

RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Government efforts help only some IDPs rebuild their lives

A profile of the internal displacement situation

13 August, 2007

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The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

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OVERVIEW

Government efforts help only some IDPs rebuild their lives

Despite the efforts of the Russian government and the international community, more than 150,000 people remain displaced in Russia more than a decade after the beginning of armed conflict. Hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes as a result of an inter-ethnic conflict in North Ossetia in 1992 and separatist conflicts in Chechnya which started in 1994 and again in 1999. While large-scale warfare has ended, hostilities continue between government forces and separatist rebels in Chechnya, and an air of mistrust between Ingush and Ossetians prevails in North Ossetia. In the absence of political resolutions to the conflicts, the security situation has deteriorated in other parts of the North Caucasus and human rights abuses including abductions and enforced disappearances persist in the region.

The permanent settlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) has become a priority for the governments in Chechnya and North Ossetia. The Chechen government has been campaigning for the return of displaced people to the republic for some time, and in mid-2007 is also in the process of closing collective accommodation centres where many returnees had been housed. People leaving the centres have been either offered permanent shelter or asked to return to their original areas of residence. However, according to some IDPs, their wishes have not always been considered and in some instances, government officials have threatened to use force to evacuate residents of the centres.

In North Ossetia, many IDPs have been able to return home, but some of the 10,000 people still displaced have been blocked from moving back to their villages by district court decisions defining the areas as “water conservation zones”. Many IDPs from North Ossetia who could not return moved to a new government-established village where the government allocated land plots and humanitarian agencies provided temporary housing. Some of the displaced who refused to resettle and insisted on returning to their former place of residence were forcibly resettled to this new village.

Government land and housing allocation, as well as housing construction by humanitarian organisations and by IDPs themselves, are having an impact on internal displacement in Russia, but compensation schemes have failed to resolve the housing crisis. More time is needed to evaluate whether these initiatives will be sufficient to meet the needs of returnees and resettlers from Chechnya and North Ossetia.

Background to displacement

Internal displacement in Russia has largely resulted from armed violence and conflicts in two south-western republics, Chechnya and North Ossetia. Over ten years after the beginning of these conflicts, more than 150,000 people remain internally displaced (UNHCR, 20 June 2007).

In Chechnya, two rounds of armed conflict between rebels and government troops caused more than 600,000 people to flee their homes (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Federal troops first entered Chechnya in 1994 to quash the republic's independence movement, and withdrew in 1996 after President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov signed a ceasefire agreement. However, in 1999, armed separatists from Chechnya went to the neighbouring republic of Dagestan to support a call to create an independent Islamic state. In response to this and other destabilising events, the federal government sent troops back to Chechnya and full-scale war ensued. This second conflict in Chechnya was especially brutal, with both government

and rebel forces guilty of indiscriminate attacks, arbitrary arrest, torture and inhumane treatment of suspected combatants and civilians alike (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November 2006). Despite Russian claims that the situation in the North Caucasus has normalised, and statements by the Chechen resistance of readiness for talks, the conflict is still not resolved and hostilities continue (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November 2006; RFE / RL, 14 July 2006; Memorial, 31 July 2006).

A briefer conflict in North Ossetia also caused significant internal displacement in 1992, when a territorial dispute over the status of Prigorodny district escalated into armed inter-ethnic confrontation between the Ingush and Ossetians. The eastern part of Prigorodny district had been within Ingushetia until 1944, when the Ingush and other ethnic groups were deported to Central Asia. The district was soon thereafter ceded to North Ossetia and has remained within North Ossetia ever since. Nevertheless, the Ingush continued to demand that the territory be returned to them, and a 1991 federal law allowing for the return of territory to peoples repressed under Stalin provided a catalyst for the conflict. Although the conflict only lasted a week, about 500 people were killed and up to 64,000 ethnic Ingush and Ossetians were displaced (HRW, May 1996). Many Ingush have since returned to their original place of residence in Prigorodny district and are living side by side with returned Ossetians, but the return process has met a number of obstacles (Open Democracy, 7 September 2004). The conflict remains unresolved and a climate of mistrust between the two groups prevails.

The security situation in the North Caucasus

Change is evident in Chechnya as the conflict becomes less intense and the signs of war are erased. In the cities of Grozny, Gudermes and Argun, buildings and streets have been restored, squares and schools have been rebuilt and small businesses are opening up (The Independent, 6 March 2007). The brutality and intensity of the conflict has diminished since 2005, as shown by the decrease in the number of recorded abductions and by the replacement of large-scale “sweep” operations, in which government forces would seal off communities and search and detain individuals on an arbitrary basis, with more targeted searches aimed at capturing rebels and their supporters (HRW, 13 November 2006; Memorial, 16 May 2007; Research Centre for East European Studies / Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007). International organisations have also noted progress in Chechnya, with the UN decreasing its security phase rating for Chechnya from V (evacuation) to IV (emergency operations), and the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture noting an improvement in the material conditions of detention (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006; CoE, 13 March 2007).

Despite these signs of progress, life in Chechnya is not back to normal. While the number of armed insurgents remaining is disputed, they are still active and regularly clash with local and federal government forces throughout the republic (IWPR, 12 July 2007; Swisspeace, 28 May 2007 and October 2006; Prague Watchdog, 23 April 2007; Memorial, 14 March 2007). Abductions and enforced disappearances continue, albeit less often, and perpetrators are rarely investigated or punished (UN CAT, 6 February 2007; Memorial, 16 May 2007; HRW, November 2006; AI, 23 May 2007). Unofficial detention centres continue to be run by local and federal soldiers who mistreat and torture to extract confessions, though the government denies their existence (UN CAT, 6 February 2007 and 21 November 2006; UN HRC, 25 January 2007; IHF, 15 May 2006; HRW, November 2006; CoE CPT, 13 March 2007). Some victims of human rights abuses who have applied to the European Court of Human Rights have been subjected to violent pressure to discourage them from continuing their application (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November 2006). The result is a “climate of fear” where society is governed by force rather than by law (BBC, 24 February 2006).

The security situation in other North Caucasus republics remains volatile. As government forces have forced Chechen rebels out of Chechnya, the rebels have been gradually establishing

themselves in other North Caucasus republics, mainly Ingushetia and Dagestan. The result has been an increase in the number of armed confrontations in the North Caucasus outside Chechnya (Research Centre for East European Studies / Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007; The Moscow Times, 28 August 2006; RFE / RL, 25 August 2006). Abductions and disappearances continue in Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Dagestan, reportedly mainly by government forces trying to collect information about the rebels' plans (CoE, 25 January 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 16 July 2007 and 18 July 2007; Memorial, 1 June 2007; Jamestown Foundation, 1 August 2007). Shootings and bombings by unknown parties also continue (Vesti, 19 July 2007; Swisspeace, 28 May 2007). The situation in Ingushetia became especially tense in mid-2007 as federal forces launched a major security sweep in response to a series of deadly attacks on government targets, and Ingushetia became the North Caucasus republic with the highest *per-capita* rate of abductions (Memorial, 1 June 2007; RFE / RL 31 July 2007).

IDP figures

The majority of people displaced within the Russian Federation are from Chechnya. They are of different ethnic backgrounds and most have fled to other areas in Chechnya and to the neighbouring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. Those displaced by the conflict in North Ossetia fled within North Ossetia and to neighbouring Ingushetia, making Ingushetia a host of IDPs from both Chechnya and North Ossetia.

		Source (date)
Total IDP population (persons)	158,905	UNHCR (June 2007)
IDPs from Second Chechen Conflict:		
In Chechnya	25,473 57,349	Chechen government (May 2007) UNHCR (December 2006)
In Ingushetia	15,384	DRC (July 2007)
In Dagestan	4,935	DRC (July 2007)
Other republics of Russia	40,000	UN (December 2006)
IDPs from conflict in North Ossetia:	10,019	Federal government (December 2006)

There is a lack of accurate and consistent figures on the number of IDPs in Russia. The overall UNHCR figure includes some 30,000 IDPs with forced migrant status, who UNHCR assumes are not included in the statistics above since they are accounted for separately. Also, the figure that UNHCR cites for the number of IDPs in Chechnya is more than twice that given by the Chechen government in May 2007. This difference is probably the result of an ongoing government campaign to verify IDP status, during which many IDPs have been de-registered from the government list. In November 2005, for example, the federal government's Migration Service removed some 130,000 IDPs living in private accommodation in Chechnya from the state register (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Displacement in the North Caucasus is a fluid process and this has had an impact on records of IDPs. Many families have moved several times and some regularly move between republics. For example, after returning to Chechnya and finding inadequate security or housing there, some Chechen IDP families have gone back to Ingushetia. Others commute to Chechnya to attend university, look for work or secure documentation. As a result, some IDPs have not been present during government verification exercises and have subsequently been de-registered.

Displaced people from Chechnya

People displaced within Chechnya mainly live in private housing or collective centres. At the beginning of 2007, there were 26 Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) and 25 Temporary Settlements (TSs) in Chechnya, respectively housing 30,407 and 21,704 IDPs (UNHCR, June 2007). There were also some 6,700 IDPs living in private accommodation in Chechnya in late 2006, according to government figures (www.regions.ru, 18 October 2006).

In Ingushetia, approximately 25 per cent of the republic's 15,384 IDPs were living in 76 TSs in mid-2007; the remaining 75 per cent were living in private housing (DRC, 31 July 2007). The majority of IDPs in Dagestan live in private rented accommodation, though some have spontaneously settled in collective centres. Whereas the property and utility payments of collective accommodation in Chechnya and Ingushetia are covered by the federal authorities, collective centres in Dagestan are neither recognised nor subsidised by the local or federal authorities and as a result, IDPs there mostly pay rent and utility fees themselves.

Several years after they left their homes, internally displaced people in the North Caucasus continue to live in very poor conditions. Most collective accommodation facilities are crowded, damp and subject to inadequate sanitation and unreliable water, gas and electricity supplies (Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007; Chechenskoe Obshestvo, 26 November 2006; BBC, 24 February 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 6 May 2006). The supply of gas and electricity to TSs in Ingushetia, as well as to IDP camps in North Ossetia administered by the government of Ingushetia, has been periodically interrupted due to Ingushetia's arrears in payments to the regional electricity provider, funds which should have been provided from the federal budget (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 6 May 2006). Moreover, those living in collective accommodation in Ingushetia have been subjected to passport checks, detention and abductions by federal and local security officials (Kavkazski Uzel, 21 June 2006, 27 January 2007 and 16 March 2007; Memorial, 1 June 2007). Those who have not secured lodging in collective accommodation often live in even worse conditions, as there is a chronic shortage of adequate housing, and homes are often without water, electricity or gas (UNDP, 15 May 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Displaced people can access healthcare to the same extent as other citizens, but it is often unaffordable for them. Patients must pay for prescriptions and, at times, pay bribes to health professionals (Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007). Those who have lost family members in the conflict may have no-one to take care of other dependent relatives during a visit to a medical clinic, and so diseases often remain untreated until they reach an advanced stage (Swisspeace, October 2006).

Many IDPs reportedly suffer from mental health problems. An MSF survey of IDPs living in collective centres in Ingushetia and Chechnya found that nearly all the people they interviewed were suffering from anxiety, insomnia, depressive feelings or social dysfunction (Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007). A UNICEF study found that children and teenagers from 11 to 15 years of age living in collective centres in Chechnya exhibited a higher number of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and were more withdrawn, irritable and aggressive than non-displaced children (UNICEF, April 2007).

Nearly 80 per cent of the population of Chechnya is unemployed, giving it the highest unemployment rate in Russia (UNDP, 15 May 2007). Humanitarian aid and social subsidies such as pensions, unemployment allowances and child benefits are the main source of income for IDPs (DRC, 2007; Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007), although UN agencies observed in 2006 that IDPs had become less dependent on food aid (UN OCHA, 7 December 2006; Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007). Many children in the North Caucasus do not go to school, since parents are unable to afford school supplies and clothes (Memorial, 30 September 2005), and in the Kizlyarski district of Dagestan, some IDP children do not go to school because their family has no residence registration (TV Center, 7 September 2006).

Return to Chechnya

As government attempts to have IDPs return to Chechnya intensified in 2006, approximately 4,000 IDPs returned to Chechnya from both TSs and private housing in Ingushetia (DRC, 31 July 2007). By early 2007, the total number of returnees since 2000 stood at 57,000 (Swisspeace, 30 March 2007). Although the authorities provided temporary accommodation for these returnees, many were unable to find a place in the collective centres upon their arrival (Swisspeace, 25 May 2007; Memorial, April 2006), and were faced with finding alternative accommodation.

