



Australian Government
Refugee Review Tribunal

Country Advice

China

China – CHN38562 – Urumqi Riots 2009 –
Han Chinese in Xinjiang – *Hukou*
21 April 2011

1. What is the status of Han Chinese living in Urumqi? Is there information in relation to whether a Han Chinese family would receive protection from the authorities if harassed by Uighurs?

The Han Chinese population in Urumqi is currently estimated to be 80% of the total population. The Uighur are now a minority population in Urumqi comprising approximately 18% of the total. By way of contrast, in the 1950's, the population demographics were the reverse: 80% Uighur and 20% Han Chinese.

For decades the central government has been encouraging Han Chinese, with various incentives, to emigrate to the XUAR and to Urumqi, which is the capital of the autonomous region. In addition, the central government has instituted a policy of transferring Uighur labour to other Han dominated provinces in the country thus reducing the existence of high concentrations of the Uighur population. The US Department of State in its *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009* states that it is Uighurs that suffer the most from institutionalised socioeconomic discrimination in the XUAR.¹ Amnesty International commented that the Chinese state has not protected Uighurs from employment discrimination, resulting in extremely high unemployment among Uighurs in the XUAR.² In contrast, the Han Chinese has greater access to employment opportunities. The Han Chinese have greater access to employment with government agencies, the security apparatus and Han Chinese-run businesses, including those in line to be awarded government contracts as a result of the policy to develop the region. During 2009 The US Congressional-Executive Commission on China commented on the employment discrimination against non-Han ethnic groups in the XUAR stating:

“observed discrimination in both state jobs and private sector employment, including private sector jobs publicized by local governments. The practices indicate both direct government involvement in discriminatory practices and endorsement of or failure to prevent such practices in private job recruitment.”³

In addition, all the top official positions within the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region's Public Security Department and the Police department are held by Han Chinese. Each of the civil servants has been handpicked by the central government soon after the July 2009 riots (detailed below), for their track record in suppressing civil dissent and creating „social stability’.⁴

¹ US Department of State 2010, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)*, March, Section 6 – Accessed 19 April 2011 – Attachment 1

² Amnesty International 2009, *Uighur Ethnic Identity under threat in China*, April, ASA 17/010/2009, Accessed 19 April 2011 - Attachment 2

³ Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, *Annual Report 2009*, 10 October, p. 264 – Attachment 3

⁴ „China Fires Two Officials in Urumqi Unrest New Party Leader Promises Security as Anniversary Nears’ 2009, *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 September <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125224614851089251.html> – Accessed 13

No reports could be located to indicate that Han Chinese civilians are routinely targeted by Uighurs for harassment. In addition, no reports were found to indicate that Han Chinese would be denied protection from authorities if harassed by Uighurs.⁵

There are reports of Uighurs using violence against the central government's security apparatus and there have been occasional and random acts of violence that have affected members of the population, for example, in the late 1990's public buses had been targeted and bombed. On each occasion the central government reacted quickly, first rounding up suspects followed by executions or lengthy prison sentences for those viewed to be responsible.

On 5 July 2009 the tensions between the two ethnic groups resulted in violence in Urumqi which continued for several days afterwards. Although there have been other outbreaks of violence and protests in the past, this event was unprecedented in its ferocity, the numbers of people involved and the incidents of deaths and injuries sustained by civilians. While there is some ambiguity in reports about the initial flashpoint of the demonstrations and violence, which is partly due to the central government's control of information flowing from Urumqi, it appears that the initial attacks involved Uighurs destroying property owned by Han Chinese. These acts then escalated to include the death and injury of individuals. This was immediately followed by reprisal attacks by Han Chinese on Uighurs, with further civilian casualties. The government reported that 197 people were killed, the majority of whom were Han killed by Uighurs, and more than 1,600 were injured. The catalyst for the violence was Uighur calls for a protest in reaction to government inaction over the beatings and deaths of Uighur migrant workers by Han workers in a toy factory in Guangdong province in eastern China in June 2009. The Han workers had attacked their Uighur co-workers, ostensibly due to rumours that a Han Chinese woman had been raped by a Uighur. The allegations were never substantiated nor proven to have occurred.⁶

In August 2009, the authorities announced that they were holding 718 people in connection with the unrest, and that 83 of these faced criminal charges including for murder, arson and robbery. At years end, the authorities announced the execution of 23 individuals. Based on their names, 22 were Uighurs and one was Han Chinese.⁷

