

# DURABLE SOLUTIONS

Perspectives of Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and Ethiopian Camps and Selected Communities of Return

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## Acknowledgements

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## Acronyms

<b>ARRA</b>	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (GoE)
<b>CBO</b>	Cross-Border Operation
<b>DRA</b>	Department of Refugee Affairs (GoK)
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Refugee Council
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia
<b>GoE</b>	Government of Ethiopia
<b>GoK</b>	Government of Kenya
<b>GSDO</b>	Gedo Social Development Organisation
<b>HH</b>	Household
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>ICU</b>	Islamist Courts Union
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>ITW</b>	Interview
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Unity
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
<b>PRM</b>	American Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
<b>QIPs</b>	Quick Impact Projects
<b>SCWRW</b>	Somali Children Welfare and Rights Watch
<b>Sedhuro</b>	Sean Deveruxe Human Rights Organisation
<b>SNM</b>	Somali National Movement
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollars
<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

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## Executive Summary

Continued crises of governance in Somalia since the early 1990's have provoked several episodes of large-scale internal and external displacement (Menkhaus, 2008: 4, 21). More than a quarter of Somalia's population has been forced to flee. As commonly observed in large-scale displacement situations, the majority has moved to a safer area within the country, but large numbers have also fled to another country. As of August 2012, some 1.36 million people were displaced within Somalia, and more than a million, mostly from south-central Somalia, had claimed asylum in another country (UNHCR Information portal, 13 Sept. 2012; UNDESA, 2011: 31).

A significant number of Somali refugees have been living in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps for up to two decades. Encampment policies limiting refugees' freedom of movement and access to labour markets have undermined the quality of the asylum offered in both countries. Camps, usually considered temporary, have turned into a *de facto* long-term solution. In Kenya, nearly half a million refugees live in Dadaab and Kakuma camps. In Ethiopia, camps in the Somali region, near Jijiga and Dolo Ado, host some 211,000 refugees (UNHCR Information portal, 13 Sept. 2012).

Repatriation, local integration and resettlement prospects are limited for refugees in camps<sup>1</sup>. Large-scale formal local integration is improbable for politico-historical reasons and resettlement is only offered to a small proportion of refugees. Repatriation, which is not necessarily the optimal solution for all, is likely to be the only option available to the vast majority. Yet, conditions in Somalia are not currently conducive for a sustainable return. While there has been political change in the situation in south-central Somalia in recent months, notably with presidential elections in August 2012, stability and safety remain uncertain and their lasting character will only be established with time.

Previous episodes of repatriation to Somalia and Somaliland from eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya have shown that lasting security, basic services, and humanitarian access are minimal prerequisites for successful and durable repatriation and reintegration. Careful attention to livelihoods and access to land and their intersection with clan territory and inter-clan relations are essential, as is the participation of clan leaders in planning and mobilization. Experience suggests that smaller and incremental population movements, coupled with assistance and monitoring of returnees can help make return and reintegration sustainable. It also highlights the importance of viewing repatriation as more than simply a logistical movement of people, but rather an integrated part of wider development and peacebuilding projects.

This research was undertaken as an attempt to better understand how displaced Somalis view their situation, envisage their future, and if their repatriation ever became possible, what would make it sustainable. To do so, several hundred refugees were interviewed and participated in Focus Group Discussions (FGD) in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps. The perspective of three selected communities in areas of origin or anticipated return was also explored through interviews with key informants in Afmadow in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay and Belet Xaawo in Gedo.

Given its relatively small sample, the research was not designed to allow statistical projections, but to permit pertinent observations. It is not a planning document, but an analytical input aimed at contributing to further planning on durable solutions. The following pages present a summary of key findings.

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<sup>1</sup> UNHCR acknowledges voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement as the three possible durable solutions, i.e., solutions allowing refugees to secure the political, economic, legal and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity.

## The perspective of refugees in camps

### Return intentions and reintegration prospects

Given the choice, nearly half of Somali refugees interviewed in camps would prefer to move to a third country, a third would return to Somalia and small numbers would integrate locally. Yet, if conditions were conducive in Somalia, more than half would consider returning. In light of their previous experience, refugees recurrently stress that improvements in stability and security would have to be long-lasting before they opt to return. A number of refugees in camps have, indeed, experienced several episodes of displacement, due to short-lived improvements in security and stability, and would do their utmost to avoid being displaced yet again. However, local integration did not emerge as a popular option, possibly because refugees judge their conditions in asylum difficult as well as recognising that local integration is not an option recognised by the Government of Kenya.

As the duration of exile increases, repatriation and reintegration prospects decrease, even if conditions for return became conducive. Approximately half the refugees interviewed in the study had access to land in Somalia before fleeing. Of that number, slightly less than half said they would still have access to it, a fifth did not know. A significant difference exists between refugees who arrived before 2006 (40% say that they had access to land and less than half of them believe they would still have access to it) and those who arrived in 2011-12 (80% had access to land, with less than half believing they would still have access to it and an important proportion saying they did not know).

The fact that many youths have spent most of their lives in exile and have limited recollection and personal connections with Somalia, if any, might come into play. For youths who grew up in camps, which can, to some extent, be compared to cities (*cf.* Jansen, 2011), returning to the rural areas many come from, with limited public facilities, seems especially difficult to envisage. For different reasons, the return and reintegration of people who have had traumatic experiences or experienced direct violence also appears unlikely, regardless of the duration of their exile or their bond with Somalia. It is clear that no response will be adequate for all refugees, thus there is a need to be creative in the search for durable solutions and further explore pathways to local integration and mobility opportunities.

Nearly all refugees mentioned fighting as one of the drivers of their displacement. Insecurity was also commonly raised, while small numbers cited drought, loss of livestock and loss of livelihood. A slightly greater proportion of refugees intending to return listed drought, livestock depletion and loss of livelihood as some of the reasons for their displacement. Although insecurity may be the overriding factor for displacement, those arriving in 2011 were affected by the drought.

The length of exile, drivers of displacement, age, belonging to a minority group and conditions in the country of asylum appear as important factors when examining return intentions and reintegration prospects of Somali refugees. Having been displaced before, receiving remittances or having benefited from education or vocational training classes did not seem to significantly influence return intentions.

### Pre-conditions for returning

Before taking the decision to return, in addition to considering security and safety, refugees would assess access to education and health care, their livelihood opportunities and whether humanitarian assistance would be available upon return. Only a small number of refugees said that if they were to repatriate, they would return to a different location than their locality of origin, usually an urban area for livelihood opportunities, the urban way of life, security and access to basic services. In all locations, refugees stressed that conditions were harsh and could induce premature returns.

In all locations except Jijiga, only a minority reported no longer having relatives in Somalia. In general, the proportion of people with no known relatives in Somalia increased with the duration of exile. Very few people knew refugees who had repatriated since they had arrived in the camps. Those who did mostly explained such returns by the difficult living conditions and lack of livelihood opportunities in the camps, the improvement of security in their country, family bonds in Somalia, and the need to resume agricultural activities.

### Enhancing self-reliance in camps

At this point in time, a majority of refugees in camps assess that the reasons that led to their displacement still prevail, and thus would not envision returning until conditions improve. In the meantime, in addition to ensuring that standards of living and security in camps are and remain satisfactory, refugees note that aid organisations could take measures in the camps to enhance their reintegration prospects through skills building, *i.e.*, by ensuring greater access to education, including for adults, vocational training - notably in tailoring, business, carpentry, driving, computer literacy, language, electricity and mechanics - and to livelihood opportunities. Refugees hired as incentive workers stressed they could benefit from advanced on-the-job training, skills transfer and mentoring, that could lead to enhanced responsibilities. Key informants in areas of origin also regularly emphasised that the return of refugees with education and training would be helpful locally.



For the time being, educational and livelihood opportunities in the camps remain relatively limited, even though efforts have been made to boost access to such opportunities. One third of the refugees interviewed said they had gained useful skills in exile, most commonly education, business skills and tailoring. Refugees who have been in camps longer and men generally seem to have more prospects in camps as they have relatively better access to livelihood opportunities and are more mobile compared to women who have cultural constraints and responsibilities. Similarly, more established camps offer better opportunities than newly opened ones.

Approximately 45% of households interviewed pursue at least one livelihood activity in the camps, most commonly petty trade, small shops or casual labour. Adults under the age of 35 appear more likely to have a livelihood activity than older people. Education in the camps tends to be insufficient. Existing facilities are in poor condition and under-equipped, while teachers are under-qualified. Enrolment, attendance and levels of retention are low, especially for girls (Dippo, 2011: 19; UNHCR et al., 2012: 9, 15 and 25; UNHCR, 2011a: 31). Over two thirds of refugees that arrived before 2006 said at least one of their family members had been to school. This proportion dropped to less than half for those who arrived in 2011-12. Finally, the proportion of refugees who have attended vocational training classes is low. Refugee leaders, entrepreneurs and employees have had slightly more access to training, while opportunities for women and vulnerable refugees seem limited.

### **Assisting repatriation and reintegration**

Refugees highlighted that when conditions become conducive for return - in their words: when there is significant progress in peace, justice, security and stability -, humanitarian organisations should be ready to support repatriation and reintegration, through transport and basic assistance, and to assist refugees with access to land and housing. If refugees were repatriating, most plan to farm, raise livestock or pursue business activities, which makes access to land in areas of return crucial. Prior to fleeing, nearly half of the refugees interviewed farmed and/or raised livestock.

## **The perspectives of selected communities of return**

The situation in Somalia differs from one location to another. While Somaliland and Puntland are relatively stable and conflict-free, most of the south-central region remains volatile, with limited humanitarian access and continued population displacement.

A majority of Somali refugees in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps fled from the south and central regions. Even though the security landscape in the area has been changing rapidly since the beginning of the year, there is no evidence yet of a significant improvement in the generally poor human rights situation for the local population (HRW, July 2012).

The three localities studied, Afmadow in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay and Belet Xaawo in Gedo, were recently captured from Al-Shabab. The three regions host significant populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (31,000 in Lower Juba, 40,000 in Baidoa and 77,000 in Gedo) and are the areas of origin of a significant number of refugees (more than 200,000 are from Lower Juba, incl. more than 48,000 from Afmadow, 80,000 from Baidoa, 124,000 from Gedo).

In the three locations, similar to most of south-central Somalia, after two decades of conflict and instability and in the absence of a functioning government, public infrastructure and basic social services are very limited and, when available, are frequently of unsatisfactory quality. In the districts studied, small numbers of refugees and IDPs are reported to have returned spontaneously.

### **Pre-conditions for sustainable and peaceful returns**

Authorities in Kenya have discussed the creation of “Jubbaland” in southern Somalia as a safe zone intended to curb the flow of refugees into Kenya and allow for the repatriation of refugees to southern Somalia. Without clear benchmarks to ensure that sustainable security is in place in areas of return, that essential services are available, and that humanitarian organisations have secure access, a repatriation programme would likely be unsustainable and create tensions and competition over scarce resources.

So as to make large-scale returns possible and sustainable, key informants in all districts pointed out that careful planning was essential and that hasty repatriation would risk stability and peacebuilding. Planning should include access to land and livelihoods, quality basic services, shelter, food and water.

Struggle for land has been a central element to the Somali conflict. In order to avoid creating further conflicts, a fair and efficient land restitution system, addressing restoration and compensation, will be necessary. Indeed, access to land will be a crucial and sensitive matter in both rural and urban areas. Although a large part of the potentially repatriating refugee population will rely on farming and agro-pastoralism for their livelihood, hence requiring significant land access, those returning to urban areas will require assistance in terms of housing, land and property matters. The situation for women and minorities will require special attention, as certain customary rules discriminate against them, which could further limit their reintegration prospects. It is recognised that particularities exist for urban areas which would require further research beyond the scope of this study.

Key informants also suggested that refugees should be equipped with practical skills while in exile. In all districts, a critical shortage of qualified staff was highlighted, notably due to large-scale departures - a number fled, while some of those who remained, lost their jobs, as schools and health centres were left unused, and ended up seeking job opportunities elsewhere. Unattractive wages and a lack of training structures have also encouraged a number of qualified people to move to Kenya or Ethiopia.

The dearth of teachers, doctors and other health professionals is deemed especially critical. The need for administrators was also commonly highlighted, while the need for engineers and business people capable of contributing to the development of the local economy also emerged. In general, people with skills were described as in high demand. Returnees with assets, such as farming tools, livestock and sewing machines, would have an easier time earning their living again, which, in addition to contributing to the local economy, would facilitate their reintegration.

Several key informants stressed that humanitarian organisations could help communities prepare for sustainable repatriation by contributing to improving quality and access to basic services, building infrastructure (notably roads and electricity), enhancing food security, supporting livelihoods and skills training and the local economy, as well as activities aimed at restoring and consolidating peace and security. In addition to providing direct support to people returning in the form of food and shelters, aid organisations could support the creation of mechanisms aimed at preventing and addressing land-related tensions.

Given the socio-economic situation of the population in Somalia, activities and aid targeting returnees should be balanced against support to the overall population to ensure effective integration opportunities and avoid creating tensions and discrimination against returnees.



# 1 Preliminary remarks and purpose of the research

*“If it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, as the years go by, they progressively waste these same lives. A refugee may be able to receive assistance, but is prevented from enjoying those rights – for example, to freedom of movement, employment, and in some cases, education – that would enable him or her to become a productive member of a society.”*

UNHCR, 2004: 3

A significant number of Somali refugees have been living in Kenya and Ethiopia for up to two decades, with limited prospects to repatriate, integrate locally or be resettled. Encampment policies that restrict refugees’ freedom of movement and access to labour markets have undermined the quality of the asylum offered<sup>2</sup>. Camps, usually considered a temporary solution, have turned into a *de facto* long-term solution for Somali refugees. Since the organised repatriation from Ethiopia and Kenya from 1993 to the early 2000’s, only minimal research and longer-term planning for durable solutions for Somali refugees has been undertaken.

UNHCR acknowledges voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement as the three possible durable solutions, *i.e.*, solutions that enable refugees to secure the political, economic, legal and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity. Recent discussions have highlighted the need to be more creative in the search for durable solutions, notably through considering intermediate integration<sup>3</sup> and mobility within and between borders, as migration might help a number of refugees regain physical, legal and livelihood security (Long, 2010; Lindley, 2011; UNHCR, 2012).

Repatriation has become the preferred durable solution since the 1980’s, notably due to the unwillingness of host countries to offer local integration to refugees due to their inability to cater for these people in addition to their own national poor – and a sedentarist bias, according to a number of scholars, e.g. Malkki (1995: 508) and Verdirame (2005: 335) –, is likely to be the only option offered to a vast majority of Somali refugees. For politico-historical reasons, formal local integration is improbable for large numbers of refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. However, gradual approaches to local integration should not be excluded, notably for groups unlikely to repatriate voluntarily. While it can be argued that refugee-hosting countries shoulder a disproportionate part of the burden and that greater resettlement efforts should be made, resettlement remains unlikely to become an option for a significant proportion of refugees.

“Local integration and repatriation are sensitive topics in the Kenyan context characterised by growing political support for the quick return of refugees.” Authorities have discussed the creation of a safe zone inside Somalia, “Jubbaland”, to both stem the arrival of new refugees and allow the repatriation of others (HRW, March 2012; Lindley, 2011: 29-30). Such a plan, that evokes the unsuccessful 1992 Cross-Border Operation, would most likely lead to involuntary returns, and thus fail to respect recognised standards (Hyndman, 1998: 24-27)<sup>4</sup>.

