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AUSTRALIA

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This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

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RESPONSE

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Executive Summary

Little information could be found that addressed the question of whether police in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) have entered in complicit arrangements with narcotics-traffickers. Nonetheless, some reports of alleged complicity were located along with a larger, more substantial, body of information dealing with the more general problem of corruption in the policing of narcotics in Pakistan. Within the latter corpus of information the alleged involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the Pakistan military in conspiring with narcotics-traffickers for mutual gain is discussed by a number of sources. The US forces deployed in Afghanistan are also alleged, by some sources, to have entered into complicit arrangements with narcotics-traffickers as a means of generating intelligence to support operations against the Taliban-led insurgency being fought along the Afghan-Pakistan border (for reports of alleged police complicity in narcotics-trafficking in the NWFP, see: ‘Peshawar: MMA leader, two policemen set free in drug case’ 2004, *Dawn* website, 26 June <http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/26/local27.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 1; and also: ‘Peshawar: MPA, ex-police officers indicted in drug case’ 2004,

Dawn website, 8 April <http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/08/local37.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 2; for a statement by a Sindh province minister on police involvement in narcotics in Karachi and elsewhere, see: ‘Karachi: Police blamed for drug trade’ 2003, Dawn website, 13 May <http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/13/local11.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 3; for a comprehensive, though less recent, appraisal of the situation, see: Chandran, D.S. 1998, ‘Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State: Case Study of Pakistan’, Afgha.com website, September <http://www.afgha.com/?af=archive&op=printpage&artid=83> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 4; for a report referring to the general problem of corruption in regard to narcotics policing in Pakistan, see: US Department of State 2006, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Southwest Asia*, March <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62109.htm> – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 5; for reports referring to the alleged involvement of the ISI in narcotics-trafficking, see: Kronstadt, K.A. 2006, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress – Pakistan–US Relations*, US Department of State website, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress – Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 10 February <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61524.pdf> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 6; also: Raman, B. 2001, ‘Heroin, Taliban & Pakistan’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 6 August <http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper288.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 7; for reports referring to alleged links between US forces, US intelligence agencies and narcotics-trafficking in the region, see: McCoy, A.W. 2003/2004, ‘The Costs of Covert Warfare: Airpower, Drugs, and Warlords in the Conduct of US Foreign Policy’, *New England Journal of Public Policy*, Fall: Vol.19: Iss.1, pp. 227-8, 232, 234 – Attachment 8; see also: Raman, B. 2004, ‘Terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 24 November <http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1172.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 9; and: Raman, B. 2002, ‘Punishment Terrorism’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 10 April <http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper441.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 10).

The Taliban-led insurgency, for its part, is thought by some to derive a good deal of its finances from narcotics. And this relationship, along with regional poverty, has been known to generate tacit support for the cultivation of opium poppies, by NWFP farmers, on the part of some local clerics and within the Islamist political parties which currently rule in the NWFP provincial assembly as the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA) coalition group. *TIME Magazine*’s Phil Zabriskie has recently reported that “opium traffickers and Taliban militants have struck up a marriage of mutual convenience” along the Afghan–Pakistan border; and that “many Afghan officials believe that elements in Pakistan’s intelligence agency, which midwived the Taliban in its early years, are conspiring with the religious parties that govern Pakistan’s border regions to create a safe haven for Taliban commanders and a launching pad for attacks”. The MMA’s two leading parties, the *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) and the *Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami* (JUI), have both been linked to militant Islamist groups which have conducted operations in Afghanistan (although only JUI has advocated open support for the Taliban itself) (for reports claiming that the Taliban-led insurgency receives finances from narcotics, see: Zabriskie, P. 2006, ‘Dangers Up Ahead’, *TIME Magazine* website, 13 March <http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1169897,00.html> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 11; also: Raman, B. 2002, ‘Punishment Terrorism’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 10 April <http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper441.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 10; for a report which retains some scepticism about the degree to which evidence is lacking to validate such claims, see: ‘A charter in London, troops for the badlands’ 2006, *The Economist*, 2 February