In April 2006 Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov announced plans to close all TACs (Kavkazski Uzel, 19 April 2006; AFP, 4 March 2007). A commission was created to review the legal status of TAC residents, and to determine whether they had received compensation for lost property and housing, or possessed other habitable accommodation. Those residents who had not received property compensation and were deemed not to have habitable housing were considered for government-renovated apartments or cottages. The rest were de-registered from the Migration Service's register and told to return to their original place of residence, where the local government would provide them with land plots. In the meantime, those without housing were instructed to move in temporarily with friends or family (SNO, 22 June 2007 and 11 July 2007). As a result of this verification exercise, six TACs were closed by mid-2006 and several thousand IDPs were excluded from government assistance (Kavkazski Uzel, 8 June 2006 and 26 January 2007; Chechenskoe Obshchestvo, 8 July 2007).

While the government verification exercise highlighted cases of people unlawfully residing in the TACs, there were a number of flaws in its implementation. In some cases, the government determined the original housing of IDPs to have been habitable when in fact it was not, and the intention of IDPs who were not willing to return to their original residence was not taken into consideration (SNO, 29 June 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Caucasian Knot, 6 June 2006). Although the government has allocated land plots to some people leaving the TACs, it has been left to IDPs to acquire building materials (SNO, 11 July 2007). In some instances, commission officials reportedly told residents that if they did not comply with the request to vacate the TAC premises they would use force to evacuate them (SNO, 29 June 2007 and 26 July 2007; Kavkazski Uzel, 23 June 2007).

Obstacles to return for Chechen IDPs

The majority of IDPs from Chechnya currently living in Ingushetia want to return home, but have several concerns. A UNHCR survey of collective centre residents showed that 54 per cent intend to return to Chechnya, and a Danish Refugee Council survey showed that 79 per cent of IDPs surveyed (the majority of whom are currently living in rural areas) are planning to return to Chechnya (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). Whereas personal security used to be the main concern of IDPs wanting to return to Chechnya, the main obstacles are now lack of housing, lack of income generation opportunities, and lack of physical security (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). This contrasts with the IDPs from mountainous areas in Chechnya wishing to return to their original place of residence, for whom the main concerns are the lack of physical security, lack of housing and infrastructure and various obstacles to cattle rearing (Memorial, 15 March 2007; IWPR, 16 August 2006; UN OCHA, 12 December 2006; IWPR, 5 April 2007). Although agricultural land was almost completely cleared of landmines by 2007, mines and unexploded ordnance still posed a threat to IDPs and returnees (Swisspeace, 22 June 2007; ICBL, 2006).

There is a great shortage of permanent housing for Chechnya's IDPs. A 2007 UNHCR survey showed that 99 per cent of all houses and flats owned by IDPs living in collective accommodation centres in Chechnya and Ingushetia have been totally or partially destroyed (UNHCR, June 2007). The survey also highlighted that 50 per cent of IDPs interviewed in Chechnya, and 40 per cent interviewed in Ingushetia, are in need of property of their own, the majority having lived with

their parents prior to displacement. In 2007, the Chechen government listed such families as priority recipients of land plots.

Chechen IDPs' access to government assistance and compensation

The system of compensation for lost property and housing has not led to widespread reconstruction of private housing by IDPs in Chechnya. People choosing to permanently reside in Chechnya are entitled to 350,000 roubles (approximately \$13,700) for their loss of property and housing, while those settling outside Chechnya are entitled to 120,000 roubles (approximately \$4,700). According to the federal government, some 39,000 people have received compensation (Government of Russian Federation, 5 April 2006). As inflation and the price of building materials continue to rise in the North Caucasus, these amounts are not enough to build or rebuild a house (Swisspeace, October 2006; The Independent, 6 March 2007). While some people have managed to buy an apartment with their compensation, others have rather put the money towards buying a car, a plot of land, construction materials, or towards daily living expenses. However, many IDPs have secured new housing thanks to assistance from international agencies.

While the compensation has helped many displaced people rebuild their lives, there have been several shortcomings with the programme. Those with partially destroyed housing were disqualified from applying, and there has often been contested ownership, with properties having passed through numerous hands. Corruption has also tainted the system: in Grozny an official on the committee for compensation payments was arrested in 2006 for accepting bribes (Prague Watchdog, 24 November 2006), while many people have also tried to make false applications (Kavkazski Uzel, 30 April 2007 and 9 June 2007). Furthermore, the availability and allocation of compensation depends largely on how the federal budget is formed. Although residents of collective centres were listed as priority recipients of compensation in 2007, payments and processing of the 25,000 outstanding applications have been on hold since 2005, due to a lack of federal budget funds (Kavkazski Uzel, 30 April 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Integration of IDPs from Chechnya

Despite assurances by both the administration of Ingushetia and the federal authorities that IDPs there would not be forced to return to Chechnya, there has been substantial pressure on them to return. In 2004, the Migration Service began to de-register people in the TSs, first targeting those who had received compensation or were believed to own habitable residences in Chechnya. In autumn 2005, federal authorities increased pressure on the Ingush administration to close TSs, though in 2007 more than 70 remained open. All IDPs living in the private sector in Ingushetia were de-registered by the Migration Service in early 2007 on the pretext that they were not registered at their current residence (Caucasian Refugee Council, 25 June 2007; UNHCR 31 May 2007; IA Regnum, 13 March 2007; Kavkazskiy Uzel, 20 July 2006). IDPs can appeal against de-registration, but the cost makes it prohibitive for many.

Approximately 25 per cent of collective centre residents would prefer to stay in Ingushetia than return to Chechnya (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). The Danish Refugee Council survey showed that the majority of IDPs who wanted to remain in Ingushetia were living in district centres, and that about 25 per cent of IDPs surveyed had obtained their own housing in Ingushetia (DRC, 2007). The government of Ingushetia has several times announced plans for the integration of IDPs in the republic, though these plans have yet to materialise. While the government has allocated land plots to some IDPs intent on staying, international and national humanitarian organisations have until now been the primary actors supporting IDPs in their local integration.

As IDPs face problems obtaining residence registration in Dagestan, the prospects for those hoping to settle there permanently are poor. Unlike in Ingushetia and Chechnya, the Migration

Service in Dagestan does not register IDPs, leaving this group more vulnerable than IDPs in the other republics. With no registration they have to pay for accommodation and there is a high risk of eviction. In order to access benefits such as pensions and unemployment allowances as well as medical care and education, IDPs must register in their place of residence; some have had difficulty registering their residence with the local authorities, since the authorities reportedly prefer them to return to their original place of residence rather than settle at their current location (Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007).

Regardless of their level of integration, Chechens living in the Moscow region are subjected to informal police surveillance and to discrimination (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; OSI, 2006). According to the Russian human rights NGO Memorial, NGO workers and Chechens have heard from local interior ministry officials on numerous occasions that a secret directive exists that restricts the registration of Chechens in many regions of Russia. Indeed, displaced people from Chechnya have faced difficulties securing residence registration from local authorities outside Chechnya, limiting their access to medical care, education and social allowances (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). The Moscow region, Krasnodar territory and Kabardino-Balkaria are reputed to have the toughest regimes. The treatment of Chechens outside Chechnya worsened in 2006, when a brawl in Kondopoga in northern Russia between ethnic Russians and migrants from the Caucasus left two Russians dead. Migrants subsequently fled the area, but have since largely returned (www.newsru.com, 2 November 2006). Since then additional clashes between Russians and Chechens have in at least one instance led to fatalities (Prague Watchdog, 7 June 2007 and 29 October 2006; RFE / RL, 7 June 2007).

IDPs from North Ossetia

In North Ossetia, people displaced by the 1992 conflict live mainly in railway wagons or prefabricated rooms provided by humanitarian agencies, while in Ingushetia, IDPs from North Ossetia live in private residences and in 37 Temporary Settlements (TSs) (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). The housing conditions of IDPs from North Ossetia who are living in private-sector accommodation are unknown. Some IDPs from North Ossetia living in Ingushetia have been assisted by international organisations to build houses of their own after they have acquired a plot of land.

The compensation offered to IDPs from Prigorodny district is at least twice that paid to IDPs from Chechnya. Moreover, the South Federal Region authorities have ruled that this compensation is due not only to those who reside permanently in Prigorodny, but also to residents of dormitories in Prigorodny and to those without registration who prove to the court that they resided permanently in Prigorodny region before the beginning of the conflict (Government of the Russian Federation, 20 April 2006; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Information on the number of IDPs who have received this compensation and what they have managed to build with it was unavailable among the sources consulted.

Some displaced people who were living in Maiskoye, North Ossetia have highlighted problems in securing passports, residence registration, compensation for lost property and housing, and government support for house construction (IDPs from the villages of Terek, Yuzhnoe, Chernorechenskoe, Ir and Oktyabrskoe, 18 July 2006).

Approximately 24,000 people have returned to their homes in Prigorodny district in North Ossetia, and some 450 people returned in 2006 (IA Regnum, 17 July 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). The biggest problems facing them were the lack of livelihood opportunities and problems with the supply of water and gas (Kavkazski Uzel, 18 April 2006).

Not all IDPs have been able to return to their original residence in Prigorodny district. The district court deemed some villages part of water conservation zones and IDPs, as well as other citizens,

were forbidden from settling there (Memorial, March 2006). The events in Beslan, North Ossetia, where a school occupation in 2004 led to the deaths of more than 330 people including 184 children, worsened inter-ethnic relations in the region and put a halt to Ingush returns to the republic. It was only in May 2005 that the return process gradually resumed. Furthermore, some peoples' homes had been occupied since their displacement by asylum seekers from Georgia.

Government resettlement of IDPs in Novy, a new purpose-built settlement in North Ossetia, has been especially sensitive. In 2006, after a court decision declared the North Ossetian IDP village of Maiskoye to be an agricultural pasture zone, the government offered IDPs land plots in Novy. While some 150 families accepted the offer and moved voluntarily, others refused and insisted on their right to return to their original place of residence in Prigorodny district. In protest against government plans to eventually close Maiskoye and transfer residents to Novy, IDPs launched hunger strikes in Maiskoye and in Moscow (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 30 May 2007). Although government officials assured the IDPs that their concerns would be raised in the appropriate meetings, government officials forcibly moved the remaining residents of Maiskoye to Novy in mid-2007 (Memorial, 28 June 2007; Committee for the Protection of the Rights of IDPs, 13 June 2007). As of mid-2007, approximately 300 families were living in Novy (Vesti, 20 July 2007).

Improved national response

The federal and Chechen governments have made a notable effort to assist IDPs from Chechnya by providing pensions and children's allowances, paying compensation to those whose houses were totally destroyed and allocating funds for permanent housing. In 2006, a human rights commissioner post was established in Chechnya and the Chechen government joined a protection working group that brings together international and national actors to ensure protection of IDPs' rights (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006). A shortcoming of these efforts, however, is that compensation payments have been suspended, government promises of land plots for returnees have not always been fulfilled, and a government IDP committee was dissolved in early 2007 (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Swisspeace, 22 June 2007).

For its part, the North Ossetian government has allocated land plots for Ingush IDPs in Novy, a village it had established for displaced people (Vesti, 22 December 2005). The federal government has also devoted significant attention to IDPs from Prigorodny district and has achieved results including the increased return of IDPs to their place of origin or settlement in Novy (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). The government, however, has used force against IDPs in order to enforce court decisions deeming certain villages in Prigorodny to be district water conservation and pasture zones, thus denying some IDPs their wish to return to their former homes or to stay at their current residence.

The government in Dagestan has allowed IDPs from Chechnya to remain on its territory, but the Migration Service of the federal government has not granted them legal status, apparently due to lack of funds. In some cases, the local government in Dagestan has not registered the residence of some IDPs. This group of IDPs therefore must pay for their accommodation and faces obstacles to accessing social services and benefits.

The federal government has included "forced migrants" in a national housing programme established by decree in 2006. Those registered as persons in need of housing by the Migration Service's list are entitled to a housing subsidy issued from the federal budget, proportional to the number of members in the family and based on a government figure for the cost of one square meter of housing.

International response shifts to development

In 2006, the UN and its NGO partners began to change their focus from emergency to development activities in the North Caucasus, while continuing to acknowledge that the conflict-affected population still needs humanitarian support. As a result, the 2007 Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan for the North Caucasus includes development activities such as economic growth and governance, in addition to humanitarian activities like health, shelter and education. Meanwhile, some international actors have indicated their departure from the North Caucasus, including UN OCHA, which will close its office at the end of 2007 (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006).

