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Au nom des membres du Groupe d'experts sur la République centrafricaine créé par la résolution 2127 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire tenir ci-joint le rapport du Groupe d'experts, établi en application de l'alinéa c) du paragraphe 59 de la résolution susmentionnée.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir porter la présente lettre et le rapport ci-joint à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de les faire publier comme document du Conseil.

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Rapport du Groupe d'experts sur la République centrafricaine créé par la résolution 2127 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité

Résumé

Après le renversement du Président François Bozizé, le 24 mars 2013, et la démission forcée du Président suivant, Michel Djotodia, le 10 janvier 2014, le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine doit encore surmonter d'immenses obstacles pour mener à bien la deuxième phase de la transition politique, qui devrait conduire à des élections démocratiques libres et régulières en 2015.

L'impunité totale, qui permet à certains individus de se livrer à des actes portant atteinte à la paix, la sécurité et l'intégrité territoriale de la Centrafrique ou d'y apporter un appui demeure la principale pierre d'achoppement sur le chemin de la transition politique. Les cycles répétés de violence dans le pays ont été alimentés par cette impunité, qui a créé un terreau fertile pour les activités des rebelles et les activités criminelles dans le pays. Le Groupe d'experts prend note de la décision prise le 9 mai 2014 par le Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 2127 (2013) concernant la République centrafricaine d'appliquer des sanctions ciblées à l'encontre de François Bozizé, Lévy Yakité et Nourredine Adam comme moyen de contribuer à mettre fin à l'impunité dans le pays. Il a l'intention de surveiller l'application des mesures relatives au gel des avoirs et à l'interdiction de voyager visant ces personnes.

Le Groupe d'experts a pu identifier plusieurs autres acteurs politiques centrafricains, tels que certains de ceux formant la « nouvelle » Séléka ou les milices anti-balaka autoproclamées (voir annexes 5 et 6), qui profitent du vide sécuritaire dans le pays pour financer, organiser ou manipuler des groupes armés en vue de se positionner dans le processus de transition nationale ou d'encourager la partition du pays. Il relève que des membres des forces armées centrafricaines et de la gendarmerie continuent d'occuper des postes de commandement au sein de certains des principaux groupes anti-balaka.

Le Groupe d'experts a rassemblé des preuves dans sa base de données sur 444 incidents qui se sont produits entre le 5 décembre 2013 et le 30 avril 2014, au cours desquels 2 424 civils ont trouvé la mort. Il constate toutefois qu'un grand nombre d'incidents ne sont pas signalés.

La persistance de la situation, plus de quatre mois après l'élection de la Chef de l'État de transition, compromet le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité dans le pays, et soulève des questions quant à la stratégie mise en œuvre par les autorités de transition à l'égard des groupes armés en général et des anti-balaka en particulier. Certains membres de la communauté internationale ont fait part au Groupe d'experts de leur frustration face à l'absence d'une ferme condamnation par les autorités de transition des exactions commises par les milices anti-balaka.

Des groupes armés participent au trafic et à l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles, notamment de l'or et des diamants. Dans l'ouest du pays, des membres des milices anti-balaka creusent des mines et font le commerce de diamants dans des villages reculés comme, par exemple, à Boda (préfecture de la Lobaye) et à Guen (préfecture de Mambéré-Kadeï). Dans l'est, les forces de la Séléka continuent d'avoir la mainmise sur des mines d'or artisanales, comme à Ndassima (préfecture

de la Ouaka). L'administration des mines reprend peu à peu le contrôle des zones de production de diamants autour de Bria et de Sam-Ouandja (préfecture de la Haute-Kotto), le commerce officiel avec Bangui recommençant en partie. Il reste que certains chefs de la Séléka se sont emparés d'une partie du commerce et acheminent les diamants au Soudan.

À cause de la suspension temporaire de la République centrafricaine du Système de certification du Processus de Kimberley, les exportations officielles de diamants ont été interdites en mai. L'acquisition de maisons à Bangui s'est néanmoins poursuivie dans le but d'acheter et de stocker officiellement des diamants en provenance de toutes les zones de production, tandis qu'on assiste à une augmentation du trafic des diamants transitant par Bangui ou par les États voisins. Beaucoup de collecteurs de diamants qui ont fui l'ouest du pays à cause des violences sectaires et religieuses commises par les anti-balaka à la fin de 2013 se trouvent à présent au Cameroun où ils poursuivent leurs activités.

Hormis les importations illégales de munitions de chasse, le Groupe d'experts n'a pas recueilli de preuves attestant d'importants transferts d'armes, de munitions ou de matériel militaire depuis l'imposition de l'embargo sur les armes le 5 décembre 2013. Les groupes armés utilisent surtout des armes légères, qui circulaient dans le pays avant la crise ou ont été récupérées dans les arsenaux gouvernementaux après l'effondrement des forces nationales de défense et de sécurité et l'arrivée au pouvoir de la Séléka à Bangui.

Le présent rapport du Groupe d'experts a été établi sur la base des enquêtes menées entre mars et mai 2014 en République centrafricaine (notamment à Bangui et dans les préfectures de la Lobaye, Mambéré-Kadeï, Nana Mambéré, l'Ouham, la Ouaka, la Haute-Kotto et Bamingui-Bangoram) et dans les États voisins (Cameroun, Gabon et Congo), ainsi que sur les informations fournies par les autorités de transition de la République centrafricaine, les États Membres, les organisations internationales, régionales et sous-régionales et des entités privées, comme suite aux résolutions [2127 \(2013\)](#), [2134 \(2014\)](#) et [2149 \(2014\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité.

Le Groupe d'experts constate que la crise en Centrafrique a une dimension régionale, que les éléments des groupes armés ont des origines diverses et que ces groupes utilisent les territoires des États limitrophes. Il prend aussi note des différentes mesures qu'ont prises les pays de la région pour appliquer la résolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité.

Dans le présent rapport, le Groupe d'experts décrit l'évolution de la situation politique et des conditions de sécurité en République centrafricaine, présente des études de cas et formule des recommandations à l'attention du Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concernant la République centrafricaine.

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I. Historique

A. Mandat et nominations

1. Par sa résolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) du 5 décembre 2013, le Conseil de sécurité a imposé un régime de sanctions à la République centrafricaine et créé un comité des sanctions (le Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concernant la République centrafricaine) et un groupe d'experts (le Groupe d'experts sur la République centrafricaine) chargé de surveiller l'application des sanctions. Le mandat du Comité a été prorogé à la suite de l'adoption de la résolution [2134 \(2014\)](#) le 28 janvier 2014, afin d'y inclure la capacité d'imposer des sanctions ciblées (interdiction de voyager et gel des avoirs) aux individus et entités responsables des actes énumérés aux paragraphes 36 et 37 de la résolution.

2. Le 13 février 2014, en consultation avec le Comité, le Secrétaire général a nommé les cinq membres du Comité d'experts ([S/2014/98](#)), qui comprend un expert pour les questions régionales (Paul-Simon Handy), un expert en armement (Ahmed Himmiche), un expert pour les questions financières et les ressources naturelles (Ruben de Koning), un expert des groupes armés et coordonnateur du Groupe (Aurélien Llorca) et une experte des questions humanitaires (Carolina Reyes Aragón).

3. Les experts sont établis dans leurs pays mais le Groupe a maintenu une présence quasiment permanente à Bangui entre mars et mai 2014 et effectué des missions en se rendant dans les différentes préfectures par la route (à Bambari, Batalimo, Béloko, Boda, Bossangoa, Bouar, Cantonner, Carnot, Gadzi, Guen et Mbaïki) et par avion (à Ndélé et Bria). Il s'est également rendu à Yaoundé (Cameroun), à Libreville (Gabon), à Brazzaville (Congo) et à Paris (France) pour présenter le mandat du Groupe et s'entretenir avec des représentants de ces États.

4. En mars, le Groupe d'experts s'est rendu au Siège de l'ONU en vue d'examiner avec le Comité son premier compte rendu de la situation, qui a été transmis à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité le 5 mars 2014, et d'avoir des rencontres bilatérales avec les membres du Comité, des diplomates en poste dans les États voisins de la Centrafrique, le Président de la Commission de consolidation de la paix et son envoyé en République centrafricaine, et des entités des Nations Unies.

B. Méthode

5. Le Groupe d'experts entend se conformer aux normes recommandées par le Groupe de travail officieux du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions générales relatives aux sanctions dans son rapport de décembre 2006 ([S/2006/997](#), annexe) en se fondant sur des documents authentiques et vérifiés et, dans la mesure du possible, sur des éléments de preuve concrets et sur des observations faites directement sur les lieux par les experts eux-mêmes, y compris des photographies. Quand une inspection physique était impossible, le Groupe s'est efforcé de corroborer les informations à l'aide de sources indépendantes multiples pour répondre aux plus hautes normes en privilégiant les déclarations des acteurs principaux et des témoins directs des événements.

6. Le Groupe d'experts entend être aussi transparent que possible mais, au cas où l'identification des sources exposerait celles-ci ou d'autres personnes à des risques

inacceptables pour leur sécurité, il s'abstiendra de révéler la source de l'information et versera les éléments de preuve correspondants aux archives de l'ONU.

7. Par souci d'équité, le Groupe d'experts s'efforcera, s'il y a lieu et si possible, de mettre à la disposition des parties tous renseignements figurant dans le rapport sur les actes dont elles pourraient être appelées à répondre, pour qu'elles puissent les examiner, faire des observations et y répondre dans un délai donné.

8. Le Groupe d'experts garantit l'indépendance de ses travaux contre toute tentative de compromettre son impartialité ou de donner l'impression qu'il a un parti pris. Il a approuvé le texte du présent rapport, ainsi que les conclusions et les recommandations qui y figurent, sur la base d'un consensus, avant que le Coordonnateur le transmette au Président du Conseil de sécurité.

9. Conformément aux résolutions de l'Assemblée générale sur le contrôle et la limitation de la longueur des documents, en particulier les résolutions [52/214](#), [53/208](#) et [59/265](#), le Groupe d'experts a décidé de faire figurer une partie de ses conclusions et observations dans les annexes au présent rapport, limitant la traduction d'une grande partie du document.

C. Coopération avec les parties prenantes et les organisations

10. Le Groupe d'experts se félicite de l'excellente coopération apportée par les autorités de transition de la République centrafricaine et, en particulier, les membres du Gouvernement de la Chef de l'État de transition, Catherine Samba-Panza. Le mandat du Comité et du Groupe d'experts a été expliqué aux membres concernés du Gouvernement, dont le Premier Ministre et plusieurs ministres, et le Groupe d'experts a obtenu, conformément à son mandat et à sa demande, les renseignements demandés des services et fonctionnaires compétents, lorsqu'ils étaient disponibles. Le Groupe d'experts a aussi expliqué son mandat et les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité aux principales parties prenantes présentes en Centrafrique, y compris les forces internationales et les membres de la communauté internationale.

11. Le Groupe d'experts a pu faire appel à la Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) pour se faire accompagner dans les provinces, accéder aux armes et munitions saisies lors d'opérations et échanger des informations utiles à l'exécution de son mandat, à titre confidentiel. Il espère coopérer avec la force européenne en République centrafricaine, en attendant qu'elle soit effectivement déployée sur le terrain. Les forces françaises en République centrafricaine (opération Sangaris) ont permis au Groupe d'experts d'avoir pleinement accès aux armes et munitions saisies. Toutefois, l'échange d'informations a été jusqu'ici limité, même dans le contexte des attaques menées contre les forces internationales.

12. Enfin, le Groupe d'experts a reçu du Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (BINUCA) un soutien logistique précieux pour accomplir son mandat et coopère actuellement avec la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine (MINUSCA) en vue de systématiser l'échange d'informations et de garantir un soutien logistique à long terme.

13. Le Groupe d'experts a envoyé 23 communications officielles à 18 États, organisations et entités privées et a reçu à ce jour neuf réponses contenant les renseignements demandés (voir annexe 1).

II. Menaces à la paix et la sécurité

A. Contexte politique et régional

1. Généralités : comprendre le conflit

14. Le conflit qui a éclaté en 2012 en République centrafricaine, dont le point culminant a été le renversement du Président François Bozizé le 24 mars 2013 par une alliance de circonstance entre des groupes rebelles appelés la Séléka, est l'escalade la plus récente dans la succession de crises que connaît le pays depuis près de 40 ans. Depuis des décennies, des gouvernements successifs concentrent un faible pouvoir dans la capitale, tandis que des groupes armés (des rebelles et des bandits) contrôlent de vastes pans du territoire centrafricain.

15. Depuis que la République centrafricaine a obtenu son indépendance de la France, en 1960, elle a connu des putschs et des contre-putschs avec une telle régularité que cela en est venu à créer un contexte politique de violence et de prédation économique. La création de groupes armés et la fourniture d'un soutien à ces groupes est la méthode de prédilection pour accéder au pouvoir politique et aux richesses économiques (voir annexe 2).

16. Le cercle vicieux des crises politiques à répétition a gravement affaibli l'économie de la République centrafricaine, pays pauvre et enclavé, marqué par une instabilité permanente, incapable d'exploiter avec succès ses vastes ressources économiques, dont la majorité de la population vit dans la pauvreté¹.

17. L'élite politique et les groupes armés monopolisent entre-temps illégalement le contrôle des ressources minières du pays, notamment les diamants et l'or. Le contrôle de l'exploitation minière à petite échelle est devenu un instrument important qui profite à la fois aux réseaux clientélistes au sein de l'appareil étatique et finance en partie les activités des groupes rebelles (voir la section C ci-après, sur les ressources naturelles).

18. Par son emplacement géographique, la République centrafricaine se trouve à la confluence de nombre de régions marginalisées et appauvries le long de la frontière d'États qui, dans le cas de la République démocratique du Congo, de la République du Congo, du Soudan, du Soudan du Sud et du Tchad, ont connu, eux aussi, des conflits armés majeurs, ces dernières années.

19. À bien des égards, le violent conflit en République centrafricaine a été à la fois le résultat et le moteur de l'instabilité dans les pays voisins. Par exemple, au cours des conflits qui ont fait rage au Soudan, au Tchad et en République centrafricaine, cette dernière a servi de base arrière aux groupes rebelles dans les pays voisins².

¹ Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement, *Rapport sur le développement humain 2013 – L'essor du Sud : le progrès humain dans un monde diversifié* (New York, 2013).

² En 2006, des rebelles tchadiens venant du Soudan se sont servis du territoire centrafricain pour lancer une attaque décisive contre N'Djamena. Dans les années 80, l'Armée populaire de libération sud-soudanaise a largement utilisé le territoire centrafricain comme base arrière.

L'Armée de résistance du Seigneur, un groupe rebelle ougandais qui se revendique d'une idéologie chrétienne fondamentaliste, a fui les Forces de défense populaires de l'Ouganda et cherché refuge en République centrafricaine, où elle a attaqué épisodiquement des villages dans l'est (voir la section B ci-après).

20. Par ailleurs, les problèmes de sécurité en République centrafricaine se sont transposés dans les pays voisins où, par exemple, durant les années 90, des *zaraguinas* locaux ou bandits de grands chemins ont fait régner l'insécurité, notamment sur les routes camerounaises. Les crises successives sur le plan de la sécurité en République centrafricaine ont en outre poussé un grand nombre de personnes, dont certaines armées, à se réfugier dans les pays voisins.

21. Cette situation, ajoutée à d'autres facteurs, a encouragé la création de milices d'autodéfense au niveau des communautés, dont certaines sont à l'origine des anti-balaka (voir annexe 5).

22. Les pays de la région influencent de ce fait l'évolution de la situation politique en République centrafricaine, par l'intermédiaire d'un soutien à un ou plusieurs groupes politiques³, l'envoi de contingents de maintien de la paix dans le pays ou la fourniture d'un appui à la médiation politique.

23. Leur implication a souvent été entachée de frictions, comme en témoigne le ressentiment de la population à l'égard de la participation présumée du Tchad aux côtés des rebelles de la Séléka. Ce ressentiment explique l'annonce par celui-ci, le 3 avril 2014, de son retrait de la MISCA, la force régionale mise en place par l'Union africaine le 19 décembre 2013, pour remplacer la Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique centrale.

Construction d'un discours hostile aux étrangers et aux Tchadiens

24. Un des traits les plus saillants de la crise en cours en République centrafricaine est l'apparition d'un discours ouvertement hostile aux étrangers et aux Tchadiens, avec des connotations religieuses, dans le contexte d'une reconfiguration politique et sécuritaire. Les raisons en sont à la fois les perceptions locales de l'identité nationale et des incidents récents au cours desquels des combattants étrangers ont pris des postes d'influence au sein de l'appareil étatique et dans les zones contrôlées par les rebelles. Du fait du nombre élevé de violations des droits de l'homme, y compris les pillages, les viols et les harcèlements, commis à grande échelle pendant le règne de courte durée de la Séléka, un discours hostile aux étrangers a été intégré dans la sphère politique⁴.

25. Traditionnellement, cette région du nord-est de la République centrafricaine à faible densité de population est le foyer de groupes ethniques (goulas, arabes, peuls et roungas), qui ont de solides liens culturels et économiques avec leurs congénères au Cameroun, au Soudan du Sud et au Tchad. C'est la partie la plus négligée du pays, qui n'est pratiquement pas accessible depuis la capitale par la route et dont les infrastructures sociales laissent fortement à désirer. Cette région compte également le plus grand nombre de musulmans, qui constituent 15 % environ de la population

³ François Bozizé a accédé au pouvoir en 2003 à la suite d'un coup d'état soutenu par le Tchad et la France. Les deux pays ont toléré qu'il soit renversé par la Séléka en mars 2013, à la suite d'un différend avec lui.

⁴ Entretiens à Bangui, les 21 et 24 mai 2014, avec un membre du Conseil national de transition et un ancien ministre au sein du gouvernement de transition, sous Djotodia.

de la République centrafricaine : le nord-est est donc davantage orienté, sur les plans économique et culturel, vers le Soudan et le Tchad que vers Bangui et le reste du pays.

26. Les habitants du nord-est sont largement perçus comme des étrangers par les Centrafricains, du fait de leur appartenance ethnique, de leur religion et de leurs moyens de subsistance. À l'inverse, les habitants du nord en général et ceux du nord-est en particulier ont souvent le sentiment d'être marginalisés⁵.

27. Le déclenchement de la vague la plus récente de ressentiment contre les étrangers et les Tchadiens, avec ses fortes connotations antimusulmanes, doit être compris dans le contexte de la prise de pouvoir par l'ex-Séléka, qui a régné pendant 10 mois, en 2013. Du fait de la présence de soldats tchadiens et soudanais dans les rangs de la Séléka, la plupart des Centrafricains ont eu le sentiment que la coalition rebelle était un groupe étranger qui assujettissait la majeure partie de la population. Le harcèlement par la Séléka de communautés en majorité non musulmanes a exacerbé les ressentiments qui sommeillaient et a été canalisé de façon opportuniste à des fins politiques par l'intermédiaire des anti-balaka.

28. La réapparition au second semestre de 2013 de ce groupe, qui avait été constitué au départ à des fins de légitime défense pour protéger les civils et les communautés contre ce qui a été perçu comme une oppression de non-musulmans parrainée par l'État, a débouché sur un mouvement plus vaste, mieux structuré et mieux organisé contre la Séléka. Cela a également donné aux anciens membres des Forces armées centrafricaines la possibilité de prendre une revanche tant attendue sur ceux qui les avaient vaincus pendant le coup d'état de mars 2013.

29. Si le mouvement anti-balaka a bénéficié d'un fort appui, c'est principalement parce que la population a estimé qu'il libérerait le pays d'une invasion étrangère⁶. L'activisme de nombre d'entrepreneurs politiques et tout particulièrement (mais non exclusivement) autour de l'ancien Président Bozizé a activement contribué à l'apparition de ce discours qui a fini par motiver les assassinats ciblés de musulmans à Bangui et dans d'autres secteurs contrôlés par les anti-balaka. À ce stade, les membres de la communauté musulmane étaient déjà assimilés aux éléments de la Séléka : étrangers, Tchadiens et jihadistes.

La transition en cours et les difficultés qu'elle présente

30. La transition en cours a ses racines juridiques dans l'accord signé à Libreville en janvier 2013 et dans la déclaration de N'Djamena (voir [S/2014/319](#), par. 38). Plusieurs acteurs et observateurs estiment que l'accord est nul et non avenue, du fait que ses principaux signataires (Président Bozizé et Michel Djotodia) ne sont plus au

⁵ Entretien, le 24 mai 2014 à Bangui, avec le président d'un parti politique; un des signes visibles de cette marginalisation est la très faible représentation des habitants du nord-est dans les échelons supérieurs de l'administration et de l'armée. Il n'y a jamais eu par exemple de général d'armée originaire du nord-est, exception faite des généraux autoproclamés de la Séléka.

⁶ Cette perception largement partagée parmi la population centrafricaine est en fait erronée, le déploiement de l'opération Sangaris de la mission française le 6 décembre 2013 ayant mis fin aux assassinats commis par la Séléka et enhardi une milice d'autodéfense qui a augmenté ses attaques contre les musulmans.

pouvoir⁷. Mais les artisans de la déclaration de N'Djamena considèrent qu'elle s'inscrit dans le prolongement de l'accord de Libreville, dont elle conserve l'esprit, même si le contexte et les acteurs ne sont plus les mêmes.

31. Le Président tchadien, Idriss Déby, aurait promis à la Séléka le poste de premier ministre dans le nouveau Gouvernement centrafricain, promesse qui ne s'est pas matérialisée, ce qui aurait ulcéré la Séléka⁸. À l'inverse, les membres anti-balaka estiment que les signataires de l'accord de N'Djamena ont manqué une occasion en ne réformant pas le Conseil national de la transition, désigné par Michel Djotodia⁹.

32. Les interrogations autour de la légitimité de la transition en cours risquent de faire dérailler l'actuel Gouvernement, notamment dans la mesure où elles soulèvent la question sensible de la représentation. Le pays a une longue histoire de transitions ratées et d'accords de paix précaires. Depuis la prise du pouvoir par M. Bozizé en 2003, les rébellions en République centrafricaine se succèdent, suivies d'une série d'accords qui ne sont pas appliqués sérieusement. La chute de M. Bozizé peut, entre autres, être imputée à son manque de volonté politique d'appliquer les accords politiques et d'entreprendre une véritable action de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réintégration (voir annexe 2).

33. L'armée nationale brille par son absence, après la défaite militaire des Forces armées centrafricaines au cours du putsch de mars 2013, le cantonnement et la dispersion de la Séléka à la suite de l'intervention française et de la chute du Gouvernement de Djotodia, problème auquel vient se greffer la fragilité instaurée dans le contexte actuel par la réorganisation des milices et les rapports contradictoires sur la partition éventuelle du pays (voir la section B ci-après, sur les groupes armés). La difficulté pour les acteurs internationaux consiste à instaurer la sécurité en l'absence d'armée nationale, tout en aidant les autorités de transition à en construire une.

2. Contexte régional

34. Le conflit en République centrafricaine est ancré dans une dynamique régionale et donc rattaché à l'évolution de la situation dans nombre de pays voisins. L'insécurité en République centrafricaine est du moins partiellement liée à l'insécurité qui règne dans les pays voisins (République démocratique du Congo, Soudan, Soudan du Sud et Tchad). Le contexte régional de la crise est marqué par nombre de facteurs clefs : un grand nombre de combattants étrangers et de groupes armés (groupes rebelles, *zaraguinas* et braconniers), une quantité considérable d'armes légères et de petit calibre en circulation dans la région, des pays voisins qui ont des intérêts stratégiques en République centrafricaine et nombre d'organisations régionales (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale,

⁷ Entretien avec Jean-Jacques Démafouth (actuellement Ministre conseiller à la présidence, chargé de la sécurité et des relations avec l'opération Sangaris et la MISCA) à Bangui et à Libreville.

⁸ Le 14 mars 2014, l'Alliance des forces démocratiques de la transition a publié le communiqué n° 007/014 dans lequel elle a reproché au Président tchadien Deby d'avoir insisté sur les promesses faites aux chefs de l'ex-Séléka comme conditions du renvoi de Michel Djotodia et de Nicolas Tiangaye. Elle a exhorté dans le communiqué toutes les parties à respecter l'accord de N'Djamena et la transition en cours.

⁹ Entretien avec Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, réalisé à Bangui le 3 mai 2014.


Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique centrale et Union africaine). De plus, l'extrémisme religieux de Boko Haram, groupe inscrit le 22 mai 2014 sur la Liste relative aux sanctions contre Al-Qaïda du Conseil de sécurité, est considéré dans la plupart des capitales de la région comme une importante menace à la sécurité.

35. La récente instabilité en République centrafricaine a gagné les pays voisins à divers degrés. Si le Cameroun, la République démocratique du Congo et le Tchad ont été directement touchés sur les plans sécuritaire, humanitaire et économique, d'autres, comme la République du Congo et tout particulièrement le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud l'ont été dans une moindre mesure. Par conséquent, les mesures prises par les pays de la région pour faire face à la crise en République centrafricaine montrent bien que l'insécurité en République centrafricaine fait peser une menace sur leur propre stabilité.

36. Depuis que le Groupe d'experts a pris ses fonctions, le 13 février 2014, il s'est rendu au Cameroun, au Gabon et en République du Congo, où il a obtenu des informations de première main sur les mesures adoptées par les pays pour faire appliquer les résolutions [2127 \(2013\)](#) et [2134 \(2014\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité (voir annexe 3).

B. Groupes armés

37. Les groupes armés exercent actuellement une influence sur pratiquement toutes les zones habitées en République centrafricaine, à l'exception de quelques quartiers de Bangui et de la majeure partie des préfectures du Mbomou et du Haut-Mbomou. Le pays est de fait partagé en deux, avec une ligne de séparation située actuellement au nord de la préfecture de l'Ouham-Pendé, au nord et à l'est des préfectures de l'Ouham et de la Kémo et à l'ouest et au sud de la préfecture de la Ouaka, avec la présence majoritaire de milices dites anti-balaka à l'ouest et de la « nouvelle » Séléka à l'est de la ligne de front (voir la figure ci-après pour plus de détails).



Groupe d'experts de la République centrafricaine – Carte de référence générale : PAM-RCA, Aperçu de la situation, le 31 juillet 2013

38. Dans une moindre mesure, les groupes armés étrangers se servent également du territoire centrafricain comme base arrière pour commettre des pillages de biens et des exactions contre les civils. En particulier, l'Armée de résistance du Seigneur a été active depuis 2007 dans la partie est de la République centrafricaine et trempé dans des incidents isolés, qui se produisent avec régularité (pour de plus amples informations sur les autres groupes armés, voir annexe 4).

39. Le Groupe d'experts a réussi à interroger la plupart des principaux chefs politiques et militaires du mouvement anti-balaka et des différentes composantes de l'ex-Séléka, dans la capitale et les provinces où il a pu se rendre.