Conditions in Somalia are not currently conducive for a large-scale sustainable repatriation: in late August 2012, more than a hundred new arrivals from Somalia, mostly from Gedo region, were registered in Dolo Ado camps daily (ITW UNHCR Dolo Ado, 28 Aug. 2012). For the majority of refugees, without a major and durable political solution, organised mass voluntary return is improbable in the foreseeable future (Lindley, 2011: 4). Indeed, while there has been political change in south-central Somalia in recent months, notably with presidential elections in August 2012, stability and safety remain uncertain and their lasting character will only be established with time. Forced returns would be indefensible. Likewise, refugees should not be driven to repatriate by inadequate or deteriorating security and living conditions in the refugee camps, but should return when they deem conditions conducive in their country of origin<sup>5</sup>.

Repatriation is not tantamount to mere physical return. It entails the restoration of meaningful citizenship, in which fundamental human rights are protected by the state or, in the context of a fragile state, perhaps communities (Long, 2010: 3, 40). In such an environment, repatriation needs to be considered and planned carefully, in conjunction with a broader peacebuilding and development strategy.

2 Long (2011: 8-10) notes that over the last two decades, the quality of asylum protection has been deteriorating, not only in Africa and Asia, but also in Europe. The focus on durable solutions (and hasty and unsustainable repatriation) can notably be explained by the inadequate protection offered during displacement.

3 This report uses the definition and indicators of intermediate integration suggested by Banki (2004: 2-3). It refers to the “ability of the refugee to participate with relative freedom in the economic and communal life of the host region.” It might entail partial self-sufficiency rather than full self-sufficiency. Unlike local integration, it might not include cultural and political participation, as well as full legal rights. High levels of refugee integration are characterised by the fact that refugees are not restricted in their movements, own or have access to land, can participate in the local economy, are moving towards self-sufficiency, are able to utilise local services such as health facilities and schools and are dispersed among the population.

4 In 1992, in response to pressures from the Government of Kenya, UNHCR attempted to create a preventive zone in southern Somalia to encourage refugees in Kenya to repatriate (Hyndman, 2000: 21).

5 Some 5,200 refugees returned to Somalia by their own means in March and April 2012, according to UNHCR’s Somalia population movement tracking (PMT). It is not known whether such movements were temporary or permanent. Refugees returning to Somalia have cited the resumption of agricultural activities, but also reduced services and lack of livelihood opportunities in the camps to explain their decision (UNHCR, April 2012: 2). Similarly, while some refugees in Dolo Ado in Ethiopia temporarily returned to harvest in the first months of 2012, according to refugees interviewed in the camps in August 2012, a number of refugees also returned to Somalia permanently, due to the harsh living conditions in the camps (ITW UNHCR Dolo Ado, 28 Aug. 2012; HH ITW and FGD, Aug. 2012). It has been repeatedly noted that a large number of refugees repatriated from Kenya to Somalia in 1993-94 because of the insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps, and not because conditions were conducive in Somalia (Waldron, 1995: 13-15; Collin, 1996: 89-97).

By putting institutions and communities under pressure, premature mass returns can hinder peacebuilding, reconstruction and sustainable reintegration. The departure of refugees is also likely to have a significant impact on host communities, as camps have become an intrinsic part of their economic survival and development<sup>6</sup>.

Moreover, repatriation is not necessarily the optimal solution for all refugees, especially in protracted situations (Kibreab, 1999: 390)<sup>7</sup>. Repatriating refugees may face serious obstacles (re)integrating into the socio-economic environment of their country of origin. Compounding this, the return and reintegration process often takes place in difficult environments with derelict infrastructure and social services (Jacobsen, 2005: 9-10; Omata, 2012: 1). After decades in exile, it is unlikely that all refugees choose to return to Somalia, even if the reasons for their flight (or their parents' flight) cease to exist. Repatriation might entail significant losses, notably in terms of livelihood, educational opportunities and access to basic services (Jacobsen, 2005: 10; Long, 2010: 27).

## Purpose of the research

This research was undertaken as an attempt to better understand how people who have been displaced due to conflict and violence, as well as recurrent drought and floods, view their situation, envisage their future and, if their repatriation ever becomes possible, what would make it sustainable.

This project aimed to examine short and long-term opportunities for durable solutions, with a focus on repatriation, from the perspective of refugees in camps<sup>8</sup> and selected return communities<sup>9</sup>, with the objective of informing humanitarian organisations' strategic planning. While the immediate focus on repatriation might need to be carefully considered, it is likely to be the only option offered to a significant number of refugees. Thus, understanding how to better prepare refugees to reintegrate in a sustainable manner in Somalia is prioritised for practical reasons. In addition, designing programmes to better prepare refugees for an eventual return, when conditions are conducive for repatriation, should strengthen refugees' ability to integrate locally or in a third country.

Repatriation and reintegration affect not only refugees, but also communities of return or of origin and refugee hosting communities. To limit the scope and duration of the study, focus on the impact of the potential return of refugees on selected communities of origin was chosen. Their absorption capacity and views on anticipated positive and negative impacts of such repatriation, notably in terms of access to land and property, as well as skills and assets with which refugees could return to contribute to community recovery and reconstruction, were examined.

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<sup>6</sup> A 2010 assessment of the socio-economic and environmental impact of Dadaab refugee camps on host communities concluded that the total economic benefit of the camps and related operations for the host community were around USD 14 million annually (Enghoff, 2010: 8-10).

<sup>7</sup> The will to prevent local integration and ensure early repatriation means that refugees in Africa are treated as "temporary guests" with curtailed rights, regardless of the length of their exile (Kibreab, 1999: 390, 399). Such determination has also turned refugee camps, built around the notion of temporariness, into the preferred response to a refugee crisis, even though many refugee situations last well beyond the emergency period and repatriation might not happen for years (Crisp, 1998: 28 and 2003: 3-4; Jacobsen, 2005: 108). This can also be linked to the shift to preventive protection that focuses on the right to remain in one's country rather than the right to seek asylum (Chimni, 1993: 443-444; Hyndman, 2000: 17).

<sup>8</sup> While it would have been relevant and interesting to also include the perspective of refugees living outside camps, for capacity reasons, it was decided to focus on refugee in camps.

<sup>9</sup> Return communities are understood as communities to which significant numbers of Somali refugees would potentially return if conditions became conducive for repatriation, based on number of refugees originating from these communities.



## 2 Methodology and structure of the report

In attempting to understand durable solutions from the perspective of refugees and return communities, some of the key elements that had to be considered were: refugees' views of their situation, and their potential for repatriation or local integration; refugees' coping mechanisms and livelihood practices in exile and their transferability; refugees' relationship to their areas or country of origin and access to assets left behind, including land, housing and other property; refugees' (re)integration prospects in view of their education and livelihood, knowledge of and relationship to their country of origin or of asylum.

The research focused on refugees living in camps in Kenya (Dadaab and Kakuma) and Ethiopia (Dolo Ado and Jijiga), as well as on selected areas of origin or anticipated return: Afmadow in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay, and Belet Xaavo in Gedo.

Accurate statistical data on Somali refugees living in camps in Kenya and Ethiopia is scarce, notably with respect to their livelihood prior to being in exile and while in the camps, assets in the camps and in their locality of origin, levels of education achieved in the camps, and intentions in terms of durable solutions. This project did not aim to fill this gap, as a comprehensive census or registration exercise would be necessary to gather this information. It was understood that the research would not allow statistical projections, but should permit pertinent observations.

The methodology for the fieldwork mixed qualitative and quantitative tools and approaches. Given the relatively small sample used in refugee camps, it was decided to combine a number of household interviews with focus group discussions (FGDs), in order to corroborate findings and observations. Some 62 FGDs were held with a total of 410 refugees drawn from diverse populations in the camps, *i.e.*, youth, women, minority groups, people considered vulnerable (single-headed households, people with disabilities, those afflicted by chronic disease, the destitute, etc.), entrepreneurs, incentive workers, unemployed adults, recent arrivals (2011 and onwards), arrivals from 2006 and onwards, refugees who have been there for over a decade, camp leaders, including women representatives and elders. Interviews were conducted with 360 randomly selected heads of refugee households. It was decided to interview heads of household rather than individuals to elicit more information about other members of the family. Some 160 interviews took place in Dadaab, 40 in Kakuma, 80 in Dolo Ado and 80 in Jijiga (*cf.* Annex A for details).

It was expected that by collecting data in all four main camp locations in Kenya and Ethiopia (Dadaab, Kakuma and Jijiga camps, and four out of five Dolo Ado camps), the sample would include refugees from all periods of arrival, from rural and urban areas, with differing levels of wealth, age, gender and clan affiliation, which would thus help capture the specificity of individual experience and determine which factors are likely to influence refugees' intentions and views on the future. For example, while Ifo's old residents mostly came from rural areas, many of Hagadera's old residents came from urban areas (PRM, 2011: 19).

Seventy-three interviews with key informants were conducted in three potential districts of return. The districts were selected based on the areas of origin of refugees in camps, given that a number of refugees are likely repatriate to their area of origin, and based on humanitarian access. In every district, interviews with key informants were conducted by Somali partners: the Sean Deveruxe Human Rights Organisation in Afmadow (Lower Juba), the Somali Children Welfare and Rights Watch in Baidoa (Bay), and the Gedo Social Development Organisation in Belet Xaawo (Gedo). Key informants included community leaders, elders, clan leaders, local authorities, service providers (health and education), entrepreneurs, and civil society organisations.

### Structure of the report

After briefly outlining key episodes of Somali displacement and lessons learned from previous repatriation to Somaliland from Ethiopia, this report presents the condition of Somali refugees in camps and their perspective on durable solutions. It then briefly sketches the situation in selected communities of return and introduces the perspectives of key informants on the potential large-scale return of refugees and IDPs.





### 3 Somali Displacement

Continued crises of governance in Somalia since the early 1990's have provoked several episodes of large-scale internal and external displacement (Menkhaus, 2008: 4, 21), turning Somalia into "a country in exile" (Farah, N., 1998: 715). Approximately a quarter of all Somalis, or over 2.3 million people out of a population of 9.4 million people, have been displaced (UNHCR Information portal, 13 Sept. 2012; UNDESA, 2011: 31). As commonly observed in large-scale displacement situations, the majority have moved to a safer area within the country (thus categorised as internally displaced persons), but large numbers have also fled to another country (Jacobsen, 2005: 1<sup>10</sup>). As of August 2012, some 1.36 million people were displaced within Somalia, and more than a million had claimed asylum in other countries, primarily Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia (UNHCR Information portal, 13 Sept. 2012)<sup>11</sup>. The Gulf States, Western Europe and North America are also home to significant Somali refugee populations (Jureidini, 2010: 5)<sup>12</sup>.

Movement has been driven by a complex combination of clan-based conflict that has led to massive destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods, and recurrent floods and drought. Although movement has been ongoing since the late 1990's, three main periods of large-scale displacement can be roughly distinguished:

i. Civil war, state collapse, clan war and drought (1988-1992): The Somali civil war that began in 1988 led to the collapse of the Somali state and the fall of Siyad Barre's regime in 1991. The violence, compounded by a severe drought in 1991-92, led to an acute humanitarian crisis that prompted large-scale displacement. Some 800,000 Somalis left for neighbouring countries. More than 600,000 people from northwestern Somalia (now Somaliland) fled to the Somali Region of Ethiopia and Djibouti between 1988 and 1991. Clan-based fighting in south-central Somalia between December 1991 and March 1992 displaced some 3.5 million people. Of that number, nearly 300,000 crossed the border to Kenya (Bradbury, 2010: 10; Gundel, 2002: 264; UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database).

While most of those who fled from Somaliland to Ethiopia and Djibouti repatriated between 1997 and 2005, only a relatively small number of refugees in Kenya returned to Somalia<sup>13</sup>. In 2000, some 137,200 Somali refugees were still in Kenya, most of them in Dadaab camps (UNHCR, 2002). No significant movement of return has occurred since and only a minor proportion of refugees has been resettled. UNHCR reports that some 10,000 children currently in Dadaab camps were born of parents themselves born in the camps (UNHCR, 2012a).

ii. Ousting of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and ensuing violence (2006-2012): In late 2006, the ousting of the ICU, which had expanded its control over most of southern Somalia, by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by the Ethiopian army, led to renewed widespread violence. Fighting between clan militia and radicalised splinter groups of the ICU, notably Al-Shabab, and the Ethiopian and TFG troops led to a massive humanitarian crisis and forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee (Menkhaus, 2010: 12-13). More than 150,000 refugees arrived in Dadaab between 2007 and 2010. In Ethiopia, four new refugee camps were opened to accommodate new arrivals between 2007 and 2010. The number of Somali refugees in the country increased from 25,800 to 81,200 during the same period (UNHCR statistics, June 2012; UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database).

iii. Drought, food crisis and lack of humanitarian assistance (2011-2012): In 2011, a severe drought hit southern Somalia. In the absence of humanitarian assistance due to the insecurity preventing access, large numbers of agro-pastoralists and farming families who lost their livelihoods were forced to move.

Some 164,000 new refugees arrived in Dadaab camps. In Ethiopia, three new camps were opened to receive some 98,000 new refugees (UNHCR, 2011).


10 Jacobsen (2005) estimates that a third of those forcibly displaced by a conflict cross an international border. The majority will be internally displaced. To be considered a refugee, an individual must have crossed an international border to seek asylum and have a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, art. 1 § b) or have been compelled to leave his place of habitual residence to seek refuge outside his country of origin or nationality "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality." (Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969, art. 1 § 2)

11 Yemen and Ethiopia, with respectively 192,000 and 158,000 registered refugees, are also important host countries (UNHCR, 2011: 4).

12 The presence of a family member or people from the same ethnic group, the possibility of obtaining a legal status, education and professional prospects, the proximity of the country of origin, the existence of known routes and smuggling networks, historical and economical links and language are factors intervening in the selection of a first country of asylum by refugees, cf. Zimmerman, 2009.

13 Between 1992 and 2000, the number of registered Somali refugees in Kenya declined from some 285,600 to 137,400 and later stabilised at approx. 150,000. The number of registered Somali refugees in Ethiopia decreased from 514,000 in 1991 to 15,900 in 2005 (UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database). Large-scale repatriation from Ethiopian camps started in 1997. The decrease in refugee population is not strictly linked to repatriation, as a number of refugees have also moved out of camps and informally migrated onwards and settled in Kenyan cities or in a third country.

Photo: Alexandra Strand Holm



Sources: UNHCR Online Population Database, UNHCR Global Report 2011 and UNHCR's information sharing portal on the Somali Displacement Crisis.





## 4 Repatriation efforts to Somaliland and Puntland from Ethiopia

The large-scale UNHCR supported repatriation effort to Somaliland and Puntland from camps in eastern Ethiopia that officially began in 1997 highlights relevant issues for refugees, host communities, communities of return, and international aid actors that can inform discussions of the potential repatriation and reintegration of Somali refugees.

### a) Repatriation from eastern Ethiopia

In the late 1980's and early 1990's, the fighting and turmoil surrounding the secession of Somaliland and its first years of independence forced more than 600,000 Somalis to flee the northwest region of Somalia into eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti (UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database). In the following 15 years, the majority repatriated to self-proclaimed Somaliland.

The Somali Civil War began and the first major cracks in Siyad Barre's regime appeared when the secessionist group the Somali National Movement (SNM) attacked and seized control of the urban centres of Hargeisa and Burao in northwest Somalia in 1988 (Markos, 1997: 367). Supported by the Isaaq, Somaliland's majority clan, funded by a number of Isaaq business people abroad, and operating out of bases in Ethiopia, the SNM sought an independent state corresponding to the colonial borders of British Somaliland. Perceived marginalisation of the northwest, and the repressive and dictatorial power wielded by Barre and the Darod from Mogadishu, drove the secessionist movement (Ambroso, 2004:5).