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5475258 – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 12; for information on the level of support given, by the NWFP’s clerics and Islamist parties, to the competing agendas of poppy cultivation verses the national governments war on narcotics, see: Khattak, Iqbal. 2003, ‘NWFP govt urged to act against poppy growers’, *Daily Times* website, 25 March
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-3-2003_pg7_42 – Accessed 3 April 2006 – Attachment 15; Raza, Shahzad. 2005, ‘Poppy farming has clerics’ support in Balochistan, NWFP’, *Daily Times* website, 16 July
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-7-2005_pg7_25 – Accessed 3 April 2006 – Attachment 17; for information on the nature of the relationships shared by JI and JUI with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other militant groups, see page 9 of: International Crisis Group 2006, *Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake*, Asia Briefing N°46, Islamabad/Brussels, 15 March, p.9 – Attachment 13).

The MMA parties may also be linked to narcotics in a more direct way. An NWFP *Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan* (JUP) member was recently alleged to have been involved in smuggling narcotics along with two NWFP police officers. According to a less recent report published by *Al-Ahram*, “[s]ome analysts allege that some of the religious parties – the JUI in particular – have benefited financially from drugs, arms and other smuggling through Afghanistan”. The MMA leadership has, nonetheless, recently announced its public support for the national government’s anti-narcotics campaign and has called on local clerics to do the same (for information on the JUP’s members involvement in alleged narcotics-trafficking in the NWFP, see: ‘Peshawar: MMA leader, two policemen set free in drug case’ 2004, *Dawn* website, 26 June <http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/26/local27.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 1; and also: ‘Peshawar: MPA, ex-police officers indicted in drug case’ 2004, *Dawn* website, 8 April <http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/08/local37.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 2; for more on the relations between the MMA parties and militant Islamist groups, as well as for the allegation that MMA parties have benefited financially from the narcotics trade, see: Malek, I. 2001, ‘Islamists rise to the challenge’, *Al-Ahram Weekly Online* website, 1-7 November <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/558/2war.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 14; for further background on Pakistan’s domestic political scene, see: Kronstadt, K. Alan 2005, ‘CRS Report for Congress: Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments’, US Department of State website, 14 February. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42440.pdf> – Accessed 21 February 2005 – Attachment 18; for the MMA’s public announcement supporting the counter-narcotics campaign, see: ‘NWFP govt wil smash drug trade’ 2005, *Daily Times*, 20 March http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-3-2005_pg10_5 – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 16).

At the national level, the Pakistan government has entered into an alliance with the US and both governments are publicly opposed to narcotics-trafficking in the region. The US and Pakistan have been working cooperatively to build an anti-narcotics force capable of eradicating narcotics-trafficking in the region. US government reports suggest that progress is being made in this area but this optimism is tempered by the caveat that a general culture of corruption, and other complications, still constitute an impediment to effective law enforcement in this regard (see: US Department of State 2006, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Southwest Asia*, March <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62109.htm> – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 5; also: Kronstadt, K.A. 2006, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress – Pakistan–US Relations*, US Department of State website, (Congressional Research Service, Library of

Congress – Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 10 February
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61524.pdf> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 6).

A discussion of the source materials informing this executive summary follows below.

Source Materials

Only one recent incident could be located within the sources consulted which pointed to possible police involvement in the trafficking of narcotics in the NWFP. The incident involved two police officers and a member of the province's ruling MMA coalition. On 26 June 2004, it was reported that a Peshawar "Additional District and Sessions judge [had] acquitted a Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal MPA [Member of the Provincial Assembly] Akhter Nawaz and two former police officers in a case of drug trafficking". It had been alleged that "[t]he two policemen...used to smuggle heroin in [an] official police vehicle to Haripur"; "[t]he court ruled that the prosecution could not prove its case against the accused". The report also notes that the two policemen involved had been "sacked from service by the police department" following their arrest; and that the MMA politician involved was a member of the JUP. Elsewhere, in the Sindh province, "[t]he provincial Education Minister, Irfanullah Khan Marwat, has said that police were involved in marketing of narcotics and that drugs are easily available in any part of Karachi and elsewhere owing to police patronage". In May 2003, *Dawn* reported that the Minister was of the view that a "well-organized drug mafia was still using Pakistan as a transit country for drug trafficking" ('Peshawar: MMA leader, two policemen set free in drug case' 2004, *Dawn* website, 26 June <http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/26/local27.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 1; for more background on the NWFP case, see: 'Peshawar: MPA, ex-police officers indicted in drug case' 2004, *Dawn* website, 8 April <http://www.dawn.com/2004/04/08/local37.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 2; for the Sindh Minister's comments on police involvement in narcotics in Karachi and elsewhere, see: 'Karachi: Police blamed for drug trade' 2003, *Dawn* website, 13 May <http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/13/local11.htm> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 3).

