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# BUILDING PEACE **and** ADVANCING DEVELOPMENT **in the** GREAT LAKES REGION




United Nations Development Programme





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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFDB	AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
CAR	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DDR	DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION
DRC	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GF	GLOBAL FACILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS
GLR	GREAT LAKES REGION
HDI	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
ICGLR	INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION
MDRP	MULTI-COUNTRY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME
ODA	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
PSC	PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION
SME	SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES
TSI	TRADE-SUPPORTED INSTITUTION



## 1. INTRODUCTION

### A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Great Lakes Region (GLR)<sup>1</sup> has been prone to conflict for several decades, and has witnessed some of the worst conflicts on the African continent. These conflicts are rooted in long-standing tensions over ethnicity and citizenship rights, which are in turn related to grievances over access to resources, particularly land but also mineral and other natural resources. These grievances manifest as challenges to the legitimacy and power of national and local authorities. One example of this was the 1959 Rwandan revolution, which was thought to be the starting point for many of the tensions that exist today. It left more than a million people dead and forced a large number of Tutsi refugees to flee to Burundi, eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania and Uganda. Conflicts mainly over land and local control began to escalate in the 1960s in eastern DRC.

Constant migration (within and across borders) and flows of refugees mean that ethnic tensions or grievances in one place often spill over into other countries or regions. In addition, most countries in the region suffer from weak state systems and porous borders, which makes it easier for conflicts to spread across several countries at once, and has given rise to an expanding, multi-country zone of insecurity and instability.

For example, in Burundi, violence erupted in 1965 but reached its peak in 1972, when a Hutu rebellion that started in Tanzania spread to the south of Burundi. The result was a massive Hutu migration into Rwanda that further strained Hutu–Tutsi relations. Ethnic tensions have also been fuelled by governments' deliberately favouring specific ethnic groups. For example, in 1981 the Government of Zaire passed a law which overturned a 1972 law that granted citizenship to nearly all people of Rwandan origin. In effect, this meant that Rwandan people in Zaire were stateless. Displaced refugees from Rwanda played an active role in the 1986 Ugandan revolution, while the ravages of civil war in Uganda caused insecurity and displacement, especially in the northern

part of the country. In Burundi, the assassination of the democratically elected President in 1993 triggered a lengthy civil war.

In Rwanda, the aborted attempts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to seize power, and the subsequent 1994 genocide after the shooting down of a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, both Hutu, saw an influx of an estimated 2 million Hutu refugees in eastern DRC and in Kivu province. Following the victory of the RPF, Hutu militias crossed the border to Kivu, motivating direct and indirect Rwandan interventions in the DRC. Eastern DRC has also been a safe haven for militia groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda and militias from Burundi. Frequent cross-border raids by these militia groups into Rwanda and Uganda were a persistent security concern for both of these countries during the First Congo War in 1997, which devastated the continent, leaving a deadly trail of destruction and bloodshed. Nearly 4 million people are estimated to have died in the DRC since 1998 – the largest documented death toll since World War I.



These examples demonstrate how the vast geographic reach of tension in the GLR has created problems of continental proportions. Conflicts that cut across national boundaries have, in some cases, transformed ethnic solidarities into very powerful vectors of transnational violence.

Tensions in the GLR, especially since the end of the Cold War, have also been fuelled by attempts to accumulate wealth, often through the exploitation of natural resources and control over informal cross-border trading activities. In other words, conflicts in the region are a set of wars over control of resources, with numerous actors involved. For example, the violence in the Kivu province of eastern DRC is largely fuelled by the drive to control the country's vast and rich natural resources. The three 'T' metals — tantalum, tungsten and tin — as well as gold, have been identified as 'conflict minerals', and mining and regional trade as the root of conflict dynamics. Disputes relating to land further add to the current woes. Nearly all illicit traffic in Congolese minerals that funds armed groups transits through Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, and strongly influences the economic and political dynamics in those countries. The conflict also has regional security implications, as illegal arms are smuggled through to other neighbouring countries. The broader governance challenges in the DRC, including the inability of the Congolese state to maintain security, are a source of instability in eastern DRC, and contribute to persistent violations of human

rights. Without a functioning army under state civilian control, armed groups continue to proliferate in the region and are able to operate with impunity.

Although the magnitude of the conflict has receded since its peak in the mid-1990s, militia attacks continue on a regular basis despite attempts to negotiate peace. The rebellion attacks by the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) in 2007 and 2008, and the rebel attack on the airport in Mbandaka, Équateur Province, in April 2010, further revealed the continuing struggle for power in Kinshasa and control over the DRC (Heyl, 2010). The mutiny in April 2012 and subsequent creation of the March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars — M23), which has clashed repeatedly with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), indicate a return of violence to eastern DRC.

## B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

In 2011, the total number of refugees from the DRC was estimated to be 457,000. As many as 800,000 people have been displaced since the M23 rebel group took up arms against the Kinshasa government in April 2012. There are estimated to be around 2.2 million internally displaced persons in the DRC alone (UNHCR, 2013). Thousands more people have become victims of violence and abuse due to this long-running conflict. Moreover, the livelihoods of millions of people have been disrupted, trapping them in poverty and leaving the majority of the population — as many as 56 million people — living in extreme poverty. This is just one of a number of socio-economic implications of the conflict, with refugees and displaced people putting pressure on already burdened communities and on the environment.

The majority of refugees and internally displaced persons in the GLR are women and children, and women bear the brunt of the conflict and the subsequent humanitarian crisis. Women constitute 70 percent of the work force and are the main producers in the region. Yet the conflict and insecurity, and associated sexual violence, have driven many women from their communities. Sexual violence against women is, in fact, one of the main features of the conflict in the region, and has been used as a weapon by all sides. An estimated 250,000 women were raped during the war and genocide in Rwanda. Around 40,000–60,000 women were estimated



to have been raped between 1996 and 2002 in eastern DRC alone (Sow, 2006). Between December 2011 and November 2012, the UN documented 764 victims of sexual violence in the conflict, including 280 children, with approximately 50 percent of the crimes attributed to state forces. In addition to the mental and physical trauma and health complications experienced by victims of rape, many are infected with HIV, as 60 percent of combatants in eastern DRC are HIV-positive.

While poverty is rife in the GLR, the economic conditions vary by country. Recent data indicate, for example, that Rwanda continues to take ownership for and to lead its own development process in an innovative and committed way. It has reported high levels of sustained and inclusive economic growth, significant reductions in poverty, more gender empowerment and notable progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Between 2008 and 2012, its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average 7.7 percent per year, which translated into an annual growth in GDP per capita of 5.1 percent, both of which were significantly higher than the averages for sub-Saharan Africa. Income per capita reached US\$580 in 2012, the second highest in East Africa. However, the percentage of people living below the poverty line remains high (44.9 percent in 2011). With a Human Development Index (HDI) estimated at 0.429 in 2012, the country is ranked 166th out of 187 in the world.

The picture in Burundi, however, is quite different. Despite the progress made after the civil war, Burundi is unlikely to achieve its MDG targets by 2015 in the areas of primary and secondary education, child mortality, maternal health, and HIV/AIDS and other diseases. In 2012, its GDP per capita was estimated at US\$170, which is roughly half of what it was in 1993 (US\$286) before the civil war. The country is ranked 178th out of 187 according to its 2012 HDI estimation, and more than 81 percent of its population live below the poverty threshold. In the DRC, despite the country's recent economic performance, the social and human development indicators remain tragically low, with nearly 71 percent of people living in extreme poverty, and two thirds of the active population (especially young people) unemployed. The country is ranked 186th out of 187 countries according to its 2012 HDI estimation.

### C. SHORTCOMINGS OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO BROKER PEACE

Amid continued violence, there have been a number of formal and informal attempts — locally, regionally and internationally — to establish peace. The first came in July 1999 when six countries signed a ceasefire accord in Lusaka; the rebels signed the accord the following month. This was followed by a UN pull-out plan agreed by Rwanda, Uganda and the rebels. A peace deal was signed in July 2002 between the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda. It called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the east and for the DRC to disarm and arrest Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of Tutsis in Rwanda's 1994 genocide. A similar deal was struck between the presidents of the DRC and Uganda in September 2002. In December that year, a peace deal was signed between the Kinshasa government and rebels to end the second war, to reunify the country and to set-up a transitional government with a view to organize the free and fair elections. In another attempt at ending years of conflict in the east, the government signed a peace deal with the rebels in January 2008, which was followed by the approval of a law giving amnesty to armed groups.

Although peace deals have been signed, the conflicts continue, as promises are not fulfilled. Little has been done to move away from day-to-day conflict management and towards proactively building the capacity of societies to develop their own culture of conflict prevention. This could be done by teaching skills and creating mechanisms and institutions that enable communities to resolve disputes and address the root causes of conflict, particularly tensions over the control of resources. Yet this has not been the focus of peace deals in the region. Rather, international engagement continues to be fragmented, with an emphasis on symptoms, and no comprehensive framework to end the conflict.

Most peace initiatives in the region have failed to take into account the complexity of the conflict and its implications, not only at national levels, but also at regional and international levels. Moreover, most initiatives have relied solely on the willpower of the states involved, thereby neglecting local communities' participation in the process of peace negotiations. Institutionalized mechanisms for peacebuilding, such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),

have become ineffective due to a lack of support from international partners. Many donors had the notion that the ICGLR was to be a political forum for reconciliation and dialogue, and that it should not become involved in development projects. Similarly, others have called for the ICGLR to limit itself to the issues of peace and security. Yet, without full support from the donor community and other partners, the ICGLR failed to meet its goals.