In 1988, having been defeated in a major battle by Eritrean separatists in the north, the head of the Ethiopian state Mengistu signed a peace deal with Somalia's president Barre in order to concentrate on his northern front. The peace deal included assurances that both parties would not harbour armed rebel groups in their respective territories, depriving the SNM of its Ethiopian bases and thus provoking its offensive in northwest Somalia. When Barre's infantry was unable to retake Hargeisa and Burao, a massive bombing and artillery campaign levelled the two cities, with an estimated death toll of 30,000 (Ambroso, 2002: 6).

Massive infrastructural destruction, violence, and state collapse caused a humanitarian crisis that displaced hundreds of thousands internally and an estimated 600,000 to the Somali regions of neighbouring Ethiopia and Djibouti (Markos, 1997: 367; UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database). Displaced Somalis in Ethiopia were grouped in camps based primarily on their ethnicity (Markos, 1997: 375). Each camp had a "distinct majority" from a single clan, typically situated in the territory of that clan (Ryle, 1992: 163).

When the Isaaq-led SNM was able to complete its takeover of northwest Somalia and unilaterally declare Somaliland an independent state in 1991, large numbers of refugees in Ethiopia spontaneously repatriated, especially Isaaq clan members. Gadabursi, prominent in Awdal region, began to repatriate in large numbers soon after, as their clan elders negotiated peace with the Isaaq leaders of the SNM (Ambroso, 2002: 13). Spontaneous repatriation led to a significant reduction of refugee populations in Ethiopian camps: between 1991 and 1994 some 400,000 people returned to Somaliland or dispersed locally (Ambroso, 2002: 16). The first to repatriate were those who had property and resources to return to in Hargeisa and other urban centres, while urban and rural poor were much more likely to remain in the camps (Ryle, 1992: 165).

Even though refugees were returning and the actual number of refugees in camps was visibly diminishing, official refugee population statistics (based on the number of ration cards held in the refugee camps) remained relatively stable. In response, food rations were reduced and a series of verification exercises were held (Ambroso, 2002: 14). According to returnees interviewed in Somaliland, a cut in rations and services in camps in Ethiopia created a strong impetus to return (ITW with returnees, Salahley and Hargeisa, Aug. 2012).

Yet, the reduction in the refugee population proved temporary as clan-based fighting broke out in Hargeisa in November 1994 and quickly spread to other towns. Renewed violence caused another mass displacement and forced UNHCR to stop planning for a large-scale, assisted repatriation. Some 90,000 people fled to Ethiopia, and instability and lingering violence in Burao only subsided in 1996 (Ambroso, 2002: 7-8).

In 1997, following the stabilisation of Somaliland, UNHCR finally launched its programme to support the repatriation and reintegration of Somali refugees from Ethiopia. Return was primarily encouraged through the provision of transportation and a return package, worth approximately USD 130 per person and given in exchange for a ration card. The package contained food for nine months, 200 Ethiopian birr (USD 30), blankets, jerry cans, and plastic sheeting for shelter (Ambroso, 2002: 18).

In addition, hundreds of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were undertaken in areas of return from 1994 through to 2005. QIPs focused on providing water, healthcare, livelihoods, and education (ITW, MRRR and OCHA, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012). These projects, designed to reconstruct and rehabilitate communities of return, generally met their short-term objectives but had little lasting impact (ITW, MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012; Ambroso, 2002: 27) Approximately 130,000 refugees returned with UNHCR assistance between 1997 and 2005 (ITW, MRRR and OCHA, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012).

By mid 2005, most camps had been successfully closed (ITW, OCHA and MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012). Currently, only a small number of refugees from Somaliland remain in exile, mostly in Kebribeyah camp, near Jijiga in Ethiopia. Several refugees interviewed in the camp explained they felt that their clan affiliation could put them at risk if they were repatriating: they belonged to the Darod clan, who had been closely allied with Barre (ITW, refugees, Kebribeyah, Aug., 2012).

Just as Somalis fled to their clan's territory across the border, clan ties also shaped patterns of return. Many of those displaced from urban settings chose to return to rural villages where the cost of living is cheaper; clan affiliation and clan territory normally determined the choice of a given rural area (Ambroso, 2002: 22; ITW with returnees, Salahley and Borama, Aug. 2012). People who returned to Hargeisa without UNHCR's support from 1991 to 1994 generally had land and resources. Those assisted by UNHCR (1997-2005) tended to be either urban poor or rural people whose livestock had been lost, and often faced a more difficult reintegration experience (ITW with returnees, Aug. 2012).

Officials who worked on repatriation for the Somaliland Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction (MRRR) emphasised that go-and-see visits to areas of return for refugee elders proved crucial in mobilising refugees. Elders were able to testify to their clan "constituents" that infrastructural preparations had been made and that areas were safe (ITW, MRRR, Hargeisa and Borama, Aug. 2012).

In interviews in Somaliland with returnees, NGOs, and institutional actors, two issues emerged as critical for reintegration: land and employment. A number of returnees emphasised that they had chosen to return to rural areas rather than Hargeisa because of better access to land. Rural returnees commonly had better reintegration experiences; they were more successful in securing land and employment. Interviews in Hargeisa with returnees in settlements or urban poor suggested that lack of stable land tenure and employment opportunities prevented successful reintegration. Nearly all returnees stated that the toughest challenge upon return to Somaliland was lack of livelihood opportunities and many linked this to the limited availability of land. Only a few returnees cited basic services as a major factor in their decision making.

There was a marked difference in reported well-being and availability of opportunities between interviewees in various settlements or slums in Hargeisa. In M. Moge camp, returnees had been allocated land, and thus been able to build permanent structures and businesses. At State House and Stadium settlements, returnees have lived in cramped conditions in temporary structures, in some cases for more than a decade, and lack of opportunity was widely reported. NGO informants attributed the stark contrast to difference in access to land (ITW CCBRS, NRC, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012).

NGOs and development institutions cited livelihood and employment opportunities as the key to successful reintegration (ITW CCBRS, NRC, MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012). Yet, unemployment is not solely an issue for returnees: Somaliland's general population has an unemployment rate of over 80% (ITW, MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012). Most Somalilanders were not significantly better off than returnees between 1997-2005, and allocating resources to programmes that benefited all Somalilanders, returnees included, might have been a more equitable use of development resources (Ryle, 1992:166). Yet, this might not have been an option because the return package was designed specifically to induce return, as UNHCR sought closure of camps in Ethiopia (Ambroso, 2002: 15).

The speed of the repatriation exercise was an issue. As large-scale relocations began, preparations in areas of return were largely overwhelmed. Somaliland's MRRR informants noted that this informed the planning of the 2002-05 repatriation from Djibouti. When repatriating refugees to the Awdal region, the MRRR and UNHCR limited the size and frequency of convoys and placed extra focus on the development of livelihood opportunities in areas of return. These efforts appear to have paid off, as return is deemed largely sustainable in Awdal compared with previous efforts that resulted in several large informal settlements of urban poor in Hargeisa (ITW MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012). Thus, a fundamental tension between speed and sustainability seems to exist.

## **b) Observations**

Somalia, with its troubled history, will require thorough assessment of areas of return to determine what programmes can aid the reintegration prospects of returnees, especially in terms of employment prospects, when return becomes possible. Careful attention to issues of land tenure and its intersection with clan territory and inter-clan relations will be essential, as will the incorporation of clan leaders in planning and mobilisation. The historical repatriation to Somaliland also suggests that smaller and incremental population movements, coupled with assistance and monitoring of returnees as they reintegrate, can help make return and reintegration sustainable.

When planning repatriation to a country that is susceptible to recurrent crises, it has been suggested that “reconstruction” and “rehabilitation” represent less relevant goals than “construction” and “creativity” (Ambroso, 2002: 28). Rather than framing repatriation as return to a previous state, it might make more sense to understand a repatriation programme as assisting adaptation to a *new* situation. Several informants also stressed that there were drawbacks to viewing repatriation only as a logistical exercise, rather than as part of broader development and peacebuilding challenges (ITW MRRR, Hargeisa, Aug. 2012; Long, 2011: 30; Ryle, 1992: 167). For example, while the repatriation was taking place, the overall economic situation in Somaliland needed to be addressed: massive unemployment was a clear barrier for successful reintegration and required attention on a macroeconomic level.

There is also a need to ensure that repatriation is truly voluntary. Refugees should not return because life in camps has become so challenging that they are willing to risk unsafe return or return that offers little chance of successful and sustainable reintegration (Markos, 1997: 385). Returnees who claimed that reduction of rations and services in eastern Ethiopian camps drove them to return present a troubling challenge to the notion that their return was voluntary.





## 5 Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia

In October 2011, citing the threat of Al-Shabab to regional stability, Kenya sent hundreds of troops to Somalia. Kenyan forces, still militarily engaged there, albeit under African Union command, aimed to create a more stable border region, paving the way for possible voluntary repatriation (BBC, 17 Oct. 2011; PANA Press, 30 March 2012). A month later, shortly after the TFG requested help from the international community and neighbouring countries to secure Somalia, Ethiopia also crossed the Somali border to combat Al-Shabab (BBC, 19 Nov. 2011). Nearly a year later, Somalia remains unstable.

With more than half a million Somali refugees on its soil, Kenya is the main country of asylum for Somalis, followed by Yemen (219,000) and Ethiopia (211,400). Both Kenya and Ethiopia register Somalis from south-central Somalia as *prima facie* refugees (Campbell, 2011: 16; Lindley, 2011: 22; RMMS). Kenya's border with Somalia has been officially closed since 3 January 2007, on security grounds. While this has not prevented refugees from seeking asylum in Kenya, it has rendered them more vulnerable (Long, 2010: 51-52).<sup>14</sup> In both countries, a vast majority of refugees are settled in camps near the Somali border. The provision of humanitarian aid is generally limited to the camps, where living and security conditions are challenging.

### a) Overview of legal frameworks and government policies

Both Kenya and Ethiopia are party to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

Article 2 (6) of the 2010 Constitution of **Kenya** states that any international convention or treaty will become a part of Kenyan law, thus the provisions within these conventions are part of national law (RCK, 2012: 17-31). In 2006, the Refugees Act came into force, which shifted responsibility for the overall management of refugees from UNHCR back to the GoK and led to the establishment of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) within the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons (Lindley, 2011: 25). A formal registration process and the issuance of refugee identity cards, in coordination with the National Registration Bureau, were also put in place. A new Refugees Bill (2011) that would repeal the 2006 Refugee Act is currently being reviewed to ensure its compatibility with Kenya's international and regional obligations, with UNHCR's support.

In 2004, **Ethiopia** adopted the National Refugee Proclamation (GoE, 2004). This proclamation put in place a legal framework and laid out key protection principles for domestic refugee policy (UNHCR, 2011). The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the governmental branch mandated to handle refugee affairs, in close coordination with UNHCR. Some of the most significant impediments to refugee protection in Ethiopia are the reservations placed by the country on the Refugee Convention, which prevent refugees from earning wages and limits their self-sufficiency and ability to locally integrate (UNHCR, 2011).

### b) Enhanced self-reliance and local integration

Historically, Kenya has been recognised for its generous asylum policies, allowing nearly all refugees to integrate locally. Only with the large-scale influx of the early 1990's did the country's approach towards refugees become more restrictive, a relatively common occurrence when the size of a refugee population increases (Banki, 2004: 12, 15, 19; Campbell, 2011: 5)<sup>15</sup>.

Both Kenya and Ethiopia limit intermediate and local integration through limiting refugees' right to work and to move and settle freely outside of camps either by law, de facto or through reservations placed on the 1951 Refugee Convention. This makes self-reliance and local integration virtually impossible for the majority of refugees<sup>16</sup> Yet, in both countries a number of refugees have settled with the local population, outside of camps, and have found ways to integrate informally to the economy, often without approval from the government and almost entirely outside of the legal system (Banki, 2004: 12-13; DRC, 2011: 7; RCK, 2012: 11 and 29). Refugees who live outside camps tend to be those individuals with greater resources and education (Banki, 2004: 13 and 16). At the end of 2009, more than 160,000 unregistered and self-supporting Somali refugees were living in Addis Ababa and other Ethiopian towns, according to ARRA (ARRA, 2009). In 2011, UNHCR and NGOs estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 registered and unregistered refugees, including significant numbers of Somalis, lived in Nairobi (Campbell, 2011: 7).

<sup>14</sup> By closing its border, there is concern regarding the right of refugees to seek asylum.

<sup>15</sup> Banki (2004: 19) notes that the most significant factors affecting intermediate integration or self-reliance relate to the size of the refugee population (large refugee populations are less likely to integrate than small ones), time (the longer refugees stay in a country, the more likely they are to integrate), the political and social context, as well as individual agency. Legal, security and economic factors (for intermediate integration) were not found to play a significant role for intermediate integration. They would, however, play a significant role for formal local integration.

<sup>16</sup> In 2010, Ethiopia shifted its approach towards Eritrean refugees by allowing them to live outside the camps in urban locations (UN News Centre, 2010). This 'out of camp scheme' was open to refugees who could support themselves financially or who had strong family networks that could provide them with the necessary assistance, since refugees were not given the right to work. However, this policy is restricted to Eritreans and not extended to other refugees in the country (ARRA, 2010: 3; ITW UNHCR Addis, 11 June 2012).

A number of refugees in camps complement humanitarian handouts with livelihood activities, but their income is usually not enough to ensure self-sufficiency, making even intermediate integration impossible. Activities to improve the level of refugee self-reliance have been implemented, but major investments will be necessary for sustainability (Banki, 2004: 12; PRM, 2011; UNHCR, 2011).

In theory, in both countries, a refugee could acquire citizenship through marriage with a national (GoE, 2003: Art. 6; 2; GoK, 2011: Art. 12). However, this is a limited avenue and the few cases put forward in Ethiopia have not been successful (ITW UNHCR Addis, 11 June 2012). UNHCR Kenya is currently assessing potential opportunities for residency or citizenship created by the 2011 Citizenship and Immigration Act (communication with UNHCR Kenya, Aug. 2012). For a small number of refugees with academic or vocational qualifications gained in the country of origin or asylum, work permits could eventually be secured in the country of asylum or in another country.<sup>17</sup>

### **c) Resettlement**

From 1995 to 2010, 55,422 Somali refugees in Kenya and 2,259 in Ethiopia were resettled to a third country, most commonly the United States (UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database). In 2011, Somalis represented nearly a sixth of the 87,849 files submitted by UNHCR for consideration by resettlement countries (UNHCR, April 2012a: 5-6). The agency has been focussing on resettlement as a durable solution for refugees who arrived in Kenya and Ethiopia in 1991-92 and as a protection intervention for those with specific needs (ITW UNHCR Dadaab, Dec. 2010). Resettlement activities are ongoing in all camps, except those near Dolo Ado (ITW UNHCR Addis, 12 June 2012). It is expected that some 8,200 long-staying refugees will be resettled from Kebribeyah camp, in Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2010: 68-69). Some 16,000 refugees in Kenya are currently at various stages of the resettlement process to the US (ITW US Embassy, June 2012).

Even though opportunities remain very limited, resettlement does bring changes into refugee camps through remittances and in terms of options envisaged by refugees. In camps with resettlement activities, resettlement tends to become a prominent theme and a highly desired outcome (Horst, 2006a: 152; Jansen, 2011: 13, 171). Resettlement opportunities, combined with the availability of education, might also attract a number of refugees to the camps that are perceived as transitory spaces offering migration opportunities (Jansen, 2011: 171).

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17. UNHCR statistics (11 June 2012, 3 July 2012 and 28 August 2012) indicate that 249 refugees in Dadaab have a university level education, 551 have a technical or vocational education and 23 are listed as having a post-university level education; in Jijiga, 114 refugees are registered as having university level education, 6 post-university level, 74 technical or vocational training; in Dolo Ado, 20 refugees have university education.