40. Comme indiqué plus haut (voir la section A du présent rapport), un vide du pouvoir dans le contexte actuel pourrait être un terrain fertile pour des mouvements politico-militaires, qui sont une tradition établie de longue date en République centrafricaine. En fait, les entrepreneurs politiques rivalisent entre eux pour représenter les groupes armés et parler en leur nom, afin de négocier des postes au sein du gouvernement et de faire avancer leur propre carrière politique, avec une tendance à exagérer à quel point ils représentent la population (sur le plan du domaine d'influence et de la force des milices) et au bout du compte leur capacité de surveiller et de contrôler efficacement leurs activités.

41. Par ailleurs, les informations obtenues par le Groupe d'experts et ses propres observations sur le terrain indiquent que les groupes anti-balaka auto-proclamés ainsi que la « nouvelle » Séléka tirent profit de la taxation illégale de la circulation des biens et des personnes et des entreprises locales qui sont actives dans leurs zones d'influence (voir la section C du présent rapport), ce qui renforce leur présence politique et militaire et leur capacité de faire perdurer leur contrôle et leur influence directs sur la majeure partie du pays, y compris la capitale.

42. Enfin, le Groupe d'experts pense que les groupes armés, associés aux anti-balaka ou à l'ex-Séléka, sont manipulés par des saboteurs politiques qui les incitent à commettre des actes de violence contre les civils et les forces internationales, en vue de renforcer l'influence de ces chefs, de déstabiliser la transition ou de promouvoir la partition du pays.

43. Le Groupe d'experts estime que cette situation mine la crédibilité et la capacité des autorités de transition de rétablir et de préserver la sécurité publique et l'état de droit, et menace par conséquent les accords et la transition politiques, y compris l'organisation en 2015 d'élections démocratiques, libres et équitables.

44. Par conséquent, les personnes et entités dont le Groupe a établi qu'elles avaient participé à de tels actes ou les avaient soutenus, décrits aux paragraphes 36 et 37 de la résolution 2134 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité, y compris celles qui encouragent la partition du pays et constituent à l'heure actuelle la principale menace pour la stabilité de la République centrafricaine et de la région, devraient faire l'objet de sanctions ciblées de la part du Comité.

Incidents liés à la sécurité

Les anti-balaka

45. Les anti-balaka ne sont pas un groupe armé doté d'une structure centralisée et d'un commandement qui exerce un contrôle efficace sur ses éléments. D'après le Groupe d'experts, il s'agit d'une myriade de milices diverses qui se définissent comme faisant partie du mouvement anti-balaka ou qui y sont associées par défaut.

46. D'après les renseignements figurant dans la base de données du Groupe d'experts, du 5 décembre 2013 au 30 avril 2014, 670 civils et 3 agents humanitaires ont été tués par des groupes considérés comme appartenant aux anti-balaka. Des études de cas sur la situation des groupes anti-balaka à Bossangoa et Boda, où le Groupe a réuni des éléments de preuve sur des attaques contre des civils, des destructions de biens et une entrave à l'aide humanitaire, sont présentées aux annexes 5.5 et 23.

47. À Bangui, le Groupe d'experts estime, sur la base d'entretiens avec des sources multiples, que les groupes anti-balaka et d'autres acteurs, associés à la faction dirigée par Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, portent la responsabilité des attaques commises contre les forces internationales. Le 22 mars 2014, d'après un rapport officiel communiqué au Groupe par la MISCA, plusieurs soldats congolais et rwandais de la Mission ont été gravement blessés par des éléments anti-balaka dans les quartiers Combattant et Fou de Bangui. Le 25 mars, le Groupe a été témoin d'une attaque lourde contre les forces françaises dans les parages de l'aéroport (voir annexe 5.6).

48. Si le Groupe d'experts est en mesure de confirmer que les attaques contre le quartier de PK5 à Bangui, où vit toujours la majeure partie des victimes des violences sectaires et religieuses, ont été principalement commises par les groupes anti-balaka du camp de déplacés, situé à l'aéroport et dans les quartiers de Boeing et de Castors, la responsabilité directe d'un commandant anti-balaka en particulier n'a pas encore été établie. Ngaïssona a cependant déclaré au cours d'un entretien avec le Groupe que son organisation contrôlait les groupes anti-balaka présents dans ces quartiers¹⁰.

49. Les différentes composantes du mouvement anti-balaka et sa dynamique actuelle sont décrites à l'annexe 5.

La Séléka

50. D'après des renseignements figurant dans la base de données du Groupe d'experts, l'ex-Séléka porte la responsabilité de l'assassinat de 453 civils et de 7 agents humanitaires entre le 5 décembre 2013 et le 30 avril 2014.

51. Le Groupe d'experts a réussi à corroborer les informations provenant de sources multiples au sujet de l'implication de membres de l'ex-Séléka du colonel Issa¹¹, un officier de haut rang qui est sous le commandement du général de brigade Alkhatim¹², dans le meurtre de 3 agents humanitaires et de 15 civils et notables à Boguila, le 26 avril 2014.

52. Les forces du général de brigade Alkhatim ont été également impliquées dans un violent accrochage avec les forces françaises au sud de la localité de Bémal (province d'Ouham-Pendé), le 5 mai 2014 (voir annexe 7). L'implication directe du colonel Issa a été confirmée par le Groupe d'experts, d'après plusieurs sources confidentielles.

53. Le Groupe d'experts a également entendu un témoignage impliquant le colonel Saleh Zabadi, le commandant de la « nouvelle » Séléka à Batangafo (province d'Ouham), et le général de brigade Alkhatim dans l'enlèvement, le 16 avril 2014, de l'évêque de Bossangoa ainsi que de trois prêtres qui se rendaient à Batangafo pour célébrer la fête de Pâques¹³. Les quatre prêtres ont été relâchés le lendemain à Kabo, après une forte mobilisation à Bangui de la part de la communauté internationale et d'autres acteurs¹⁴, sans que leurs biens personnels leur soient restitués.

54. Enfin, des sources militaires ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts que des forces loyales au général de brigade Ali Daras avaient été impliquées le 24 mai 2014 dans des attaques lourdes contre les forces internationales, au moyen de lance-roquettes et de mitraillettes légères, dans le cadre de l'application des « mesures de consolidation de la confiance » à Bambari.

55. Malgré la façade politique, qui demeure très fragile, les partisans de la partition continuent d'exercer une influence sur le destin et la direction de la

¹⁰ Entretien avec Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona à Bangui, le 3 mai 2014.

¹¹ Entretiens à Bossangoa et à Bangui en avril et en mai 2014 avec des sources confidentielles et des contacts institutionnels.

¹² Conversation téléphonique avec le général de brigade Alkhatim Mahamat, le 20 mai 2014.

¹³ Les témoignages sont archivés au Siège de l'ONU.

¹⁴ Les diplomates qui ont participé aux débats en vue de la libération des prêtres ont confirmé au Groupe d'experts l'implication directe du général de brigade Alkhatim.

« nouvelle » Séléka, ce qui fait peser un risque réel sur la stabilité et l'intégrité territoriale de la République centrafricaine.

56. La nouvelle structure militaire de la Séléka et sa coordination politique provisoire sont décrits en détail à l'annexe 6.

C. Exploitation des ressources naturelles

1. Les diamants

57. Le 23 mai 2013, la République centrafricaine a fait l'objet d'une suspension temporaire au titre du Système de certification du Processus de Kimberley. Comme le prévoit dans la résolution 55/56 de l'Assemblée générale du 1^{er} décembre 2000, le Processus de Kimberley est une initiative que les pays africains producteurs de diamants ont prise en consultation avec les gouvernements, l'industrie et la société civile afin d'endiguer le flux de diamants bruts qui servent à financer les activités militaires de mouvements rebelles contre les gouvernements légitimes. Deux mois avant cette suspension, une carte montrant les avancées et les positions des rebelles de la Séléka dans les zones riches en gisements diamantifères de l'est du pays comme Bria, Sam-Ouganda (province de Haute-Kotto) et Bamingui (province de Bamingui-Bangor) (voir annexe 8) avait été publiée sur le site du Processus de Kimberley. Le 18 avril 2013, son président a engagé les participants à faire preuve de vigilance pour empêcher que des diamants bruts soient introduits de manière illicite dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement par les groupes rebelles. À cette date, la coalition rebelle Séléka avait déjà pris le pouvoir à Bangui.

58. D'après le rapport annuel de 2013 du Secrétaire permanent du Processus de Kimberley en République centrafricaine, le pays a exporté 43 929 carats de diamants, soit plus de 9 millions de dollars, au cours du premier trimestre et 75 017 carats, soit plus de 11 millions de dollars au cours du second, principalement à destination de l'Union européenne (67 %) et des Émirats arabes unis (31 %), alors qu'en 2012, il en avait exporté 371 917, soit plus de 62 millions de dollars¹⁵.

59. Bien que l'exportation de diamants bruts ait été suspendue, le commerce légal se poursuit. En mars 2014, la Direction générale des mines et de la géologie et l'Unité spéciale antifraude (USAF) ont mené une opération conjointe de vérification des stocks des principaux bureaux d'achats de Bangui. La société Sodiam (Société centrafricaine du diamant) avait 40 576 carats en stock, évalués à 8,3 millions de dollars, provenant pour l'essentiel de l'ouest du pays. Les relevés de bordereaux d'achats remis à la Direction générale des mines et de la géologie montrent que la majeure partie des stocks de la Soda, soit 90 %, a été achetée après la suspension¹⁶. À Carnot, Guen et Borda, dans les provinces de Mambéré-Kadeï et Lobaye situées dans l'ouest du pays, les collecteurs de diamants ont déclaré au Groupe d'experts que la Sodiam continuait d'acheter leur production¹⁷.

¹⁵ Voir https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/public_statistics/2012/2012_GlobalSummary.pdf (lien vérifié le 1^{er} mai 2014).

¹⁶ Le rapport complet est conservé dans les archives de l'ONU.

¹⁷ Sur la base de nombreux entretiens avec les collecteurs de diamants de Carnot, Guen et Boda tenus entre le 24 et le 27 avril 2014.

60. En mars, le Bureau d'achat de diamants en Centrafrique (Badica) avait 760 carats de diamants en stock¹⁸. Son administrateur gérant a déclaré au Groupe d'experts que la société n'achetait plus de diamants à cause de la suspension de la République centrafricaine du Système de certification du Processus de Kimberley mais aussi par crainte que ses bureaux sur le terrain ne soient pillés, comme cela s'était produit à Berberati en février 2014¹⁹. Toutefois, un second inventaire des stocks de Badica, effectué en avril 2014, a révélé que la société avait acheté 1 698 carats supplémentaires, d'une valeur de 292 917 dollars, à Bria et Sam-Ouandja²⁰. Les lots de diamants que Badica conservait dans ses stocks n'avaient pas encore été scellés ou datés par les services miniers, comme ils auraient dû l'être d'après la feuille de route que les autorités centrafricaines avaient présentée en juin 2013 afin de pouvoir réintégrer le Processus de Kimberley²¹.

61. On n'a pas trouvé de stocks chez les sociétés Sud Azur et Socadium; l'administrateur gérant de la première a dit au Groupe d'experts que la société avait préfinancé des opérations d'extraction dans l'ouest et l'est du pays, mais qu'elle n'avait pas pu aller plus loin à cause de l'insécurité dans ces zones.

62. Une petite partie de la production est donc vendue légalement en République centrafricaine et stockée à Bangui et les diamants bruts sont également taillés dans la capitale pour être revendus sur place et éventuellement envoyés à l'étranger, que ce soit sous la forme d'articles de joaillerie ou autre. La bijouterie Guinot, qui possède une licence diamantaire pour l'achat, la taille et le polissage des diamants, produit ainsi chaque mois jusqu'à 100 carats. Les diamants taillés vendus à Bangui sont généralement destinés à des particuliers et non pas à la revente. Le Système de certification des diamants bruts du Processus de Kimberley ne porte pas sur la vente des diamants taillés.

63. En avril 2014, le Groupe s'est rendu dans l'ouest du pays pour visiter des sites d'extraction artisanale. D'après les mineurs rencontrés sur place, la production diamantaire sur l'axe Boda-Guen-Carnot a baissé de 50 % à 70 % par rapport à 2013. Cette baisse est due en grande partie au départ de la quasi-totalité des collecteurs musulmans à la suite du retrait des forces de la Séléka et de l'insurrection des milices anti-balaka à la fin du mois de janvier 2014. Les collecteurs préfinançaient les opérations d'extraction et achetaient la production des mineurs pour la vendre aux bureaux d'achats de Bangui ou la faire sortir du pays en contrebande. Ces collecteurs avaient quitté leurs pays d'origine, comme le Mali, le Sénégal ou le Tchad, pour se rendre dans les zones diamantifères de l'est de la République centrafricaine toujours sous le contrôle de la Séléka ou s'établir dans des villes frontalières du Cameroun comme Kenzou et Garoua-Boulaï. Ceux qui étaient restés dans les zones diamantifères de l'ouest étaient généralement de confession chrétienne ou double (chrétienne et musulmane). Certains, comme

¹⁸ Badica fait partie du Groupe Abdoukarim, compagnie sise à Anvers qui est membre de la bourse du diamant de cette ville. Le groupe possède également la société de transport aérien Minair et la société de transport routier Sofia. Ces trois sociétés sont inscrites au registre du commerce de la République centrafricaine. Voir www.groupeabdoukarim.com (lien vérifié le 22 mai 2014).

¹⁹ Entretien avec l'administrateur gérant de Badica à Bangui, le 28 avril 2014.

²⁰ Le compte rendu de la mission de contrôle et de vérification des stocks du bureau d'achats Badica est conservé dans les archives de l'ONU.

²¹ La feuille de route pour le Processus de Kimberley (juin 2013) est conservée dans les archives de l'ONU.

Léonard Bakongo à Guen et Grégoire Moussa à Sasele, occupaient également des fonctions de commandement au sein des anti-balaka.

64. En plus de leur travail de mineurs ou de collecteurs, les anti-balaka proposaient leur protection aux négociants de diamants des centres urbains en échange de fonds. À Carnot, ils ont avoué au Groupe d'experts que leur chef de section, Aimé Blaise Zoworo, avait pris contact avec les collecteurs qui travaillaient ou avaient travaillé avec les bureaux d'achats afin de marchander sa protection. Le Groupe avait déjà auparavant vu la liste des personnes visées (voir annexe 9). Zoworo et ses hommes font partie de la structure de commandement associée à Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona (voir annexe 5) et portent des cartes d'identification standard (voir annexe 5.3).

65. À Carnot, les anti-balaka, tout comme les Séléka avant eux, monnaient leur protection auprès des acteurs économiques. D'après l'Unité spéciale antifraude (USAF) de Carnot, les Séléka exigeaient des versements mensuels de 400 dollars auprès des bureaux d'achats et de 100 dollars auprès des collecteurs.

66. En mai 2014, le Groupe d'experts s'est rendu dans le centre d'achats de diamants de Bria. D'après les autorités minières locales, les éléments de la Séléka patrouillent le long de la route principale menant vers le nord mais ne sont pas présents dans les zones minières. En revanche, d'après les collecteurs que le Groupe a rencontrés, ils seraient bien présents dans ces zones, mais ils ne percevraient pas de taxes. Avant l'arrivée des forces de la MISCA et de l'opération Sangaris le 7 avril, ils imposaient une redevance à l'atterrissage de 75 dollars aux compagnies aériennes privées dont Sodiam et Badica affrétaient les avions pour expédier les diamants à Bangui.

67. Les principaux collecteurs de Bangui, Guen, et Bria disent vendre leurs diamants en toute légalité aux bureaux d'achats de Bangui, et accusent les autres collecteurs et trafiquants de faire passer des diamants en contrebande au Cameroun, au Soudan et au Tchad. En réalité, de nombreux collecteurs écoulent une partie de leurs diamants légalement afin de pouvoir se justifier auprès des autorités minières et en revendent une autre partie à l'étranger par des voies détournées, simplement parce que la capacité d'achats des bureaux de Bangui est très réduite. D'après des officiers des forces armées centrafricaines, les collecteurs et experts diamantaires de Bangui et Bria, le « général » de la Séléka Omar Younous, alias « Oumar Sodiam », fait le trafic de diamants en provenance de Bria et Sam-Ouandja vers le Soudan. Le Groupe continue d'enquêter à partir des informations préliminaires qui lui ont été communiquées sur les trafiquants de diamants qui opèrent depuis le Cameroun et le Tchad.

2. L'or

68. Environ deux tonnes d'or par an sont extraites artisanalement en République centrafricaine, soit une valeur équivalente à celle du secteur diamantifère²². Les gisements aurifères sont globalement situés dans les mêmes zones que les gisements

²² Tieguhong Julius Chupezi, Verina Ingram et Jolien Schure, *Impacts of Artisanal Gold and Diamond Mining on Livelihoods and the Environment in the Sangha Tri-national Park Landscape* (Bogor, Indonésie, Centre for International Forestry Research, 2009). Disponible à l'adresse www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BChupezi0901.pdf (lien vérifié le 3 mai 2014).

de diamants. Officiellement, en 2013, la République centrafricaine a exporté 11 kilogrammes et vendu moins de 1 kilogramme d'or sur le marché local de la joaillerie après apposition du poinçon de la Direction générale des mines et de la géologie²³. Dans la pratique, toute la production d'or du pays est exportée illégalement vers les pays voisins. Par exemple, entre 2013 et 2014, les autorités douanières de l'aéroport de Douala, au Cameroun, ont saisi au total 7,5 kilogrammes d'or que transportaient trois voyageurs dont un Camerounais et deux Chinois en provenance de Bangui²⁴.

69. En décembre 2012, le seul prospecteur d'or industriel du pays, la compagnie minière canadienne Axmin Inc., a cessé ses activités à Ndassima (province d'Ouaka), à environ 400 km au nord-est de Bangui, à cause des agissements des rebelles. La compagnie a signalé que des rebelles venus du nord pour s'emparer de la ville de Bambari avaient pris d'assaut puis occupé le campement de sa mine d'or, et avaient volé nourriture, fournitures médicales et véhicules²⁵. Les activités d'Axmin à Ndassima font partie du projet Passendro et, une fois opérationnelles, les mines de Passendro devaient produire environ 6 400 kilogrammes de minerai pendant les trois premières années²⁶.

70. En mai 2014, le Groupe d'experts a visité la mine d'or de Ndassima où plusieurs centaines de mineurs produisent de manière artisanale environ 15 kilogrammes d'or par mois pour le compte d'Axmin (voir annexe 10). Les forces de la Séléka de la cinquième région militaire du district d'Ouaka, qui est sous le commandement du général Ali Daras, occupent le campement de la mine d'Axmin et gardent l'entrée du village situé avant la mine (voir annexes 6 et 11). D'après les artisans-mineurs, les commerçants locaux et un commandant de la Séléka, les soldats ont pour ordre de ne se livrer à aucune activité commerciale et de ne percevoir aucune taxe²⁷. Ils reçoivent néanmoins des fonds de la population lorsqu'ils interviennent en cas de vol notamment. L'or de Ndassima est pour l'essentiel introduit en contrebande au Cameroun par transport aérien ou routier après avoir transité par Bangui.

3. Les espèces sauvages

71. Le braconnage et le trafic d'espèces sauvages sont des activités centrales de la rébellion Séléka qui a débuté dans le nord-est du pays pour s'étendre au sud-est après avoir pris le pouvoir à Bangui en mars 2013. En décembre 2012, sur les 60 écogardes engagés dans le cadre du projet Écofaune financé par l'Union européenne pour patrouiller dans les parcs nationaux de Bamingui-Bangoran et Manovo-Gounda-Saint-Floris dans le nord du pays, 22 ont rejoint la Séléka et pillé

²³ Documentation sur la situation minière et douanière des exportations d'or (de janvier à décembre 2013), conservée dans les archives de l'ONU.

²⁴ Documentation conservée dans les archives de l'ONU.

²⁵ Voir www.axmininc.com/site/Newsnbsp/News2012/PRDecember242012.aspx (lien vérifié le 3 mai 2014).

²⁶ Omayra Bermúdez-Lugo, « The mineral industries of Central African Republic and Togo », 2012 Minerals Yearbook (United States Geological Survey, décembre 2013).

²⁷ Entretien avec les mineurs, les négociants d'or et les commandants de la Séléka, Ndassima, 22 mai 2014.

le poste de garde de Sangba²⁸. Ils étaient soupçonnés d'avoir participé au massacre de 12 éléphants dans la région en février 2013²⁹.

72. Si, selon toute vraisemblance, il reste peu d'éléphants dans la zone, la chasse de certaines espèces de grandes antilopes comme l'éland de Derby et le bongo et la vente de leur viande continuent d'être une source de revenus pour les forces locales de la Séléka qui contrôlent ces activités soit en pratiquant eux-mêmes leur chasse soit en fournissant des armes et des munitions aux braconniers. Les routes commerciales empruntées par la viande de brousse mènent à Bangui mais aussi au Soudan et au Tchad. D'après les autorités locales et les associations de protection de la nature de Ndélé (province de Bamingui-Bangoran), Aroun Assane, alias « Tigane », serait le principal transporteur de viande de brousse pour le compte de la Séléka³⁰.

73. Avant la défection des écogardes et le pillage du poste de garde de Sangba, la plupart des armes servant au projet Écofaune, dont 62 fusils d'assaut AK-47, avaient été remises au Ministère des eaux et forêts à Bangui afin d'éviter que les hommes de la Séléka ne s'en emparent³¹. Le 24 mars 2013, lorsqu'ils ont pris le contrôle de Bangui, ceux-ci ont pillé les dépôts du Ministère et ont volé, entre autres, 135 fusils d'assaut AK-47 et 124 défenses d'éléphant que l'office des forêts et de la faune sauvage avaient saisies depuis 20 ans (voir annexe 12).

74. Le 6 mai 2013, un groupe de braconniers lourdement armés a pénétré dans le parc national de Dzanga-Ndoki dans la province de Sangha Mbaere (au sud-ouest du pays) et a abattu 26 éléphants pour leurs défenses³². Les autorités de la Séléka à Bangui, aussi bien au Ministère des eaux et forêts qu'au Ministère de la défense, avaient autorisé cette opération menée au moyen de chevaux et de chameaux³³.

75. À la fin du moins de janvier 2014, quand les forces de la Séléka ont quitté le sud-ouest du pays, les anciens braconniers sont revenus. Le 17 février 2014, la gendarmerie et les services de protection de la faune sauvage de Bayanga ont arrêté René Sangha Zéle, un braconnier bien connu de leurs services, à l'intérieur du Parc national de Dzanga Sangha pour possession illicite d'un Mauser de calibre 375, fusil utilisé pour la chasse du gros gibier (en République centrafricaine, il s'agit principalement des buffles et des éléphants, deux espèces protégées)³⁴. En 2007, les autorités centrafricaines avaient déjà arrêté René Sangha Zéle pour le massacre d'éléphants mais celui-ci avait réussi à s'échapper avant d'être rattrapé en août 2013

²⁸ Entretien avec les associations de protection de la nature, Bangui, 20 mars 2014.

²⁹ Kasper Agger, *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic* (Enough Project, mai 2014). Disponible à l'adresse www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf (lien vérifié le 17 mai 2014).

³⁰ Entretiens avec les associations de protection de la nature et les autorités locales de Ndélé et Bangui, 20 et 22 mars et 8 avril.

³¹ Une lettre du Ministère accusant réception des armes servant au projet Écofaune est conservée dans les archives de l'ONU.

³² Wildlife News, « Elephant death toll at Dzanga Bai starts to come in », 10 mai 2013. Disponible à l'adresse <http://wildlifeneeds.co.uk/2013/elephant-death-toll-at-dzanga-bai-start-to-come-in> (lien vérifié le 17 mai 2014).

³³ Entretiens avec les associations de protection de la nature et les gardes forestiers, Bangui, 20 mars et 21 avril 2014.

³⁴ Informations fournies par les associations de protection de la nature, Bangui et Yaoundé, 1^{er} avril 2014.

au Cameroun, dans le Parc national de Lobeke en possession de deux défenses et d'un fusil de chasse de gros calibre. En septembre 2013, le tribunal de Yokadouma a condamné René Sangha à deux mois de prison et son frère jumeau, Symphorien Sangha, à une peine maximale de trois ans d'emprisonnement pour avoir été non seulement massacré des éléphants, mais aussi agressé un garde forestier³⁵. Les frères Sangha sont accusés d'avoir massacré 100 éléphants dans le Parc trinational de la Sangha³⁶.

76. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur le réseau de braconnage de René Sangha, dont ferait partie un policier de Salo, d'après les associations de protection de la nature et les autorités de préservation de la faune sauvage, et sur le rôle que celui-ci aurait joué dans l'importation illégale de fusils de chasse et de munitions en République centrafricaine, en violation de l'embargo sur les armes.

77. On trouvera à l'annexe 13 une autre analyse qui porte sur le bois, le bétail et le pétrole.

III. Violations de l'embargo sur les armes

A. Point sur les armes et munitions présentes en République centrafricaine

78. Le renforcement des contingents français et des forces de maintien de la paix de l'Union africaine prévu dans la résolution 2127 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité a entraîné la dissolution de la Séléka, ce qui a rendu totalement impossible tout contrôle des stocks d'armes et de munitions auparavant détenus par le Gouvernement.

79. En se fondant sur des sources et indicateurs divers pour estimer la taille et la nature des arsenaux du pays, le Groupe d'experts a dressé un inventaire des armes et munitions en circulation en République centrafricaine qui servira de référence pour contrôler le respect de l'embargo et évaluer ses effets.

80. En procédant à une analyse qualitative des armes et munitions saisies par la MISCA et les forces françaises lors des opérations de désarmement qu'elles mènent depuis décembre 2013, le Groupe d'experts a pu se faire une idée précise des différents types et modèles de matériel militaire en circulation dans le pays. Il est convaincu que cet arsenal est représentatif des stocks d'armes qui étaient détenus par les forces gouvernementales ou la Séléka, lesquels se composent essentiellement d'armes légères et de petit calibre, auxquelles viennent s'ajouter quelques mortiers de calibre inférieur ou égal à 120 mm et d'autres systèmes d'armes, notamment des lance-roquettes multiples, deux hélicoptères d'attaque Mi-24 hors service stationnés à la base aérienne de Bangui et des véhicules blindés de transport de troupes (voir annexe 14). Le Registre des armes classiques ne fait état d'aucune exportation d'armes classiques à destination de la République centrafricaine en dehors de trois véhicules blindés fournis par la Slovaquie en 2008. Les armes et munitions se trouvant en République centrafricaine sont cataloguées aux annexes 15 et 16.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Robbie Corey-Boulet, « Cameroon court judges twin brothers accused of killing 100 éléphants », 24 septembre 2013. Disponible à l'adresse www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-court-judges-twin-brothers-accused-of-killing-100-elephants/1755919.html (lien vérifié le 17 mai 2014)

81. Les munitions en circulation en République centrafricaine proviennent de plusieurs pays, les plus récentes ayant été fabriquées au Soudan entre 2011 et 2013. D'après le catalogue établi par le Groupe d'experts, qui recense 116 types de cartouche et précise leur fabricant et leur année de fabrication, les munitions utilisées dans le pays ont été produites par 42 fabricants de 16 pays différents sur 52 ans (de 1961 à 2013).