The trade and movement of weapons has also been neglected in previous peace initiatives, as have the network of elites in the states and actions in connection with transnational actors and organized crime networks. Other weaknesses include: (i) the lack of enforcement of sanctions against perpetrators of crimes; (ii) the failure to consider and execute various recommendations from expert reports about the conflict and the region; (iii) the limited consideration of issues related to displaced persons and refugees; (iv) biased analysis of land problems and illegal exploitation of natural resources; and (v) the absence of multinational actors in conflict resolution plans.

Although previous peace agreements have made important contributions to stability in the GLR, they have not addressed the drivers of the conflict. The persistent violence illustrates how the movement of actors and interests across both national boundaries and markets allows elites and interest groups from the region and from abroad to benefit from the plunder of resources and, ultimately, to benefit from the conflict. The structure of incentives in the region is such that too many powerful actors benefit more from instability than from peace, regardless of the human costs. This structure of incentives has to be reversed, to make sure that the interests and aspirations of the population of the GLR come first. Only through development can this pernicious structure be turned on its head.

#### D. THE PEACE, SECURITY AND COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

In February 2013, representatives of the 11 countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) met in Ethiopia to sign an accord that pledged to help end the conflict in the DRC. The accord gives a framework for hope, stability and progress for DRC and the GLR. It includes a series of commitments that address most of the weaknesses of the previous

peace accords, and caters to almost all parties involved in the conflict, including individual countries, the regional and international communities, the private sector and civil society.

Ahead of the peace talks, the M23 rebel group declared a ceasefire. In March 2013, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2098, setting up the first ever UN peacekeeping brigade. Its mandate includes neutralizing armed groups in the DRC and monitoring arms embargoes along with a panel of UN experts.

While these are important developments, it is still vital that the signatories of the Addis Ababa framework agreement put in place the most appropriate implementation mechanisms to prevent conflict, restore peace and enforce the agreements.

#### E. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY

During a recent joint mission to the region by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the World Bank, the World Bank Group announced \$1 billion of funding for development work in the GLR. This funding could help to revitalize economic development, create jobs and improve people's lives. Leaders in the GLR can boost confidence, rebuild their economies and provide new opportunities for millions of people by encouraging economic activity and improving lives and livelihoods in border areas. Additional funding is also proposed by the World Bank for the recovery of livelihoods, which can help to reduce the vulnerability of people living in the region, and for revitalizing and expanding cross-border economic activity to spur greater opportunity and integration in the areas of agriculture, energy, transport and regional trade. A complementary initiative by the UN is being launched for long-term development.

The objective of this study is to identify the drivers of conflict and instability in the GLR; to explore possible measures to address these drivers, with a focus on advancing development in the region; and to identify means of implementing them. This will help to support the UN and other development partners to identify challenges and opportunities and to prioritize areas for development, while avoiding the mistakes of past peace initiatives.



## 2. THE UNDERLYING DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION

The dynamics of the conflict in the GLR are complex, and rooted in the legacies of colonialism, nationality and identity, ethnic tensions and discrimination, lack of rule of law, violation of human rights, political exclusion, and a wide range of development challenges, including poor governance (including corruption), poverty and youth disenfranchisement. All of these issues are heightened by foreign interference. This section explores the specific drivers of the conflict and instability in the GLR, touching on natural resources, politics and conflicts in extractive resources, poverty and inequality, weak state institutions, political exclusion, poor governance, and demographic pressures.

### A. NATURAL RESOURCES

The GLR is rich in natural resources. In the DRC alone natural resources are estimated to be worth \$24 trillion. The centre of the conflict in the GLR, eastern DRC, has one of the greatest concentrations of precious minerals and metals on Earth. Most of these minerals are used in the manufacture of a range of high-tech devices, such as mobile phones, laptops and spacecraft, and thus have a high value and are in high demand (Kok et al., 2009).

Natural resources have become a major driver of the conflict in the region, especially in light of the fragility of the State and its inability to exercise its public authority over non-state actors. Two factors that have aggravated this are inequality in access to resources and the ease with which such resources can be looted. Weak governance structures in the DRC mean that most resources are easily plundered. Horizontal inequality in access to or control over scarce land, water or other natural endowments in the countries within the region seem to have exacerbated tensions, as ethnicity, religion, race and class have become key factors in determining who has access to resources. These are also driving forces of mass migration and the formation of complex networks of illegal extractors. For example, the extraction of coltan in North and South Kivu involves an intricate network of individual extractors and their superiors, armed movements and authorities, regional governments

and multinational corporations. The result has been severe environmental damage in an uncontrolled mining regime, which has in turn led to conflicts. In Burundi, poor environmental management at local and national government levels has led to conflict, as policies favour particular groups, and policymaking is not transparent.

The resource-driven conflict is not localized. It is linked to an endless scramble for power (which is again linked to resources) and resources between internal and external actors. While natural resource wealth has fuelled conflict among factions within the DRC, some neighbouring actors have also been eager to obtain a share of the country's vast natural resources. For example, since the 1998 conflict began in the DRC, competition between neighbouring states over the extraction of mineral wealth fuelled the conflict in eastern DRC and led to broader instability in the GLR.

### B. POLITICS AND CONFLICTS IN EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES

Conflicts over natural resources arise when parties disagree about their management and distribution, and about the protection of the resources and related ecosystems. These conflicts can escalate into destructive relations and violence when the parties are unable or unwilling to engage in a constructive process of dialogue and conflict resolution. Conflict becomes even more



problematic when social mechanisms and institutions for managing and resolving conflict break down, giving way to violence. Societies with weak institutions, fragile political systems and divisive social relations can be drawn into cycles of conflict and violence.

The exploitation of non-renewable extractive resources in the region has been implicated in triggering, escalating or sustaining violent conflicts. Violent conflict is most likely to occur where local communities have been systematically excluded from decision-making processes, when the economic benefits are concentrated in the hands of a few, and when the burdens associated with extractive resources clash with local social, cultural, religious and environmental norms or align with pre-existing tensions. The price paid by societies threatened by, undergoing or emerging from violence related to natural resources is evident in the lives lost or touched by conflict, and amplified by fractured relationships, weakened institutions and destroyed infrastructure.

The main drivers of conflict related to extractive resources in the GLR include:

- poor engagement, marginalization or exclusion of communities and stakeholders from discussions related to the process of extractive resource development;
- the unfair (or apparently unfair) distribution of benefits compared to the distribution of costs, risks and responsibilities. Those who are disenfranchised may bear risks and responsibilities without fair compensation and, therefore, are likely to oppose the development and may even rebel;

- diversion of the vast revenues from extractive resources to satisfy individual gains (or to finance armies and violent conflict) at the expense of national and community interests; and
- the mismanagement of funds, which is often a symptom of a broader lack of institutional and legal capacity to manage the development of extractive resources for the benefit of the country as a whole.

The political aspect of extractive resource management seeks to find ways of institutionalizing political reforms to strengthen the administrative capacities of governments to adequately respond to external shocks, rent-seeking and the predatory behaviour of state agents. Politicians fall short in making difficult political choices to reform bureaucracies in an attempt to insulate the State from organized interest groups and deploy economic policies more effectively.

In contexts where governance is influenced by external actors, states must exercise political autonomy that is separate from the forces of globalization, including powers to build economic and social programmes that are largely independent of commodity production. Extractive resource governance depends on States' abilities to decide the management of scarce resources. This means finding the appropriate balance between State-led and market-led mechanisms in facilitating the internationalization of extractive resources. To this end, it is important to examine institutions and to construct normative standards of good governance in managing resources.

### C. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

A root source of the conflict in the region is the high degree of structural violence that characterizes most of the communities in the GLR. Extreme poverty is widely regarded as a key driver of structural violence and conflict. The frustration of being marginalized can force poor people to migrate and can push them towards direct violence. The region has some of the highest poverty rates in the world based on the international standard of \$1.25 (purchasing power parity — PPP) a day (see Table 1).



**TABLE 1. POVERTY DYNAMICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION**

Country	Poverty Levels		MPI	Contribution of Deprivation to overall poverty		Inequality	Child labour
	National	PPP \$1.25		Education health	Living standards		
Burundi	66.9	81.3	84.5	53.9	46.1	33.3	19
Congo DR	71.3	87.7	74	43.1	56.9	44.4	42
Rwanda	44.9	63.2	69	50.4	49.6	53.1	35
Tanzania	33.4	67.9	65.6	44.7	55.3	37.6	21
Uganda	24.5	51.5	69.9	49.6	50.4	44.3	25

Source: HDR 2013 and UBOS 2010.

Fifty-six million people live below the national poverty line, of which 47 million are in the DRC (71 percent of the total population of the country). The poverty rate in Burundi is also high, at 70 percent. In Rwanda, the poverty rate of 45 percent partly reflects recent gains from economic and political transformation. Similar poverty levels are reflected in a broader multidimensional poverty index (MPI). Low standards of living are the primary contributor to overall poverty levels, while lack of access to health and education are also important factors. All countries have high levels of income inequality as well.

Although reliable data are not available, high poverty levels and lack of opportunities for decent employment imply high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment. Unemployed youth with no future

expectations could easily be mobilized by armed groups. High levels of child labour are an indicator of deprivation and pressure on poor households, and can increase the vulnerability of children to coercion or forced engagement in illegal activities.

