



2007 SURVEY

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
IN EASTERN BURMA

Thailand Burma Border Consortium

October 2007

Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma
2007 Survey

With Field Research and Situation Updates by:

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Front cover photos : CIDKP, River Crossing, Kyaukgyi, 2007
MRDC, Ceasefire Area, Ye, 2007
Back cover photo : KORD, Road Crossing, Papun, 2007

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COLLOQUIAL AND HISTORICAL NAMES

Burma
Irrawaddy Division
Karenni State
Karen State
Moulmein
Mergui
Pa-an
Pegu Division
Salween River
Sittaung River
Tavoy
Tenasserim Division
Taungoo
Rangoon

SPDC NAMES

Myanmar
Ayeyarwady Division
Kayah State
Kayin State
Mawlamyine
Myeik
Hpa-an
Bago Division
Thanlwin River
Sittoung River
Dawei
Tanintharyi Division
Toungoo
Yangon

ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CIDKP	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
FBR	Free Burma Rangers
IASC	(UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
KNLP	Kayan New Lands Party
KNPLF	Karenni National People's Liberation Front
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KnSO	Karenni Solidarity Organisation
KNU	Karen National Union
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KORD	Karen Office of Relief and Development
KPF	Karen Peace Front
KSWDC	Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
NGO	non government organisation
NMSP	New Mon State Party
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNO	PaO National Organisation
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSA-N	Shan State Army – North
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SNPLO	Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation
SRDC	Shan Relief and Development Committee
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWSA	United Wa State Army



PHOTO : CIDKP, In Hiding, Kyaukgyi, 2007



PHOTO : KHRG, New Arrivals on the Salween River, 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The brutal crackdown by the Burmese military junta against the saffron revolution in September 2007 once again frustrated aspirations for a peaceful transition to democratic governance. Images beamed throughout the world clearly demonstrate the political will of the public is for national reconciliation and an end to military rule. Out of the media spotlight, the brutality of the regime and the daily struggle for survival is every bit as much a shocking reality for the internally displaced communities of eastern Burma.

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002. This year's research updates estimates of the scale and distribution of internal displacement, and documents the impacts of militarization and state-sponsored development, based on quantitative surveys with key informants in 38 townships. Trends relating to vulnerability, coping strategies and efforts at promoting protection were assessed by utilizing a multi-stage cluster sampling method to select and interview almost 1,000 households spread across six states and divisions.

This year's survey has identified 273 infantry and light infantry battalions active in eastern Burma, representing more than 30% of the Burmese Army's battalions nationwide. These troops are generally controlled by the State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC's) Coastal Command based in Mergui, South Eastern Command in Moulmein, Southern Command in Taungoo, Eastern Command in Taunggyi and Triangle Area Command in Keng Tung. Documentation in this report reflects that human rights violations committed by the Burmese Army as part of their counter-insurgency strategy are tantamount to crimes against humanity and remain a key cause of displacement. However, even the SPDC's military hierarchy has admitted that poor troop management, inadequate rations and harsh conditions resulted in low morale and an 8% increase in desertion during the past year.

Rather than alleviating poverty, state-sponsored development initiatives primarily facilitate the consolidation of military control over rural communities and induce displacement. Local livelihoods in areas surrounding proposed hydro-electric dams along the Salween River have been further undermined during the past year, with additional troop deployments to the Hutgyi dam site in Karen State during September particularly notable. Similarly, the livelihoods of Mon villagers continue to be undermined by the imposition of forced labour to secure the gas pipeline transporting electricity to Thailand. The government's promotion of castor oil plantations has become more systematic, with reports of land confiscation, extortion and forced cultivation especially significant in Southern Shan State. Palm oil and rubber plantations operated as joint ventures between local Burmese Army commanders and foreign investors have caused similar problems in Tenasserim Division, Meanwhile over 3,000 acres of farm land was confiscated in northern Karenni State to pave the way for an industrial estate.

Approximately 76,000 people were forced to leave their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict and human rights abuses during the past

year. The number of people displaced was slightly lower than last year, which was primarily related to a relaxation of restrictions in Tenasserim Division. Forced migration was most concentrated in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division where counter-insurgency operations displaced approximately 43,000 civilians. While the total number of deaths in these four townships is unknown, at least 38 villagers have been killed by the Burmese Army during 2007 in Thandaung township alone.

TBBC has previously reported that more than 3,000 villages were destroyed, forcibly relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma between 1996 and 2006. These field reports have recently been corroborated by high resolution commercial satellite imagery taken before and after the villages were displaced. Visual evidence includes the removal of structures from villages that were forcibly relocated, and burn scars where destroyed villages used to be. During the past year, at least 167 more entire villages have been displaced.

Internal displacement in eastern Burma, however, is more commonly associated with the coerced movements of smaller groups rather than entire villages. This relates to impoverishment and forced migration caused by the confiscation of land, asset stripping, forced procurement policies, agricultural production quotas, forced labour, arbitrary taxation, extortion and restrictions on access to fields and markets. The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors is distinct from the voluntary, profit-oriented, “pull-factors” more commonly associated with economic migration.

The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society is estimated to be at least half a million people. This displaced population includes 295,000 people currently in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities. A further 99,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes, while approximately 109,000 villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites.

While the overall figures are comparable to last year, lower estimates for relocation sites primarily reflect villagers’ attempts at returning to former villages or resettling nearby in Tenasserim Division and Shan State. However, it is not known how sustainable these movements will be, while SPDC campaigns to forcibly relocate and consolidate villages have intensified in northern Karen State, eastern Pegu Division and northern Mon state. Higher estimates for the internally displaced in ethnic ceasefire areas are largely attributed to the expansion of authority exercised by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the newly formed KNU/KNLA Peace Council and subsequent instability in central Karen State. A slight population increase reported from hiding sites reflects the protracted emergency for the most vulnerable communities in eastern Burma

A feature of this report is the inclusion of trend assessments which have been derived from comparisons to findings from previous household surveys conducted by TBBC and partner agencies over the past few years. In terms of vulnerability, the prevalence of threats to personal safety and security has increased, and in particular the incidence of arbitrary arrest or detention and forced conscription to porter military

supplies. Indicators suggest that restrictions on movement to fields and markets have almost doubled to become the most pervasive threat to livelihoods, ahead of forced labour and arbitrary taxation. Violence against women, and in particular the threat of domestic violence and physical assault, was perceived as most prevalent in relocation sites and mixed administration areas where Burmese Army troops are in close proximity.

Assessments of malnutrition have been utilised to quantify the extent of vulnerability. Acute malnutrition was detected amongst 9.5% of children, which borders on a serious public health problem according to World Health Organisation standards. This compares poorly to the latest national baseline figures which indicate that 7.4% of children are acutely malnourished. Given that a third of children are chronically malnourished nation-wide, it can be speculated that close to half the children in internally displaced communities suffer from stunting.

In terms of coping strategies, the significance of traders and other civilians as a source of early warning about approaching troop movements appears to have decreased during the past couple of years. Civilians have become more dependent on their own village security guards as a result of increased restrictions on movement weakening broader economic and social networks. However, accessing loans and aid from neighbours remain key mechanisms for coping with shocks to livelihoods. This highlights the continued importance of social capital within and between local communities for the development of a protective environment.

With regards to grassroots perceptions about efforts to promote protection, expectations about the benefits of human rights documentation have decreased since 2005. Nonetheless, there remains support for the promotion of attitudinal change in society to stop patterns of abuse in the long term even if legal redress is not attainable in the short term. Similarly, the protection dividend of humanitarian aid is still perceived positively by villagers although not as conclusively as in 2005. The majority of respondents continue to report that the provision of aid strengthens their economic and social links across political conflict lines or contributes to a decrease in human rights abuses. However in ceasefire areas, levels of satisfaction about the impact of ceasefire agreements decreased to less than half of the population surveyed. The main benefit identified was in relation to increased livelihood opportunities, with few respondents suggesting there had been any improvement in the human rights situation.

The findings of this sixth annual survey of internal displacement in eastern Burma are unlikely to surprise many readers, but that makes the urgency of concerted international intervention even more poignant. The military regime has committed crimes against humanity and systematic human rights violations for far too long, and the coping strategies of rural villagers are almost exhausted. A window of opportunity exists for change in Burma, an end to the primary causes of forced migration, and a new era of peace and justice. Burma's civil society has created this momentum, but the responsibility now shifts to the international community to ensure an end to the regime's impunity.

PHOTO: AP, Saffron Revolution, Rangoon, 2007



PHOTO: CIDKP, Fleeing Across Rivers, Tenasserim, 2007



CHAPTER **1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Internally displaced persons have been forced away from their homes but remain in their country of origin. The authoritative definition, as stated in standards derived from international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, recognises internally displaced persons as:

“persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”¹

In the context of conflict-induced displacement, it is not only proximity to actual fighting but also the broader effects of war that are recognised as potential causes of internal displacement. Similarly, it is accepted that internal displacement may not only be the result of violence and abuse that has already taken place but also due to the avoidance of threats which are yet to occur. Both of these conditions highlight the involuntary nature of internal displacement regardless of whether people are forced to flee conflict, violence or abuse, or alternatively obliged to leave by government orders or fear.

However, the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles’ framework describes a broader set of causes for internal displacement than the refugee-like criteria of fleeing conflict and human rights abuses. Apart from recognising forced migration caused by natural disasters, arbitrary displacement is also prohibited “in cases of large-scale development projects that are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests”.² Development-induced displacement is problematic even when part of genuine efforts at poverty alleviation. Yet in situations of protracted conflict, development projects are often closely related to militarisation and designed so that communities perceived as opposing the State bear a disproportionate share of the costs and are denied a fair share of the benefits. In such cases, “development-induced displacement constitutes a violation of human rights and humanitarian law and calls for a response from the international community”.³

References in the UN Guiding Principles about human rights violations and human made disasters reflect how “internal displacement may be caused by a combination of coercive and economic factors”⁴. This relates to impoverishment and forced migration caused by the confiscation of land, asset stripping, forced procurement policies, agricultural production quotas, forced labour, arbitrary taxation, extortion and restrictions on access to fields and markets. “Chronic deprivation of resources, capabilities, choices, security and power ... (resulting in) extreme poverty and

¹ Para 2, Introduction, *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998, UN document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; November 11, 1998

² Principle 6.2 (c), *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998

³ Courtland Robinson, 2003, *Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement*, Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

⁴ UN OCHA & Brookings Institution, 1999, *Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, New York, p5

exclusion from society constitute a violation of human dignity”.⁵ The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors is distinct from the voluntary, profit-oriented, “pull-factors” more commonly associated with economic migration.

While there is no specific cessation clause defining the end of internal displacement in international standards, potential solutions are identified as incorporating either return to former areas of residence or resettlement into another part of the country voluntarily, in safety and with dignity. National authorities are obliged to support reintegration by ensuring that internally displaced persons are protected against discrimination, able to participate fully in public affairs and enjoy access to public services. It is stipulated that national authorities’ responsibilities include facilitating the recovery or compensation of property which was dispossessed as a result of displacement. Further, international humanitarian agencies are to be granted unimpeded access to assist internally displaced persons during all phases of return or resettlement and reintegration.⁶ These principles have been expanded upon with the adoption of international standards specifically addressing the rights of displaced persons to recovery of their homes, lands and properties.⁷

While recognising the plight of internally displaced people is essential to advocating for appropriate protection and solutions, programmatic responses to protracted conflicts tend to broaden the focus to vulnerable populations.⁸ At an international level, the institutional framework since the late 1990’s for responding to the assistance, protection and recovery needs of internally displaced persons has been based on inter-agency collaboration rather than mandating one agency. However this collaborative response has been largely ineffective in dealing with governments either unwilling or unable to deal with internally displaced persons.⁹

In response, a global process of humanitarian reform has been launched to enhance leadership and coordination. This has included the introduction of a global and country level cluster leadership approach, efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian Coordinator system, and the restructuring of pooled funding mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund.¹⁰ Bringing order to a huge range of complex situations involving nearly 20 million internally displaced persons globally¹¹ was always going to be an enormous challenge. During these early years, weaknesses have been identified which will need concerted efforts and additional resources to resolve. In particular, concerns have been raised that efforts to strengthen the

⁵ UN Human Rights Council, 11 Sep 2006, “Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: the Rights of the Poor”, Draft Guiding Principles, Annex to UN doc. A/HRC/2/2

⁶ Principles 28-30, *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998

⁷ *UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons*, 2005, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17

⁸ ICRC, 2000, *Internally Displaced Persons : The Mandate and Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*, Geneva, p2.

⁹ Simon Bagshaw and Diana Paul, 2004, *Protect or Neglect – Towards a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, UN OCHA – Inter Agency Internal Displacement Division.

¹⁰ IASC, 2006, *Strengthening the Humanitarian Coordination System: Achievements and Next Steps*, IASC Principals Meeting, New York, 12 December 2006.

¹¹ Antonio Guterres, 1 October 2007, Opening Statement by the High Commissioner at the 58th Session of UNHCR Executive Committee, Geneva, p3

Humanitarian Coordinator system have been sidelined, resulting in insufficient staffing support from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and in many cases the “double-hatting” of responsibilities for the UN Resident Coordinator.¹² There are also concerns that the cluster leadership approach is UN-centric, has insufficiently engaged with non governmental organisations (NGOs), and that there is a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities at the field level.¹³

Although the international legal framework for humanitarian action was founded over half a century ago, the protection agenda has only gained prominence since the end of the Cold War and the genocide in Rwanda. The UN definition that has evolved for humanitarian protection is “all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law”.¹⁴ In practice, this purpose has been interpreted as “making states and individuals meet their humanitarian responsibilities to protect people in war and filling in for them as much as possible when they do not”.¹⁵

So while humanitarian assistance helps people recover from harm already caused, a protective approach also strives to stop violence and abuse, or at least to mitigate the effects, to ensure survivors have access to judicial and social redress and to prevent emerging threats from causing further harm. This necessitates engaging national authorities who are primarily responsible for the protection of their citizens and empowering the coping strategies of those at risk. Protection and empowerment have thus been recognised as mutually reinforcing factors of human security. “People protected can exercise many choices. And people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvements in the system of protection.”¹⁶

Humanitarian protection is understood as incorporating three general types of activities.¹⁷ Responsive actions are urgent attempts to stop, prevent and / or mitigate the immediate harm inflicted by a pattern of abuse. Remedial actions try to restore people’s dignity subsequent to a pattern of abuse through longer-term recovery processes. Environment building involves promoting attitudinal and behavioral change as well as frameworks for governance which are conducive to respect for human rights. These three types of activities are not chronologically ordered but rather overlap, with timing related instead to the nature and gravity of the pattern of abuse. Similarly, given sufficient information sharing and resource coordination, the respective mandates and activities of different humanitarian agencies can complement each other to promote shared protection goals.