As lead agency for the protection of IDPs in the North Caucasus, UNHCR, with the help of partner NGOs, provides shelter assistance and legal counselling for IDPs, monitors the situation of IDPs in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, and carries out independent verifications of cases of evacuation from TACs. Support to IDPs from Prigorodny district in North Ossetia is limited to *ad hoc* interventions such as housing support in Ingushetia and legal assistance on the right to return.

Other humanitarian organisations that directly assist IDPs include the Danish Refugee Council (in the areas of shelter, food and protection), the International Committee of the Red Cross (healthcare), Médecins Sans Frontières (healthcare), the Polish Humanitarian Organisation (water and sanitation) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (housing and healthcare). The work of several international NGOs in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan was interrupted in 2006 by their efforts to comply with a new legislation governing foreign NGOs. In some cases, this meant delays in assistance to IDPs. However, by 2007 all 15 international NGOs in the North Caucasus had managed to resume their work.

Various institutions at the Council of Europe have continued to express concern over the lack of respect for human rights of institutions in the North Caucasus. In a 2006 resolution, the Council's Parliamentary Assembly identified Chechnya as the most serious situation of human rights violations of all Council of Europe member states, and stated that the security forces produced a sense of anxiety rather than security among the population. In March 2007, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture issued its third public statement on torture in Chechnya, a measure rarely invoked and used only when a party fails to cooperate or refuses to improve the situation. By mid-2007, the Council of Europe's European Court of Human Rights had handed down 14 decisions on cases from Chechnya. The court found federal troops guilty of human rights abuses such as torture, enforced disappearances and illegal detention and ordered the Russian government to pay compensation to claimants (Prague Watchdog 27 July 2007).

РЕЗЮМЕ ПРОФИЛЯ НА РУССКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ

Россия: усилия правительства помогут только некоторым ВПЛ восстановить свою жизнь

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Несмотря на усилия российского правительства и международного сообщества более 150 000 человек в России остаются перемещенными более чем через десять лет после начала вооруженного конфликта. Сотни тысяч человек покинули свои дома в результате межэтнического конфликта в Северной Осетии в 1992 г. и сепаратистских конфликтов в Чечне, которые начались в 1994 г. и возобновились в 1999 г. В то время

как крупномасштабные военные действия закончились, продолжают военные действия между правительственными войсками и сепаратистскими повстанцами в Чечне и атмосфера недоверия превалирует в Северной Осетии между ингушами и осетинцами. За неимением политического разрешения конфликтов положение с безопасностью в других частях Северного Кавказа ухудшилось и в регионе сохраняются нарушения прав человека, включая похищения и насильственные исчезновения.

Размещение на постоянное жительство внутренних перемещенных лиц (ВПЛ) стало приоритетом для правительств Чечни и Северной Осетии. Чеченское правительство уже на протяжении некоторого времени проводит кампанию по возвращению перемещенных лиц в республику и в середине 2007 г. находится также в процессе закрытия центров коллективного проживания, в которых были поселены многие возвратившиеся люди. Покидающим центры людям было предложено постоянное жилище, либо их просили вернуться в прежние районы проживания. Однако, как заявляют некоторые ВПЛ, их пожелания не всегда учитывались, а в некоторых случаях правительственные должностные лица угрожали применением силы с целью заставить проживающих покинуть центры.

В Северной Осетии многие ВПЛ смогли вернуться домой, но некоторым из 10000 человек, по-прежнему находящихся на положении перемещенных лиц, было запрещено возвращение в свои села на основании решений районных судов, определивших эти районы "водоохранными зонами". Многие ВПЛ из Северной Осетии, которые не смогли вернуться, переехали в новый, созданный правительством поселок, где правительством были выделены участки земли, а гуманитарные организации предоставили временное жилище. Некоторые из перемещенных лиц, отказавшиеся от переселения и настаивавшие на возвращении в свои прежние места проживания, были насильно переселены в этот новый поселок.

Выделение правительством земли и жилья, также как и строительство жилья гуманитарными организациями и самими ВПЛ, оказывает влияние на внутреннее перемещение в России, но схемы компенсации не смогли разрешить жилищный кризис. Потребуется еще некоторое время, чтобы определить, являются ли эти инициативы достаточными для удовлетворения нужд возвращающихся лиц и переселенцев из Чечни и Северной Осетии.

Предпосылки перемещения

Внутреннее перемещение в России, в основном, явилось результатом вооруженного насилия и конфликтов в двух юго-западных республиках – Чечне и Северной Осетии. Через десять с лишним лет после начала этих конфликтов, более 150 000 человек остаются внутренне перемещенными (UNHCR, 20 June 2007).

В Чечне два вооруженных конфликта между повстанцами и правительственными войсками явились причиной бегства более 600 000 человек из своих домов (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Впервые федеральные войска вошли в Чечню в 1994 г. для подавления борьбы республики за независимость, затем были выведены в 1996 г. после подписания президентом Борисом Ельциным и чеченским лидером Асланом Масхадовым соглашения о прекращении огня. Однако в 1999 г. вооруженные сепаратисты из Чечни вошли в соседнюю республику Дагестан для поддержки призыва о создании независимого исламистского государства. В ответ на это и другие дестабилизирующие действия федеральное правительство направило войска обратно в Чечню и последовала полномасштабная война. Этот второй конфликт в Чечне был особенно жестоким, при этом и на правительстве, и на повстанцах лежит вина за беспорядочные атаки, произвольные аресты, пытки и негуманное обращение в отношении как подозреваемых участников

военных действий, так и гражданских лиц (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November 2006). Несмотря на утверждения России о том, что ситуация на Северном Кавказе нормализовалась, и заявления чеченского сопротивления о готовности к переговорам, конфликт по-прежнему не разрешен и военные действия продолжаются (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November 2006; RFE / RL, 14 July 2006; Memorial, 31 July 2006).

Менее продолжительный конфликт в Северной Осетии также явился причиной значительного внутреннего перемещения в 1992 г., когда территориальный спор из-за статуса Пригородного района перерос в вооруженное межэтническое противостояние между ингушами и осетинами. Восточная часть Пригородного района находилась в составе Ингушетии до 1944 г., когда ингуши и другие этнические группы были депортированы в Центральную Азию. Вскоре после этого район был передан Северной Осетии и с тех пор оставался в пределах Северной Осетии. Тем не менее, ингуши продолжали требовать возвращения им этой территории, и в 1991 г. федеральный закон, допускающий возвращение территории репрессированным при Сталине людям, явился катализатором конфликта. Хотя вооруженный конфликт длился только неделю, около 500 человек были убиты и до 64000 этнических ингушей и осетинов были перемещены (HRW, May 1996). Многие ингуши с тех пор вернулись на свои бывшие места проживания в Пригородном районе и живут бок о бок с вернувшимися осетинами, но процесс возвращения столкнулся с рядом препятствий (Open Democracy, 7 September 2004). Конфликт остается неразрешенным и между двумя группами существует атмосфера недоверия.

Ситуация на Северном Кавказе с точки зрения безопасности

Изменения в Чечне налицо по мере ослабления конфликтов и ликвидации следов войны. В городах Грозный, Гудермес и Аргун здания и улицы восстановлены, площади и школы выстроены заново, открываются предприятия малого бизнеса (The Independent, 6 March 2007). Жестокость и интенсивность конфликта уменьшились с 2005 г., что заметно по уменьшению количества учтенных похищений и заменой крупномасштабных операций "зачистки", при которых правительственные войска окружают общины и обыскивают и задерживают отдельных лиц на произвольном основании, на более целевые поиски, направленные на захват повстанцев и их сторонников (HRW, 13 November 2006; Memorial, 16 May 2007; Research Centre for East European Studies / Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007). Международные организации отметили также прогресс в Чечне, что позволило ООН снизить свой рейтинг фазы безопасности для Чечни с V (эвакуация) до IV (чрезвычайные операции), а Комитету против пыток Совета Европы отметить улучшение материальных условий содержания под задержанием (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006; CoE, 13 March 2007).

Несмотря на эти признаки прогресса жизнь в Чечне не возвратилась в нормальное русло. В то время как дискутируется вопрос о количестве оставшихся вооруженных повстанцев, они по-прежнему активны и между ними и местными и федеральными правительственными войсками постоянно происходят столкновения по всей республике (IWPR, 12 July 2007; Swisspeace, 28 May 2007 and October 2006; Prague Watchdog, 23 April 2007; Memorial, 14 March 2007). Похищения и насильственные исчезновения продолжаются, хотя и не так часто, а преступников редко разыскивают или наказывают (UN CAT, 6 February 2007; Memorial, 16 May 2007; HRW, November 2006; AI, 23 May 2007). Неофициальные места задержания под стражей продолжают оставаться в ведении местных и федеральных военных, которые применяют жестокое обращение и пытки с целью получения признания вины, хотя правительство отрицает их существование (UN CAT, 6 February 2007 and 21 November 2006; UN HRC, 25 January 2007; IHF, 15 May 2006; HRW, November 2006; CoE CPT, 13 March 2007). Некоторые жертвы нарушений прав человека, обратившиеся в Европейский суд по правам человека, были подвергнуты насильственному давлению с целью заставить отказаться от своих заявлений (Grouping of Russian NGOs, November

2006). Результатом является “атмосфера страха”, в которой обществом правит сила, а не закон (BBC, 24 February 2006).

Ситуация в области безопасности в республиках Северного Кавказа остается крайне неустойчивой. Поскольку правительственные войска вытеснили чеченских повстанцев из Чечни, повстанцы постепенно укрепились в других республиках Северного Кавказа, в основном, в Ингушетии и Дагестане. В результате возросло количество вооруженных столкновений на Северном Кавказе за пределами Чечни (Research Centre for East European Studies / Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007; The Moscow Times, 28 August 2006; RFE / RL, 25 August 2006). Похищения и исчезновения продолжаются в Ингушетии, Северной Осетии и Дагестане, в основном, как сообщается, правительственными войсками, пытающимися собрать информацию о планах повстанцев (CoE, 25 January 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 16 July 2007 and 18 July 2007; Memorial, 1 June 2007; Jamestown Foundation, 1 August 2007). Продолжаются также обстрелы и бомбардировки со стороны неизвестных групп (Vesti, 19 July 2007; Swisspeace, 28 May 2007). Ситуация в Ингушетии стала особенно напряженной в середине 2007 г., поскольку федеральные войска начали крупную операцию по зачистке в ответ на серию повлекших человеческие жертвы атак на государственные объекты, и Ингушетия стала северокавказской республикой с самым высоким уровнем похищений *на душу населения* (Memorial, 1 June 2007; RFE / RL 31 July 2007).

Статистика по ВПЛ

Большинство людей, перемещенных внутри Российской Федерации, из Чечни. Они имеют различное этническое происхождение и большинство из них переместились в другие районы Чечни и в соседние республики Ингушетию и Дагестан. Те, кто был перемещен в результате конфликта в Северной Осетии, перемещались внутри Северной Осетии, а также в соседнюю Ингушетию, что сделало Ингушетию принимающей стороной ВПЛ как из Чечни, так и Северной Осетии.

		Источник (дата)
Общее количество ВПЛ (человек)	158 905	УВКБ ООН (июнь 2007)
ВПЛ после второго чеченского конфликта:		
В Чечне	25 473 57 349	Правительство Чечни (май 2007) УВКБ ООН (декабрь 2006)
В Ингушетии	15 384	ДСБ (июль 2007)
В Дагестане	4 935	ДСБ (июль 2007)
Другие республики России	40 000	ООН (декабрь 2006)
ВПЛ в результате конфликта в Северной Осетии:	10 019	Федеральное правительство (декабрь 2006)

Для определения количества ВПЛ в России не хватает точных и последовательных данных. Общее число, приводимое УВКБ ООН, включает около 30 000 ВПЛ со статусом вынужденного мигранта, которые, по мнению УВКБ ООН, не включены в вышеуказанную статистику, поскольку они были учтены отдельно. К тому же приводимые УВКБ ООН данные о количестве ВПЛ в Чечне более чем в два раза превышают данные, предоставленные правительством Чечни в мае 2007 г. Эта разница, возможно, появилась в результате текущей правительственной кампании по проверке статуса ВПЛ, в ходе которой

многие ВПЛ были исключены из правительственного списка. В ноябре 2005 г., например, миграционная служба федерального правительства исключила около 130 000 ВПЛ, проживающих в частном секторе в Чечне, из государственного реестра (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Перемещения на Северном Кавказе – процесс изменчивый, что оказывает влияние на учет ВПЛ. Многие семьи переезжали несколько раз, а некоторые семьи регулярно перемещаются между республиками. Например, переехав в Чечню и найдя неудовлетворительными условия безопасности и проживания там, некоторые чеченские семьи ВПЛ возвратились в Ингушетию. Другие ездят в Чечню для учебы в университете, поиска работы или получения документов. В результате, некоторые ВПЛ отсутствуют во время правительственной сверки и, соответственно, снимаются с учета.