## 6 Refugees in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps

### a) Overview of the camps

With the exception of Kakuma, located several hundred kilometres away from the Somali border, camps hosting Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia are located close to the Somali border. In both countries, camps are situated in isolated areas and refugees' relationships with host communities have been challenging. Indeed, while the opening of a camp is usually accompanied by significant investments, job creation and contracts for the host community, it also signifies that scarce natural resources have to be shared with refugees, perceived as beneficiaries of international aid.


### 1. Kenya

In Kenya, most refugees in the country live in one of Dadaab's five camps, in the northeastern province. Kakuma, in northwestern Kenya (Rift Valley province), is also host to a sizeable Somali refugee population (UNHCR Information portal, 11 Sept. 2012). Both camp complexes were opened in the early 1990's and are located in some of Kenya's poorest regions, populated by nomadic pastoralist communities.

**Dadaab's** refugee camps are situated in an area mostly inhabited by pastoralists of Somali ethnicity belonging to various Darod sub-clans, like a vast number of the Somali refugees (Horst, 2008: 122). The northeastern province, marked by a history of marginalisation, repression and violence, is home to 75% of Kenya's poorest citizens (UNHCR et al., 2011: 11; Lindley, 2011: 22). When the refugee complex was established in 1991-92, it consisted of three camps built to accommodate 90,000 refugees (Kagwanja, 2008: 221). Currently, there are five camps with more than 450,000 people, 98% of whom are Somalis, Dadaab has become the biggest and one of the oldest refugee complexes in the world (UNHCR, 2010: 1 and 2012). The newest camp Ifo 2 (East and West) was opened in 2011, in response to the large-scale influx provoked by the drought and lasting insecurity. Over 13,000 refugees are living in Kambioos.

**Kakuma** camp is located in northwestern Kenya, in an area populated by the Turkana that periodically requires emergency food aid, due to recurrent droughts (Jansen, 2011: 11). The camp was founded in 1992 to receive Sudanese fleeing from civil war. With the significant refugee repatriation to South Sudan, transfers of Somalis from Dadaab<sup>18</sup> and spontaneous movements of Somalis to Kakuma,<sup>19</sup> Somalis have become the most populous group in the camp (Jansen, 2011: 240; RCK, 2012: 75-76). At the end of August 2012, nearly half of Kakuma's 101,200 residents were Somalis (UNHCR Statistics, Aug. 2012). Unlike other camps in Kenya and Ethiopia where all or nearly all refugees are Somalis, Kakuma is characterised by its mixed population: refugees from 13 different countries, including Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, coexist in the camp (UNHCR 2012f: 1).

Since the beginning of the year, a few hundred refugees, mostly from South Sudan, have been registered in Kakuma on a daily basis (UNHCR, 13 Sept. 2012)<sup>20</sup>. The camp has now exceeded its 100,000-person capacity and negotiations for new land to enhance the camp are ongoing with the Government.



Sources: UNHCR Statistics, June, July and Sept. 2012.

<sup>18</sup> In 2003, a first group of approx. 12,000 Somali Bantus was transferred from Dadaab to Kakuma for resettlement purposes. In 2009, another group of some 13,000 Somalis was moved from Dadaab to decongest the camps (RCK, 2012: 76).

<sup>19</sup> Jansen (2011: 240) reports that from 2010, growing numbers of Somalis started arriving in Kakuma on their own from Dadaab, Nairobi and Somalia, either hoping for resettlement or trying to avoid overcrowding in Dadaab. RCK (2012: 76) notes that in late 2011-early 2012, some 5,000 Somalis who travelled there by their own means were registered in Kakuma. This coincided with the suspension of registration in Dadaab.

<sup>20</sup> Registered new arrivals in 2012 include 782 Somalis, 7,965 South Sudanese, 1,606 Sudanese, 1,068 Burundians, 794 Ethiopians and 683 Congolese (DRC).


## 2. Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the government designates areas within which refugees must live (GoE, 2004: Art. 21 § 2). Until 2009, newly arriving Somali refugees were settled near **Jijiga**, the capital of the Somali region, located close to the Somaliland border (Markos, 1997: 366). Jijiga camps were first established in 1989. Between 1997 and 2005, seven of the region's eight camps were closed, following a large-scale repatriation to Somaliland. The remaining refugees were moved to the only remaining camp, Kebribeyah (UNHCR, 2009). However, by July 2007, the former camp of Aw-barre (or Teferi Ber) had to be reopened to accommodate refugees fleeing an escalation of the political crisis and the fighting between the TFG and ICU forces (IRIN, 26 July 2007). In May 2008, a third camp, Sheder, was opened. As of June 2012, Jijiga camps are home to 41,545 Somali refugees (UNHCR Information portal).

In 2009, camps near Jijiga were deemed full and new camps were progressively established in the semi-arid southern part of the Somali region, around **Dolo Ado**. Since then, newly arriving refugees have been sheltered there (ITW UNHCR Addis, 11 June 2012). The number of refugees arriving each year has steadily increased from 2009, peaking during the drought in 2011. As of September 2012, 167,482 Somali refugees live in five camps: Bokolmayo and Melkadida founded in 2009 and 2010 respectively, and Kobe, Hiloweyn, and Bur Amino founded in 2011 (UNHCR Information portal, 4-6 Sept. 2012). Discussions are underway between the Government of Ethiopia and UNHCR to open a sixth camp (UNHCR, 2012k).

## 3. Place of origin and ethnicity

A vast majority of Somali refugees in camps are from areas relatively close to Kenya or Ethiopia. Some 92% of refugees come from one of the five following regions: Lower Juba (30%), Banadir (19%), Gedo (18%), Middle Juba (13%) and Bay (12%). Yet, regions of origin of refugees significantly vary from one camp to the other.



In Kenya, refugees in **Dadaab** mostly originate from Lower Juba (42%), Banadir (Mogadishu) (21%) and Middle Juba (20%). Some 55% of the Lower Juba refugees are from Kismayo district (more than 100,000 individuals), and more than a quarter from Afmadow district (nearly 50,000 people). In Middle Juba, a majority of the refugees come from Buale (51% or approx. 46,000 individuals) and Sakow (32%) (UNHCR, Sept. 2012). In **Kakuma**, greater numbers come from Banadir (57%). Slightly more than a quarter are from Lower Juba (26%), and some 6% come from Middle Juba (6%) (UNHCR Statistics, June 2012).

In Ethiopia, refugees in **Jijiga** are primarily from Banadir (33%), Woqooyi Galbeed (11%), Hiran (10%), and Galgadud (7%). While in **Dolo Ado**, refugees mostly originate from Gedo (53%), Bay (30%) and Bakool (11%) (UNHCR Statistics, July and Sept. 2012).

## 4. Ethnicity

More than half of Dadaab's population belongs to one of the Darod sub-clans, especially Ogaden (more than a quarter of the camps' population). Digil and Hawiye each represent approximately 12%, and Somali Bantu, approximately 6% (UNHCR statistics, June 2012). Nearly 30% of Kakuma's Somali population is Bantu. Unlike in Dadaab, Darod sub-clans represent less than a quarter of the total population. One Somali refugee in five in Kakuma is Hawiye (UNHCR Statistics, June 2012).

The largest ethnic group in Jijiga is Darod (40%), followed by Hawiye (24%) and Dir (8%) (UNHCR Statistics, May 2012). In Dolo Ado, the Rahanweyn, the largest clan in the camps, represent about 58% of the Somali population. The other two primary clans are the Marehan (22%) and Hawiye (8%) (UNHCR Statistics, Aug. 2012; UNHCR, 2012b, c, e, g, i and j).

## 5. Gender balance

In all camps, there are slightly more females than males aged 18-59 years. The difference is especially important in Dolo Ado where females of this age group represent 19% of the population (31,000 individuals), while males only constitute 12% (19,000 individuals). In Melkadida, this gender gap is even larger with 9.5% male and 19% female aged 18-59 (UNHCR Statistics, Sept. 2012). This suggests there are a significant number of female-headed households.

The 2010 World Food Programme, UNHCR and ARRA Joint Assessment Mission noted that in the Dolo Ado camps, some 40% to 60% of the camps' households were headed by females (and more than 80% in Melkadida). This could perhaps indicate that a number of men have stayed in Somalia and a number of women in polygamous or separated marriages are registered separately as the head of the household (WFP, 2010: 13, 17).

## b) Presentation and analysis of the findings

### 1. Profile of households interviewed


In total, 360 households were interviewed and 410 refugees participated in 62 FGDs. Slightly more than 40% of the refugees interviewed arrived in the camps before 2006, a third between 2006 and 2010, and a quarter after 2010. Three quarters of refugees in Ethiopia and half of those in Kenya arrived since 2006.

This means that refugees who have arrived before 2006 are over-represented in the sample, as less than a fifth of the overall Somali refugee population in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps has been there since 2005 or earlier. Consequently, refugees who arrived between 2006-10 and between 2011-12 are underrepresented (33% compared to 42%, and 25% compared to 41%).


A vast majority of refugees interviewed belong to one of the Darod sub-clans, especially the Ogaden, roughly matching the ethnicity of refugees in camps. Similarly, a majority of the refugees interviewed came from Lower Juba, Gedo or Banadir, which is also in line with the regions of origin of refugees in camps. For most recent arrivals, Bay was also a common region of origin (more than a quarter).

*1.1 Family composition:* In Jijiga and Kakuma, more than 40% said they were not living with a spouse, a much higher proportion than in Dolo Ado and Dadaab, where less than a quarter said they were without a spouse. In the vast majority of cases, the spouse was dead or missing. Smaller numbers were divorced. A small proportion of refugees indicated that their spouse was still in Somalia, living in another refugee camp in Kenya or Ethiopia, or living in the US or the UK

When did you arrive in this camp?



Year of arrival in camps (overall population)



Sources: UNHCR Statistics, June - Sept. 2012.

*1.2 Previous experience of displacement:* Slightly more than half of the refugees in Jijiga, Kakuma and Dadaab had previously experienced displacement, while less than 10% of those interviewed in Dolo Ado had. More than half of the refugees who had arrived before 2006 said they had been displaced before. This proportion dropped to 40% for those who arrived between 2006 and 2010 and to less than a third for the most recent arrivals.

Most refugees who had a prior experience of displacement had been internally displaced during the 1990's, but small numbers had also been refugees in Mombassa or Dadaab. A number of refugees in Kakuma mentioned having been in Dadaab in the early 1990's, having repatriated to Somalia, and been forced to flee again. In light of their previous experience, refugees recurrently stress that improvements in stability and security would have to be long-lasting before they opt to return, in order to avoid yet another episode of displacement.

## 2. Livelihood activities

### 2.1 Livelihood prior to fleeing, in exile and in the future

Prior to fleeing, nearly half of the refugees interviewed in Kenya and Ethiopia were farming and/or raising livestock. Slightly more than 10% combined farming and raising livestock. Fairly significant numbers defined themselves as merchants or petty traders. Small numbers indicated they had a specialised trade or were artisans (masons, carpenters, mechanics, etc.).

Refugees living in camps are not officially allowed to work. Still, households have considerably more complex livelihood strategies than a strict dependence on humanitarian handouts<sup>21</sup>. Aid can be understood as one of the resources at the disposal of refugees. A number of refugees complement humanitarian assistance through engaging in various income generating activities or by finding other sources of income notably through their social and family network. Levels of income tend to be very diverse and fluctuating (Jacobsen, 2005: 28-33; Jansen, 2011: 126, 143, 166).<sup>22</sup>


While small numbers of refugees are hired by aid organisations as incentive workers, most engage in a number of informal activities such as trading, running businesses, providing services like catering or running restaurants and entertainment establishments. Jansen (2011: 129) stresses that such a situation is not exceptional in Sub-Saharan Africa where the informal sector accounts for an average of 78% of non-agricultural employment.

Approximately 45% of households interviewed have at least one livelihood activity in the camp, with slightly more than one household in ten having more than one source of income. In a very small proportion of households, parents reported that some of their children were working.


Such a proportion of households with at least one livelihood activity is comparable to figures found in Dadaab camps by the American Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration during a recent livelihood assessment (PRM, 2011). Some 43% of households interviewed by PRM earned money through economic activities.

Based on household interviews and FGDs, refugees who have been in exile for longer appear more likely to have a livelihood activity and more established refugee camps offer more livelihood opportunities. In the most recently opened camps in Dolo Ado, opportunities are scarce. Slightly more than half of households arrived before 2006 and nearly half of those arrived between 2006 and 2010 reported having at least one livelihood activity. Less than 30% of refugees arrived in 2011-12 said so. In all cases, women were less likely to work than men. Based on FGDs, adults under 35 seemed more likely to have a livelihood activity than older people.

HH income in exile



Proportion of men and women with a livelihood



<sup>21</sup> Jansen (2011: 143) suggests the following twelve livelihood categories: businesspeople, incentive workers, employees in the informal sector, remittance receivers, shifters (people who secure an income or other opportunities from another city and partly shift between their homelands, other locations in Kenya and the camp), the poor (refugees whose only source of income is aid handouts), entrepreneurs (craftsmen and women who run small home-based shops or prepare food for road-side shops, or are engaged in weaving, cloth making, stamp making, etc.), refugee "elites" (people able to obtain assets and cash from other sources due to their status or position of power in the camp), hustlers, crooks and petty thieves, the dependants, the targeted (people able to make use of schemes, funding and other arrangements designated specifically for them on the basis of vulnerability or another social label, those who become eligible for micro-credit after completing vocational training programs, the insecure who are given special protection arrangements, or those who are eligible for scholarships), the unrecognised.

<sup>22</sup> Accurate data on livelihoods tends to be relatively difficult to obtain: refugees might fear that disclosing their level of wealth will affect the support of agencies or put them at risk; a number of income generating activities are not legal or taboo, disclosing corrupt practices might endanger the recipient (Jansen, 2011: 130).

While the most common livelihood activities identified by PRM in Dadaab were raising livestock (27% of active heads of household) and farming (20%), only a small proportion of the refugees interviewed mentioned such a source of income. This could be explained by restrictions placed on such activities either by law or through a lack of access to arable land or pasture in most refugee settings studied. For example, refugees in Kakuma are not permitted to own livestock or take part in farming activities (Jansen, 2011: 126). While in principle this policy also holds true for Dadaab, it is not being enforced (UNHCR, written communication, Aug. 2012).


Of the households interviewed who had at least one livelihood activity, a small proportion (less than 7%) said they were farming or raising livestock. The most common activities were petty trade (37% of households with a livelihood activity). Slightly more than a fifth earned money through a specialised trade, such as carpentry, tailoring, masonry or hairdressing. Some 19% of households earned money as incentive workers or teachers, slightly fewer as shop owners and traders (17%) or casual labourers (15%).

In FGDs, the most common livelihood activities mentioned by refugees were operating small shops (grocery stores, tea shops, butcheries), doing petty trade (milk selling, recycling of plastic bags, milk selling, etc.) or working as casual labourers. Smaller proportions were hired as teachers and incentive workers. In the vast majority of cases, refugees reported receiving cash for their work. Small numbers were receiving a combination of cash and goods, or only goods.

A minority of refugees mentioned receiving support for their livelihood activities, mostly from humanitarian organisations. A few individuals also cited support from relatives, friends or the host community. This information could not be assessed against statistical data, as such information does not seem to be available. However, it does appear that the proportion of refugees receiving support for their livelihood activities is relatively small. For example, recent mapping of livelihood activities in Jijiga camps shows that less than 3,000 refugees benefit from any kind of livelihood-related support, which represents less than 7% of the camp population (data compiled by DRC Jijiga, 24 Sept. 2012).

### 2.1.1 Livelihood in the future

If refugees were to return or move out of the camps, they would mainly plan to farm or pursue business activities. Others would engage in petty trade, raise livestock or use their skills in various fields such as carpentry, tailoring, masonry or hairdressing. A greater proportion of women plan to farm, while more men intend to raise livestock. The relatively low numbers of people planning to raise livestock can probably be partly understood by the fact that refugees have often lost their livestock to the drought or when fleeing. Parents most frequently mentioned that their children would pursue business activities or petty trade, farm or raise livestock.