There continues to be a climate of distrust in both the Han and Uighur communities towards one another. This is tempered by the omnipresence of security forces which have been bolstered with many thousands of additional personnel since July 2009⁸ and who now have at their disposal an additional 10,000 security cameras located across the city, in locations such as schools, shops and bus and railway stations.⁹ It is likely that any acts of intimidation or

April 2011 – Attachment 6; Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, *Annual Report 2009*, 10 October, pp. 249-250 – Attachment 3

⁵ A broad search of the internet was conducted utilising the following research databases: UNHCR, *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online, Google and Bing search engines, DIAC CISNET Country Information, IRBDC Research Responses (Canada), JSTOR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

⁶ Amnesty International Report 2010, *China*, page 106; Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, *Annual Report 2009*, 10 October, p. 264 – Attachment 3; Lorenz, A. 2009, 'Ethnic Unrest in Xinjiang - Uighurs Lament their Lost Homeland', *Der Spiegel*, 13 July <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,635792-2,00.html> - Accessed 19 April 2011 Attachment 21

⁷ US Department of State 2010, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)*, March, Section 6 – Attachment 1

⁸ Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, *Annual Report 2009*, 10 October, pp. 249-250 – Attachment 3

⁹ 'China puts Urumqi under 'full surveillance' 2011, *The Guardian* 25 January, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/25/china-urumqi-under-full-surveillance> – Accessed 13 April 2011 – Attachment 5

harassment would be swiftly dealt with by the security apparatus to discourage any further possibility of a situation deteriorating into another round of violence and retaliation. Ill feelings, however, continue to simmer between the communities with members of both communities feeling that they were the victim during the July 2009 riots and have been unfairly treated by authorities.¹⁰

2. Is it possible for a Han Chinese person with a Hukou registered in XUAR to return there at the present time?

A Han Chinese with their *Hukou* registered in the XUAR and who intended to return to Xinjiang or to Urumqi would not be prevented from doing so, indeed the government is encouraging Han Chinese migration to the area.

The central government continues to encourage Han Chinese emigration into Xinjiang. The central government has indicated that further significant infrastructure projects will occur in the region to link the region to the eastern provinces. The financial injection into the economy will however be the catalyst needed to cause more Han Chinese to emigrate from other regions of China into the XUAR.¹¹ The central government has also significantly increased security arrangements since the July 2009 riots, partly in response to later Han Chinese street demonstrations, in which citizens expressed their anger at the local government.¹²

3. Is there information regarding discrimination against Han Chinese from XUAR in other parts of China?

No information could be located that referred to discrimination against Han Chinese from XUAR in other parts of China.¹³

The Han Chinese is the dominant ethnic group, accounting for 92% of China's population. With many millions of Han Chinese having emigrated to the XUAR from various provinces in China over the past 50 years, it is unclear whether a Han Chinese who had lived their whole life in XUAR would be readily identified as such if they moved to another part of China.

It is possible that a Han Chinese from the XUAR would illicit sympathy from those Han Chinese that learnt that they were from the XUAR. In the eyes of many Han Chinese, Uighurs are synonymous with the „three evil forces' of terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism.¹⁴ The majority of Han Chinese would have noted the reports of bus bombings, attacks on police stations, the riots in Urumqi in 2009, and the subsequent high number of deaths amongst the Han population.¹⁵

¹⁰ „China: Hatred ‚simmers' in Urumqi' 2010 *Radio Free Asia* 8 July <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c56ba72c.html> – Accessed 13 April 2011 – Attachment 7

¹¹ „East Turkestan: Development Could Widen Ethnic Divide' 2011, *Radio Free Asia* 1 April, <http://www.unpo.org/article/12468> - Accessed 14 April 2011. Attachment 8

¹² „Tension in Xinjiang - The party under siege in Urumqi' 2009, *The Economist* 10 September, <http://www.economist.com/node/14413290> - Accessed 20 April 2011 Attachment 22

¹³ A broad search of the internet was conducted utilising the following research databases: UNHCR, *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online, Google and Bing search engines, DIAC CISNET Country Information, IRBDC Research Responses (Canada), JSTOR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch 2010, *China: Events of 2008* – Attachment 13

¹⁵ „Regions and territories: Xinjiang' 2010, *BBC News* http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/8152132.stm – Accessed 10 May 2010 – Attachment 12

4. If a husband's Hukou is registered in Fujian province, are his Han Chinese wife from XUAR and her baby (born in Australia) entitled to live there?