¹² Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2007, “Lost in Translation: Managing Coordination and Leadership Reform in the Humanitarian System”, Policy Brief 27, London, www.odi.org.uk/hpg

¹³ International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), October 2005, “What is All This ‘Cluster’ Talk?”, *ICVA Newsletter Special Issue: Humanitarian Reforms, Talk Back*.

¹⁴ IASC, 2000, *Protection of Internally Displaced Persons – Inter Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper Series*, No.2, UN, New York, p4

¹⁵ Hugo Slim and Luis Enrique Eguren, 2001, *Humanitarian Protection: A Guidance Booklet*, ALNAP, p21

¹⁶ Commission on Human Security, 2003, *Human Security Now*, UN, p12

¹⁷ IASC, 2002, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights Through Humanitarian Action*, UN, p12

Techniques for securing protection range from pressuring relevant authorities to comply with their obligations to protect civilians from violence and abuse, to providing assistance for those survivors recovering from abuses. Pressure can be applied on authorities via denunciation through public censure, persuasion through private negotiation, and / or the diplomatic mobilization of advisors and other influential stakeholders. The main techniques for providing protective assistance are to support and empower existing local structures and services and / or substituting for the authorities by directly providing aid to the survivors of abuse.

Despite this protective framework, recent evaluations of humanitarian action in ten countries identified that “where national governments fail to protect internally displaced persons, there is evidence of a continuing and substantial deficit in the protection work done by the international community”.¹⁸ Practices contributing to this protection deficit were identified as the neglect of minorities; prioritisation of material assistance over protection needs; lack of protection capacities and will; lack of access into insecure areas; and a lack of human rights monitoring.

1.2 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The responsibility to protect people from massive atrocities does not primarily rest with the humanitarian community. National authorities have the primary obligation to respect, protect and promote the human rights of their citizens, yet the responsible authorities are often the primary perpetrators of violence and abuse. In such cases, the international diplomatic community has been reluctant to intervene in so-called “domestic affairs” due to the sacred cow of sovereignty amongst nation-states. These perceptions led to woefully inadequate international responses to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in 1995 and crimes against humanity in Kosovo during 1999, amongst other humanitarian crises.

In recent years, however, it has been recognised that the debate should not be about the right to intervene at all, but rather about the international community’s responsibility to protect people at grave risk. “The relevant perspective is not that of the powerful interveners but those needing support. Sovereignty, in the modern age, involves not just control but responsibility.”¹⁹ This conceptual change has been formally embraced by the heads of state and government meeting at the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2005 and reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in 2006. It is now accepted in principle that if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect potential or actual victims of massive atrocities, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and enforcement action. This is a landmark change which has the potential to bring our common humanity to the forefront of the global security agenda.

¹⁸ John Borton, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Ralph Otto, 2005, *Learning from Evaluations of Support to Internally Displaced Persons*, Channel Research, Belgium.

¹⁹ Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect: Unfinished Business”, G8 Summit 2006: Issues and Instruments, www.crisisgroup.org

“The international community, through the United Nations... (is) prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”²⁰

“The Security Council... notes that the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, reaffirms in this regard its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.”²¹

1.3 PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN BURMA

Burma’s post-independence history has been dominated by conflict between successive military juntas against both legal and armed opposition groups.²² Political instability has been rooted in ideological conflict between a socialist State and communist resistance, and then since 1988 between military rule and democratic opposition. However, the most protracted conflict has been between the Burman controlled State and a loose alliance of non-Burman ethnic nationalities who are fighting for self determination.²³

The scale of armed conflict decreased in the 1990’s due to the negotiation of seventeen ceasefire agreements with various ethnic-nationalist forces. While these ceasefires have led to the establishment of special regions with some degree of administrative autonomy, broader political grievances are yet to be addressed and human rights abuses continue to be widespread. In the mid-1990’s, Rangoon’s ceasefire with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) lasted only a few months while Khun Sa’s surrender of the Mong Tai Army in exchange for an amnesty against drug-related charges led to the Shan States Army (SSA) reforming around a more genuinely ethnic nationalist cause. The New Mon State Party’s (NMSP’s) ceasefire has been maintained, but its authority has been challenged by the deployment of Burma Army troops into areas previously controlled



²⁰ UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN doc. A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 138

²¹ UN Security Council, Resolution 1674, Adopted on 28 April 2006

²² The Union of Burma was officially renamed the Union of Myanmar by military decree after a coup in 1988. A number of states and divisions were also renamed, including Karen state (now Kayah), Karenni state (now Kayah) and Pegu Division (now Bago). This report uses historical and colloquial titles.

²³ The Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan and others are often described as ethnic minorities or indigenous people, but generally prefer the term “ethnic nationalities”.

by the Mon. A split in the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1994 also resulted in an expansion of the Burmese Army's control.

Despite the cessation of hostilities in ethnic areas, the nation remained under military rule with even pretence of the rule of law suspended in 1988. The UN General Assembly's annual calls for democratisation, the restoration of human rights, and tri-partite dialogue between the military, democratic opposition and ethnic representatives were ignored. Guidelines for a new constitution were finally produced in September 2007, in the junta's self-proclaimed first stage of the road map to democracy. However, amendments proposed by ethnic nationalities to promote federal democracy were subverted. Instead, the guidelines ensure the military will control key ministries, hold large blocs of unelected seats in all legislative bodies, and be able to legitimise human rights abuses with constitutional immunity.

The "saffron revolution" of September 2007 was sparked by fuel price hikes which were implemented without warning or any phasing in, and overwhelmed the livelihoods of many already impoverished citizens. Yet it was a brutal attack on protesting monks which intensified the anti-government sentiment, and led to monks declaring a boycott of the military regime. Protests evolved to include the more substantive political demand that the junta enter into dialogue about national reconciliation with the pro-democracy opposition and the ethnic nationalities.²⁴ This non-violent uprising may have been dramatic in its escalation, but it also reflected the public's pent-up frustration with military rule and mismanagement.

The case for an international response to the threat that the State Peace and Development (SPDC) poses has been succinctly outlined in a report commissioned by the Nobel Peace prize laureate, Bishop Desmond Tutu, and former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel.²⁵ The criteria that the UN Security Council previously cited in seven situations of internal conflict as causing a threat to regional peace were reviewed to determine whether the situation in Burma warranted intervention. The determining factors were identified as the overthrow of a democratically elected government; conflict among government bodies and armed opposition groups; widespread violations of humanitarian and human rights law; the substantial outflow of refugees; and other cross-border problems such as drug trafficking. While all the cases of internal conflict in which the Security Council has intervened have involved at least one of these factors, Burma is the only situation in which all five factors are present.

China and Russia vetoed a draft resolution at the UN Security Council in January 2007 which recognised the SPDC as a threat to regional peace and security, and have argued that human rights violations are a matter for the UN Human Rights Council to address. Yet, there is increasing recognition within the Security Council, as well as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), that protracted conflict in Burma is no longer tolerable. This was reflected during the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Myanmar's series of consultations with governments during July and August. Diplomatic frustration was also reflected in an extraordinary

²⁴ The Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan and others are often described as ethnic minorities or indigenous people, but generally prefer the term "ethnic nationalities".


²⁵ DLA Piper, 2005, "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to act in Burma"

public denunciation of the SPDC by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in relation to systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws.²⁶

The junta's brutal crackdown on the saffron revolution further raised concerns amongst the international community about the regime's sincerity in pursuing national reconciliation through dialogue. With the 2008 Olympic Games approaching, the Chinese government is also becoming increasingly sensitive to criticism of its role as a supporter of repressive regimes. While the outcome of the uprising is yet to be determined as this report goes to print, images beamed throughout the world clearly demonstrate the political will of the public. People are desperate for change, putting their lives on the line, and surely this time, deserve the full support of the international community to end to the junta's impunity.

1.4 2007 SURVEY RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002.²⁷ More communities have been displaced during the past year while others have attempted to return to former villages, resettle elsewhere in Burma or flee to Thailand. As the environment is constantly evolving, situation assessments also need to be regularly revised. The objectives of this year's research was thus to update estimates of the scale and distribution of internal displacement, assess the vulnerability and coping strategies of villagers, and review efforts in promoting protection.



Much of eastern Burma remains inaccessible to international observers and there are significant risks associated with collecting information from conflict-affected areas. Without the participating ethnic community-based organizations' commitment and courage, this report could not have been written. Questionnaires were designed collaboratively by drawing from the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and questionnaires from previous years to facilitate trend analysis.

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²⁶ ICRC, 29 June 2007, "Press Release : Myanmar : ICRC denounces major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law", Yangon / Geneva

²⁷ Previous surveys can be accessed from www.tbtc.org/resources.html

Quantitative surveys of the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development have been based on interviews with key informants in 38 townships between June and July 2007.²⁸ Population estimates were compiled for people who:

- have fled from SPDC patrols and hide in the most militarily contested areas
- were forcibly evicted and obliged to move into SPDC relocation sites
- reside in ethnic administered ceasefire areas after having fled from human rights abuses and the effects of war, having been forcibly relocated by non-state actors, or having returned from refugee camps in Thailand.

As in previous years, it has not been possible to estimate the number of people obliged to leave their homes but remaining in a state of internal displacement in mixed administration areas or on the fringes of urban settlements. Further, given the complexities in distinguishing between different location types as well as between displaced and resident populations these are best estimates only. Approximations derived from the sub-township level have been triangulated against last year's estimates and situation updates from the field staff of ethnic community based organisations.


Assessments of vulnerability, coping strategies and protection have been derived from questionnaires conducted with almost 1,000 households spread across eastern Burma. A multi-stage cluster sampling method was utilized to select these households, which were spread across six states and divisions and were evenly distributed between hiding sites, ethnic ceasefire areas, government relocation sites and mixed administration areas. This sampling method was based on that used for a vulnerability survey that TBBC and partners conducted in 2004 and a protection survey that was implemented in 2005. This has enabled findings to be compared across time, and hence facilitated trend analysis.

To guide the demarcation of population estimates, the following definitions of different location types were used :



- Hiding sites are the most contested areas where people are actively seeking to conceal themselves from detection by SPDC patrols.
- Relocation sites are consolidated villages where people have been ordered to move by SPDC after having been forcibly evicted.
- Ceasefire areas are special regions with some autonomy for ethnic nationality authorities and provisional guarantees against SPDC attack.
- Mixed administration areas are rural areas nominally under SPDC control, but within the sphere of influence of the armed opposition.

It is recognised that the demarcation of distinct areas is largely a theoretical exercise, and that in practice the distinction between different location types is imprecise. For example, it is difficult to distinguish between civilians in the most militarily contested areas who do not expose themselves to SPDC and villagers in mixed administration areas who leave home if SPDC patrols approach. Similarly, people who have previously been forcibly evicted and relocated but now have a relative (although still restricted) degree of choice about their place of dwelling, could justifiably be classified as living in either SPDC relocation sites or mixed administration areas.


²⁸ The questionnaires are reproduced in Appendix 1.



It was not possible to interview 200 households in each state as originally planned. There are no ethnic ceasefire areas in Pegu Division, so only 150 interviews were conducted there. However, the main gap in data collection was due to a misunderstanding with field staff about the sampling method in Mon State. While 200 interviews were conducted, these were almost exclusively in ceasefire areas, and hence more than 100 responses have been omitted from the sample population.




Just under half of the villagers surveyed were female, which represents a significant improvement compared to the last household survey in 2005 when two thirds of respondents were male. This reflects an increased gender awareness amongst the field staff of community based organisations. The age distribution, however, was comparable to the previous survey as the survey again specified that respondents should be over 18 years of age.



Respondents to the household survey came from thirteen different ethnic groups, indicating a diverse sample population. Greater representation for the Sgaw Karen reflects their prominence in conflict affected areas not only in Karen State, but also Pegu Division and Tenasserim Division. Similarly, the religious diversity of eastern Burma is proportionately reflected in the survey's reach to a majority of Buddhists, with a significant minority of Christians and animists.

Just over half of the sample population reported having not been forcibly displaced during the past ten years, having subsequently returned to their former dwelling or having resettled elsewhere after displacement. However, these responses probably underestimate the proportion of respondents who remain displaced. It is likely that some of the respondents were first displaced more than ten years ago, and so may have discounted subsequent forced movements. There is also a high probability that many of those who have been displaced but reported having successfully returned or resettled may in fact not yet have re-established a sustainable livelihood or reintegrated into society. A more comprehensive assessment of initial responses is thus likely to have concluded that significantly more than 47% of respondents remain internally displaced.



This becomes more evident when only the responses of those who reported having been displaced during the past ten years are analysed in regards to their experience of sustainable return or resettlement. Overall, 39% of the displaced reported having re-established a livelihood and reintegrated into society. However, this includes 43% of respondents in hiding sites where, rather than experiencing the restoration of rights, villagers are specifically targeted for punishment by government authorities on account of being alleged “rebel sympathisers”. Such a positive response to the question about sustainable return or resettlement is thus likely to reflect methodological weaknesses in the training of field staff. It may also reflect a short term sense of sustainability amongst internally displaced communities in a relatively stable environment after months or years on the move.




PHOTO : KORD, Generations in Hiding, Taungoo, 2007



CHAPTER

2. DISPLACMENT TRENDS IN EASTERN BURMA

2.1 CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

The impacts of war, and specifically counter-insurgency strategies, on human rights and displacement in eastern Burma have been widely documented.²⁹ Through decades of low-intensity conflict, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and its predecessors have based their counter insurgency strategy on targeting the civilian population. The “Four Cuts” policy aims to undermine the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies and finances by forcibly relocating villagers from contested areas into government controlled areas. The policy has aimed to turn “black” opposition controlled areas into “brown” contested areas and ultimately into “white” areas controlled by Rangoon.

Villagers who do not comply with forced relocation orders are considered sympathetic to the armed opposition. The subsequent targeting of these civilians by military patrols is a violation of international humanitarian law which the State of Burma has formally ratified.³⁰ Conflict-induced displacement can thus be considered a manifestation of not only systematic human rights abuses but also of crimes against humanity committed by the Burmese Army.

Threats to lives are the most severe manifestations of this counter-insurgency policy and include military attacks, summary execution, landmines and inhumane punishment. However threats to livelihoods in the form of the destruction of agricultural fields and housing as well as the confiscation of land and food supplies are a more common method of undermining the capacity of villagers to remain in militarily contested areas. Either way the risks for civilians generally increase after military skirmishes, when the SPDC retaliates against villagers for supposedly enabling the armed opposition forces to strike.