Total respondents: Female: 157; Male: 181

In FGDs, refugees indicated that they plan to pursue business activities, farming or raise livestock. Those planning to run business stressed the need for grants, while those who aim to farm or raise livestock highlighted they need money, but also agricultural inputs, animals and land. Refugees' intended livelihood activity would affect their needs in terms of access to land.

### 2.2 Remittances

A number of refugees benefit from assistance from friends or relatives living outside the camps. Cindy Horst assessed that at least 10 to 15% of refugees in Dadaab receive remittances. More than a third (37%) of the refugees interviewed by PRM mentioned receiving such support (PRM, 2011: 3, 28-29; Horst, 2006: 29).

Less than a fifth of households interviewed for this research said they were receiving remittances, generally in the form of cash, but in a minority of cases in the form of food. Remittances are usually sent on a monthly basis by relatives in the US or Kenya, but also in a number of other Western countries (and Somalia, in a few instances).



Greater numbers of refugees in Kenya mentioned receiving remittances, ranging from USD 45 to 3,000, than in Ethiopia (26% against 10%). This difference seems related to time in exile, rather than location: refugees who have been living in the camp for longer appeared more likely to receive remittances. More than a quarter of those who arrived before 2006 said they were receiving support from relatives outside the camp, less than a fifth of those who arrived between 2006 and 2010 less than a tenth of those who arrived in 2011-12. A large number of refugees in Ethiopia have only arrived in the camps recently.

Of all people interviewed, only 14 individuals, nearly all in Kenya, indicated sending support to their family, mostly in Somalia, but also in Kenya and Ethiopia. Amounts sent range from USD 15 to 350 a year.

In FGDs, a small number of refugees mentioned receiving remittances and even smaller numbers said they were sending money to relatives in Somalia.


### 3. Education and Vocational training

#### 3.1 Education

In all camps, a vast majority of refugees have never accessed education either before fleeing or once in exile. For example, more than 75% of refugees registered in Dadaab, 67% of refugees in Jijiga and 93% of those in Dolo Ado reported having no education (UNHCR statistics, June, July and Aug. 2012).

In Ethiopia, less than half of the refugees interviewed indicated that one or many of their family members had attended school in the camps, compared with 64% in Kenya. Figures were especially low in Dolo Ado (41% of refugees), which could be explained by the fact that schools have only opened recently in some of the camps, only emergency ones in Buramino. In July 2011, many months after the drought-related emergency started, up to 80% of the Dolo Ado camp children were out of school because there were still no schools in several camps (UNHCR, 2011a)

Proportion HH with at least one member having attended school in the camp



The proportion of households reporting that at least one family member has attended school in the camp increases with the duration of exile. More than two thirds of those who have arrived before 2006 had at least one family member who had been to school, a proportion that dropped to slightly more than half for those who arrived between 2006-2010 and less than half for those arrived in 2011-12.

Such figures are not unexpected. Even though education facilities have been set up in all camps in Kenya and Ethiopia and in both countries, pupils follow the national curriculum and sit for national exams, for school-aged children, access to quality education is unsatisfactory (UNHCR et al., 2011: 7; ITW DRC Jijiga, Sept. 2012). Education tends to be underfunded and educational facilities are insufficient to meet the needs of the refugee population. Those that exist are in poor condition and under-equipped, and teachers are under-qualified. Enrolment, attendance and levels of retention are low, especially for girls (Dippo, 2011: 19; UNHCR et al., 2012: 9, 15, 25; UNHCR, 2011a: 31)<sup>23</sup>.

In Dadaab, where efforts are being made to ensure that educational activities prepare refugees for life outside the camps through a recently adopted joint education strategy, 39.7% of school-aged children were enrolled in primary school and 8.6% in secondary school in June 2012 (UNICEF/UNHCR, 2012: 2 and 7).<sup>24</sup> In Kakuma, 68% of children are attending primary or secondary school (UNHCR et al., 2012: 6,13). In Jijiga in 2010, less than 45% of school-aged children were enrolled in primary school. For secondary education, figures dropped to 17% of girls and 31% of boys (UNHCR, 2011a: 30).

In FGDs, refugees frequently mentioned that parents who had the means to do so were sending their children to private schools in the camps. In Dadaab, in 2009, 3% of the school-aged population were enrolled in such schools (Dryden-Peterson, 2011: 60). Refugees participating in FGDs explained that the quality of education is better in private facilities, as teachers are better trained and classes are smaller.<sup>25</sup> Other reasons cited by parents for sending their children to private schools in Dadaab in 2009 were strong discipline and the integration of religious and secular studies (Dryden-Peterson, 2011: 60).

<sup>23</sup> Dippo et al. (2012: 10-11) note that barriers confronting girls' access to education include social-cultural norms that place girls in a subordinate position to boys, threats to security and lack of facilities that accommodate the health needs of girls and the fact that teachers in the camps are mainly men, contributing to cultural barriers of communication and a shortage of female role models.

<sup>24</sup> In a recent assessment in Dadaab, NRC (2012: 4) noted that low attendance in public schools can notably be explained by the fact that a number of students prefer attending religious schools, a lack of resources for purchasing school uniforms and learning material, long distances to school, language barriers and competing priorities.

<sup>25</sup> Ratios of teacher to students in public schools in camps are often very high (1:131 in Dadaab against a standard ratio of 1:40; up to 1:90 in Kakuma (UNICEF/UNHCR, 2012: 4; UNHCR et al., 2012: 9)). The number of trained teachers in the camps' school system is too low to meet the needs. In Dadaab and Kakuma, less than 20% of teachers have had formal training and numerous teachers stop teaching when they secure a better paying job or a less demanding one in another sector (NRC 2012: 1; Dryden-Peterson, 2011: 56; UNHCR et al., 2012: 24).

Only a minority of children graduating from primary school have access to secondary education, a gap regularly underlined in FGDs. According to Cooper (2005: 465-66), in Dadaab in 2003, only 27% of those who completed primary school could pursue further education.<sup>26</sup> At that point, it was estimated that by 2009, more than 11,000 refugee youths in the camps would have completed primary school without the possibility of enrolling in post-primary education. In Kakuma, only 100 to 200 secondary school positions are available every year. As the number of primary school graduates exceeds the available spaces in secondary schools, numerous students are unable to continue their education (UNHCR et al., 2012: 21). Even though higher education for refugees is deemed important both for individuals and for fostering leadership in protracted settings and post-conflict reconstruction, opportunities for post-secondary learning are even more limited (Dryden Peterson, 2011: 52).<sup>27</sup>

### 3.2 Vocational training and adult education

Vocational training classes are offered in most camps. For example, in Dadaab, the Norwegian Refugee Council offers a one-year full time Youth Education Pack (YEP), focused on literacy, life skills and vocational training (ITW NRC Dadaab, 4 June 2012). In Kakuma, Don Bosco provides trainings to some 600 students a year in carpentry, masonry, welding, plumbing, computers, electrical work, agriculture, tailoring and dressmaking, as well as secretarial and typing courses (Don Bosco, 2011: 6). In Jijiga, a handful of organisations offer basic training and support to livelihood activities.

The proportion of interviewed refugees who mentioned having attended vocational training classes in camps was relatively low. Nearly twice as many refugees in Kenya than in Ethiopia mentioned having attended vocational training classes (28% against 15%). The greatest proportion of people who reported having attended vocational training was in Kakuma camp, with 36% of refugees interviewed, and the smallest, in Dolo Ado. This can be explained by the fact that while vocational training activities are limited in all camps and deemed insufficient by refugees met in FGDs, they are especially so in Dolo Ado's recently opened camps.

In general, just as with education, the proportion of refugees who have attended vocational training classes increases with the duration of exile (29% for 1989-2005; 23% for 2006-2010; 12% for 2011-12). Based on FGDs, refugee leaders, entrepreneurs and employees seem to have slightly better access to vocational training, while opportunities for women and vulnerable refugees appear extremely limited.

Refugees interviewed had most commonly attended business management and tailoring trainings. Small numbers also participated in computer, counselling, teaching, carpentry or mechanical training. Some 75% of those who benefited from vocational training classes assessed that they had helped them improve their lives or increase their earning due to the development of new skills and business and job opportunities.

In FGDs, refugees listed a number of trainings that would be beneficial, most commonly tailoring, business training, carpentry, driving courses, computer courses, electrician and mechanics training. Language classes were also regularly requested. It was stressed that refugees hired as incentive workers could benefit from more advanced on-the-job training, skills transfer and mentoring, leading to enhanced responsibilities.

A majority of refugees registered in camps have had no access to education before fleeing (UNHCR statistics, June, July and Aug. 2012). In FGDs, refugees regularly highlighted that adult education and literacy should be more readily available in the camps. Adult education centers exist in some camps, but are deemed insufficient by refugees. For example, in Kakuma, 12 centres run by the refugee community offer language classes and a number of courses in topics such as mathematics, science or business (UNHCR et al., 2012: 39).

### 3.3 Skills and social relations gained in exile

Only a third of the refugees mentioned gaining new skills in exile that would be useful if they were repatriating or moving out of the camps. Skills most commonly mentioned in interviews and FGDs were education, business skills and tailoring. Small numbers reported gaining carpentry, construction and brick-making skills, computer education, life-skills, leadership and peacebuilding skills or watchmen skills. A number of refugees in Kakuma underlined having learned English and/or Swahili.

While nearly half of the refugees in Kenya mentioned having gained useful skills in exile, only 13% of refugees in Ethiopia felt the same way. In general, refugees who had been there for longer were more likely to indicate they had gained useful skills in exile (44% of those arrived before 2006; 32% of the 2006-2010 group; and 16% of refugees arrived since 2011).

A number of refugees indicated having gained valuable social relationships in exile. Refugees notably mentioned having developed business relations, having been part of workers and traders associations and having interacted with people of other nationalities.


<sup>26</sup> The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that only primary education is mandatory (art. 28 § a).

<sup>27</sup> For example, Afghan refugees who had had access to higher education repatriated earlier, took up work as civil servants or as NGO managers, filling critical roles in a society during a rebuilding process (Dryden Peterson, 2011: 52).

## 4. Safety

Only a minor proportion of refugees interviewed in Ethiopia (3% in Jijiga and 20% in Dolo Ado) felt it was unsafe for them or their family to travel outside the camps. This proportion was greater in both Kenyan camp locations (57% in Dadaab and 65% in Kakuma).

In Kenyan camps, refugees commonly explained that it was unsafe to travel outside the camps because they did not have the authorisation to do so. In Dadaab, a number of refugees also stressed they feared police harassment. Refugees in the other camps surveyed did not express such concern.





## 5. Intentions and pre-conditions for repatriation

### 5.1 Reasons for displacement

Nearly all refugees mentioned fighting as one of the reasons that led to their displacement (87%). Insecurity was raised by more than 40% of refugees, while small numbers also cited drought, loss of livestock and loss of livelihood.

Refugees who arrived in 2011-12 were more likely than others to list drought and/or loss of livestock as one of the reasons leading to their displacement. Greater proportions of refugees that arrived before 2011 indicated that fighting had caused their displacement. Nearly 90% assessed that the reasons that led to their displacement still prevailed. A slightly higher proportion of those who arrived in 2011-12 compared to refugees who arrived before said so.




### 5.2 Intentions for the future


When asked about their intentions for the future, nearly half of those interviewed wanted to move to another country (49%), 31% said they would return to Somalia and 20% that they would like to stay in Kenya or Ethiopia. Such proportions match the intentions expressed in FGDs.

A relatively small proportion of recent arrivals (2011-2012) said resettlement was their plan for the future. A vast majority wanted to either return to Somalia or integrate locally. The proportion of people hoping to move to a third country increased substantially with time, while the desire to integrate locally decreased. Less than a fifth of refugees who arrived in the camps before 2005 mentioned intending to repatriate.

In the recently opened Dolo Ado camps, the only camps with no resettlement activities, 47% of refugees said they would like to return to Somalia, while 42% want to settle permanently in Ethiopia. Only 11% intended to move to a third country. In Jijiga, this picture is completely different: 80% said they wanted resettlement, 17% wanted to repatriate and 3% wanted to stay in Ethiopia. In Dadaab and Kakuma, slightly more than half of the refugees interviewed hoped for resettlement.

### What are your intentions for the future





**Figure:** Intentions for the future by camp and by period of arrival


In FGDs, youths and older arrivals were the least likely to express the desire to repatriate and more commonly said they wanted to move to a third country. Refugee leaders and the most recent arrivals (2011-12) were most likely to want to repatriate.

When asked if they would consider returning to Somalia if conditions were conducive, 53% of households interviewed answered positively. The longer refugees have been in the camp, the less likely they are to consider return. Less than half of households who arrived in the camps before 2005 said they would consider returning if conditions were conducive (45%), while more than half (55%) of those who have arrived since 2006 said they would. A slightly greater proportion of refugees who would consider returning listed drought, livestock and loss of livelihood as part of the reasons for their displacement.

While Jijiga had the highest proportion of refugees assessing that reasons that led to their displacement no longer prevailed (27%), this did not influence people’s intention for the future: Jijiga also had one of the highest proportion of people saying they would not consider returning, even if conditions were favourable (68%). This could be partly explained by the large-scale resettlement of long-staying refugees currently taking place in one of the Jijiga camps, Kebribeyah (UNHCR, 2010: 68-69).


Unlike the duration of exile, having been displaced before, receiving remittances or having benefited from education or vocational training classes, did not seem to influence intentions. While belonging to a minority did not appear as a significant factor in household interviews, it was regularly mentioned as an impediment to return in FGDs.

A majority of the refugees who said they would not consider returning, indicated they were waiting for resettlement, while more than a third wanted to become residents in their country of asylum. A number of refugees assessed that life in exile was better than they had in Somalia: in camps they have access to school and health facilities and have managed to find some livelihood opportunities. Others said they had traumatic experiences in Somalia and would never consider returning.



**5.3 Pre-conditions for return**

Refugees commonly stressed that improvements in stability and security would have to be long-lasting before they consider returning. This can notably be explained by the fact that a number of refugees in camps have experienced several episodes of displacement, due to short-lived improvements in security and stability, and will do their utmost to avoid being displaced yet again. Refugees’ decision to repatriate or not is also likely to rest on several other factors, including access to education and health care, livelihood opportunities and whether humanitarian assistance would be provided upon return.



### 5.4 Location of return


Only a small number of refugees said that if they were to repatriate, they would return to a different location than their locality of origin. Those who said so typically came from a rural area, but planned to settle in an urban area for livelihood opportunities, the urban way of life, security and access to services. The presence of relatives, access to housing and land were only underlined in a few instances. The main motivations for returning to the locality of origin were the presence of relatives and friends, owning land, housing or other property and livelihood opportunities.

Reasons why people would return to their locality of origin varied slightly between Kenya and Ethiopia. In Kenya, refugees mostly cited the presence of relatives, security and livelihood opportunities. Refugees in Ethiopia most often highlighted having access to land in the locality.

### 5.5 Land and other assets in Somalia

Approximately half of the refugees interviewed had access to land in Somalia before fleeing. Of that number, slightly less than half said they would still have access to it, a fifth did not know. In nearly all cases, when refugees said they would still have access to their land, they also indicated that a relative was looking after it. Approximately a third of the refugees in FGDs believed they would still have access to land in Somalia. Some 40% said a relative was looking after it and they would still have access to it.


Proportion of refugees who had access to land before fleeing



Three quarters of the refugees in Dolo Ado indicated they had access to land before fleeing. Some 64% believed they would still have access to it, nearly a fifth did not know, and another fifth said they would no longer have access to it. Figures in Jijiga were very different: only a quarter of refugees said they had access to land before fleeing. Of those, 5% indicated they would still have access to it and 21% said they did not know. In Kakuma and Dadaab, 48% and 57% of refugees said they had access to land before fleeing, 40% in Kakuma stated they still had access to the land while in Dadaab, 57% indicated they would still have access to it.