B. Prolifération des armes

82. Faute de documents ou d'archives, le Groupe d'experts peut difficilement déterminer les quantités et la nature des armes et des munitions qui sont passées aux mains de divers groupes armés et réseaux criminels, et donc évaluer les proportions prises par la prolifération de ces armes et munitions dans l'ensemble du pays, voire dans la sous-région.

83. Les armes et munitions qui circulent actuellement en République centrafricaine proviennent pour la plupart :

- a) Des arsenaux des forces armées centrafricaines;
- b) Des stocks initiaux de la Séléka;
- c) Du détournement de stocks saisis lors des précédentes opérations de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réintégration;
- d) Du pillage de l'arsenal de l'ancien Président Bozizé;
- e) De la contrebande transfrontières à laquelle se livrent divers groupes armés et réseaux criminels.

84. Pour s'armer, la plupart des anciens éléments de la Séléka ont puisé dans les arsenaux gouvernementaux de Bossangoa et de Bossembélé, lors de leur marche sur Bangui. Deux inspections menées en décembre 2012 et en décembre 2013 par le Service de la lutte antimines de l'ONU dans trois entrepôts de Bangui où étaient stockées des munitions saisies lors d'opérations de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réintégration ont ainsi révélé que plus de 82 % des munitions obsolètes, soit 9 600 articles, et 98 % des munitions d'armes de petit calibre, soit 164 000 cartouches, qui s'y trouvaient avaient disparu. Par ailleurs, lorsqu'ils étaient au pouvoir, les éléments de la Séléka avaient également récupéré des armes qui avaient été saisies précédemment par la Force multinationale d'Afrique centrale lors d'opérations de désarmement³⁷.

85. Sur l'ensemble du matériel militaire initialement détenu par les quelque 8 000 membres des forces armées centrafricaines, y compris la gendarmerie, et les quelques centaines de combattants de la Séléka avant la prise de Bangui, seuls 122 fusils d'assaut (52 appartenant à la gendarmerie et 70 aux forces armées centrafricaines) seraient officiellement détenus par les forces régulières de la République centrafricaine. À Bangui, les forces internationales ont récupéré quelque 1 100 armes de petit calibre et sans doute la majorité des armes légères et des munitions qui étaient aux mains des anciens éléments de la Séléka stationnés dans la capitale,

³⁷ Copie d'un bordereau de remise de ces armes signé par un membre de la Force multinationale de l'Afrique centrale et le général Issa Issaka, archivée à l'ONU.

notamment des mitrailleuses légères et lourdes de calibre inférieur ou égal à 14,5 mm, des mortiers de 60 à 120 mm de calibre et divers types de roquette (voir annexe 14).

86. Le Groupe d'experts a appris que les armes de petit calibre, en prolifération, étaient revendues sur le marché local. D'anciens éléments de la Séléka auraient ainsi vendu des fusils d'assaut de type AK pour 80 dollars environ dans certaines zones et les « anti-balaka » des grenades de type 82-2 de fabrication chinoise pour un prix pour 1 ou 2 dollars. D'après les intervenants humanitaires, les grenades avaient posé de gros problèmes au premier trimestre 2014, faisant plusieurs morts et blessés, y compris des enfants, parmi la population civile.

87. À Bangui, les armes de petit calibre ont été beaucoup moins présentes ces deux derniers mois, même si on entend encore parfois des coups de feu la nuit dans certains quartiers. En dehors de la capitale, le Groupe d'experts a pu constater qu'il existait plusieurs postes de contrôle établis par les « anti-balaka » qui étaient tenus par des hommes armés, dont certains en uniforme et munis de fusils d'assaut, ou des combattants locaux en civil armés de fusils de chasse traditionnels ou de machettes.

88. Le Groupe d'experts a également vu des petits groupes de combattants anti-balaka armés de fusils d'assaut, de mitraillettes légères et de roquettes qui se déplaçaient en convoi à bord de deux pick-ups. Plusieurs incidents survenus dans le nord du pays et certains rapports sur la sécurité donnent également à penser qu'il y aurait des armes de petit calibre aux mains de groupes armés non identifiés ou associés aux anciens éléments de la Séléka. Rien ne laisse toutefois supposer que des mitrailleuses lourdes, des canons sans recul ou des mortiers aient été utilisés.

C. Transfert illicite d'armes et de munitions

89. Après inspection des armes et des munitions saisies, le Groupe d'experts a pu commencer à enquêter sur le transfert illicite d'armes de petit calibre et de munitions, qui constitue une violation de l'embargo. Il a ainsi pu constater par trois fois la présence d'armes de petit calibre qui n'avaient encore jamais figuré dans les arsenaux des forces armées de la République centrafricaine ou des anciens combattants de la Séléka.

90. Dans le premier cas, le marquage et le numéro de série d'un lot de fusils d'assaut de type AKM avaient été délibérément effacés à l'aide d'un outil abrasif (voir annexe 17), sans doute pour dissimuler la provenance des armes, lesquelles pourraient avoir été introduites illégalement dans le pays en violation de l'embargo. D'autres groupes d'experts mandatés par le Conseil de sécurité ont signalé que la même méthode avait été utilisée pour empêcher le traçage des armes, et donc le contrôle du respect de l'embargo qui les frappe³⁸. Le Groupe d'experts enquête actuellement sur les deux autres cas.

91. Pour finir, le Groupe d'experts enquête sur la saisie, par les douanes centrafricaines, de munitions de chasse de 12 mm de calibre introduites illégalement par une femme et un enfant au principal point de passage de la frontière terrestre avec le Cameroun. Le Groupe a été informé que des cartouches identiques avaient

³⁸ Le Groupe d'experts sur la Côte d'Ivoire a signalé dans plusieurs de ses rapports que cette méthode avait été utilisée pour des armes détenues par les Forces nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire (voir par exemple [S/2013/228](#)).

déjà été passées en contrebande au même endroit. Ces munitions de fabrication européenne ont été expédiées à un courtier au Cameroun avec un certificat d'utilisateur final indiquant qu'elles ne seraient ni vendues ni réexportées. Cette affaire prouve que la contrebande d'armes et de munitions s'explique non seulement par la porosité des frontières, mais aussi par l'absence d'échange réel d'informations relatives aux transferts d'armes et de munitions illicites entre les États de la sous-région, comme prévu par la Convention de l'Afrique centrale pour le contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre, de leurs munitions et de toutes pièces et composantes pouvant servir à leur fabrication, réparation et assemblage de novembre 2010.

92. Le Groupe d'experts a mené une enquête approfondie sur cette affaire car il s'est aperçu à l'occasion de déplacements sur le terrain et d'inspections que des éléments anti-balaka utilisaient des cartouches conçues pour petit gibier qu'ils modifiaient, de façon à pouvoir les utiliser contre du grand gibier, voire des êtres humains, en les vidant de leurs plombs d'origine pour les remplacer par des plombs de fabrication artisanale ou en les substituant par des cartouches militaires de 7,62 mm ou des balles artisanales pour fusil de chasse. Ce procédé, bien que rudimentaire, pourrait bien être encore amélioré de façon à donner à terme les résultats escomptés (voir annexe 18).

93. On trouvera à l'annexe 19 une description du cadre juridique dans lequel s'inscrit l'embargo sur les armes. Les cas de non-respect de l'embargo et les initiatives prises par la communauté internationale pour appuyer la réforme du secteur de la sécurité en République centrafricaine sont détaillés respectivement dans les annexes 21 et 20.

IV. Entrave à l'apport de l'aide humanitaire en République centrafricaine

94. En 2014, les organisations humanitaires continuent de lutter contre la crise humanitaire en République centrafricaine où, faute de pouvoir accéder à une grande partie du pays, du fait de l'insécurité qui y règne, et de disposer de fonds suffisants, entre autres raisons, elles ont à faire face à l'une des plus graves situations d'urgence humanitaire du continent africain.

95. D'après le Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires³⁹, il y a 560 050 déplacés dans le pays, dont 135 050 se trouvent dans l'un des 43 camps de Bangui ou dans des familles d'accueil. Sur une population d'environ 4,6 millions de personnes, 2,5 millions, soit près de la moitié, sont tributaires de l'aide humanitaire. Les groupes de population vulnérables ont besoin de nourriture, de services d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement, d'abris d'urgence, de denrées non alimentaires, de soins médicaux, d'une éducation et d'une protection.

96. D'après les derniers chiffres du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, outre les 244 783 personnes déjà déplacées, 120 472 autres ont quitté la République centrafricaine pour les pays voisins depuis décembre 2013. Le Cameroun accueille la grande majorité des réfugiés centrafricains, suivi du Tchad,

³⁹ Rapport de situation sur la République centrafricaine n° 25 (14 mai 2014). Disponible à l'adresse suivante : <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info>, lien vérifié le 21 mai 2014.

de la République démocratique du Congo et de la République du Congo (voir annexe 31)⁴⁰.

97. Après enquête, le Groupe d'experts a pu établir que 103 cas d'entrave à l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire, acte tombant sous le coup du paragraphe 37 e) de la résolution 2134 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité, qui s'étaient produits en République centrafricaine entre le 5 décembre 2013 et le 30 avril 2014. Ce chiffre ne comprend pas tous les incidents qui ont eu lieu dans le pays. Les données recueillies à Boda et à Ndélé montrent que l'insécurité entrave l'action des organisations humanitaires, notamment la distribution de l'aide aux populations vulnérables (voir annexes 22 et 23).

98. Au cours de la période susmentionnée, 14 agents humanitaires ont été tués en République centrafricaine (voir annexe 24) lors d'incidents sans liens apparents entre eux (voir annexe 28). Certains ont été tués à cause de leur travail et d'autres à la faveur d'actes de violence gratuite (voir annexe 24).

99. D'après des renseignements recueillis par le Groupe d'experts auprès de sources directes et indirectes, les auteurs ont été identifiés dans près de 60 % des incidents recensés. Les groupes anti-balaka seraient responsables d'environ 30 % de ces incidents, les membres de l'ex-Séléka d'environ 25 %, et d'autres groupes ou auteurs inconnus d'environ 45 % (voir annexe 24).

100. D'après les informations recueillies par le Groupe d'experts, il y a eu pendant la période considérée 13 incidents au cours desquels des convois humanitaires ont été attaqués, bloqués ou menacés. Ces attaques ont eu de graves répercussions sur l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et les moyens de subsistance des groupes de population vulnérables (voir annexe 24).

101. Par ailleurs, des convois qui transportaient des civils musulmans fuyant pour des raisons de sécurité ont, d'après les informations recueillies, subi des attaques qui ont fait au moins 10 morts.

102. Fait particulièrement préoccupant, plusieurs cas d'entrave à l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire imputés à des éléments anti-balaka ciblaient des agents humanitaires musulmans ou l'aide destinée à des zones à majorité musulmane. (Pour plus de détails sur ces incidents, voir l'annexe 24.)

103. Au cours de la période considérée, les organisations humanitaires n'ont cessé d'être arrêtées, harcelées et bloquées aux barrages mis en place par différents groupes armés ou criminels, qui leur extorquent de l'argent en échange de leur sécurité ou du libre passage.

V. Violations du droit international humanitaire⁴¹

104. Après enquête, et sur la base d'informations de sources directes et indirectes, le Groupe d'experts a établi qu'environ 2 424 civils, y compris des humanitaires, avaient été tués par les parties au conflit entre le 5 décembre 2013 et le 30 avril

⁴⁰ Central African Republic Situation UNHCR External Regional Update 15 (9-15 mai 2014). Disponible à l'adresse suivante : <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20External%20Regional%20Update%20CAR%20Situation%20%2315.pdf>, lien vérifié le 21 mai 2014.

⁴¹ Voir annexe 28 pour des précisions d'ordre méthodologique.

2014 (voir annexe 25)⁴². Ces meurtres ont été commis, dans leur grande majorité, à Bangui lors de la vague de violence de décembre 2013, mais d'autres civils ont été tués dans tout le pays au cours des premiers mois de 2014 par toutes les parties au conflit (voir annexe 27).

105. Le massacre commis dans le village de Guen (province de Mambéré-Kadéï), dans lequel le Groupe s'est rendu le 25 avril 2014, au cours duquel les groupes anti-balaka ont tué 43 civils les 1^{er} et 5 février 2014, est l'un des plus graves incidents rapportés pour la période concernée (voir annexe 29).

106. Les restrictions imposées à la liberté de circulation des civils sur le territoire centrafricain sont un sujet de préoccupation croissant pour le Groupe d'experts. Pour y faire face, le module Protection du Comité permanent interorganisations a donc mis au point la notion de « communautés à risque »⁴³, lesquelles sont, à l'heure actuelle, au nombre de 11 se trouvant en majorité dans l'ouest du pays et comptant environ 21 000 personnes. Les populations du PK5 (Bangui), de Boda (province de Lobaye), de Carnot (province de Mambéré-Kadéï) et de Bouar (province de Nana Mambéré) sont dans une situation particulièrement préoccupante⁴⁴. Certaines n'ont été classées dans la catégorie des communautés à risque que récemment, alors que d'autres, comme celles de Boali, Bossembélé et Yaloke (province d'Ombella-Mpoko), l'ont été il y a quelques mois. Une partie de la population de ces localités s'est réfugiée au Cameroun, ce qui a fait baisser le nombre de personnes exposées mais a aussi contribué à vider l'ouest de la République centrafricaine de sa population musulmane en raison des violences communautaires et interconfessionnelles⁴⁵.

107. À ce jour, trois opérations de réinstallation de civils musulmans dans d'autres régions du pays et au Cameroun ont été organisées : à Bossembélé le 17 janvier 2014 (58 personnes), à Bossangoa (province d'Ouham) le 14 avril 2014 (540 personnes, ayant pour la plupart décidé de partir d'elles-mêmes) et dans le PK12 du 21 au 30 avril 2014 (environ 1 300 personnes).

108. La population civile a souvent difficilement accès aux services de base (santé, éducation, sécurité et autres), ce qui est particulièrement préoccupant.

109. L'UNICEF signale qu'à la date du présent rapport, près des deux tiers des écoles du pays étaient toujours fermées³⁹, alors que plus de la moitié de l'année scolaire s'était déjà écoulée. D'après le module Éducation du Comité permanent interorganisations, 111 écoles ont été attaquées entre le 1^{er} mars 2013 et le 30 avril 2014, soit 33 % du total des écoles du pays⁴⁶. Les dates exactes de ces attaques ne sont pas connues, en raison principalement de l'impossibilité dans laquelle se trouvent les humanitaires d'accéder à de nombreuses régions du pays, en particulier

⁴² Estimation fondée sur les informations auxquelles le Groupe d'experts a eu accès.

⁴³ Le module Protection détermine qu'une communauté est à risque en fonction de trois facteurs : l'absence de liberté de circulation, la violence et l'insécurité généralisées, et l'absence d'accès à l'aide humanitaire.

⁴⁴ Le Groupe d'experts a corroboré cette information grâce aux entretiens qu'il a eus et aux visites qu'il a effectuées dans les localités mentionnées.

⁴⁵ Entretien avec le responsable du module Protection, Bangui, le 22 mai 2014.

⁴⁶ Le module Éducation parle d'attaque en cas de : pillage par un groupe armé ou des civils; occupation par un groupe armé; incendie volontaire; tirs par balle ou tout autre type de projectile; ou de pose d'explosif.

aux zones rurales⁴⁷. Le Groupe d'experts a pu constater que les écoles étaient fermées lorsqu'il s'est rendu à Ndélé et à Boda.

110. Au cours de la période susmentionnée, le Groupe a recensé sept attaques visant des hôpitaux par des éléments armés qui, dans chaque cas, s'en sont pris aux hôpitaux, ont volé du matériel et fait obstacle à l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire destinée à la population civile. Des incidents ont été signalés à Bangui, Ndélé, Boguila (province d'Ouham), Bouar et Yongoro (province de Nana Mambéré) dont un à Boguila, le 26 avril 2014, qui a coûté la vie à trois agents de l'aide humanitaire (voir annexe 24).

111. Le Groupe d'experts a recueilli auprès de sources indirectes des informations concernant six cas de violence sexuelle commise en République centrafricaine au cours de la période considérée (voir plus haut chap. II, sect. B, et annexe 30). Il enquêtera sur cette question au cours des prochains mois.

112. Le Groupe a obtenu de sources indirectes des renseignements sur cinq cas d'utilisation des enfants soldats, tous survenus dans le sud-est du pays et imputables à l'Armée de résistance du Seigneur. D'après l'UNICEF, le nombre d'enfants soldats a beaucoup augmenté en République centrafricaine. Jusqu'à 6 000 mineurs (âgés de moins de 18 ans) auraient été enrôlés par toutes les parties au conflit, soit pour combattre soit pour jouer un rôle de soutien⁴⁸. S'étant rendu sur le terrain, le Groupe n'a pas vu d'enfants soldats dans les rangs des groupes armés, mais il entend poursuivre ses recherches sur cette question particulièrement préoccupante.

VI. Recommandations

113. Le Groupe d'experts recommande au Comité :

a) De demander aux pays voisins de la République centrafricaine de publier chaque année des statistiques complètes sur l'importation et l'exportation de ressources naturelles, notamment de diamants et d'or;

b) D'encourager vivement toutes les parties, notamment les pays d'Afrique centrale, INTERPOL et les organisations régionales et sous-régionales à améliorer le partage de l'information et la collaboration afin d'enquêter sur les réseaux criminels régionaux impliqués dans l'exploitation et le commerce illicites des ressources naturelles, notamment les produits issus de la faune et de la flore sauvages, et de combattre ces réseaux;

c) De prier instamment les autorités de transition de la République centrafricaine de prendre toutes les mesures qui s'imposent pour :

i) Lui certifier que les membres des forces de défense et de sécurité connus pour faire partie de groupes armés actifs en République centrafricaine ont bien été renvoyés;

ii) Lui rendre compte des mesures qu'elles ont prises pour assurer la bonne gestion des armes et des munitions, notamment leur enregistrement, leur distribution, leur utilisation et leur entretien, et dresser la liste de tous leurs besoins en matière de formation et d'infrastructure.

⁴⁷ Voir <https://car.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/education>.

⁴⁸ Rencontre avec des représentants de l'UNICEF, le 27 mai 2014.

Annex 1: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel (last updated on 25 May 2014)

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
BINUCA/UNDP	1	1			
Cameroun	3		1	1	1
Central African Republic	2	2			
People's Republic of China	1				1
Republic of the Congo	1	1			
Gabon	1	1			
IWI	2		1		1
MAXAM	1	1			
MINUSCA	1	1			
Morocco	1		1		
SAMT	1	1			
SANGARIS	2		1		1
Senegal	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Togo	1			1	
Ukraine	1			1	
TOTAL	23	9	4	6	4

* Either the Member State or the entity indicated that a response is forthcoming, or the deadline has not expired at the time of drafting.

Annex 2: The political context of the Central African Republic

1. The current crisis is the culmination of several unresolved structural problems that have characterized the CAR for several decades. The permanence of *coups d'état* has deepened state fragility and ethnic divisions in both the administration and the armed forces, which has impeded economic progress and triggered a proliferation of non-state armed groups and of light weapons throughout the region.
2. As a result the country's political landscape is deeply fragmented, militarised and saturated with political actors showing little interest in finding sustainable and peaceful solutions to the crises.¹

A weakly institutionalized state

3. The delay in state building in the CAR has resulted in successive governments' inability to project substantive presence beyond the capital Bangui. This is mostly visible from security and administrative points of view. In fact, the state has never had the monopoly on the use of force in the country.² Successive governments' security forces were not just insufficiently equipped to provide basic security, but they have, in many ways like non-state armed groups, also been drivers of insecurity against civilians.³
4. Physical infrastructure is poorly developed with northern provinces being more marginalised and neglected than the southern ones, a situation that also owes to colonial patterns of state formation. Most rebel groups in the northeast cite this as one of their central grievances.⁴ Weak deployment of state institutions throughout the country means limited access to basic education, healthcare and other social services for a majority of the population. However, the recent professionalization of armed groups and their ambition to control physical territories is pushing them towards forms of political and security rule that could pre-empt governance arrangements with the central government in Bangui.⁵

¹ Panel's discussions with several local political actors, members of armed groups and academics in Bangui and Paris in March and May 2014.

² The Central African Republic in: Bertelsman Transformation Index 2014, accessed on 22 May 2014 at: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/caf/2014/index.nc>

³ Between 1981 and 2013 successive heads of State have demonstrated a pronounced suspicion towards the army which led to the marginalisation of armed forces to the benefit of presidential guards. Panel's discussions with political and security actors in Bangui, May 2014; several studies have well documented the very poor human rights record of the CAR security forces. For an overview, see: Sian Herbert, Nathalia Dukhan and Marielle Debos (2013), *State Fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?* Rapid literature review. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

⁴ Panel's interview with two ex-Seleka leaders, Bangui, 19 May 2014.

⁵ The recent Seleka statements after the meeting in Ndélé on 10 May 2014 mentioning their ambition to partition the country and create a "Republic of North Ubangui" are the most visible manifestations of this trend so far. Although this secession claim is contested within Seleka ranks, it nevertheless indicates that stateless enclaves are not necessarily lacking political and security control. See: Emmanuel Chauvin, Christian Seignobos (2014), *L'Imbroglie Centrafricain. Etats, rebelles et bandits: La fusion des territoires*; To be published in: *Afrique Contemporaine*, in 2014.

A profusion of politico-military groups

5. Since the early 2000s, a fundamental aspect of the CAR political landscape has been the presence and increased activities of a multitude of rebel groups (also referred to as politico-military groups) that have taken control of large swaths of the CAR's territory. While the reasons for their creation and expansion vary greatly, most rebel groups have understood the potential benefits linked to the maintenance of armed elements as a tool for political bargaining during peace negotiations. Because conflict resolution mechanisms in the CAR have favoured consensual exit strategies (inclusive political dialogue, power-sharing) with guaranteed impunity for grave human rights violations, the formation of a rebel group has become an additional tool for many political entrepreneurs with presidential ambitions.⁶
6. The systematic practice of impunity in the past has therefore increased militarisation tendencies and widespread human rights violations. In the last ten years state and non-state armed groups increasingly overlap. The distinction between rebels, bandits (*zarguinas*, poachers, illicit miners) and representatives of the state is not always clear. Not only do allegiances between actors fluctuate greatly, but also several fighters happen to be simultaneously rebels, bandits and representatives of the state. Many combatants follow the rebellion – reintegration – defection trajectory.⁷ It has come to the attention of the Panel in Bangui that several members of the former Seleka and anti-Balaka (currently the most important rebel groups) fall into this category, particularly those in government.

Decreased influence of political parties

7. In the last 20 years, the multiplication of politico-military groups has largely eclipsed political parties, which have struggled to exist in a context dominated by militarisation of social discontent.⁸ As a result of state capture by rebel groups, the space for political parties has been reduced and their capacity to mobilise social groups has suffered.
8. With the exception of independence, the last time a political party came to power without resorting to violence was in 1993 when Patassé's *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain* (MLPC) claimed victory and assumed power for 10 years. To date, there is no political party with nationwide representation and coverage.

⁶ The leader of a political party in the CAR calls this 'the country's reward for violence'. Panel's interview in Bangui, 19 May 2014. See also : International Crisis Group (2007), RCA, Anatomie d'un état fantôme, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No 136, p.26

⁷ Marielle Debos (2008), Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian combatants in the Central African Republic; African Affairs, Vol. 107, No 427, p.226.. E. Chauvin, C. Seignobos (2014) *ibid*.

⁸ Andreas Mehler (2009), Reshaping political space: the impact of armed insurgency in CAR; Working Paper No. 116. Hamburg: GIGA Institute of African Affairs. Accessed on 23 April 2014 at: http://repec.giga-hamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_wp116_mehler.pdf

9. The main political parties of the last 30 years (Kolingba's *Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain* (RDC), Patassé's MLPC and Bozizé's presidential coalition known as *Kwa na Kwa* (KNK)) hardly survived the ousting of their initiator, indicating their lack of ideological and social rooting. In fact, there are to date about 60 registered political parties in the CAR and it is rather unclear how representative they are at the moment, owing to the irregularity of elections under Bozizé. The result is a fragmentation of the party landscape and the persistence of personality-driven and ethnically based parties.⁹

Large presence of foreign combatants and implications

10. A recent development within politico-military groups is the increasingly large presence of foreign elements and particularly their direct involvement in political and military processes. Their presence in the CAR is the direct consequence of the decades long interconnection of local crises that have formed a regional conflict system between Chad, Sudan and the CAR characterised by historic transnational networks and cross-border activities in the tri-border zone.¹⁰
11. The porous nature of borders, historical patterns of living (including nomadism and an increasingly violent pastoralism)¹¹ and the existence of clan family links across borders have transformed the tri-border zone into a territory where civilians, traders, bandits and rebel groups are used to cross borders. The crisis in the CAR can therefore not be fully understood without taking into account the specific trajectory of mostly Chadian and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese combatants of various social provenances who have been roaming in the region for decades offering their skills to a multitude of clients across the borders of the tri-zone region.¹²

⁹ After the demise of Bozizé's regime in March 2013, political parties have attempted to build electoral groupings in order to maximise their chances in the post-transition elections expected to take place in 2015. As a result, 3 main coalitions of political parties currently dominate the political scene. However, the Panel could note the opportunistic nature of these groupings, which makes them vulnerable to regular change. The first grouping is the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Transition* (AFDT), which is centred around the MLPC, the former ruling party under President Patassé now led by his former Prime Minister Martin Ziguélé. In addition to the MLPC, the AFDT is composed of the *Alliance pour la solidarité et le développement* (ASD), the *Convention républicaine pour le progrès social* (CRPS) and the *Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain* (RDC). The second coalition consists of the parties that formed the former presidential majority under President Bozizé. It is currently led by his former communication minister Cyriaque Ngonda and is organized around the *Kwa na Kwa*. The third grouping, the *Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix* (ACDP) is comprised of parties from both former opposition and presidential majorities. It mainly claims to stand for a democratic renewal in contrast to the AFDT and KNK, which are linked to the previous regimes of Patassé and Bozizé.

¹⁰ Roland Marchal, *Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale*. Les Etudes du CERI No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr/ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf. Paris. p.4

¹¹ The Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures have always been very popular among Chadian and Sudanese herders who come to the CAR to pasture their herds. In recent decades, these foreign herders have acquired firearms, which they often use against local populations. In addition to being illegal, this activity is potentially detrimental to the CAR's ecosystem in the region. For some government members, Chad openly ignores existing bilateral arrangements that regulate this transhumance sphere. Panel's interview with a current Transition Government member who previously served in former governments. Bangui, March 2014.

¹² The conflict system between Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the CAR also involves to a lesser extent the DRC and Uganda. It is however not unique in Africa where a similar 'nomadism of combatants' was observed in the Mano river conflicts in West Africa. See Marielle Debos (2008), *Fluid Loyalties*, op.cit.