Poverty and deprivation in the GLR are also reflected in HDI scores. The DRC and Burundi continue to have very low HDI scores after a period of deterioration in the 1990s, and have progressed only marginally since 2000. The DRC was at the bottom of the HDI ranking in 2012 (ranked at 186 alongside Niger). Burundi was ranked 178<sup>th</sup>, while Rwanda has made some quick gains since 2000. Poverty can be linked to deprivation in relation to basic needs, which prevents development and can lay the groundwork for political mobilization. Gender

**TABLE 2. TRENDS IN HDI IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION**

Country	1980	1990	2000	2005	2007	2010	2011	2012	Rank 2012
Burundi	0.217	0.272	0.270	0.298	0.323	0.348	0.352	0.355	178
Congo DR	0.286	0.297	0.234	0.258	0.280	0.295	0.299	0.304	186
Rwanda	0.277	0.233	0.314	0.377	0.400	0.425	0.429	0.434	167
Tanzania		0.353	0.369	0.395	0.408	0.466	0.470	0.476	152
Uganda		0.306	0.375	0.408	0.427	0.450	0.454	0.456	161

Source: HDR 2013.





inequality is another factor that contributes to violence. It manifests in multiple ways within the family, labour market, politico-judicial structures and cultural-ideological tendencies (see Table 3). Harmful gender values, norms and practices influence social interaction, reinforce gender-related power differentials and/or increase violence against women. For instance, the cultural practice of son preference is contributing to the denial of girls' access to education, curtails their opportunities in life and can lead to early marriage and childbearing. In addition, the perception that politics and economics are principally the preserve of males leads to disparities in political, economic and social participation, decision-making and leadership.

#### D. WEAK STATE INSTITUTIONS

Countries in the GLR have been classified as failed States to different degrees over the past few decades. Most of them are still considered fragile, where the reach of state organizations and institutions is limited and challenged by non-state organizations. This situation, coupled with corruption, has played a crucial part in the conflict in the GLR. For example, in the absence of well-established governance structures, the fall of the then-Zairian state (the current DRC) after the end of the Cold War created a new power structure in the region. With its vast geographical area and rich mineral wealth, this created a power vacuum, which led to the privatization and criminalization of public space (Elijah, 2005). This resulted in a decentralization of power away from central authority and a fragmentation of the provinces. In the absence of a strong state system, the DRC became a safe haven for militia movements, which pose a threat to regional security.

A similar situation was seen in Burundi and Rwanda until very recently, where the shrinking power and legitimacy of the state created local dynamics that eventually imploded into regional conflict. In both countries, political institutions were exclusionary, paving the way for the creation of ethnocratic States,<sup>2</sup> which had no universal mandate or legitimacy. While such policies became lethal in vertically structured Rwanda, under the Habyarimana regime, where the State had ceased to exist (Lemarchand, date?), power in Burundi became

**TABLE 3. GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX IN 2012**

Country	Rank out of 146 countries	Seats in national Parliament (% female)	Population with at least secondary education (% aged 25 and older): 2006–2010		Labour force participation (% aged 15 and older): 2011	
			Female	Male	Female	Male
Burundi	98	34.9	5.2	9.2	83.7	82.1
Congo DR	144	8.2	10.7	36.2	70.2	72.5
Rwanda	76	51.9	7.4	8.0	86.4	85.4
Tanzania	119	36.0	5.6	9.2	88.2	90.3
Uganda	110	35.0	23.0	23.9	76.0	79.5

Source: HDR 2013.

a monopoly ruled by the Tutsi-Hima elements. In both countries, such hierarchical structures of governance between the Hutu and Tutsi bred feelings of superiority and hatred.

Another element at the core of the conflict in the region is the lack of structural adaptation of state institutions that were bequeathed by colonialism. This generated power struggles that turned into ethnic rivalries. The weakening of traditional authorities and the State's inability to enforce property laws have also produced permanent conflict over land ownership.

With the exception of Rwanda, the current situation of state institutions in the GLR is no different from how it was decades ago. While Rwanda has managed to build its state institutions since its revolution, in Burundi and the DRC there is no sign of improvement. In fact, the institutional quality in both Burundi and the DRC has deteriorated in recent years. For example, in an institutional quality index that takes into account, among other things, respect for property rights, corruption, functioning of the judicial system and a system of checks and balance, the DRC is ranked 186th out of 191 countries, and Burundi is ranked 180th (see Table 4).

## E. POLITICAL EXCLUSION

One of the most important drivers of conflict and warfare in the GLR is the economic and political marginalization of the majority of the population. After independence, almost all countries were governed by autocratic or military regimes. The DRC (then

Zaire), one of the first to have a democratically elected government after independence in 1960, soon emerged without an effective central government and embraced autocratic or military regimes as a form of governance. Bold moves towards democracy triggered armed conflict. Democracy returned to the DRC only in 2006, but the State does not have full control, as several militia groups have their own territories within the country.

The story is similar in Burundi, where the partly democratic system prevailed only for a short period, until military intervention took over. Although democracy returned to Burundi under a one-party state constitution in 1984, political suppression was rampant. A fully democratic government came into effect in 1993, but this was again short-lived. Since 2003, Burundi has been governed by a democratically elected government. Elsewhere in the region, Rwanda has mostly been governed by military regimes until very recently, while Uganda's new democracy failed within 10 years of independence, and the country returned to democratic rule only recently. The majority of military interventions, characterized by various forms of ethnic, inter-communal and political mass murder, have severely undermined political inclusion in the region.

True democratic systems are still a new phenomenon in the region, while military interventions are common. According to Marshall (2005), "The prevailing conditions and the rush to institute 'modern' state structures in the immediate post-colonial states not only favored autocratic governance, but also favored the creation or capture of the state by parochial social groups who

**TABLE 4. GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX IN 2012**

Country	Index 2009	Regional Rank		Global Rank		
		2009	2009	2008	2007	
Burundi	0.0628	44	180	168	173	
Congo DR	0.0314	48	186	188	182	
Rwanda	0.1728	32	159	159	169	
Tanzania	0.4398	8	108	114	119	
Uganda	0.3822	12	119	124	116	

Source: Krause (2009).

often used state authority to enrich group members and consolidate the group's domination of the political process" (p.11). The trend of exclusionary politics has continued, even within the current democratic regimes in most countries in the GLR.

A key feature of political governance in most countries in the region, even in the current context, is ethnic exclusion. For example, in Burundi power became a monopoly of the Tutsi-Hima elements, a situation that was even reflected in the military echelons. In Uganda the failure of the State to build an all-inclusive political structure during the years after independence created numerous problems. In particular, it did not address the regional divide between Bantus and Nilotes in favour of the latter until the NRM movement came to power. The Acholi in northern Uganda were marginalized in a similar way, which divided Uganda culturally, politically and economically and sowed the seeds for conflict. While the NRM gained power in 1986 on a platform of ethnic inclusion and reducing ethnic violence and tension, ethnicity and cultural identity are still important political factors in Uganda. In the absence of a strong democratic platform, the political space in Uganda is likely to be subject to violent contestations, and conflict is more likely in such exclusive political systems. Post-genocide Rwanda has also failed to move away from a restricted political mentality informed by past fears, which has slowed its move towards stability (Sidiroupolos, 2002).

## F. POOR GOVERNANCE

The recurrence of conflicts in the GLR is maintained by bad governance at political, administrative, economic, and judicial and security levels, particularly in the DRC. At the political level, at least in the DRC, this is characterized by the absence of citizen participation, the failure or lack of parliamentary oversight of government action, and the disconnection of the elected officials from the population they are supposed to represent. Most political parties do not fulfil their duties with respect to reinforcing the population's civic and political participation, and are unable to develop realistic proposals for social projects that respond to the population's real needs.

At the administrative level, public authorities do not adequately provide the most basic services, particularly in the domains of primary needs (health, education) and

the protection of human rights (justice and security). The gap between institutions and citizens is growing, and confidence in the State apparatus is declining.

At the economic level, a lack of a strategic long-term vision for development coupled with an absence of policies and planning that are responsive to people's needs, are among the reasons for the continued contrast between the huge potential wealth of the region and the growing poverty of the populations. In addition, the prevailing business environment has not improved transparency in the management of public goods, nor has it reduced corruption or encouraged private initiatives that can contribute to growth and job creation.

**TABLE 5. RANKINGS ON THE EASE OF DOING BUSINESS**

Country	Rank out of 185 countries
Burundi	159
Congo DR	181
Rwanda	52
Tanzania	134
Uganda	120

Source: World Bank (2013).

With regard to legal environments and safety, especially in the DRC, there is still no assurance of security for people and goods, nor is there access to justice for all people. In addition, there is still a need to implement reforms of the police, the army, security services and the judicial system.

## G. POPULATION PRESSURE

Population pressure is another driver of conflict in the GLR. Burundi and Rwanda have very high population densities (411 and 473 per square kilometre, respectively), as does eastern DRC. Although the DRC has a lower population density than Rwanda and Burundi (32.5 per square kilometre), its population is the ninth largest in the world. Population growth in most countries in the region exceeds 2.6 percent per annum, suggesting there will be further pressure in the years to come (see Table 6).

**TABLE 6. DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION**

Country	Population (million)	Population growth (%)	Population density (per square kilometre)
Burundi	8.7	1.9	411.1
Congo DR	69.6	2.6	32.5
Rwanda	11.3	2.9	473.8
Tanzania	44.9	2.7	49.2
Uganda	35.6	3.1	182.0

Sources: World Population Report 2012, CIA World Fact Book 2012.

Rapid population growth and high population density have led to increasing demands for land, water, firewood, economic resources and social services. Deforestation and environmental pressure are also major concerns in the region. More than 90 percent of the population is dependent on agriculture, which creates high demand for land. Apart from the value of land in subsistence and small-scale agricultural production, it is also a crucial element of stability, identity and belonging in the country; therefore, disputes over land can lead to conflict. This is especially true following mass population migration (which may be caused by an existing conflict), when internally displaced persons and refugees return home to find that their land is being occupied and/or utilized by others. If not managed properly, this can lead to frustration and create a breeding ground for potential

mobilization by armed groups. Young unemployed men are particularly vulnerable to such mobilizations, and the situation is further provoked by relative isolation, particularly in the DRC.