Перемещенные лица из Чечни

Лица, перемещенные из Чечни, проживают, в основном, в частном секторе или в коллективных центрах. На начало 2007 г. в Чечне имелись 26 центров временного размещения (ЦВР) и 25 временных поселений (ВП), в которых размещались соответственно 30 407 и 21 704 ВПЛ (UNHCR, June 2007). В соответствии с правительственными данными в Чечне также 6700 ВПЛ проживали в частном секторе в конце 2006 г. (www.regions.ru, 18 October 2006).

В Ингушетии примерно 25 процентов из 15 384 проживающих в республике ВПЛ жили в 76 ВП в середине 2007 г., а остальные 75 процентов проживали в частном секторе (DRC, 31 July 2007). Большинство ВПЛ в Дагестане арендуют жилье в частном секторе, однако некоторые добровольно поселились в коллективных центрах. Несмотря на то, что оплата за жилье и коммунальные услуги в местах коллективного проживания в Чечне и Ингушетии покрывается федеральными властями, коллективные центры в Дагестане не признаются и не субсидируются местными или федеральными властями и, в результате, ВПЛ в этих местах обычно платят за проживание и коммунальные услуги сами.

Спустя несколько лет после того как они покинули свои дома, внутренне перемещенные лица на Северном Кавказе продолжают жить в очень плохих условиях. Большинство мест коллективного проживания переполнены, сыры, не отвечают требованиям санитарии и не имеют надежного снабжения водой, газом и электричеством (Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007; Chechenskoe Obshestvo, 26 November 2006; BBC, 24 February 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 6 May 2006). Снабжение газом и электричеством в ВП в Ингушетии, а также в лагерях ВПЛ в Северной Осетии, находящихся в управлении правительства Ингушетии, периодически прерывалась вследствие задолженности Ингушетии по оплате перед региональными поставщиками электроэнергии, на что должны были быть выделены денежные средства из федерального бюджета (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 6 May 2006). Кроме того, проживающие в местах коллективного проживания в Ингушетии подвергаются паспортным проверкам, задержанию и похищениям со стороны федеральных и местных представителей служб безопасности (Kavkazski Uzel, 21 June 2006, 27 January 2007 and 16 March 2007; Memorial, 1 June 2007). Те же, кто не смог обеспечить себе жилье в месте коллективного проживания, живет в еще худших условиях, поскольку существует хроническая нехватка пригодного жилья, а в домах часто не имеется воды, электричества или газа (UNDP, 15 May 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Перемещенные лица могут иметь доступ к услугам здравоохранения в равной степени с другими гражданами, но часто они не могут это себе позволить. Пациенты должны платить за рецепты, а иногда давать взятку работникам системы здравоохранения (Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007). Те, кто потерял членов семьи в результате конфликта, могут не иметь никого из близких, кто мог бы позаботиться о других

родственников-иждивенцах во время визита в поликлинику, поэтому заболевания часто остаются без лечения до самой поздней стадии (Swisspeace, October 2006).

По сообщениям, многие ВПЛ страдают расстройствами психического здоровья. Обследование ВПЛ, проведенное организацией «Врачи без границ» в коллективных центрах Ингушетии и Чечни, показало, что почти все опрошенные люди страдали тревогой, бессонницей, депрессией или дисфункцией (Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007). Исследование ЮНИСЕФ показало, что живущие в коллективных центрах Чечни у детей и подростков в возрасте от 11 до 15 лет чаще наблюдаются симптомы синдрома посттравматического стресса и они более замкнуты, раздражены и агрессивны, чем перемещенные дети (UNICEF, April 2007). Около 80 процентов населения Чечни – безработны, что является самым высоким уровнем безработицы в России (UNDP, 15 May 2007). Гуманитарная помощь и социальные выплаты, такие как пенсии, пособия по безработице и пособия на детей – основные источники дохода для ВПЛ (DRC, 2007; Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007), хотя агентства ООН отметили в 2006 г., что ВПЛ стали меньше зависеть от продовольственной помощи (UN OCHA, 7 December 2006; Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007). Многие дети на Северном Кавказе не посещают школу, поскольку родители не могут обеспечить школьные принадлежности и одежду (Memorial, 30 September 2005), а в Кизлярском районе Дагестана некоторые дети ВПЛ не посещают школу по причине отсутствия у семьи разрешения на проживание (TV Center, 7 September 2006).

Возвращение в Чечню

Поскольку правительство усилило в 2006 г. попытки вернуть ВПЛ в Чечню, приблизительно 4000 ВПЛ возвратились в Чечню как из ВП, так и из частного сектора в Ингушетии (DRC, 31 July 2007). К началу 2007 г. общее количество возвратившихся начиная с 2000 г. равнялось 57 000 (Swisspeace, 30 March 2007). Хотя власти предоставили временное жилье возвратившимся, многие не смогли найти место в коллективных центрах по прибытию (Swisspeace, 25 May 2007; Memorial, April 2006), и стали перед проблемой поиска альтернативного жилья.

В апреле 2006 г. президент Чечни Рамзан Кадыров объявил о плане закрытия всех ЦВР (Kavkazski Uzel, 19 April 2006; AFP, 4 March 2007). Была создана комиссия с целью проверить легальный статус проживающих в ЦВР лиц и определить, получили ли они компенсацию за утраченное имущество и жилье, или у них имеется другое жилое помещение. Те лица, которые не получили компенсацию за имущество и не имели жилого помещения, ставились на учет для получения восстановленных правительством квартир или коттеджей. Остальные были сняты с учета миграционной службой и получили указание вернуться в их прежние места проживания, где местное правительство предоставит им участки земли. Тем временем, тем кто остался без жилья было дано указание на время переехать к друзьям или родственникам (SNO, 22 June 2007 and 11 July 2007). В результате этой проверки шесть ЦВР были закрыты к середине 2006 г. и нескольким тысячам ВПЛ было отказано в правительственной помощи (Kavkazski Uzel, 8 June 2006 and 26 January 2007; Chechenskoe Obshchestvo, 8 July 2007).

В то время как правительственная проверка выявила случаи незаконного проживания людей в ЦВР, имеется ряд ошибок в ее проведении. В некоторых случаях правительство определило, что прежнее место проживания ВПЛ пригодно для проживания, хотя фактически оно не пригодно, а нежелание ВПЛ возвращаться на свое прежнее место проживания не было принято во внимание (SNO, 29 June 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Caucasian Knot, 6 June 2006). Хотя правительство выделило участки земли некоторым людям, покидающим ЦВР, ВПЛ должны были сами приобретать строительные материалы (SNO, 11 July 2007). В некоторых случаях, как сообщается, официальные лица

комиссии сказали проживающим, что если они не подчинятся требованиям покинуть территорию ЦБР, то они применят силу для их эвакуации (SNO, 29 June 2007 and 26 July 2007; Kavkazski Uzel, 23 June 2007).

Препятствия к возвращению чеченских ВПЛ

Большинство проживающих в настоящее время в Ингушетии ВПЛ из Чечни хотят вернуться домой, но выражают беспокойство по ряду моментов. Проведенный УВКБ ООН опрос проживающих в коллективных центрах показал, что 54 процента намереваются вернуться в Чечню, а опрос Датского совета по беженцам показал, что 79 процентов опрошенных ВПЛ (большинство которых в настоящее время проживает в сельских районах) намереваются вернуться в Чечню (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). Если раньше основной тревогой желающих вернуться в Чечню ВПЛ была личная безопасность, то теперь основными препятствиями стали отсутствие жилья, возможностей заработка и личной безопасности (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). Это контрастирует с мнением ВПЛ из горных районов Чечни, желающих вернуться на свое прежнее место проживания, для которых основную обеспокоенность вызывают отсутствие личной безопасности, жилья и инфраструктуры и различные препятствия по разведению скота (Memorial, 15 March 2007; IWPR, 16 August 2006; UN OCHA, 12 December 2006; IWPR, 5 April 2007). Хотя сельскохозяйственная земля была почти полностью очищена от противопехотных мин к 2007 г., мины и неразорвавшиеся снаряды все еще представляют угрозу для ВПЛ и возвратившихся лиц (Swisspeace, 22 June 2007; ICBL, 2006).

Существует острая нехватка постоянного жилья для чеченских ВПЛ. Проведенный УВКБ ООН в 2007 г. опрос показал, что 99% всех домов и квартир, принадлежавших ВПЛ, живущих в центрах коллективного проживания в Чечне и Ингушетии, были полностью или частично разрушены (UNHCR, June 2007). Опрос также показал, что 50 процентов опрошенных ВПЛ в Чечне и 40 процентов опрошенных в Ингушетии нуждаются в личном имуществе, причем большинство до перемещения проживало со своими родителями. В 2007 г. чеченское правительство внесло такие семьи в список приоритетных получателей земельных участков.

Доступ чеченских ВПЛ к правительственной помощи и компенсации

Система компенсации за утраченное имущество и жилье не привели к широко распространенному восстановлению жилья силами ВПЛ в Чечне. Люди, выбирающие постоянное местожительство в Чечне, имеют право на 350 000 рублей (примерно \$13 700) за утраченное имущество и жилье, а те, кто селится за пределами Чечни имеют право на 120 000 рублей (примерно \$4700). По данным федерального правительства, компенсацию получили около 39 000 человек (Government of Russian Federation, 5 April 2006). Поскольку инфляция и стоимость строительных материалов на Северном Кавказе продолжают расти, эти суммы недостаточны для строительства или восстановления дома (Swisspeace, October 2006; The Independent, 6 March 2007). В то время как некоторым людям удалось купить квартиру на сумму компенсации, другие предпочли потратить деньги на покупку автомобиля, земельного участка, строительных материалов или ежедневные расходы на жизнь. Однако многие ВПЛ обеспечили себе новое жилье благодаря помощи со стороны международных организаций.

В то время как компенсация помогла многим перемещенным лицам восстановить свою жизнь, в программе имеется ряд недостатков. Те, кто имел частично разрушенное жилье, были лишены права обращаться с заявлением, часто существовала спорная собственность, прошедшая через многие руки. Система была также поражена коррупцией: в Грозном ответственный чиновник комиссии по компенсации был арестован в 2006 г. за то, что брал взятки (Prague Watchdog, 24 November 2006), а многие люди также пытались

подать ложные заявления (Kavkazski Uzel, 30 April 2007 and 9 June 2007). Более того, наличие и распределение компенсации зависят в большой степени от того, как формируется федеральный бюджет. И хотя те, кто проживал в коллективных центрах были внесены в списки как приоритетные получатели компенсации в 2007 г., оплата и рассмотрение 25 000 неоплаченных заявлений были приостановлены с 2005 г. в связи с отсутствием фондов в федеральном бюджете (Kavkazski Uzel, 30 April 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Интеграция ВПЛ из Чечни

Несмотря на заверения и администрации Ингушетии, и федеральных властей о том, что ВПЛ не будут принудительно возвращены в Чечню, на них оказывается значительное давление с целью их возвращения. В 2004 г. миграционная служба начала снимать с учета людей, проживающих в ВП, в первую очередь тех, кто получил компенсацию или кого считали владельцами жилья в Чечне. Осенью 2005 г. федеральные власти усилили давление на ингушскую администрацию с целью закрыть ВП, хотя в 2007 г. более 70 из них оставались открытыми. Все ВПЛ, проживающих в частном секторе в Ингушетии были сняты с учета миграционной службой в начале 2007 г. под предлогом того, что они не зарегистрировались по месту своего проживания (Caucasian Refugee Council, 25 June 2007; UNHCR, 31 May 2007; IA Regnum, 13 March 2007; Kavkazskiy Uzel, 20 July 2006). ВПЛ могут обжаловать снятие с учета, но цена для многих чрезмерно высока.

