

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: CHN30199
Country: China
Date: 29 May 2006

Keywords: CHN30199 – China – Tibet Supporters – Kuomintang – Cultural Revolution

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Background

The applicant says her father was involved negatively with the Kuomintang and later the Cultural Revolution. She states she was involved in the Student's Movement and also protesting for freedom in Tibet.

Questions

1. Please obtain from the DIMA database the old reports stating that the KMT, CR, and SM are no longer relevant to the PRC Government, and that people are not being discriminated against because of association with them.
2. Please supply any updated reports, if relevant, on the KMT, CR and SM.
3. Please provide information regarding the attitude of the PRC Government to persons who support freedom in Tibet.

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb.gc.ca/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/refinfo_e

UK Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

US Department of State <http://www.state.gov/>

United Nations (UN)

UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>

Non-Government Organisations

Amnesty International <http://www.amnesty.org/>

Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>

Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/>

Topic Specific Links

Free Tibet Campaign <http://www.freetibet.org/>

International Tibetan Support Network <http://www.tibetnetwork.org/>
The Official Website of the Central Tibetan Administration <http://www.tibet.net/>
Tibet Foundation <http://www.tibet-foundation.org/index.php>
Tibet Online <http://www.tibet.org/>
Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy <http://www.tchrd.org/>
TibetInfoNet <http://www.tibetinfonet.net/>

Search Engines

Google <http://www.google.com.au/http://www.falundafa.org>

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database)

BACIS (DIMA Country Information database)

REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database)

ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports)

RRT Library Catalogue

RESPONSE

1. Please obtain from the DIMA database the old reports stating that the KMT, CR, and SM are no longer relevant to the PRC Government, and that people are not being discriminated against because of association with them.

Kuomintang (KMT)

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response dated 16 August 1989 provides the following information on the current treatment of children of Kuomintang (KMT) military officers:

A Canadian academic expert on Chinese politics states that the treatment of the children of former Kuomintang officers depends upon what the parents' rank had been and in what part of the country they now reside. The rank of officer will impart more significance because the attainment of this rank would have involved more active participation in politics. Otherwise, ordinary soldiers conscripted by the Kuomintang are of less concern to the Communist authorities. The person's residence is an important factor because the impact of the father's Kuomintang link which comes under the category of political background and is most likely noted on the personal dossier kept on every Chinese citizen is assessed at the discretion of local officials. (According to this source, there is a strong Chinese cultural tradition that sins of the father can be visited upon his children.)

A second academic source contacted on this request for information observes that a person with the abovementioned type of background might be discriminated against in such areas as employment.

The Department of External Affairs adds that since the events of the first weekend of June, there is a stronger possibility that such a person would encounter difficulties. Before that time, it appears that in the interests of fostering cordial relations with Taiwan (which is still governed by the Kuomintang), people with links to former Kuomintang officials were not harassed. The Departmental spokesperson corroborated the fact that the current treatment depends very much on the locale and rank factors (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989, CHN1715 – China: 1) *Current treatment of children of a Kuomintang military officer;* 2) *Proportion of Chinese population who are members of the Communist Party; Possible*

sanctions for a person who voluntarily leaves the Party; 3) Information on the demonstrations in Guangzhou City, in April-May 1989, 16 August – Attachment 1).

On 7 December 1990, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided the following advice on claims of past links with the KMT:

Although China is technically still at war with the KMT regime in Taiwan, the war ended some 41 years ago in 1949. It may be that parents of some of the applicants may have been victimised for having past links with the KMT, but applicants themselves appear not to have been ostracised as they have been able to receive an education up to tertiary level, to seek employment, and indeed to be able to leave the country.

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His father's association with the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) in 1939 would have created difficulties for the family subsequent to 1949 when the Peoples Republic was founded.

However, the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC has relaxed in recent times to the extent that there is now a major influx of Taiwanese tourists visiting China. There is also a great deal of Taiwanese investment in China, and this investment is growing.

...Notwithstanding his family's support for the KMT, it is noted that he was not discriminated as he was able to be educated up to tertiary level, and be in employment up to the time of his departure (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, *Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications*, 7 December – Attachment 2).

On 19 November 1991, DFAT provided the following advice on claims of association with the KMT:

There were 9 million KMT members in the PRC in 1949. Multiply this figure by the number of their immediate family you will get a very big number. Not all of them have been or are in prison solely because they themselves or members of their family have been in association with KMT.