In 1998, D. Suba Chandran (currently Assistant Director of India's Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies or IPCS) provided the following analysis of the relationship between Pakistan's drug mafia networks and police corruption:

In Pakistan, the drug money starts from the local police. "The police force is involved. If the police is not involved, drug trafficking cannot take place" alleged President Farooq Leghari in 1995. Next, the drug money is used to bribe the PNCB [the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board] and other related agencies. The best example of drug money corrupting the PNCB could be seen from the Dalbandin raid. During December 1990, the Frontier Constabulary (FC) of Pakistan seized 1,800 kg of fine heroin, the biggest haul in drug history. The PNCB in Quetta refused to file an FIR at first; later, due to pressure, an FIR was filed after 12 days. The three people who were named in the FIR were never arrested. All the PNCB officials in Quetta refused to investigate the case, and instead sent four-month leave applications to the PNCB headquarters in Islamabad. The Inspector General of the FC, who seized the heroin, was transferred. The narcotics-politics and narcotics-Army linkages in Pakistan have been already seen. Besides, the drug mafias use the officials of the government to conduct fake seizure operations. According to one official, "Low quality heroin is dumped at a site and a raid is conducted. While the government celebrates the success of the operation, fine quality heroin is transported through other routes." According to a report prepared by a security agency on

drug trafficking, “Pakistan is silently and visibly being kidnapped by narco-barons. They can influence anyone, at any level, in any department. The judiciary, the civil administration and the police co-ordinate and co-operate with narco-barons. Working against narcotics is a risky game” (Chandran, D.S. 1998, ‘Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State: Case Study of Pakistan’, Afgha.com website, September <http://www.afgha.com/?af=archive&op=printpage&artid=83> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 4).

The trafficking of narcotics is illegal in Pakistan and the federal government is presently reported to be working closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to eradicate such practices. The law enforcement unit specifically tasked with this role is Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force (ANF), which operates in cooperation with other law enforcement agencies including “Frontier Corps, Pakistan Rangers, Customs and Coast Guards” and “agencies with responsibilities for interdiction in the Federally and Provincially Administered tribal areas (FATAs and PATAs)”. The US Department of State’s 2006 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* makes note of the fact that the “counternarcotics efforts...led by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) under the Ministry of Narcotics Control...also include[s] several other law enforcement agencies and the Home Departments of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)”. The report claims that “US assistance programs in counternarcotics and border security have strengthened the capacity of law enforcement agencies”, and points, as evidence of this, to “a nearly 61 percent increase in opium seizures in 2005”. Nonetheless, the US Department of State’s report also notes that, “with government salaries low and societal and government corruption endemic, narcotics-related corruption is likely to be associated with the movement of large quantities of narcotics and pre-cursor chemicals”. According to this report, Pakistan remains “part of the massive Afghan opium production/refining ‘system’”; “Afghan opiates, being trafficked to Europe and North America, enter Pakistan’s Balochistan and NWFP provinces and exit either through Iran or Pakistan’s Makran coast, or through international airports located in Pakistan’s major cities” (‘Drug Law Enforcement Programme for Pakistan’ (undated), UN Office on Drugs and Crime website <http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/enforcement.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 18; see also: ‘Anti Narcotics Structure of Pakistan’ (undated), Pakistan.Gov website, Last updated: 28 January 2006 http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentInfo.jsp?DivID=11&cPath=101_106_269&ContentID=2995 – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 19; US Department of State 2006, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Southwest Asia*, March <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62109.htm> – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 5).