Hukou, the system of household registration that regulates and restricts population mobility, is governed at the national level by the *The Regulations of the Peoples' Republic of China on Residence Registration 1958*.¹⁶ Under the 1958 version of the Regulation and prior to 1998, a child's hukou status was required to follow its mother. According to a 2008 World Bank publication, this changed in 1998 when the State Council, the highest executive and administrative organ of State power, approved four guidelines that relaxed urban *hukou* requirements allowing that a child's *hukou* status be conferred from either the mother's or the father's *hukou*.¹⁷ Therefore, based on the information contained in this World Bank report, the child could be registered in Fujian province.

With respect to the mother's status, there is less clarity in the sources consulted.¹⁸ According to the national regulation, an individual seeking to legally change his/her permanent residential address must undertake the process of *hukou* conversion (*nongzhuanfei*).¹⁹ Although the requirements to obtain *nongzhuanfei* may vary among regions, generally a person's success depends on regional policy and quota controls, which determine who is entitled to an urban hukou and how many people can get one. Despite the regional variations throughout China, the qualifications required to obtain urban registration tend to be similar.²⁰ Examples of circumstances that allow changing one's *hukou* permanently include:

...permanent internal migration (*qianyi*) for a state-sector job assignment, college or graduate-school enrolment, or specially authorized change of *hukou* such as recategorization of rural residents as urban residents, or for **family reunion** purposes.²¹

The procedures required to permanently internally migrate to another *hukou* zone appear below.

- Anyone who moves out of his/her *hukou* zone permanently (*qianyi*) must apply for a Migrant *Hukou* Certificate (*hukou qianyi zhang*) from the *hukou* police and then cancel his/her old *hukou* record and register in the new *hukou* zone. The Migrant *Hukou* Certificate serves as the legal proof of the person's *hukou* record for a specified period of time (no more than 30 days) until a new permanent *hukou* registration can be made at

¹⁶ „Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Residence Registration' 2001, *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.34, No.3, pp.52–57 (Attachment 22)

¹⁷ Fan, C. 2008, „China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies, Chapter 3 – Migration, *Hukou*, and the City' *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank*, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/02/18/000333037_20080218003105/Rendred/PDF/424850PUB01ISBN101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187282&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000333037_20080218003105&searchMenuPK=64187282&theSitePK=523679 – Accessed 19 April 2011 – Attachment 18

¹⁸ A broad search of the internet was conducted utilising the following research databases: UNHCR, *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online, Google and Bing search engines, DIAC CISNET Country Information, IRBDC Research Responses (Canada), JSTOR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

¹⁹ *Nongzhuanfei* usually refers to the conversion of one's hukou from rural to urban. It is not clear in this case whether the mother's hukou is classified as rural or urban. Nevertheless, she would be required to formally seek a new permanent hukou registration.

²⁰ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004)*, February, Section 2 & 7.1 (Attachment 17)

²⁰ Wang, F.L. 2005, *Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p.70. ; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004)*, February, Section 2 & 7.1.

²¹ Wang, F.L. 2005, *Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 63-67, 70.

the migrant's destination.

- For rural residents resettling in urban areas, one of the following special documents is required in applying for a Migrant *Hukou* Certificate: an employment notice from an urban labor bureau above the county level, or proof of admission to an urban school (which must be a state accredited professional school, college or graduate school), or a special *Hukou* Relocation Permit (*hukou zhunqian zheng*) from an urban hukou authority. Any migration to a border region must be approved by a PSB at, or above, the county level.²²
- If a request to change a person's permanent *hukou* residence is approved, the individual must notify the PSB office in the original *hukou* zone to have his/her name deleted, as well as notify the PSB in the new *hukou* zone, where his/her name would be registered. This notification should be done within 30 days.²³

As in many places across China, cities and towns in Fujian now have the power to set their own admission criteria and numbers for new permanent residents and *hukou*, independent of quotas previously imposed by the central government.²⁴ No information was located in the sources consulted regarding the ease of which a new permanent *hukou* based on marriage can be obtained in Fujian. The *hukou* system has gradually become more flexible in recent decades in an attempt to adapt to the growth of the free market in China and large influxes on internal migrants. It is in this context that, since 2001, the distinction in Fujian between agricultural and non-agricultural *hukou* has been abolished and every citizen in the province is registered under the categories of either resident or temporary *hukou*.²⁵ This is important as reports indicate that where localities have the different classifications of 'urban' and 'rural' *hukou*, there is the possibility of husbands and wives living together but having separate hukous.²⁶ Based on this information, it may therefore be more likely that the mother could obtain a new permanent hukou in Fujian and it may be highly relevant as to whether the mother's *hukou* from Urumqi is classified as either 'urban' or 'rural'.