Приблизительно 25 процентов обитателей коллективных центров предпочли бы остаться в Ингушетии, а не возвращаться в Чечню (UNHCR, June 2007; DRC, 2007). Опрос, проведенный Датским советом по беженцам, показал, что большинство ВПЛ, желающие остаться в Ингушетии, жили в районных центрах, а 25 процентов опрошенных ВПЛ приобрели собственное жилье в Ингушетии (DRC, 2007). Правительство Ингушетии неоднократно объявляло о планах по интеграции ВПЛ в республике, однако эти планы пока не осуществились. Несмотря на то, что правительство выделило земельные участки некоторым решившим остаться ВПЛ, международные и национальные гуманитарные организации до сих пор остаются основными участниками, поддерживающими ВПЛ в их интеграции в местную жизнь.

Поскольку ВПЛ сталкиваются с проблемой получения регистрации по месту жительства в Дагестане, то шансы тех, кто надеется поселиться туда для постоянного проживания, крайне малы. В отличие от Ингушетии и Чечни, миграционная служба Дагестана не регистрирует ВПЛ, делая эту группу более уязвимой, чем в других республиках. Не имея регистрации, они должны платить за жилье, и существует большой риск их выселения. Для получения доступа к пособиям, таким как пенсии и пособия по безработице, а также к системе здравоохранения и образования, ВПЛ должны регистрироваться по месту проживания; у некоторых возникают проблемы с местными властями при регистрации своего проживания, поскольку, как сообщается, местные власти предпочитают, чтобы они селились в своих прежних местах проживания, а не в данной местности (Memorial / Civic Assistance Committee, 15 March 2007).

Невзирая на свой уровень интеграции, проживающие в Московской области чеченцы подвергаются неофициальному милицейскому надзору и дискриминации (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; OSI, 2006). Согласно российскому НПО в области прав человека "Мемориал" сотрудники НПО и чеченцы неоднократно слышали от местных должностных лиц министерства внутренних дел о существовании секретного распоряжения, ограничивающего регистрацию чеченцев во многих регионах России. Действительно, перемещенные лица из Чечни столкнулись с трудностями при регистрации проживания местными властями за пределами Чечни, что ограничивает их доступ к медицинскому обслуживанию, образованию и социальным выплатам (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006).

Московская область, Краснодарский край и Кабардино-Балкария имеют репутацию применения наиболее строгого режима. Обращение с чеченцами за пределами Чечни ухудшилось в 2006 г., когда в результате драки в Кондопоге на севере России между этническими русскими и мигрантами с Кавказа погибли двое русских. Мигранты впоследствии покинули этот район, но затем большинство из них вернулось (www.newsru.com, 2 November 2006). С тех пор имели место и другие столкновения между русскими и чеченцами и, по крайней мере, одно из них закончилось фатальным исходом (Prague Watchdog, 7 June 2007 and 29 October 2006; RFE / RL, 7 June 2007).

ВПЛ из Северной Осетии

В Северной Осетии люди, перемещенные в результате конфликта 1992 г., живут, в основном, в железнодорожных вагонах или сборных домах, предоставленных гуманитарными организациями, тогда как в Ингушетии ВПЛ из Северной Осетии живут в частном секторе и 37 временных поселениях (ВП) (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Жилищные условия ВПЛ из Северной Осетии, проживающих в частном секторе, неизвестны. Некоторым ВПЛ из Северной Осетии, проживающим в Ингушетии, со стороны международных организаций была оказана помощь в строительстве собственных домов после приобретения ими земельных участков.

Компенсация, предложенная ВПЛ из Пригородного района, по крайней мере, в два раза больше выплаты ВПЛ из Чечни. Более того, власти Южного федерального округа установили, что эта компенсация должна выплачиваться не только тем, кто проживает постоянно в Пригородном, но также и проживающим в общежитиях Пригородного, и проживающим без регистрации, если они в судебном порядке докажут, что они постоянно проживали в Пригородном районе до начала конфликта (Government of the Russian Federation, 20 April 2006; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Информация о количестве ВПЛ, которые получили эту компенсацию и о том, что им удалось построить с ее помощью, не имела в распоряжении информированных источников.

Некоторые перемещенные лица, проживавшие в Майском, Северная Осетия, выдвинули на первое место проблемы получения паспортов, регистрации проживания, компенсации за утраченное имущество и жилье, и правительственной поддержки жилищного строительства (ВПЛ из сел Терек, Южное, Чернореченское, Ир и Октябрьское, 18 июля 2006 г.)

Примерно 24 000 человек возвратились в свои дома в Пригородном районе в Северной Осетии и около 450 человек возвратились в 2006 г. (IA Regnum, 17 July 2007; IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Самые большие трудности, с которыми они столкнулись, были отсутствие возможностей заработка и проблемы с водо- и газоснабжением (Kavkazski Uzel, 18 April 2006).

Не все ВПЛ смогли вернуться в свои первоначальные места проживания в Пригородном районе. Районный суд принял решение, что некоторые села являются частью водоохранных зон и ВПЛ, а также другим гражданам было запрещено там селиться (Memorial, March 2006). События в Беслане, Северная Осетия, где захват школы в 2004 г. привел к гибели более 330 человек, включая 184 детей, ухудшил межэтнические отношения в регионе и остановил возвращение ингушей в республику. И только в мае 2005 г. процесс возвращения постепенно возобновился. Кроме того, дома некоторых людей после их перемещения были заняты теми, кто покинул Грузию в поисках убежища.

Правительственное переселение ВПЛ в п. Новое, специально построенный новый поселок в Северной Осетии, было особенно болезненным. В 2006 г. решением суда североосетинский поселок для ВПЛ Майское был признан сельскохозяйственной зоной-пастбищем, после чего правительство предложило ВПЛ участки земли в Новом. Тогда как

около 150 семей приняли предложение и переехали добровольно, другие отказались и настаивали на своем праве на возвращение на свое первоначальное место жительства в Пригородном районе. В знак протеста против правительственных планов закрыть в конечном счете Майское и переселить обитателей в Новый, ВПЛ объявили голодовку в Майском и Москве (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Kavkazski Uzel, 30 May 2007). Несмотря на то, что правительственные должностные лица заверили ВПЛ, что их проблемы будут рассмотрены на соответствующих заседаниях, правительственные должностные лица принудительно перевезли оставшихся обитателей Майского в Новый в середине 2007 г. (Memorial, 28 June 2007; Committee for the Protection of the Rights of IDPs, 13 June 2007). На середину 2007 г. в Новом проживало около 300 семей (Vesti, 20 July 2007).

Улучшение национальных ответных мер

Федеральное и чеченское правительства приложили заметные усилия в оказании помощи ВПЛ из Чечни путем выделения пенсий и детских пособий, выплачивая компенсацию тем, чьи дома были полностью разрушены, а также выделив фонды на постоянное жилье. В 2006 г. был учрежден пост комиссара по правам человека в Чечне, а чеченское правительство присоединилось к правозащитной рабочей группе, которая собрала вместе международных и национальных участников для обеспечения прав ВПЛ (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006). Недостатком этих усилий, однако, является приостановка выплат компенсации, не всегда выполняются правительственные обещания о выделении возвратившимся лицам земельных участков, а правительственная комиссия по ВПЛ была распущена в начале 2007 г. (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006; Swisspeace, 22 June 2007).

Со своей стороны, североосетинское правительство выделило земельные участки для ингушских ВПЛ в Новом, - поселке, который оно создало для перемещенных лиц (Vesti, 22 December 2005). Федеральное правительство также уделило значительное внимание ВПЛ из Пригородного района и достигло результатов, включая увеличившееся возвращение ВПЛ на свои прежние места проживания или поселение в Новом (IDMC / Memorial, 10 October 2006). Правительство, однако, применило силу против ВПЛ с целью исполнения решений суда, в соответствии с которыми некоторые поселки в Пригородном должны быть районными водоохранными и пастбищными зонами, отказав, таким образом, некоторым ВПЛ в их праве на возвращение в свои бывшие дома или праве остаться в их нынешнем жилье.

Правительство в Дагестане позволило ВПЛ из Чечни остаться на своей территории, но миграционная служба федерального правительства еще не предоставило им легальный статус, вероятно, по причине отсутствия финансирования. В некоторых случаях местное правительство в Дагестане еще не зарегистрировало жилье некоторых ВПЛ. В результате эта группа ВПЛ должна платить за свое проживание и сталкивается с препятствиями при доступе к социальным службам и пособиям.

Федеральное правительство включило “вынужденных мигрантов” в национальную жилищную программу, созданную в соответствии с указом в 2006 г. Те, кто был включен в список миграционной службы в качестве нуждающихся в жилье лиц, имеют право на жилищную субсидию, выделяемую из федерального бюджета пропорционально количеству членов семьи и базирующуюся на правительственных данных о стоимости одного квадратного метра жилья.

Международная поддержка смещается к развитию

В 2006 г. ООН и ее партнерские НПО начали переключать свое основное внимание с чрезвычайной помощи на деятельность по развитию на Северном Кавказе, в то же время

признавая, что затронутое конфликтом население по-прежнему нуждается в гуманитарной поддержке. В результате Межучрежденческий план работы в условиях переходного периода на Северном Кавказе 2007 года включает деятельность по развитию, такую как экономический рост и управление, в дополнение к гуманитарной деятельности, такой как медицинская помощь, жилье и образование. Тем временем, некоторые международные участники упомянули о своем уходе с Северного Кавказа, включая УКГД ООН, который закрывает свой офис в конце 2007 г. (UN OCHA, 13 December 2006).

УВКБ ООН, как ведущее агентство по защите ВПЛ на Северном Кавказе, с помощью партнерских НПО предоставляет помощь в поисках крова и правовую поддержку ВПЛ, проводит мониторинг положения ВПЛ в Ингушетии, Чечне и Дагестане, а также проводит независимую проверку случаев выселения из ЦВР. Поддержка ВПЛ из Пригородного района в Северной Осетии ограничивается *ad hoc* вмешательствами, такими как жилищная поддержка в Ингушетии и правовая помощь относительно права на возвращение.

Другие гуманитарные организации, непосредственно помогающие ВПЛ, включают Датский совет по беженцам (предоставление жилья, продуктов питания и защиты), Международный комитет Красного Креста (медицинская помощь), «Врачи без границ» (медицинская помощь), Польская гуманитарная организация (вода и санитария) и Швейцарское агентство по развитию и сотрудничеству (жилье и медицинская помощь). Работа ряда международных НПО в Чечне, Ингушетии и Дагестане была прервана в 2006 г. из-за предпринимаемых ими усилий по исполнению нового законодательства, определяющего деятельность иностранных НПО. В некоторых случаях это означало задержку помощи ВПЛ. Однако к 2007 г. все 15 международных НПО на Северном Кавказе удалось возобновить свою работу.

Различные органы Совета Европы продолжают выражать озабоченность в связи с отсутствием уважения к институтам по защите прав человека на Северном Кавказе. В резолюции 2006 года Парламентская ассамблея Совета указала, что ситуация с нарушением прав человека в Чечне является самой серьезной среди всех стран – членов Совета Европы и отметила, что подразделения силовых структур порождают среди населения атмосферу страха, а не защиты. В марте 2007 г. Европейский комитет против пыток выпустил свое третье публичное заявление по пыткам в Чечне, что является редко осуществляемой мерой, применяемой только тогда, когда какая-либо сторона прекращает сотрудничать и отказывается улучшить ситуацию. К середине 2007 г. Европейский суд по правам человека Совета Европы вынес 14 постановлений по делам из Чечни. Суд нашел федеральные войска виновными в нарушениях прав человека, таких как пытки, насильственные исчезновения и незаконное задержание, и предписал российскому правительству выплатить компенсацию истцам. (Prague Watchdog 27 July 2007).

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

The conflicts in Chechnya

Background to the first conflict in Chechnya

- After many years and bloody battles, Russians won the Caucasus region in 1859
- Chechnya experienced a brief period of independence following the 1917 Russian revolution until 1922
- Forced collectivization and attempts at "Russification" by the Bolsheviks led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating with brutal repression during the Stalinist 1930s
- Chechens and Ingush were deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches in 1944, but were allowed to return in 1957
- After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev proclaimed Chechen independence from Russia on 2 November 1991
- As a result of the declaration of independence, some 100,000 ethnic Russians left Chechnya
- From 1994-1996, Russian troops launched a military intervention in the republic to bring Chechnya back under control of the federal center; up to 400,000 people fled to other areas of Chechnya and the Russian Federation
- Federal forces withdrew after a 1996 cease-fire agreement

Hansen 1998, pp. 20-22:

"Chechnya experienced 21 months of warfare between December 1994, when some 40,000 Russian troops entered the rebellious republic, and August 1996 when a cease-fire took hold. An estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Indiscriminate bombing and artillery attacks destroyed large areas of the Chechen capital Grozny in the first two months of the war, forcing up to 400,000 people to flee to other areas of Chechnya and to the frontier regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, and southern Russia. As the war continued into the surrounding countryside and southern mountain areas, entire villages were destroyed, resulting in further displacement.