Differences in figures seem to be partly linked to the duration of exile. The proportion of refugees who had been in camps for longer (1988-2005) who said they did not have access to land in Somalia is greater, as is the proportion of those saying that they would not have access to it. This also surfaced in FGDs, along with the fact that youth and refugees belonging to minority groups are less likely than other refugees to still own land in Somalia.

Did you have access to land before fleeing?



Less than a quarter of the refugees interviewed said they still owned other assets in Somalia, most commonly a house or a farm. Small numbers also had livestock. Virtually all refugees in Jijiga said they had no other assets left in Somalia, while less than a quarter did in Dadaab and Kakuma. In Dolo Ado, 40% did, most in the form of a farm. Just as with land ownership, refugees who recently arrived (2011-2012) were more likely to still own assets in Somalia (44%, compared to 19% of those arrived between 2006-2010 and 13% of those arrived before 2006).

Would you still have access to it?




A slightly greater proportion of refugees considering returning had access to land (58% compared to 50%) or other assets (29% compared to 15%) and would still have access to it (50% compared to 43%).

### 5.5 Assets in the camps

Only a very small proportion of refugees (8%) reported having brought assets with them when fleeing from Somalia. Several refugees said they had no assets in the camps that they would bring with them if they were leaving. Those who would commonly listed non-food items, money and shelter. Over a fifth of those who would consider repatriating, would plan to leave with their shelter.

Assets that refugees would take with them if they were repatriating or moving out of the camp



### 5.6 Support that could be provided by humanitarian organisations

When asked how humanitarian organisations could help refugees prepare to repatriate and reintegrate if conditions became conducive in Somalia, heads of households mostly focused on direct support to repatriation and reintegration, commonly listing the provision of transport, food, shelter and cash.

In FGDs, refugees suggested that aid organisations should take measures in the camps to help them be ready to repatriate and reintegrate, notably by ensuring a greater access to education and vocational training, as well as providing livelihood opportunities. Incentive workers stressed that they could further develop their skills and capacities through mentoring by aid organisations, which would enable them to find employment upon return.

Refugees also highlighted that humanitarian organisations should be ready to support repatriation and reintegration (through transport and the provision of basic assistance) and assist refugees with access to land and housing upon return. In addition, refugees commonly stressed that improvement of peace, justice and stability would be crucial to help them repatriate and reintegrate.

## 6. Decision-making and sources of information

### 6.1 Decision-making process

In all camps, the decision to repatriate or not would be taken by heads of households. To a limited extent, relatives in Somalia, refugee leaders and elders would also be influential in such a decision.

Refugee leaders were mentioned as influential in decision-making more regularly in Jijiga, while relatives in Somalia were more significant in Dolo Ado. It was a regular occurrence for recent arrivals (2011-12) to indicate that they would also take advice from relatives in Somalia into account.

### 6.2 Information

Some 70% of refugees said they felt well informed about the situation in their area of origin. Similar proportions were recorded in FGDs, although women and vulnerable refugees felt well-informed in remarkably smaller proportions, while youth and entrepreneurs were the most likely to feel well-informed. The main source of information was media (mostly the BBC, VOA, Universal TV and Star FM), followed by relatives in the locality of origin and other refugees. Smaller numbers listed telephones, the Internet (and social networks) and new arrivals as sources of information.

Nearly half of the refugees interviewed indicated receiving information from their area of origin daily, while 13% said they never received any information. In Dolo Ado, a quarter of the refugees said they never received any information, which could partly be explained by the fact that in a number of the camps, there is no phone network, which considerably limits contact with relatives in Somalia. Yet, in all camps, media are the most common source of information. Being well informed or not did not seem influence return intentions.


### 6.3 Relatives in Somalia

In all locations except Jijiga, only a minority reported no longer having relatives in Somalia (between 3% and 22%). In Jijiga, more than half of the refugees said so. Some 70% of the refugees who participated in FGDs said they still had relatives in Somalia.

The proportion of people who said having no known relatives in Somalia increased with the duration of exile. While only 11% of those who arrived between 2011-12 said they had no relatives in Somalia, more than a third of the older arrivals said they did have. This was also noted in FGDs. Some 75% of those saying they would consider returning to Somalia still had relatives in the country, compared with 68% of those who would not consider returning.

#### *Temporary visits and spontaneous repatriation to Somalia*

Only a very small number of refugees who were interviewed or participated in FGDs reported having been back to Somalia since fleeing (6% of the population interviewed and less than 3% of the FGD participants).<sup>28</sup> Those who said they had visited did so for family-related reasons or to look after their land or assets. Most reported having been only once, but a few mentioned returning once a year. In slightly more than half of the cases, people who had visited said the situation had been



<sup>28</sup> Eliciting answers to such a question can be problematic as refugees are usually aware that visits to their country of origin can be seen as in contradiction with their claim for protection in another country.

characterised by fighting and insecurity, while a small number said that at the time of their trip, it had been calm or the situation had been improving. Problems most frequently experienced during visits related to fighting and insecurity, the poor quality of roads and transport and insufficient access to food and water.

Refugees who had never been back to Somalia mostly indicated that insecurity and fighting had prevented from doing so. Yet, in FGDs, the lack of means to pay for transport, the absence of transportation, the fact that assets have been looted and lands occupied and bad memories were also commonly raised.

Very few people knew refugees who had repatriated since they had arrived in the camps (less than 30 individuals). Similar proportions came out of FGDs. Those who knew people who repatriated mostly mentioned harsh conditions, insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities in the camps, the improvement of security in Somalia, family bonds in Somalia and the will to resume agricultural activities as reasons for their return. In FGDs, youth also stressed that other youth had repatriated to take advantage of job opportunities in Somalia.

## 7. Observations

While refugees might share a number of religious and cultural practices, as well as a collective history and memory, their experience will be gendered and refugees are likely to be different in terms of personal history, skills and interest, socio-economical status, health, and social belonging or beliefs (Colson, 1999: 23; Essed, 2004: 2). The uniqueness of refugees' experience means that no response or analysis can be appropriate for all.

When examining return intentions and the bonds Somali refugees have with their country of origin, the length of their exile, drivers of displacement, conditions in the country of asylum, age, and belonging to a minority group are important elements.

Given the choice, nearly half of refugees would move to a third country. Yet, if conditions were conducive in Somalia, a significant proportion would consider returning. Local integration does not emerge as a popular option, possibly because refugees deem their conditions in asylum challenging. However, intentions and reintegration prospects seem to significantly vary with the duration of exile, just as bonds with Somalia do.

Unsurprisingly, refugees who have been in exile for longer seem to have a weaker bond with their country of origin and might have limited reintegration prospects. While more than half of refugees in prolonged exile said they still had relatives in Somalia, only a minority believed they would still have access to land or other assets.

In general, adults below 35 and refugees belonging to minority groups seemed less likely than other refugees to still own land or other assets in Somalia, which could partly explain why these groups expressed little desire to repatriate, even if conditions were conducive. The fact that many youths have spent most of their lives in exile and have limited recollection of Somalia, if any, must also come into play. For youths who grew up in camps, which can to some extent be compared to cities (*cf.* Jansen, 2011), returning to the rural areas that many come from, with limited public facilities, seems especially difficult to envisage. Further research would be required focused on youth which was beyond the scope of this study.

Refugees who fled after having experienced direct violence appeared especially unlikely to consider repatriation, regardless of the duration of their exile or their bond with Somalia. Such views were repeatedly expressed by refugees in Bokolmayo, the first camp opened in the area of Dolo Ado that hosts a significant number of refugees who fled from violence in Banadir in 2009.

The location of exile did not seem to significantly influence refugees' perspective. Yet, in all locations, refugees stressed that conditions were difficult and could induce premature returns. In Dolo Ado camps, a number of refugees stressed that others had left due to the harshness of the setting.

Having been displaced before, receiving remittances or having benefited from education or vocational training classes did not seem to significantly influence intentions.

Refugees usually note that the causes of their displacement still prevail. Measures to enable refugees to reintegrate in Somalia or integrate elsewhere could already be taken in the camps by increasing access to education and livelihood opportunities.





## 7 Perspectives of selected communities of return

The situation in Somalia broadly differs from one location to another. Whereas Somaliland and Puntland are relatively stable and conflict-free, most of the south and central region remains subject to instability, violence and continued population displacement. A majority of Somali refugees in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps fled from the southern part of Somalia: most come from Lower Juba, Banadir, Gedo, Middle Juba and Bay.

While the security landscape in south-central Somalia has been changing rapidly since the beginning of 2012, Human Rights Watch recently stressed that there is no evidence of a significant improvement in the human rights situation for the local population (HRW, July 2012). OCHA noted that increased military operations in late 2011 and the first half of 2012 resulted in localised and temporary displacement in Gedo, Lower Juba, Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions. Yet, the organisation reported an improved humanitarian access in Mogadishu, Gedo and Dhobley in Lower Juba (OCHA, July 2012: 1-2).

After two decades of conflict and instability and in the absence of a functioning government, public infrastructure and basic social services are generally very limited and in a poor state in south-central Somalia. Millions of Somalis have no access to services such as WASH, health or education (OCHA, July 2012: 22).

In order to capture key elements to consider when reflecting on the eventual repatriation of Somali refugees, Somali partners (Sean Deveruxe Human Rights Organisation, Somali Children Welfare and Rights Watch and Gedo Social Development Organisation in Belet Xaavo) conducted 73 interviews with key informants in selected districts. Key informants included community leaders, elders, clan leaders, local authorities, service providers (health and education), entrepreneurs and civil society organisations.

The three districts, Afmadow in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay and Belet Xaavo in Gedo, were selected based on access and the areas of origin of refugees in camps. Although experience has shown that refugees may not be repatriating to the locality they came from, it is likely that a number would be returning to their region of origin if the situation allows, especially if they still have assets or relatives (Long, 2010: 5-6).

The following section sketches the situation in selected communities of return and introduces the perspectives of key informants on the potential large-scale return of refugees and IDPs. It highlights that access to land and skills building for returnees, allowing them to secure a livelihood and contribute to the reconstruction of their communities, are important aspects to consider when discussing repatriation and reintegration.

### a) Overview of the situation in selected districts of return

#### 1. Afmadow in Lower Juba Region

##### 1.1 Security and stability and humanitarian access

In May 2012, Somalia and AU forces captured the town of Afmadow, home to some 50,000 people mostly from the Ogaden sub-clan (Darod) in Lower Juba (est. pop.: 386,000), from Al-Shabab (BBC, 31 May 2012; UNDP, 2005). The group had taken the city from Hizbul Islam in November 2009 (IRIN, 24 Nov. 2009). During the first six months of 2012, insecurity of mid to high level intensity, notably stemming from inter-clan fighting, was widespread in the district (FSNAU, 2012; UNDP, 2005). In interviews, key informants described the security in Afmadow as average, but improving. They partly attributed the responsibility for the remaining insecurity to military forces present in the area. Local authorities reported the presence of mines or unexploded ordnance on roads surrounding the town.

In 2006, after Afmadow was taken over by the Islamic courts, many humanitarian organisations left and have not resumed activities. However, organisations that had been operating in the region the longest have been allowed to remain (Sedhuro, 2012). Even though OCHA reports that humanitarian access has been improving, it is still considered extremely restricted (OCHA, July 2012: 2; OCHA, Aug. 2012)

##### 1.2 Displacement

It is estimated that some 31,000 people are displaced in Lower Juba (OCHA, July 2012: 22). IDP figures for Afmadow district provided by local authorities, civil society organisations and clan leaders vary between 4,500 and 15,000 people living in three settlements or with the host community.

Some 200,000 people from Lower Juba have become refugees, mostly in Kenya. Some 41% of the population in Dadaab camps originate from Lower Juba. Slightly more than a quarter are from Afmadow (approx. 48,000 people) (UNHCR, Sept. 2012). Several key informants mentioned that the population had become scarce in the last two decades. They usually listed several periods of displacement: during

Photo: Alexandra Strand Holm

the early 1990's and since 2006. Many noted that when Al-Shabab captured Afmadow in 2009, large numbers of people fled to Kenya. Some people were also said to have fled due to land disputes.

### 1.3 Livelihood and food security

Pastoralism is the dominant livelihood activity in the region. Other activities include petty trade, carpentry, farming, and charcoal burning (Sedhuro, 2012; key informants).

Lower Juba is the largest producer of maize and sorghum in Southern Somalia, but flash floods in November and December 2011 have damaged large portions of crops (FSNAU, 2012: 8). Additionally, due to a long dry spell between April and June 2012, the harvest was significantly below average (FSNAU, 2012a: 1). Between February and June 2012, 90,000 people in rural and urban areas were categorised as in an emergency food security situation (FSNAU, 2012: 3). In interviews, key informants regularly stressed that food insecurity was a major problem in Afmadow. Nutrition continues to be affected by the 2011 drought. Severe acute malnutrition rates for April-July 2012 were 25.1% in the Juba agro-pastoral region. In the Juba riverine and Juba pastoral regions the rates were 21.5% and 16% respectively (Nutrition Cluster, 2012).

### 1.4 Public infrastructure and basic services

Key informants generally describe public services in Afmadow as of poor quality and insufficient to meet the needs of the population. The lack of qualified staff in the health and education sectors is consistently highlighted. Several mentioned that qualified workers have been moving to other areas of the country or to neighbouring countries to seek better opportunities and/or security.

There are seven health facilities in Lower Juba (Health cluster). In Afmadow, where there is a health centre and a hospital, key informants stressed that access to health services is insufficient, facilities are in poor condition, and more should be done to address malnutrition.

There is one public primary school and one secondary school in Afmadow (local authorities), a number considered too low to meet the needs of the school-aged population by key informants and the Somalia Education Cluster. This means that a number of children can only access Quranic schools. In addition, key informants commonly raised the lack of learning material, as well as suitable WASH facilities.

Access to water in Afmadow, mostly through wells, is deemed good. On the other hand, sanitation is described as non-existent or extremely poor, which is consistent with other assessments. FSNAU notes that poor WASH facilities increase the outbreak of diseases such as measles and watery diarrhoea (FSNAU, 2012). A number of interlocutors stressed that roads were in a poor state.

## **Community Driven Recovery, Development and Safety programming in Somalia**

As an example of how a local governance programme can consider returns, DRC and Danish Demining Group have been implementing community driven recovery, development safety programmes in Somalia since 2008. Through the community-driven process, communities analyse their resources and needs, prioritise their requirements, develop a plan of action, receive and manage resources, implement their projects, and ensure quality and accountability. Such programmes could target areas with potential for return. In areas with potential for return, community analysis could include priority needs for when people start to return. Analysis on prioritisation could be shared with refugees in camps.

## **2. Baidoa in Bay Region**

### 2.1 Security, stability and humanitarian access

The capital city of Bay region (pop. 620,500) and one of Somalia's largest cities, Baidoa was taken over from Al-Shabab in February 2012. Yet, in July, OCHA reported that the group was still in control of most of the villages and rural areas surrounding the town (OCHA, July 2012: 11). The city that used to house Somalia's interim parliament had been seized by Al-Shabab in January 2009 and was the second most important base for the group, after Kismayo (Al Jazeera, 16 Aug. 2012; BBC, 22 Feb. 2012).

While the region is relatively secure, humanitarian access remains very restricted (OCHA, Aug. 2012). In November 2011, six out of seven international organisations were banned from the region by Al-Shabab (OCHA, March 2012). Between February and June 2012, there was limited insecurity and the situation was expected to remain the same (FSNAU, 2012). Key informants generally consider the security to be average in Baidoa. The regional governor, deputy mayor and a few clan leaders mentioned the presence of unexploded ordnance in the surroundings of the city and in rubbish dumps.