This year’s survey has identified 273 infantry and light infantry battalions active in eastern Burma, which represents about 30% of the Burmese Army’s battalions nationwide.³¹ These battalions are under the authority of the SPDC’s Coastal Command based in Mergui, South Eastern Command in Moulmein, Southern Command in Taungoo, Eastern Command in Taunggyi and Triangle Area Command in Keng Tung. However, battalions have also been deployed from Rangoon and Mandalay Divisions to supplement joint roving patrols in eastern Burma. A culture of authoritarian discipline reflects the ultra-nationalist values which underlie the “paranoid orientation of the military leaders, their strong emphasis on self-reliance and fundamentally ethnocentric outlook.”³² However, even the SPDC’s military hierarchy has admitted that poor troop management, inadequate rations and harsh conditions resulted in low morale and an 8% increase in desertion during 2006.³³

²⁹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 28 March 2007, *Myanmar (Burma) : A Worsening Crisis of Internal Displacement*, www.internal-displacement.org

UN Human Rights Council, 12 February 2007, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, A/HRC/4/14

Human Rights Watch, 2005, *They Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State*, Vol.17, No. 4(C).


³⁰ Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949, Common Article 3.

³¹ Network for Democracy and Development, May 2007, *Civil and Military Administrative Echelon of State Peace and Development Council in Burma*

³² International Crisis Group, 2001, “Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World”, p4

³³ Samuel Blyt, 4 April 2007, “Myanmar Army Document Spotlights Low Morale”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*

Militarisation in Eastern Burma, 2007



2.2 DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

Burma lags behind most of its neighbours in terms of poverty alleviation, with UN agencies and the Asian Development Bank recently reporting that Burma is either unable to provide credible data, off-track or regressing in regards to indicators for all of the Millenium Development Goals.³⁴ This partly reflects the government's priorities as an estimated 40% of the budget is allocated to the military³⁵ whereas annual public expenditure on health and education is less than US\$1 per person.³⁶ A recent global survey of transparent governance in 180 countries rates systematic corruption as most prevalent in Burma and Somalia.³⁷

While poverty is a nation-wide phenomenon, many of the most deprived areas are in border areas where protracted conflict has further undermined human, social, economic and natural capital. By focusing on infrastructure construction and commercial agriculture, the government's Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict-affected areas.³⁸ In contrast, state-sponsored development initiatives have often undermined livelihoods and "primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population"³⁹

Burma's energy sector is its largest recipient of foreign direct investment, however gas pipelines and the proposed hydro-electric dams along the Salween river have also been significant causes of human rights abuses during the past year. While approximately 35,000 people were previously displaced from areas surrounding the proposed Tasang dam site in Shan State, the livelihoods of those remaining continue to be undermined by forced labour for the construction of roads and deforestation caused by large scale logging. Additional troop deployments to Hutgyi dam site in Karen state, after a Thai surveyor was killed and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand suspended operations in September 2007, will likewise increase restrictions on local livelihoods. Meanwhile, villages along the perimeter of the Yadana gas pipeline in Tenasserim Division and the Kanbauk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline in Mon state continue to be forced to provide security guards without payment by the local authorities.

Commercial agriculture has intensified during the past year with the promotion of a national development initiative to cultivate castor oil plantations to produce bio-diesel as a potential fuel substitute. Thousands of acres across eastern Burma have been confiscated by local authorities without the payment of compensation to landowners and primarily to the benefit of privately financed joint-ventures with SPDC. Livelihoods have been further undermined by the imposition of procurement quotas and forced labour for the cultivation of seedlings. There have been no indications that former landowners and labourers will share any of the harvests, which in any case are years away.

³⁴ *A Future Within Reach: Reshaping Institutions in a region of Disparities to meet the Millenium Development Goals in Asia and the Pacific*, UNESCAP, UNDP and ADB, 2005, New York, p13

³⁵ International Crisis Group, 2004, *Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas*, Yangon / Brussels, p14.

³⁶ Center for Public Health and Human Rights, March 2006, *Responding to AIDS, TB, Malaria and Emerging Infectious Diseases in Burma*, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, p7

³⁷ Transparency International, 2007, Corruption Perceptions Index, www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2007/2007_09_26_cpi_en

³⁸ International Crisis Group, 2004, *Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas*, Yangon / Brussels, p4

³⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2005, *They Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State*, Vol. 17, No. 4(c), p43

Active Development Projects Associated with Human Rights Abuses, 2006-2007



2.3 DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN 1996 AND 2007

Field surveys conducted by indigenous humanitarian and human rights groups and collated by TBBC have previously indicated that more than 3,000 villages were destroyed, forcibly relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma between 1996 and 2006.⁴⁰ Based on the refugee exodus into camps and migrant communities in Thailand and estimations of the internally displaced population, over a million people are understood to have been forcibly displaced from their homes in eastern Burma during that period.

These field reports have recently been corroborated by high resolution commercial satellite imagery of villages, before and after the villages were attacked or forcibly relocated. As an example, satellite imagery reproduced in this report clearly shows how 24 structures have been removed from a village in Mawk Mai township of Shan State that TBBC documented as having been forcibly relocated in 2006.⁴¹ Similarly, other field reports of villages having been attacked and destroyed are supported by visual evidence of burn scars.

This survey estimates that during the past year alone, 76,000 people were forced to leave their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict and human rights abuses. This includes people from 167 villages that have been documented as having been completely displaced in the past 12 months. The number of people displaced was slightly lower than last year, which was primarily related to a relaxation of restrictions in Tenasserim Division. Forced migration was most concentrated in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division where counter-insurgency operations displaced approximately 43,000 civilians.

RATE OF DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN 2002 AND 2007

States and Divisions	Civilians displaced by armed conflict or human rights abuses					
	2002-3 ⁴²	2003-4 ⁴³	2004-5 ⁴⁴	2005-6 ⁴⁵	2006-7	annual average
Southern Shan	15,500	15,500	23,100	16,200	15,400	17,100
Karenni	6,100	6,100	12,500	7,400	2,800	7,000
Eastern Pegu	3,050	3,050	5,900	13,400	11,500	7,400
Karen	30,500	30,500	29,500	30,100	43,400	32,800
Mon	8,150	8,200	10,000	1,100	1,200	5,700
Tenasserim	15,200	15,150	6,000	13,800	1,700	10,400
Overall	78,500	78,500	87,000	82,000	76,000	80,400

⁴⁰ TBBC, 2006, "Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org

⁴¹ Science and Human Rights Program, 2007, *High Resolution Satellite Imagery of the Conflict of Burma*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC. www.aaas.org/news/releases/2007/media/0928burma_report.pdf

See also, TBBC, 2006, "Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org pp 33 & 56


⁴² TBBC, 2004, "Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org

⁴³ Ibid. (Estimates were originally for a 2 year period between 2002 and 2004)


⁴⁴ TBBC, 2005, "Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org

⁴⁵ TBBC, 2006. "Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org

Displaced Villages in Eastern Burma, 1996-2007



Satellite Imagery of Forced Village Relocation in Mawkmai, Shan State⁴⁶



The cumulative impact of SPDC's forced relocation campaigns between 1996 and 2002 reflects the extent of the Burma Army's expanded presence. This period followed the fall of KNU's headquarters, Khun Sa's surrender of the Mong Tai Army and ceasefire agreements in Mon and Karenni states. The Burma Army substantially expanded its control over contested areas in the late 1990's by establishing new bases in strategic locations and forcing rural villages to relocate into towns or consolidated villages. By 2002 few rural villages had not already been subjected to forced relocation orders, although in many cases civilians had resisted these attempts to subjugate customary land ownership. The main form of civil disobedience against

⁴⁶ Science and Human Rights Program, 2007, *High Resolution Satellite Imagery of the Conflict of Burma*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC, Image 23, p 36,

the imposition of forced eviction and relocation has been to hide in surrounding fields and forests as close as possible to former villages and ancestral lands.

While over 3,200 villages have been documented as forcibly displaced since 1996, some of these villages have been at least partly repopulated. Indeed, local arrangements with SPDC authorities enabled villagers from over 20 relocation sites in Tenasserim Division to either return to their original villages or resettle on nearby lands during the past year. However, the sustainability of such return and resettlement is restricted not only by livelihood constraints but also by the lack of official authorisation. Indeed, attempts during previous years to re-establish over 100 villages have already been thwarted by harassment leading to further rounds of forced displacement.

2.4 INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION ESTIMATES IN 2007

The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society as of October 2007 is estimated to be at least half a million people. The population is comprised of 295,000 people currently in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, while 99,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes and approximately 109,000 villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites.

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN 2005 AND 2006

States and Divisions	IDPs in Hiding		IDPs in Relocation Sites		IDPs in Ceasefire Areas		Total IDPs	
	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007
South Shan	13,300	13,700	31,300	24,100	131,000	126,000	175,600	163,800
Karenni	9,300	10,000	6,400	4,800	63,600	66,200	79,300	81,000
East Pegu	17,400	18,700	6,400	12,200	0	0	23,800	30,900
Karen	49,100	51,600	4,300	9,700	45,900	55,600	99,300	116,900
Mon	300	600	500	7,200	41,000	41,600	41,800	49,400
Tenasserim	5,600	4,400	69,100	51,000	5,500	5,600	80,200	61,000
Overall	95,000	99,000	118,000	109,000	287,000	295,000	500,000	503,000

While the overall figures are comparable to last year, the estimates for internally displaced persons in relocation sites have decreased while those in ceasefire areas and, to a lesser extent, hiding sites have increased. Decreased estimates for relocation sites primarily reflect villagers' attempts at returning to former villages or resettling nearby in Tenasserim Division and Shan State. However, it is not known how sustainable these movements will be, while SPDC campaigns to forcibly relocate and consolidate villages have intensified in northern Karen State, eastern Pegu Division and northern Mon state. Increased estimates for the internally displaced in ethnic ceasefire areas are largely attributed to the expansion of authority

exercised by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the newly formed KNU/KNLA Peace Council. A slight population increase reported from hiding sites reflects the protracted emergency for the most vulnerable communities in eastern Burma.

From a longer term perspective, the internally displaced population estimates for 2006 represent a decrease of over 130,000 people compared to the first border wide reports that TBBC documented in 2002.⁴⁷ This decrease can be explained in part by improved survey techniques, but other factors also include sustainable return or resettlement, flight into refugee and migrant populations in Thailand, and forced migration into Burma's urban communities beyond the reach of these field surveys.

These population figures are considered conservative due to constraints in the methodology. While estimates have been derived from the rural areas of 38 townships most affected by internal displacement, it has not been possible to include approximations from urban areas and from other townships. Similarly, there remain difficulties distinguishing between formerly displaced persons who have successfully returned or resettled into mixed administration areas compared to those who still dare not expose themselves if SPDC patrols approach. This survey has generally discounted such populations in mixed administration areas, as it was not possible to verify how many have reintegrated into society and how many remain in a state of internal displacement.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN HIDING SITES


An estimated 99,000 civilians are hiding in the most militarily contested areas, which are generally located in remote and mountainous forests and fields. This type of geography strengthens the ability of the armed opposition forces to move undetected and weakens the logistical advantage of the government forces. Forest growth also provides shelter under which internally displaced populations can hide their temporary settlements.

This population has fled from their homes to avoid contact with SPDC military patrols due to fear of harassment under the pretext of counter insurgency activities. People in hiding may not move far from their homes, which is a key motivating factor for remaining despite the risks of being detected by SPDC or paramilitary patrols. However, while there may be opportunities for people to return periodically to nearby villages and fields, the risks prohibit the possibility of a more sustainable return or resettlement.

The categorisation of these people as members of the armed opposition for disobeying relocation orders contravenes the government's obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Threats to lives include heavy artillery shelling of civilian settlements, landmines, summary execution and inhumane punishment if captured. If settlements are discovered uninhabited, livelihoods are commonly undermined by the burning of civilian

⁴⁷ BBC, 2002, "Internally Displaced Persons and Relocation Sites in Eastern Burma", www.tbbc.org

Relocation Sites, Hiding Areas & Ceasefire Areas in Eastern Burma, 2007



dwellings and the destruction or theft of crops and food stocks. Offences documented in this report constitute not merely more examples of human rights abuses which are widespread in Burma, but rather are indicative of the crimes against humanity that are committed against people hiding in conflict-affected areas.

Counter-insurgency military operations during the past year have particularly targeted civilians in northern Karen and eastern Pegu Division. At least 38 civilians have been killed by Burmese Army patrols in Thandaung township alone during 2007 to date, while over 60,000 villagers are currently hiding from government forces. This denotes an increase of approximately 7,000 people since 2006, and represents the number of people who were previously living with the tacit approval of local SPDC authorities in mixed administration areas. However, local arrangements became null and void when the Southern and South Eastern Military Commands coordinated patrols by over 40 battalions to search for civilian settlements and destroy their means of survival. This level of coordination is illustrative of the systematic nature of the Burmese Army's crimes against humanity.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN SPDC RELOCATION SITES

The third category of internally displaced persons in eastern Burma consists of approximately 109,000 villagers who currently reside in designated relocation sites after having been evicted from their homes. Government relocation sites are generally situated on barren land near a town or village and in close proximity to roads and SPDC army bases. Relocation sites can result from either the forced transfer of villages to a newly constructed center, or the forced consolidation of dispersed villages into a more densely populated pre-existing settlement.

Population estimates for internally displaced persons in relocation sites have decreased by 9,000 people since 2006. This is primarily due to movements out of relocation sites in Tenasserim Division, and to lesser extent in Shan State, related to a relaxation in restrictions imposed by local SPDC commanders. Rather than reflecting increased freedom, this is illustrative of expanded SPDC control over surrounding mixed administration areas. As villagers in surrounding areas become resigned to complying with Burmese Army orders, the SPDC's perceived need for relocation sites becomes redundant.

Conversely, a renewed campaign of forced evictions and village relocations has been reported in the contested areas of northern Karen State, Pegu Division and northern Mon State. This campaign is part of SPDC counter-insurgency operations which attempt to divide upland and lowland Karen communities in order to undermine the armed opposition of the Karen National Union.

Villagers were generally obliged to dismantle their houses and carry whatever property and food stocks were transportable to the designated relocation site within a few days notice. There is commonly no assistance provided for the reconstruction of shelters and tenancy is usually not officially registered. Restrictions on movement outside of relocation sites vary, with travel passes for between a day to a week generally available for purchase from SPDC military commanders. These passes

guarantee passage through checkpoints and into markets but single day passes are often not long enough to enable people to return to their homes and fields.