12. The composition of individual rebel groups forming the Seleka is representative of this trend without being unique in the Central African Republic's political history. In fact, the involvement of foreign elements in military-political battles started under Patassé who resorted to Libyan troops to protect his power, which had been threatened by a series of army mutinies and rebellions.
13. These rebellions, particularly the one led by the then former chief of staff Bozizé, were also comprised of substantial amounts of foreign fighters, mostly from Chad.¹³ However, the negative memory of Patassé's militarised response to mutinies and rebellions is rather linked to the support he got from foreign fighters from the DRC's *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) led by the former warlord turned vice-president and subsequently ICC defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba.¹⁴
14. President Patassé was eventually ousted on 13 March 2003 and François Bozizé assumed power inaugurating a new era of rebel groups mostly composed and supported by foreign elements. President Bozizé subsequently relied heavily on both elements of the *Armée Nationale du Tchad* (ANT) and some former Chadian 'Liberators'¹⁵ to rebuild his Presidential Guard and the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), the CAR armed forces. This strongly contributed to the widespread perception that Chad was the main mentor and patron of Bozizé's regime and by extension of the CAR as a country.¹⁶
15. Bozizé himself lost his power to a rebel coalition that displays a number of similar features like the one that had helped him to conquer the presidency ten years earlier: a rebel coalition comprised of several Chadian and Sudanese fighters, as well as support from Chad and other countries in the region despite the presence of a regional stabilization force. Because of this and other political developments, the CAR crisis cannot be understood without its regional dimension.¹⁷

The current transition

16. The incapacity of the Seleka to enforce a semblance of order and security in the country, including the capital, exposed the group's lack of governance capacity and ultimately prompted its downfall. In a combined diplomatic effort, France and ECCAS countries (particularly Chad and

¹³ ICG (2007), *ibid.* p. 16.

¹⁴ The brutal intervention of Bemba's forces alongside Patassé's Presidential Guard in 2002-2003 did not prevent Patassé's fall in 2003

¹⁵ Chadian Liberators are former unemployed Chadian soldiers that were recruited to fight alongside Bozizé's successful campaign to topple President Patassé in 2003. Many of them fell out with him and joined other rebel movements that later formed the Seleka and ousted Bozizé in 2013.

¹⁶ Michel Luntumbue et Simon Massock, 'Afrique Centrale, Risques et envers de la pax-tchadiana; Note d'Analyse du Groupe de Recherches et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP), 2014, pp 2-4.

¹⁷ Panel's telephone discussion with Roland Marchal, March 2014; see also Roland Marchal, *Aux marges du monde en Afrique Centrale. Les Etudes du CERI* No. 153-154; accessed on 10 May 2014 at: www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/ceri/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude153_154.pdf], and Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, *Mapping conflict motives: The Central African Republic*, Antwerpen: IPIS. 2009

Congo) obtained the demise of the Seleka leadership on 10 January 2014 at an extraordinary summit of the regional organisation held in N'Djamena.

17. The removal of President Djotodia by ECCAS is an unprecedented move that reflects both the regional organisation's involvement in the crisis and the CAR's dependence on its neighbours. This paved the way to a new transition led by Catherine Samba-Panza who was elected by the Transitional National Council (TNC) on 20 January 2014.
18. Initial hopes of a new beginning did not increase security for the population. On the contrary, fighting between the former Seleka and the anti-Balaka continued in several parts of the country as did targeted inter-communal killings that contributed to the misleading framing of the crisis in CAR as a religious conflict. The deployment of MISCA troops alongside the French forces (under operation SANGARIS) prevented worse from happening but did not stop the killing of civilians. The interim government was facing a number of structural problems that needed immediate attention: state coffers were empty, civil servants had not been paid for several months, and the administration was not functioning because of internal displacement and the slow deployment of international troops¹⁸.

Political agreements

19. Although marginal, episodic contestations around the legitimacy of the current transition have the potential to derail the Transitional Government as they touch upon the sensitive issue of representation in a context of increased identity politics.¹⁹ The country has a long history of failed transitions and weak peace agreements. Since Bozizé's seizure of power in 2003, rebellions have mushroomed in the CAR followed by a series of agreements that, according to several actors, have not seriously been implemented. Bozizé's fall can among others be blamed on his lack of political will to implement political agreements and to seriously engage in DDR.

Four main agreements were signed between Bozizé's government and different rebel groups.

- The first one was signed in Sirte (Libye) with the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) on 2 February 2007;
- The second one was signed on 13 April 2007 with the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR);
- The third accord was signed with the *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie* (APRD) on 9 May 2007.

¹⁸ It took the European Union about 3 months between the decision to deploy and the actual deployment of 800 soldiers to the CAR (EUFOR-CAR). The first soldiers only arrived in April 2014 and took control of the Bangui airport in order to allow the French troops to deploy elsewhere within the country.

¹⁹ Panel's discussions with political actors and representatives of anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka movements in May 2014 in Bangui could establish a growing contestation of the legitimacy of some transitional institutions like the Transitional National Council and the government.

- In order to harmonise all these agreements a fourth one was signed in Libreville in June 2008 between the government and the three rebel groups.²⁰

²⁰ For a good analysis of peace agreements signed between 2007 and 2008, see Alphonse Zozime Tamekamta (2013), *Gouvernance, rebellions armées et déficit sécuritaire en RCA. Comprendre les crises centrafricaines*. Note d'Analyse du GRIP, pp. 2-5

Annex 3: Neighbouring countries' contributions to the implementation of resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014)

A. Cameroon

1. The CAR shares an 800 km long land border with Cameroon that culminates in a tri-border zone with Chad in the North and another one with the Republic of Congo in the south. This western border is vital for the CAR as it is the passing point for all goods entering and exiting the country.¹
2. Since the renewed outbreak of violence in December 2013, Cameroon has received 80,004 refugees from the CAR bringing the total number of CAR refugees in Cameroon to about 191,265 people.² Cameroon is the country with the highest amount of refugees from CAR.
3. Among those fleeing the violence since March 2013 has also been a minority of ex-FACA who were duly disarmed and cantoned in various sites in Bertoua and Douala. Around 150 ex-FACA were concerned.³ These soldiers remain in Cameroon in expectation of a return to the CAR once conditions for the reform of the army have been put in place. Before being asked to leave Cameroon where he had sought refuge after leaving his country and where he had stayed for a couple of months, President Bozizé was actively pursuing his objective of 'restoring the constitutional order' using various channels including propaganda by some organisations led by his supporters.⁴ President Bozizé arrived in Cameroon on a CAR governmental helicopter that was seized by Cameroonian authorities in expectation of their retrocession to CAR.⁵
4. Cameroon has taken a number of measures to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014), including tightening controls on goods and passengers at the border area with the CAR, a region already considered as a priority security area because of intense activities of *zaraguinas* and other armed groups in the region. Having ratified the Kinshasa Convention, Cameroon has also undertaken additional steps to control the circulation of small arms and light weapons in the country. An Inter-ministerial Committee has been set up that is comprised of all departments affected by the crisis in the CAR.⁶ The aim of this Committee is to coordinate the Government's responses to the crisis and improve much-needed inter-

¹ The Cameroonian port of Douala is the nearest access the CAR has to the sea.

² Since the 1990s Cameroon has received successive waves of refugees fleeing war, widespread insecurity and hunger in the CAR. See UNHCR, Central African Republic Situation; UNHCR external Regional Update 15, 9-15 May 2014.

³ Meetings with Cameroonian government authorities and diplomats, Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁴ Levi Yakité's Mouvement de Résistance Populaire pour la Refondation de Centrafrique (MRPRC) was one of the most active groups in this regard.

⁵ Meeting with a diplomat in Yaoundé, April 2014; meeting with Foreign Ministry officials in Yaoundé, April 2014.

⁶ Those are the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Territorial administration and decentralization (chair), Interior and finally Customs and the Presidency.

departmental communication. Cameroon has also tightened up the screening of goods arriving at the Douala seaport and destined to the CAR.

5. Through CEMAC and ECCAS Cameroon has also participated in regional diplomatic, security and financial efforts to settle the crisis and implement Security Council resolutions. In addition to providing 850 military and police troops to MISCA.⁷ Cameroon has also contributed its share of financial support to the Transitional Government⁸.
6. However, Cameroon faces several challenges in fulfilling its duty of implementing resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014); the difficulty to monitor movements across the long and porous CAR-Cameroon border is certainly one of the most important. The limited capacity of the police and the army in terms of vehicles to patrol, well-trained manpower and the chronic problem of lack of fuel make any systematic border control difficult. There are, however, some exceptions to this. The *Brigade d' Intervention Rapide* (BIR), a better equipped, trained and motivated elite corps within the army has often been called to the rescue of overwhelmed regular troops.⁹ However the 10,000 strong BIR is currently much occupied on Cameroon's western border where Boko Haram has been abducting European and Chinese nationals from Cameroon's territory, posing new challenges to Cameroonian security agents. In some instances, the BIR has also been deployed within national parks to confront increasingly armed poachers.

B. Gabon

7. The Republic of Gabon does not border the CAR and has not been affected by refugee flows like its northern neighbours.¹⁰ No movements of arms have been recorded into or from the country as a consequence of the crisis in the CAR.¹¹ Gabon has mediated successive crises in the CAR until it handed over to the RoC and has provided a substantial amount of diplomatic and financial resources in the past. Today, the country provides 850 military and police personnel to MISCA.
8. As poaching has intensified in Central African, Congolese and Cameroonian forests, the Republic of Gabon has increased its border monitoring activities because the forest that runs across the four countries is regarded as a common good.

⁷ MISCA's Military Commander, General Tumenta, is from Cameroon.

⁸ CEMAC and ECCAS countries have all contributed 5 billion CFA francs (about 10 million USD) to help paying salaries in the CAR and partly fund MISCA.

⁹ Meeting with an official from the National Police of Cameroon, Yaoundé, April 2014.

¹⁰ According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, around 200 CAR refugees have been registered in Gabon; meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Gabon, Libreville, 24 April 2014.

¹¹ Meeting with the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of staff, Libreville, April 2014.

C. The Republic of Congo (RoC)

9. The RoC has a common border with the CAR in the north. About 16,000 refugees have arrived from the CAR since December 2013. A small number of these refugees were armed and have subsequently been disarmed and cantoned in refugee camps in Impfundo, Betou, Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville.¹²
10. At the political and diplomatic level, the RoC has taken over the mediation of the crisis from Gabon and chairs the International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR). Congo also maintains the highest amount of military and police personnel (roughly 1000) within MISCA and provides the political head of the mission. Both at the regional and bilateral levels, the Government of Congo has often assisted the CAR authorities financially. The RoC was the first ECCAS' country to provide 10 million USD assistance, which helped paying the salaries of CAR civil servants in March 2014 at a time when social expectations about the new transitional Government were very high.
11. Similar to Cameroon, the RoC has put in place a ministerial coordination framework aimed at harmonising the country' s actions regarding the crisis in the CAR. It is headed by the RoC Presidency.
12. For the RoC, the tri-border zone between Cameroon, Congo and the CAR is problematic because of increased poaching activities that deplete the country's forests of valuable resources. In general, the RoC's assessment of the crisis in the CAR is that it has the potential to spill across the border and sow divisions in a country that slowly recovers from its civil war of the late 1990s.
13. Measures taken by the Congolese Government to implement resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) include increased monitoring of the border and the screening of arms movements. However, due the fact that the border zones are covered with dense forest, the RoC struggles to monitor movements and admits that there are multiple unknown footpads that could be used by violent entrepreneurs. Some officials also think that a better management of Congo's border with the CAR could start with the proper demarcation of the border, a step that is to be understood in the framework of long-term conflict prevention.¹³

¹² Meetings with government officials, Brazzaville, May 2014.

¹³ Meetings with officials at the Interior Ministry, Brazzaville, May 2014.

Annex 4: Other armed groups

1. The Panel received five reports of incidents in the region of Paoua (Ouham-Pendé province) from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 involving a group described as composed of armed elements formerly part of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR), formerly commanded by Chadian rebel Abdelkader Babba Laddé, with a total of 26 casualties, including civilians, and hundreds of incidents of destruction of properties.
2. In the same region, an armed group called *Révolution et Justice* (RJ), commanded by Armel Bedaya alias Armel Sayo,¹ with the rank of Captain in the FACA, and who is known as the son-in-law and bodyguard of former President Ange-Félix Patassé, is allegedly responsible for the killing of four civilians on 28 January 2014, an intrusion into a humanitarian compound on 4 March 2014, and an attack on MISCA troops in the district of Ngaoundaye, bordering Cameroon, on 26 April 2014, which resulted in the death of four Cameroonian soldiers and the destruction of one military truck.
3. According to the Panel's database, an armed group identified as part of the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) of Abdullaye Miskine,² formerly allied with Armel Bedaya,³ is allegedly responsible of the killing of one civilian during a clash with French forces in the vicinity of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambere province) on 2 April 2014, located twenty kilometres from Garoua-Boulai, and for one incident of looting of property committed on 14 April 2014 in the same area. During a mission to the region, the Panel was told that attacks on international forces by FDPC are happening on a regular basis, and were described as involving most of time around 20 fighters either by foot or on motorbikes.⁴
4. In the Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangora provinces, the presence of individuals bearing distinctive signs of Janjaweed from the Darfur region of Sudan was confirmed by multiple sources and institutional contacts of the Panel. Also, the Panel documented one incident of an attack against humanitarian aid workers in Ndele involving alleged Janjaweed militiamen.
5. Lastly, concerning the activity of small groups associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), its presence was reported in the regions of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Haute and Basse-Kotto, the Panel documented in its database two killing of civilians, eight incidents of kidnapping of civilians (including 5 cases where the victims were released within approximately 48 hours), and three cases of looting and destruction of properties. The LRA has been moving during the past year deeper into the CAR territory, in reaction to increasing military pressure from African Union-Regional Task Force (AU/RTF).

¹ See annex 4.1.

² Abdullaye Miskine is included in the annex of US President Obama's executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

³ See annex 4.2.

⁴ Meeting with international forces, Béloko, 26 April 2014.

Annex 4.1: Armel Bedaya Sayo and “Révolution et Justice”

*Armel Bedaya Sayo delivering a speech to “Révolution et Justice” troops
(screenshots of a video allegedly taken in January 2014)¹*



¹ Video accessed on 1 April 2014 at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ybPTiMffLM>

Armel Bedaya Sayo with youths belonging to “Révolution et Justice” during a joint humanitarian operation with MISCA and UNHCR, on 31 March 2014



Annex 4.2: Abdullaye Miskine and Armel Bedaya Sayo

*Abdullaye Miskine (left) and Armel Bedaya Sayo
(picture allegedly taken in 2013)²*



² Accessed on 8 April 2014 at: <http://tchadonline.com/index.php/ufacard-communique-de-presse-crise-en-rca/ufacard-general-abdoulaye-miskine-et-commandant-armel-sayo-18-04-2013-17-01-55/>

Annex 5: Anti-Balaka - Structure and dynamics

History

1. The appellation “anti-Balaka” first appeared in the district of Bossangoa (Ouham) in mid-September 2013, following coordinated attacks conducted in the outskirts of Bossangoa on 6 and 7 September 2013 by militia then described by media as “pro-Bozizé armed men”.¹ The armed insurgency against Seleka troops then spread to the districts of Bouca (Ouham), Boali, Bossembélé and Bessemtélé (Ombella-Mpoko).
2. As confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, including anti-Balaka, and institutional contacts, FACA and *Gendarmes* personnel loyal to former President François Bozizé² were then recruiting youths from local communities from the Baya area (Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko provinces), some of them already part of hunting groups or self-defence militias called “*archers*”, created mainly in the mid-2000s in response to the activities of “*coupeurs de route*” or “*zaraguinas*”³, but also in the region of Garoua Boulai (border town between Cameroon and the CAR) and Zongo (DRC), a city located opposite to Bangui, on the DRC side of the Oubangui river.⁴
3. On 5 December 2013, around a thousand militia men conducted a coordinated attack by foot on Bangui, coming from at least three directions (international airport, Boy-Rabe/Cité Jean XIII neighbourhoods and Zongo), while groups of youth from the 4th and 8th arrondissements of Bangui, strongholds of the “*Coalition Citoyenne d’Opposition aux Rébellions Armées*” (COCORA) and “*Comité d’Organisation des Actions Citoyennes*” (COAC) created by key figures of President Bozizé’s *entourage* in December 2012 to track down supporters of the Seleka in Bangui, were also erecting barricades and harassing former Seleka troops in the capital.
4. At the same time, the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*”, commanded by a nephew of François Bozizé, Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’,⁵ and

¹ « Centrafrique: des villages autour de Bossangoa sous le contrôle d’hommes armés pro-Bozizé », RFI, 8 September 2013, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130908-centrafrique-villages-autour-bossangoa-sous-contrôle-hommes-armes-pro-bozize/>, accessed on 15 April 2014 ; see also annex 5.5 on Bossangoa.

² François Bozizé was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

³ Armed banditry in the region of northern Cameroon, southern Chad and north-west of the CAR has been extensively documented by researchers, in particular Louisa Lombard and Marielle Debos, and human rights organisations, notably Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

⁴ According to UN sources in DRC, anti-Balaka groups continue to pose a security threat in the region of Zongo.

⁵ Also brother of Maxime Mokom, military coordinator of the CLPC, Colonel “Rocco” was killed on 11 May 2014 while driving a motorbike together with Camille Lepage, a French photojournalist.

Mike Stève Yambété, founder of the COAC with the rank of Lieutenant in the FACA,⁶ based out of the region of Garoua Boulai, led its first military offensive on Cantonnier, on the other side of the border, and Béloko,⁷ clashing with former Seleka troops commanded by General Saïd Souleymane, of Sudanese origin, based in Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), who was eventually killed on 21 January 2014 while former Seleka troops were withdrawing towards southern Chad and eastern CAR. According to a diplomatic source in Yaoundé, the Cameroonian territory has been used by former President François Bozizé and his supporters to prepare the offensive on Bangui.⁸

Current status

5. The Panel classifies the anti-Balakas in four different categories:

- The first group, named “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC), is based out of the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui and operates in the north of the city, up to the town of Damara,⁹ and is issuing identification badges to its members, including in Carnot.¹⁰ It is coordinated at the military level by Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’,¹¹ a former FACA, and at the political level by a businessman named Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona,¹² former Youth and Sports Minister of the last Bozizé’s government, founder of the COCORA and president of the CAR Football federation.¹³
- The second group, which representation has shifted from Joachim Kokaté, adviser to the Primer Minister of the Transition with the rank of Captain in the FACA,¹⁴ to Sébastien Wénézoui, a 33 years-old engineer related to François Bozizé’s daughter Joséphine Kéléfio. The group, known as the “group of the anti-Balakas from the south”, is headed by the Chief-Corporal of the FACA Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Rombhot’ and FACA Lieutenant Gilbert Kamezoulai, and operates mainly in the southwest of the capital, out of the neighbourhood of PK9, and the towns of Bimbo, Bérengo, Pissa and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), racketing transport of goods and passengers as observed by the Panel.¹⁵
- The third category regroups local armed militias, mainly located in the south-west of the country (Mambere-kadei, Sangha Mbaere and Lobaye provinces), like in Guen and

⁶ Stève Yambété was according to several sources still jailed in Yaoundé, Cameroon, at the time of drafting, after being arrested on 17 January 2014 by Cameroonian authorities for attacking the Ecobank agency in Béloko, alongside the *Gendarmerie* Sabe and Rochael Mokom.

⁷ See also annex 5.1.

⁸ Meeting with a diplomatic source, Yaoundé, 16 April 2014.

⁹ See annex 5.2.

¹⁰ See annex 5.3.

¹¹ Meeting with ‘Colonel 12 puissances’, 22 March 2014.

¹² Meeting and telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 and 20 May 2014.

¹³ <http://fr.cafonline.com/association/central-african/information>, accessed on 28 May 2014.

¹⁴ Meetings and telephone conversation with Joachim Kokaté, Bangui, 20 March, 26 April and 3 May 2014.

¹⁵ Meeting with ‘Rombhot’, Mbaiki, 21 April 2014; meeting with ‘Rombhot’ and Kamezoulai, Bimbo, 26 May 2014; see also annex 5.4.

Gadzi,¹⁶ but also in some neighbourhoods of Bangui where 72 anti-Balaka groups were identified.¹⁷ In Bangui, former *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* - APRD - commander Jean-Jacques Larma alias ‘Larmassou’, has reportedly control of a neighbourhood south of the airport, although the CLPC claimed that ‘Larmassou’ was a fake anti-Balaka. He was arrested on 28 February by ‘Colonel 12 puissances’,¹⁸ and freed under unclear circumstances.

- The fourth group, whose command structure is mainly composed of FACA and *Gendarmes* of Baya origin, is the backbone of the original military insurgency against Seleka, and does not have any political figurehead. It still controls directly the road from Cantonnier (border post with Cameroon) to Bangui, and more specifically the towns of Bouar (Nana Mambéré province), Bozoum (Ouham Pendé province), and Bossangoa (Ouham province), Bossembélé and all the checkpoints from Boali to the PK 12 neighbourhood of Bangui (Ombella-Mpoko province). The Panel obtained information that troops were gathering during the months of March and April 2014 in the area of Ben Zambé (Ouham province), place of origin of Bozizé’s family located east of Bossangoa, where the presence in a training capacity of Teddy Bozizé, François Bozizé’s adoptive son, with the rank of Captain in the FACA, was eye witnessed by individuals interviewed by the Panel.¹⁹

6. The idiosyncratic complexity of the structure of the anti-Balaka is reinforced by the fluidity which characterizes the relationship between its different components. For example, Ngaïssona and Wénézoui claim to represent ‘Rombhot’, or to control the anti-Balaka groups in Boda and Bouar. Also, Minister Leopold Narcisse Bara, officially appointed by the Transitional Head of State as a representative of the anti-Balaka movement, but not recognised as such,²⁰ is perceived as being behind the initiative of the Reconciliation Minister, Antoinette Montaigne, that led to the election on 15 May 2014 of Sébastien Wenezoui, former CLPC deputy spokesperson, as general coordinator of the anti-Balaka movement. The leader of the CLPC, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, has qualified this election as a “farce”.²¹

¹⁶ See also annex 29.

¹⁷ Meeting with a transitional government official, Bangui, 27 May 2014.

¹⁸ Meeting with ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’, op. cit.; meeting with a confidential source member of the anti-Balaka, Bangui, 24 March 2014; see also Tweet from @lesamisdesiloe on 28 February 2014: #Centrafrique RNL - Thierry Libéré alias 12 puissances responsable Anti balaka a arrêté lieutenant Jean Jacques Larmassou après enquête, accessed at <https://twitter.com/lesamisdesiloe/status/439388030324191232> on 28 May 2014.

¹⁹ Meetings with local authorities, anti-Balaka representative, UN officials and international forces, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014; see also case study on Bossangoa, in annex 5.5.

²⁰ Meetings with anti-Balaka political and military leaders, March-May 2014.

²¹ Telephone conversation with Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, 20 May 2014; Press communiqué number 11, received on 18 May 2014.

7. The initiative of the Government seems to have weakened Ngaïssona's group, with a disparate coalition of groups henceforth under the banner of Wénézoui, which main common ground appears to be opposition to Ngaïssona and the Baya ethnic group. Several defections of senior commanders of the CLPC, including its former military coordinator and nephew of former President Bozizé, Maxime Mokom, brother of 'Colonel Rocco', were reported to the Panel on 27 May 2014, in connection with the election of Wénézoui as representative of the "anti-Balaka from the South". At the same time, Yvon Konaté's vehicle was targeted by a grenade attack in the neighbourhood of Cité Jean XIII in Bangui.

8. The Panel also documented the significant presence in the chain of command of the above-mentioned different groups of personnel from the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) – including from the Presidential Guard, e.g. Yvon Konaté – and the *Gendarmerie*, who are still in some cases on the pay-roll of the current Government, and of individuals who were closely connected to former President François Bozizé and his family. The CAR Transitional Authorities have identified 89 members of the FACA within the group commanded by 'Rombhot' only,²² and the Panel obtained independently information that the first and fourth group are largely commanded and trained by FACA officers and non-commissioned officers, *Gendarmes* and some police officers.

9. In addition, the Panel was able to confirm information that the fourth group was at the time of writing the one carrying out the military offensive on the front line in the area of Ben Zambé, in particular in the town of Bouca, alongside a group commanded by Andilo Ngaïbona alias 'Angelo', and in the town Dékoa, with reinforcements coming from the towns of Bozoum and Bossembélé, clashing on a regular basis with the forces of Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat, appointed in Ndélé as deputy chief of staff of the "new" Seleka.

10. However, the Panel could not confirm the involvement of any known anti-Balaka military commander in the region of Grimari, where troops of both Alkhatim and Brigadier-General Ali Daras (of Peulh origin) are regularly involved in clashes with groups of anti-Balaka, as observed by the Panel on 20 May 2014.²³ According to a military source, the groups of anti-Balaka attacking Grimari and Bambari would be partly coming from the district of Kouango (Ouaka province), at the border with DRC.

²² Meeting with a Defence official, Bangui, 23 April 2014; see also annex 5.4.

²³ During its road mission to Bambari, the Panel could observe of group of 20 anti-Balakas coming out of the bush by foot on the road from Grimari to Bambari.

Relationship with Transitional Authorities

11. The Transitional Head of State, Ms. Samba-Panza, met for the first time at the end of January 2014 with representatives of the anti-Balaka, which was followed by a split between Ngaïssona, Kokaté and Bara. The first was accused of promoting the interest of the Baya ethnic group only, the second of switching affiliations too frequently²⁴ and the latter was denied any form of legitimacy over the anti-Balaka, and suspected of promoting Bozizé's return.
12. However, the Authorities then decided to exclude Ngaïssona's group from the political process, appointing Bara as Minister of Youth and Kokaté as an adviser to the Primer Minister, leading coincidentally to a peak of violence in Bangui in March 2014.²⁵ Similarly, the level of violence in the capital reduced drastically after the issuance of a press communiqué by Ngaïssona on 4 April 2014, calling for a cease-fire and restoration of peace.²⁶
13. On 17 April 2014, the Head of State of the Transitional Authorities met again with a dozen of representatives of anti-Balaka groups in Bangui, at the Presidency. Following the meeting, Ngaïssona was arrested by the MISCA, in accordance with an arrest warrant issued by CAR judicial authorities, then handed-over to the Gendarmerie, and subsequently placed under judicial supervision by the Prosecutor's office in Bangui. This indicates further that Transitional Authorities and the international community have difference of views with regard to the strategy towards anti-Balaka leadership, as outlined in the executive summary of this report.²⁷
14. Lastly, the Panel obtained information that a group of anti-Balaka represented at a reconciliation meeting organised by a Christian INGO was during the same week involved in violent clashes on 25 May 2014 with Muslim self-defence militias based in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.
15. According to an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, the current Government is planning to implement with the anti-Balaka a strategy based on a memorandum of understanding, which would be signed by Ngaïssona and the CAR Defence Minister. This document, not yet signed at the time of writing, would include more specifically a process of registering, demobilization and reintegration of members of the anti-Balaka into their communities of origin.²⁸ However, this approach may change in light of recent events.

²⁴ For example, on 24 February 2010, Joachim Kokaté was appointed 'coordinator' of the "*Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix*" (CPJP) of Abdoulaye Issène, now coordinator of the "new" Seleka; see annex 5.7.