Unlike in the 60's, unless one is involved with Taiwanese intelligence, action against families in the PRC for associating with KMT members has not been particularly harsh since the 80's. We are not aware of cases in recent years that have been punished because of family's KMT background (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1991, *Cable BJ 48535 – Distinction between leaders and followers*, 19 November – Attachment 3).

On 16 November 1995, DFAT was asked whether membership of a KMT linked organisation would pose problems for Chinese nationals on return to China (RRT Country Research 1995, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Cable CE572276 'RRT Request for Information CHN10894 – KMT Membership', 16 November – Attachment 4). DFAT replied on 23 November 1995. The advice is as follows:

(A) Membership of a KMT linked organisation would not/not pose any problems on return to the PRC, especially given that the applicant belongs to one expressly committed to the reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland. Members of such organisations have been returning to China for many years and, as far as we can tell, no longer experience any problems. We would note that the so-called "Revolutionary Committee of the KMT" is a legal organisation in China.

(B) DFAT consider it unlikely that membership of such an organisation per se would attract any untoward attention from the security authorities (DIMIA Country Information Service 1995, *Country Information Report No. 142/95: RRT Request for Information: KMT Membership* (sourced from DFAT advice of 23 November, 28 November – Attachment 5).

An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response dated 12 March 1996 provides the following information on the treatment by authorities of former members of the Nationalist Party and their families:

After the 1949 revolution former members of the Nationalist or Kuomintang/Guomintang Party in China were frequently charged with being counter-revolutionaries and subjected to reform or re-education through labour (HRIC 12 Mar. 1996; Ladany 1992, 57; Wu 1992, 19, 24). Human rights activist Hongda Harry Wu in his 1992 book *Laogai—The Chinese Gulag* describes this group as “historical counter-revolutionaries,” a term which refers to all those people who before 1949 had served in the Kuomintang (KMT) regime at any level above secretary in the KMT Party, section chief in the government, company commander in the military, or chief in the policeRegardless of whether or not they had ever, at that time or in the past, directly resisted the Communist Party, they were all either punished or arrested and thrown into labor reform camps. Later this category gradually expanded so that anyone who had served in the Kuomintang regime at any level, even as an ordinary staff or Party member, was treated as a counter-revolutionary. In the 1950s, 50-60 percent of the prisoners in the laogaidui [labour reform camps] belonged to this category, totaling about 10 million in all. Following a major change in Communist policy in 1978, most of the remaining prisoners of this type were released. At present, 20,000-30,000 still remain in custody (24).

Wu also quotes a July 1983 Public Security announcement which stated that “nationwide there was a total of 79,504 ‘landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements.’ Of these, 78,327 had already ‘removed their hat’ (i.e., had their former charges dismissed)” (ibid. 78).

A representative of Human Rights in China (HRIC), a New York-based group monitoring human rights practices in China, stated in a 12 March 1996 interview with the DIRB that HRIC has no recent information on the treatment of former Nationalist Party members or their relatives, but that for the most part in China, former Nationalist Party connections have by now been relegated to history. However, the HRIC representative also stated that especially in the countryside, the treatment one receives from authorities depends greatly on individual officials in particular localities, and it is possible that ill-treatment of former Nationalist Party members and their families still exists (12 Mar. 1996). According to the HRIC representative, family records and political history remain important parts of every Chinese citizen’s dossier (ibid.). However, the HRIC representative also stated that current political tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, the home of the Nationalist Party, probably have no bearing on the treatment in China of individuals with a past connection to the Nationalist Party (ibid.). The representative noted that business links between China and Taiwan remain open, and that the Chinese government has made no official announcements concerning the treatment of people with former Nationalist Party connections (ibid.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, *CHN23282.E – China: Information on the treatment by authorities of former members of the Nationalist Party and their families*, 12 March – Attachment 6).

On 12 December 1996, Professor J Bruce Jacobs of Monash University provided the following advice on whether those with KMT associations are at risk from the PRC authorities:

I also agree that you are correct that basically “those with KMT associations are now no longer at risk from the PRC authorities” (DIMA Country Information Service 1997, *Country Information Report No. 97/97: Request for advice on former member of KMT intelligence unit* (sourced from Professor J Bruce Jacobs advice of 12 December 1996), 5 March – Attachment 7).