Apart from the fundamentally coercive nature of population movements into SPDC relocation sites and the loss of property as a result of displacement, possibilities for resettlement and reintegration are also restricted by limited livelihood options. Limited access to suitable agricultural land results either from relocation sites being located close to towns, adjacent to SPDC army bases where lands have been confiscated to support the livelihoods of soldiers, or due to population density and barren soil. Proximity to SPDC bases results in orders to work without compensation, taking time away from earning an income, as well as demands for payment of arbitrary taxes at irregular and short notice.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN ETHNIC CEASEFIRE AREAS

People in ethnic administered ceasefire areas represent the largest category of internally displaced persons in eastern Burma. 295,000 displaced people are residing throughout areas administered by ceasefire groups in eastern Burma who have each been granted a relative degree of autonomy by the Burma Army. This authority is generally formalised by the demarcation of special regions, with the main exceptions being in the areas of southern Shan State which are claimed by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Authorities in ceasefire areas can generally be divided into three types. There are former members or allies of the Communist Party of Burma,⁴⁸ militias who split from the main political party representing their ethnic group⁴⁹ and former members of the armed opposition's National Democratic Front.⁵⁰

77,000 people are estimated to remain in areas nominally governed by the UWSA along the Thailand border. This population primarily consists of villagers who were evicted from their homes in northern Shan state between 1999 and 2001 and forcibly relocated for strategic and supposedly drug eradication purposes. Autocratic rule and the ongoing suppression of rights by the UWSA has obstructed opportunities for people to re-establish their livelihoods, while at the same time inducing further displacement amongst former land owners whose property has been seized to accommodate the new arrivals. Harassment from SPDC patrols has also increased during the past year, especially since the UWSA refused orders to relocate its troops and constituents back to their original base on the Chinese border. 2,500 villagers are estimated to have fled from UWSA areas in Mong Ton and moved to Mong Hsat as a result of this harassment by SPDC troops.

In contrast, ceasefire areas where the legitimacy of ethnic nationality authorities is less disputed provide a relative degree of protection for displaced communities. Over 60,000 people are currently residing in the New Mon State Party's (NMSP's) 12 designated ceasefire areas. This includes former refugees who were repatriated

⁴⁸ United Wa State Army (UWSA), Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), and Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation (SNPLO)

⁴⁹ Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karen Peace Force (KPF), the Karenni Solidarity Organisation (KnSO), and the Karen National Union / Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council

⁵⁰ New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and PaO National Organisation (PNO)

from Thailand back into a situation in flux over ten years ago as well as villagers from SPDC controlled areas who have fled from systematic human rights abuses. Over 1,000 new arrivals have been reported seeking refuge in the NMSP ceasefire areas during the past year alone. However these areas can not provide a sustainable solution for the internally displaced due to population density with limited access to suitable agricultural land, SPDC restrictions on travel outside of ceasefire areas, and the inability of ethnic nationality authorities to support resettlement or compensate for livelihood assets lost. The Rangoon-based international community's attempts to access and assist these displaced communities have been largely ineffective since the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) was forced to suspend operations from field offices in October 2006.

Other ceasefire parties include the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Shan Nationalities' Peoples Liberation Organisation (SNPLO). However, the boundary between areas primarily influenced by non state actors and those under the administration of Burmese authorities is porous. SPDC's expansion into ceasefire areas during the past year has effectively reduced the displaced population under the administration of KNPLF, SSA-N and SNPLO in particular. This expansion has manifested in various ways including orders for villages to be relocated, confiscation of land and property, imposition of forced labour, and restrictions on trade and travel. As long as the human rights dividends accruing from ceasefire agreements remain negligible, their sustainability continues to be undermined.

PHOTO: KHRG, Forced labour, Thaton, 2007



CHAPTER

3. SITUATION UPDATES

FROM COMMUNITY BASED
ORGANISATIONS

3.1 SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

During the past year, SPDC has increased pressure on ethnic ceasefire groups, harassment of the civilian population and control over private enterprise in southern Shan State. This has resulted in militarization and state-sponsored development projects becoming more significant factors of displacement and insecurity. Systematic human rights abuses across 12 townships alone have forcibly displaced over 15,000 people from their homes during the past year. At least 163,000 people are currently estimated to be internally displaced in southern Shan State, with the majority attempting to survive under the administration of ethnic ceasefire parties.

SPDC's expanded presence into ceasefire areas has taken different forms, depending on perceived relations with the armed opposition. In areas nominally controlled by recent defectors from the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) 758 battalion in Laikha township, the SPDC liaises directly with the newly empowered ceasefire authorities. During the past year, this resulted in a range of human rights abuses including the imposition of forced labour to cultivate agricultural plantations and construct military camps. The Burmese Army coordinated military strategy with the splinter group during frequent skirmishes against SSA-S, while also imposing restrictions on civilian travel and threatening to forcibly relocate local villages.

In areas where the compliance of ceasefire authorities has decreased, the Burmese Army has deployed more troops to maintain control. For example, after the United Wa State Army (UWSA) refused SPDC orders to relocate back to their original base on the Chinese border, Burmese Army patrols into Mong Ton township on the Thailand border increased. 2,500 villagers in UWSA territory are reported to have fled from their homes rather than face the harassment of SPDC troops. Burmese Army patrols also increased in Mawkmai township following the return to armed struggle by one faction of the Shan Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Organisation (SNPLO). Skirmishes resulted with the displacement of over 2,000 civilians.

Expanded State control has intensified demands to cultivate castor oil and physic nut plantations to produce bio-diesel as a fuel substitute. Associated human rights abuses, such as land confiscation, extortion, and forced cultivation have become more systematic, with the junta establishing sub-township supervisory committees. The crops require tending to all year, but the demands placed upon villagers to reach their quotas are not matched with any decrease in other impositions from local authorities. When plantations in Wan Lao village tract in Kunhing township grew well in 2006, the authorities responded by doubling the quota in 2007. The imposition of forced labour for castor oil plantations has been cited as the main reason for flight by new arrivals to the Thailand border in 2007.⁵¹

The Ta Hsang dam in Mong Pan remains the largest single project to have caused development-induced displacement in southern Shan State, given that 30,000 people have already been forced to leave their homes. However, during the past year, a joint venture between SPDC and the private firm Asia World for logging in Kung Hing township caused the most instability. Approximately 3,000 people were forced from their homes as a result of demands for forced labour, arbitrary taxes or the fear of SPDC troop deployments being sent in to "secure" the investment site.

⁵¹ Shan Human Rights Foundation, Monthly Report, August 2007

3.2 KARENNI STATE

The political context in Karenni (or Kayah) State is strongly influenced by business and military links between the Burmese Army and various ceasefire groups, although the armed opposition of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) remains a potent force. 81,000 people are estimated to currently remain internally displaced in Karenni State with the majority of these living in chronic poverty in ceasefire areas administered by the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) and others. However, the most vulnerable internally displaced communities amount to 10,000 people who are hiding from detection by joint SPDC and ceasefire party patrols in Shadaw, Pruso and Pasaung townships.


SPDC has 14 infantry battalions permanently based in Karenni State, with these troops reporting to the Regional Operation Command in Loikaw and the Military Operations Command in Pekon. Another 10 battalions regularly conduct mobile patrols throughout the State, although they are under the command of the Light Infantry Division 55 based in Kalaw (Shan State). While mobile units previously withdrew after a couple of months, these battalions have been rotated to patrol continuously throughout Karenni State since 2005. Given the Burmese army's so-called self reliance policy, such troop deployments result in local livelihoods being undermined in order to feed the front line troops. In northern Loikaw township during the past year, over 3,000 acres of farm land has been confiscated to pave the way for an industrial zone.

While the ceasefire areas may have offered the promise of greater protection for villagers when first established over ten years ago, the ceasefire parties have lost much of their autonomy and must largely comply with SPDC orders. When the Burmese Army launches a military operation, the only difference in ceasefire areas is that the patrols are jointly conducted with ethnic forces and that villagers are taxed double the amount. While the ceasefire parties depend on mineral extraction, logging and taxes on the export of cattle and import of motor vehicles, villagers in Pruso and Demawso townships have been coerced into cultivating opium poppy for the first time to supplement their subsistence livelihoods.

Even greater threats to lives and livelihoods are prevalent in the contested areas in Pasaung township, where construction work continues along the Mawchit to Taungoo road. The imposition of forced labour to repair the road and restrictions on movements to secure the road from sabotage have resulted in decreased access to fields, forests and markets for local villagers. In a meeting with village leaders on 25 August 2007, the SPDC's LIB #72 reaffirmed that roving patrols by the SPDC and its proxy the Karenni National Solidarity Organisation (KNSO) would continue to consider the surrounding forests as rebel territory. Anyone found in these forests is liable to be shot on sight, while the deployment of landmines remains widespread.

Government controlled relocation sites were first established in 1996 and, although the majority of residents have since moved elsewhere, almost 5,000 villagers remain spread across eight relocation sites in Karenni State in 2007. This is mainly due to fear of returning to their original villages due to ongoing human rights abuses. However, close proximity to SPDC troops and the high prevalence of harassment also pushes people away from relocation sites. The biggest movement during the past year was from Dawtamagyi relocation site, where villagers had been constantly punished by SPDC in retaliation for military ambushes conducted by KNPP.

Karenni State



3.3 NORTHERN KAREN AREAS

The most severe humanitarian atrocities in eastern Burma during the past year have been committed in the townships of Papun and Thandaung in Karen State as well as Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin in Pegu Division. Although 20 battalions are based in this area, more than 40 roving battalions have been targetting civilians and their means of survival in order to undermine the armed resistance. Over 42,000 people have been displaced during the past twelve months in these four townships, while more than 62,000 civilians remain hiding in fear from SPDC patrols. At least 38 villagers have been killed by the Burmese Army during 2007 in Thandaung township alone.

In low land areas, where civilians deal with the SPDC authorities regularly, greater restrictions on village locations and travel are reflected by an increased number of government controlled relocation sites compared to last year. Over 5,000 people have been ordered into these relocation sites. Apart from disrupting trade with upland villagers, which was a major source of income for lowlanders, farm lands have also been confiscated. Livelihoods in relocation sites have been undermined by demands for forced labour to repair military camps, carry military supplies to outposts, and for the construction of roads to facilitate SPDC militarization.

It is difficult to distinguish between conflict and development induced displacement in this area, because the Burmese Army's militarization is so interdependent with road construction. While reconstruction of the old Taungoo-Mawchi and Kyaukgyi-Saw Hta roads that stretch east towards the Thailand border continues, orders have also been imposed to cut a new road linking these access routes together. Work on this new road from Bawgali Gyi-Saw Mu Plaw temporarily stopped at Kay Pu at the onset of the 2007 wet season. However the deployment of Burmese Army troops to 10 new military outposts and regular heavy artillery attacks on surrounding hillside cultivation sites has already forced over 4,000 people to abandon 25 nearby villages and flee to the east of the Yunzalin river.

The pattern for targeting civilians in contested areas by Burmese troops is widespread and systematic across northern Karen communities. Roving patrols set out to search for settlements in areas where the armed opposition of the Karen National Union (KNU) is active, based on the assumption that anyone seen is either a rebel or rebel sympathizer liable to be shot on sight. Upon discovering settlements and hillsides under cultivation, heavy artillery is launched indiscriminately. Unless villagers have received early warning of approaching troops, this is their first chance to flee. Foot soldiers then enter the area to destroy or confiscate whatever food supplies, livestock and property can be found. Landmines are planted to deter villagers from returning to their homes.

The majority of civilians in hiding depend on their networks with neighbouring villagers to survive livelihood shocks, and struggle to remain as close to their ancestral lands as possible. However when coping strategies collapse, villagers must decide between fleeing to seek asylum or work in Thailand and migrating into Burmese towns and relocation sites in search of paid labour. Those who have tried fleeing to Thailand have found it increasingly difficult to access asylum since early 2006, and in response a temporary IDP camp was established right on the border. 3,800 people are now living in Eethuhta, which far exceeds the carrying capacity of the surrounding forests. Security is of even greater concern as SPDC outposts are only 3 hours walk away.

3.4 CENTRAL KAREN STATE

The Burmese Army has controlled most of central Karen State since a major offensive was launched in the mid 1990's and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) splintered away from the KNU. SPDC has consolidated territorial gains through a campaign of confiscating lands and forcibly relocating remote villages. As a result, there is significantly less armed conflict in central Karen State compared to the northern areas. However, the prevalence of human rights abuses committed by the Burmese Army and some sections of the Karen ceasefire groups continues to undermine human security.

Despite the lack of a political settlement, small economic concessions and fatigue from decades of armed conflict have encouraged other small groups to break away from KNU and "return to the legal fold". The most recent example was KNU's former 7th Brigade Commander who established the KNU/KNLA Peace Council early in 2007. While degrees of understanding have ultimately been established between some of the Karen ceasefire groups and the armed opposition, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council split has been bitter so far. In a joint operation with DKBA to challenge the authority of KNU along the Dawna Range, fields belonging to over 900 households from 17 villages were confiscated in Myawaddy township. Landmines were reportedly planted to deter both the KNU and local villagers from returning.


While there are local commanders of the DKBA who genuinely aspire to the promotion of human rights, there also remain others who collaborate with the Burmese Army in perpetrating widespread human rights abuses. Forced labour is particularly common, with village leaders in Myawaddy township regularly ordered to provide labourers for 3-4 days at a time for road or other infrastructure construction during the past year. A fine of 10,000 to 15,000 kyat per person is imposed if the quota is not met.

The Burmese Army and DKBA also perpetrated humanitarian atrocities in Hlaingbwe township during operations supposedly targeting the KNU during March and April 2007. A village headman was killed while carrying military supplies for these joint patrols when he stepped on a landmine, while 19 others were arrested and detained as suspected KNU sympathizers. The harassment and destruction of rice supplies affected over 4,000 people spread across 24 villages.

In Kyain Seikkyi township, the effects of expanded militarization by the SPDC has been documented by local human rights organizations. Over 100 interviews have been conducted with villagers and more than 100 written orders from local SPDC authorities have been obtained. The findings include forced membership of SPDC affiliated groups; land confiscation without compensation, forced labour without payment on military farms, roads and other infrastructure; forced portering of military supplies; arbitrary taxation, extortion and theft; as well as direct personal violence including rape and execution.⁵²

⁵² Karen Human Rights Group, Report 2006#4, *Setting up the Systems of Repression : The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooplaya District*, 7 September 2006, www.khrg.org

Central Karen State



3.5 MON AREAS

Although the New Mon State Party (NMSP) negotiated a ceasefire with the national authorities in 1995, the lack of a subsequent political settlement has led to ongoing human rights violations and the resumption of armed resistance by frustrated Mon splinter groups. As a result, over 70,000 civilians in ethnic Mon majority areas are estimated to remain internally displaced in 2007. The vast majority of these people reside in NMSP ceasefire areas in Ye township of Mon State, Kyain Seikkgyi township of Karen State and Yebyu township of Tenasserim Division.