²⁵ See annex 5.6.

²⁶ See annex 5.8.

²⁷ Meeting with judicial authorities, Bangui, 25 April 2014.

²⁸ Meeting with an official from the CAR Defence Ministry, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

Annex 5.1: Anti-Balakas in Cantonnier, Béloko and Bouar (Nana Mambéré Province)

1. The Panel observed presence of anti-Balaka elements at the main Béloko-Garoua Boulai border crossing between the Central African Republic and Cameroon. From the village of Cantonnier, located at the border, these forces control an illegal border crossing just south of the official border. They were initially part of the “*Haut Conseil de Résistance et du Redressement National*” and composed mainly of former FACA officers who fled to Cameroon after the Seleka coalition seized power in Bangui.

‘Colonel’ Aron Wilibona (center, pointing his shotgun at the camera) and Rochael Mokom alias ‘Colonel Rocco’ (right, with the cap), after taking over Cantonnier, in January 2014 (screenshot from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source)¹



2. This crossing is used to smuggle petrol and other merchandise, which is subjected to illegal taxes. The crossing is also used to smuggle ammunition (see also chapter III). In addition, forces also intervene whenever customs officers seize illegal imports of ammunition and drugs hidden in vehicles using the official border crossing, creating havoc to put pressure to release goods.

¹ Video archived at the UN.

*Pick-up truck vehicle mounted with a light machine-gun,
Cantonnier, January 2014 (source: ibid.)*




3. Anti-Balaka elements with FACA background in Béloko told the Panel on 27 April 2014 that “Colonel” Aron Wilibona was still in command of the anti-Balaka from Cantonnier/Béloko to Bouar, capital of the province of Nana Mambéré.

Anti-Balaka in Cantonnier in front of a vehicle with painted inscriptions mentioning “Hibou-Rouge” and “Balaka”, making reference to the “Patrouilles Hiboux” (‘owls patrols’), nicknames of the “Compagnies éclairs”, special units of the Police based in Bangui and accused of tracking opponents to former President Bozizé at night (source: ibid.)




Annex 5.2: Mission order from Thierry Lébéné, alias ‘Colonel 12 Puissances’, instructing a group of anti-Balaka to patrol the road from Damara (Ombella-Mpoko Province) to Sibut (Kémo Province)¹




¹ Copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014.

Annex 5.3: Identification badges delivered by the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC)

*Badge of the anti-Balaka coordinator in Damara
(recto and verso – photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 23 March 2014)*



*Badge of a chief of post in Bangui
(copy provided by international forces to the Panel on 2 May 2014)*



*Badge of an anti-Balaka fighter in Carnot (Mambere-Kadei)
(photograph taken by the Panel in Carnot on 26 April 2014)*



Annex 5.4: Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Colonel Rombhot’

1. Anti-Balaka forces operating under FACA Chief-Corporal Alfred Yekatom alias ‘Colonel Rombhot’ exercise a significant degree of control over road transport into Bangui from the southern transport axis linking the country with Cameroon. On the 107 kilometre stretch of road between Bangui and Mbaiki (Lobaye province), the Panel observed the presence of Rombhot’s forces at seven different checkpoints, starting from PK 9, i.e. nine kilometres from Bangui city centre. In the towns of Cekia and Pissa, Rombhot’s forces are in uniform, identify themselves as FACA, and operate alongside regular forestry, police and road maintenance agents. Rombhot personally collects part of the taxes, which amounts to about 200 USD per barrier per week.

‘Colonel Rombhot’ and his ‘sister’, during a meeting with the Panel in Pissa, on 24 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



Rombhot’s forces also tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot’s elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives.

Annex 5.5: Case study: Bossangoa (Ouham Province)

1. The Panel conducted a two-day road mission to Bossangoa between 30 April and 1 May 2014, to interview a representative of a local anti-Balaka group, local authorities, United Nations officials and international forces. The Panel also met with religious authorities from Bossangoa in Bangui on 23 April 2014.

2. Bossangoa has played a key role in the crisis. As the capital of the Baya's region, it represents a symbol of the former regime of François Bozizé, and the region is commonly depicted as his family's stronghold and the berth of his power.

3. The region of Bossangoa is where the first military operations against forces of the former Seleka coalition were planned and conducted in early September 2013, during which killings of scores of civilians were also reported. In retaliation, many villages perceived by the Seleka as supporting the insurgency were burnt down by Seleka forces based out of Bossangoa, causing also civilian casualties.¹

4. Seleka forces in Bossangoa were at that time commanded by Général Yaya, who was killed in Bangui on 5 December 2013, and his deputy, Colonel Saleh Zabadi, who is currently the zone commander in Batangafo under the authority of Brigadier-General Alkatim Mahamat based in Sido.

5. According to analysis of satellite imagery conducted by UNOSAT (see annex 5.5.1), 227 buildings were probably destroyed in Bossangoa before 5 December 2013, and 1,007 buildings were destroyed between 5 December 2013 and 28 February 2014. Testimonies obtained by the Panel in Bossangoa and Bangui from eyewitnesses and local authorities describe three different waves of destruction:

- Before 5 December 2013: most of the destruction and lootings of properties were conducted by forces of General Yaya, in retaliation of the attacks carried out by anti-Balakas in the outskirts of Bossangoa;
- Between 5 December 2013 and 22 January 2014: the destruction of buildings was related to the attack of anti-Balaka groups on Bossangoa on 5 December 2013 in retaliation of actions of Seleka fighters; and
- Between 22 January and 28 February 2014: almost all the destructions of buildings was committed by local groups associated with the anti-Balaka, targeting more specifically

¹ Human Rights Watch reported extensively on atrocities and sectarian violence committed by both sides in the region of Bossangoa between September and November 2013: "They came to kill", 19 December 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill> ; Amnesty International also reported on the events of

the neighbourhood of Boro that is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, which appears now almost completely destroyed (see photographs below, and also inset in annex 5.5.1 and more photographs taken by the Panel in annex 5.5.2).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



6. The anti-Balaka local group in Bossangoa is based in the neighbourhood of the Evêché and is commanded by ‘Kéma’, who was appointed in mid-April 2014 and coming from Ben Zambé. His deputies are reportedly ‘Dorassio’ and ‘Dangba’, and the spokesperson of the movement is called “André”.² They do not carry identification badges and according to local authorities, the chain of command is loose and the leadership not in full control of the force.

7. According to local sources, the local anti-Balaka force in Bossangoa, which is approximately 250-strong, has a close relationship with the group in Ben Zambé, although it does not participate in the military operations currently conducted in Bouca and Dékoua. However, the adoptive son of

September 2013: “Human Rights Crisis Spiralling Out of Control”, 29 October 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/info/AFR19/003/2013/en>

² The Panel could not meet with the main military leaders of the anti-Balaka in Bossangoa on 30 April 2014, as all of them were out of town and not reachable on their cellphones.

former President Bozizé, Teddy Bozizé, has been spotted on a regular basis since mid-April on a motorbike coming back-and-forth to Bossangoa.

8. The interface between the anti-Balaka and international actors is handled by a community liaison officer, a Pastor named ‘Bertin’, based at the Liberté neighbourhood, and ‘Rocky’, a local businessman described as holding influence and money, who lives and operates a garage close by the main WFP warehouse located in front of the Evêché.

9. According to an anti-Balaka representative, there are actually no “anti-Balaka” in Bossangoa but only youths organised in self-defence groups without any identified leadership. As a representative, his role is to liaise between the youths and external actors. However, despite his claim, the Panel could observe the inscription “anti-Balaka” on destroyed houses owned by members of the Muslim community in the Boro neighbourhood (see photograph below).

Boro neighbourhood, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014 (photograph taken by the Panel)



10. The group of anti-Balakas in Bossangoa is also reportedly responsible of several incidents targeting the humanitarian community, including an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 20 March

2014, an abduction of one humanitarian aid worker on 1 April 2014, and an attack on humanitarian aid workers on 27 April 2014.³


11. However, the Panel could not observe any checkpoint on the road between the towns of Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko province) and Bossangoa, and no armed elements were spotted in Bossangoa during the Panel's mission. According to the local population, this was related to the successful implementation of the "*mesures de confiance*" (confidence-building measures) since the arrival of the French forces on 6 April 2014.

³ See also the Panel's database of incidents.

Annex 5.5.1: Destruction in Bossangoa area, Ouham, CAR – UNOSAT

DESTRUCTION IN BOSSANGOA AREA, OUHAM, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Analysis with WorldView-2 Data Acquired 22 January 2014 and 5 December 2013 and WorldView-1 Data Acquired 28 February 2014




Production Date: 14-Feb-14
Version 1.0
Activation Code: CE20131215CAF



This map illustrates locations of destroyed structures in Bossangoa, Central African Republic. Using a satellite image acquired 28 February 2014 and compared to images from 22 January 2014 and 5 December 2013, UNOSAT reviewed the town of Bossangoa and surrounding areas to locate signs of destroyed structures. A total of 1,234 destroyed structures were located in the area, though structures marked as destroyed on 5 December are classed as 'probable' due to the lack of a previous image for comparison. Some of the destruction detected in the 28 February 2014 image was likely a result of burning given the blackened structural remains visible in the imagery. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been validated in the field. Please send ground feedback to UNITAR / UNOSAT.

- LEGEND**
- Destroyed Building (as of 28 February 2014)
 - Destroyed building (as of 22 January 2014)
 - Destroyed Building (Probable; as of 5 December 2013)
 - Primary Road



Satellite Data (1): WorldView-2
Imagery Dates: 5 December 2013
Resolution: 60 cm
Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
Satellite Data (2): WorldView-2
Imagery Date: 22 January 2014
Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
Satellite Data (3): WorldView-1
Imagery Dates: 28 February 2014
Resolution: 60 cm
Copyright: DigitalGlobe, Inc.
Source: US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License
Road Data: Google Map Maker / OSM / ESRI
Other Data: USGS, UNCS, NASA, NGA
Analysis: UNITAR / UNOSAT
Production: UNITAR / UNOSAT
Analysis conducted with ArcGIS v10.1

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 33N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: WGS 1984
Units: Meter

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24/7 Hotline: +41 78 481 4992
www.unitar.org/unosat

Annex 5.5.2: Photographs of the Boro neighbourhood taken by the Panel, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014



Annex 5.6: Attack on international forces and United Nations convoy by anti-Balakas in Bangui on 25 March 2014 (screenshots from a video taken by the Panel)

Explosion of a grenade next to French forces armoured personnel carriers



Anti-Balakas attacking a United Nations convoy with stones and arrows






Anti-Balaka arming his bow with an arrow and targeting a United Nations convoy



Annex 5.7: Joachim Kokaté, ‘coordinator’ of the CPJP (copy archived at the UN)



Annex 5.8: Press communiqué number 9 of the “*Coordination nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple Centrafricain*” (CLPC) (copy archived at the UN)



ANTIBALAKA

COMITE DE DIRECTION

N° 022 /ATB/14.

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 9

Dans le cadre de la recherche des voies et moyens de sortie de crise en République centrafricaine, et tenant compte de l'urgence et de la nécessité de la restauration de la paix et de la sécurité dans notre pays, le Coordonnateur Général du Mouvement des Patriotes Antibalaka, Monsieur **Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA**, en attendant d'entrer en négociation avec les Autorités gouvernementales, prend l'engagement solennel en ce jour, 04 Avril 2013, de déclarer la fin de toutes hostilités sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

A cet effet, le Coordonnateur national du Mouvement des Antibalaka, demande impérativement à tous Chef des bataillons des Patriotes Antibalaka, de veiller à l'observation scrupuleuse de la présente décision. Ils doivent instruire tous les patriotes Antibalaka, afin que ceux-ci regagnent leur base respective.

Il s'agit ici de donner une chance à la paix et à la sécurité, seule condition sine qua non pour une relance des activités socio-économiques en vue du développement national.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Avril 2014

Le Coordonnateur Général



Patrice Edouard NGAÏSSONA

Annex 6: Seleka - Structure and dynamics

1. The Seleka coalition was dissolved by former President Michel Djotodia¹ on 13 September 2013, and subsequently 3,437 soldiers were integrated on 10 October 2013 into the Central African armed forces (FACA) by a decree of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour.²

2. In Ndélé and Bria, the Panel met with the zone commanders, known as Seleka, but presenting themselves as Colonel of the FACA appointed by Presidential decrees.³ In fact, most of the senior officers of the former Seleka wear the distinctive characteristics of the Central African Army, e.g. the red beret, the flag of the CAR as a badge or the “Forces centrafricaines” insigne.

3. It is the understanding of the Panel that the administrative situation of the soldiers integrated by decree on 10 October 2013, and of the senior officers appointed or promoted by Presidential decree under Djotodia’s regime, needs to be clarified by the Transitional Authorities.⁴

Current status

4. On 11 May 2014, military and political leaders of the former Seleka concluded a conclave in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran province), which led to the following two substantial outcomes:

- Formation of a new military structure, referred to by the Panel as the “new” Seleka, headed by Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (former UFDR Chief of Staff, from the Goula ethnic group), with two deputies (Brigadier-Generals Alkhatim Mahamat and Adam Kanton Yacoub) (see photograph in annex 6.2 and organogram in annex 6.3); and
- Establishment of a temporary political coordination structure, headed by Abdoulaye Issène (President of the CPJP, from the Rounga ethnic group), with Rizigala Ramadane as deputy coordinator (UFDR) (see chart in annex 6.4).

Dynamics

5. The Panel could obtain copy of the first version of the final recommendations distributed after the conclave, stating that the international community should “facilitate the process of partition of the country”.⁵ According to participants and observers present at the conclave,⁶ the drafting of the

¹ Michel Djotodia is included in the annex of the executive order blocking property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in the Central African Republic released on 13 May 2014.

² See annex 6.1.

³ Meeting with Seleka zone commanders, Ndele, 10 April 2014, and Bria, 15 May 2014.

⁴ Meeting with Defence official, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

⁵ See annex 6.5.

recommendations was coordinated by General Zacharia Damane (UFDR, of the Goula ethnic group), who was heading the organisational committee of the conclave.

6. General Damane admitted to the Panel that the first communiqué recommending the partition was not distributed “by mistake”, as claimed by the political leaders of the coordination structure, but was the result of an agreement amongst the military leaders of the “new” Seleka. He also explained that the partition may happen in case the requirements outlined as “recommendations” by the “new” Seleka are not met.⁷

7. Another senior member of the coordination structure confirmed to the Panel⁸ that the political leaders of the former Seleka had to convince their military counterparts to reverse their position and issue a second communiqué reaffirming the commitment of the “new” Seleka to maintaining the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic and ensure its national unity. They also consider that some prominent military leaders, in particular affiliated with the UFDR or close with Nourredine Adam (former strongman of the Seleka, leader of the CPJP-Fondamentale, and listed by the Committee for targeted sanctions),⁹ are currently pushing for the partition of the CAR.¹⁰

8. Moreover, military leaders involved in the cantonment of Seleka forces following the imposition of the “*mesures de confiance*” (confidence-building measures) by French forces in Bangui in December 2013, most notably General Issa Issaka, who signed as the representative of the former Seleka the memorandum of understanding with the Transitional Authorities regarding the relocation of cantoned fighters outside Bangui, and Colonel Abdulkarim Moussa, are absent from the structure of the “new” Seleka and considered now as “sidelined”.

9. Therefore, the expected outcome of the conclave might not yet be forthcoming, neither from the perspective of the international community in terms of having a single partner for future discussions, nor from the perspective of most of the political leaders of the former Seleka who wanted to take over the leadership of the “new” Seleka permanently. Furthermore, the fact that Brigadier-General Alkhatim appears as the main winner of the restructuration of the former Seleka gives the impression once again that military activism leads to political gains.

10. In addition, the establishment of its military head-quarters in Bambari have modified a fragile balance of powers in a key town, where gold production generates significant incomes, and sparked great tension amongst troops loyal to Ali Daras and Damane.

⁶ Meetings, Bangui, 14 and 16 May 2014.

⁷ Meeting with General Damane, Bambari, 22 May 2014.

⁸ Meeting, Bangui, 17 May 2014.

⁹ Nourredine Adam was added on 9 May 2014 to the list established and maintained by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the CAR.

¹⁰ Telephone conversation, Bangui, 20 May 2014.

Annex 6.1: Decree (last page) of former Defence Minister Bertrand Mamour integrating 3,437 Seleka into the FACA (original copy archived at the UN)

N°	Classe	NOM	NOM	N° Mle
3420	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZONDORO	ETIENNE	201324438
3421	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZONIWA	JEAN-PIERRE	201324439
3422	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUA	GUY-ROGER	201324440
3423	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUABA	YOUSOUF-MAX	201324441
3424	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUANGBA	FREDERIC-LE-PLY	201324442
3425	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUBAÏROU	BAKARI	201324443
3426	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUBINGUI	CHRISTELAIRE-DIEU-BENI-COME	201324444
3427	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUCKBA-ZAKARIA	DAMANE	201324445
3428	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUMBEIDA	ADRIZIT	201324446
3429	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNDECKO	SEVERIN	201324447
3430	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNDEKO	JOSEPH	201324448
3431	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNDEKO	DIDIER	201324449
3432	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNDI	GILDAS RODRIGUI	201324450
3433	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNGUERE	BIENVENU	201324451
3434	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNONGO	MAXIMEN	201324452
3435	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOUNOUA	LETICIA	201324453
3436	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOYONDOKO	DEYA	201324454
3437	Soldat de 2° Classe	ZOYO-NDOKO	SIDICK-NESTOR	201324455

Art.2 : Le contrat d'engagement souscrit par les intéressés pourra être résilié de plein droit par le Ministre de la Défense Nationale.

Art.3 : La présente Décision sera enregistrée, notifiée aux intéressés et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

DESTINATAIRES

- Cabinet Militaire
- I G A N
- D.G.I.A.N
- D.G.R.H
- Tous Corps et Sces FACA
- Intéressés
- Major de Garnison
- Archives & Chrono

BANGUI, le 10 OCT 2013

General de Brigade
Bertrand MAMOUR

LE DIRECTEUR
DIRECTION DU CONTROLE FINANCIER


SN: 2512
du 10/10/13

Annex 6.2: Photograph taken by international observers in Ndélé of the newly appointed senior leadership of the “new” Seleka


Brigadier-General Joseph Zoundeko (Chief of Staff, left), Brigadier-General Alkhatim Mahamat (First Deputy, center) and Brigadier-General Adam Kanton Yacoub (Second Deputy, right)



Annex 6.3: Organogram of the military leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.4: Organigram of the provisional political leadership of the “new” Seleka



Annex 6.5: First version of the final recommendations to the international community initially distributed in Ndélé by the military leaders of the “new” Seleka (copy archived at the UN)¹

Bangui et des autres préfectures hostiles.

- ❖ Considérant le non respect de l'accord de Ndjamena de janvier 2014.

RECOMMANDONS

A- Au Gouvernement Centrafricain

- De tout mettre en œuvre pour que les exactions contre les musulman cessent avant une semaine ;
- De prendre en charge l'intégralité des réparations des biens des musulmans (civils et militaires) détruits ;
- De mettre a disposition un fonds pour la construction des infrastructures (Routes, Ecoles, centres de santé, des édifices de l'administration...) dans le Nord-Est.
- D'autoriser sans délai l'exfiltration de nos compatriotes.

B-A la communauté internationale :

- De prendre acte des agissements de certains chrétiens.
- De continuer l'exfiltration de la population musulman de ces zones.
- De veiller au respect des droits humains de tous les citoyens.
- De faciliter le processus de la partition.

Fait à NDELE, le 10 mai 2014

¹ Provided to the Panel by a confidential diplomatic source on 26 May 2014.

Annex 7: French forces clashing with Seleka forces of General Alkhatim (photographs taken by French forces)¹



¹ Accessed on 23 May 2014 at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-attaque-par-un-groupe-lourdement-arme-au-nord-ouest-du-pays>

Sangaris : attaque par un groupe lourdement armé au Nord-Ouest du pays

Mise à jour : 06/05/2014 12:24

Le 5 mai 2014, dans l'après-midi, en République Centrafricaine, à environ 450 km au Nord-Ouest de Bangui, la force Sangaris a été attaquée par un groupe lourdement armé, d'un volume d'une quarantaine d'individus qui étaient engagés dans un raid entre Bémaï, au Nord du pays, et de Boguila. Une partie du groupe armé qui composait cette colonne adverse a été détruite, d'autres attaquants se sont repliés. Il n'y a pas de blessé parmi les soldats français.

Ces combats ont débuté alors qu'un détachement de la force Sangaris conduisait une mission de reconnaissance depuis Bossangoa vers Paoua, ville située dans l'extrémité Nord-Ouest de la RCA. Cette mission visait à reconnaître cette zone difficile d'accès, dans laquelle de nombreuses exactions étaient rapportées depuis une dizaine de jours, et à y rétablir la situation sécuritaire avec la MISCA.




A moins d'une centaine de kilomètres au Sud de Paoua, au niveau de la localité de Boguila, les éléments de tête de la force Sangaris se sont déployés, sur renseignement, pour protéger le village de Boguila et barrer la route à une colonne de pick-ups et de motos transportant des individus lourdement armés.

Le groupe armé adverse a immédiatement engagé le combat manœuvrant avec agressivité semblant décidé à s'emparer de la position des éléments français.

Ces combats, ont duré plus de trois heures et ont cessé à la tombée de la nuit. Face à l'agressivité de l'adversaire, la force Sangaris a fait usage de son armement lourd, incluant missile anti-char et mortier. La décision a également été prise d'engager un appui aérien d'avions de chasse, en provenance de Ndjamena.

Les patrouilles ont repris ce matin autour du village de Boguila, il n'est pas encore possible de déterminer avec précision les pertes adverses. Néanmoins plusieurs véhicules ont été détruits et plusieurs individus armés tués. L'adversaire a rompu le contact et semble s'être exfiltré. L'identité et l'appartenance de cet adversaire est à ce stade difficile à déterminer avec précision. Il pourrait néanmoins s'agir des éléments de la bande armée qui est à l'origine des exactions rapportées dans la région depuis plusieurs jours. La force Sangaris maintient son dispositif de contrôle du village de Boguila.

Annex 8: Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the Central African Republic as of 23 March 2013




Note: Information compiled from multiple media reports and other sources.

Map of the diamond deposits and Seleka rebel activity in the Central African Republic As of 3/23/13

For more information on the alluvial diamond deposits of the Central African Republic, see: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2010/5043/>



Annex 9: Names of collectors associated or formerly associated with buying offices in Carnot with which the anti-Balaka want to negotiate protection arrangements



**Annex 10: Artisanal miners working in Axmin's Ndassima gold exploration concession
(photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)**



Annex 11: Seleka forces of General Ali Daras at Ndassima gold mining site (photograph taken by the Panel on 23 May 2014)



Annex 12: Stocks of arms, ammunition and trophies in the depot of the Ministry of Water and Forests prior to being looted

MINISTÈRE DES EAUX, FORÊTS,
CHASSE ET PÊCHE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES, DE LA
PLANIFICATION, D'APPUI JURIDIQUE
ET DES RESSOURCES
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES
ET DU CONTENTIEUX
SERVICE DU DÉPÔT ET DE LA POUDRIÈRE
N° 1/MEF/DIR/CAB/DGEPAJR/DJ/CSDP

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

SITUATION DES ARMES, MUNITIONS ET TROPHÉES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE
AVANT LE PILLAGE

I – ARMES DE GUERRE DISPONIBLES A LA POUDRIÈRE CENTRALE

- > Cent trente cinq (135) AK 47 + 270 Chargeurs ;
- > Deux (02) MAS 36 Sans munitions ;
- > Un (01) G 3 sans munitions ;
- > Quatre (04) grenades en bon état ;
- > Une (01) grenade moisie ;

II – ARMES AK 47 MISE EN SERVICE

> Résidence du Ministre	2
> Service de garde au Ministère	2

> Aide-Camp DU Ministre de l'Environnement..... 1

> Coordonateur BMC..... 1

III- MUNITIONS DE GUERRE

- ❖ 6 000 (Six mille) munitions de 7,62 court
- ❖ 1 514 (Mille Cinq Cent Quatorze) de 7,62 long

IV- ARMES DE CHASSE

- ❖ Quinze (15) armes de chasse calibre confondues en état moyen
- ❖ Treize (13) armes de chasse complètement rouillées
- ❖ Vingt deux (22) armes de chasse (ancienne saisie)
- ❖ Six (06) armes de chasse rayée (MOZER)

VI- ARMES DE CHASSE ARTISANALE

- ❖ Vingt (20) armes de chasse artisanale à détruire
- ❖ Six (06) crosse à bois
- ❖ Quatre Vingt Treize (93) munitions de chasse) détruire

VII- POINTES D'IVOIRE ET DIVERS

7-1- POINTES D'IVOIRE

- ❖ Soixante trois (63) pointes d'ivoire
- ❖ Cinquante une (51) pointes d'ivoire (WWWF)

- ❖ Cinquante Six (56) défenses de phacochères

7-2- **DIVERS**

- ❖ Trois tronçonneuse marque STIHL guide 120
- ❖ Sept (07) grumeliettes
- ❖ Deux (02) guides
- ❖ Cinq (05) peaux de crocodile
- ❖ Une (1) de panthère
- ❖ Une (1) de Bongo

Fait à Bangui, le

27 JAN 2013

Le Chef de Service de Dépôts et de
la



L/Alfred Modeste SEPAMIO MBAT

Annex 13: Other natural resources

Timber

2. Industrial logging and timber exports have continued all through 2013 to date, although at a slightly lower pace compared to 2012. Log exports were down 2 per cent, while sawn wood exports declined by 23 per cent.¹ Timber is officially exported to European and Asian destinations through Cameroon, using the border crossings of Garoua-Boulai and Kenzou. While the Seleka were in power, illegal artisanal exploitation surged in non-attributed forest areas, as well as industrial concessions close to Bangui, some of which was exported illegally to Chad.²

3. Logging trucks operating between concession areas and Cameroon were systematically subjected to illegal tax levying during the Seleka's time in power.³ Illegal taxes levied by Seleka forces at checkpoints along transport routes within CAR amounted to about 70 USD per truck.⁴ Calculating from an average monthly export volume in 2013 of 15,000 m³ and an average load of 30-40 m³ per truck, per month Seleka would have fetched 30,000 USD of revenues per month from the timber industry.⁵ In addition some logging companies paid Seleka commanders protection money of up to 6,000 USD per month for their facilities in Bangui.⁶

4. Since the departure of Seleka forces from the southwest of the CAR at the end of January 2014, illegal taxation of logging trucks by armed forces reduced. However, anti-Balaka forces also demand payments haphazardly at checkpoints. The Panel confirmed the presence of anti-Balaka forces under commander Afred Yekatom "Rombhot", alongside the *Gendarmerie*, at Pissa, Mbaiki and Boda in Lobaye province, where trucks to practically all forestry concessions pass coming from Bangui. Rombhot's soldiers levy up between 2 and 10 USD on each truck at the three checkpoints.⁷ In addition, a forester told the Panel that within his concessions local unidentified anti-Balaka youths occasionally steal chainsaws and petrol for sale.⁸

Cattle

5. With the departure of Seleka forces from the west of the Central African Republic at the end of January 2014, Muslim and Peuhl cattle owners have come under siege of anti-Balaka forces and have either been killed or forced to flee. On the road between Guen and Carnot, the Panel observed anti-Balaka elements in the possession of cattle they claimed to have recuperated from the forest.⁹ All along the road meat is smoked to be transported by motorbike to Carnot and onwards by truck to Bouar and Bangui.

