



Somalia: Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 5 July 2010

**Information required on the Somali clans/tribes Marehan and Marjeteen, particularly their relations with the Bajuni Noufail
Are the Bajuni Noufail being discriminated against by the other two clans?**

Information on the Somali clans/tribes Marehan and Marjeteen and their relations with the Bajuni was scarce among the sources consulted by the Refugee Documentation Centre within time constraints.

Dr Joakim Gundel is quoted in an Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) COI Workshop as follows:

“The Darood are commonly divided into three major groups referred to as Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti. The Harti are composed of the Majerteen who now are found in Puntland mainly, and the Dulbahante and Warsangeli who mainly live within the borders of Somaliland. Puntland almost entirely overlaps with the Majerteen clan family.¹⁴ The Marehan inhabit South-Central Somalia, where they are dominant in Gedo region.” (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) (15 May 2009) *Clans in Somalia - Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna*, p. 12)

A document from the Danish Refugee Council/Novib-Oxfam states:

“Luuq, which is located in the Southern region of Gedo, shares much of the history of the Raxanweyn and the Geledi Sultanate as their Gasargude Sultanate was closely linked with the Geledi. Here too, you find that nomadic clans have settled and mixed with the sedentary people, however here the nomadic element was primarily represented by the Marehan from the Darood clan family. Today, they have formed a guurti, which they claim is like the one in Somaliland...The Marehan are also part of the Guurti. The highest ranking elders among the Marehan in Luuq is the Ugaas of the Marehan/Howrarsame, and the Suldaan of the Marehan, Rer Hassan lineages. These two represent all the Marehan in Luuq, and replace each other when the other is absent. The role of these duub in Luuq is to chair all the shir, and ratify decisions made by the nabadoon.” (Danish Refugee Council/Novib-Oxfam (November 2006) *The predicament of the ‘Oday’ - The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia*, p. 33)

A document published by the United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs states:

“The tradition seafaring Bajuni community were also subjected to similar abuses of their rights in Kismayo, and the Bajuni Islands. These communities were

forced to join government cooperatives such as the Somali Fishing Cooperative, established in Kismayo in 1974. Marehan, Majerten and Dhulbahante people who did not have the traditional culture of fishing established this and other cooperatives. They took over most of the fishing equipment including fishing boats and forced the Bajuni to join the cooperatives. This had and continues to have a serious effect on the most important economic lifeline of the Bajuni community.” (United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (1 August 2002) *A study on minorities in Somalia*. p. 5)

This report also states:

“In Kismaiyo, all economic sources such as the seaport, airport and commercial activities are all controlled by the Habregedir and Marehan. Those who do not belong to these groups, and particular the Bantu and Bajuni work only as underpaid servants.” (Ibid, p. 5)

This report also states:

“The current condition of minority groups has changed as a result of changing social, economic and political environments in the various regions of Somalia. In Kismayo, for instance, previous rivals (Habargedir and Marehan) have now become allies and are now in control of Kismayo’s social and political affairs.” (Ibid, p.6)

The UK Home Office *Operational Guidance Note* states:

“The small Bajuni population in Somalia suffered considerably at the hands of Somali militia, principally Marehan militia who tried to force them off the islands. Though Marehan settlers still have effective control of the islands, Bajuni can work for the Marehan as paid labourers. This is an improvement on the period during the 1990s when General Morgan’s forces controlled Kismayo and the islands, when the Bajuni were treated by the occupying Somali clans as little more than slave labour. Essentially the plight of the Bajuni is based on the denial of economic access by Somali clans, rather than outright abuse. Approximately 2,000 Bajuni voluntarily repatriated to Kismayo and islands from Jomvu refugee camp in Kenya in 1997 following Kenya’s decision to close all 3 refugee camps. They have no patron clans. (UK Home Office (July 2010) *Operational Guidance Note – Somalia*, p. 18)

An International Crisis Group report states:

“In early October 2009, a long-simmering dispute in the southern port city of Kismaayo, mainly over distribution of port revenues, the way in which the town was administered and rivalries between Ogaden, Harti and Marehan clans, escalated into an all-out conflict for its control.” (International Crisis Group (ICG) (18 May 2010) *Somalia’s Divided Islamists - Africa Briefing N°74*, p. 10)

This report also states:

“ASWJ is predominantly a clan alliance that brings together major Hawiye sub-clans inhabiting the central regions of Hiiraan and Galgudud. The main sub-clan spearheading its military and political campaign is the Habar Gedir/Ayr. The Sa’ad and Saleban sub-clans are also increasingly joining its bandwagon. So too are other non-Hawiye clans, prominent among which is the Marehan (Gedo region), a Darood clan that has traditionally been hostile to Hawiye ambitions.” (Ibid, p. 13)

A footnote in UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines states:

“...Marehan dominance of Kismaayo was suddenly overturned by Islamist militias in August 2008” (UNHCR (5 May 2010) *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia*, p. 49)

A document from Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre states:

- The Juba Valley Authority is a loose alliance of militias and businessmen from the Habar Gedir/Ayr and Marehan clans who control Kismayo port city since 2001.
- The Juba Valley Alliance were ousted by Marehan militias after the former rescinded an agreement to collect taxes on goods passing through the port in support of newly established sharia courts (2004)” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (10 December 2009) *Somalia: Political and Security Crises, Access Limits and Donor Cuts Increasing IDP Vulnerability*, p. 37)

This report also states:

“The JVA’s [Jubba Valley Authority] principal interest is in the trade through the all-weather seaport, where Ayr and Marehan businessmen are making handsome profits exporting charcoal and importing a range of goods, including sugar and weaponry, destined either for Kenya or Mogadishu. The JVA is essentially an outside occupying force. Because it is composed of two different clans, it does not possess a consistent policy in national affairs – though close to the TNG in the past, it maintains a separate political identity, and in more recent times has been identified with the G-8.” (Ibid, p, 38)

This report also states:

“Kismayo seaport is tense following the ousting of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) administration by some Marehan militias. The group was upset when JVA rescinded an agreement to collect taxes on goods passing through the port and hand it over to support the newly established sharia courts.” (Ibid, p. 38)

This report also states:

“In 1975, large sections of Bantu agricultural lands in Jilib and Jamame were systematically appropriated by the Siyad Barre regime under the pretext of

development projects through the Resources Sharing Policy of Hawl iyo Hantiwadaag. This is a Leninist and Marxist ideology that the regime adopted. [...] Other Bantu lands in the same area were distributed as political rewards to Siyad Barre's supporters from the Marehan and Dhulbahante clans. All these violations resulted in the suffering of Bantu families in the Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas." (Ibid, p. 47)

This report also states:

"The current condition of minority groups has changed as a result of changing social, economic and political environments in the various regions of Somalia. In Kismayo, for instance, previous rivals (Habargedir and Marehan) have now become allies and are now in control of Kismayo's social and political affairs. There is less insecurity between these clan groups, positively affecting the minorities. However, conflicts between these allies and General Morgan's forces that are currently in Bay region are expected. In general, security conditions have improved. Nevertheless, there are unconfirmed reports of rape of Bantu and Galgala women in IDP camps." (Ibid, p. 48)

A report from the UN Security Council states:

"Khalid bin Walid Forces is a principally Marehan clan militia based in Kismayo. Although it coordinates with Turki's forces and shares responsibility for control of Kismayo, it possesses autonomous command arrangements." (UN Security Council (10 December 2008) *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008)*, S/2008/769, p. 22)

A report from Landinfo states:

"In June 2008, the Gedo region was described as relatively stable, but was the scene of greater insurgent activity in the autumn. The Marehan clan has consolidated its position in Gedo, but there are conflicts with the Rahanweyn clan in the area, and the situation in Gedo is closely connected with the situation and changes in the conditions related to the powers in Kismayo in Lower Juba. The UN reported in the last week of October that a total of 22 civilians were injured when an unknown perpetrator threw hand grenades at two civilian targets in Bulo Hawa in Gedo. One of these was aimed at a house inhabited by a member of the TFG, and the other was aimed at a house in which internally displaced persons lived (UNHCR 2008b). The Juba regions have been unstable in recent years, particularly the port of Kismayo. After a long-term conflict between the Marehan and Majerteen clans, al-Shabaab took over control of the town in August 2008." (Landinfo (12 November 2008) *Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia*, p. 15)