The Mon ceasefire areas remain a relative sanctuary of protection from human rights abuses, although SPDC troops regularly intrude and harass villagers while supposedly searching for the Mon splinter groups. Regardless, the lack of arable soil and livelihood opportunities restricts the possibility of these areas becoming sustainable for displaced villagers.

International humanitarian agencies have still not been able to negotiate any substantive access or presence into the Mon ceasefire areas or southern Ye township. This situation has deteriorated during the past year since the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its field office in Moulmein.


The Mon splinter groups offer an insignificant degree of opposition to the Burmese Army, but the SPDC manipulates the existence of armed opposition to justify a range of oppressive controls over the civilian population. Travel restrictions prevent farmers from sleeping overnight in their fields, which often makes tending to crops virtually impossible. In June 2007, suspicion that southern Ye villagers from Baround had been in contact with the splinter group was sufficient for the Burmese Army to forcibly evict the entire village and relocate them to Khaw Zar. Some villagers were tortured and even the monastery was driven out.

This broader trend of increasing controls on the civilian population is also reflected in an increased number of displaced villagers in relocation sites. Villagers in Khawzar relocation site were ordered to repair around 40 bridges along the Ye-Tavoy and Ye-Khawzar main roads. SPDC authorities provided a token amount of cement for each bridge, but essentially the villagers had to provide not only their labour free of charge but also additional cement.

Given a lack of rations, Burmese Army battalions remain engaged in businesses to raise funds for their own troops. Most of the battalions, such as IB 31 in Ye township during May 2007, have also confiscated farm land surrounding their compounds for their soldiers' families. This battalion also has a brick-burning business, for which the commander also forced villagers to provide fire wood. Local villages in Ye have also been ordered to prepare 5-10 porters a day when military operations are conducted.

Thai investment in the Yadana Gas pipeline was one of the principal factors which pressured the NMSP into a ceasefire agreement back in 1995, and it is still the cause of human rights violations in 2007. As with the Kanbawk-Myaingkalay domestic gas pipeline, the SPDC has delegated responsibility for security to local villagers. In effect, this means that local people have less time for their own livelihoods as they must work to secure electricity for others.

Mon Areas



3.6 TENASSERIM DIVISION

Tenasserim Division is ruled by the SPDC's Coastal Military Command, based in Mergui (Myeik), with the support of three Military Operation Command centers in Tavoy, Bokpyin and Kawthaung. There are currently 46 Infantry and Light Infantry battalions spread throughout Tenasserim Division. Amongst other social, economic and political problems, military rule has resulted in approximately 61,000 villagers remaining internally displaced in 2007. This includes almost 2,000 people who have been forced to move from their homes during the past year alone.

The misrule of law to intimidate villagers against having contact with the armed opposition is widespread, even in government controlled areas. In December 2006, the entire village of Kya Chaung in Bokpyin Township was burnt and forcibly relocated to Lanphonnga in retaliation for alleged contact with KNU. In the months preceding that, one of the villagers had been tortured to death and three others from nearby Manoeroe village tract had been sentenced to three years imprisonment. Extortion is a more common form of punishment, such as when 3 villagers from Thayetchaung township were fined 70,000 kyat each in June 2007.

The poverty of villagers in relocation sites has been exacerbated during the past year by increased demands from SPDC for forced labour and land. To consolidate the military's expansion, villagers from relocation sites were forced to carry military supplies to border camps on a monthly basis. Betel nut plantations that existed nearby to the new military camps were confiscated, and to add insult to injury the villagers were forced to work on their former lands for the benefit of the local Burmese Army troops.

Thousands of acres of land have also been confiscated by the Burmese Army for commercial agriculture. Some of this land has been appropriated for joint ventures between Thai and Malaysian investors and local Burmese Army commanders for palm oil and rubber plantations. However land confiscation, forced labour and extortion related to the national initiative to cultivate castor oil is also becoming increasingly common.

During the past year, villagers from over 20 relocation sites in Tavoy, Thayetchaung and Tenasserim township have attempted to either return to their original villages or resettle on nearby lands. This has been done on the basis of local agreements with SPDC authorities, but without any official permission. So there is no guarantee that these villagers will not be obliged to move back to the Burmese Army's designated sites, nor that efforts to re-establish livelihoods and reintegrate into society will be sustainable. Nonetheless, given the voluntary movement, estimates for the number of people in relocation sites have been cut by 18,000 people compared to last year.

The most destructive SPDC military operations during the past year were conducted by LIB 342 and IB 265 in Tenasserim and Bokpyin townships. While these patrols were purportedly targeting a KNU battalion, the result was that the housing and food supplies of civilians who were hiding in fear of the SPDC were destroyed. As a result of these atrocities, over 1,000 villagers were unable to sustain their subsistence any longer. Some were obliged to move into nearby relocation sites, but the majority fled to seek asylum in Thailand. Estimates for the number of IDPs in hiding have thus slightly decreased, but this does not reflect any solution to their problems.

Tenasserim Division




PHOTO : KSWDC, Uncertain futures, Karenni State, 2007




CHAPTER

4. VULNERABILITY AND

PROTECTION ASSESSMENT


4.1 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

The humanitarian imperative to alleviate suffering is a call to respond not only to basic needs, but also to address underlying causes of vulnerability and a lack of human security. Vulnerability is an outcome of political, economic, and social processes that neglect, exclude or exploit the livelihoods and human rights of marginalised individuals and communities. From a livelihoods perspective, vulnerability is caused by a limited capacity to cope and recover from stresses and shocks on assets, activities and capabilities related to survival and development. However from a humanitarian protection perspective in the context of protracted emergency, vulnerability is fundamentally related to patterns of conflict, violence and abuse.⁵³




Direct physical violence remains a threat to personal safety for internally displaced persons across all location types in eastern Burma. The dangers of military patrols, landmines and artillery attack are especially acute for households hiding in the most contested areas. When responses are disaggregated by state, these threats were most prominent in Karen State and Pegu Division, which is consistent with widespread reports of the most severe humanitarian atrocities occurring in these areas. However, the greatest risks of arbitrary arrest or detention, torture or beatings and forced conscription as a porter and landmine sweeper have been recorded in mixed administration areas and relocation sites where the Burmese Army have a constant presence. These responses support the assessments of human rights groups that the primary perpetrators of violence against civilians are the SPDC's own troops and administrative authorities.


⁵³ Narbeth and McLean, 2003, "Livelihoods and Protection : Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia ", Humanitarian Practice Network Paper 44, ODI, London, www.odihpn.org



Responses from this year’s survey can be compared with those from 2005, because the sampling method, number of respondents and line of inquiry were similar. In both cases, respondents were asked about threats during the previous twelve months. Although the threat of military patrols was not assessed in 2005, the findings suggest that prevalence of the most common threats to personal safety and security has slightly increased. In particular, there has been a significant increase in fears related to arbitrary arrest or detention and forced conscription to porter military supplies. This reflects field reports about increased SPDC troop deployments to outposts along the border compelling an increased dependence on forced labour to transport supplies.




Despite the severity of threats to personal safety and security, the prevalence of threats to livelihoods is on a greater scale. Restrictions on movement to fields and markets was the most pervasive human rights abuse recorded during the past year, followed by forced labour and extortion or arbitrary taxation. The proportion of households affected by these patterns of abuse was highest in mixed administration areas and relocation sites, which is indicative of the oppressive conditions associated with living in close proximity to the Burmese Army. Conversely, the destruction or confiscation of food supplies and the destruction of, or forced eviction from, housing primarily targeted villagers hiding in the most contested areas. This reflects the SPDC's counter insurgency strategy, which deliberately targets civilians through impoverishment and deprivation. When disaggregated by state, abuses were generally most prevalent in eastern Pegu Division with the exception of forced labour which was significantly higher in Shan State.




Indicators of trends relating to the deprivations of war can be assessed through a comparison of responses to similar field surveys coordinated by TBBC and conducted in 2004 and 2005. Findings suggest there has been a dramatic decrease in the incidence of extortion and forced labour since 2004. This could be partly attributed to the International Labour Organisation's (ILO's) ongoing efforts to lift the impunity associated with the imposition of forced labour. However given that the field reports of community organisations do not corroborate such a decrease, this is more likely to reflect errors in the first household survey rather than such a significant decrease in the prevalence of abuse. However, the indication that restrictions on movement have increased is supported by field reports which have documented restrictions on overnight travel in southern Shan State since the surrender of SSA-S' 158th battalion commander, in the northern Karen areas in order to separate lowland and upland villagers, and in Mon state in response to the activities of armed splinter groups.

Survey responses disaggregated by gender did not show significant differences in the prevalence of threats to lives and livelihoods during the past year as experienced by men and women. Men reported only slightly higher rates of having experienced


forced labour, extortion, arbitrary arrest or detention and restrictions on travel. Community organisations attribute this to the likelihood that men are more likely to be travelling to forests and markets, and hence coming into contact with SPDC forces. To assess the added vulnerability experienced by girls and women, this year’s household survey included questions specifically addressing gender discrimination and violence against women in the broader cultural context.



The survey findings, which were comparable when disaggregated by sex, indicate that almost half of the internally displaced in eastern Burma feel that men and women have equal opportunities. However, there was also a widespread awareness of the ways in which girls and women are being marginalised by gender stereotypes about expected behaviours. A significant proportion of households recognised that females were expected to assume more domestic responsibilities at the expense of community leadership and income generating activities. This is also a cause of isolation as indicated by restricted travel opportunities, although this could also be partly attributed to paternalistic measures to prevent sexual violence. Such cultural restrictions on girls and women were documented as most prevalent in mixed administration areas. However, it is debatable how much perceptions of equal opportunities amongst communities in hiding sites and relocation sites reflects gender equality or conversely a lack of awareness about women’s rights at the community level.




Domestic violence, physical assault, threats from authorities and forced or early marriage are regarded by villagers as the most common types of violence that especially threaten girls and women in eastern Burma. When disaggregated by State, the threat of domestic violence was most significant in Karenni state, while forced or early marriage and the physical assault of women were most common in Shan State. In all cases, the threat is perceived as greatest in relocation sites and mixed administration areas where Burmese Army troops are in close proximity.



Children are particularly vulnerable to patterns of abuse, and in a protracted conflict such as that in eastern Burma there is the additional danger of being lured into military service. This survey found that almost 10% of households had a member currently working in some capacity for an armed force, with slightly more children working for non state actors compared to the Burmese Army. Although the KNU and KNPP signed deeds of commitment to end the recruitment of children into armed conflict earlier in 2007, these findings suggest there remains a significant number of children active in military service for non state actors. This may reflect the reluctance of local commanders to prohibit and decommission children who are under the age of 18 years but who have volunteered to serve the armed opposition.

Given the Burmese Army's admission that children have been recruited into their armed forces, the absence from this survey of family members working as under-age soldiers with the SPDC is surprising. However, it is likely that the majority of children recruited by the Burmese Army are from urban centers, and not villages in the vicinity of contested areas.



While all of these patterns of abuse are factors of vulnerability, measurements of malnutrition and life expectancy help to quantify the extent of vulnerability. Malnutrition is associated with increased risks of growth failure and mortality and incorporates states of wasting (thinness or acute malnutrition), stunting (shortness or chronic malnutrition) and micro-nutrient deficiencies. Measuring malnutrition levels amongst children as a proxy for the population as a whole is widely accepted practice. The generally preferred tool is to compare weight-for-height (WFH) status of children aged between 6 and 59 months and to report the prevalence of acute malnutrition in terms of standard deviations (Z scores) from international reference values. Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) surveys offer a rapid assessment alternative which is often easier to conduct in complex emergencies. MUAC tests are targeted at children aged between one and five years, with a circumference of less than 12.5 centimeters indicative of global acute malnutrition (GAM).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ The SHERE Project, 2004, "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response", pp 108, 183.

This survey, as with the other surveys of internally displaced populations cited, conducted MUAC tests because it was not logistically possible to carry scales into the field. Tests conducted in refugee camps in 2006 on children who were newly arrived from a state of internal displacement, used the weight-for height method. Assessments of malnutrition, conducted in dangerous and difficult circumstances, have produced a wide range of findings over the past seven years. This is considered primarily due to methodological constraints rather than any dramatic change in nutritional status. However, with the compatibility of results between this year's MUAC survey and last year's WFH survey of newly arrived refugees, a global acute malnutrition rate of 9.5% amongst internally displaced children can be reported with greater confidence.

This represents a serious public health problem according to World Health Organisation indicators⁵⁵, and compares poorly to the most recent national baseline figures which indicate that 7.4% of children are acutely malnourished.⁵⁶ Given that baseline figures indicate that a third of children are chronically malnourished nation-wide⁵⁷, it can be speculated that close to half the children in internally displaced communities are stunting.


4.2 COPING STRATEGIES

Although unable to stop or prevent abuses, internally displaced and conflict-affected communities have developed a range of coping strategies to resist threats and mitigate the consequences of violence and abuse. Victims of conflict are also resilient survivors with a wealth of knowledge about the nature of threats, the psychology of perpetrators and potential practical responses. Recognition of, and support for, these local capabilities will be the foundation for developing the most effective humanitarian protection strategies. This survey has assessed early warning signals and risk management practices for threats to safety and security as well as coping strategies for dealing with livelihood shocks and poor health.


⁵⁵ World Health Organisation, 2000, *The Management of Nutrition in Major Emergencies*, Geneva

⁵⁶ Ministry of Health, 2003, *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey*, Dept of Health Planning, Yangon.

⁵⁷ UNICEF, 2004, *The State of the World's Children*, New York, p 108




Early warning signals enhance the abilities of villagers to prepare for approaching troop movements and a range of other threats. This survey found that village security guards and traders or other civilians have been the main sources of early warning for villagers during the past twelve months. This highlights the importance of social capital, or networks of trust, within and between local communities for the development of a protective environment. Non state actors were also a significant source of information about threatening troop movements, especially in hiding sites and ethnic ceasefire areas. Conversely, Burmese Army authorities assume an inconsequential role in warning local villagers of imminent danger. These findings confer legitimacy to claims by non state actors that they are genuine representatives of the ethnic nationalities, regardless of the expansion of SPDC control.