Although the DRC as a whole has a low population density, land is fiercely contested in the more densely populated and ethnically heterogeneous eastern provinces. Competition over land is intertwined with violent conflict and is a root cause of, sustaining factor for and consequence of war and human suffering (Beck, 2012). In Tanzania, conflicts over land use related to population pressure are most common in protected areas, such as the Swagaswaga Game Reserve, where human activities have encroached on protected lands (Madulu, 2001).







### 3. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, WITH A FOCUS ON ADVANCING DEVELOPMENT

UN resolution 2098 outlines a number of military and civilian responsibilities. It addresses the acceleration of reform of the security sector, the importance of transparent political dialogue, civilian oversight of mining activities, and the broader implementation of the peace, security and cooperation (PSC) framework in the DRC. Although peacebuilding is a priority in the GLR, the sources of conflict are complex, multiple and often mutually reinforcing. They are intimately related to development issues, which include political, economic and social development and issues of governance, human security and sustainability. Addressing these factors will require either a systematic and comprehensive response such as the **3x6 Approach** developed in Burundi (see Box 1)<sup>3</sup>, or a comprehensive set of short-, medium- and long-term measures.

#### A. SHORT-TERM MEASURES AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING INTERVENTIONS

##### i. Natural resource management and allocation

The link between natural resources and armed conflict in the GLR is well established. Weak governance, poor law enforcement and lack of transparency in resource-rich countries (i.e. the DRC) have led to the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources. Insecurity around mines and the questionable legality of previously signed contracts for mining concessions are two impediments to transforming the DRC's natural resources into drivers of development. Establishing and enforcing law and order in the region are the most fundamental tasks in managing natural resources. Removing militia operations from resource areas is also critical for the peaceful operation of extractive industries. At the same time the extraction of resources has to be modernized in a sustainable way, and with value added as much as possible at local level, without marginalizing local and regional actors.

In 2009, the DRC set up a national committee on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to

promote good management of its natural resources. The government also initiated a review of mining and oil laws and regulations to make them more transparent and stricter about bidding for contracts and protecting local communities. Such measures should combat corruption and help the country receive the best possible prices for its natural resources. Recent initiatives such as the publication of dozens of mining contracts have increased transparency, but full transparency by publishing all evaluations carried out by independent evaluators and contracts could make a significant difference. A key measure to improve transparency in the resource sector is the maintenance of proper accounting of all financial and in-kind payments made in relation to resource contracts, including signature bonuses and taxes.

The DRC has also been participating in the Kimberley Process since 2003 to eliminate trade in conflict diamonds. Setting up strong internal controls over the mining and trade in diamonds and their enforcement are priorities to ensure that it can track all diamonds from the mine to the point of export: a crucial component of the Kimberley Process. A priority focus could be on monitoring known problem areas, particularly diamond mines closer to the borders and mines with high production. These would also require strong political will and support.



### BOX 1. THE 3X6 APPROACH

The 3x6 Approach originated in the Burundi Country Office of UNDP, as an innovative way to facilitate the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and other populations affected by conflict. It is made up of three organizing principles — inclusiveness, ownership and sustainability — and six discrete steps: enrolment, rapid income generation, savings, joint-venturing, investing and expanding markets.

The principle of inclusiveness has both individual and collective dimensions. Individual inclusion refers to the voluntary participation of people affected by conflict in the rehabilitation of social infrastructure. Collective inclusion implies community definition of their development vision — in other words, that it is community-driven. Community development plans (*Plan Communal de Développement Communautaire* — PCDC) define the development priorities of communities in the post-conflict scenario, such as rebuilding roads, health posts and schools, rehabilitating irrigation and marshlands and other such interventions. Through these interventions, community dividends are produced that benefit all community members regardless of whether or not they participate directly in the rehabilitation actions.

The principle of ownership ensures that community members participating in social infrastructure rehabilitation organize themselves to implement an economic activity (and share the risk with others) to ensure future income, based on their own interests, skills, the economic potential of the community, and assessment of most feasible option.

Sustainability refers to making choices among different opportunities, accessing markets to increase incomes and generate sustainable employment.

Six steps constitute the approach:

- 1st** Enrolment refers to community members (vulnerable members of the host community, particularly women and youth, demobilized ex-combatants and returning refugees) signing up to participate in the reconstruction of social infrastructure.
- 2nd** Participants in the reconstruction projects receive a daily wage for a period of three months, which constitutes initial income to the participant and an injection of ‘new capital’ into the community. Extending the period of reconstruction to six months is under consideration, to provide a longer period of time for people to work together.
- 3rd** Participants are obliged to save a portion of the money they receive, which is deposited in a savings account at a local financial institute.
- 4th** Individuals are then encouraged to form a group with others in joint ventures for the implementation of an economic activity once the initial three-month period comes to an end.
- 5th** The total amount of capital that the group has is then tripled by the project. For example, a group may be interested in growing vegetables to sell in a local market, and they collectively save US\$100, for which the project will invest an additional US\$300, allowing the group to have start-up capital of US\$400.
- 6th** A feasibility study will be conducted to confirm that the proposed project idea (vegetable production and marketing) is economically viable and access to a local market is ensured.



The governments with rich natural resources in the region should consider how to harness their natural wealth to advance human development. It is only by enhancing development and enabling links between the sustainable use of resources and improvements in well-being that the vicious cycle of conflict and natural resource extraction can be broken. The UNDP strategy on natural resources provides an in-depth discussion of and proposals for what can be done and how, including, for example, using a certain portion of revenues from extractive resources to establish ‘Natural Resource Funds’ for future generations. The revenues should also be strictly managed under the purview of parliaments to ensure they are used effectively for productive purposes. Environmental damage from extractive industries has come as a result of unregulated operators which undertake logging and improper land management. Environmental management is important for livelihoods and sustainable development. A key aspect of environmental management is the regulation of logging and extractive industries, with set standards for minimizing environmental damage and compensatory mechanisms such as corporate social responsibility.

## ii. Reducing poverty and inequality

With such a rich natural resource base, countries in the GLR have opportunities to quickly reduce poverty and inequality and to foster human development, if — and only if — natural resources are properly managed and used to improve livelihoods. There is the potential for faster economic growth, but it is important that governments take steps to ensure that investments in natural resources do not create enclave economies with limited employment generation capabilities. The resources that are generated could be used to invest in people through enhanced and better public service delivery, especially health services and education.

The lack of access to land, particularly for women, is a key impediment to faster growth and a contributing factor for high poverty in the GLR. Land reforms and reforms in inheritance laws are essential for removing these impediments. Rural infrastructure is another bottleneck constraining income generation in rural communities. There need to be concerted efforts to develop rural infrastructure, facilitate/enhance production and market what is produced. Improving access to electricity in rural areas would support the development of small- and medium-scale enterprises and reduce poverty and inequality faster.

Ensuring better access to production inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, and to credit, and the development of irrigation facilities, storage and marketing strategies are critical for increasing rural development and reducing poverty. However, large populations and the continued rapid population growth are key concerns, in part because they exert pressure on land use, which can lead to conflict. Proper population management is vital for sustainable development in the region. It is also important to recognize that gender equality and women’s empowerment are an integral part of national development, peacebuilding and conflict-resolution, and are at the centre of humanizing the world.

While political and economic interventions are vital in redressing inequalities, cultural interventions are also important. For example, the regional UN Women strategy on peace and security aims to bring about coherence in UN Women’s efforts and encourage the exchange of best practices in the region. It is designed to strengthen the capacities of women as mediators and provide

more space for women's contributions to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (UN Women, 2012). Likewise, it is important to encourage projects aimed at improving the conditions of people living in poverty, as recommended by the World Bank (2011a), especially in relation to poor cross-border trading between the DRC and its neighbours.

### iii. Strengthening the democratization process and good governance

Democratic processes combined with effective, transparent and accountable government enhance political stability and the capacity of countries to prevent and manage conflict by channeling grievances. They also improve sustainable economic growth by encouraging private investment, integration into the global economy and more effective disbursement of aid. This increases prospects for reducing poverty and achieving development objectives. Democratic processes and government accountability also help to identify and address the needs of populations, and provide an institutional framework for the protection of civil and political rights.

Institutionalizing principles of good governance is essential for effective and inclusive public service delivery, the coherent disbursement and absorption of donor aid flows, the creation of a functioning state of law and the reduction of risk associated with private investment. Democratic systems allow for peaceful articulation, debate and reconciliation of divergent sectoral and group demands. By contrast, the lack of democracy and good governance characterized, for example, by corruption and patrimonial practices, has a regressive impact on poor people, limits economic growth and development, and increases the risk of violent conflict.

The countries of the GLR have made substantial progress in developing practices of good governance, democracy and human rights since the 1990s. For example, it is now broadly accepted that regime legitimacy stems from free and fair elections, and there is strong popular support for democratic forms of government. However, powerful drivers of bad governance and anti-democratic tendencies persist, and there is still a substantial gap between the superficial demonstrations of democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, and the actual practice of democracy. Thus there is still a need for development partners to support and maintain recent moves

towards democratization with improved strategies and intervention. Moreover, since good governance is vital for economic growth in the GLR, it is estimated that the majority of countries in the subregion need to double their per capita income to achieve the MDGs by 2015.