The war was the most recent manifestation of the historical inability of Chechnya and Russia to find a workable *modus vivendi*. Chechnya's history over the past 200 years has been defined largely by Russian and Soviet attempts to subdue the Caucasus. In Czarist times, an uncontrolled northern Caucasus was considered to be Russia's Achilles' heel against incursions from the Persian and Ottoman Empires. From the second decade of the nineteenth century, Russian armies began their push into the mountains meeting fierce, well-organized, and Islamicized Chechen resistance. During a 25-year campaign of resistance led by the Imam Shamil between 1834-1859, Russian forces opted for a scorched earth strategy, destroying the lands and villages that gave the Chechen fighters sustenance and forcing the population to flee to the relative safety of the mountains. Russian armies won a titular military victory in 1859 with Shamil's capture, but resistance continued for the remainder of the century and well into the next. In modern times Shamil, who was an ethnic Avar from Dagestan, remains a venerated folk hero in both Chechnya and Dagestan.

Upon the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Bolsheviks promised independence, cultural autonomy, and religious freedom to Chechens and others in the northern Caucasus. However, the Soviet Red Army consolidated its power in the Caucasus soon afterward. Forced collectivization and attempts at Russification led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating during the Stalinist 1930s with brutal repression, forced famine, mass arrests, exiles, and killings. Chechnya was united with Ingushetia as an ASSR in 1934. The Ingush and Chechens, who together comprise the Vainakh people, are ethnically related, speak a similar language, and often share kinship ties.

With the advent of World War II, as German forces advanced into the Caucasus, small numbers of anti-Soviet guerrillas mounted attacks against Soviet forces. This provided Stalin with a pretext to punish the 'unreliable' ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus. With great loss of life, Chechens and Ingush were deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches, and their lands were divided up among Russians, the Laks of Daghestan, and North Ossetians. The Chechens and Ingush remained in exile until 1957, when it was decreed by Khrushchev that they could return to their homes. The return was badly managed, however, and recurring clashes between the returnees and settlers continued for many years.

Perestroika in the late 1980s allowed for the resurgence and open expression of national identities in the Caucasus, leading in Chechnya as elsewhere to a declaration of independence from Russia. With Ingushetia opting to remain within Russia, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, proclaimed Chechen sovereignty on November 2, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations between the struggling democracy in Moscow and the Chechen capital Grozny were difficult from the outset. Moscow refused to recognize Chechnya's secessionist aspirations and mounted both covert and overt operations to weaken Dudayev's position and replace him with a more tractable regime.

In Chechnya, the pervasive socioeconomic ills brought about by the collapse of the Soviet system and Dudayev's own increasingly autocratic style of leadership sent the territory into a spiral of fragmentation and instability. These conditions were exacerbated by the emptying of jails, the proliferation of small arms, and burgeoning criminal activity. Like his successor Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's challenge was to impose a hierarchical state system atop a society more closely organized along lateral, clan-based relations. Amid a worsening breakdown of law and order, some 100,000 Russians, many of them holding highly skilled, essential jobs in Chechnya's infrastructure and industry, departed for more hospitable surroundings. Russian military leaders promised Yeltsin that Chechnya could be quickly subdued. Amid protests from Ingushetia and liberal circles in Moscow, a Russian invasion force was mustered in the northern Caucasus and entered Chechnya on December 11, 1994.

[...] Russia was given largely free reign by the international community in its prosecution of the war, in deference to Russian sovereignty and its key roles in other pressing international foreign policy issues. Fighting eventually ended in August 1996, following an all-out attack in Grozny on Russian forces, who were forced out in a humiliating defeat by a much smaller separatist force. Russian President Yeltsin's national security advisor at the time, former Soviet general Alexander Lebed, concluded a cease-fire agreement with the separatist leadership. The terms of the cease-fire stipulated the withdrawal of Russian forces and a five-year hiatus for discussions on Chechnya's future political relationship with Russia."

BBC, 4 June 2007:

"In 1994 Russia sent its forces in a very poorly planned bid to bring the rebellious region back to heel. Early promises of a quick victory were soon silent as the Chechens put up fierce resistance to the Russian assault and the death toll mounted.

Amid growing public outcry over rising losses in the Russian army, Moscow withdrew its forces under a 1996 peace agreement. The deal gave Chechnya substantial autonomy but not full independence. The Chechen chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov, was elected president."

See also "[Chechnya War](#)," *Reuters*, 11 April 2007 and "[Regions and Territories: Chechnya](#)," *BBC News*, 4 June 2007 and "[Why did 1997 peace agreement fail?](#)," 11 May 2007, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.

Background to the second conflict in Chechnya

- In 1999, large-scale warfare reignited between Russian federal forces and Chechen rebels after call for independent Islamic state in Dagestan and explosions in Russian cities
- Hostilities still ongoing

Research Centre for East European Studies and Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007:

"Over the past thirteen years, the Russian government has fought two brutal wars against separatist guerrillas in Chechnya, a small, landlocked republic adjoining Dagestan, Stavropol Krai, North Ossetia, and Ingushetia in Russia's North Caucasus region. The first war lasted from December 1994 until August 1996, when the two sides signed an armistice that led to a suspension of fighting and three years of de facto independence for Chechnya. This interregnum came to an end in the latter half of 1999 when a series of events beginning with deadly incursions by Islamic extremists from Chechnya into neighboring Dagestan reignited large-scale warfare between Russian federal forces and Chechen guerrillas — a conflict that has continued ever since."

BBC, 4 June 2007:

"In August 1999, Chechen fighters crossed into the neighbouring Russian Republic of Dagestan to support a declaration by an Islamic body based there of an independent Islamic state in parts of Dagestan and Chechnya. This body also called on all Muslims to take up arms against Russia in a holy war. By now Vladimir Putin was Russian prime minister and Moscow was fast and firm in its reaction. Within a couple of weeks the rebellion was over.

The late summer of the same year saw several explosions in Russia in which hundreds died. The Russian authorities did not hesitate to blame the Chechens.

Mr Putin sent the army back to subdue the republic by force in a second brutal campaign which, despite Russian claims of victory, has yet to reach a conclusion."

Reuters, 11 April 2007:

"Aslan Maskhadov, who led the rebels during the 1994-1996 war, was elected Chechen president in 1997. Russia initially recognised the government, and a peace agreement was reached. It granted the region substantial autonomy but stopped short of full independence, so it soon broke down.

Hardline Chechen rebels defied Maskhadov's leadership and launched cross-border attacks on neighbouring Dagestan to the east, sparking a Russian crackdown that has continued since 1999 [...]

Armed pro-separatists still want self-rule, and sporadic fighting continues in the mountains and south of the republic. But Russia has scaled down its presence in Chechnya and left the local pro-Moscow government to stabilise the region."

See also "[Why did 1997 peace agreement fail?](#)," 11 May 2007, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.

Military operations in Dagestan and Chechnya (1999-2000)

- Russian military intervention in Chechnya follows bomb explosions in Moscow blamed on Chechen terrorists and a Chechen incursion into the neighbouring republic of Dagestan (August-September 1999)
- After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny (November-December 1999)
- Chechen rebel forces abandon Grozny; military operations continue in Southern Chechnya; Chechen leader calls for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces (February-March 2000)

USCR October 1999:

"On September 5 [1999], Russian military forces began a month-long air assault on Russia's self-ruled, separatist republic of Chechnya, displacing more than 80,000 civilians by month's end. What began as a campaign to defeat Chechen-based armed Islamic 'Wahhabi' guerrillas who seized several villages in Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, in August and early September, quickly turned into an offensive resembling the 1994-1996 Russian-Chechen war [...]"

Throughout September, Russian forces widened the bombing campaign from sites along Chechnya's eastern border with Dagestan to targets throughout the republic. They reportedly targeted the Wahhabi guerrillas, who they claimed bombed several apartment buildings in Moscow, Dagestan, and other areas of the Russian Federation. On September 28, after several failed attempts to engage Russia and stop the escalating war, President Maskhadov condemned 'the Russian aggression' and enlisted Shamil Basayev--former Chechen commander and leader of the Wahhabi guerrillas--to lead Chechnya's new war against the Russian Federation. (Unlike the 1994-1996 war in which many ethnic Chechens fought for independence, most Chechens reportedly oppose the fundamentalist ideology of the Wahhabi guerrillas and their attempts to infiltrate Dagestan.)

By the end of September, villages surrounding Chechnya's capital, Grozny, lay in ruins, hundreds of civilians had been killed by wayward bombs, and more than 80,000 displaced Chechens sought shelter in neighboring Ingushetia, Dagestan, and North Ossetia."

HRW February 2000:

"After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, taking several towns without a fight, including Chechnya's second largest city of Gudermes, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny. In November, Russian troops fought hard to encircle the city and cut off supply lines from the south, with towns and villages to the south of Grozny the scene of very heavy fighting. By early December, Russian forces had more or less encircled Grozny.

Russian commanders initially ruled out a ground offensive into Grozny, in an apparent attempt to avoid repeating the mistakes of December 1994 and January 1995, when hundreds of Russian soldiers entering the city in columns of tanks proved to be easy targets for the Chechen rebels. Russian forces began a relentless bombing and shelling campaign on the city in late November 1999. On December 6, the Russian military announced an ultimatum to all civilians in Grozny to leave the city by December 11 or face 'elimination.' Leaflets dropped from Russian planes instructed civilians: 'Those who remain will be viewed as terrorists and bandits and will be

destroyed.... Everyone who does not leave the city will be destroyed.' The ultimatum was eventually retracted, apparently under pressure from the international community.

Countless civilians fell victim to the continuing bombing and shelling campaign. On various occasions the Russian government and military announced safe exit routes for civilians wishing to flee from the city but continued to target those very routes. An estimated ten to fifty thousand civilians, often the elderly, poor, and infirm, remained trapped in Grozny's basements.

In mid-December, Russian forces started the ground offensive on Grozny. In Grozny, Russian soldiers met fierce resistance from Chechen rebel fighters intimately familiar with the city. During the offensive, the number of casualties among Russian soldiers rose very quickly. In one episode reminiscent of the 1994-1995 offensive on Grozny, Associated Press and Reuters correspondents reported that, on December 16, a column of tanks trying to enter the center of the city was surprised, and Russian troops were slaughtered by Chechen fighters. Maria Eismont of Reuters and Ruslan Musayev of the Associated Press said they had counted the bodies of more than one hundred Russian soldiers. The report was vehemently denied by the Russian government. In interviews with foreign and Russian journalists, however, numerous Russian soldiers who had fought in Grozny admitted that many soldiers from their units had died. Several soldiers described how each step on the streets of Grozny posed a threat as Chechen snipers were hiding all over the city and claimed the lives of many Russian soldiers. In mid-January, Chechen snipers killed General Malofeyev, one of the commanders of the invasion of Grozny, in a major setback for the Russian army. Russian troops were unable to recover his body until five days later.

The Russian government initially denied reports in the Russian and international media that claimed that the casualty rate among soldiers had soared. In mid-January, officials reported that 700 soldiers had died since the beginning of the fighting in Dagestan in August. On January 25, the Russian government said that in fact 1,173 soldiers had died. Many independent observers, however, believe even these numbers severely understate the real casualty figures, and some have estimated that as many as 3,000 Russian soldiers may have died in the Chechnya campaign so far.

In early February, Chechen rebel forces abandoned Grozny. One group apparently tried to bribe Russian officers for a safe passage but walked into a mine field which left many rebels dead and many more wounded. On February 7, Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin claimed that his troops had taken control of all of Grozny. In an interview with a Spanish daily, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that 'for the time being we have given up [Grozny].'"

UNHCR, 28 March 2000:

"Civilians continue to flee villages in southern Chechnya amid reports of widespread destruction of property and a continuing military push by Russian troops. Newcomers report that virtually all homes in the Komsomolskoe village in Southern Chechnya have been destroyed. The number of people fleeing Chechnya has remained steady at about 1,000 people a week."

"The Russian authorities at present claim to have control over the vast majority of the territory of Chechnya: however, military operations continue in the mountains in the south of the Republic. The media have put the number of Chechen combatants at approximately 3 000. The Russian forces have captured a leader of the Chechen fighters, Mr S. Raduyev, who has been taken to Moscow for trial.