When findings are compared against responses to the same question in 2005, it becomes evident that the significance of traders and other civilians as a source of early warning has decreased. This reflects the impact of increasing restrictions on


movement imposed by SPDC in contested areas. Civilians have become more dependent on their own village security guards for early warning of approaching troops as a result of this reduction in broader economic and social networks.



The means of coping with threats to physical safety and livelihoods at the household level varied considerably across different location types. Hiding food supplies in various locations and preparing alternative hiding sites in case of emergency evacuation were the main approaches to mitigating the consequences of military patrols amongst households in hiding sites. These households are also the most likely to work at night to avoid detection, indicating not only the severity of threats in hiding sites but also the determination of villagers to survive and remain in their own land.


Conversely, the main method of minimizing threats in relocation sites and mixed administration areas during the past year was to pay fines and follow orders. This reflects how SPDC demands for porters or labourers, and associated risks such as sweeping landmines, can be avoided through the payment of fees. It can be extrapolated that such extortion is motivated not only by retaliation against armed opposition patrols, but also by the junta's impoverishment of its frontline troops.

Responses to this question in 2007 are consistent with the findings from 2005, with the most significant differences being a 6% decrease in the prevalence of working at night and a 5% increase in the payment of fines.




Collective harm mitigation strategies that are coordinated at the village level also vary considerably depending on the type of location. As in 2005, the most common approach reported from relocation sites and mixed administration areas during the past year was to provide village leaders with a pool of funds in order to placate SPDC authorities. The selection of female village leaders to deal with local authorities was also more significant in relocation sites than elsewhere, although the overall prevalence doubled compared to the 2005 survey.

However, the incidence of coordinating village security guards, relocating villages to a safer place and requesting non state actors to deploy landmines were most prevalent amongst villagers in hiding. Dependence on relocation and landmines reflect how self defense strategies in contested areas are not sustainable solutions, nor without associated burdens and risks. Rather, coping with threats to safety and security for villagers in hiding sites is a basic struggle for survival.



As with the sources of early warning signals, coping strategies for dealing with shocks to livelihoods during the past year highlight the importance of social capital. Seeking help from neighbours and loans from traders were key mechanisms by internally displaced communities across all types of places. Provision of loans, especially if they are interest-free loans, in such an unstable environment depends upon networks of trust substituting for material collateral. This high prevalence of accessing loans and help from neighbours reflect how maintaining strong relations between communities, and across conflict lines, is fundamental to the viability of coping strategies. The social basis of coping strategies is also reflected in responses from the most vulnerable communities in hiding sites, of whom almost half had received aid from community based organizations during the past year.

The most strictly economic strategies for coping with livelihood shocks were selling assets and migrating in search of income, which were mostly used in relocation sites and mixed administration areas. While the sale of possessions offers immediate respite from poverty, the sale of productive assets such as livestock or property can also inhibit longer term prospects for recovery. Similarly, risks associated with migration include family separation, especially in such an unstable environment, and loss of land in absentia.




In terms of coping with ill health, dependence on herbal medicine, traditional healers, cross border aid and traders reflects the breakdown in the government's health care system. While government clinics were accessed during the past year by a third of respondents in relocation sites, their significance was negligible to internally displaced persons in other types of places. Even in relocation sites, western medicine was twice as likely to be accessed through traders compared to physicians at a government clinic. Lack of access to public health care is associated with high mortality rates from infectious diseases, such as malaria, which could otherwise be prevented and treated. Conversely, the findings indicate that the most relevant coordinated response to poor health for internally displaced communities are the systems maintained by non state actors and supported as cross border aid operations.

4.3 PROTECTION ASSESSMENT

While national authorities have the primary obligation to protect civilians from harm, the SPDC are the primary perpetrators of violence and abuse in eastern Burma. In this context, humanitarian protection is understood as making states and individuals meet their humanitarian responsibilities to protect people in war and filling in for them as much as possible when they do not.⁵⁸ However the international community has had negligible success in raising protection concerns with government authorities.

Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been so frustrated in using confidential and bilateral dialogue as its preferred means of achieving results, that it took the exceptional measure of publicly denouncing the SPDC earlier this year. Despite evidence of systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, the ICRC bemoaned that the government remains unwilling to enter into serious discussion about how to stop these abuses and prevent them reoccurring.⁵⁹

TBBC has previously documented a more comprehensive assessment of efforts by the international community to engage the humanitarian responsibility of the Burmese national authorities.⁶⁰ This year's protection assessment was limited to the efforts of others to stop violence and abuse or at least to mitigate the effects. Using the ICRC protection framework as a guide, this assessment looks at the attempts of human rights groups in responsive action to stop patterns of abuse, humanitarian groups in remedial action to restore human dignity, and non state actors in environment building to promote human rights.




⁵⁸ Hugo Slim and Luis Enrique Aguren, 2001, *Humanitarian Protection: A Guidance Booklet*, ALNAP, p21

⁵⁹ ICRC, 29 June 2007, "Press Release : Myanmar – ICRC denounces major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law", Yangon / Geneva.

⁶⁰ TBBC, 2005, *Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma*, Bangkok, www.tbcc.org


The household survey found that the perceived impact of documenting human rights abuses was greatest in terms of raising awareness rather than actually leading to judicial or social redress. This reflects an acceptance that even if human rights documentation does not directly lead to the punishment of perpetrators, the promotion of attitudinal change in society is important to stop patterns of abuse in the long term. However, the grassroots benefits of human rights documentation appear to have decreased since the perceptions of conflict affected villagers were last surveyed in 2005. Villagers reported significantly more ambivalence this year, with the incidence of redress through both the Burmese government and non state actors decreasing dramatically.

Vulnerable communities in hiding sites remain the most optimistic about the positive impacts of human rights documentation, while those in government controlled relocation sites reported the most pessimistic responses. It could be speculated from these responses that a sense of hope in justice prevailing remains strongest in communities that have witnessed the worst humanitarian atrocities but do not have to deal with SPDC authorities on a daily basis.



The protection dividend of humanitarian aid during the past was also perceived positively by villagers, although not as conclusively as in 2005. The majority of respondents believed that their economic and social links had been strengthened across political conflict or that the incidence of human rights abuses had decreased due to the provision of aid. As in the previous survey, only a negligible proportion of villagers reported suffering from intimidation prior to the arrival, or violent repercussions after the departure, of humanitarian agencies.

When disaggregated by State or Division and by place type, the reach of aid (and hence the protection dividend) during the past year was weakest in Shan State and government controlled relocation sites. While the survey did not distinguish between aid delivered by groups based inside Burma and cross border operations, this finding reflects limited access for cross border aid agencies in these areas compared to other states and place types.



Less than half of the population surveyed in ethnic ceasefire areas believed that their situation had improved as a result of the ceasefire agreement. This represents an 11% decrease in satisfaction compared to responses to a similar question in 2005. The main benefit identified by residents of ceasefire areas was in relation to increased livelihood opportunities, with few responses suggesting there had been an improvement in the human rights situation. This finding may understate the significance of the cessation of hostilities in terms of reducing casualties from armed conflict, and indeed ceasefire agreements are an essential step towards national reconciliation. However until a political settlement addressing the causes of conflict can be brokered, the protection dividend of ceasefire agreements in terms of promoting human rights is likely to remain limited.

PHOTO : MRDC, Making Brooms in a Ceasefire Area, Ye, 2007



APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 : 2007 QUESTIONNAIRES

POPULATION SURVEY

The objective is to assess the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development.

Township name (on maps of Burma) :

Background about key informants :

.....

1. How many villages have been completely destroyed, relocated or abandoned during the past 12 months? Where were these villages?
(Please indicate on the table and map provided)
2. How many people have fled or been forced to leave their homes and moved elsewhere due to war or human rights abuses during the past 12 months?
(Please indicate on the table provided)
3. How many previously displaced villages have been re-established by at least 10 households during the past 12 months? Where are these villages?
(Please indicate on the table and map provided)
4. How many SPDC "relocation sites" (including consolidated villages) currently remain populated by force? Where are these relocation sites?
(Please indicate on the table and map provided)
5. How many people are currently obliged to live in SPDC relocation sites (including consolidated villages)?
(Please indicate on the table provided)
6. Where are any "hiding areas" in which people conceal themselves from SPDC patrols, including opposition controlled areas?
(Please indicate on the map provided)
7. How many people currently hide from, or do not show themselves to, SPDC patrols?
(Please indicate on the table provided)
8. Where are any special regions or "ceasefire areas" in which the ethnic nationality authorities have limited autonomy and guarantees against SPDC attack?
(Please indicate on the map provided)
9. How many people currently live in ethnic "ceasefire areas"?
(Please indicate on the table provided)
10. Where are development projects (eg road construction, agricultural plantations, mining, logging, dam construction, gas pipelines) which have caused human rights abuses during the past 12 months?
(Please indicate location, project type and human rights abuse on the map provided)
11. Where are current locations of SPDC outposts, battalion headquarters, Light Infantry Divisions (LID), Operational Control Headquarters (OCH) and Regional Commands?
(Please indicate the location and type of army camp on the map provided)

8. Has your livelihood been damaged in any of the following ways during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Floods damaged crops | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. landslides damaged crops |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. pests damaged crops | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. food supplies destroyed by armed forces |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. theft of food supplies by armed forces | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. travel restrictions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. forced displacement | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. land confiscation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. extortion or arbitrary taxes | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. imposition of forced labour |

9. Has your safety and security been threatened in any of the following ways during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. heavy artillery attack | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. small arms attack |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. landmines or military patrols | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. arbitrary killing of a family member |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. arbitrary arrest or detention | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. torture or beatings |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. rape or other sexual abuse | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. destruction of housing or forced eviction |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. forced portering or landmine sweeper | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. forced recruitment into the armed forces |

10. Have any members of your household died in the past 12 months?

(mark one box, and write the age)

1. no 2. yes, (s)he was aged years

11. If children aged between 12 months and 5 years are with you, please allow me to measure their left arm and assess their nutrition status.

(conduct MUAC test, mark results for each child)

No children present

- | | | |
|----------|--|--|
| Child 1: | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. normal nutrition (green) | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. mild malnutrition (yellow) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 3. moderate malnutrition (orange) | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. severe malnutrition (red) |
| Child 2: | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. normal nutrition (green) | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. mild malnutrition (yellow) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 3. moderate malnutrition (orange) | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. severe malnutrition (red) |
| Child 3: | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. normal nutrition (green) | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. mild malnutrition (yellow) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 3. moderate malnutrition (orange) | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. severe malnutrition (red) |

COPING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT

12. How have you received early warning about troop movements during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. unarmed village security guards | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. armed village security guards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Burma Army authorities | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. armed opposition or ceasefire authorities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Traders and other villagers | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. humanitarian or human rights monitors |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Have not received warnings | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify) : |

13. How did your household minimized threats to safety and livelihoods during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. hid food supplies in different places | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. prepared hiding sites for evacuation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. paid fines and followed orders | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. worked at night |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. carried a gun | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. joined armed opposition group or militia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. did nothing different | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify) : |

14. How has your village minimized threats to safety and livelihoods during the past 12 months? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. selected female village leaders | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. paid village leaders |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. reported lower population figures | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. relocated the village to safer place |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. laid landmines | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. coordinated an armed security guards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. coordinated unarmed security guards | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. did nothing different |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. split into smaller groups | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. other (specify) |

15. How have you coped with damaging shocks to your livelihood in the past 12 months? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. survive on rice soup | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. hunt and gather food from the forest |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. aid from neighbours | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. loans from traders (with interest charged) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. aid from organisations | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. sell animals, property or possessions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. send someone to work elsewhere | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. other |

16. How have you coped with disease or health problems during the past 12 months? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. herbal medicine from the forest | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. visited traditional healer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. western medicine | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. visited government clinic |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. government authorized private clinic | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. ethnic nationalities' clinic or medics |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. bought medicine from trader | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. rested, but nothing else different |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. other | |

PROTECTION ASSESSMENT

17. How are opportunities restricted for women in your community? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | |
|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Women expected to care for family & home |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. travel restricted more for women |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. education prioritized for boys over girls |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. village leadership is dominated by men |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. lack of family planning choices |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. daily wages higher for men than women |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. not relevant – there are equal opportunities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. other |

18. What types of violence and abuse especially threatens women in your community? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Beatings | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Sexual harassment or rape |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Domestic violence | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Forced or early marriage |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Being tricked or sold into slavery | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Forced prostitution |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Threats from authorities | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other |

19. If anyone in your family is under 18 years old and working in an armed force, what are they doing? *(mark all relevant boxes)*

- | |
|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Soldier for the Tatmadaw |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Soldier for an armed opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. kitchen hand for the Tatmadaw |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. kitchen hand for armed opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. porter or messenger for the Tatmadaw |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. porter or messenger for armed opposition |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. masseuse for the Tatmadaw |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. masseuse for an armed opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. no one is under 18 years old and working in an armed force |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10. other..... |

20. How has the presence of aid workers affected your safety and security during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- 1. No change – but hope they come again
- 2. No change – but hope they stay away
- 3. Better - human rights abuses decreased
- 4. Better, economic & social links stronger
- 5. Worse – violent threats beforehand
- 6. Worse - violent repercussions afterwards
- 7. No humanitarian aid reached us
- 8. Other (specify)

21. If human rights abuses have been reported from your area, how has that affected the safety of villagers during the past 12 months? (mark all relevant boxes)

- 1. No change – same as before
- 2. No one's collected that information here
- 3. better awareness about human rights
- 4. Worse - more troop patrols afterwards
- 5. better, government punished offenders
- 6. Worse – victim suffered more abuse
- 7. better, ethnic authorities punished offender
- 8. Other (specify):.....

22. How have ceasefire agreements affected your livelihoods and vulnerability to human rights abuses? (if relevant, mark two boxes)

- 1. Not relevant – there's no ceasefire here
- 2. livelihood opportunities similar to before
- 3. Livelihood opportunities increased
- 4. livelihood opportunities decreased
- 5. Human rights abuses continue as before
- 6. human rights abuses are not as bad
- 7. Human rights abuses have worsened
- 8. Other (specify):.....

Thankyou for your cooperation!