Further to this, the most recent edition of the US Congressional Research Service’s issue brief on Pakistan–US Relations states that “Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control with the United States ‘remains excellent,’ and the Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating indigenous opium poppy cultivation”; while also observing that “Pakistan’s own counter-narcotics efforts are hampered by lack of full government commitment, scarcity of funds, poor infrastructure, and ‘acute’ corruption”; that “[e]lements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency are suspected of involvement in drug trafficking”; and that, “in September 2005, President Bush again identified Pakistan as being among the world’s ‘major illicit drug producing or drug-transit countries’”. The report also notes that “[s]ome reports indicate that profits from drug sales are financing the activities of Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir”. The relevant extract follows in detail:

Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in Afghanistan then distributed worldwide by Pakistan-based traffickers. The State Department indicates that Pakistan's cooperation on drug control with the United States "remains excellent," and the Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating indigenous opium poppy cultivation. However, opium production spiked in post-Taliban Afghanistan (which is now said to supply up to 90% of the world's heroin) and, in September 2005, President Bush again identified Pakistan as being among the world's "major illicit drug producing or drug-transit countries." Elements of Pakistan's major intelligence agency are suspected of involvement in drug trafficking; in March 2003, a former US Ambassador to IB94041 02-10-06 CRS-13 Pakistan told a House panel that their role in the heroin trade from 1997-2003 was "substantial." Some reports indicate that profits from drug sales are financing the activities of Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. US counter-narcotics programs aim to reduce the flow of opiates through Pakistan, eliminate Pakistan as a source of such opiates, and reduce the demand for illegal drugs within the country. Pakistan's own counter-narcotics efforts are hampered by lack of full government commitment, scarcity of funds, poor infrastructure, and "acute" corruption. Since 2002, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has supported Pakistan's Border Security Project by training border forces, providing vehicles and surveillance and communications equipment, transferring helicopters and fixed-wing (Kronstadt, K.A. 2006, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress – Pakistan–US Relations*, US Department of State website, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress – Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division) 10 February <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/61524.pdf> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 6).

Opium poppy cultivation remains a problem in Pakistan. In its 2005 annual report, the UN's International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) observes that "[i]llicit opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan, while not on the same scale as in Afghanistan, has also increased in recent years". According to this report, "[t]he persistence of illicit opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan is believed to be associated with the displacement of trafficking organizations from Afghanistan to Pakistan". Some relevant details on cultivation levels follow:

In Pakistan, the total area under illicit opium poppy cultivation was reduced dramatically in 1996, to under 1,000 hectares, and was further reduced in the years that followed. In 2003, however, the total area under such cultivation rose sharply, to 2,500 hectares. Illicit opium poppy cultivation remained at that level in 2004, and there are indications that it could increase again in 2005. The Board urges the Government of Pakistan to intensify its eradication efforts before the country becomes a major source of supply.

...Pakistan remains the country with the largest seizures of opiates (which include opium and all of its derivatives); in 2003, seizures of opiates in Pakistan amounted to 34.7 tons, or 31 per cent of global seizures. However, seizures of heroin in Pakistan decreased significantly in 2004, from 6.4 tons in 2003 to 3.5 tons (International Narcotics Control Board 2006, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2005*, III. 'Analysis of the world situation', p.76, 79, 80 http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/ar/2005/incb_report_2005_3.pdf – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 20).

An October 2002 report produced by the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP – the former title of the UNODC) provides historical background on opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan in regard to competing political agendas on the part of local Islamist groups on the one hand and the federal administration on the other. According to this report, the "resurgence" of opium poppy cultivation began in the NWFP locale of "Dir in September 2001" ("Dir had been poppy free as of 1999") "was mainly politically motivated and directly promoted by all political parties, including the ruling Jamaat-e-Islami at the district level." "Repeated ODCCP advocacy and follow-up, strengthened the [Pakistan federal]

government's resolve to eradicate about 162 hectares of opium poppy primarily cultivated in the Nehag valley (Dir District)". The relevant extract follows in detail:

Opium poppy cultivation decreased in Pakistan from approx. 9,400 hectares in 1992 to some 243 hectares in the 2000-2001 season. This was the result of the government's determination to eliminate opium poppy and to launch sizable alternative development projects largely funded by the international community. The bulk of cultivated area in 2001 was in the Khyber Agency which has, over the past three seasons, threatened to jeopardize Pakistan's poppy free status. In the 2001-2002 season, alerted the government to a possible resurgence of opium poppy in Dir in September 2001. Dir had been poppy free as of 1999 with the complete enforcement of the ban on poppy cultivation – the drug control objective of the US\$ 38 million Dir District Development Project, implemented in two phases over a 16 year period beginning in 1985. Repeated ODCCP advocacy and follow-up, strengthened the government's resolve to eradicate about 162 hectares of opium poppy primarily cultivated in the Nehag valley (Dir District). The cultivation was mainly politically motivated and directly promoted by all political parties, including the ruling Jamaat-e-Islami at the district level. The cultivation was sporadic and in full view from access roads to bargain for additional development assistance. In early April 2002, the government deployed about 100 troops to physically eradicate the crops. 85 to 90% of the crop was eradicated. This has been confirmed by surface and aerial monitoring (UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2002, *Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighbouring Afghanistan and the Response of ODCCP*, UN Office on Drugs and Crime website, October, pp.5-6 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_drug-situation_2002-10-01_1.pdf – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 21).

Poppy cultivation in the NWFP has reportedly enjoyed a degree of tacit support from the province's Islamist administration and its clerics. In March 2003, *The Daily Times* reported that farmers growing poppies in the NWFP were thought by certain sources to enjoy the backing of the MMA led provincial government; noting that NWFP Chief Minister, Akram Khan Durrani, "has banned alcohol and music but not poppy cultivation". More recently, *The Daily Times* has reported Durrani's March 2005 announcement "that the MMA government would ensure the eradication of poppy cultivation in the province" and his call for "clerics to rally behind the effort against the drug menace". In spite of this, it would seem that some NWFP clerics have continued to confer legitimacy upon the practice of poppy farming. Three months after Durrani's announcement, *The Daily Times* reported that the Pakistan Narcotics Control Ministry had claimed that "[s]everal religious clerics in Balochistan, NWFP and tribal areas [had] decreed in favour of poppy cultivation" (Khattak, Iqbal. 2003, 'NWFP govt urged to act against poppy growers', *Daily Times* website, 25 March http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-3-2003_pg7_42 – Accessed 3 April 2006 – Attachment 15; 'NWFP govt wil smash drug trade' 2005, *Daily Times*, 20 March http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-3-2005_pg10_5 – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 16; Raza, Shahzad. 2005, 'Poppy farming has clerics' support in Balochistan, NWFP', *Daily Times* website, 16 July http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-7-2005_pg7_25 – Accessed 3 April 2006 – Attachment 17).

In February 2006, it was reported that the authorities had failed to completely destroy the poppy crops growing in the NWFP, even though this goal has been achieved in the neighbouring province of Balochistan. The relevant extract follows in detail:

Poppy cultivation has resumed in Pakistan that had been declared a poppy-free country in 2002, said United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) representative Vincent McClean.

...Poppy is now being cultivated in areas previously not known for its cultivation, including certain parts of Balochistan, Khyber, Kohistan and Kala Dhaka.

The cultivation is being done on a limited scale but the UNODC official feared the problem may intensify and the country can once again become a major growing centre.

Poppy crop in Balochistan was completely destroyed, but in NWFP it could not be wiped off, the official stated without elaborating the reasons why the crop could not be fully destroyed in the Frontier. However, he said, UNODC was in an active engagement with the NWFP government (Syed, Baqir Sajjad. 2006, 'Poppy cultivation resumes in Pakistan: UN', *Dawn* website, 28 February <http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/01/nat3.htm> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 23).

There exists much speculation that the sympathy which has been extended to poppy cultivation in the NWFP by some local Islamist politicians and clerics is a product of not only the poverty which afflicts the region but also intersections between narcotics-trafficking and the Islamist insurgency being fought by a resurgent Taliban along the Pakistan-Afghan border. As was noted in the introduction to this response, such alleged connections have recently been reported on by *TIME Magazine's* Phil Zabriskie. It should be noted, however, that not all sources are entirely convinced that such a significant connection exists between the narcotics trade and the Taliban. *The Economist*, for example, finds that evidence to support such claims "is scanty"; and suggests that the more pressing reality may be that "the trade has stirred local conflict, between rival traders, and with local druglords employing violence as a way to keep meddling officials away" (Zabriskie, P. 2006, 'Dangers Up Ahead', *TIME Magazine* website, 13 March <http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1169897,00.html> – Accessed 5 April 2006 – Attachment 11; 'A charter in London, troops for the badlands' 2006, *The Economist*, 2 February http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5475258 – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 12).