COE Parliamentary Assembly, 4 April 2000, paras. 20-21:

"This fighting still causes significant loss of life among civilians and military personnel alike. There is no evidence that the belligerents have changed their way of conducting the military operations.

Mr Maskhadov has called for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces, and attacks on Russian military targets are increasing in the territories formally controlled by the Russians."

For a detailed chronology of events in Chechnya from August 1999 to January 2000, see Annex IV of the [report on the conflict in Chechnya presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe \(25 January 2000\) \[Internet\]](#)

Violations of humanitarian law by the Federal Forces led to displacement of civilians (1999)

- Indiscriminate use of force by federal servicemen in 1999 resulted in the displacement of up to 200,000 persons and widespread civilian casualties
- Reports of summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture and rape by the federal forces
- In early December 1999, Federal forces order civilian population to leave Grozny despite absence of safe corridors

US DOS 25 February 2000, Sec. 1g:

"The indiscriminate use of force by government forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000 persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.

Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are employing 'high precision' tactics against separatist and terrorist targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low precision weapons.

In September and early October, government forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they were not supporters of Basayev.

Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's capital, Grozny, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery, which destroyed numerous residential and civilian buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Grozny, killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren. Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-Martan, 15 miles south of Grozny, on October 3, which resulted in the deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed scores of civilians in Grozny's downtown market and a local hospital. Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists. However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that special forces units

had attacked a weapons market, but without using artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Grozny's 150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign. On October 27, government forces subjected Grozny to the heaviest attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116 persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27, government forces shelled the village of Samashki, killing at least 5 persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two large towns near Grozny, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.

According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in other villages.

Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of leaflets over Grozny that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Grozny after December 12 would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the city's inhabitants."

"Special Operation" in Borzhdinovskaya leaves some 1000 displaced (2005)

- Government Vostok battalion conducted special operation in Borzhdinovskaya, Chechnya in June 2005
- As a result of this operation, 4 houses were burned, at least 1 person was killed and 11 men abducted
- About 1000 people subsequently fled to neighbouring Dagestan
- Prosecutor's office launched investigation into arson, abductions, killings and concluded that the Vostok battalion conducted "sweep operation" on their own initiative
- One officer was put on probation for abuse of power and commander of Vostok Battalion soon after awarded the highest Russian military decoration, the Hero of Russia Star
- Fate of disappeared remains unknown and people still remain displaced

AI, 23 May 2007:

"On 4 June 2005, security forces carried out a "special operation" in Borzhdinovskaia, during which around 200 men were arbitrarily detained and ill-treated, at least one man was killed and 11 men disappeared.

Around 100 members of the security forces arrived in Borzhdinovskaia in two armoured personnel carriers, over 10 UAZ-469 jeeps and several VAZ-2109 vehicles. They were dressed in grey military and camouflage uniforms, and, according to villagers were ethnic Chechen members of the Vostok battalion. Sulim Yamadaev, commander of the battalion, denied that the Vostok battalion was responsible for the 4 June raid. However, Khusein Nutaev, head of Shalkovskii district, reportedly told the television channel NTV on 16 June that "special services and federal structures had not worked properly and permitted the law to be violated".

The raid prompted a mass exodus over the border to neighbouring Dagestan of around 1,000 villagers, who have refused to return until the fate of the 11 men was made known."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 17:

"At 3:00 p.m. on [June 4, 2005], the village was seized by a group of armed men numbering 70 to 80 people, who arrived by armored vehicles and cars. It emerged later that they were servicemen from *Vostok* [East] battalion, as testified by entry No. 535, made at 8:00 p.m. on June 5, 2005 in the Chechen Republic [Ministry of the Interior] message log for the Shelkovskaya District (Appendix 3). They burned down four houses, in one of which one man, 77-year old Magomaz Magomazov, was killed, and abducted 11 young men, whose fate is still unknown [...] the fact that a special operation was conducted has been denied and the investigation into the abduction of the people, into which a criminal case was opened, has been suspended.

The villagers of the stanitsa of Borozdinovskaya did not put up with the abduction of their relatives. On June 16, they left the stanitsa en masse and set up a camp alongside a federal highway on the outskirts of the city of Kizlyar in the Republic of Dagestan.

At first this evoked some response from the authorities; the Borozdinovskaya villagers were visited by the Chechen Republic President Alu Alkhanov and the Cabinet Vice-Premier Ramzan Kadyrov; the latter even paid compensation to some of the residents. The Borozdinovskaya residents were promised that an investigation would be conducted and the perpetrators punished. By the beginning of July, the villagers returned to their homes.

However, the abduction case was stalled [...] so Borozdinovskaya residents again set up a camp on the territory of Dagestan [...] Recently there have been increased contacts between the refugees and officials from the Ministry for Nationalities Policy and Information of the Republic of Dagestan [...]

These contacts intensified after the incident which happened in the camp on June 4, 2006, on the day of the anniversary of the Borozdinovskaya tragedy. The refugees decided on that day to move to a clearing which is considered to be an administrative-territorial part of Dagestan. As soon as they moved a big tent there, police officers arrived by two buses and by force and persuasion by arguments made them move back. A Deputy Minister of the [Republic of Dagestan Ministry of the Interior] arrived to the camp and gave the refugees a promise to have their problem solved in a matter of days. Refugees are still waiting for him to keep that promise. They are asking for: return of the 11 abductees and consideration of the criminal case on its merits; payment of compensation for involuntarily abandoned housing in the Chechen Republic or interest-free loans for construction of housing; and provision of land plots for construction of housing somewhere in Dagestan, even if in different locations."

US DOS, 6 March 2007, Sec. 2d:

"In June 2005 members of the *Vostok* (East) Battalion conducted a security sweep in the village of Borozdinovskaya. During that operation, 11 men from the village were detained. Some homes in the village were burned and two villagers were killed. Subsequently villagers left en masse and crossed into the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. According to press reports, most of the villagers have returned to their village but approximately 160 others remain in a tent camp in Dagestan."

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"In 2004, all sweeps ["ID checks" by combined uniformed units, including the army, internal forces, the Ministry of Interior, Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Justice forces, where they would seal off local communities to conduct blanket searches and massive, random, unlawful detentions and take detainees to "temporary filtration points" set up nearby in the armed forces' deployment area] were less cruel, with fewer human rights violations. However, the cruelty

of certain “sweep operations” in 2005 were comparable with those of the first years of the war. An illustrative example was the operation in Borodzinovskaya, Shelkovsky District, neighboring with the Republic of Dagestan. Until recently, the local community totaled 1118, with 90% ethnic Avars. On 4 June 2005, in the daytime, servicemen of Vostok special purpose battalion manned mostly by ethnic Chechens, but under the Ministry of Defense command, conducted a security operation in the village of Borodzinovskaya to detain “11 local villagers suspected of assisting rebel fighters.” At 3 p.m., two APCs and at least 15 other vehicles carrying armed men entered the village. The men were wearing gray police uniforms and camouflage. They broke into homes and forced all men to get into the vehicles. The men were brought to the local schoolyard, forced to lie face down on the ground, with clothes covering their heads. All, including elderly, teenagers and disabled people, were kicked and beaten with rifle butts. The villagers were forced to lie face-down on the ground until 10.00 pm, although it was raining heavily. The villagers gathered from the servicemen's words that they were suspected of killing the local forester and attempting at the life of the local head of administration, events that preceded the raid by two days. 11 men were called by name and taken out of the schoolyard, never to be seen again.

Around 10.00 pm other men were brought to the school gym, where the servicemen beat them again with batons and trampled on their backs. Then the servicemen told the villagers to stay where they were and left. In Lenin Street, two houses were burnt – No 9 and No 11 – belonging to Nazirbek Magomedov and his son Said. The servicemen also burned the house of Kamil and Zarakhan Magomedovs, and the house of Magomad Magomadov, aged 77. Magomadov's wife and daughter were lead out of the house, and the old man was burnt alive. After the servicemen left, the villagers found that a few private cars had disappeared, as well as people. None of those who conducted the “security operation” identified themselves, but the villagers recognized one of them, named Khamzat (nicknamed The Beard) who served in Vostok Battalion and was the leader of the local United Russia Party chapter. On 14 July, local villagers found human remains in the burnt out home of Nazirbek Magomedov. The Chechen Ministry of Interior forces whom the villagers called to the site put the remains in four bags and attempted to drive away, but the villagers shocked by their behavior surrounded them and blocked the way. In response, the police beat father and son Batayevs, threw them in one of the police cars, and drove along the village streets, shooting randomly. On the same day, they tossed Batayevs out of the car on the road to Gudermes District of Chechnya. Following these events, on 16 June, fearing for their safety, 230 Avar families left Borodzinovskaya in an organized manner, crossed the administrative border to the Republic of Dagestan, and set up a tent camp outside the entrance to the city of Kizlyar.

The prosecutor's office launched a criminal investigation into the arson attacks, killings and abductions. An ad-hoc group of investigators went to the scene of the crime and spent a long time in Borodzinovskaya. Given this fact and the active discussion of events in Borodzinovskaya in the press due to the scandal and the exodus of villagers to the neighboring Dagestan, there was hope for some time that this crime would be an exception, and the culprits would be brought to justice. Unfortunately, these hopes were frustrated. It was proven during the investigation that on that day, servicemen of Vostok Battalion conducted a ‘sweep operation’ on their own initiative. One of the officers of the battalion was sentenced to a probational term for “abuse of power.” At the time of this publication, no one else was punished for the crime. Moreover, soon after the events described above, the commander of Vostok Battalion, Sulim Yamadayev, was awarded the highest Russian military decoration, the Hero of Russia Star. The destiny of the “disappeared” people is still unknown, except that in November 2005 two servicemen of Vostok Battalion, speaking informally to Demos Center staff, said, without identifying themselves, that “[the victims] had long been buried.” As of today, virtually nobody has any doubts that the victims had been killed.”

RFE/RL, 29 July 2005:

"On 4 June, troops believed to be operating under federal command raided the predominantly ethnic-Avar village of Borozdinovskaya, killing two residents, abducting 11 others, and setting several houses on fire.

Fearing new abuses, nearly all of Borozdinovskaya's 1,000-strong population sought refuge among their ethnic kin in neighboring Daghestan.

Usually reluctant to denounce abuses committed by their own troops in Chechnya, the Russian authorities this time expressed outrage at the raid.

President Vladimir Putin's representative in the Southern Federal District, Dmitrii Kozak, called the Borozdinovskaya mop-up operation an "act of sabotage" against Russia.

The Vostok battalion is made of Chechen recruits, but formally answers to the Russian Army's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The Borozdinovskaya raid has raised concerns of possible troubles between the Chechen and Avar communities [...]

After the pro-Moscow Chechen government promised to search the abducted villagers and pay compensation for the damage caused by the attackers, Borozdinovskaya refugees agreed to return to Chechnya.

However, the majority of them crossed again into Daghestan this week, setting up a makeshift tent camp near the town of Kizlyar.

They have cited different reasons to explain their decision to leave Borozdinovskaya.

Some refugees said they want to protest against the inaction of the Chechen government in looking for their abducted relatives.

Others said they fear further abuses from Yamadayev and his men.

Refugees in Kizlyar told RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service that after police forces deployed near Borozdinovskaya in the wake of the raid were removed and sent to the village of Znamenskoye after the car bomb attack that killed 14 people there on 19 July. They said that since police left, masked gunmen have made incursions into the village to extort money from the residents.

Pro-Moscow Chechen officials claim that most Borozdinovskaya refugees have now returned to Chechnya. But RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service correspondent Nutsar Chumchayev reported from Kizlyar that 400 villagers were believed to be remaining there today."

Conflict has diminished, but hostilities continue (2007)

- Conflict in Chechnya has diminished since 2005, but hostilities and insecurity persist in addition to high unemployment, corruption and brutality of law enforcement officials
- Civilians still at risk of persecution by rebels and federal forces
- The responsibility for eradicating the rebel forces was transferred from federal military and police to pro-Moscow forces in Chechnya in 2003, also called "Chechenisation"
- In 2007, Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov, son of former president Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, as president of Chechnya, despite the fact that he is young, uneducated and known for violent abuses
- Kadyrov no longer speaks of a special status for Chechnya

Research Centre for East European Studies, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 5 June 2007:

"Heavy fighting occurred during the first several months of the latest Russian-Chechen war, when roughly 2,500 Russian federal troops were killed along with tens of thousands of civilians. Starting in mid-2000, the war increasingly evolved into a classic insurgency. From 2002 through 2004 the Chechen separatists embarked on a series of spectacular terrorist attacks in Moscow and other major Russian cities, including mass hostage-takings, assassinations, and suicide bombings designed to kill the maximum number of people. This campaign was supplemented by hundreds of terrorist attacks within the North Caucasus, causing widespread bloodshed, misery, and destruction. The worst of these attacks was the grisly siege in September 2004 of a school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, an incident that killed roughly 340 hostages, more than half of whom were children. Smaller incidents have occurred since then, and preparations for much larger attacks have been narrowly averted, mainly through luck. Nonetheless, the Chechens' terrorist campaign has ebbed sharply over the past two years. More generally, the separatist conflict in Chechnya, which had remained intense and deadly through late 2005, has diminished markedly over the past two years. The Russian government has trumpeted the decline of the insurgency as a rousing success and has implied that Chechnya is returning steadily to "normal life." Although the diminution of fighting in Chechnya has clearly been welcomed by — and beneficial to — the civilian population there, the "solution" devised by the Russian federal government raises serious doubts that long-term stability can be ensured [...]