### iv. Regional integration

Empirical studies confirm the statement "Countries that trade with each other on equitable terms are less likely to fight each other" (World Bank, 2011b). Although the specific causal pathways are still much debated, there is a growing consensus that the benefits of trade reduce the incentives for countries to engage in costly conflicts with their trade partners.<sup>4</sup> In line with this conviction, the links between economies and conflict in the context of the GLR have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, as it has been observed that violent conflicts have a devastating impact on the region's economy and individual livelihoods.<sup>5</sup>

Conceptually, regional approaches to peacebuilding and conflict management can be cooperative or integrative. Cooperation agreements involve selected policy harmonization or joint production of public goods, such as security. Integration arrangements are characterized by much deeper mutual interactions or synergies. Regional cooperation initiatives tend to be more selective in their coverage and generally require shorter-term commitment than integration. Research indicates that countries of the GLR can benefit more from regional cooperation than from formal trade integration. Unfortunately, existing integration agreements in the region mainly focus on trade and production,<sup>6</sup> and vary in their effectiveness. However, they do face similar obstacles, namely:

- lack of political commitment by Member States;
- insufficient attention to existing regional political and economic asymmetries;
- continued mistrust and mutual suspicion among members; and
- top-down approaches that exclude many stakeholders.

Regional cooperation is very important in developing constructive relations between States, which is essential for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the GLR. It is equally crucial in pooling resources to provide public goods for populations and creating platforms for dialogue





regarding shared interests. For instance, the energy sector lends itself to regional cooperation. GLR countries, with assistance from the international community, can share the burden of financing and managing large infrastructure projects by interconnecting and stabilizing their electricity grids. Energy cooperation has the potential for peacebuilding through a number of mechanisms. First, it creates interdependence and mutual benefits in a strategic economic area. Second, interdependence requires and is intended to build trust. Ideally, cooperation with respect to energy can bring together political leaders as well as technical experts, which can open channels for broader dialogue. Third, affordable electricity and a reliable energy supply are prerequisites for long-term economic recovery and development. They both allow for value creation — for example, by facilitating the further processing of raw materials and agricultural produce. In areas where poverty and socio-economic deprivation are causes of conflict, energy production may contribute to peacebuilding if it promotes equitable access and improves human security by enabling socio-economic development.

It is essential to promote economic integration as a way of deepening ties between countries in the region and strengthening common interest in the promotion of peace, stability and cooperation. One way of achieving this is by rationalizing and strengthening the capacity of the existing economic blocs in the region and deepening economic integration, not only in terms of reducing trade tariffs but also in areas such as migration/movement of people, trade facilitation and investment. Economic integration could also be achieved by promoting trans-border community cooperation initiatives that

strengthen ties between local communities living in border regions and enable them to address challenges and seize opportunities of common interest.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the ongoing joint initiative by the UNDP Country Offices in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda to set up a support programme to revitalize the regional economic integration process and improve living conditions. The programme focuses on three main components:

- institutional support to the secretariats of regional organizations to provide leadership for the promotion of economic integration and national institutions, including the line ministries in charge of economic integration issues;
- support to the development of intraregional trade, including the development of networks of different stakeholders for greater participation in national and regional dialogues related to economic policy in general, and trade policies in particular; and
- support to the development of value chains for products or sectors with high intraregional trade potential, and creation of added value and jobs, especially for youth and women involved in sectors such as the environment, climate change and the management of natural resources.

## B. MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM MEASURES

### i. Infrastructure development

The lack of infrastructure in the DRC, especially roads connecting Kinshasa to eastern provinces, is considered one of the key obstacles to eastern DRC's development of strong relations eastwards, as Kinshasa is considered far away. This lack of infrastructure is also a reason for weak state control in eastern DRC. Throughout the region, economic development in transition economies rests mainly on the expansion of infrastructure and basic social service delivery. In addition, infrastructure, including roads, power supply and communication networks, among other factors, could play an important role in integrating economies in the GLR.

### ii. Political inclusion

Developing political space as an alternative to militancy and promoting inclusion of all communities in the

political process are key to sustaining peace in the GLR. Fostering protection of the political rights and civil liberties of all communities is a good starting point. Most communities in the region, in particular eastern DRC, have experienced lengthy conflicts, and inter-communal challenges have worsened, which requires an urgent integration of local communities into the political and development frameworks. As the Goma conference demonstrated, including community representation in the peace, political and development process can build consensus, reduce militia activity and support disarmament (Bihuzo, 2012). Political and economic decentralization could be an effective medium- to long-term measure. This is an area where UNDP can play an important role, including by speeding up the process. Its neutrality could help to engage national, regional and local authorities in the dialogue, which could give a boost to the process and accelerate its implementation.

Another critical step is to promote reconciliation, tolerance and democratization. UNDP operates at different levels (national, provincial and local) to promote reconciliation and democratization through interventions with community radio stations, legal advice, participatory planning, and other activities. This reconciliation process could also include engaging with militias by offering alternatives, such as enabling militia groups to transform themselves and become involved in the formal political process, thereby creating a future to certain members of the groups. In particular, those not directly involved in war crimes could be considered for reintegration. The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) is a good example of this type of initiative (see Box 2).<sup>7</sup>

Given the overriding regional political and ethnic dimensions of the conflict and instability in the region, it is crucial to continue providing strong external support to ensure that all countries in the region meet their obligations. In this regard, the UNDP–World Bank partnership could play a vital role in sustaining the peace process through strengthened political engagement and economic empowerment.

### iii. Reform of the security sector

Reforming the security sector, particularly with respect to the army and police force, is a key aspect of transforming a conflict-ridden country into one that is governed

by a more democratic system. UNDP has a history of providing support for security-sector reform, with an emphasis on justice and the police. Although UNDP is not directly involved in reforming armies, it can support the improvement of living conditions of members of the military and their families.

One of the basic objectives of security-sector reform is the consolidation of State authority, particularly in eastern DRC, which, among other things, will contribute to preventing armed groups from destabilizing neighbouring countries. In line with UNDP's mandate, this can strengthen and build capacity, especially for the government. Most of UNDP's interventions are designed to strengthen State authority, but specific programmes, similar to Stabilization and Reconstruction of Former Armed Conflict Areas in Eastern Congo (STAREC), need to be encouraged.

### iv. Institutional change and development

New State institutions need to be established, and existing ones need to be transformed to meet the increasing demands in the new political and economic environments in the countries of the GLR. These include further structural reform of government institutions, including the financial sector, democratic institutions (parliament, provincial assemblies), and the control mechanisms of public finance, the national election commission and the national institute for statistics. These are areas where UNDP has a long history of engagement in development assistance.

There are likely to be greater opportunities for regional as well as international trade in the GLR. Exploiting the gains from these opportunities requires the development of key support services within relevant Trade-supported Institutions (TSIs) in disciplines such as quality management, standards (including environmental standards), exporter training and supply-chain management. These TSIs will subsequently support selected small and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in the above-mentioned sectors to upgrade their business processes and export management skills, and thereby improve their competitiveness in regional and overseas markets. Potential negative environmental effects could be duly addressed by raising awareness, providing expert advice and promoting good practices.



## BOX 2. MULTI-COUNTRY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (MDRP)

**Purpose:** Enhance the prospects for stabilization and recovery in the region. The strategy's main premise is that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is necessary to establish peace and restore security, which are in turn preconditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

**Objectives:** (i) Provide a comprehensive regional framework for disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts for both government and irregular forces; (ii) establish a single mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization; and (iii) serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilization and reintegration programmes.

**Design:** Based on the premise that no single donor or agency can address the complexity of DDR issues in the region; therefore, opted for a partnership of national governments, donor countries, UN agencies, the World Bank and local implementers, which had a regional approach yet was based on national ownership:

- **Partnership:** It was recognized that a successful DDR strategy required a range of activities that no single actor would be able to provide, so different actors combined their capabilities and resources.
- **Regional approach:** It was understood that the conflicts in the GLR were mainly trans-border disputes, so a regional approach to dealing with DDR issues was seen as necessary.
- **National ownership:** MDRP started from the assumption that for DDR activities to be successful and sustainable, national actors must define and take responsibility for the DDR activities in their respective countries. In practice, national actors were defined as the governments of the participating countries.

**Finance:** The original costs estimated in the MDRP strategy were US\$500 million. The donor community was to provide US\$350 million via a Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) which would be established as part of MDRP and administered by the World Bank, and the International Development Association (IDA) would contribute the remaining US\$150 million. Funds would be allocated to one of four activities: (i) national programmes, (ii) special projects, (iii) regional activities, and (iv) programme management.

**DDR strategy:** Designed to reflect the lessons learned from previous DDR activities in Africa and elsewhere, it addresses the following phases:

1. **Disarmament** of ex-combatants should be a distinct phase without directly associated benefits to avoid giving the impression that the DDR programme is a weapons buy-back programme that rewards ex-combatants for handing over weapons. Disarmament refers to the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons. Experience suggests that the quality and calibre of the weapons improves as disarmament proceeds and mutual trust and confidence are gradually built. Ideally, arms should be destroyed as soon as possible after they are collected, but the government involved may choose to retain some of them. The best confidence-building measure for disarmament is a manifestly fair process, well planned and executed with transparent monitoring and verification.
2. **Demobilization** is the shortest phase but logistically complex. Its successful implementation is a precondition for the subsequent provision of targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance.





Key demobilization activities include the distribution of non-transferable ID cards, the collection of socio-economic data and the establishment of a database on the beneficiary population. Furthermore, the assembly of ex-combatants provides a good opportunity for health counselling and HIV/AIDS education and voluntary testing, as well as the dissemination of information about programme benefits and civilian life. Particular attention needs to be paid to clear eligibility criteria and screening processes to avoid targeting errors.