Cultural Revolution

On 7 December 1990, DFAT provided the following advice on claims for refugee status based on the Cultural Revolution:

The Cultural Revolution was a phenomenon which affected the whole country, and millions of people were affected directly. Many people were unfairly and brutally victimised. This unhappy phase of Chinese history officially came to an end in the late 1970s. This “normalisation” of China occurred over a decade ago when many of the DORS applicants were only children.

...6. XXXX

Has provided a rather sad account of his family ostracised during the Cultural Revolution. So were many thousands of other families during that period. This is no longer the case and he cannot use the Cultural Revolution as a basis for making his refugee claim.

...As already indicated a number of times in this cable, a great number of people were affected by the confusion and struggle that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Her circumstance during that period should not be relevant to her current claim for refugee status (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, *Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications*, 7 December – Attachment 2).

On 6 July 1992, DFAT provided the following advice on claims for refugee status based on the Cultural Revolution:

It may well be true that he and his family suffered in the Cultural Revolution, as did many Chinese including most of the present senior Chinese leadership. The fact that he had such difficulties would not of itself be relevant in the 1990s. Unless there is some other evidence, say of a major political feud in which he was involved which led to enduring local hatred, his Cultural Revolution experiences...are irrelevant to his treatment by the PRC authorities if he were returned to China (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, *Cable BJ 51078 – ‘Jeremiah’ Captain: Information Request*, 6 July – Attachment 8).

On 16 February 1995, DFAT provided the following advice on return from the countryside after the Cultural Revolution:

The circumstances described by the applicant – public humiliation, detention and exile to the countryside were not isolated instances but affected millions of people from 1966 to 1976.

Persons who had been sent to the countryside were allowed to return. Depending on the influence of their relatives and the severity of the charges against them individuals began returning to their usual/former place of residence from 1972. Most had returned and had been cleared of all charges against them by 1978/79.

Permission was needed before anyone was allowed to return. This was usually in the form of a written authority issued by the Party Committee (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

1995, *Re: China: Return from countryside after the Cultural Revolution*, 16 February – Attachment 9).

On 7 May 1997, DFAT provided the following advice on claims for refugee status based on the Cultural Revolution:

Being related to persons persecuted during the Anti-Rightists Campaign and Cultural Revolution no longer carries any great stigma in China. This would be particularly so for those whose relatives had been rehabilitated (DIMIA Country Information Service 1997, *Country Information Report No. 195/97 – China: PSB and Cultural Revolution – CIS Information Request No. CHN3996* (sourced from DFAT advice dated 30 March 1997), 7 May – Attachment 10).

1989 Student's Movement

On 7 December 1990, DFAT provided the following advice on claims related to participation in the June 1989 demonstrations:

Like the Cultural Revolution, the sequence of events that occurred in June 1989 as another unhappy period of Chinese history. It was a turbulent period with mass suspicions of huge proportion.

Given the extent of disenchantment against the government, it was practicable that the government in the aftermath of June 4th crackdown would want to ensure the disenchantment be crushed completely. Consequently, many people would have been caught in the government's broad sweep of suspects, only to be released after interrogation when it became clear the people being released were not the major key players they seek.

Although the focus of dissent as principally in Beijing, the phenomenon occurred in other parts of China as well. As a result of the June crackdown, many people have been placed under detention. Although it is true that many are still in prison, it is fair to say many have also been released since June 89.

The thirteen cases referred to us do not appear to fit into the category of major key players the government seeks. If they were, it would have been unlikely that they would have been permitted to be issued with a second exit permit. Given the extensive Chinese security network, they would have been unlikely to depart Chinese airports wither had there been a slip in the second exit permit vetting procedures. It should be noted the referred cases were permitted to depart China legally more than 6 months after the June turmoil. It should also be noted that prior to their departure they had not been imprisoned for other than short spells when they were being interrogated, and for most of them they appeared to have retained their employment up to about the time of their departure to Australia.

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Appears his only fear of returning was because of his participation in demonstrations. As already indicated, many thousands of people participated in demonstrations. Given these demonstrations occurred over 18 months ago, it is unlikely that he would be punished for his past action (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, *Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications*, 7 December – Attachment 2).

On 31 March 1992, DFAT provided the following advice on the 1989 pro-democracy protests:

1989 Pro-democracy Protests

Inside China

After June 6 1989 there were mass suspensions of hue proportions. In the broad sweep crackdown, many individuals were detained and questioned but released when it was clear the person was not a major or key player. Prominent activists were rounded up fairly soon after 4 June, but investigation of activists in Shanghai really only began in mid-late August 1989, so 4 June to 31 August gave opportunity for them to leave.