Nonetheless, the view that there is a connection between the insurgency and narcotics does enjoy wide currency. B. Raman of India's South Asia Analysis Group has argued that the resilience of the resistance Taliban-led Islamist insurgency is, in part, to be explained by the finances it receives from a vast store of heroin stocks and the failure of the US forces to locate and destroy these stocks and "capture of the Pakistani heroin barons who were running this infrastructure":

...there has been no significant destruction of the heroin infrastructure in Afghan territory, no major killing or capture of the Pakistani heroin barons who were running this infrastructure and no major capture of heroin stocks. Before October 7, 2001, there was general agreement amongst professionals that the Pakistani heroin barons had a secret reserve of at least two years' market requirement of heroin cached in Afghanistan. It is believed that between September 11 and October 7, 2001, most of these reserves were moved largely into Pakistan and, in a smaller measure, into the Central Asian Republics (CARs). With these reserves still available to them, the terrorists should be able to maintain a high level of activity despite the freezing of their bank accounts (Raman, B. 2002, 'Punishment Terrorism', South Asia Analysis Group website, 10 April <http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper441.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 10).

B. Raman has also alleged, in a number of articles, that US forces in Afghanistan are attempting to make use of their own contacts in the local narcotics-trade. Certain narcotics-traffickers are said to provide the US with intelligence and operational assistance in conducting operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda along the Afghan-Pakistan border,

and in return for this they receive much freedom of action. B. Raman has also alleged that Pakistan's own forces – particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency – have a history of working with the narcotics trade when it suits their purposes. Relevant extracts from a number of reports follow below:

...there are disturbing reports from reliable sources in Afghanistan that this marked lack of success in the heroin front is due to the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA, which encouraged these heroin barons during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to spread heroin-addiction amongst the Soviet troops, is now using them in its search for bin Laden and other surviving leaders of the Al Qaeda, by taking advantage of their local knowledge and contacts. These Pakistani heroin barons and their Afghan lieutenants are reported to have played an important role in facilitating the induction of Hamid Karzai into the Pashtun areas to counter the Taliban in November, 2001. It is alleged that in return for the services rendered by them, the USA has turned a blind eye to their heroin refineries and reserves (Raman, B. 2002, 'Punishment Terrorism', South Asia Analysis Group website, 10 April <http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper441.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 10).

...In their hunt for the dregs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the US security forces have been using Afghan warlords of the pre-1992 vintage and narcotics smugglers because of their good knowledge of the topography of the area. It has been alleged that at the request of the US intelligence agencies and security forces, many narcotics barons, undergoing imprisonment in Pakistan, were got released in order to use their services; and that action against opium producers and heroin smugglers was given low priority (Raman, B. 2004, 'Terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia', South Asia Analysis Group website, 24 November <http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1172.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 9)

...In the 1980s, at the instance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US, the Internal Political Division of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), headed by Brig (retd). Imtiaz, who worked directly under Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, the DG of the ISI during the later years of Zia-ul-Haq and during the first few months of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto's first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), started a special cell for the use of heroin for covert actions.

This cell promoted the cultivation of opium and the extraction of heroin in Pakistani territory as well as in the Afghan territory under Mujahideen control for being smuggled into the Soviet controlled areas in order to make the Soviet troops heroin addicts. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the ISI's heroin cell started using its network of refineries and smugglers for smuggling heroin to the Western countries and using the money as a supplement to its legitimate economy. But for these heroin dollars, Pakistan's legitimate economy must have collapsed many years ago.

Not only the legitimate State economy, but also many senior officers of the Army and the ISI benefited from the heroin dollars (Raman, B. 2001, 'Heroin, Taliban & Pakistan', South Asia Analysis Group website, 6 August <http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper288.html> – Accessed 4 April 2006 – Attachment 7).