¹ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 19 May 2014.

² Interview with forest guard and official in the Ministry of Water, Forest and Environment in Bangui, 21 April 2014.

³ Multiple Interviews truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁴ Interview with timber trade expert in Bangui, 23 March, 2014.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with forester in Bangui, 21 March 2014.

⁷ Interviews with truck drivers and forestry agents in Bangui, Mbiaki and Boda, 19-21 April 2014.

⁸ Interview with forester op. cit.

⁹ Interview with anti-Balaka cattle herders and motorbike drivers on the road between Guen and Carnot, 26 April 2014.

Oil

6. On 7 March 2014, the Minister of Mines, Energy and Waterworks signed a ministerial order cutting-up non-attributed oil-blocks D-G into sub-blocks of 500 square kilometres, with the view to enable entry of more exploration companies.¹⁰

7. A map was attached to the ministerial order showing attribution of blocks A and B to Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), a Beijing-based company wholly owned by the Government of China (annex 13.1). Block B was attributed to PTI in joint venture with Doha based company IAS by a Presidential decree signed by Bozizé in 2007.¹¹ For block A the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was granted a prospecting licence in January 2011, which was never publicly announced.¹² CNPC carried out seismic tests in the area of Boromata in Bamingui-Bangoran province up until February 2013 when Seleka fighters forced its workers out.¹³ It is unclear when the CNPC licence was transferred to PTI. In March 2012 a third oil block C, in the southeast of the country, was awarded to the South African firm Dig-Oil (see annex 13.2).


¹⁰ Arrête no 005/14/MMEH/DIRCAB/DGP portant découpage du domaine pétrolier de la République Centrafricaine en blocs et sous-blocs surfaces, 7 March.

¹¹ <http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/general/ias-wins-exploration-bid->, accessed on 4 May 2014.


¹² <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1798133564&Country=Central+African+Republic&topic=Economy&subtopic=Current+policy&subsubtopic=Economic+policy:+Oil+exploration+is+to+resume+in+north-eastern+CAR>, accessed on 3 May 2014.

¹³ <http://www.africaintelligence.com/AEM/spotlight/2013/02/05/the-oil-stakes-in-an-armed-conflict,107943013-EVE>, accessed on 6 May 2014.

Annex 13.1: Oil blocks in northern Central African Republic as per 7 March 2014



Annex 13.2: Map of oil block in the Central African Republic before 7 March 2014



Annex 14: Arms and ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic

1. The panel developed lists of arms and ammunition in circulation in CAR based on samples collected by international forces. The lists within this annex will serve as a baseline to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.
2. Currently, based on the Panel's observation and information collected, the typology of weapons in custody in the CAR can be presented as follows:

Entity	Estimated holding
Government forces FACA, police and Gendarmerie	- about 110 rifles - 3 ammunition stores secured by MISCA
Cantoned elements of Ex-Seleka in 3 sites in Bangui	individual arms kept by combatants under confidence building measures
Ex-Seleka not cantoned	Not known
FACA associated with anti-Balaka	Individual arms and few light weapon
Anti-balaka	Military arms and hunting rifles, grenades and machete
Other armed entities	Not known
Civilian for self-protection and hunting	Military arms and hunting rifles
Collected by impartial forces	Around 1,100 small arms and a number of light weapon

Photograph of containers of ammunition in Bossembélé looted after the Seleka seized power in March 2013¹



¹ See "Centrafrique: à Bossembele, les fantômes du régime de Bozizé hantent encore la ville", RFI, 8 April 2013, accessed at: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130408-centrafrique-bossembele-fantomes-regime-bozize-sont-encore-presents/>

Sangaris discovered on 11 February 2014, after the cantonment of former Seleka, abandoned containers of ammunition north of Bangui that were looted (left)². Mortar shells 60 to 120 mm not useable without mortar tubes were left behind on the open, while small arms and grenades have probably been taken by anti Balaka (right)³.



² Screenshot from France 24 international news.

³ See “Sangaris: la force se déploie en province”, Website Ministère de la défense, 11 February 2014, accessed at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/sangaris-la-force-se-deploie-en-province>

List of arms and military equipment found in the CAR
Rifles

AK type (see profile)
 AR-15 A2 Cal 223
 CS/LS 06
 FAL 50.00
 HK-G3 A3
 HK MP-5 SD3
 Galil AR
 Lee-Enfield
 MAS 36
 MAT 49
 Mauser
 M-16 A1
 R4 Vector
 SAR 80
 STEYR AUG
 SVD
 Type 85
 UZI

Light Machine Gun

AA-52
 Browning M1919 A4
 MAG-58
 Model 68
 PKM
 Type 56
 Type 56-1
 Type 67-2C
 Type 80
 Type 81
 Vector MG 4
 VZ 59

Medium Machine Gun

Type 54
 Type 85
 W-85

Heavy Machine Gun

KPVT
 Type 58
 ZPU-1
 ZPU-2
 ZPU-4
 ZU-23/2

Grenade Launcher

AGS 17
 ARSENAL UGBL
 GP 25
 HK-69 / GPZ-1
 M 79
 MILKOR MGL
 QLZ 87
 Zastava M-93

Multiple rocket launcher

AT-4 M136
 BM 21
 LAW M-72
 RBR64 M80
 RPG-7
 RPO-A
 Type 63
 Type 69

Mortars

60 mm WW90L
 60 mm NIMIR
 81 mm B 499
 M 37
 Type 67

Recoilless rifle

SPG-9
 106 SR M40 A1

APC

FV 107 FERRET
 BRD-2
 BTR-152
 OT-90
 RATEL-90
 VAB

Vehicles

RDLVS Gecko
 SAFIR 106 mm M40A1
 SAMIL-20 HUNTER
 TOYOTA LC Serie 70

List of ammunition found in the CAR

Mortar Shells

Mle 44
M48
M49A3
M61
M73
OF-D
O-832-DU
PP87
PP-93
Type 63
Type 832

Propelled Grenades

DZP1C
F-7
PG-7L
PG-7M
PG-7S
PG-7V
PG-9
Type 63
Type 69
Type 69-3
R-107

For Grenades launchers

Arsenal RHE-F
Arsenal RHV-HEF
DFS 87-35 HE
ENERGA
FI AP 34-52
HEAT 83
M 433 HEDP
M-60 AC
Super ENERGA

Hand Grenades

DF-37
F1
F1 V2
M-26 T
OF-37
RG-4
82-2

Mines

M-19
TC6

Cartridge

See Profile Annex 16

Annex 15: Profile of type of assault-rifles found in the Central African Republic

1. Pursuant to the adoption of resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of models of AK-type rifles found in the CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of AK-type rifles in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the Panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of the arms embargo in cases where new types of weapons are discovered.
3. The profile shows that there are 20 different models of AK-type rifles in circulation in the CAR, which were produced in ten different countries.

Profile of AK models found in the CAR







Type 56 China 313




AK E. Germany




AK Hungaria



AK Iraq 1988



AKM Romania



AK 47S USSR 1974



AKM USSR 1961








AKM USSR 1966



AKM USSR 1971



<p>AKM USSR 1973</p> 		
<p>Zastava M-64 Yugoslavia</p> 		

Not Known TBC



Not Known TBC



Not Known TBC



Annex 16: Profile of arms cartridges found in the Central African Republic

Background












1. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), MISCA and the French forces launched a disarmament exercise in some areas of the CAR. The Panel inspected the arms collected and developed a profile of cartridges found in CAR.
2. The aim of the profile is to establish a baseline of ammunition in circulation in the country. It will be updated regularly and could be used by the panel and MINUSCA to identify potential violations of arms embargoes in cases where new type of weapons is discovered.






Analysis

3. The profile shows that the ammunition found in the CAR was produced by 42 different manufacturers from 16 countries, over a period of 52 years, from 1961 to 2013, and include calibres from both former “Western”- and “Eastern”-bloc states. The profile includes 116 lots representing manufactures and year of production of which 29.3 per cent were produced in France up to the year 1990, 26.7 per cent in China up to 2011 and 9.5 per cent in Sudan up to 2013. It has to be noted that these percentage figures represent the diversity of the ammunition profile rather than its volume.

Profile of cartridges found in the CAR















Manufacturer: Belgium / FN				
Calibre	8x60mm	7.62x51		
1				
Markings	FN 8x60 S	FN 77		
Year manufactured	Not known	1977		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Bulgaria / 10				
Calibre	7.62x39			
2				
Marking	10 69			
Year manufactured	1969			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 41				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
3				
Marking	41 95	41 07		
Year manufactured	1995	2007		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
4				
Marking	61 74	61 87	61 95	61 97
Year manufactured	1974	1987	1995	1997
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014















Manufacturer: China / 61				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
5				
Marking	61 71	61 80	61 90	
Year manufactured	1971	1980	1990	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 71				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
6				
Marking	71 73	71 90	71 98	71 01
Year manufactured	1973	1990	1998	2001
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: China / 71				
Calibre	7.62x39	9		
7				
Marking	71 98	71 11		
Year manufactured	1998	2011		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 81				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x39		
8				
Marking	81 90	81 97		
Year manufactured	1990	1997		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		











Manufacturer: China / 270				
Calibre	7.62x39			
9				
Marking	270 74			
Year manufactured	1974			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 351				
Calibre	7.62x54R	12.7x108		
10				
Marking	351 78	351 76		
Year manufactured	1978	1976		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: China / 539				
Calibre	7.62x39			
11				
Marking	539 72			
Year manufactured	1972			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: China / 811				
Calibre	7.62x39			
12				
Marking	811 08			
Year manufactured	2008			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			












Manufacturer: China / 911				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	
13				
Marking	911 76	911 77	911 78	
Year manufactured	1976	1977	1978	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China / 945				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
14				
Marking	945 07	945 09	945 10	
Year manufactured	2007	2009	2010	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: China 9121; 9611, 9631				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	
15				
Marking	9121 86	9611 77	9631 05	
Year manufactured	1986	1977	2005	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39	7.62x39
16				
Marking	bxn 62	bxn 68	bxn 72	bxn 73
Year manufactured	1962	1968	1972	1973
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014




Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / bxn				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
17				
Marking	bxn 80	bxn 65	bxn 66	bxn 87
Year manufactured	1980	1965	1966	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Former Czechoslovakia / CZO				
Calibre	14.5x114			
18				
Marking	CZO 55			
Year manufactured	1955			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Egypt /10				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
19				
Marking	١٠ ع ٨٠			
Year manufactured	1980			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5 x54	7.5 x54	5.56x45	5.56x45
20				
Marking	LM 65	LM 77	LM 1.86	LM 90
Year manufactured	1965	1977	1986	1990
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
21				
Marking	LM 1-61	LM 1-67	LM 1-70	LM 3-71
Year manufactured	1961	1967	1970	1971
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France LM				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54		
22				
Marking	LM 3-72	LM 4-74		
Year manufactured	1972	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: France TE				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	12.7x99
23				
Marking	TE 7.5 S	TE 9 F	S TE	TE S
Year manufactured	1971	1974	1983	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	9x51	9x51	9x51
24				
Marking	SF 84	SF 57	SF 81	SF 82
Year manufactured	1984	1957	1981	1982
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54	7.5x54
25				
Marking	SS 2.70	SF 81	Sf 2.83	SF 84
Year manufactured	1970	1981	1983	1984
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France SF				
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	12.7x99
26				
Marking	SF 1 78	SF 83	SF 84	SF 4-87
Year manufactured	1978	1983	1984	1987
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: France FNM, VE				
Calibre	7.5x54	5.56x45	5.56x45	
27				
Marking	VE 2 40	FNM 83	FNM 89	
Year manufactured	TBC	1983	1989	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Iran				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	12.7x108	14.5x114
28				
Marking	7.62x51 97	7.62x54 01	12.7 03	14.5 81
Year manufactured	1997	2001	2003	1981
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Israel / IMI				
Calibre	5.56x45			
29				
Marking	IMI 07			
Year manufactured	2007			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Romania				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	14.5x114	14.5x114
30				
Marking	22 70	21 76	21 77	21 78
Year manufactured	1979	1976	1977	1978
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Saudia Arabia				
Calibre	7.62x51			
31				
Marking	7.62 1405			
Year manufactured	1985			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: South Africa				
Calibre	5.56x45	7.62x51	7.62x51	12.7x99
32				
Marking	86 13	90 12	90 22	92 14
Year manufactured	1986	1990	1990	1992
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Sudan / س (TBC)				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51		
33				
Marking	س ١٩٨٠	س ١٩٨٢		
Year manufactured	1980	1982		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre				
34				
H Marking	2 39 011	2 39 12	1 39 13	
Year manufactured	2011	2012	2013	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x51	7.62x51	
35				
Marking	SUD 51 97	SUD 51 98	Su 1 51 01	
Year manufactured	1997	198	2001	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	
Manufacturer: Sudan /				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	
36				
Marking	54 05	54 07	07 54	
Year manufactured	2005	2007	2007	
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	

Manufacturer: Sweden /				
Calibre	7.62x54R			
37				
Marking	Mar 2014			
Year manufactured	Not Known			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: USA				
Calibre	.280			
38				
Marking	RP 280 REM	RP 20AUTO		
Year manufactured	Not Known	Not Known		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 60 and 711				
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x39		
39				
Marking	60 74	711 74		
Year manufactured	1974	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188				
Calibre	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108
40				
Marking	188 72	188 74	188 73	188 79
Year manufactured	1972	1874	1973	1979
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014

Manufacturer: Former USSR / 188, 3				
Calibre	12.7x108	14.5x114		
41				
Marking	188 80	3 74		
Year manufactured	1980	1974		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		
Manufacturer: Former Yugoslavia / ППУ				
Calibre	7.62x51	7.62x54R	7.62x54R	7.62x54R
42				
Marking	ППУ 03	ППУ 1986	ППУ 1988	ППУ 1989
Year manufactured	2003	1986	1988	1989
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014	Mar 2014
Manufacturer: Zimbabwe / ZI				
Calibre	7.62x39			
43				
Marking	ZI 96			
Year manufactured	1996			
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014			
Manufacturer: Not Known				
Calibre	14.5x114	14.5x114		
44				
Marking	86 3.	9 52		
Year manufactured	1986	1952		
First reported in CAR	Mar 2014	Mar 2014		

Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
FN	Belgium	1
10 NN	Bulgaria	2
41 NN	China	3
61 NN	China	4, 5
71 NN	China	6, 7
81 NN	China	8
270 NN	China	9
351 NN	China	10
539	China	11
811	China	12
911	China	13
945	China	14
9121 NN	China	15
9611 NN	China	15
9631 NN	China	15
Bxn NN	Former Czechoslovakia	16, 17
CZO NN	Former Czechoslovakia	18
ع م ج	Egypt	19
LM NN	France	20,21,22
TE NN	France	23
SF NN	France	24, 25, 26
VE NN	France	27
7.62x51 NN	Iran	28
12.7 NN	Iran	28
14.5 NN	Iran	28
IMI NN	Israel	29
22 NN	Romania	30
21 NN	Romania	30
Swords palm	Saudia Arabia	31
12/13/14 /22bottom	South Africa	32
س	Sudan	33
N 39 NN	Sudan	34
SUD 51 NN	Sudan	35
SU N 51 NN	Sudan	35
N 54 NN	Sudan	36
norma	Sweden	37
R.P	USA	38
60 NN	Former USSR	39
188 NN	Former USSR	40, 41
3 NN	Former USSR	41
IIIIY NN	Former Yugoslavia	42
ZI NN	Zimbabwe	43

Annex 17: Removal of markings and serial numbers from AKMs

1. The Panel observed four cases of removals of markings and serial numbers from one Soviet-made AKM model. These rifles were observed at three different locations in Bangui, within collected weapons by MISCA and Sangaris and with cantoned former Seleka.
2. Their markings were certainly removed to hide the origin of the weapons, which might have been smuggled to the CAR potentially in violation the arms embargo. The Panel is investigating these cases.



Marking erased on an AKM held by a cantoned former Seleka



Fire selector indication of Soviet origin



Marking erased on an AKM collected by MISCA



Marking erased on an AKM collected by SANGARIS



Annex 18: Smuggling of hunting ammunition in violation of the arms embargo


Background

1. On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs supported by a unit of MISCA seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the CAR at its main land crossing point with Cameroon, (Garoua Boulai-Beloko). The Panel was conducting a field visit to this border crossing during the same day and was informed of this seizure. It could therefore document this case and take photographs of the seized materials (see below).
2. The director of the CAR customs in Béloko informed the Panel that the box of cartridges was hidden inside a bag of onions carried by a woman and a child who managed to escape at the time of the seizure. The Panel learned from other sources of another seizure of 64 boxes of 25 hunting cartridges calibre 12, which occurred in mid-February 2014 and that alleged anti-Balaka elements threatened customs agents to release the seized boxes. MISCA intervened and confiscated the ammunition.
3. The Panel is aware of cases of original cartridges designed for smaller game being modified to allow more effectiveness against larger game or human beings. The process consists of removing the original smaller lead and replacing it with artisanal pellets made from lead made of battery electrodes or by inserting a single artisanal large projectile to mimic shotgun slugs. The process is still rudimentary and might improve over time to achieve the expected effect (see pictures below).

Investigation

3. The cartridges were made in Spain by MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. In response to the Panel's letter dated 30 April 2014, MAXAM Outdoors, S.A. informed that the ammunition mentioned above were part of a lot of 528,000 cartridges of 12-00 Redstar and Rio 20 sold to SAMT (Armes Transports et Munitions SARL) in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and shipped on 9 January 2014. A bill of lading and an end user undertaking for exclusive use in Cameroun are below.
4. In a letter dated 9 May 2014, the Panel requested from SAMT, the list of entities and individuals that have bought large quantities of hunting cartridges from January 2014 to date. SAMT sent to the Panel a list of 26 clients who bought this type of cartridges. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations requesting a visit to discuss this case and other arms related issues and awaiting a response.

Bill of lading indicating the shipment of ammunition

		BILL OF LADING FOR OCEAN TRANSPORT OR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT		SCAC: MAEU B/L No. 951253142
Shipper: MAXAM OUTDOORS,S.A AV PARTENON 16-18 28042 MADRID ESPANA		Booking No. 951253142		Export references E4779
Consignee (assignable only if consigned "to order", "to order of" a named Person or "to order of bearer") ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN		Notify Party (see clause 23) ARMES ET MUNITIONS TRANSPORT SARL BP 147 YAOUNDE CAMEROUN		
Vessel (see clause 1.1.19) GLUECKSBURG	Voyage No. 1402	Place of Receipt, Applicable only when document used as Multimodal Transport B/L. (see clause 1) Nandares de Oca		
Port of Loading Bilbao	Port of Discharge Douala	Place of Delivery, Applicable only when document used as Multimodal Transport B/L. (see clause 1)		
PARTICULARS FURNISHED BY SHIPPER				
Kind of Packages; Description of goods; Marks and Numbers; Container No./Seal No. 1 Container Said to Contain 2112 BOXES UN0012, CARTRIDGES FOR WEAPONS, INERT PROJECTILE, CLASS 1.4S NET EXPLOSIVE CONTENT: 845Kg 528,000 UNITS 2112 BOXES GROSS WEIGHT: 24.264 KGS NET WEIGHT: 22.903 KGS MSKU4217896 ML-ES2342696 20 DRY 8'6 2112 BOXES 24264.000 KGS 20.000 CBM SHIPPER'S LOAD, STOW, WEIGHT AND COUNT FREIGHT PREPAID SD/CY Consignee Ref: ORDER E4779 First Notify Ref: null Inward Forwarders reference null		Weight 24264.000 KGS	Measurement 20.000 CBM	
FREIGHTED COPY				
Above particulars as declared by Shipper, but without responsibility of or representation by Carrier. (see clause 14)				
Freight & Charges Basic Ocean Freight Inland Haulage Export Export Intermodal Fuel Fee Examination Service Dangerous Cargo Service Documentation Fee - Origin Terminal Handling Service- Ori	Intentionally masked			Collect
Carrier's Receipt (see clause 1 and 14), total number of containers or packages received by Carrier: 1 container	Place of Issue of B/L Madrid	<small>WHETHER BY THE SIGNATURE OF AN AUTHORIZED OFFICER OF THE CARRIER OR BY THE SIGNATURE OF AN AUTHORIZED OFFICER OF THE SHIPPER, THE LABEL NUMBER OR QUANTITY OF CONTAINERS OR OTHER PACKAGES OR UNITS INDICATED IN THE PRESENT "Carrier's Receipt" for storage from the Port of Loading (or the Place of Receipt, if mentioned above) to the Port of Discharge (or the Place of Delivery, if mentioned above), such carriage being always subject to the terms, rights, defenses, provisions, conditions, exceptions, limitations, and liabilities hereof EXCEPTED ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF REFERRED TO-26 AND THOSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE CARRIER'S APPLICABLE TARIFFS and the Merchant's attention is drawn in particular to the Carrier's terms in respect of on deck stowage (see clause 14) and the carrying vessel (see clause 18). Where the bill of lading is non-negotiable the Carrier may give delivery of the Goods to the named consignee upon reasonable proof of identity and without receiving surrender of an original bill of lading. Where the bill of lading is negotiable, the Merchant is obliged to surrender any original bill of lading in exchange for the Goods. The Carrier accepts a duty of reasonable care to check that any such document which the Merchant surrenders as a bill of lading is accurate and complete. If the Carrier complies with this duty, it will be entitled to enforce the Goods against what it reasonably believes to be a genuine and original bill of lading, such delivery discharging the Carrier's delivery obligations. In accepting this bill of lading, any local customs or practices to the contrary notwithstanding, the Merchant agrees to be bound by all Terms and Conditions stated herein, whether written, printed, stamped or incorporated on the face or reverse side hereof, as fully as if they were all signed by the Merchant. BY ACCEPTING SIGNATURE the number of original bills of lading stated on this side have been signed and whatever one original bill of lading has been surrendered any others shall be void.</small>		
Number & Sequence of Original B(s)/L THREE/3	Date of Issue of B/L 2014-01-13			
Declared Value (see clause 7.3)	Shipped on Board Date (Local Time) 2014-01-09			
Signed for the Carrier: J.R. Hilde - Maersk A/S trading as Maersk Line				
Maersk Spain, SLU As Agent(s) for the Carrier				
This transport document has one or more numbered pages				

End user undertaking certifying that the ammunition "will be used solely for civil use purposes" and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from Cameroon

S.A.M.T
Sarl ARMES ET MUNITIONS - TRANSPORTS
 Vente et Réparation Armes - Munitions et Articles de chasse

END - USER UNDERTAKING

DATE: 04 december 2013

We Armes et Munitions - Transport, certify that we are

- 1.- The end user
- 2.- The importer/Consignee of the goods x

to be supplied by MAXAM OUTDOORS S.A.

We further certify that the goods are sporting shotgun cartridges and will **be used solely for civil use purposes** and will not be sold or re-exported to any other country from CAMEROUN.

We further certify that the goods will not be used for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Neither will the goods be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred if it is known or suspected that they are intended or likely to be used for such purposes; and that the goods, or any replica of them, will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity. Products will not be sold nor re-exported to a third party without previous consent from the Spanish Authorities.


Yours sincerely

NAME AND STAMP OF THE COMPANY

Armes et Munitions - Transport

NAME AND POSITION OF THE UNDERSIGNER

AUTIN Nicole - Directrice


 ARMES ET MUNITIONS
 Transport s.a.r.l
 BP 147 YDE Tél./Fax 22 22 15 23

SARL au Capital de 4 000 000 FCFA - RC : RH-810 - N° contribuable : M06760000030Y
 Yaoundé : B.P. : 147 - Tél./Fax : +237 22 22 15 23 • Douala : B.P. : 13174 - Tél./Fax : +237 33 43 11 39
 E-mail : armes_munitions@yahoo.fr

Photographs of seized ammunition



Box containing 250 cartridges



Label indicating manufacturing entity:

- Made in EU - Spain by
MAXAM Outdoors
- Address: **Avda. del Partenón, 16 bajo
28042 Madrid**
- www.rioammo.com



Lot number: #C1312149#

Use of hunting ammunition by anti-Balaka combatants



Top:
Hunting cartridges modified by removing the original pellets (lead shots) and replacing them with bigger artisanal shots (seized from anti-Balaka in Carnot).

Bottom:
Hunting cartridges modified by inserting machine gun cartridge 7.62x54R shown on the left (seized from anti-Balaka in Bouar)

Annex 19: Legal framework of the arms embargo regime

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, and by paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 of 28 January 2014, decided with regards to the arms embargo that initially from 5 December to 27 January 2015, all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the CAR, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

- a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned;
- b) technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities;
- c) the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel; and the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories.

2. The Council established the following standing exemptions to the arms embargo in resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014):

- a) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by MICOPAX, MISCA, BINUCA and its guard unit, the AU-RTF, and the French forces deployed in the CAR (paragraph 54 (a) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- b) protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the CAR by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only (paragraph 54 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- c) supplies of small arms and other related equipment intended solely for use in international patrols providing security in the Sangha River Tri-national Protected Area to defend against poaching, smuggling of ivory and arms, and other activities contrary to the national laws of CAR or CAR's international legal obligations (paragraph 54 (d) of resolution 2127 (2013));
- d) supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the European Union operation (paragraph 40 of resolution 2134 (2014); and
- e) supplies used by MISCA, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, the AU-RTF and the French forces operating in the CAR for the implementation of their mandates (paragraph 37 of resolution 2149 (2014).

3. Finally, the Council decided in its resolution 2127 (2013) that an advance approval by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of the same resolution is required for exemptions to the arms embargo for:

- a) supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training (paragraph 54 (b) of resolution 2127 (2013));

- b) supplies of arms and other related lethal equipment to the CAR security forces, intended solely for support of or use in the CAR process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) (paragraph 54 (e) of resolution 2127 (2013); and
- c) other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel (paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013).

Annex 20: Support to the Central African Republic Security Sector Reform (SSR)

A. Support approved by the Committee

1. Support to the CAR SSR process is currently limited to the Police and *Gendarmerie* for public order operations in Bangui. Since its establishment, the Security Council Committee on the CAR has approved the provision of eleven pick-up trucks, the provision of 48 rapid-response vehicles, equipment and materials for two projects in the CAR for a total of 730 CAR police officers. The Committee has also approved two in-country training modules, each for the duration of eight weeks that would benefit around 250 members of the CAR security forces.
2. The Committee has approved the transfer by French forces to the CAR internal security forces of 51 individual arms from the stockpile of weapons seized during the disarmament operations carried out by SANGARIS. However, the Panel observed that at least six assault-rifles were transferred in April by the *Gendarmerie* component of the French forces to local security forces in Bria (Hautte-Kotto) before the Committee's approval, in addition to the provision of training.