China is concerned mainly, with those who led or participated actively in the protest movement in China itself, particularly in Beijing. Unless they had come to particular attention of the Chinese authorities through playing a leadership role, making public statements or having otherwise emerged with a high profile, it is unlikely that they would encounter any serious difficulties. Vast numbers of students and workers were given “reform through education”, which could include “Self criticism” and compulsory attendance of courses, but this kind of “brainwashing” has been a way of life for the Chinese for centuries. Other punishments could include labour, but the grass roots education carried out today is not as severe as that of the Cultural Revolution.

...Outside China

It is important to draw the distinction between organisers and followers of pro-democracy movements. Chinese authorities are most concerned about those who have assumed leadership roles in organised opposition... People involved at a high level in these activities could be punished on return with education/reform through labour, imprisonment or treatment that could amount to persecution as defined by the UN Convention.

...China's attitudes to students.

There was an original MOU on education cooperation between Australia and China in which it was stated that “Australia would take all possible steps to ensure that students return to the PRC”. China reminded Australia of this (March 1990) and gave assurances of lenient attitude towards students who had participated in protests – ie they would not be persecuted on their return. While there has been evidence to the contrary, the more time that passes, the more the events of June 6 1989 fade and other issues take priority. While there is no hard evidence of this, it is reinforced by events. Why have we not heard stories of persecution of the 11,000 Australian PRC students (or others who have returned from other countries)?

...The Chinese Government would expect an account of some students' activities on their return home, but could allow that they were acting in good faith and had been misled by a biased western media. In many instances a term of “self criticism” would be the only punishment administered.

...Participation in protest activity (as distinct from “leader”) would make little difference to the prospects in non-state sectors. State sector employment is declining and it would be difficult for anyone to find jobs there (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, *Country Information China*, 31 March – Attachment 11).

On 2 July 1992, DFAT provided the following advice on treatment of those who demonstrated at Tiananmen in 1989:

Up to one million people demonstrated on some days in Beijing at that time, and commonly participated in chanting and fund-raising. Such demonstrators, even if known to the authorities have not been reported as having suffered severe punishment unless they had prominent leadership roles, or belonged to dissident organisations, or were unlucky enough to be caught up in reprisals during the first weeks of the clampdown. Depending on the political complexion of the demonstrators' home locality and work unit, they might be given counselling sessions and have a notation made on their personal files. The latter would tend to reduce their prospects of career advancement to responsible administrative or management positions. In the case of the applicant, the fact that he participated in June 1989 demonstrations might attract a more prolonged period of counselling than if he had not, but it would probably not greatly affect his prospects of regaining in time employment in a position equivalent to group leader (Department of Foreign Affairs 1992, *Cable BJ 51035 – PRC stowaway: Applicant for refugee status*, 2 July – Attachment 12).

On 1 June 1993, DFAT provided the following advice on the treatment of pro-democracy returnees to China:

We spoke recently with a former Senior Editor of a national daily newspaper and a prominent dissident released from detention last year who are well informed on dissident issues. On the question of likely treatment of office-bearers of overseas pro-democracy organisations returning to China, they made the following comments:

...It is clear from the foregoing that the Chinese authorities are not so much concerned about the issue of political activities overseas, but rather the question whether returnees have an intention to oppose the government in an effective and organised way after their return to China. Students and others who did not have a high dissident profile and significant influence in China at the time of the Tiananmen incident, even if they are now office bearers of overseas pro-democracy organisations, would have only a remote chance of facing administrative or criminal sanctions by the Chinese authorities unless, after their return, they initiated organised activities opposing the government in an effective way (Department of Foreign Affairs 1993, *Cable BJ 1879 – PRC application for refugee status – office-bearers of pro-democracy organisations*, 1 June – Attachment 13).

A June 1994 *Country Profile* by DFAT provides the following information on the treatment of June 1989 demonstrators:

3.5.5.1 This was a turbulent period. Many people were caught in the Government's broad sweep of suspects, only to be released after interrogation when it became clear the people being released were not the major players they sought.