A UK Home Office Fact Finding Mission from July 2007 states:

"On checkpoints, the source said that extortion tended to happen at night and robberies done surreptitiously from time to time. Generally, there is a vacuum of law and order. The source concluded that if you are not from the Abgal (the

Prime Minister's sub-clan) or from the Majerteen (the President's sub-clan), then you are not immune from TFG attacks and that if you are in anyway associated with the TFG you are also not immune from the insurgent attacks." (United Kingdom Home Office (20 July 2007) *UK Home Office Border & Immigration Agency Report of Fact Finding Mission - Somalia, 11-15 June 2007*)

A UN Security Council report states:

"Elsewhere, lawlessness and interclan violence continued in large areas of central and southern Somalia. Tensions remained high in the Lower Juba region, particularly in and around the strategic port city of Kismaayo, which is witnessing a continued power struggle between the leading Darod clans — the Marehan and the Majerteen — for control of the city. The Hiraan and Galguduud regions also saw interclan tensions and confrontations during the reporting period." (UN Security Council (7 November 2007) *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia*, p. 5)

I am attaching two older Danish Immigration Service reports which may be of interest.

References

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) (15 May 2009) *Clans in Somalia - Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna*
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1261130976_accord-report-clans-in-somalia-revised-edition-20091215.pdf
(Accessed 5 July 2010)

Danish Immigration Service (17 March 2004) *Human Rights and Security in Central and Southern Somalia: Joint Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and British Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya*
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/405b2d804.html>
(Accessed 5 July 2010)

Danish Immigration Service (24 September 2000) *Report on Minority Groups in Somalia*
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a5fa0.html>
(Accessed 5 July 2010)

Danish Refugee Council/Novib-Oxfam (November 2006) *The predicament of the 'Oday' - The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia*
http://www.logcluster.org/som/infrastructure-communication-various/Gundel_The%20role%20of%20traditional%20structures.pdf
(Accessed 5 July 2010)

International Crisis Group (ICG) (18 May 2010) *Somalia's Divided Islamists - Africa Briefing N°74*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf4e2732.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (10 December 2009) *Somalia: Political and Security Crises, Access Limits and Donor Cuts Increasing IDP Vulnerability* <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b20f2df2.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

Landinfo (12 November 2008) *Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49b669f52.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

UK Home Office (July 2010) *Operational Guidance Note – Somalia*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4c2d95e92.pdf>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

United Kingdom Home Office (20 July 2007) *UK Home Office Border & Immigration Agency Report of Fact Finding Mission - Somalia, 11-15 June 2007*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46c15cb82.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (1 August 2002) *A study on minorities in Somalia*

[http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/76E68B26463E184E802570B70059F73A/\\$file/MinoritiesSomaliaUNCU+OCHAJul02draft.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/76E68B26463E184E802570B70059F73A/$file/MinoritiesSomaliaUNCU+OCHAJul02draft.pdf)

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

UN Security Council (10 December 2008) *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008), S/2008/769*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/494900240.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

UN Security Council (7 November 2007) *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia*

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/SOMALIA%20S2007658.pdf>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

UNHCR (5 May 2010) *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia*

<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be3b9142.html>

(Accessed 5 July 2010)

This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Refugee Documentation Centre within time constraints. This response is not and does not purport to be conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please read in full all documents referred to.

Sources consulted

Amnesty International
European Country of Origin Information Network
Freedom House
Google
Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group
IRIN News
Lexis Nexis
Minority Rights Group International
Refugee Documentation Centre Databases
UNHCR Refworld
United Kingdom Home Office
United States Department of State