- 3. Reinsertion** immediately after demobilization is crucial, as the ex-combatants are usually financially vulnerable as they have lost their source of (formal or informal) income. During this period, ex-combatants require a transitional safety net to cover their families' basic material needs. Cash assistance is often preferable to in-kind support, as it maximizes beneficiary choice and reduces administrative costs.
- 4. Economic reintegration** is a targeted support to help ex-combatants' families to establish sustainable livelihoods. To be relevant and cost-effective, such assistance should be tailored to their socio-economic profile and adjusted to the economic environment. Female ex-combatants often require customized support to establish sustainable livelihoods. The ex-combatants should receive no more support than is necessary to help them attain the general standard of living of the communities into which they reintegrate. Furthermore, reintegration assistance should be limited in time to avoid the creation of a dependency syndrome. Information, counselling and referral services can assist them to assess their livelihood options and find employment. Apprenticeships in the informal sector combine the benefits of vocational training and employment and are thus preferable to training only. Micro-projects can help ex-combatants secure their economic independence and self-employment. They are, however, also complex interventions that require significant administrative capacity and a stable market environment. Ultimately, ex-combatants are reintegrated into a broader economic context. The creation of viable long-term employment opportunities for ex-combatants is closely linked to growth of the private sector and associated employment generation. It should be noted that ex-combatants themselves can provide a significant human resource contribution to the civilian economy.
- 5. Social reintegration** is often eased by the support of an extended family network. Therefore, ex-combatants should be encouraged to reintegrate in the vicinity of their extended families. Informal networks of ex-combatants, discussion groups, associations and joint economic ventures are important elements of successful economic and social reintegration. Efforts to structure assistance to ex-combatants such that communities of return benefit can offer incentives for collaboration and acceptance, thereby strengthening social capital. Care should be taken to prevent the stigmatization of ex-combatants as unfit for military service or as conveyors of disease and violence. Community sensitization and information efforts are paramount in this regard. The fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed.

**Institutional issues:** Programme coordination by one civilian agency with overall programme responsibility, balanced by decentralization of implementation to regions and communities makes for a powerful institutional arrangement. Where possible, existing implementation capacities should be leveraged. The employment of ex-combatants as counsellors and field staff can facilitate reintegration.



## 4. REQUIRED MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING MEASURES AND IMPLEMENTATION ENTITIES

The challenge of sustaining regional peace looms large in the GLR. The ongoing conflicts in the DRC and failed peace agreements with rebels exacerbate the lack of trust and confidence at all levels. This makes shared efforts to bring about effective peacebuilding — let alone economic recovery at the national and regional levels — a distant goal. Tensions and suspicions exist among some governments in the region, and there is limited confidence in each other's ability and/or willingness to address the root causes and drivers of conflict. In exploring means to strengthen peacebuilding and conflict resolution, it is crucial to understand context-specific circumstances so that proposed interventions have the potential to address the regional dimensions of economic interdependence, conflict and peace. The information in this section is based on our understanding of the regional situation, examination of books and reports, direct impressions from conversations, as well as our observation of phenomena on the ground. We focus our analysis on strengthening national political will as a way to reinforce policy dialogue, economic interdependence and capacity-building around natural resource management.<sup>8</sup>

The implementation of the PSC framework needs to be promoted and supervised by the highest bodies of the region's follow-up mechanism, which is the summit level of Heads of States and Governments. Only their involvement will ensure the necessary political will and sustained commitment from all Member States. Their involvement will also facilitate the mobilization of resources from Member States and international partners as well as the sustainability of the efforts of the Special Envoy for the GLR.

### A. POLICY DIALOGUE AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Building peace in the GLR largely depends on the efforts of the region's governments and people. However, cooperation and assistance from development partners can make a critical difference. Important policies, programmes and initiatives have been put in place to enable and promote peacebuilding in the region, but these require further development. There are still gaps

between declared policies and real practices. Initiatives are often inadequately designed, resourced or implemented, and sometimes undermined by other types of more selfish engagement with some member countries. In line with this, we strongly support the strengthening of sectoral cooperation among countries of the GLR. It is worth noting that, while the Rwandan government's official diplomatic ties to the DRC have been broken for a number of years, electricity still continues to flow between the two countries through a joint management scheme. These formal and informal economic cooperation schemes have persisted throughout decades of war and cycles of violence, signifying the resilience of such technical networks in the face of conflict.

### B. CAPACITY-BUILDING AROUND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Experience in the DRC has reinforced the view that mineral wealth (oil, metals, diamonds, timber, wildlife etc.) can be a curse rather than a blessing. In the entire

GLR and elsewhere in Africa, violent conflict has been more likely in countries that are rich in natural resources than in those that have resource scarcity. World Bank econometric studies have indicated that developing countries are more than twice as likely to experience armed conflict if more than 25 percent of their GDP comes from the production and trade of mineral resources or timber. In fact, the availability of rich natural resources creates incentives for conflict, including rent-seeking, economic instability and conflict financing. Control of territories rich in resources creates opportunities to gain rents from their exploitation, which generate greed-based incentives for taking such control. Also, high dependence on the export of natural resources is always associated with complacency in relation to diversifying the economy, and makes economies highly vulnerable to external trade shocks. Finally, once violent conflict begins, the availability of rich natural resources can help to finance the continuation of the conflict.

The complexity and context specificity of the interrelationship between resources, their abundance or scarcity, and conflict are great challenges for the GLR. Although each civil war in the region has its own logic and idiosyncratic characteristics, the following two aspects should be taken into consideration by governments and development partners in conflict-preventive policies in the region. First, to prevent, manage and end civil and inter-State wars in the countries of the GLR, it is essential to build capacity and establish or rehabilitate national legal institutions and administrations to handle, allocate and distribute revenues from the exploitation of natural resources. Second, while the State must be recognized as an important actor in this, it is equally important to secure individual livelihoods.

### C. FINANCING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK OF HOPE

Securing adequate funding for the type of measures outlined in the previous sections is critical for the successful implementation of the Framework of Hope for the DRC and the GLR. During the joint United Nations/World Bank Group high-level mission to the GLR in May 2013, the President of the World Bank, Dr. Jim Yong Kim, pledged US\$ 1 billion in new funding in support of the implementation of the

framework agreement. These funds are to be spent in assisting countries in the region to provide better health and education services, generate more cross-border trade, and fund hydroelectricity projects. In an interview with Reuters on 21 May 2013, the UN Secretary-General indicated that these funds were contingent on signatory countries honouring the provision of the Framework of Hope agreement.

The launch of this fund is an important step towards securing tangible dividends for peace, security and development in the GLR. By contrast, the Special Fund for Reconstruction and Development (SFRD) established in 2008 and managed by the African Development Bank (AfDB) had only received commitments of \$12.13 million from donors and Member States at the time of its launch, and was only managing \$4 million in funds by November 2009.

It is important to note that the GLR is already one of the largest recipients of official development assistance (ODA), accounting for around 35 percent of total ODA received in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005. In 2011, the country signatories to the ICGLR received \$16.8 billion in ODA, with the DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi alone accounting for \$11.4 billion that same year.

The World Bank is yet to release the exact details of its \$1 billion pledge to the GLR, but the information available suggests that these funds will take the form of zero-interest loans to be channelled through the Bank's concessional loans and grants arm, the International Development Association (IDA) fund. Funding will be going to two main regional development priority areas:

- recovery of livelihoods to reduce the vulnerability of people living in the GLR whose communities have suffered greatly during conflict in the region; and
- revitalizing and expanding cross-border economic activity to spur greater opportunity and integration in the areas of agriculture, energy, transport and regional trade.

Most of this \$1 billion pledge by the World Bank is already committed to specific projects or initiatives in the region. For example, \$340 million will finance the 80 megawatt Rusumo Falls hydroelectric project



for Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. An additional \$150 million has been earmarked for the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi I and II hydroelectric projects and to finance the new Ruzizi III hydroelectric plant, which will be supplying electricity to Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. Funds amounting to \$100 million are also targeted at supporting agriculture and rural livelihoods for internally displaced persons and refugees in the region. Moreover, the Bank is planning to use \$165 million of these funds to build roads in the DRC's North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale provinces and a further \$180 million for improving infrastructure and border management along the Rwanda–DRC border.

Some of these projects are being supported by other development partners. For instance, according to the

European Union, African European donors have pledged up to EUR400 million for the Ruzizi III project and associated infrastructure (e.g. in power transmission and distribution), while the feasibility studies for the Rusumo project have benefited from support from SIDA and NORAD, as well as from the World Bank.

Based on the available information, it appears that the \$1 billion World Bank pledge in support of the Framework of Hope agreement will target large-scale development projects (the 'hardware'), addressing the immediate developmental needs of the DRC and countries on its eastern border. It is unclear, in this sense, whether additional financing will be made available to fund programmes to support non-infrastructure and non-economic sectors, which are instrumental

**TABLE 7. NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE GREAT LAKES REGION (CURRENT US\$ MILLIONS)**

Country	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Angola	415	164	248	369	239	238	200
Burundi	364	431	479	522	561	630	579
Central African Republic	89	134	177	257	242	261	272
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1,882	2,197	1,357	1,766	2,357	3,543	5,522
Congo, Rep.	1,425	258	119	485	283	1,312	254
Kenya	759	947	1,327	1,366	1,776	1,629	2,474
Rwanda	577	603	723	934	934	1,032	1,278
Sudan	1,826	2,048	2,121	2,566	2,351	2,076	1,138
Uganda	1,192	1,586	1,737	1,641	1,785	1,723	1,580
Tanzania	1,499	1,883	2,822	2,331	2,933	2,958	2,445
Zambia	1,172	1,468	1,008	1,116	1,267	914	1,073
Total DRC, Rw., Bur., Ug. & Tz.	5,514	6,701	7,117	7,195	8,570	9,887	11,404
Total for ICGLR countries	11,200	11,719	12,116	13,354	14,728	16,317	16,814
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	32,870	41,233	35,609	40,267	44,070	44,589	46,353
% DRC, Rw., Bur., Ug., Tz./SSA	34.1%	28.4%	34.0%	33.2%	33.4%	36.6%	36.3%
% ICGLR /SSA	16.8%	16.3%	20.0%	17.9%	19.4%	22.2%	24.6%

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online, accessed 19 June 2013).

in enabling the successful implementation of the framework agreement (e.g. judicial cooperation, gender and women's empowerment, governance reform, natural resource management, decentralization). It is also unclear whether additional funds will be made available for technical assistance and institutional capacity development at the local, national or regional level. This would include, for instance, targeting specific bodies and mechanisms (including a regional oversight mechanism, mentioned in the agreement), which are also critical to long-lasting peace, security and development in the region.

