing means and materials for police;
- Bringing domestic law in accordance with international human rights instruments

(UN HRC, 16 February 2009).

The international community must push for peace negotiations in Chad that parallel those undertaken for Darfur. A comprehensive approach to peace in the region must address the political turmoil in Chad, the flow of weapons into the country and across its borders, and the belief that armed rebellion is the only avenue for dissent in the country. Ad hoc efforts are insufficient and require collaboration among major external state players, such as France, Libya, and the US. The international community's investment in peace in Sudan is laudable but will bear fruit of equal attention is paid to neighbouring Chad (Enough Project, July 2009).

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