5. Would a couple now be considered to be legally married in China, if their overseas marriage occurred when they were both 20 (below the marriageable age in China) and their child was born when they were 21? What ramifications might this have on the wife's ability to register a Hukou in the husband's province (Fujian)?

An Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada response deals with the question as to whether China recognises civil or religious marriages performed outside China, between two Chinese nationals. The response states that as long as the couple marry in accordance with *Article 6 of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China*, then the marriage is valid

²² Wang, F.L. 2005, *Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p.65-6 - Attachment 16

²³ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004)*, February, Section 2 & 7.1 - (Attachment 17)

²⁴ Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 2008, "Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?", *The China Quarterly*, September, p. 594. (Attachment 15)

²⁵ Wang, F.L. 2005, *Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 193 - Attachment 16; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004)*, February, Section 5.2: Regional Reforms - Attachment 17

²⁶ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002, *CHN39978.E - China*, 7 November - Attachment 21

and recognised.²⁷ According to *Article 6* of the *Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China* a women can legally marry at the age of 20 and men at the age of 22.²⁸

As the male was under 22 years of age at the time of the marriage in Australia, then according to the IRB advice, the Australian marriage would not be recognised in China.²⁹ *Articles 10* and *12* of the *Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China* state that a marriage in which the marriageable age was not attained will be invalid from its inception.³⁰

If the couple return to China, however, and both are over the legal age for marriage, then *Articles 8* of the *Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China* provides a process of retrospective marriage registration. Article 8 states:

The husband and wife relationship shall be established as soon as they acquire the marriage certificates. In the absence of the marriage registration, the man and the woman shall go through the procedures subsequently

The Supreme People's Court has made rulings in the interpretation of the *Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China* and adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court on 24 December 2001 and which came into force on 27 December 2001. *Article 4* of the *Interpretations 2001* states that:

[I]f both the man and woman make up their marriage registration under Article 8 of the marriage Law, the validity of the marital relations shall be calculated from the time when both parties conform with substantial conditions for getting married as described in the Marriage Law.³¹

This ruling would indicate that the authorities in China would recognise a marriage once the woman and man are of marriageable age. Once the marriage is recognised, then the couple could submit this information to the authorities to be included in their *hukou*.³² No information was located to indicate that this could negatively affect the wife's ability to register in Fujian province.

²⁷ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *Responses to Information Requests (CHN100072.E)*, 27 May http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?l=e&id=449316 - Accessed 21 April 2011 Attachment 11

²⁸ People's Republic of China 2001, „Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China', Adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on September 10, 1980, and amended in accordance with "Decision Regarding the Amendment (of Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China)" passed at 21st Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on April 28, 2001

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/3625/3630/t18322.htm> – Accessed 15 November 2010.

²⁹ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *Responses to Information Requests (CHN100072.E)*, 27 May http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?l=e&id=449316 - Accessed 21 April 2011.

³⁰ People's Republic of China 2001, „Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China', Adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on September 10, 1980, and amended in accordance with "Decision Regarding the Amendment (of Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China)" passed at 21st Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on April 28, 2001

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/3625/3630/t18322.htm> – Accessed 15 November 2010.

³¹ Excerpt from „Interpretation No.1 of the Supreme People's Court on several issues in the Application of Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China' (undated) Harvard University handout

<http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic615004.files/Handouts/class15%20maybemarrg%20law%20regulation%20handout.PDF> - Accessed 21 April 2011.

³² Clarke, D.C. 2007, „China's legal system: new developments, new challenges,' *The China Quarterly Special Issues New Series*, No.8, Cambridge University Press

http://books.google.com.au/books?id=5L_d9iu4OtMC&pg=PA124&lpg=PA124&dq=unregistered+marriages+in+China&source=bl&ots=9KHofOlV6G&sig=S6Jt3htU1oWmuWJtMd5vvsf9SEY&hl=en&ei=DnauTa2kK46yrAeVsoGPCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q=unregistered%20marriages%20in%20China&f=false - Accessed 21 April 2011 - Attachment 10

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was contacted on 14 January 2010 requesting information relating to the official procedures that need to be undertaken for children born overseas when their parents return to China. DFAT responded with the following advice.

In order to apply for the child's household registration, the parents would be required to provide the following documentation: a Chinese translation of the child's birth certificate; the parents' household registration; ID cards; passports; certificate of marriage; and a receipt issued by the local Family Planning Committee to demonstrate that a family planning fee (also known as a social compensation fee) has been paid. This list of requirements is not comprehensive; the local authority may request more information or identification on a case-by-case basis.