On 31 March 2014, UNDP and BINUCA handed over 11 pick-up truck vehicles to Central African Police and Gendarmerie¹



3.

¹ See « 'ONU remet 11 véhicules aux policiers et gendarmes de Centrafrique », 31 March 2014, PNUD/CAR website accessed on 24 May 2014 at: http://www.cf.undp.org/content/car/fr/home/presscenter/actualites/2014/03/1_onu-remet-11-vehicules-aux-policiers-et-gendarmes-de-centrafri/

B. Stockpile management

1. The Panel noted that stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Bangui are secured by MISCA and French forces under the confidence-building measures (“*mesures de confiance*”) implemented by the international forces. MISCA is securing three ammunition sites originally belonging to Government forces in Bangui.
2. The Panel noted the absence of proper physical security and stockpile management as well as record keeping for FACA ammunition secured by MISCA. Moreover, the three sites where FACA ammunition is stored are located within population centres in Bangui and hence present risks especially due to the poor quality of storage and the presence of large quantities of obsolete ammunition. The Mine Action Section of MINUSCA and its partners have made contributions to improve stockpile management, safety and awareness and assisted to destroy 742 artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris.

*Cutting of artisanal rifles collected by Sangaris from 20 to 25 March 2014 in Bangui
(photographs taken by the Panel)*



Annex 21: Cases of non-compliance

1. The Panel noticed cases of non-compliance with the embargo regime, that were addressed with the concerned parties. It concerns provision of training, assistance and equipment to the CAR defence and security forces without prior approval of the Security Council Committee on the CAR.
2. On 31 March 2014, BINUCA and UNDP handed over to the police forces of the CAR eleven pick-up truck vehicles. The Panel sent a letter on the issue, which prompted a *post facto* notification from UNDP to the Committee on 29 April 2014. On 1 May 2014, a large quantity of equipment and accessories, including military-style uniforms, was donated by Togo to the Police and *Gendarmerie* of the CAR during a ceremony in Bangui. In this connection, the Panel sent a letter to the Government of Togo on 6 May 2014 to obtain further information, but to date no reply has been forthcoming.
3. With regard to assistance and training, Sudan provided basic infantry training to around 170 soldiers from the CAR in a Sudanese training centre north of Khartoum between 8 November 2013 and 5 March 2014. The Panel learned that sixty of these recruits returned to Bangui in April 2014 while the rest headed to Birao (Vakaga province) and presumably joined the former Seleka according to one General of that group. The Panel sent a letter requesting further information on this training to the Government of Sudan on 2 May 2014, but no reply has been forthcoming.
4. On 5 May 2014, the Panel sent two letters to the Governments of Morocco and Senegal, where a number of CAR defence and security personnel are being trained. Morocco confirmed that 34 military trainees who were in the country before 5 December 2013 (the imposition of the arms embargo) were still present in May 2014. Senegal, where about 20 FACA trainees are believed to be still present, has not yet replied to the Panel's letter. The Panel has also obtained information that small numbers of military trainees are also still present in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France and Niger. The Panel is in the process of informing those countries that exemption requests should be transmitted to the Committee in connection with these trainings.
5. With regards to support to the CAR SSR process, the Committee has approved so far all requests for the provision of equipment and training to the Police and Gendarmerie.¹ However, the Committee reiterated that the provision of training by international forces is exempted from the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) only in the context of support given by MISCA for its contribution to the reform of the security sector in coordination with MINUSCA.

¹ See annex 20.

Annex 22: Case Study I: Killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross staff in Ndélé

1. On 8 March 2014, three armed men killed an International Committee staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of Ndélé. At the time of the incident, the ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with three other ICRC staff members; the other three were unharmed. The incident happened in the context of civil unrest that was taking place in the town on the day of the incident, but clearly amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law.¹
2. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of the incident by contacting witnesses and by visiting the town of Ndélé on 10 April 2014.

Background

3. The town of Ndélé is located in the northeast of the CAR in the prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran. The town has approximately 51,000 inhabitants; 60 per cent are Christians and 40 per cent are Muslim.² The grand majority of the population belongs to the Goula and Runga ethnic groups; a considerable percentage of the population is of Chadian origin.
4. Being close to the Chadian border, Ndélé is a town where commercial and migration routes intersect. Sudanese and Chadian individuals, armed and non-armed, pass through this town.
5. Ndélé has been under the control of the former Seleka since they took power in in March 2013³. As per accounts from several sources consulted by the Panel, the security situation in Ndélé has been more volatile since December 2012. Banditry has been common phenomenon in the area for decades. During the period when the former Seleka was in power (March – December 2013) the security situation improved according to several sources, there was a reduction of robberies, car hijackings and other crimes, but since December 2013 and during the past five months the situation has deteriorated.
6. Since December 2013 different factions of the former Seleka have been present and in control of the town. Mainly CPJP and UFDR, but none has absolute control of the town. These different factions have been cohabitating on relatively good terms for the past few months apart from isolated incidents. There is no clear and unique command and control in Ndélé and its surroundings.

¹ ICRC Press Release, 8 March 2014; <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-08-central-african-republic-icrc-staff-member-killed.htm>; Jeune Afrique, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20140308T221625Z20140308T221554Z/>; and Reuters, Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA270PV20140308>

² According to Government institutions and humanitarian organizations.

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel with a wide variety of sources as well as the field visit conducted by the Panel on 10 April 2014 confirm this statement.

7. There was no significant change of local authorities in Ndélé in December 2013 when former Seleka was pressured to give up power in Bangui. The Préfet, Sous-Préfet and COMZONE remained in place.
8. Nevertheless it is noteworthy to mention that the Chadian contingent of MISCA evacuated the Préfet, Mr. Bernard Sendeo Okape on 26 January 2014 due to security threats he had received from armed men based on accusations that he was supporting the anti-Balaka forces.

Humanitarian situation

9. Presence: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (WASH⁴), food security and protection); *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (health); *Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale* (PU-AMI) (health and food security); as well as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (education and protection), have on-going humanitarian operations in N'Dele and surrounding areas. The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) recently closed its operations in the area. Since November / December 2013 all organizations have reduced their operations and number of staff in Ndélé, mainly due to the volatile security situation. Various humanitarian actors have expressed their precautions of deploying either expatriates or national staff ('impats') who are white or non-Muslims to Ndélé as a mitigating measure to be able to operate in an insecure environment.
10. Needs: Potable water remains the main humanitarian need for the population of Ndélé.
11. IDPs: Approximately 5,000 IDPs mainly integrated within host community, no existing IDP sites. All IDPs belong to the Muslim community.
12. Previous incidents reported in 2014: Attacks against humanitarian organizations

In the course of 2014 humanitarian organizations have been victim of various security related incidents in Ndélé. On 29 January 2014, unknown armed men robbed the health centre that is run by an INGO; On 31 January, the vehicle of an INGO was hijacked in the road between Ndélé and Manovo; on 14 February, the base of an INGO in Ndélé was attacked, property and money was stolen; on 25 February, another INGO vehicle was attacked and their staff robbed on the road between NDélé and Bamingui; On 28 February 2014, after mid-night, five unknown armed men unlawfully entered the Guest House of an INGO, verbally and physically threatened the staff present and damaged some equipment; On 30 April 2014, an INGO convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the NDélé population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were

⁴ WASH stands for WAter, Sanitation and Hygiene services

permitted to pass through, but one was held behind. This truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.⁵ The incident was widely condemned by the international community.

13. All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February 2014 through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter (see below) was signed by a group that calls themselves *Groupe des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran*. According to several sources consulted and interviewed by the Panel in relation to the investigation of this incident the group is composed of few young men from Ndélé who are not directly related to the different former Seleka factions that are present in the town. However, after the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and former Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and to assure their security. There were no more threats issued by the group, according to various sources consulted by the Panel, the group of young men were identified and approached by one of the former Seleka commanders in the town and ordered them to discontinue this type of threats. The letter was the last time (until the writing of this report) where the existence of this group had been mentioned.

Description of Events

14. On 8 March 2014 at around 09:00 hours, a SANGARIS patrol of one vehicle went to the Commissariat to arrest former Seleka Colonel Inus and hand him over to MISCA⁶. Upon their return to the base, a vehicle coming from the Gendarmerie commanded by Colonel Isa and his armed men followed them. They shot at the SANGARIS vehicle from behind to which they reacted by shooting back. The exchange of fire took place at the roundabout that leads towards the airstrip, close to the church and the commercial part of the town.
15. The SANGARIS patrol left the scene and returned to its base. The clash left four former Seleka fighters dead and two others wounded. The corpses and wounded were left in the street. The Muslim population reacted a while after the exchange of fire had ended, and went to take the dead to be buried and the injured to the hospital.
16. The clash caused fear within the civilian population of the town, mostly the Christian population, some of which took refuge in the catholic church of Ndélé.
17. At around 10:00 hours, three armed men in military attire (beige camouflage) followed the crowd of civilians seeking refuge at the church. The men forced themselves into the house

⁵ <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2014/05/rca-apres-une-nouvelle-attaque-l-inquietude-grandit-au-sein-des-ong.html>; and http://www.pu-ami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1879&Itemid=28

⁶ The arrest was related to a verbal threat that Colonel Inus had made against SANGARIS in Ndélé. He had stated publicly on 7 March 2014 that if SANGARIS did not leave Ndélé within 48 hours they would be attacked. Information obtained by primary sources through interviews conducted by the Panel.

next to the church and fired at the ICRC staff who was residing at that house with the other three ICRC staff members and the cleaning lady.

18. According to several accounts of the incident, the three men just entered the premises and shot at the ICRC staff, no explanation was given in relation to why the other three were left unharmed. Only one of the three-armed men fired at the moment of the incident, the same person who the local authorities have signalled as the perpetrator of the killing. There is no explanation of why the other two did not shoot.
19. The three armed men asked everyone inside the premises to gather in the garden at the back of the church, right after they went to the church and the other church residence premises (where three priests and a seminarist resided) and also requested everyone to gather in the back garden.
20. At this time, the three armed men asked the civilians who were present at the church: “*where are the men?*” question to which one of the priest responded that there were none left. After the armed men took the personal belongings and money from the people present and entered the priests’ residence to take some money, a computer and mobile phones.
21. The three armed men were not recognized by any of the individuals who were present at the moment of the incident, nor did they carry any insignia or indication as to which armed group they belonged. However, all individuals interviewed and consulted in the course of the investigation indicated that these young men were related to former Seleka factions present in Ndélé.
22. After taking all the valuables they could find they left the church premises.
23. According to local authorities interviewed by the Panel in Bangui and in Ndélé, the perpetrator of the incident is a young man named Jamal Amat. He left Ndélé the day of the incident and has been on the run since. The local authorities have been trying to arrest him for detention. The father of this individual has a money transfer business in the centre of town. There is no further information about the individual; however at the moment of writing of this report the Panel obtained information from three confidential sources that clearly stated that the individual is closely related to former Seleka members in Ndélé.
24. The day after the incident representatives of the former Seleka present in town formally apologized to the ICRC for the incident and expressed their willingness and intention to apprehend the perpetrator, however at the moment of writing of this report this has not happened.⁷

⁷ Interview with confidential source on 10 April 2014.

25. The Panel conducted this investigation independently and did not receive any information from ICRC.

Annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organizations

1. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left Boda. On 29 January 2014, clashes between the Muslim and non-Muslim population erupted in town. As many as 61 civilians were killed, approximately 850 houses and shops were burned and destroyed and more than half of the population in Boda was displaced. The violence decreased upon the arrival of the SANGARIS forces on 5 February 2014. Nevertheless, the security situation remained fragile and unstable until the time of writing.
2. On 22 February 2014, a team from an INGO was forced to stop the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs) in the town of Boda due to threats made by anti-Balaka militias. This incident amounts to a violation of International Humanitarian Law. It happened in the context of confrontations and high tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda. The Panel has decided not to disclose the name of the INGO that was victim in the incident investigated in this case file to protect humanitarian operations in the country as well as future investigations of similar incidents by the Panel.
3. The Panel conducted a comprehensive investigation of this incident, by interviewing sources and by visiting the town of Boda on 19 April 2014.

Background

4. Boda is located approximately 160 km south-west of Bangui in the Lobaye Prefecture. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants.¹ These figures include approximately 12,000 Muslims² and 30,000 non-Muslims, the remaining figure is the estimate number of people living outside the town; no reliable information is available in relation to which religious community they belong to. Since end of January 2014 most of the Muslim population is cantoned in the centre of town and the non-Muslims population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town but there is no information on this matter available.
5. During the last couple of decades the livelihoods of the inhabitants in Boda consisted mainly of trading diamonds and to a lesser extent of agricultural production. The latter mainly for local consumption. Traditionally, individuals belonging to the Muslim community in Boda and Mbaki managed most of the diamond trade, but since the end of January 2014 these

¹ Evaluation Report, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), February 2014; OCHA figures; the number of inhabitants was calculated by the RRM team based on the statistics from the health centre in Boda.

² According to information collected by humanitarian organizations, the Muslim community in Boda is composed not only of Central Africans but also individuals of Chadian, Cameroonian, and Nigerian origin.

individuals have not been able to access the mines due to a lack of freedom of movement. According to primary sources of the Panel the diamond trade has partially resumed under the control of the non-Muslim community.

6. Boda has one hospital and thirteen schools (twelve public schools and one private school), one kindergarten and two maternity centres, all were closed after the eruption of violence in late January 2014 and none were operational at the time of writing this report.
7. On 28 January 2014, former Seleka forces left the town of Boda. Presence of local authorities was reduced to the Mayor, one gendarme, one policeman (both un-armed) and 15 teachers / educators, all others authorities left.³
8. According to numerous local sources, during the time the former Seleka controlled Boda, they were responsible for committing crimes against the non-Muslim population. The former Seleka having armed the Muslim population is one of the allegations received by the Panel during its investigations.⁴ Nevertheless, the same sources agreed in stating that the security situation was calm during the period when the former Seleka were in power. There were no reports of anti-Balaka militias in Boda before the end of January 2014.
9. On 29 January 2014, violence erupted between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the town. Houses and shops in and around the centre of town and the market were attacked and burned, as many as 61 civilians were killed during this event according to several sources.⁵ Reports of humanitarian organizations stated that approximately 850 houses and businesses were burned down between 28 January and the 5 February 2014. On 5 February 2014, SANGARIS Forces arrived in Boda.⁶
10. According to three reliable primary sources interviewed by the Panel, anti-Balaka militias arrived in Boda shortly after the eruption of violence. One or two days after 29 January 2014, a group of about 50 young men from the non-Muslim community left Boda and went to be

³ Interviews conducted by the Panel, Boda, 19 April 2014

⁴ It is important to note that more than one humanitarian organization has received testimony from the Muslim community that they were armed by the former Seleka and have a certain level of capability to defend themselves; which is one of the reasons why they haven't been "eliminated" or "expelled" from Boda.

⁵ Interviews conducted by the Panel in Boda on 19 April 2014; HRW <http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; Rapport d'Evaluation, RRM, Boda, Prefecture de la Lobaye, February 2014; Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-centralafrican-killings-idUSBREA121PF20140203>; Jeune Afrique, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articleimp_ARTJAWEB20140203152234_centrafrique-flambee-de-violence-entre-chretiens-et-musulmans-pres-de-bangui.html; HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/12/central-african-republic-muslims-forced-flee>; UN, <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/central-african-republic-un-rights-office-warns-worsening-insecurity-bangui>; UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org.hk/files/2014%20Emergency/CAR/update/Feb/Regional%20Update%20II%20-%20Central%20African%20Situation.pdf>

⁶ Confidential source of the Panel within a humanitarian organization.

“trained” by an anti-Balaka commander with the nom de guerre “General 8-8” from the town of Pama (around 40 km north of Boda), they returned to Boda and partially took control of the town. The anti-Balaka militias of Boda are locals.

11. It remains unclear who exactly was responsible for the commencement of violence, destruction of property and killing of civilians. The Panel interviewed individuals from both communities who were present at the beginning of the violence between Christians and Muslims and each presented their own version of events. However, it is clear that both communities were armed at that time and the departure of the former Seleka left a vacuum of power that triggered the violence. Most of the crimes reported after 29 January 2014 seem to have been committed by anti-Balaka militias.
12. Since 29 January 2014, the Muslim community has been compelled to live in the centre of town with no freedom of movement, limited access to basic health and educational facilities, restricted livelihood activities and, furthermore, under continuous threats from anti-Balaka militias who surround the centre of town and partially control the town and its surroundings.
13. The non-Muslim population inhabits five IDP sites, they have access to the fields to cultivate and potable water, however due to their sudden forced displacement and the fragile security situation in the town they lack mainly NFIs and access to health and educational facilities.
14. The IDP sites are:⁷
 - St Michele Church: approximately 9,517 persons
 - *Sous-Préfecturale* School for girls: approximately 4,407 persons
 - Cotonaf School: approximately 3,000 persons
 - Samboli School: approximately 840 persons
 - *Préfecturale* School for boys: approximately 2,400 persons
15. After the eruption of violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Boda its market has been closed mainly due to the fact that shops were burned and destroyed and no reconstruction has taken place.
16. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and OCHA reports show that until end of March 2014 no sexual violence cases had been reported or documented in Boda. However, the lack of proper and functional health facilities as well as protection mechanisms in place could be the cause for the lack of reports.

⁷ Names and figures were obtained by the Panel from OCHA and corroborated on the ground during a field visit.

17. Reports from various sources state consistently that the anti-Balaka militias present in Boda had not only been targeting the Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim population. A confidential report from a mission to Boda conducted by various humanitarian organizations between 12 and 14 March 2014 stated that anti-Balaka militias had confiscated mobile phones from several people in the Saint-Michel Church IDP site, accusing them of being in touch with the Muslim community.
18. Some Muslims have expressed their willingness to be relocated outside of Boda, others want to stay. The Muslims who have expressed their willingness to be relocated seem to be the ones who are not originally from Boda, but who fled to Boda seeking protection from violence.

Description of Events: Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance

19. On 22 February 2014, at around 1730 hours, a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) mission conducted by an INGO to distribute NFIs for the population in need arrived in Boda.
20. The first truck of NFIs arrived in Boda's Muslim neighbourhood and delivered part of the supplies, after the truck was emptied the driver decided to take the truck to the Catholic Church Saint Michele for security reasons.
21. Once at the Catholic mission, the RRM team encountered a group of anti-Balaka militias as well as a group of representatives from the non-Muslim community. The individuals expressed their disapproval of the distribution of NFIs to the Muslim community underlining that the NFIs given to the Muslim community were of better quality than those distributed among the non-Muslim communities.⁸
22. Individuals (both civilians and armed anti-Balaka) threatened to burn the vehicles and trucks of the RRM team and to throw grenades at them if they didn't leave the town immediately and to kill the INGO director (the "white" person) claiming that white people were the cause of all the problems in the CAR. Furthermore a very distressed anti-Balaka individual approached the RRM team with a machete crying out loud: "who are the people who came to help the Muslims?".
23. After this incident, the RRM team took their vehicles and went to the SANGARIS base to seek advice and protection, leaving the trucks, drivers and some team members behind.
24. At around 1900 hours part of the team went back to the Catholic mission to join the remaining part of the team and the trucks. At that moment the individual who claimed to be the leader of the anti-Balaka militias in Boda, 'Général 8-8', spoke to the RRM team and assured their security. Nevertheless, anti-Balaka elements present at the meeting point said in Sango that they would still kill them and burn their trucks if they stayed in Boda. This comment was

⁸ The Panel consulted and verified with several humanitarian sources that the NFI packages were the same for both communities, same items and same quality.

picked up by one of the national staff of the team. The entire team returned to the SANGARIS base to spend the night there.

25. At 0500 hours on 23 February 2014, the RRM team left the SANGARIS base and held a meeting with the representatives of the non-Muslim community (some of them being the Priests) and explained that the NFI distribution had to be suspended due to the security situation. The RRM team did the same with representatives of the Muslim community and then left Boda and returned to Bangui.
26. All NFIs that were not distributed remained in Boda together with paperwork for representatives of each community to continue the distribution. NFIs were distributed to both communities by each of their representatives.
27. None of the individuals that were part of the RRM team returned to Boda until the time of writing of this report.
28. The distribution of humanitarian aid was suspended in Boda until late March 2014 when another INGO took over the activities of the previous INGO. Even though the tensions in the town continue and the unstable security situation for the civilian population remains a mayor concern, humanitarian aid has resumed and no mayor incidents have been reported since then.

Perpetrators

29. According to the investigation conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka Commander 'Général 8-8' is responsible for threatening humanitarian organizations and hindering the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians in need. Information collected until the time of writing of this report indicates that the 'Général 8-8' is still in Boda and commands and controls the anti-Balaka militias in the town.
30. According to investigations conducted by the Panel, the anti-Balaka in Boda seem to be one example of a community based militia that falls under the third category mentioned in the Armed Groups Section of the report.

Photographs taken by the Panel

Households destroyed in Boda during January violence



Market area destroyed during January violence



Annex 24: Attacks against humanitarians in the Central African Republic from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014

	Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LT	T	Summary	Source
1	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Eight (8) Ex-Seleka elements stole 16 mosquito nets on a non-violent form after six of them received treatment in a health centre run by an INGO	Panel Interview with INGO
2	December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 05 December 2014, Ex-Seleka armed elements attacked the neighbourhood where the house of an aid worker was located. They entered the house and looted the premises taking with them all valuables and a vehicle. They stated that the reason for the attack was because the aid worker and the neighbours did not like Muslims.	UN Report
3	December	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	International Medical Corps (IMC) confirms the death of one of its national staff members in CAR, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in his home during the violent clashes in the capital Bangui on 5 December 2013.	IMC News Release through their website
4	December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown armed men forced an aid worker to attend a patient on an aggressive manner. The staff joined them on the tent where he was and gave indications this served to ease the tension	Panel Interview with INGO
5	December	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	On the night of 8 December 2013 at around 2100 hours a group of armed Ex-Seleka men stormed into the offices of an INGO, verbally threatened the guard and stole computers, the generator, money and destroyed documents and furniture. The perpetrators shouted to the guard that they did not want the presence of the INGO in the country and that all personnel should leave. After this, the group of armed men left. The office was then closed and activities were suspended for a few weeks. The organization was obliged to look for new premises due to the security situation.	Panel Interview with INGO
6	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO driver arrested by Ex-Seleka during an hour accused of conducting a survey in Moyen Sido against Ex-Seleka	Panel Interview with INGO
7	December	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men prosecuting Muslims in the hospital. They aggressively asked to expel the Muslims from the hospital. MISCA replied shooting in the air. Evacuation of Muslim patients was envisaged at the moment. INGO activities hampered due to general insecurity	Panel Interview with INGO
8	December	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Armed men chased a Muslim individual who had requested refuge in the health centre ran by an INGO. INGO reported the increasing difficulty of operating in such environment.	Panel Interview with INGO
9	December	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka accused and INGO of collaborating with the Anti-Balaka and asked for their presence in the headquarters	Panel Interview with INGO
10	December	Bangui	Various	0	0	0	0	0	A Muslim civilian with his wife came to health centre run by INGO but was prevented from leaving by a crowd of civilians and armed men. They sought refuge in the INGO premises and later had to be relocated to a safer place	Panel Interview with INGO

11	December	Ouham	Various	0	0	1	0	0	In the context of an Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka clash in a village, aid workers had to run to the jungle to seek refuge. Civilians and non-civilians wounded and killed. Burning of houses also reported. Rockets were fired.	Panel Interview with INGO
12	December	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	Anti-Balaka elements stole 50,000 XAF and a mobile phone from an aid worker after beating him.	Panel Interview with INGO
13	January	Bangui	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker, and looted the house. They stole inventory such as a fridge, television and clothes.	UN
14	January	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Aid worker stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint who threatened him by shooting in the air. The INGO staff was held for some time and then released under the explanation that perpetrators thought it was another INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
15	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	An unknown person threw a grenade that landed on a humanitarian agency truck parked nearby the airport IDP site after a tire problem. The truck was carrying food from the logistics base to the airport IDP site. The explosion of the grenade damaged two other tires of the truck, causing no casualties. The person suspected of throwing the grenade was reportedly arrested by Burundian soldiers.	UN
16	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Unidentified armed men forcibly entered the house of an aid worker. They threatened one of the family members and looted the house. The aid worker was at the office at the moment of the incident but neighbours called to inform about what was happening. Aid worker notified Burundian MISCA troops and they immediately went to the house. They succeeded in rescuing the family member from the house, but the entire inventory and all the valuable items including cars and motorcycles were stolen	UN
17	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	0	0	Three grenades thrown in the IDP camp near Castor health centre ran by INGO after Djotodia resignation. 15 wounded (1 aid worker) and 3 civilians dead.	Panel Interview with INGO
18	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO team on their way back to the office was stopped by Anti-Balaka members on the road. They were demanded to identify themselves and hand over their mobile phones. Apparently the anti-Balaka were searching for Muslim contacts in the phones of the drivers and the team members with the aim of identifying and prosecuting those Muslim contacts. The INGO staff was released after few hours. The INGO no longer deploys Muslim staff to the area and has advised the staff to be careful of the type of names registered on their mobile numbers as a mitigating measure.	Panel Interview with INGO
19	January	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 14 January 2014, in Bangui in the Bibale neighbourhood, the corpse of an aid worker was discovered floating in the canal that passed under the Jackson bridge. The employee was on his way to the airport, when he was allegedly stabbed to death by Muslims in the area of the Yakite neighbourhood. Young men marched with the body of the deceased on avenue Barthelemy Boganda to express their discontent.	UN

20	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	At 0200 hours three armed men forcibly entered the compound of an INGO. The guards claim to have recognized Ex-Seleka and ran for their lives. Motorbikes were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
21	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Between the 15th and 17th of February, following heavy fighting in Bocaranga, Anti-Balaka elements looted shops of Muslims and also looted one (1) INGO Compound.	UN
22	January	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In January, a staff member of an INGO who was living at the BINUCA regrouping location point, was on his way to distribute a health kit at the Prefectural Hospital when he was intercepted on two occasions by Anti-Balaka elements. After checking the inside of the car, they verbally threatened the aid worker by saying: 'if you were carrying Muslims with you, we would kill you with them.'	UN
23	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	At about 0930 hours unknown perpetrators hijacked a vehicle of an INGO in the PK12 area at the outskirts of Bangui.	UN
24	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	1	Anti-Balaka armed elements physically harmed and robbed an aid worker. Mobile telephone was stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
25	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January, unknown quantity of food items was stolen from UN humanitarian Agency-contracted truck in the area of Beloko, when it was on the way from Cameroon to CAR. It is not clear how and by whom the theft was committed	UN
26	January	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	1	0	0	INGO vehicle on the way to projects was threatened and thrown stones at by young armed men allegedly looking for Muslims. Vehicle and staff were let go unharmed. Vehicle was slightly damaged.	Panel Interview with INGO
27	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	On 20 January 2014, armed men entered the offices of an INGO breaking down the main entrance and robbed all the furniture, some desks, chairs and others. According to the statement of the aid worker, at this time of year PK13 was totally controlled by the Anti-Balaka and they as well as eyewitnesses believed that it was Anti-Balaka men who attacked the office. No civilian casualties or injuries were reported. After the incident the INGO moved to another location.	Panel Interview with INGO
28	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Two unidentified armed men forcibly entered an INGO run clinic in Bangui and hit the guard.	Panel Interview with INGO
29	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Insecurity in the border area with Cameroon has led to the suspension of trucks connecting Cameroon and Bangui. This threatens the supply to the capital, Bangui, and prevents humanitarian aid agencies from replenishing their stocks.	UN
30	January	Kemo	Various	0	0	0	0	0	Clashes between Ex-Seleka and Anti-Balaka elements in Sibut obstructed the circulation of INGO vehicles, staff and therefore hindered their humanitarian operation.	Panel Interview with INGO
31	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka armed elements arrived to the INGO run health centre and threatened the staff to give preferential treatment to Ex-Seleka patients	Panel Interview with INGO