3.5.5.2 The following are not likely to be considered key players in the demonstrations:

- given the extensive security network and vetting procedures, ability to obtain a second exit permit (except possibly Shanghai June-August in Shanghai – see 1.3)
- legal departure more than six months after the June 1989 events
- no imprisonment for other than short spells for interrogation
- retaining employment up to about the time of departure

3.5.5.3 More than 1 million people were involved in pro-democracy activities in Beijing, hundreds of thousands in Shanghai and thousands more in other cities and towns in China. Most applicants from Beijing claim to have participated in organised marches in the Square. These participants were mostly drawn from the applicant's workplace, college or University. They claim to have organised fellow students or workers, shouted slogans, carried banners, given speeches or, place pro-democracy posters on walls or building. Others claim to have responded more spontaneously to the marches and gathering of people in the Square,

providing food and money in support of the student movement. Applicants from other cities and provinces have lodged similar claims (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994, *Country Profile – China*, June, pp.28-29 – Attachment 14).

On 28 September 1994, DFAT provided the following advice on the treatment of pro-democracy activists from the Tiananmen period:

Many of the pro-democracy activists from the Tiananmen period and those who have returned have been allowed to become involved in trade and economic pursuits without hindrance from the government. The government seem to have drawn a clear line, in that they welcome participation in economic development but ban any attempt by returning dissidents to engage in political activities (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994, *Cable BJ 7550 – RRT Request: Current treatment of dissidents*, 28 September – Attachment 15).

On 9 May 1995, the Australian Consulate General in Guangzhou provided the following advice on the attitude of the authorities to participants in the events of June 1989:

It has already been noted by other posts' reporting in the past that the PRC authorities have stated that those involved in the events of June 1989 who are living overseas should not fear for themselves after returning to China. Particular emphasis has been put on encouraging students to return to put their overseas-acquired skills to use in China, but we understand that this attitude applies to anyone, regardless of their reasons for being overseas in the first place.

... We have spoken to people across a wide range of sectors in Guangdong about this. The prevailing attitude is that the government's actions following June 1989 to the vast majority of people caught up in the events are over and best forgotten. They are not interested in bringing it up again (Australian Consulate General, Guangzhou 1995, *Facsimile F.0244 – Customs Officer in Shenzhen*, 12 May – Attachment 16).

2. Please supply any updated reports, if relevant, on the KMT, CR and SM.

A US Department of State report dated June 2004 reports that in “general, the more remote the applicant's political involvement, the less likely he or she would be to face reprisals from the Government” (US Department of State 2004, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, June, Para 74 – Attachment 17).

Kuomintang (KMT)

A US Department of State report dated June 2004 reports that some applicants may claim past persecution because of alleged association with the KMT and assert that they would suffer because of this if they returned to China. The US Department of State notes that the “political environment in China today is significantly different from that of the 1950s and 1960s, and we are not aware of any citizen in the last 10 years who has suffered official discrimination because of ‘bad class’ background” (US Department of State 2004, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, June, Para 75 – Attachment 17).

Cultural Revolution

A US Department of State report dated June 2004 reports that millions of citizens across China were “brutalized arbitrarily” during the Cultural Revolution. The US Department of State notes that the “Cultural Revolution affected a large portion of China's citizens, but we are not aware that it affects Chinese who now return to China” (US Department of State

2004, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, June, Para 76 – Attachment 17).

1989 Student’s Movement

On 12 March 2002, DFAT provided the following advice on the treatment of Tiananmen-era returnees:

As far as we are aware, the likely treatment of Tiananmen-era returnees would depend to a large degree on their behaviour on return, as well as on the nature and extent of their involvement in protest activities abroad. Individuals who took a leading role in protests overseas would likely be monitored by local public security authorities on return (provided, of course, that they were aware of the individual’s return). Official interest would be ongoing if those authorities assessed that an individual was likely to continue political agitation while in China.

We are aware of one instance in 1999 where public security officials sought voluntary informal discussions with a Tiananmen-era returnees from Australia. We understand they were seeking information on the individuals’ past activities and association (DIMIA Country Information Service 2002, *Country Information Report No. 61/02 – China: Treatment on return of demonstrator* (sourced from DFAT advice dated 12 March 2002), 13 March – Attachment 18).

3. Please provide information regarding the attitude of the PRC Government to persons who support freedom in Tibet.

No information on the attitude of the PRC government to Chinese persons who live outside Tibet and who support freedom in Tibet was found amongst the sources consulted. The information found relates to Tibetans and freedom of expression and association in Tibet and is therefore not included.