The University of Wisconsin's Alfred W. McCoy has produced a detailed history of the narcotics trade in the Afghan-Pakistan region, and the relationship between this trade and competing strategic interests: tracing the manner in which the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is thought to have re-activated its links with the ISI and heroin traffickers in 2001 in order to support its operations against the Taliban. According to McCoy's study, the US first cooperated with the ISI and the region's narcotics-traffickers as part of its covert operations against Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan. During the early '80s a general culture of impunity developed for the narcotics networks operating in the NWFP. According to McCoy, "between 1985 and 1988, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) unit in

Islamabad did not mount any serious investigations or participate in any major arrests while the CIA was operating in the North West Frontier – making the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, in effect, an enforcement-free zone”. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, “the trade was centralized under forty merchants who worked through Pushtun tribal connections to export heroin and morphine eastward into Pakistan”. McCoy’s discussion of the CIA’s reactivation of its ties with such networks follows below:

As the Taliban collapsed in mid November, this dragons’ teeth soil suddenly raised a new crop of warlords who used their drug money to arm fighters and seize territory. Using the covert-warfare doctrine first seen in Laos, Washington had deployed massive airpower and Special Forces as advisers to Afghan warlords – providing arms and money that reinvigorated local commanders after four tough years under the Taliban. Across the country, the brutal warlords, eclipsed by the Taliban victory in 1996, re-emerged to fight for territory, seize food shipments, and smuggle drugs. ...In the southeast, the Agency delivered money to Pushtun warlords, who dominated drug smuggling on the Pakistan border, to drive the Taliban out of their spiritual heartland. By the time the Taliban forces were in full flight, the CIA had distributed, through its agents and Special Operations forces, \$70 million in “direct cash outlays on the ground in Afghanistan,” an expense that President Bush called one of history’s biggest “bargains.” But this was a bargain with a high hidden cost. After Taliban rule collapsed suddenly in November 2001, these same “corrupt and brutal” warlords quickly filled the political void by moving into towns and cities with thousands of militia armed from their arsenals, creating conditions ideal for the resumption of heroin trafficking (McCoy, A.W. 2003/2004, ‘The Costs of Covert Warfare: Airpower, Drugs, and Warlords in the Conduct of US Foreign Policy’, *New England Journal of Public Policy*, Fall: Vol.19: Iss.1, pp. 227-8, 232, 234 – Attachment 8).

A *Jane’s Intelligence Review* report of March 2003, ‘Opiate smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia’, provides further details as to the nature of the ethno-tribal affiliations of the narcotics networks operating in the region, the nature of the narcotics traded and the trade-routes employed (a map is also supplied, see Attachment 22):

Between 2000 and 2003 heroin as well as opium was still exported to Pakistan through North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan province in the south.

One of the main opium markets in northern Afghanistan was, until it was closed down in April 2002, in the village of Ghani Khel, southeast of Jalalabad, the provincial capital of one of the main opium-producing areas of Afghanistan, Nangrahar. Two other such regional markets were Achin and Kahi, located further away from the Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar road and thus less convenient, until the closure of Ghani Khel.

As the UN Drug Control Programme reported, in southern Afghanistan, where most of the opium production is concentrated (in Kandahar and Helmand provinces), the opium market was less centralised than in the north (Nangrahar) where the Pashtun (the Shinwari tribe in Afghanistan and the Afridi in NWFP) tend to monopolise the trade. In the south, Sangin in Helmand province was the biggest opium market in 2002, followed by Musa Qala, north of Sangin.

Northern Afghanistan’s regional market is dominated by the heroin trade, mainly because of the leading role taken by both the Shinwari and the Afridi in heroin conversion. In the south of the country, the principal trade is in opium and morphine base (converted into heroin using acetic acid anhydride), mostly conducted by Balochi and Pashtun merchants who are not members of the Afridi and Shinwari tribes.

The result is that NWFP and Central Asia are experiencing heroin trafficking on a larger scale than southern Pakistan (Balochistan) and Iran, where seizures tend to relate to opium and morphine base. Heroin is easily trafficked in NWFP from Afghanistan across Afridi territory and the Khyber Pass, through what has been termed a “drug pipeline” (Chouvy, P.A. 2003, ‘Opiate smuggling routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 1 March <http://jir.janes.com> – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 22; see also: Chalk, P. & Fair, C.C. 2005, ‘Pakistan tackles impact of Afghan opium trade’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 1 March <http://jir.janes.com> – Accessed 3 March 2006 – Attachment 24).

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