Baidoa, located some 250 km southeast of the Ethiopian border, is home to 340,000 people, according to local authorities. Its population is predominantly from the Rahaweyn, Digil and Mirifle clan and sub-clans (SCWRW, 2012: 6).

### *2.2 Displacement*

It is estimated that some 40,000 people are internally displaced in the region, while more than 80,000 people have fled to another country, mostly Ethiopia, but also Kenya (OCHA, July 2012: 22; UNHCR statistics).

Local authorities assess that approximately 8,000 people are displaced in Baidoa district and hosted by the community or living in a number of settlements (between 24 and 40, according to various authorities). Their estimates of internal displacement from Baidoa to other districts in Somalia vary between 30,000 and 45,000. Figures of estimated refugees from Baidoa are much higher, ranging between 200,000 (mayor) to 250,000 (regional governor). Such estimates are most likely higher than real figures given that “only” 80,000 registered refugees in camps originate from the region.

Key informants noted that 1991-1992, 2003, 2007-2008 and 2011-12 were key periods of displacement, driven by war, clan conflict and insecurity. For all periods except 2007-2008, drought was also identified as one of the causes of displacement.

### *2.3 Livelihood and food security*

Baidoa is a major economic centre in southern Somalia, with strong economic links to other rural and urban centres in the region, notably Mogadishu, Marka and Belet Xaawo. It is the trading centre for surrounding sorghum producing regions, Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiran. Main economic activities in the town include business, casual labour, self-employment, and livestock and agricultural trade (FSNAU, 2009: 1). In 2009, 10% of Baidoa’s urban population was deemed very poor, 30% poor, 45% middle class and 15% better-off (FSNAU, 2009: 1). Key informants ranked farming as the most important livelihood activity, followed by raising livestock, petty trades, trades and business activities.

Between February and June 2012, an estimated urban population of 45,000 and a rural population of 200,000 were categorised as in food security crisis in the region (FSNAU, 2012: 3). Watery diarrhoea, cholera, and measles, in addition to poor WASH programmes and substandard childcare facilities, make it challenging to control malnutrition rates (FSNAU, 2012:16).

### *2.4 Public infrastructure and basic services*

Just as in Afmadow, key informants consider availability and quality of basic services unsatisfactory and stress the lack of qualified workers, especially in the health and education sectors. Several mentioned that qualified teachers and health workers have left the district for other parts of Somalia or other countries.

There is one hospital, nine functioning health posts and 11 mother and child health centres in Baidoa, according to the Somalia Health Cluster. Key informants commonly said that the existing infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the needs of the population and neither is the quality of the services provided.

Baidoa has one university and seven public primary and secondary schools. In addition, there are a number of private schools. Bay has the second highest school enrolment in south-central Somalia, with boys outnumbering girls two-to-one (Education Cluster, 2011). A majority of key informants deemed access and the quality of education in Baidoa average. Approximately a third felt it was insufficient, mostly underlining that there should be more schools. Several also noted the lack of access to higher education.

Access to water in Baidoa city is considered good to average by key informants, even though a number underlined the need for a public provision of clean water. Interlocutors considered sanitation infrastructure insufficient to non-existent. The regional governor highlighted that rubbish collection needed to resume. The state of roads was described as inadequate and poor telecommunications and an erratic provision of electricity as problematic.

### 3. Belet Xaawo in Gedo Region

#### 3.1 Security and humanitarian access

In late 2011, TFG troops started taking over Gedo region, bordering Kenya to the west and Ethiopia to the north, from Al-Shabab. In July 2012, OCHA reported that the TFG controlled most parts of the five districts (Belet Xaawo, Ceel Waaq, Luuq, Doloow and Garbahareey) and that humanitarian access had improved (OCHA, July 2012a). Access was still considered poor (OCHA, Aug. 2012). In November 2011, NGOs and UN agencies were banned from the region, hampering the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet, some organisations, mostly local, have continued to deliver life-saving assistance (OCHA, Feb. 2012). In interviews, local authorities, clan and religious leaders and representatives of civil society generally deemed the security good. A number of key informants underlined the presence of unexploded ordnance in the district and that Al-Shabab had planted mines along the Kenyan border.

Gedo has an estimated population of 328,378, of which some 22,000 live in Belet Xaawo district (UNDP, 2005; D.C Belet Xaawo). Marehan (Darod) is the dominant clan and Ali Dehere is the dominant subclan in Belet Xaawo (GSDO, 2012: 1).

#### 3.2 Displacement

It is estimated that some 77,000 people are displaced in the region (OCHA, July 2012: 22). Local authorities and IDP leaders in Belet Xaawo indicate that between 6,000 and 8,000 IDPs live in the locality, with the host community or in settlements. Some 124,000 refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia come from Gedo. A majority are hosted in Dolo Ado and Dadaab camps.

Local authorities, elders and civil society organisations assess that up to 10,000 people from Belet Xaawo have been displaced to another district and up to 10,000 people have become refugees. A number of key periods and drivers of displacement were listed, including the civil war of the early 1990's; fighting between Al-Itihad, aiming at uniting Ethiopia's eastern region with Somalia, and Ethiopian troops in 1996; inter-Marehan fighting from 2001 to 2004; the rise of the ICU in 2006; the drought from October 2010; and the invasion by Kenya Defence Forces a year later.

#### 3.3 Livelihood and food security

Gedo's population mostly relies on livestock, farming, and petty trade. Many pastoralists lost their livestock because of erratic rains (OCHA, Feb. 2012). In addition, farmers have had to use large portions of their harvest to repay debt from the 2011 drought, leaving them with little to sustain themselves (OCHA, Dec. 2011: 1).

Gedo's agro-pastoral community continues to struggle with food security and is largely dependent on aid because of the ongoing drought and recurrent food shortages (OCHA, Dec. 2011 and Feb. 2012). In November and December 2011, flash floods damaged large portions of crops. In addition, because of the long dry spell between April and June 2012, harvests were significantly below average (FSNAU, 2012a).

Between April and July 2012, malnutrition rates in the North Gedo pastoral area were 28.4% and 22% in the North Gedo riverine area (Nutrition Cluster, 2012). Malnutrition is linked to the interruption of humanitarian access and outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea, cholera, malaria, measles and whooping cough (OCHA, Dec. 2011: 2). Overall, food is of low dietary quality, childcare facilities are substandard, and there is limited access to WASH programmes (FSNAU, 2012).

#### 3.4 Public infrastructure and basic services

Similar to other locations, access to basic services and public infrastructure is considered inadequate and the lack of qualified staff is commonly emphasised. Insecurity attributed to Al-Shabab is said to prevent access to basic services, especially as people might have to walk long distances to reach public facilities.

Belet Xaawo has seven health facilities and one hospital. There are two mother and child health centres, four health posts and one mobile clinic (GSDO, 2012: 3). Key informants generally deem the access to quality health services insufficient and note the lack of equipment, medicine and ambulances.

In 1991, following the outbreak of civil war, schools became the responsibility of community education committees. Even though these committees now offer teacher-training opportunities in Belet Xaawo, there are not enough qualified teachers to meet the needs of school-aged children. Many children, particularly in rural areas, only have access to Quranic schools. There are no secondary schools in the district, an issue commonly highlighted by key informants (GSDO, 2012: 3).

As of December 2011, less than 20% of the population had access to a water source (OCHA, Dec. 2011: 1). Key informants rated access to water, usually through communal boreholes, as average. Yet, they noted limited access to clean water.

Sanitation was deemed insufficient. Roads were described as impassable. Key informants regularly stressed the lack of electricity, post offices, banking services and Internet access.

## **b) Impact of displacement and of an eventual large-scale return of refugees and IDPs**

### **1. Spontaneous returns of refugees and IDPs**

#### *1.1 Impact of displacement:*

In addition to mentioning that people who fled generally abandoned their land and other assets and left their houses unoccupied, key informants stressed that such departures had meant a loss of qualified workers. Some fled, while others who stayed lost their jobs and moved in search of employment, as schools and health centres were left unused. Economic activity diminished, due to a decrease in the population, looting and violence. Still, a number of key informants pointed out that members of the community had continued to benefit from remittances from refugees abroad.

#### *1.2 Spontaneous returns:*

Key informants in the three districts studied said that small numbers of refugees and IDPs had been returning spontaneously. In Afmadow, local authorities and clan leaders estimated that between 3,000 and 11,000 IDPs and up to 15,000 refugees had returned. In Baidoa, estimates of returning IDPs varied between 500 and 1,500, while numbers of refugees ranged between 100 and 500. Most returned to agro-pastoral areas in the vicinity of Baidoa. Yet, according to IDP leaders, a few hundred returned to the town of Baidoa and settled in IDP camps. In Belet Xaawo, figures ranged between 500 to 2,000 for IDPs and 1,000 to 3,000 for refugees.

In all districts, key informants mentioned that IDPs and refugees had been in touch with the community, some also coming back to look after their land and other assets. In Belet Xaawo, it was also mentioned that some refugees have visited to share their skills and knowledge with people in the locality.

#### *1.3 Reintegration of returnees:*

Former IDPs and refugees have faced specific challenges related to the return and reintegration in the three districts covered, notably with respect to the restoration of their land and other properties. Houses and land left behind, that have often been occupied, are said to be difficult to regain. This has created tensions and conflicts between returnees and those who stayed behind. It was often stressed that those who still had access to their land had relatives looking after it. According to key informants, other assets have commonly been looted or, in the case of livestock, have been depleted during the recent drought. Shelters that have not been occupied are usually in bad condition and fixing them has been challenging, since returnees have limited means.

In addition, key informants in all districts note that spontaneous returnees have faced a lack of access to basic services, food and job opportunities. In Belet Xaawo, a number of key informants mentioned that returnees were sometimes discriminated against when trying to access justice. Tribalism was, in many instances, highlighted as an obstacle to return and reintegration

#### *1.4 Return mechanism:*

While spontaneous returns have been occurring in the three districts, no official mechanism to facilitate the reintegration of returnees has been established. In Belet Xaawo, key informants reported that elders have been helping returnees re-acquire their land and solve conflicts through arbitration. In all locations, it was stressed that such a mechanism should be put in place by the government, in collaboration with UN Agencies and humanitarian organisations, notably looking into access to land and housing.

## **2. Impact and pre-conditions for a sustainable large-scale return**

### *2.1 Projected impact and challenges*

In all districts, the return of refugees and IDPs in large numbers would be expected to create tensions and competition over scarce resources, access to overstretched basic services and limited job opportunities. Given that food insecurity is a common occurrence in the districts covered, returnees' access to food would likely be an additional challenge. In all districts, it was noted that, for the time being, security and safety would remain a challenge.

In Afmadow, the restoration of land and other properties, including livestock, was seen as especially problematic and many warned that this could lead to clan conflicts. Most key informants believed that returnees would no longer have access to their land and houses, unless a relative had been looking after them. All believed that livestock left behind would have been taken over and would be impossible to recognise. However, key informants also noted that existing conflict resolution mechanisms could be put to use, most commonly citing community and religious leaders and clan elders. In some cases, Islamic leaders and local authorities were also mentioned.

Similarly, in Belet Xaawo, in the absence of means and proof of ownership, restoration of land and housing is expected to be problematic, leading to food insecurity and a high number of conflicts. It was noted that existing conflict mechanisms – where clan elders, local and religious leaders settle disputes through swearing of witnesses and neighbours and convening communal meetings – could contribute to easing tensions.

The perspective was more optimistic in Baidoa town where it was largely felt that returnees would have access to their land and that conflicts would be isolated cases that could be resolved legally. This could be partially explained by the fact that a number of returnees to urban areas are likely to earn their living through an activity requiring limited access to land, such as business or casual labour. Restoration of shelter, livestock and other belongings was deemed unlikely.

While key informants in Baidoa did not expect problems related to discrimination or access to justice, the perception in Belet Xaawo was different. Several people warned against discrimination towards returnees, who would be perceived as “foreigners, cowards, and betrayers”. Such discrimination could lead to biases in favour of those who stayed and towards fellow clansmen in the exercise of justice.

#### *2.2 Pre-conditions for sustainable and peaceful returns*

The regional governor of Bay stressed that before refugees or IDPs can return, reasons that caused their displacement must no longer prevail and security must be of a lasting character. So as to make large-scale returns possible and sustainable, key informants in all districts pointed out that access to quality basic services, land, shelter and water should be improved and food security and livelihood opportunities bolstered. It was also suggested that refugees should also be equipped with appropriate skills while in exile.

#### *2.3 Support by humanitarian organisations*

Several key informants stressed that humanitarian organisations could help communities prepare for a sustainable return of IDPs and refugees by contributing to improvement of the quality and access to basic services, building infrastructure (notably roads and electricity), enhancing food security, supporting livelihood activities and skills training and the local economy, as well as activities aimed at restoring and consolidating peace and security. In Baidoa, it was suggested that aid organisations could contribute to identifying land for returnees, if necessary, and should provide direct support to people returning, such as food and shelter.

#### *2.4 Useful skills and tools*

In all districts, key informants highlighted a critical shortage of qualified staff, notably due to unattractive wages encouraging people to look for job opportunities in Kenya or Ethiopia, but also because of the insecurity that forced many to flee and, in the absence of a functioning administration, a lack of training structures. The deficit of teachers, doctors and other health professionals was considered especially grave. The need for administrators was commonly highlighted, while engineers and business people capable of contributing to the development of the local economy were also mentioned. In general, people with skills were described as lacking and deeply necessary. Similarly, it is generally agreed that people coming back with assets such as farming tools, livestock and sewing machines would have an easier time earning their living again and would contribute to the local economy.

### **3. Observations**

Clear benchmarks to ensure that sustainable security is in place in areas of return, that returnees would have access to land, livelihood opportunities and essential services, and that humanitarian organisations have secure access, seem crucial before a sustainable repatriation program can take place. None of the three localities studied, all recently retaken from Al-Shabab, situated in regions hosting significant IDP populations and home to significant numbers of refugees, would currently meet basic standards.

In the three locations, similar to most of south-central Somalia, after two decades of conflict and instability and in the absence of a functioning government, public infrastructure and basic social services are very limited and, when available, often of unsatisfactory quality. The population has been surviving in difficult conditions and has commonly been using the land and assets of people who fled.

Small numbers of refugees and IDPs are reported to have returned spontaneously to the districts studied and have generally faced challenges with the restoration of their land and other properties, which has, in some instances, created tensions and conflicts between returnees and those who stayed behind. According to key informants, assets have often been looted or, in the case of livestock, have been depleted during the recent drought. Shelters that have not been occupied are usually in poor condition and returnees have limited means to fix them. Returnees also lack livelihood opportunities, food and access to basic services.

Authorities in Kenya have discussed the creation of “Jubbaland” in southern Somalia as a safe zone intended to curb the flow of refugees into Kenya as well as allow for the repatriation of refugees to southern Somalia. Yet, as highlighted by the regional governor of Bay, before IDPs and refugees return, reasons that caused their displacement should no longer prevail and security must be of a lasting nature. Premature large-scale returns would probably be unsustainable and lead to increased tensions and competition over scarce resources.

Key informants pointed out that to make large-scale returns possible and sustainable, food security and access to quality basic services, shelters, water and livelihood opportunities must be improved. Restoration of and access to land will be a crucial and sensitive matter,<sup>29</sup> especially as a large part of the potentially repatriating refugee population will substantially rely on farming for their livelihood, and hence require access to sizeable land.

Struggle for land has been a central element to the Somali conflict. Land grabbing and reallocation has been common in the last decades (Displacement Solutions, 2008: 9). Even though returnees' need for land will vary according to their livelihood activities,<sup>30</sup> access to land will be essential in all cases, at least for housing purposes. Clear, fair and efficient restitution mechanisms, allowing for the restoration of land and other property or for appropriate compensation, will also be necessary so as to avoid creating new conflicts. In addition, certain customary rules discriminate against women and minority clans, which means that the situation of women-headed households and minorities would have to be considered carefully (Displacement Solutions, 2008: 13).