APPENDIX 2 : INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION SURVEY BY TOWNSHIP

States, Divisions and Townships	Newly Displaced Civilians (2006-07)	IDPs in Hiding Sites (2007)	IDPs in Relocation Sites (2007)	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas (2007)	Total IDPs (2007)
SHAN STATE	15,400	13,700	24,100	126,000	163,800
Mawk Mai	2,300	1,500	1,900	2,200	5,600
Mong Kurng	1,000	1,400	2,500	2,000	5,900
Laikha	n/a	1,000	2,300	4,000	7,300
Loilem	1,300	1,000	1,000	800	2,800
Nam Zarng	1,500	1,500	2,000	2,700	6,200
Kun Hing	3,000	2,800	3,000	11,000	16,800
Mong Hsat	1,000	1,200	1,000	45,000	47,200
Mong Ton	2,500	1,000	6,000	32,000	39,000
Mong Pan	1,100	1,100	2,000	1,800	4,900
Kehsi	n/a	n/a	n/a	18,500	18,500
Langkher	n/a	n/a	n/a	4,000	4,000
Mong Nai	1,700	1,200	2,400	2,000	5,600
KARENNI STATE	2,800	10,000	4,800	66,200	81,000
Shadaw	200	2,900	1,300	0	4,200
Loikaw	0	0	1,900	6,700	8,600
Demawso	0	0	0	38,500	38,500
Pruso	0	1,400	0	6,000	7,400
Bawlake	0	0	900	0	900
Pasaung	2,600	5,700	700	5,200	11,600
Mehset	0	0	0	9,800	9,800
PEGU DIVISION	11,500	18,700	12,200	0	30,900
Tantabin	0	0	0	0	0
Kyaukgyi	10,000	10,000	10,600	0	20600
Shwegyin	1,500	8,700	1,600	0	10300
KAREN STATE	43,400	51,600	9,700	55,600	116,900
Thandaung	12,900	13,000	1,200	0	14,200
Papun	18,600	30,800	0	0	30,800
Hlaing Bwe	800	1,200	0	5,300	6,500
Myawaddy	2,600	0	0	10,000	10,000
Kawkareik	1,800	1,800	0	0	1,800
Kyain Seikgyi	6,700	4,800	8,500	40,300	53,600
MON STATE	1,200	600	7,200	41,600	49,400
Thaton	0	0	1,300	0	1,300
Bilin	0	0	1,400	0	1,400
Ye	1,200	600	4,500	41,600	46,700
TENASSERIM DIVISION	1,700	4,400	51,000	5,600	61,000
Yebyu	900	600	9,800	5,600	16,000
Tavoy	400	600	5,500	0	6,100
Thayetchaung	0	0	3,100	0	3,100
Palaw	0	1,500	11,900	0	13,400
Mergui	0	0	5,100	0	5,100
Tenasserim	300	1,200	13,100	0	14,300
Bokpyin	100	500	2,500	0	3,000
TOTALS	76,000	99,000	109,000	295,000	503,000

APPENDIX 3 : DESTROYED, RELOCATED OR ABANDONED VILLAGES (2006-7)

SHAN STATE ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်

Kunhing Township	ကွန်ဟိန်းမြို့နယ်	Mong Kung Township	မိုင်းကိုင်မြို့နယ်
Kun Me	ကွန်မီ	Nam Hu Mark Laung	နမ့်ဟူးမက်လန်း
Wan Nar Boa	ဝမ်နားဘော်	Wan Loi Sai	ဝမ်လွယ်ဆိုင်း
Wan Keng Kham	ဝမ်ကျိုင်းခမ်း	Wan Young Loi	ဝမ်ယန်းလွယ်
Wan Nar Keio	ဝမ်နားကျို	Wan Nam Neap	ဝမ်နမ်နက်
Mong Ton Township	မိုင်းတုံမြို့နယ်	Mong Nai Township	မိုင်းနဲမြို့နယ်
Wan Koong Sat	ဝမ်ကုန်းဆာ	Nong Ya Sai	နောင်ယာဆိုင်း
Wan Karn Ku	ဝန်ကန်ဂူ	Wan Nong Leng	ဝမ်နောင်လိုင်
Nar Park Hi	နားပတ်ဟိ		
Mong Jod	မိုင်းကျွတ်		

KARENNI STATE ကယားပြည်နယ်

Shadaw Township	ရှားတောမြို့နယ်		
Daw Mu Say	ဒေါမုစေး		
Pasaung Township	ဖာဆောင်းမြို့နယ်		
Pwado	ပွဲဒို	Todoleko	ထိုဒိုလေးခို
Sholo	ရှိုးလို	Kawtodo	ကော်တူဒိုး
Hosachi	ဟိုးဆာခီး	Saw daw ku	ရှိုဒေါရူ
Kasawkhee	ကစောခီး	Kwachi	ကွာခီး
Kathochi (lower)	ကသိုးခီး (အောက်)	Mukahday	မူဟားဒေး
Kathochi (upper)	ကသိုးခီး (အပေါ်)	Ka Pway Do	ကပွေဒို
Kawarsoe	ကဝေါဖိုး	Ka Pway Phe	ကပွေဖိုး
Hkotro	ကိုးတရို	Lalawhtee	လေလော်ထီး

PEGU DIVISION ပဲခူးတိုင်း

Kyaukgyi Township	ကျောက်ကြီးမြို့နယ်		
Hsaw Wah Der	ဆောဝါဒဲ	Ta Mu Khee	တာမူးခီး
Saw Tay Der	ဆောတေးဒဲ	Saw Khee	ဆောခီး
Kheh Pho Der	ခေးဖိုးဒဲ	Thay Nweh Khee	သေးနွယ်ခီး
Yaw Khee	ယောခီး	Thay Khay Lu	သေးခေးလူ
Phlay Pa	ဖလေးပါ	Nweh Hta	နွားထာ
Phlay Khee	ဖလေးခီး	Nweh Khee	နွားခီး

Kyaukgyi Township (continued)

Ler Wah Lu	လယ်ဝါးလူ	Me Ya Hta	မေယာတာ
Kwee Doh Khaw	ကွီးဒိုခေါ်	Maw Lu Kho	မောလူခို
Nya Mu Khee	ညာမူခီး	Htee Khaw	ထီးခေါ
Tae Na Hta	တယ်နာတာ	Ta Gaw Pu	တာဂေါပူ
Nweh Lay Kho	နွားလေးခို	Klaw Khee	ကလောခီး
Saw Kher Khee	ဆောခါခီး	Ler Htaw Der	လယ်ထောဒဲ
Kyauk Pya	ကျောက်ဖျာ	Ler Klah	လယ်ကလာ
Ka Pa Hta	ကာပါးတာ	Saw Kha Der	ဆောခါဒဲ
Theth Baw Der	သက်ဘောဒဲ	Hi Oo	ဟီအူး
Ka Waw Kho	ကဝါးခို	Kwee Lah	ကွီးလာ
Taw Pho Khee	တောဖိုးခီး	Per Pho Khee	ပါဖိုးခီး
Gi Blah Hta	ဂီးဘလားတာ	Paw Ler Kho	ဖေါလဲခို

Shwegyin Township ရွှေကျင်မြို့နယ်

Ler Wah	လေးဝါး	Klu Waw Khee	ကလူဝေါခီး
Htee Thoo Khee	ထီးသူးခီး	Pa Kah Hta	ပါကာတာ
Ta Ho Aw	တာဟိုအော	Htee Wa Bway Khe	ထီးဝါဘွေးခီး
		Wa Pae Kwee	ဝါးပေခွီး

KAREN STATE

ကရင်ပြည်နယ်

Thandaung Township သံတောင်မြို့နယ်

Bu Hsa Khee	ဘူဆာခီး	Oo Per	အူးပယ်
Tha Kwee Soe	သခွီးစိုး	Blah Khee	ဘလားခီး
Khu Ler Der	ခုလားဒဲ	Maw Tu Der	မောတူးဒဲ
Hsaw Wa Der	ဆောဝါးဒဲ	Thay Mu Der	သေမူဒဲ
Thay Khu Der	သေးခုဒဲ	Kho Haw Der	ကိုးဟော်ဒဲ
Ha To Per	ဟာထိုးပယ်	Haw Lu Der	ဟော်လူဒဲ
Tha Aye Khee	သအေးခီး	Sho Kho	ရှိုးခို
Klay Khee	ကလေးခီး	Pwi Khee	ဖွီးခီး
Bu Khee	ဘူခီး	Khaw Mee Kho	ခေါမီးခို
Wah Soe	ဝါးဆိုး	Thay Ya Yu	သေးယာယူ
Hi Daw Khaw	ဟီဒေါခေါ်	Pha Der Kah	ဖါဒဲကာ
Kho Khee	ဟိုးခီး	Pha Weh	ဖါးဝယ်
Soe Ser	ရှိုးစယ်	Ma Wa Khaw	မာဝါခေါ
Plo Mu Der	ပလိုမူဒဲ	Wae La Khaw	ဝေလာခေါ
Si Kheh Der	စီးခဲဒဲ	De Dah Kho	ဒါးခို
Khaw Htu Hto	ခေါ တူထိုး	Ma Pweh Kho	မာပွယ်ခို
Per Lo	ပယ်လို	Lae Kher Der Kah	လယ်ခယ်ဒဲကာ
May Daw Kho	မေဒေါခို	Lae Kher Der Kho	လယ်ခယ်ဒဲခို
Law Bee Ler	လော်ဘီးလယ်	Lae Kher Der Tha	လယ်ခယ်ဒဲသာ

Thandaung Township (Continued)

Maw Thay Der	မော်သေးဒဲ	Thaw Khaw Saw	သောခေါစော
Paw Pha	ဖေဖ	Saw Law Kho	စောလောခို
Lay Oh Lo	လေးဂိုလို	Ka Ta Khee	ကတာခီး
Si Daw Kho	စီဒေါခို	Kay Law Khee	ကေလော်ခီး
Pway Baw Der	ပွေဘောဒဲ	Ga Mu Doh	ကမူဒို
Saw Mu Der	စောမူဒဲ	Kheh Der	ခဲဒဲ
Wa Mi Per Kho	ဝါးမိပယ်ခို	Hu Mu Der	ဟူမူဒဲ
Yer Lo	ယယ်လို	Ler Klah	လယ်ကလားဒဲ
Thay Gi La	သေးဂီးလာ	Klaw Mee Der	ကလောမီးဒဲ
Maw Khu Der	မော်ကူဒဲ	Khaw Pho Lo	ဟောဖိုးလို
Htee Hsi Khee	ထီးဆီးခီး	Pwee Lo	ပွီးလို
Ber Kha Lay Kho	ဘယ်ခါလေးခို	Ta Per Khee	တာပါခီး
S' Wa Daw Kho	စဝါဒေါခို	Plo Baw Der	ပလောဘောဒဲ
Pho Mu Der	ဖိုးမူဒဲ		

Papun Township

Htee Hsit Khee	ထီးဆီးခီး	Po Kla Der	ဖိုးကလာဒဲ
Tru Khee	တရူခီး	Ka Baw Khee	ကဘောခီး
Bo Na Der	ဘိုနာဒဲ	Soe Per Kho	ဆိုးဖာခို
Ta May Khee	တာမေခီး	Ti Thoo Khee	တီးသူးခီး
Thay Thoo Khee	သေးသူးခီး	Ta Paw Der	တာပေါဒဲ
Ku Day	ကူဒေး		

Myawaddy Township

Tablut Kho Khee	မြဝတီမြို့နယ် တဘလူခိုခီး	Thit Wah May	သီဝါမေး
Ba Hta	ဘားထာ	Kaw Khaw Klo	ကော်ခေါကလိုး

MON STATE မွန်ပြည်နယ်

Ye Township	ရေးမြို့နယ်
Baround	ဘရောင်း

TENASSERIM DIVISION တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း

Tavoy Township	ထားဝယ်မြို့နယ်	Tenasserim Township	တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း
Mawtarthoo	မော်တာသူး	Themeinkee	သမိန်ခီး
Wamaysoe	ဝါမေးဖိုး	Yawahlor	ယာဝါးလို
Ghawhteelor	ဂေါထီးလော်	Taneraukee	တနေးရောခီး
Hteepoelay	ထီးဖိုးလေး	Maelethta	မယ်လဲထာ
Kasawlawtethelay	ကစောလောတယ်သီးလေး		
Kliithukee	ကလီသူးခီး	Bokpyin Township	ဘုတ်ပြင်းမြို့နယ်
		Kyachaung	ကျားချောင်း

APPENDIX 4 : RELOCATION SITES (2007)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်

<p>Mong Nai Township Nar Kharn</p>	<p>မိုးနဲမြို့နယ် နားခမ်း</p>	<p>Mong Pan Township Nong Bar Moon Nar Law Ho Phai Mork Zam</p>	<p>မိုင်းပန်မြို့နယ် နောင်ပါမွန် နားလော ဟိုဖိုင်မောက်စမ်</p>
<p>Mong Ton Township Mae Ken Nar Kong Mu Boong Par Kem</p>	<p>မိုင်းတုံမြို့နယ် မဲ့ကင်း နားကောင်းမူး ပုံပါကျင်</p>	<p>Mawk Mai Township Nam Lot Kan Do Long</p>	<p>မောက်မယ်မြို့နယ် နမ်လောက် ကန်ဒူးလုံ</p>
<p>Mong Kung Township Khen Oong oi Kat Pui</p>	<p>မိုင်းကိုင်မြို့နယ် ခေးအုံအွေ ကတ်ဖွေး</p>	<p>Nam Zarng Township Hai Pack Kat Ray</p>	<p>နမ်ဆန်မြို့နယ် ဟိုင်းဖတ် ကတ်လေ</p>
<p>Kunhing Township Kar Li Keing Loum</p>	<p>ကွန်ဟိန်းမြို့နယ် ကာလီ ကျိုင်းလမ်း</p>	<p>Laikha Township Wan Sang Sai Lai Kum</p>	<p>လဲချားမြို့နယ် ဝမ်ဆန်း ဆလိုင်းခုံ</p>

KARENNI STATE ကယားပြည်နယ်

<p>Loikaw Township Nwae Laboe Palaung (Pa-lao)</p>	<p>လွိုင်ကော်မြို့နယ် နှားလဘိုး ပါလောင်း</p>	<p>Shadaw Township Shadaw Pon chung</p>	<p>ရှားတောမြို့နယ် ရှားတော ပွန်ချောင်း</p>
<p>Bawlake Township Namhpe Balake Ywa Thit</p>	<p>ဘောလခဲမြို့နယ် နန်းဖဲ ဘောလခဲ ရွာသစ်</p>	<p>Pasaung Township Kahmapyu</p>	<p>ဖာဆောင်းမြို့နယ် ခဲမဖြူ</p>