In a region traditionally rich in natural resources, and with new discoveries of substantial oil and gas reserves in Uganda, the DRC, Kenya, Tanzania and even Rwanda, coming online, sound management of extractive industries could provide an equally important source of development financing for countries in the GLR. For example, it is estimated that the recently discovered oil resources in Uganda's western Albertine Graben region (on the border with the DRC), estimated at reserves of 3.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, could generate anywhere between \$1 billion and \$2 billion annually for the Government of Uganda, once full production operations commence towards the end of the decade. This could potentially add the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP to the government's domestic financing budget.

Given the renewed and growing importance of mineral wealth in the region, it is essential to ensure the sound and sustainable management of these resources, as this represents a valuable and sustainable source of development financing for peace, security and development in the GLR. UNDP could play an important role in assisting these efforts, given the recent focus on natural resource management and the launch of new initiatives in this area, such as the South-South Energy Initiative (SSEI) and RBA's Harnessing Extractive Industries for Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa programme.

#### **D. COORDINATION MECHANISM FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GLR**

This section discusses the importance of coordinating efforts of different actors involved in the framework agreement. It also addresses the importance of integrating cross-cutting issues for the success of this initiative, with



particular attention given to human rights, gender and HIV/AIDS, and suggests ways this could be achieved.

Sharing responsibility between stakeholders and different actors is key for the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the framework agreement. Even though it called for the establishment of a regional oversight mechanism, the framework needs to bring in internal actors in each step. These internal actors are parliamentarians, human rights organizations, business groups, trade unions, cross-border organizations, academics, women's groups, young people, and others.

In the implementation phase, it would be desirable to share responsibilities. With regard to the political aspects and governance under the national political powers, such as promotion of peace, security, human rights and construction of constitutional States, national parliaments and regional groupings should include in their agenda the follow-up of actions taken. This can create effective synergy in efforts in all countries and between the countries. Any delays could be identified and measures taken to eliminate them in a coordinated manner. The NEPAD peer review could be used to report on the progress made and what remains to be done. With regard to human rights, countries should engage in the periodic assessment of the UN Commission for Human Rights, to use the same instruments to measure progress.

With regard to socio-economic development aspects, national private sectors should organize themselves to

own market shares, and special provisions should be taken in their favour to enhance their respective capacity to fully participate in the formulation of national and regional economic, social and development policies. For this, the support capacities of regional and national institutions have to be strengthened to help the private sector increase its competitiveness in export, links with markets and SME exports, with particular emphasis on women-owned businesses. Then, relevant regional business networks have to be strengthened to provide an effective interface between the Regional Economic Community (REC) secretariats and the private sector in the regions, and thereby constitute an outreach mechanism for regional trade promotion activities. A regional trade information system, to be anchored within the REC secretariats (and/or relevant regional TSIs) and reaching out to national focal points, has to be established to serve as a platform for trade information exchange between the regional and national levels. The platform could be based on modern information technology, including mobile telephony to provide market alerts to exporters.

For cross-cutting issues whose effects in a country may extend to other countries, such as HIV/AIDS or gender, it would be desirable to organize meetings among national actors to develop joint programmes to be implemented in all countries, with a specific mechanism to monitor and evaluate results. These meetings among national stakeholders will define synergies to develop, taking into account cross-border effects as well as the sharing of best practices with courses in each country.

Notwithstanding the type of coordination mechanism put in place, it should carefully consider taking into account the traditional power structure, which happens to be a decentralized one. In most countries in the region, traditional authorities at chiefdom levels still play important roles in the development process. Involving them as an entire stakeholder in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the results of the PSC will foster their feeling of being part of the process and responsible for the results to be achieved, as well as the sustainability of actions. Another important and necessary element of the national ownership and participation is to disseminate information and promote knowledge among the citizens and stakeholders in the Member States to participate in the process. Only if people in the region and, especially,

at the border zones know, understand and are aware of the efforts being made will they contribute at their respective level and will local administration be able to mobilize local support for such measures. Therefore, all actions must be accompanied by public information and sensitization efforts meant to disseminate information to all populations and mobilize their support.

Coordination among Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) is also essential. In several areas, UNDP and the World Bank collaborate and/or complement each other. The Global Facility for Employment Creation in Fragile Situations (GF) is a good example of collaboration (see Box 3). The PSC opened up new potential areas of collaboration, including the following:

- **The new DDR programme:** It seems logical that a new programme for DDR is developed to ensure the socio-economic integration of people leaving the armed groups. The past experiences, in which UNDP has developed a successful community-oriented approach to reintegrate ex-combatants, are useful to combine both the need for integration of these people with the need for community development, and thus to ensure better social integration.
- **The coordination of partners and aid:** The coordination of aid and donors is an important issue, which, compared to other African countries, has so far not lived up to expectations and would need improvement. Both UNDP and the World Bank try to contribute to better coordination, especially through the thematic/sectoral working groups, some of which are quite effective, while others are less so.
- **The transition from humanitarian aid to stabilization and development:** Among the humanitarian donors there is a clear understanding that in the DRC the humanitarian interventions go well beyond the traditional humanitarian approach (saving lives). The differences between humanitarian, stabilization and development interventions have become more and more obscure. This also needs a deeper reflection on the funding mechanism, complementarity and alignment of the different interventions and more coherence between the coordination and decision-making structures of the three different logics.

### BOX 3. PUTTING JOBS AT CENTRE STAGE: GLOBAL FACILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS (GF)

**Who are the participating institutions?** The GF is a joint initiative comprising the World Bank Group (WBG), International Financial Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

**Why do we need a GF?** The GF is part of the response by the WBG and participating institutions to the challenge of creating jobs in fragile situations. The ‘2011 World Development Report (WDR) on Conflict, Security and Development’ emphasized the need to focus more squarely on jobs (economic opportunities) in fragile situations, through private-sector recovery and public programmes. As part of the operationalization of the 2011 WDR, three pillars have been identified for action within the WBG:

- Develop a **common framework** to elevate the issue of employment in fragile situations, including middle-income countries and transition countries contending with violence. This framework is informed by the ‘2013 WDR on Jobs’ as well as external partnerships with the UN, the ILO, key multilateral and bilateral organizations and regional think tanks.
- Develop **fragility-sensitive instruments** to facilitate private-sector-led employment. IFC: microfinance, SME management solutions, special economic zones, and revenue management products for extractive industries. MIGA: a proposed facility for fragile situations to protect investors from non-commercial risks.
- Undertake **research** on private-sector development in fragile situations, given the important contribution of the private sector to peacebuilding and state-building as a stabilizing economic (and political) force, and source of sustainable growth.

**What are the objectives of the GF?** Its aim is to promote greater attention to the jobs agenda, based on the belief that fragile situations exhibit fundamentally different environments and require a different business model among development partners. The GF supports equitable access to jobs — across ethnicity, race, gender, language, rural/urban location — through partnerships between the private and public sectors. Its specific objectives are to:

- promote common yet flexible approaches to employment generation in fragile situations — linked to national strategies — to reduce the duplication of efforts and maximize synergies and the impact of interventions;
- share knowledge on job creation in fragile situations — including through the World Bank’s new knowledge platform, the HIVE, and the Jobs Platform — to help shape and create a community of practice;
- support capacity development of labour market institutions in fragile situations — for example, to ministries of Labour and statistical offices — with a view to building capacity to undertake labour market surveys, analyses and policymaking; and





### ◀ BOX 3. (CONTINUE)

- leverage resources that can be pooled and used by the participating institutions (and third party partners/contractors) to fund new activities for job creation and/or complement existing ones, based on comparative advantages.

**What are the analytical underpinnings of the GF?** These include, inter alia, the ‘2011 WDR’, the ‘WDR 2011 Operationalization Paper’ and the ‘2013 WDR on Jobs’ at the World Bank; the UN ‘Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration’; the AfBD ‘Accelerating the Response to the Youth Unemployment Crisis in Africa’; and the upcoming ‘Youth Employment Initiative’, which has been developed by the AfDB, UNECA, ILO and the African Union Commission (AUC).

**What are the pillars and activities of the GF?** The GF programme is articulated around four pillars: (i) policy development and coordination; (ii) coordinated direct interventions and programmes; (iii) shared knowledge management; and (iv) monitoring and evaluation (result tracking). The GF has a cross-cutting focus on capacity-building.

**What is the operational approach in country?** Operationally, the approach in country can follow a four-step pattern: (i) conduct joint ‘mapping exercises’ of job creation initiatives; (ii) design, where necessary, a shared programmatic approach and define outcomes; (iii) co-fund, where possible, and support the implementation of programmes and activities in a coordinated fashion; and (iv) monitor outcomes and results through a common result matrix.

**What are the sources of funds, and what does the GF finance?** The GF initiatives are self-funded by the participating institutions, using administrative budgets and trust funds. During a second phase, there is the option to develop a grant proposal and conduct direct fundraising with interested donors. The GF can finance portions of the operational approach described above — for example, contract consultants, conduct mapping exercises, undertake joint analytical work, support implementation.

