Qurasha Begum v. Immigration Officer, London (Heathrow) Airport
| Publisher | United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority |
| Author | Immigration Appeal Tribunal |
| Publication Date | 22 August 1978 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | [1978] Imm AR 158 |
| Type of Decision | TH/29413/78(1331) |
| Cite as | Qurasha Begum v. Immigration Officer, London (Heathrow) Airport, [1978] Imm AR 158, United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, 22 August 1978, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,3ae6b6ae18.html [accessed 3 June 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
QURASHA BEGUM v IMMIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON (HEATHROW) AIRPORT, TH/29413/78(1331)
Immigration Appeal Tribunal
[1978] Imm AR 158
Hearing Date: 22 August 1978
22 August 1978
Index Terms:
Misrepresentation -- Effect of misrepresentation on entry clearance officer -- Visitor's entry visa sought by widow -- Desire expressed to visit children in United Kingdom -- Widowhood deliberately concealed and false representation made for purpose of showing incentive to return to Pakistan -- Visa granted -- Leave to enter refused on arrival on immigration officer learning of widowhood from sponsoring son and seeing one-way air ticket -- Entry properly refused regardless whether visa officer had been influenced by the false representation and/or concealment of a material fact -- HC 81, paras 10(a), 13.
Held:
On a true construction of para 10(a) of HC 81, if "false representations were employed or material facts were concealed... for the purpose of obtaining (an entry) clearance", the question whether the visa officer had been influenced thereby to grant the requested entry clearance was irrelevant; and if an applicant for a visitor's entry visa (under para 13 of HC 81) had employed such means for the purpose of obtaining the visa, this was sufficient to justify refusal of leave to enter on the visa holder's arrival at the United Kingdom port of entry. n1 n1 Paragraph 10(a) of HC 81 is set out in footnote 2. The Tribunal so held on the facts which are set out in the determination reported below, and noted also that the evidence of the appellant before the adjudicator further justified a finding that more than a visit was intended.Counsel:
Miss N. A. Khan, counsel for the appellant. F. W. Flemen for the respondent. PANEL: L. P. Mosdell Esq. (Chairman), J. A. Noble, Esq, Sir Gordon WhitteridgeJudgment One:
THE TRIBUNAL: The appellant Qurasha Begum, a citizen of Pakistan born in 1922, arrived at Heathrow on 15 May 1978 with a visit visa issued at Islamabad on 27 February 1978. She stated she wished to stay for six months, visiting her three sons and one daughter who were resident in the United Kingdom. Her son Afsal Hussain was at the airport to meet the appellant and he said he had bought the single ticket which the appellant produced and that she would stay with him for six to eight months. The appellant told the immigration officer that she lived with her husband Ghulam Khan in Pakistan. Afsal Hussain told the Immigration Officer that the appellant was a widow. As the result of telex communication with the visa officer, Islamabad, it appeared that the appellant had applied for a visit of three months to her son Afsal Hussain and had told the visa officer that her husband was a United Kingdom passport holder, that he had travelled to the United Kingdom two months previously for a visit and that she would return to Pakistan with her husband. No evidence was produced to the visa officer to substantiate her husband's nationality or whereabouts. The telex reply from the visa officer also stated that a field trip would be necessary to establish if Ghulam Khan was alive or dead but it could not be undertaken in the near future due to manpower commitments. It is by no means certain, from the contents of the telex reply from the visa officer, that he was not influenced by the assertion of the appellant that her husband was in the United Kingdom and that she would return with him to Pakistan. The immigration officer considered the appellant had little incentive to return to Pakistan, since she had only a single ticket to the United Kingdom and had said that she was wholly dependent upon her three sons in the United Kingdom who were planning to bring their wives and children here in the near future. Nor was he satisfied that the appellant intended to remain here for eight months only. The immigration officer was satisfied that a material fact had been concealed and false representations made to the visa officer. He considered that any conditional right of entry under para 10 of HC 81 had been removed n2 and that the appellant did not qualify for entry as a visitor under para 13 of HC 81 n3. n2 Paragraph 10 of HC 81 provides (so far as here material) as follows: "Visas and Home Office letters of consent are issued in accordance with the rules contained in this statement [i.e. HC 81]: they are to be taken as evidence of the holder's eligibility for entry to the United Kingdom, and accordingly accepted as 'entry clearances' within the meaning of the [1971 Immigration] Act. A passenger who holds an entry clearance which was duly issued to him and is still current is not to be refused leave to enter unless the Immigration Officer is satisfied that: (a) false representations were employed or material facts were concealed, whether or not to the holder's knowledge, for the purpose of obtaining the clearance,..." n3 Under para 13 of HC 81 leave to enter as a visitor "should be refused" if the immigration officer is not satisfied that, inter alia, the passenger "is genuinely seeking entry for the period of the visit as stated by him" and that "no more than a visit is intended". At the hearing before the adjudicator Mr J. K. Brownless the appellant gave evidence. She said her husband Ghulam Khan died 12 to 13 years ago and that she lived in Pakistan with her daughters-in-law. If they came to the United Kingdom one would stay behind in Pakistan. They would rotate, so that one daughter-in-law would always be in Pakistan. She admitted she had lied to the visa officer by stating her husband was alive and said that she was afraid not to continue the deception by lying to the immigration officer. She also produced a return ticket to Rawalpindi which was, apparently, in her possession on arrival at Heathrow. Afsal Hussain also gave evidence to the adjudicator and said he had bought the return ticket in