Most provincial and municipal governments have stated that a family planning fee would be imposed for children born out of wedlock. The State Family Planning Commission authorises local governments to establish their own criteria when imposing family planning fees in each jurisdiction.³³

As the baby was born before the parents met the age requirements for marriage in China, it is considered likely that a 'social compensation fee' for an "early birth" as stipulated in *Article 39 of the Population and Family Planning Regulations of Fujian Province* would be imposed. In this case, the fee is 60 to 100 percent of either the average disposable income of a town-dweller, or the average net income of a farmer.³⁴

Attachments

1. US Department of State 2010, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)*, March, Section 6 – Accessed 19 April 2011.
2. Amnesty International 2009, *Uighur Ethnic Identity under threat in China*, April, ASA 17/010/2009, Accessed 19 April 2011.
3. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, *Annual Report 2009*, 10 October, p. 264 – Accessed 19 April 2011.
4. Amnesty International Report 2010, *China*, page 106 – Accessed 19 April 2011.
5. 'China puts Urumqi under „full surveillance’ 2011, *The Guardian* 25 January, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/25/china-urumqi-under-full-surveillance> – Accessed 13 April 2011.
6. 'China Fires Two Officials in Urumqi Unrest New Party Leader Promises Security as Anniversary Nears’ 2009, *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 September <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125224614851089251.html> – Accessed 13 April 2011.
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³³ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, *DFAT Report No. 1104 – China: RRT Information Request: CHN36059*, 12 February.

³⁴ US Department of State 2007, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, Political Asylum Research and Documentation Service website, May, pp. 97 – 98 http://www.pards.org/paccc/china_may_2007.doc – Accessed 15 November 2010 – Attachment 9

8. „East Turkestan: Development Could Widen Ethnic Divide’ 2011, *Radio Free Asia* 1 April, <http://www.unpo.org/article/12468> – Accessed 14 April 2011.
9. US Department of State 2007, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, Political Asylum Research and Documentation Service website, May, pp. 97 – 98 http://www.pards.org/paccc/china_may_2007.doc – Accessed 15 November 2010 –
10. Clarke, D.C. 2007, „China’s legal system: new developments, new challenges,’ *The China Quarterly Special Issues New Series*, No.8, Cambridge University Press http://books.google.com.au/books?id=5L_d9iu4OtMC&pg=PA124&lpg=PA124&dq=unregistered+marriages+in+China&source=bl&ots=9KHofOlV6G&sig=S6Jt3htU1oWmuWJTmD5vvsf9SEY&hl=en&ei=DnauTa2kK46yrAeVsoGPCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q=unregistered%20marriages%20in%20China&f=false – Accessed 21 April 2011.
11. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *Responses to Information Requests (CHN100072.E)*, 27 May http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/RIR_RDI/RIR_RDI.aspx?l=e&id=449316 – Accessed 21 April 2011.
12. „Regions and territories: Xinjiang’ 2010, *BBC News* http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/8152132.stm – Accessed 10 May 2010.
13. Human Rights Watch 2010, *China: Events of 2008* – Accessed 19 April 2011.
14. Wang, F.L. 2005, „Brewing Tensions While Maintaining Stabilities: The Dual Role Of The *Hukou* System In Contemporary China’, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 85-124, – Accessed 20 April 2011.
15. Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 2008, “Is China Abolishing the *Hukou* System?”, *The China Quarterly*, September, p. 594 – Accessed 19 April 2011.
16. Wang, F.L. 2005, *Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 193 – Accessed 20 April 2011.
17. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, *China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004)*, February, Section 5.2: Regional Reforms.
18. Fan, C. 2008, „China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies, Chapter 3 – Migration, *Hukou*, and the City’ *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank*, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/02/18/000333037_20080218003105/Rendered/PDF/424850PUB0ISBN101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187282&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000333037_20080218003105&searchMenuPK=64187282&theSitePK=523679 – Accessed 19 April 2011.
19. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, *DFAT Report No. 1104 – China: RRT Information Request: CHN36059*, 12 February.
20. „Tension in Xinjiang – The party under siege in Urumqi’ 2009, *The Economist* 10 September, <http://www.economist.com/node/14413290> – Accessed 20 April 2011.
21. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002, *CHN39978.E – China*, 7 November.
22. „Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Residence Registration’ 2001, *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol.34, No.3, pp.52–57.