**What are the selected pilot countries?** The following countries have been retained as pilot cases under the GF: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal and South Sudan. Depending on a number of criteria — windows of opportunity, country requests, donor interest, visibility, potential for learning etc. — other countries can be added.

## E. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES

Key design features that are reflected throughout the PSC include:

- capacity development is at the very heart of the implementation strategy, permeating all PSC components. Where relevant, the framework should apply a training of trainers (TOT) approach. Linked to this, an effort should be made to groom regional lead trainers associated with

relevant regional institutions and deliver respective TOT programmes with the coaching support of international experts. The added advantage of this approach is that it not only creates multiplier effects for skills transfer, but it also creates institutional capacity for specific technical disciplines in centralized locations. These institutions will ultimately constitute an important regional network, on which future trade- and economic-related development initiatives could be built;

- ensuring buy-in from all stakeholders at the various stages of the PSC implementation, to maximize the regional ownership and its sustainability;
- building on other key regional and national initiatives and programmes, complementing past achievements and linking with related initiatives;
- giving due consideration to cross-cutting themes — specifically, gender, the environment, HIV/AIDS, and youth issues;
- aligning the selection of priority sectors, determined especially by economic factors such as supply capacity in quantitative and qualitative terms, progress towards reforms and improvements in the overall business environment, commitment to sustainable export development, existence of relevant export strategies and action plans, interest in co-financing selected programme implementation, ability to build on related support programmes etc.;
- sequencing of activities, starting with a series of crucial inception activities, with a view to providing a solid base for full-scale implementation; and
- following a results-based management (RBM) approach and related principles throughout the implementation cycle of the PSC.

## F. IMPLEMENTATION ENTITIES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Most of these initiatives could be implemented individually or — to be more effective — through partnerships with existing regional arrangements. Annex 1 provides details of a host of regional initiatives that are operating in the GLR. It should be noted, however, that not all entities have been known to be successful, due to a host of issues, including the mandates on some critical areas. For example, despite continuous support, the ICGLR and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGL/CEPGL) have thus far experienced limited peacebuilding success. They lack effective capacity, political commitment and even the trust of participating countries, partly as a result of decades of conflict (Westerkamp et al., 2009).





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## 6. ANNEX 1: SUBREGIONAL ENTITIES IN THE AFRICA GREAT LAKES REGION

ENTITY	MEMBER STATES	PURPOSE/MANDATE
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)	Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (+ Eritrea as Observer)	Established on 22 February 1999, The NBI is a regional intergovernmental partnership that seeks to develop the River Nile in a cooperative manner, share substantial socio-economic benefits and promote regional peace and security.
Lake Victoria Basin Commission	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	Established in 2001, the Lake Victoria Basin Commission is a specialized institution of the East African Community (EAC) that is responsible for coordinating the sustainable development agenda of the Lake Victoria Basin.
The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)	Angola, Burundi, CAR, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia	The ICGLR is an intergovernmental organization of the countries in the GLR established following the adoption of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, in December 2006 (in force since June 2008). Its creation is based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in the GLR have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort to promote sustainable peace and development.
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC)	DRC, Rwanda and Uganda	Created in 2006 as a mechanism for strategic, trans-boundary, collaborative management of the Greater Virunga landscape, the GVTC aims at the sustainable conservation of biodiversity in the central Albertine Rift for long-term socioeconomic development.



ENTITY	MEMBER STATES	PURPOSE/MANDATE
East African Community (EAC)	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	Initially established in 1967 and then revived in 2000, the EAC is an inter-governmental organization that seeks to promote economic and political integration of its Member States. It comprises, among others, a common market, a customs union, an East African Court of Justice and an East African Legislative Assembly.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda	Created in 1996, IGAD is an eight-country regional development organization created to assist and complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve, through increased cooperation: (i) food security and environmental protection; (ii) promotion and maintenance of peace, security and humanitarian affairs; and (iii) economic cooperation and integration.
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Established in 1992, SADC is an intergovernmental organization created with the goal of furthering socio-economic cooperation and integration, as well as political and security cooperation among its Member States.
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Sao Tome e Principe	Established in 1983, ECCAS is an economic community of the African Union for promotion of regional economic cooperation in Central Africa.
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Formed in 1994, COMESA is a Free Trade Area comprising 19 Member States.
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGL/CEPGL)	Burundi, DRC and Rwanda	Originally created in 1976 and then reconstituted in 2007, the ECGL is a sub-regional organization that aims to bring about economic integration and ensure the security of Member States, seeking to create a framework for coordination and harmonization in the areas of social, economic, commercial, scientific, cultural, political, military, financial, technical and touristic development and promote trade and the free movement of people and goods.

ENTITY	MEMBER STATES	PURPOSE/MANDATE
Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Framework of Hope Agreement	Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia [Plus the heads of the AU Commission, SADC, the ICGLR and the UN]	The mechanism contemplated under the Framework of Hope Agreement involving the 11 signatory countries and the leaders of four international organizations — namely, the Chairpersons of the Africa Union Commission, SADC and the ICGLR, and the Secretary-General of the UN. Under this mechanism, signatories agree to jointly develop a plan of implementation for the framework, which includes the establishment of benchmarks and follow-up measures to deliver on commitments made under the framework.
Trilateral Lake Kivu and Ruzizi River Basin Authority (ABAKIR)	Burundi, DRC and Rwanda	Established on 12 December 2012, ABAKIR is a lake basin commission bringing together the three riparian countries of Lake Kivu that seeks to promote an integrated approach to water resources management on Lake Kivu.
Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA)	Burundi, DRC, Tanzania and Zambia	The LTA promotes regional cooperation required for socio-economic development and sustainable management of the natural resources in the Lake Tanganyika basin. It is mandated to coordinate the implementation of the Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, as well as the coordination and oversight of the implementation of the Regional Integrated Management Programme, which focuses on establishing sustainable fisheries, catchment management, pollution control, climate change adaptation and monitoring programmes.
Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization	Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda	The LVFO is an EAC institution created in 1994 to manage the fisheries resources of Lake Victoria in a coordinated manner. It aims to harmonize, develop and adopt conservation and management measures for the sustainable utilization of the living resources of Lake Victoria to optimize socio-economic benefits from the basin for the three Partner States.
Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin	Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	Established in 1978, it aims to achieve integrated development of water and land resources on the Kagera River Basin (unclear whether still active).



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The Great Lakes Region generally comprises: Burundi, Rwanda, the north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and north-western Kenya and Tanzania.
- <sup>2</sup> Where members of a particular ethnic group hold a disproportionate number of government posts.
- <sup>3</sup> The 3x6 Approach is a starting point, post-conflict, on the road to sustainable development. It is an organizational response to move from interventions that provide immediate, one-off support to populations affected by conflict to an integrated approach that creates conditions for people to take control over their development processes and outcomes by building on and transforming capacities to better understand and take advantage of economic opportunities at the same time that it contributes to economic recovery and the social and economic reintegration of populations affected by conflict. The approach proposes a simple, systematic and comprehensive response to build and consolidate peace in what is often a highly complex, economically constrained and politically contested socio-economic context.
- <sup>4</sup> Although this is more likely to reduce risks of inter-State conflicts rather than the civil wars to which the GLR has proved particularly vulnerable.
- <sup>5</sup> UNDP Country Offices in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda are currently involved in a collaborative initiative that aims to rehabilitate the Economic Community of Countries in the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL), which includes the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.
- <sup>6</sup> See the list in annex.
- <sup>7</sup> The MDRP was a regional framework, set up in 2002 and closed in June 2009, to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in the GLR. It was by far the largest DDR programme in the world, in terms of the number of countries involved, individuals demobilized and levels of funding. A dozen donors, including the World Bank, provided over US\$450 million to finance the MDRP, which successfully demobilized around 300,000 ex-combatants. During the 1990s and early 2000s, seven countries — Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda — participated in the programme (Kölln, 2011).
- <sup>8</sup> “I am seeing a political will and an urgency for peace that has to be maintained,” Mrs. Robinson told reporters in the Burundian capital, Bujumbura, the latest stop on her trip to the GLR in April 2013.

*This publication was written by UNDP Economic Advisors serving in countries in the Great Lakes Region (Ernest Bamou, Amarakoon Bandara, Alex Warren-Rodriguez, Amata Diabate, Julius Chokerah, Daniel Gbetnkom, Rimteta Ranguébaye) under the guidance of UNDP Resident Representatives and staff from the Regional Bureau for Africa at headquarters.*

*The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or their Member States.*

## PHOTO CAPTIONS AND CREDITS

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Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) / IDPs /  
A Congolese woman with her child on her back  
washes clothes in a river close to the town of Rangira  
which has been affected by the recent fighting in the  
area between government forces and rebels,  
North Kivu in the east of the  
Democratic Republic of the Congo, May 23, 2012.  
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### PAGE 2:

The El Molo are a small fishing community found on  
the south-eastern side of the lake Turkana,  
northern Kenya (Jan 2012).  
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### PAGE 6:

Farmers from an organization based in Uvira,  
South Kivu, have received two acres of land,  
machinery, seeds and hens to start their business  
as part of a UNDP project.  
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Lake Bunyonyi in Western Uganda.  
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### PAGE 11:

In the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,  
UNDP is implementing a reintegration programme for  
ex-combatants and displaced people that is helping  
them to rebuild their livelihoods.  
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A smiling farmer poses in front of a field  
in Musanze, Rwanda.  
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### PAGE 16:

Fishermen weigh their catch in Tanzania.  
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### PAGE 23:

Villagers pump water from a local borehole  
in Nazigo, Uganda.  
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### PAGE 27:

Young women in Kenya.

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United Nations Development Programme  
Regional Bureau for Africa1 United Nations Plaza  
New York, NY 10017 USA  
Tel: (212) 906-5081  
<http://www.undp.org/africa>