EASTERN PEGU DIVISION ပဲခူးတိုင်း

<p>Kyaukgyi Township Tha Pyi Nyu Yan Myo Aung Wa Doh Klah Ya Yi Aung Soe Mo Mu Theh Hteh Htu</p>	<p>ကျောက်ကြီးမြို့နယ် သပြေညွန့် ရန်မျိုးအောင် ဝါမိုးကလား ယာယီဒေသ အောင်စိုးမိုး မူသဲ ထိုက်ထူ</p>	<p>Shwegyin Township Pa Aye Aw Pa Lah Kho Ka</p>	<p>ရွှေကျင်မြို့နယ် ပါအေး အောပလား ခိုးကာ</p>
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KAREN STATE

ကရင်ပြည်နယ်

Pa-an Township

Ka Wa Hta

No Ber Baw

Htee Hsi Baw

Khaw Pho Pleh

No Law Plaw

Htee Kyaw Khee

ဖားအံမြို့နယ်

ကဝါထ

နို့ဘာဘော

ထီးဆီဘော

ခေါ်ပိုးပလဲ့

နို့လော်ပလော

ထီးကျော်ခီး

Kyain Seikgyi Township

Shwe Doe

Anankwin

Ywathit

Myaingtharya

Thet Kwe

ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့နယ်

ရွှေငိုး

အနန်ကွင်း

ရွာသစ်

မြိုင်သာယာ

သယ်ကွီး

Thandaung Township

Phlay Hsa Lo

သံတောင်မြို့နယ်

ဖလေးဆာလို

Kawkareik Township

Ti Hu Than

ကော့ကရိတ်မြို့နယ်

တီဟူးသံ

MON STATE

မွန်ပြည်နယ်

Thaton Township

T' Rweh Khee

Plaw Pho

Naw Ka To

Ta Maw Daw

သထုံမြို့နယ်

တရွဲခီး

ပလောဖိုး

နောင်ကတို့

တမောဒေါ

Bilin Township

Na Gyi

To Tae Khee

Ta U Khee

Ler Pho

Lay kay

Peh Lae No

ဘီးလင်းမြို့နယ်

နတ်ကြီး

တိုတယ်ခီး

တာအူခီး

လယ်ဖိုး

လေးကော

ပယ်လယ်နို့

Ye Township

Khawza

Wengtamok

Lainmawchan

Sanpya

Ywathit

ရေးမြို့နယ်

ခေါဇာ

ဝင်းတမောက်

လိမွေဂါခြံ

စံပြ

ရွာသစ်

TENASSERIM DIVISION

တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း

Yebyu Township

Yapu

60 miles

Migyaunglaung

Zinba

Yinbon

Shintabi

Eindayaza

Mayanchaung

Pwashinma

Lauktheing

54 Miles

Kalein Aung

Kwethongyima

ရေဖြူမြို့နယ်

ယားပူး

၆၀ မိုင်

မိကျောင်းလောင်း

ဇင်းဘာ

ရေပုံး

ရှင်တဖီ

အိန္ဒရာဇာ

မရမ်းချောင်း

ဖွားရှင်မ

လောက်သိုင်း

၅၄ မိုင်

ကလိန်အောင်

ကျွဲသုံးညီမ

Tavoy Township

Nyaundon

Thebyuchaung

Pyinthadaw

Myitta

Taungthonlone

Nantayok

Budayu

Kyaikpelaung

ထားဝယ်မြို့နယ်

ညောင်တုံး

သပြေချောင်း

ပျဉ်းသားတော

မေတ္တာ

တောင်သုံးလုံး

နန်းပရုပ်

ဘူဒါရုံ

ကျက်မီးလောင်း

TENASSERIM DIVISION (continued)

Tenasserim Township	တနင်္သာရီမြို့နယ်	Mergui Township	မြိတ်မြို့နယ်
Nathemee	နတ်သမီး	Papyin	ပပြင်
ThebawU	သင်္ဘောဦး	Bok	ဘုတ်
Sarawa	ဆာရဝ	Yazapa	ယာတပါ
Sinmagyon	ဆင်မကျွန်း	Banmade	ဘော်မသီ
Pagwin	ဖားကွင်း	Kaungki	ကော်ခီး
Shautgon	ရှောက်ကုန်း	Wanetchaungpya	ဝါးနက်ချောင်းဖျား
Sanpe	စံပဲ	Kyetmaoh	ကြက်မအုပ်
Kyaukpeak	ကျောက်ပိတ်	Wanetchaung	ဝါးနက်ချောင်း
Kinnigyon	ကင်းနီကျွန်း	Alechaung	အလယ်ချောင်း
Tamu	တပ်မူး	Pathwi	ပသွီ
Gonthaya	ကုန်းသာယာ	Tanyat	တညတ်
Pawutchaung	ပဝတ်ချောင်း	Mazaw	မဇော
Kawet	ကဝဲ	Thagan	တကာ
Tharabwechaungpya	သရဘွင်ချောင်းဖျား	Theyetchaung Township	
Peinchaung	ပိန်းချောင်း	သရက်ချောင်းမြို့နယ်	
Kyauktaung	ကျောက်တောင်	Thinbonchaung	သင်ပုန်းချောင်း
Talaindat	တလိုင်တပ်	Padaukkyi	ပိတောက်ကြီး
Tharabwe	သရဘွင်	Padaukngae	ပိတောက်ငယ်
Ananchaung	အနန်းချောင်း	Pe	ပဲဒက်
Ngayaein	ငရဲအင်း	Yebu	ရေပူ
Dugyo	ငှူးကျွန်း	Migyaungpyu	မီးကျောင်းဖြူ
Yekanchaung	ရေခမ်းချောင်း	Bokpyin Township	ဘုတ်ပြင်းမြို့နယ်
Tonbyaw	တုံးပြော	Ngaboakchaung	ဝါးပုတ်ချောင်း
Thegyetkanankwin	သကျက်ဂဏ္ဍန်းကွင်း	Sanyingon	စံရင်ကုန်း
Thegyetkalaek	သကျက်ကုလားအိမ်	Kenchaung	ခဲချောင်း
Thegyettaungbein	သကျက်တောင်ပိုင်း	Lanphonnga	လားဖူးငန်
Melaungkwin	မီးလောင်းကွင်း	Kaukbauk	ကော့ဘော့
Anen	အနဲ	Heilnlai	ဟဲလဲ
Pawattaungma	ပဝထောင်းမ	Yodaw	ဂျိုးတောင်
Pawataingwai	ပဝအင်းပိုင်း	Chaungmon	ချောင်းမွန်
Theinkun	သိန်ခွန်း	Sadien	စတိန်
Laeseit	လှည်းဆိပ်	Nantaung	နန်းတောင်
Thebyu	သဲဖြူ		
Pyindaung	ပျဉ်းတော		
Palaw Township	ပလောမြို့နယ်	Duyinbinshaung	ဒူးရင်းပင်ရှောင်
Aingmagyi	အင်းမကြီး	Gyini	ဂျင်းနီ
Bayektaung	ဘုရင့်တောင်	Zadiwin	ဇာဒိဝင်း
Madaw	မဒေါ	Kabya	ကဗျာ
Bankadaw	ဘန်းကတို		

Wazwinoak	ဝါးစွမ်းအုပ်	Pawut	ပဝတ်
Pyicha	ပြည်ခြား	Kawblen	ခေါ်ဘလယ်
Myitchinsut	မြစ်ချဉ်စု	Letpanbyin	လက်ပံပြင်
Damemasa	ထမင်းမစား	Pettaut	ပဲ့ထောက်
Shandot	ရှမ်းဒွတ်	Tapo	တပို့
Minwin	မင်းဝင်း	Paw	ဖွေ
Kyauklake	ကျောက်လိပ်	Yinshan	ရေရှား
Migyaungthaik	မိကျောင်းသိုက်	Kamaungla	ခမောင်းလှ
Sarke	ဆားခဲ		

APPENDIX 5 : SPDC MILITARY COMMAND IN EASTERN BURMA (2007)⁶¹

REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDS

Triangle Area Command	<i>Keng Tung, Shan State</i>	South East Command	<i>Moulmein, Mon State</i>
Eastern Command	<i>Taunggyi, Shan State</i>	Coastal Command	<i>Mergui, Tenasserim Division</i>
Southern Command	<i>Taungoo, Pegu Division</i>		

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIDs)

LID - 22	<i>Pa-an, Karen State</i>	LID - 55	<i>Kalaw, Shan State</i>
LID - 44	<i>Thaton, Mon State</i>	LID - 77	<i>Pegu, Pegu Division</i>

REGIONAL & MILITARY OPERATIONAL COMMANDS (ROCs & MOCs)

Mong Pyat ROC	<i>-Mong Pyat, Shan State</i>	MOC - 12	<i>-Kawkareik, Karen State</i>
Loikaw ROC	<i>-Loikaw, Karenni State</i>	MOC - 8	<i>-Tavoy, Tenasserim Division</i>
MOC - 2	<i>-Mong Naung, Shan State</i>	MOC - 13	<i>-Bokepyin, Tenasserim Division</i>
MOC - 14	<i>-Mong Sit, Shan State</i>	MOC - 19	<i>-Ye, Mon State</i>
MOC - 17	<i>-Mong Pan, Shan State</i>	MOC - 20	<i>-Kauthaung, Tenasserim Division</i>
MOC - 7	<i>-Pekon, Shan State</i>		

BATTALION HEAD QUARTERS BY TOWNSHIP

(IB : Infantry Battalion; LIB : Light Infantry Battalion; AB : Artillery Battalion)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Mong Nai Township	Langkher Township	Mong Ton Township	Mawk Mai Township
IB-248	IB-99	IB-65	IB-132
LIB-576	LIB-525	IB-133	IB-294
LIB-518	LIB-578	IB-277	Nam Zarng Township
LIB-574	LIB-574	IB-225	IB-247
Kunhing Township	Mong Hsat Township	LIB-519	IB-66
IB-286	LIB-527	Laikha Township	IB-49
IB-287	LIB-579	IB-64	IB-278
IB-246	LIB-580	LIB-515	LIB-80
IB-296	Kehsi & Mong Kung	Loilem Township	LIB-516
LIB-524	IB-132	IB-9	LIB-333
Mong Pan Township	LIB-514	IB-12	LIB-527
LIB-575	Pekon Township	LIB-513	LIB-579
LIB-332	LIB-336	Taunggyi Township	Hsi Hseng Township
LIB-520	LIB-421	IB-94	LIB-423
LIB-517	LIB-422	LIB-510	LIB-424
LIB-577	Mong Yawn Township	Pinlaung Township	LIB-330
LIB-598	LIB-311	IB-249	LIB-335
LIB-576	LIB-334	LIB-511	Mong Pyat Township
LIB-332	LIB-573	LIB-512	IB-221
Kalaw Township	LIB 553	Tachileik Township	LIB-329
IB-3	Yatsauk Township	LIB-331	LIB-330
IB-7	IB-292	LIB-359	LIB-335
LIB-18	LIB-508	LIB-526	LIB-570
LIB-112	LIB-509	LIB-529	
LIB-117	Mong Khet Township	Keng Tung Township	
Mong PingTownship	IB-227	IB-244	
IB-43	LIB-327	IB-245	
LIB-360	LIB-328	LIB-314	
LIB-528			

⁶¹ Field surveys were cross-checked against the Network for Democracy and Development, May 2007, Civil and Military Administrative Echelon of State Peace and Development Council on Burma, Thailand. Only battalions permanently based in these townships are listed, while roving battalions are excluded.

KARENNI (KAYAH) STATE

Loikaw Township	Pruso Township	Bawlakeh Township	Demawso Township
IB-54	LIB-428	LIB-337	IB-102
IB-72	LIB-531	LIB-429	LIB-427
IB-261	Pasaung Township	LIB-430	
IB-250	IB-134		
LIB-530			

KAREN STATE

Papun Township	Hlaingbwe Township	Kyain Seikgyi Township	Kawkareik Township
LIB-341	IB-28	IB-32	IB-97
LIB-201	IB-31	IB-283	IB-230
LIB-340	IB-97	IB-284	IB-231
LIB-434	LIB-223	LIB-210	LIB-545
Thandaung Township	LIB-549	LIB-208	LIB-546
IB-124	LIB-310	LIB-206	LIB-547
IB-603	LIB-338	LIB-221	LIB-548
IB-264	LIB-339	LIB-205	LIB-549
Myawaddy Township	Pa-an Township	LIB-204	LIB-206
IB-275	LIB-201	LIB-208	
LIB-355	LIB-203	LIB-206	
LIB-356	LIB-204	LIB-205	
LIB-357	LIB-205		
	LIB-310		

PEGU DIVISION (EAST)

Taungoo Township	Shwegyin Township	Kyaukgyi Township	Phyu Township
IB-26	IB-57	IB-60	IB-35
IB-39	LIB-350	LIB-599	Pegu Township
IB-48	LIB-349	LIB-590	IB-30
IB-73	LIB-589		LIB-440
LIB-20			
LIB-249			

MON STATE

Thaton Township	Kyaikhto Township	Ye Township	Thanbyuzayat Township
LIB-118	IB-2	IB-61	IB-31
IB-24	IB-96	IB-106	IB-62
LIB-1	LIB-2	IB-229	IB-32
LIB-9	LIB-208	LIB-586	LIB-209
Bilin Township	LIB-207	LIB-587	Mudon Township
IB-8	Moulmein Township	LIB-343	IB-62
IB-96	IB-81	LIB-591	LIB-210
LIB-3	LIB-102	LIB-299	LIB-202
LIB-9	LIB-104	LIB-583	

TENASSERIM DIVISION

Yebyu Township	Tenasserim Township	Tavoy Township	Bokpyin	Kawthaung
IB-273	IB-265	IB-25	IB-224	IB-288
IB-282	LIB-556	LIB-402	LIB-585	IB-262
LIB-410	LIB-557	LIB-401	LIB-559	LIB-597
LIB-408	LIB-558	AB-302	LIB-560	LIB-594
LIB-409	LIB-561	Mergui Township	LIB-358	LIB-595
LIB-406	AB-306	IB-17	LIB-432	LIB-596
LIB-407	Theyetchaung Township	IB-103	LIB-581	LIB-342
AB-304	LIB-403	IB-101	LIB-593	LIB-431
AB-307	LIB-404	IB-265	LIB-555	LIB-582
Palaw Township	LIB-405	LIB-433	LIB-592	AB-303
IB-280	AB-201	LIB-481	LIB-584	
IB-285	Launglon Township	LIB-482	AB-305	
AB-309	IB-104	AB-301	AB-308	
	IB-267	AB-401	AB-501	



Thailand Burma Border Consortium

Mission

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self-reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.

Goal

To support displaced people of Burma to be independent and self-reliant in a peaceful society where there is full respect for human rights.

Aim

To work in partnership with displaced communities to build capacity, strengthen self-reliance and food security, ensure an adequate standard of living and human rights are respected.

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