Informants also suggested that refugees should be equipped with practical skills while in exile. In all districts, key informants highlighted a critical shortage of qualified staff, notably due to large-scale departures - a number fled, while some of those who remained, lost their jobs, as schools and health centres were left unused, and ended up seeking job opportunities elsewhere. Unattractive wages and a lack of training structures have also encouraged a number of qualified people to move to Kenya or Ethiopia.

The dearth of teachers, doctors and other health professionals is reportedly especially grave. The need for administrators was also commonly highlighted, while the need for engineers and business people capable of contributing to the development of the local economy also emerged. In general, people with skills were described as acutely needed. Returnees with assets, such as farming tools, livestock and sewing machines, would have an easier time earning their living again, which, in addition to contributing to the local economy, would facilitate their reintegration.

Several key informants stressed that humanitarian organisations could help communities prepare for a sustainable repatriation by contributing to improving quality and access to basic services, building infrastructure (notably roads and electricity), enhancing food security, supporting livelihoods and skills training and the local economy, as well as activities aimed at restoring and consolidating peace and security. In addition to providing direct support to people returning in the form of food and shelters, aid organisations could help the setting up mechanisms aimed at preventing and addressing land-related tensions.

Given the socio-economic situation of the population in Somalia, activities and aid targeting returnees could contribute to creating tensions and discrimination against returnees, unless appropriate measure are also taken to improve the living standards of the overall population.

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29 For more on land, property and housing in Somalia, see NRC, UNHCR and UNHABITAT (2008). "Land, Property and Housing in Somalia.": Displacement Solutions (2008). "Housing, Land and Property Rights in the South Central Somalia; Preliminary Assessment and Proposed Strategies for Expanded Approaches.": Unruh JD (1995). "Pastoralist resource use and access in Somalia: a changing context of development, environmental stress, and conflict." In: Sorenson J (ed.) *Disaster and Development on the Horn of Africa*. Macmillan, London.

30 Agriculturists need access to farm land, agro-pastoralists would need access to a combination of farm and grazing land, while pastoralists are likely to need seasonal access in different areas. Business-people, casual labourers or specialised workers might only need access to land for their housing and possibly their shops.





## 8 Concluding remarks

**1.** This study was undertaken as an attempt to better understand how displaced Somalis view their situation, envisage their future and, if their repatriation ever became possible, what would make it sustainable. Given its relatively small sample, the research was not designed to allow statistical projections, but to permit pertinent observations. It is not a planning document, but amounts to an analytical input into further planning on durable solutions and repatriation. For planning purposes, a better understanding of the overall situation and of land tenure, property access and ethnic geographies in areas of potential return in south-central Somalia will be essential. Similarly, such planning will require precise household level data on refugees living in camps. The verification exercise currently taking place in Dadaab represents a valuable contribution in that respect.

**2.** A fairly significant proportion of Somali refugees in camps would consider returning to Somalia when conditions become conducive for a sustainable repatriation, especially those who have fled recently. At this point in time, a majority of refugees in camps assess that the reasons that led to their displacement still prevail, and thus would not consider returning in the near future. They should not be pushed to do so by inadequate or deteriorating security and living conditions in the refugee camps.

**3.** Repatriation is not necessarily the optimal solution for all refugees and after decades in exile, a significant proportion is likely to have limited reintegration prospects, even if conditions for return become conducive. Lack of access to land, which is closely linked to livelihood opportunities, and limited personal connection to the country appear as key impediments to reintegration. The longer refugees have been in exile, the less likely they are to still have access to land. Similar observation can be made for minority groups and youth. The latter are also less likely to feel personally connected to Somalia, a country that, in many cases, they have never visited. For different reasons, the return and reintegration of people who have had traumatic experiences also appears unlikely. This brings to light the fact that no response will be adequate for all refugees, thus the need to be creative in the search for durable solutions and further explore pathways to intermediate integration, local integration and mobility opportunities that allow for residency and/or work permits. Further research should be undertaken to inform strategies for specific groups and how they impact on return.

**4.** In order to make returns sustainable in a country destroyed by decades of conflict, careful planning will be necessary, in close collaboration with local authorities and clan leaders. Experience has shown that durable security, basic services and humanitarian access are minimal prerequisites for durable repatriation, which should not be seen as a simple logistical movement of people, but as a part of wider development and peacebuilding projects. Premature or hasty mass returns could hinder peacebuilding, reconstruction and sustainable reintegration. Without clear benchmarks to ensure that sustainable security is in place in areas of return, that essential services and durable livelihood opportunities are available, returnees have livelihood opportunities, and that humanitarian organisations have secure access, a repatriation programme would likely be unsustainable. Given the socio-economic situation of the population in Somalia, activities and aid targeting returnees could cause tension, unless appropriate measure are also taken to improve the living standard of the overall population. Experience also suggests that smaller and incremental population movements, coupled with assistance and monitoring of returnees can help make return and reintegration sustainable.

**5.** Restoration of and access to land will be a crucial and extremely sensitive matter, especially as a large part of the potentially repatriating refugee population will rely on farming and agro-pastoralism for their livelihood, hence requiring significant access to land. In the absence of such access, refugees livelihood opportunities are likely to be narrow, thus their reintegration prospect limited. A number of returnees who will earn their living through activities that are not land-based, such as business or manual labour, will have more limited needs for land. Special attention should be given to ensuring that fair and efficient restitution system is in place to address matters of restoration and compensation, so as to avoid creating further conflicts. In addition, the situation of women and minorities deserves special attention, as certain customary rules discriminate against them, which could further limit their reintegration prospects (Displacement Solutions, 2008: 13)

**6.** Helping people in camps develop skills should enhance their prospects for durable return, by enabling them to reintegrate and contribute more substantially to the reconstruction of Somalia. This should also enhance their livelihood opportunities in the refugee camps, as well as their capacity to integrate locally or in a third country. Considering longer-term skills transfer and mentoring by aid organisations could be beneficial. Focusing on skills that are deemed necessary in Somalia is advisable, especially as these qualifications would also be useful in exile. In Somalia as in the camps, the deficit of qualified teachers appears especially critical. Health professionals, administrators and other trained professionals would also be extremely valuable. In addition, specialised knowledge in fields related to construction are likely to be useful.

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## Annex A: Methodology

*(Excerpt from the research proposal)*

The methodology outlined below focuses on the collection of primary data, even though the final research will include references to relevant literature. In addition, as a number of organisations and institutions were consulted during the preparation of this proposal (*c.f.*, footnote 6), they will not be interviewed again during the gathering of data, unless necessary. However, these interviews will be integrated in the final report, when appropriate.

The case study on the repatriation from Jijiga to Somaliland will constitute a separate project. It will be conducted through a literature review and interviews with key informants in Jijiga and Somaliland.

### 1. Data collection in the field

The methodology proposed for the fieldwork combines qualitative and quantitative tools and approaches.

#### a) Qualitative data collection

Qualitative assessments will comprise of focus group discussions in refugee camps and interviews with key informants in selected communities of return. Supplementary reports and information will also be collected from field-based organisations and reviewed during the fieldwork.

- i. Focus group discussions (FGD): Some 65 FGDs will be conducted in the four main camp locations (Dadaab, Kakuma, Dolo Ado and Jijiga) with refugees drawn from diverse populations in the camps, *i.e.*, youth, women, minority groups, people considered vulnerable (single-headed household, handicapped, chronic disease, poorer, etc.), entrepreneurs, incentive workers, unemployed adults, recent arrivals (2011 and onwards), arrivals from 2006 and onwards and refugees who have been there for over a decade, camp leaders, incl. women representatives and elders (*c.f.*, “Interviews” sheet of Planning.xls for planning per camp). Each group will consist of a maximum of 6 refugees.

*Steps for the selection of FGD participants:*

- In each location, the team leader will inform refugee leaders of the planned FGD one week in advance
- Refugee leaders will be asked to mobilise participants for the scheduled meetings
- Participants should always include non DRC beneficiaries. Where DRC conducts activities, a small number of DRC beneficiaries should also be included.

- ii. Interviews with key informants: In three selected districts of return, partners from the child-monitoring network will conduct interviews with key informants. The latter include community leaders, elders, clan leaders, local authorities, service providers (health and education), entrepreneurs and civil society organisations.

The suggested communities of return have been selected based on the areas of origin of refugees in camps, as it is possible to assume that a number of refugees would be repatriating to their area of origin, and based on humanitarian access. The suggested districts are Afmadow in Lower Juba, Baidoa in Bay, and Baardheere in Gedo.

Selection of key informants: Child-monitoring partners will be asked to identify key informants in the selected communities, based on the enumeration above.

#### b) Quantitative data collection

Quantitative data will be collected through semi-structured interviews with 360 heads of refugee households (HH). It is proposed that interviews be conducted with heads of household rather than individuals, as they are likely to elicit more information about other members of the household. In addition, it is likely that the decision to repatriate or not, or to leave a number of family members in a camp while others return, will be a family decision and not an individual one, as families are likely to “pool their resources for mutual benefit” (PRM, 2011: 17).

The household interviews will be conducted with the head of family present in the household at the time of the interview. If the two HH heads are present, they will be interviewed together. Some 200 interviews will be conducted in Kenya and 160 in Ethiopia (*c.f.*, “Interviews” sheet of Planning.xls):

- In Dadaab’s five camps, home to approx. 133,000 Somali households, 160 interviews will be conducted:
  - i. In Hagadera, Dagahaley and Ifo camps, 40 HH per camp, living in four different blocks will be interviewed (10 HH per block, at least one block will be located at the periphery of the camp and one at the centre).

ii. In Ifo 2 (East and West), Kambioos and Buramino, 20 HH per camp, living in 2 different blocs will be interviewed (10 HH per block, one at the periphery of the camp, the other at the centre).\*

- In Kakuma camp, home to approx. 9,500 Somali HH, 40 interviews in 4 different blocks and 6 focus group discussions are foreseen.

- In four of Dolo Ado's five camps (Bolkolmanyo, Melkadida, Hilaweyn and Buramino), home to approx. 30,550 Somali households, 80 interviews will be conducted. In each camp, 20 head of HH living in 2 different blocks of the camp will be interviewed.\*\*<sup>31</sup>

- In Jijiga's three camps, home to some 7,100 HH, 80 interviews will be conducted: 40 in Kebribeyah, 20 in Aw-Barre, and 20 in Sheder. It is planned to conduct a relatively high number of interviews in Kebribeyha (given the size of the population) as the population is expected to be somewhat more varied than in other Ethiopian camps.

By collecting data in all Dadaab, Kakuma and Jijiga camps, and most of Dolo Ado camps, the sample should include refugees from all periods of arrival, from rural and urban areas, with differing levels of wealth, age, gender and clan affiliation. For example, while Ifo's old residents mostly came from rural areas, many of Hagadera's old residents came from urban areas (PRM, 2011: 19). It is also suggested to gather information in all four main camp locations in Kenya and Ethiopia to verify how varying political and socio-economic conditions in different locations affect the perspective of refugees with respect to durable solutions.

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#### *Steps for the selection of HH:*

i. Prior to the start of the data collection, two or four blocks will be randomly selected in each camp, using the available maps. At least one will be located at the periphery of the camp and one, near the centre.

ii. In the selected blocks, interviewers will conduct the first interview at a randomly selected starting point. Once an interview is completed, interviewers will leave the house, turn right, and stop at the fifteenth house, on the right.

iii. If the head of HH is not home or does not agree to be interviewed, the next house on the right will be selected.

iv. Only households who have been in the camp for at least six months will be interviewed. When only one head of HH is present or in the case of single-headed household, an enumerator of the same sex as the refugee will conduct the interview.

v. At least 10 interviews per block will be conducted.

#### *c) Key steps for the field data collection*

i. Three different questionnaires or guides to collect primary qualitative and quantitative data will be used: One semi-structured guide for FGDs; one semi-structured questionnaire for interviews with key informants from return communities; one questionnaire for HH interviews. Questionnaires will include both closed and open-ended questions to obtain specific information and allow respondents to express their views. Parts of the HH questionnaire will be taken from the questionnaire used by PRM (2011) for comparative purposes and to enable the possibility of building on earlier results.

ii. Once approved by DRC, questionnaires will be tested with a small number of Somali refugees in Nairobi, with support from the Refugee Consortium of Kenya.

iii. A one-day training session for enumerators will be conducted in each location. The training will include a review of the protocol, guidance on how to conduct individual interviews and FGDs, and how to record the data.

iv. Following the training, interviews and FGD will be conducted over an established number of days in each location, with close support and supervision from the research team.

v. A discussion on the questionnaire used for key informant interviews in communities of return will be organised with child-monitoring partners. If necessary, support will also be provided during the data collection.

vi. The information collected will be compiled in an online database, under the supervision of the data manager. Data analysis will follow.

\* It is suggested to conduct a lower number of interviews in Ifo II and Kambioos because of the smaller size of these camps compared to the other Dadaab camps, but also based on the assumption that the population in all three locations will present similar characteristics. Most refugees in the three camps have arrived in 2011 due to the food crisis in Somalia

\*\*Only two of the three camps (Kobe, Hilaweyn and Buramino) opened in 2011 to host people arriving due to the the food crisis are included in the planning, as it is expected that refugees in the three camps will present a relatively similar profile

## Annex B: Interview planning

### Ethiopia

Camp/Site	HH	Ind.	%	# HH ITW	FGD*
Aw-barre (Jijiga), 2007	2 291	13 509	8,05%	20	1, 2, 6
Kebribeyah (Jijiga), 1989	2 207	16 305	9,72%	40	3, 4, 9
Sheder (Jijiga), 2008	2 610	11 497	6,85%	20	5, 7, 8
Bokolmanyu (Dolo Ado), 2009	9 831	39 363	23,47%	20	1, 2, 4, 3, 7
Melkadida (Dolo Ado), 2009	9 297	40 759	24,30%	20	5, 6, 10, 8, 11
Hilaweyn (Dolo Ado), 2011, 60 blocks	6 392	26 514	15,81%	20	7, 8, 10, 1, 2
Buramino (Dolo Ado), 2011	5 034	19 774	11,79%	20	3, 11, 4, 5, 6
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 662</b>	<b>167 721</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>80 Jij / 80 DA</b>	

Source: UNHCR, 31 May 2012

### Kenya

Camp/Site	HH	Ind.	%	# HH ITW	FGD*
Kakuma, 1992	9 457	46 891	9,50%	40	3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 2
Kambioos, 2012	2 797	13 356	2,71%	20	11, 1, 3, 4
Ifo, 1991	34 684	107 596	21,79%	40	3, 4, 6, 9, 2, 5
Ifo 2 East and West, 2011	18 590	72 500	14,69%	20	5, 2, 4, 6
Hagadera, 1992	42 488	135 169	27,38%	40	1, 2, 7, 4, 8, 10
Dagahaley, 1992	34 169	118 168	23,94%	40	5, 8, 10, 7, 9
<b>Total</b>	<b>142 185</b>	<b>493 680</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>160 Ddb / 40 Kak</b>	
		<b>Total</b>		<b>360</b>	<b>62 FGD</b>

Source: UNHCR, 18 June 2012

\* FGD numbers refer to the following:

- (1) Youth
- (2) Women
- (3) Minority groups
- (4) Camp leaders, incl. women representatives and elders
- (5) "Vulnerable" refugees\*
- (6) Incentive workers
- (7) Entrepreneurs
- (8) Unemployed adults
- (9) Refugees who have been there for over a decade
- (10) Arrivals from 2006 and onwards
- (11) Recent arrivals (2011 and onwards)



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