Bradford and had sent it to the appellant in Pakistan. Miss Khan, who also appeared for the appellant at the hearing before the adjudicator, submitted that the false information as to the existence of her husband had not influenced the visa officer and that under para 10 of HC 81 n2 the visa officer had to be influenced by the false representations or concealment of material facts. She said that on her return to Heathrow n4 the appellant had admitted the deception and that it was not impractical that one of her daughters-in-law would stay with her in Pakistan in rotation. n2 Paragraph 10 of HC 81 provides (so far as here material) as follows: "Visas and Home Office letters of consent are issued in accordance with the rules contained in this statement [i.e. HC 81]: they are to be taken as evidence of the holder's eligibility for entry to the United Kingdom, and accordingly accepted as 'entry clearances' within the meaning of the [1971 Immigration] Act. A passenger who holds an entry clearance which was duly issued to him and is still current is not to be refused leave to enter unless the Immigration Officer is satisfied that: (a) false representations were employed or material facts were concealed, whether or not to the holder's knowledge, for the purpose of obtaining the clearance,..." n4 i.e. on 18 May 1978, the appellant having on 15 May been granted temporary admission to reside with her sponsoring son while the immigration officer awaited a reply to the telex enquiry sent by him to the visa officer in Islamabad. The adjudicator was satisfied that the appellant had made false representations to, and concealed a material fact from, the visa officer concerning her husband for the purpose of obtaining entry clearance. He did not agree with Miss Khan, on the hypothesis that the visa officer was not influenced by the appellant's statements regarding her husband, that the visa officer had to be influenced by them. He held that the making of a false representation or concealing a material fact was sufficient, irrespective whether the visa officer was influenced by it. He consequently held that the conditional right of entry under para 10 of HC 81 had been removed n2. Moreover, he was not satisfied, in view of the fact that the appellant would not be able to live on her own in Pakistan, the impracticality of the proposed rotation arrangement by her daughters-in-law, and the varying proposed periods of visit -- namely, three months by the appellant to the visa officer, six months by the appellant to the immigration officer, and six to eight months by Afsal Hussain to the immigration officer -- that only a visit was intended. The adjudicator dismissed the appeal. n2 Paragraph 10 of HC 81 provides (so far as here material) as follows: "Visas and Home Office letters of consent are issued in accordance with the rules contained in this statement [i.e. HC 81]: they are to be taken as evidence of the holder's eligibility for entry to the United Kingdom, and accordingly accepted as 'entry clearances' within the meaning of the [1971 Immigration] Act. A passenger who holds an entry clearance which was duly issued to him and is still current is not to be refused leave to enter unless the Immigration Officer is satisfied that: (a) false representations were employed or material facts were concealed, whether or not to the holder's knowledge, for the purpose of obtaining the clearance,..." The grounds of appeal to the Tribunal are as follows: "1. The appellant had told the visa officer (incorrectly) that her husband Ghulab Khan was alive and had travelled to UK two months previously for a visit, and that she would return with him to Pakistan. No evidence of the husband's whereabouts was produced and the visa officer did not consider it of sufficient importance or relevance to inquire into her statement any further. She was granted a visa to visit her sons knowing that all male members of the family including the 'husband' were in England. 2. The appellant was refused leave to enter when she arrived at Heathrow Airport. The learned adjudicator in dismissing the appeal held that the appellant employed false representation and concealed a material fact, namely that her husband was long dead. It is submitted that the learned adjudicator erred in representation that 'my husband is at present in UK on a visit' was material in any way as to her incentive to return; if anything it would be an incentive to remain with the rest of the family in the UK. 3. There was no evidence that the visa officer was in any way influenced by the so-called false representation or concealment. The learned adjudicator erred in law in holding that the respondent did not have to satisfy the Appellate authority under para 10 of HC 81 that the visa officer was so influenced. The learned adjudicator further erred in holding that in this particular case the visa officer was so influenced. It is submitted that there was no evidence to reach such a conclusion." At the hearing before this Tribunal Miss Khan reiterated the submissions she had previously made to the adjudicator that under para 10 of HC 81 the visa officer had to be influenced by the false representation or concealment of a material fact. Mr. Flemen submitted the contrary. He submitted that whether or not the visa officer was so influenced was irrelevant. All that para 10 required was that a false representation had been made or a material fact had been concealed. He referred to Yousef's case n5. n5 Yousef v Immigration Officer, London (Heathrow) Airport, TH/25210/78(1223) (unreported). Nowhere in para 10 of HC 81 is it stated that a false representation or concealment of a material fact must influence a visa officer. We hold that it is sufficient to justify the refusal of entry if a false representation or concealment of a material fact be made "for the purpose of obtaining the clearance" and that its efficacy is irrelevant. In the instant case the appellant made a false representation that her husband was alive in the United Kingdom and that she would return with him to Pakistan. She also concealed a material fact, namely that her husband was long since dead. We find that the adjudicator was correct in his interpretation of para 10 of HC 81 and that his dissatisfaction with the claim that only a visit was intended was justified. For the above mentioned reasons we dismissed the appeal.DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.SOLICITORS:
Butterfield, Lees & Co, Keighley.Copyright notice: Crown Copyright