32	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	A group of armed men attacked the home of an aid worker. They first shoot at the air and after climbed the entrance gate and destroyed the side door to access the premises. The nephew of the aid worker was threatened; they stole 03 mattresses, one antenna and 5 cell phones. After their crime, they fled to an unknown destination. The aid worker requested assistance and UNDSS immediately responded with a detachment of the Moroccan Guard Unit. Upon arrival, the bandits had already disappeared.	UN
33	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	INGO vehicle was hijacked by unknown armed men in the road N'Dele - Manovo	Panel Interview with INGO
34	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital in a village of the Prefecture, ran by INGO, they stole material from the building (Mattresses, fuel and others)	Panel Interview with INGO
35	January	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	In January 2014, unknown armed elements entered the house of an aid worker in Bangui, looted the house and threatened to kidnap a relative of the aid worker. A post assessment of the neighbourhood showed considerable damage and destruction after several acts of violence committed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
36	January	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	A group of ex-Ex-Seleka who fled disarmament from Bangui to Ndélé, intercepted and stole the vehicle Land- Cruiser of the INGO as well as envelope containing money .	UN
37	January	Mambéré-Kadéfi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Armed ex-Ex-Seleka elements arrived to a village in the Prefecture of Mambéré-Kadéfi late at night, looted an INGO compound and stole two vehicles.	Panel Interview with INGO
38	January	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Ex-Seleka armed men came during the night and looted an INGO compound. The door of the compound was broken down and the place was thoroughly emptied of all valuables, i.e. motorcycles, mattresses, bicycles, furniture, floor mats and recreational kits.	Panel Interview with INGO
39	January	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	In January 2014 in Bangui, a group of armed Anti-Balaka (two ex- FACA were recognized by neighbours according to investigations made in relation to the incident) stormed into the house of an aid worker with the intention to loot it under the pretext that the house belonged to a Muslim. Neighbours who were witnessing the event approached the armed men and explained that the owner of the house was not a Muslim, intervention that allegedly stopped the armed men from harming the premises. The Moroccan Guard Unit arrived to the scene to intervene but the armed men had already left.	UN
40	January	Bangui	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A wood vendor threatened INGO staff and stopped the passage of one of their trucks at the entrance of unknown place in Bangui. No injuries or looting reported.	Panel Interview with INGO
41	January	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	Armed men entered the hospital ran by INGO, shooting and threatening the population and staff present. They stole one INGO vehicle.	Panel Interview with INGO

42	February	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	A UN staff member (SM) was attacked by a Anti- Balaka when he went to visit his residence in Bangui which he had abandoned since the beginning of the crisis in December due to security reasons. When he was leaving the premises he was stopped by a group of anti-Balaka who demanded him to give them money, after he gave then all he had and left the scene. A few meters after he was stopped for the second time by another group of anti-Balaka who demanded money as well, this time the UN SM explained that he did not have any more money with him. The anti-Balaka responded by pointing a gun at him, the SM managed to escape the scene in his car, the anti-Balaka opened fire while he was fleeing, causing minor injuries to the SM and damaging the vehicle.	UN
43	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	Elements of the Moroccan Guard Unit and the UNDSS intervention team were sent to intercept in a situation at the home of a UN staff member. His house was under attack and being looted by Anti-Balaka elements in the Miskine neighbourhood. The incident happened while Anti-Balaka elements were in process of conducting a significant operation of "cleaning" Miskine neighbourhood from Muslims living in the area. All valuables were taken from the residence of the staff member.	UN
44	February	Ombella M'Poko	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An INGO convoy carrying humanitarian aid goods was stopped on the road between Bogangolo and Bangui for a period of more than three hours. The convoy was released and continued it's way but all communications equipment and valuable were stolen from personnel present.	Panel Interview with INGO, UN
45	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	On February 2014 at around midnight a group of six Ex-Seleka armed men broke into an INGO compound in a village of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and looted the compound. The attackers demanded to be told where the white person was (implying the expatriate staff of the INGO) who managed to escape at a certain point of the incident without being noticed. The armed men robbed one vehicle, six cans of diesel, two mobile phones and 130,000 XFA.	Panel Interview with INGO
46	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	An NGO was the target of a robbery by unidentified gunmen. Pharmaceuticals and some medical material were stolen.	UN
47	February	Ouham - Pende	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	1	0	The office of an INGO in a village in Ouham-Pende was pillaged by Anti-Balaka, who allegedly have taken all the material collected to Paoua.	UN
48	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Four armed anti-Balaka forced their way into the house of an aid worker threatening the guard and the family members of the aid worker present at the time of the incident. The anti-Balaka elements took a vehicle. The aid worker called the to report the incident to the security officer of the organization who intervened and met the anti-Balaka commander who was in charge of the group (Commander Dieudonner). After negotiations the AB commander agreed to return the vehicle.	UN

49	February	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	In the month of February in the Prefecture Kemo an INGO vehicle was undertaking a humanitarian mission when the vehicle was stopped by ex-Ex-Seleka armed men. Three of the four aid workers who were inside the vehicle were kidnapped by the armed group. The three aid workers were able to escape the day after and find their way to the nearest village. All valuables and the vehicle were taken by the ex-Seleka elements.	UN
50	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men broke into the compound of an INGOs on the night of 10 to 11 February 2014. The group forced the front gate open to get into the compound, two vehicles and money were taken	UN
51	February	Ouham - Pende	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Ex-Seleka broke into the compound of an international NGO in Batangafo and stole a vehicle.	UN
52	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed men tried to break into the home of a UN Staff Member, with guns and machetes. Caretaker and neighbours alerted the security staff in the neighbourhood, in response the bandits attacked three people with machetes. Once the security team arrived, the bandits were gone.	UN
53	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	An aid worker was stopped at an Ex-Seleka checkpoint was killed after declaring he had no money to hand over as requested by the perpetrators. The staff clearly identified himself as a humanitarian worker	Panel Interview with INGO
54	February	Mbomou	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Three rental trucks of an INGO going from Bangui to Bangassou were hijacked by members of the Ex-Seleka. Upon arrival in Ouango, a village 75km from Bangassou they were attacked by armed inhabitants from the village who took the trucks from the ex-Seleka men.	UN
55	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Anti-Balaka armed elements obstructed and threatened INGO convoy stating that they were helping the Muslim community. The threat included to throw a grenade to the staff.	Panel Interview with INGO
56	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	The Guest House of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men. Money, equipment and personal items of staff were stolen	Panel Interview with INGO
57	February	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014, Anti-Balaka armed men blocked an inter-agency protection mission to PK12. One aid worker's vehicle was stopped between two roadblocks of armed men for many hours before being rescued. The mission did not accomplish its objective which was to assist civilian survivors of a previous attack.	UN
58	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Two Ex-Seleka armed men attacked an INGO guesthouse. Money, a satellite phone and a vehicle were taken after threatening the expat staff with a weapon.	Panel Interview with INGO
59	February	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	Tensions growing and increasing number of threats against humanitarians being accused of partiality have been hindering the movement of aid workers in the city and surrounding.	Panel Interview with INGO

60	February	Lobaye	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	An INGO team was forced to stop a distribution of NFIs in a village in the Prefecture of Lobaye due to threats made by Anti-Balaka militias in the village. The aid workers were forced to evacuate the village before finishing the distribution of humanitarian aid.	Panel Interview with INGO
61	February	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On February 2014 in the Ouham Prefecture and INGO vehicle was hijacked by Ex-Seleka armed men. The incident took place on the Kabo - Sido axis during a transfer of patients by the said vehicle. The vehicle was returned one day after to the INGO.	Panel Interview with INGO
62	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle traveling from Bamingui to N'Dele was attacked and robbed by unknown armed men. Personal items and money from staff were stolen.	Panel Interview with INGO
63	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Various	0	0	0	0	0	All international organizations received a death threat on 28 February through a letter that was posted in several different places of the town. The letter was signed by a group that call themselves <i>Group des Jeunes Révolutionnaires de Bamingui-Bangoran</i> . After the posting of the letter representatives of local authorities, IDPs and Ex-Seleka commanders present in the town held a meeting with humanitarian organizations to persuade them not to stop their operations and assure their security.	Panel Interview with INGO
64	February	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	1	1	0	Ex-Seleka armed men stormed the a town in the Prefecture of Ouham and killed three people, looted the city hospital and stole computer equipment, bikes and a sizeable amount of money. In addition, they took two INGOs vehicles.	UN
65	February	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1300 hrs, at camp Don Bosco, a team of UN staff was threatened by a dozen Anti-Balaka elements that were carrying machetes and firearms. They stopped the two vehicles that were transporting the team. The Anti-Balakas shouted threats and showcased their firearms, and even tried to take one of the passengers of vehicles out of the car. However both vehicles were able to leave the area and join the main road without further consequences.	UN
66	February	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	On February 2014 at around noon, the distribution of food by humanitarian organizations in a town in the Prefecture of Nana-Mambere generated tension within the local population. Difficulties arose due to the discrepancies between the lists of beneficiaries as well as identified fake ID holders demanding to receive aid. Threats against aid workers created a very tense situation, which eventually forced the staff to take refuge in a protected building nearby.	UN
67	February	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	Five armed individuals entered the INGO expat Guest House at late hours of the night threatening the staff with weapons to leave the town. Some staff were physically harmed by the assailants. Valuables were taken.	Panel Interview with INGO
68	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men entered the INGO run hospital, physically harmed the guards and stole all the money which was meant to pay the daily salary of hospital workers.	Panel Interview with INGO

69	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed men attacked an INGO base and staff were obliged to take refuge at the MISCA base for a few days. No further details were made available on the incident.	UN
70	March	Ouham	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Armed individuals entered the INGO Expat Guest House, threat the staff present and loot the money and the communications devices in possession of the present individuals	Panel Interview with INGO
71	March	Ouham - Pende	FPR	1	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 in a village 30 km from Pauoa, an aid worker was allegedly stabbed to death by members of the RPF General Baba Laddé, which would be stationed in the area.	Panel Interview with INGO
72	March	Ouham - Pende	RJ	0	0	0	0	0	On March 2014 at around 0900 hours a group of around ten (10) armed men from RJ stormed a UN compound in a town in the Prefecture of Ouham-Pende. Guards in the compound questioned the reason for this unlawful entry to which the armed men responded that they were searching for their commander. The guard informed that he was not there, nevertheless they insisted and searched the premises. They left without further harm done.	UN
73	March	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	At around 1530, a vehicle of an INGO with one driver on board was returning from Sibut. The vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka in a village about 55km from Sibut. The Anti-Balaka elements demanded to use the vehicle for transportation. The driver explained the prohibition of the use of humanitarian assets for purposes other than humanitarian operations but in any case the Anti-Balaka requested to be transported to a location not far away from the point where the vehicle was initially intercepted. After this the driver was allowed to leave without further trouble. The driver later discovered a machete in the booth that was probably left by one of the Anti-Balaka elements.	UN
74	March	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	Four armed Ex-Seleka assaulted the village and went to the health centre, a patient run off and a Ex-Seleka shoot him but did not injure him. INGO Staff gave what they had (50000 XAF) and yelling that they may have more than that	Panel Interview with INGO
75	March	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	INGO Convoy stopped by 16 armed anti-Balaka, threatening of throw a grenade against INGO next time	Panel Interview with INGO
76	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Ex-Seleka	1	0	0	0	0	On the 08 March 2014 three armed men killed an ICRC staff member of Cameroonian nationality in the town of N'Dele. The ICRC staff member was lodged at the Catholic mission quarters with other three staff members at the time of the incident; the other three were unharmed. The incident was investigated by Panel and perpetrator was identified.	JA090314; ICRC080314; ICRC; Open source on file: News Release 08-03-2014, Breaking and US International News, Reuters.com (Red Cross worker killed in Central African Republic); UN
77	March	Bangui	Unknown	1	0	0	0	0	On 9 March 2014, a 36-year-old volunteer with the Central African Red Cross Society, was gunned down in Bangui by unknown armed men.	ICRC0314
78	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	1	0	1	0	INGO vehicle involved in water distribution efforts was attacked, driver was stabbed and the water pump was stolen. Later demanded ransom for the pump.	UN

79	March	Nana-Grébizi	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On March 2014, a convoy of UN vehicles, traveling from Bangui to the north was stopped at about 70km from Bangui, by Anti-Balaka elements. Amongst the staff (2 national and 2 international) was a Muslim (international staff), who was asked to get out of the car and his life was threatened. They demanded to search the vehicles but the UN staff responded that they had no right to do so. The anti-Balaka suspected that the vehicles were transporting ex-Ex-Seleka and their weapons. After negotiation the rebels took food, water and an unknown amount of money and the staff was allowed to continue.	UN
80	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	UN vehicle was hit by stray bullets while armed assailants attempted to attack a Muslim exiting a bank	UN
81	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	MISCA intervened on an attempted robbery against an INGO	UN
82	March	Kemo	Ex-Seleka	2	0	0	0	0	Ex-Seleka opened fire on the inhabitants of Dekoa. Two volunteers for the Red Cross died and one civilian was injured.	http://www.radiondekeluka.org/societe/item/19026-tension-a-dekoa-la-population-est-en-brousse.html
83	March	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	The base of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran was attacked and looted by unknown armed men	Panel Interview with INGO
84	March	Nana-Grébizi	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	1	0	The house of an aid worker was attacked and looted by armed men.	Panel Interview with INGO
85	March	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	Two INGO vehicles were hijacked in Bangui	UN
86	March	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	The vehicle of an INGO was hijacked by Anti-Balaka armed elements at the Boy-Rabe. The vehicle was later recovered by the intervention of humanitarian organizations	Panel Interview with INGO
87	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	1	0	0	A UN vehicle was stopped by Anti-Balaka elements and asked the driver to drive them to an unknown location. The driver was physically harmed because he refused to drive faster than what the armed men were asking. As a result the vehicle spun out of control and fell into a trench. The Anti-Balaka men descended from the vehicle and left the scene leaving the driver and the car behind. The driver and vehicle were later recovered by a UN team.	UN

88	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	<p>On April 2014, a UN vehicles and trucks mission returning to Bangui were stopped by Anti-Balaka elements 15km outside Dekoa in a checkpoint and demanded information in relation to the MISCA and the ex-Ex-Seleka in Dekoa, the team leader of the mission explained that they had no information on this matter, they passed. The mission had seen a MISCA and ex-Ex-Seleka meeting in Dekoa when passing by. Around 10km further south from Dekoa the mission was stopped at another Anti-Balaka checkpoint. The Anti-Balaka elements searched the vehicles and let them pass. For the third time, 15 km further south, they were stopped by another Anti-Balaka checkpoint, this time they stopped the convoy by shooting at the air with AK47s. They requested the staff to get out of the vehicles and sit at the side of the road while they searched the vehicles. It is to be noted that the AB elements were very aggressive with the staff. They questioned extensively the staff and requested to hand over 50,000 XFA per vehicle, the staff answered that they did not have that amount of money and that the humanitarian nature of the mission prohibited to pay for this type of requests. Nevertheless they forcibly took the wallet of one of the staff members and took around 12,000 XFA, additionally they took all valuable personal belongings of all the present individuals, mobile phones and money. They were all released around two hours after and the mission arrived to Bangui without further obstruction.</p>	UN
89	April	Kemo	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Three trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the northern part of the country were intercepted by anti-Balaka elements 10km before Sibut. The armed anti-Balaka took 30 bags of rice of each truck and robbed all valuables from the drivers (mobile phones, money and others).</p>	UN
90	April	Ouham - Pende	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	<p>Armed unknown individuals assault the INGO expat guesthouse threatening the expat with arms. Cash and communication assets were stolen.</p>	Panel Interview with INGO
91	April	Kemo	Unknown	0	0	1	1	0	<p>On April 2014 in a village in the Kemo Prefecture at around 0100hours, a group of unidentified armed men stormed in the base of an INGO. They forced the safe of the compound and stole one Thuraya phone, several mobile phones, around 12 million XFA (two safe boxes), some electronic equipment and one vehicle. The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but independent sources indicate it was elements belonging to an Ex-Seleka faction.</p>	UN

92	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On April 2014, at 0100 hours, the house of an aid worker in Bangui was attacked by at least a dozen unknown armed men, carrying AK47s, machetes and spears. Upon arrival, the group posted a guard at each neighbouring house to control the movements of the people in the area and four (4) others went into the house of the aid worker whilst firing guns to the air. Then, by using a brick, they broke down the door of the house and demanded the keys to a motorcycle stationed outside. They also took a television, two mobile devices and a bag that contained a Motorola radio and other personal belongings. The neighbours caught two of the armed men while they were leaving with the television. The Burundian MISCA arrived to the scene and caught the two individuals. The rest of the armed men escaped the scene.	UN
93	April	Basse Kotto	Ex-Seleka	0	0	0	0	0	A team of an INGO was threatened after they refused to drive two armed Ex-Seleka men in their ambulance.	Panel Interview with INGO
94	April	Bangui	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	0	0	Armed elements came into a health centre and guardians did not dare to ask them to leave their weapons. The Anti-Balaka armed men were identified by medical staff and were taken out of the health centre.	Panel Interview with INGO
95	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	An aid worker was robbed in the city centre by armed men.	UN
96	April	Bamingui-Bangoran	Others	0	0	0	0	0	A group of unidentified armed men stormed into the compound of an INGO in the Prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran and stole two vehicles. The vehicles were returned a few days later and the incident was attributed to Sudanese Janjaweed.	Panel Interview with INGO
97	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	1	0	1	0	In April a contracted truck to transport humanitarian agricultural material had a mechanical problem in the outskirts of Bangui. The driver decided to spend the night with the truck while waiting for help to repair the truck. During the night, four Anti-Balaka armed men spotted the truck, beat the driver and looted the contents of the truck.	Panel Interview with INGO
98	April	Ouham	Ex-Seleka	3	0	0	1	0	On 26 April 2014 a group of Ex-Seleka armed men entered the town of Boguila located in the Sous Prefecture of Bossangoa and looted the offices of INGO and the local hospital. At the moment of arrival of the Ex-Seleka elements, a meeting of community leaders was being held in the compound where the offices of INGO and the hospital are located. Upon arrival, the armed men looted the compound, at the moment of departure and for unknown reasons two of the armed elements started shooting at the group of civilians, killing 17 of them including three INGO (3) staff. According to investigations conducted by the Panel the group of Ex-Seleka was commanded by Colonel Issa. The group of armed elements was passing by Boguila on the way to Béal and coming from Bouca.	INGO; http://allafrica.com/stories/201404300989.html . http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/three-INGO-staff-among-16-civilians-killed-central-african-republic-hospital


99	April	Bangui	Government Forces	0	0	0	0	0	On 26 April 2014 five trucks of an INGO were stopped by the Gendarmerie at PK12, allegedly the Gendarmerie had received information that the trucks were carrying weapons with them. The trucks were carrying humanitarian aid good for N'Dele. The Gendarmerie found a bag in the front seat of one of the trucks containing a grenade and some military attire that were confiscated and the driver of the truck was arrested. According to the one of the drivers, before they were stopped by the Gendarmerie, the truck that contained the bag had stopped to talk to someone in a Jeep. Someone from the INGO went to the site of the incident to talk to the Gendarmerie. The five trucks were released a few days later with all the humanitarian goods, the driver of the truck remains arrested at the time of writing of this report and the bag was confiscated.	Panel Interview with INGO
100	April	Bangui	Unknown	0	0	0	1	0	On 28 April a UN staff member was victim of a robbery at his house in Bangui. All valuable items were taken from the premises. No injuries or casualties were reported.	UN
101	April	Ouham	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	On 28 April 2014, around 0045 hours, in a village of the Ouham Prefecture an aid worker was victim of an armed robbery at his house by a group of six armed Anti-Balaka elements. Under armed threats they forced the gatekeeper to open the front door. The perpetrators first searched the room of the colleagues of the staff member, after which they searched his own room and stole a duffel bag with clothes and a sum of about 45,000 CFA francs. The perpetrators fled to an unknown destination, no physical violence was exerted on the staff member.	UN
102	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	0	0	0	1	0	In April 2014 a truck part of an INGO convoy (six trucks) on the way to north west of the country carrying seeds for vulnerable population had a technical problem in the route around Boali. While the drivers were fixing the truck, armed Anti-Balaka elements intercepted the truck and looted a significant part of the sacs of seeds and some fuel. The driver was threatened by the Anti-Balaka but was not harmed. The rest of the bags were handed over to the Police in Boali and recuperated the next day by the service provider. The rest of the convoy arrived unharmed to the location.	UN
103	April	Ombella M'Poko	Anti-Balaka	3	0	0	1	0	On 30 April 2014, a PU-AMI convoy composed of four trucks with humanitarian aid for the N'Dele population was held at a checkpoint manned by Anti-Balaka militias 26 km north of Bangui. Three of the trucks were permitted to pass through but one was held behind, the truck was looted, the driver and two assistants, all of Muslim origin, were killed.	PU-AMI; PU AMI Communique de Presse 2 May 2014; Panel Interview with INGO

EXPLANTION OF TABLE HEADINGS

Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilians Wounded
D	Destruction of Property: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
LT	Looting: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
T	Torture: 1 - Positive 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information


Annex 25: Graphs

Graph I – Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Graph II – Reported killings of aid workers from 1 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per province.



Source: Panel Database of Incidents


Annex 26: Reported killings of civilians

Graph III – Reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 per provinces.




Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Graph IV – Average reported killings of civilians (including children and aid workers) from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating the alleged perpetrators.




Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 27: Reported killings of civilians from 5 December 2013 to 30 April 2014 indicating alleged perpetrators



Source: Panel Database of Incidents



Source: Panel Database of Incidents

Annex 28: Methodology

The Panel compiled a database of security incidents to that are potential violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and other crimes listed in resolutions 2127 and 2143. Other security related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.

Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of staff members of humanitarian organisations; attacks against humanitarian organisations; threats to humanitarian organisations or staff members and robberies.

The database does not contain all of the incidents that happen in the country in the period reported (From 05 December 2013 and on-going) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering / hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.

The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect mediate knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.

Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, incidents that are reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.

For the collection of primary source material the Panel met with Heads of United Nations Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.

There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constrains as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.

The Panel also profited from cooperation with UN Agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.

A few methodological clarifications that apply to Chapters IV and V of the interim report of the UN Panel of Experts for the CAR are important to highlight:

1. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report¹, three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
2. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the CAR.

¹ See annex 24.

Annex 29: Case study III: Massacre in Guen (Mambéré-Kadei Province)

1. One of the most serious incidents documented in the period covered by this report was the massacre in the village of Guen in the Mambéré-Kadei province.
2. On 1 February 2014, the town of Guen came under attack of anti-Balaka forces seeking to drive out the former Seleka and associates among the Muslim population.

*Houses owned by members of the Muslim community destroyed and looted by anti-Balaka
(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)*



3. According to Muslim survivors, anti-Balaka leaders and local authorities interviewed, the attacking anti-Balaka forces came from the villages of Tedoa and Mbaina in the Nana Mambere province.¹ From 1 to 6 February 2014, approximately 75 civilians were killed.
4. The larger share of victims, 43 people, had, after the first spree of attacks, sought refuge in the house of a local resident. An allegation that this local resident was hiding a Seleka soldier set off the anti-Balaka to take the house under siege on 6 February and after killed 43 men. Women and children had sought refuge at the catholic mission after the first wave of attacks.

*House that came under siege by anti-Balakas during the attack on Guen
(photograph taken by the Panel on 26 April 2014)*



¹ Panel interviews with Muslim survivors, local Anti-Balaka leaders and local government authorities, Guen, 25 April 2014.

5. The Panel's interlocutors in Guen claim that an anti-Balaka leader of the name of 'Edmond Beïna' from the village of Tedoa had ordered the attack. Villagers in Tedoa confirmed to the Panel the presence of Beïna,² but were unable to locate him in time for the Panel to interview him.³

² Edmond Beïna has also been mentioned by HWR as one of the perpetrators of the massacre. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/central-african-republic-massacres-remote-villages>; accessed on 24 May 2014.

³ Panel interviews with villagers, Tedoa, 17 April 2014.

Annex 30: Reported incidents of sexual violence¹

1. The Panel registered six different incidents of sexual violence from secondary sources in the CAR in the period covered by this report.
2. One case of rape was allegedly perpetrated by former Seleka elements in the town of Madja, Ouham Province.
3. Anti-Balaka forces are allegedly responsible for the rape of four women in two different incidents; on 2 January 2014 in Bossangoa two women were raped by Anti-Balaka armed men in the Liberte IDP site; furthermore on 6 February 2014 a group of Anti-Balaka armed men broke into a house in the Kokoro neighbourhood of Bangui and raped a 14 year old girl, and a 19 year old woman who were at the house at the moment of the attack, additionally the house was looted.
4. One case was reported in the village of Fode, Haut-Mbomou, where a woman was released after 18 years of LRA captivity, allegedly she was raped several times throughout her captivity.
5. One case of particular concern was reported in Bouca where allegedly a woman was gang-raped.
6. In addition UNICEF documented 26 cases of sexual violence in 25 IDP sites in Bangui during just one week in February 2014.

¹ All incidents have been extracted from the Panel Database of Incidents; see annex 28 on Methodology for details on collection of data of Sexual Violence.

Annex 31: Humanitarian presence in the Central African Republic

1. It is noteworthy that since December 2013 until today the number of humanitarian organisations present in the CAR has almost doubled. In December 2013, there were 47 humanitarian organisations operating in the CAR, by May 2014, 95 humanitarian organizations were undertaking operations or were in process of establishing themselves in the country. Most humanitarian operations are in Bangui, Ombella-Mpoko and Ouham provinces. The humanitarian presence has grown significantly, however, the population in need remains very high.¹
2. The grand majority of incidents have been documented in Bangui and the Ombella M’Poko provinces. This can be explained by the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian organisations operate and therefore coverage and presence is higher there than elsewhere in the country.²
3. See map below showing the current presence of humanitarian organizations in the country according to OCHA.³

¹ See <http://car.humanitarianresponse.info> for further details, accessed on 21 May 2014.

² See annex 25.

³ OCHA, Central African Republic (CAR) Situation Report No. 25 (as of 14 May 2014); accessed on 24 May 2014 at <http://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/30d02877-6777-42c3-8530-00ba35dbec72.pdf>