According to official Chinese figures, there were 74,000 protests in China in 2004 involving 3.5 million people. According to Human Rights Watch, “workers, farmers, people forcibly evicted from their homes, victims of police abuse, and HIV/AIDS activists, amongst others” were involved in the protests (Human Rights Watch 2006, *World Report 2006 – China*, 18 January – Attachment 19). According to Chinese government statistics, over 87,000 “public order disturbances” were reported in 2005. According to the US Department of State, the vast majority of demonstrations during 2005 concerned “land disputes, housing issues, industrial, environmental, and labor matters, and other economic and social concerns” (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – China*, 8 March – Attachment 20).

The following attachments are included as they provide background information on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in China:

- The *World Report 2006* by Human Rights Watch is included as Attachment 19. Please refer to the section on “Restrictions on Freedom of Expression” (2006, *World Report 2006 – China*, 18 January – Attachment 19);
- Section 1e “Political Prisoners”, Section 2a “Freedom of Speech and Press” and Section 2b “Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association” of the most recent US Department of State’s *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005* are included as Attachment

20. (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – China*, 8 March – Attachment 20); and
- Section 6.191 to 6.212 “Freedom of Association and Assembly”, Section 6.25 to 6.47 “Freedom of Speech and the Media” and Section 6.411 to 6.429 “Political Activists” of the April 2006 UK Home Office’s *Country of Origin Information Report – China* is included as Attachment 21; (UK Home Office report 2006, *Country of Origin Information Report – China*, April – Attachment 21).

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List of Attachments

1. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989, *CHN1715 – China: 1) Current treatment of children of a Kuomintang military officer; 2) Proportion of Chinese population who are members of the Communist Party; Possible sanctions for a person who voluntarily leaves the Party; 3) Information on the demonstrations in Guangzhou City, in April-May 1989*, 16 August. (CISNET REFINFO CHN1715)
2. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, *Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications*, 7 December. (CISNET China CX755)
3. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1991, *Cable BJ 48535 – Distinction between leaders and followers*, 19 November. (CISNET China CX1365)
4. RRT Country Research 1995, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Cable CE572276 ‘RRT Request for Information CHN10894 – KMT Membership’, 16 November. (CISNET China CX12520)
5. DIMIA Country Information Service 1995, *Country Information Report No. 142/95: RRT Request for Information: KMT Membership* (sourced from DFAT advice of 23 November, 28 November. (CISNET China CX12554)
6. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, *CHN23282.E – China: Information on the treatment by authorities of former members of the Nationalist Party and their families*, 12 March. (CISNET REFINFO CHN23282.E)
7. DIMIA Country Information Service 1997, *Country Information Report No. 97/97: Request for advice on former member of KMT intelligence unit* (sourced from Professor J Bruce Jacobs advice of 12 December 1996), 5 March. (CISNET China CX21553)
8. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, *Cable BJ 51078 – ‘Jeremiah’ Captain: Information Request*, 6 July. (CISNET China CX435).
9. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995, *Re: China: Return from countryside after the Cultural Revolution*, 16 February. (CISNET China CX4513)
10. DIMIA Country Information Service 1997, *Country Information Report No. 195/97 – China: PSB and Cultural Revolution – CIS Information Request No. CHN3996* (sourced from DFAT advice dated 30 March 1997), 7 May. (CISNET China CX27869)
11. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, *Country Information China*, 31 March. (CISNET China CX11485)

12. Department of Foreign Affairs 1992, *Cable BJ 51035 – PRC stowaway: Applicant for refugee status*, 2 July. (CISNET China CX1364)
13. Department of Foreign Affairs 1993, *Cable BJ 1879 – PRC application for refugee status – office-bearers of pro-democracy organisations*, 1 June. (CISNET China CX1372)
14. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994, *Country Profile – China*, June. (Sydney Library)
15. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994, *Cable BJ 7550 – RRT Request: Current treatment of dissidents*, 28 September. (CISNET China CX3018)
16. Australian Consulate General, Guangzhou 1995, *Facsimile F.0244 – Customs Officer in Shenzhen*, 12 May. (CISNET China CX6081)
17. US Department of State 2004, *China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions*, June.
18. DIMIA Country Information Service 2002, *Country Information Report No. 61/02 – China: Treatment on return of demonstrator* (sourced from DFAT advice dated 12 March 2002), 13 March. (CISNET China CX62843)
19. Human Rights Watch 2006, *World Report 2006 – China*, 18 January.
20. US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – China*, 8 March.
21. UK Home Office report 2006, *Country of Origin Information Report – China*, April.