Vladimir Putin, who had been appointed prime minister by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 6 August 1999, took charge of Russia's latest war in Chechnya from the very start. Putin earned public acclaim in Russia for his conduct of the war and quickly became the most popular figure in the Russian government. When Yeltsin suddenly resigned at the end of 1999, he designated Putin as his successor. Putin's standing rose still further in February 2000 when most of the Chechen guerrillas left Grozny and shifted to positions further south. Putin's decisive, first-round victory in the Russian presidential election in late March 2000, winning 53 percent of the vote, seemed to convey public approval of his tough line in Chechnya, a sentiment borne out in most opinion polls. Putin acknowledged as much when three Russian journalists interviewed him for the quasi-autobiography published in mid-2000 under the title *Ot pervogo litsa: Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinyim* (From the First Person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin). During those interviews, Putin declared that his "historic mission" as president would be to "resolve the situation in the North Caucasus" and to consolidate Chechnya as a permanent component of the Russian Federation...

With the precipitous decline in fighting in Chechnya since 2005, Putin now regularly boasts that he accomplished what he set out to do: to bring Chechnya permanently back under Russian control. The toll of the war — the deaths of nearly 10,000 Russian soldiers and police and of roughly 80,000 civilians (8 percent of the prewar population), the continued displacement of at least 200,000 people (ethnic Russians as well as Chechens), and the destruction of vast swaths of the republic — is never mentioned in Putin's speeches and statements. Instead, he has been intent on portraying himself as the man who "preserved Russia's territorial integrity and repulsed an aggressive challenge from foreign-backed terrorists and their supporters [...]"

Whether the relative calm in Chechnya can be transformed into a lasting and stable solution under Putin's successors is far from clear. For one thing, a number of grave problems continue to afflict the North Caucasus — pervasive corruption, the brutality of the local police and security forces, perennial government malfeasance, high levels of unemployment, a harsh clampdown on moderate Islamic groups, and the exploitation of ethnic tensions and intercommunal strife. These conditions have fueled extremism and political violence in republics like Ingushetia, Dagestan,

and Kabardino-Balkaria. Although Putin's chief envoy in the region, Dmitrii Kozak, has made considerable headway over the past two years in dealing with some of these problems and defusing possible flashpoints, daunting obstacles remain. The general volatility of the North Caucasus tends to militate against greater long-term stability in Chechnya itself. Another factor that will clearly pose long-term problems is the federal government's reliance on "Chechenization" to supplement large-scale repression as the means of combating separatism in Chechnya. Starting in early 2003, Putin claimed that the pro-Moscow Chechen government led by Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov would take over much of the responsibility for preserving order in Chechnya with the aid of the local police and security forces. The Chechen guerrillas sought to prevent the pro-Russian government from establishing a firmer hold and repeatedly targeted police officers, especially the ones who (at Kadyrov's behest) had conducted mass roundups (zachistki) similar to those carried out by Russian troops. Many deadly bombings, shootings, and other attacks were directed against the Chechen police in 2003 and 2004, and in May 2004 the Chechen guerrillas planted a bomb that killed Kadyrov and other senior officials during a Victory Day celebration in the Chechen capital, Grozny. A subsequent wave of terrorist violence in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, combined with the federal commanders' distrust of Chechen officials, raised serious questions about whether Chechenization would remain a viable approach.

Putin, however, chose to continue moving ahead with Chechenization by giving ever greater authority to Kadyrov's son, Ramzan Kadyrov, a young and uneducated man widely known for his violent cruelty and for the egregious abuses committed by the roughly 15,000-strong security force he set up and oversaw, the so-called Kadyrovtsy. Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed a first deputy prime minister in the pro-Moscow Chechen government after his father's assassination and received a Hero of Russia medal from Putin in December 2004. In March 2006, Kadyrov became prime minister in the pro-Moscow government, and in February 2007 he was able to force Alu Alkhanov, who had succeeded Ahmad Kadyrov as Chechen president, to relinquish the presidency. A few weeks later, Ramzan Kadyrov became the new president, having reached the minimum age of 30 in October 2006. Kadyrov's consolidation of power has been strongly supported by Putin, despite the qualms of some of Putin's advisers, notably Igor Sechin."

Prague Watchdog, 31 May 2007:

"With the onset of the spring and summer season, Chechnya is once again witnessing an increase in the activity of the armed resistance, especially in the mountainous part of the country. The republic's residents are extremely concerned about recent rumours that groups of guerillas are concentrating in Grozny.

April and May of this year have been marked by a surge in guerilla activity. In May alone there were at least ten armed clashes in the mountainous part of the country where the main guerilla bases and camps are located. Also, there has recently been an increase in the numbers of young people joining the resistance. To this are now added rumours that the guerillas have begun a covert concentration of their forces in the Chechen capital."

Swisspeace, 25 May 2007:

"[...] The key political tendency of the current period is the strengthening of President Kadyrov's personal power. The president also appears to have firmly taken a course towards the full integration of Chechnya into Russia's administrative structure. It is important to note, however, that cases where republican leaders find themselves in confrontation with officials delegated from Moscow have become more frequent lately [...] On 16 May a Chechen ombudsman, Nurdi Nukhazhiev, accused federal prosecutor, Valery Kuznetsov, of "criminal inaction in protecting the rights of the local population.

[...] It is noteworthy that the political rhetoric by the new head of the republic has changed dramatically. All the references to the "special status of the republic" have been put aside. R.

Kadyrov now states that there is no need to proceed with signing the treaty on the division of jurisdictions between the federal centre and the republic."

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"In 2006 the delegation of law enforcement and security responsibilities from federal authorities to local power structures in Chechnya was practically completed. Most of the local structures were *de facto* controlled by Ramzan Kadyrov, who was officially appointed prime minister of the Chechen Republic at the beginning of the year. Although the actions of Kadyrov and his subordinates, who engaged in gross human rights violations, were supported by the Kremlin, the federal authorities disclaimed responsibility for what was going on in Chechnya.

In 2006, the "Chechenization" of the conflict, which had developed as local pro-Moscow structures assumed growing power, had reached a stage where the conflict was no longer depicted as a separatist but as an internal one by the federal authorities. In this way, the federal authorities also sought to evade criticism from the international community.

The strengthening of Kadyrov's personal authority had become the basis for the "Chechenization" process. The Kremlin gave him unconditional backing and did not hold him accountable for any actions he ordered, from forcibly collecting donations from citizens for the purpose of speeding up the reconstruction of the Chechen capital Grozny to unlawful police operations."

Memorial, 16 May 2007:

"In February - March 2007 the process of "Chechenisation" of the armed conflict in Chechnya was completed with the regime of Ramzan Kadyrov being definitively established as one and the only power and political authority in the republic. On 15 February 2007 the President of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov handed in his resignation which was immediately accepted by the President of the Russian Federation. On 2 March 2007 the Parliament of the Chechen Republic approved the candidature of Ramzan Kadyrov proposed by President Putin for the presidential office of Chechnya.

Long before his own appointment as President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his loyal friends and companions and often members of his extended family to all key positions in the Republic, especially the positions related to law enforcement functions. Currently practically all key positions in both law enforcement and economic sector are occupied by either members of the Kadyrov clan or his personal and loyal friends [...]

The gist of the policy of "Chechenisation" consisted of the following:

firstly, creation of a local government: nominally through elections, in actual fact - through appointment by the Kremlin.

and, secondly, creation of law enforcement and military forces consisting of local people, ethnic Chechens. Their task was fighting the armed militants by means of terrorising and intimidating those strata of the society, groups, families, residents of particular localities who were suspected of supporting or hiding militants. The new law enforcement forces were practically given permission to act without concern for the law and with almost total impunity. Good knowledge of local realities, customs, family ties and clan relations allowed members of these forces to act more selectively and efficiently than the federal forces were ever able to [...]

Now that Ramzan Kadyrov is the president of the Chechen Republic he has absolute control over the parliament and the government of the republic. The positions of the heads of districts are all held by Kadyrov's loyal people. Most key positions in the Chechen Ministry of Interior are held by people from Kadyrov's personal Security Service (former separatist fighters). The elite troops of the Ministry of Interior [...] were entirely formed of the Kadyrov's Security Service members. Kadyrov's loyalists who were previously part of the illegal armed formation known by the name of "Counterterrorism centre" became members of the South and North battalions in 2006.

Nominally, they are included into the 46th brigade of the Interior Troops of the Russian Ministry of Interior. However, in practice the members of these armed formations still consider themselves Kadyrov's people."

ECRE, 22 March 2007:

"Although there has been some improvement in the overall situation in Chechnya, namely a reduction in armed fighting and reconstruction in Grozny, NGOs continued to document the appalling security situation in Chechnya throughout 2006 and the atmosphere of impunity in the Republic. The civilian population is at risk of violence and persecution from both the rebel groups and the Federal security forces. The "Chechenisation" of the conflict has led to reports from NGOs that pro-Moscow Chechen forces under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov are responsible for many abuses, along with the Second Operational Bureau (ORB-2) of the North Caucasus Operative Department of the Chief Directorate of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal District and that torture in the Republic is "systemic"."

Society for Threatened Peoples, 27 February 2007:

"Even though the situation stabilized in 2006, the Society for Threatened Peoples continues to receive reports about shelling of the mountain districts, arbitrary disappearances of people and impunity for a variety of human rights violations by security forces, Russian and Chechen alike. The appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as acting president by Russian president Vladimir Putin in mid February 2007 raises no hopes. His militia, the so called Kadyrovtsy is notorious for human rights violations in the republic. The smaller number of disappearances is partly explained by the fact that people are too afraid of the authorities and do not report the abduction of a relative any more. An atmosphere of fear is reigning Chechnya."

CSIS, 29 September 2005:

"The Russian government's approach to Chechnya appears to have fueled extremism rather than contained it. Drawing on Russian and foreign newspaper and internet sources, [there was] a dramatic and stark rise in terrorist events in the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation between 1999 and 2005. In 1999, we find evidence of at least 7 terrorist events in the region, and another 14 throughout Russia. In 2000, we record 9 terrorist events in the region, and another 4 elsewhere in Russia. In 2001, the region appears to have experienced 11 terrorist events, and an additional 11 in other parts of Russia. In 2002, the region experienced at least 18 events in the region and an additional 19, including Nord-Ost. In 2003, 22 terrorist events occurred in the region and an additional 14 in other parts of Russia. In 2004, 30 terrorist events occurred in the region including the tragic and gruesome hostage crisis in Beslan, with an additional 25 events in other parts of Russia. As of September 26, 2005, a whopping 80 terrorist events had occurred in the region this year alone, and an additional 5 in other parts of Russia.

Clearly a terrorist threat exists in this region whether fed by external or internal sources. But a cycle of impunity appears also to be affecting the stability of the region: the forces – in this case, government or proxies – have alienated local populations with their brutal and ineffective tactics at clamping down on terrorism. Officials from the Moscow-backed government in Grozny have themselves begun to remark on the role the state plays in this cycle: "If the Russian state was interested in establishing the truth, it would announce the formation of an independent post-conflict commission." While there appear to be no accurate numbers of how many locals have joined the terrorists, human rights activists from the region speak about a "field of manipulation" and claim that locals are turning to the terrorists for acts of revenge and that the terrorists are able to manipulate local populations more easily precisely because of the behavior of Russian Federal and proxy troops. Since early 2003, the dominant line in the Russian government has been to claim that the situation has "normalized." The authorities have scheduled "parliamentary elections" for November 27, 2005 in Chechnya. In recent months, however, some officials have

hinted that the region was far from stable. In June 2005, for example, a leaked document from Dmitri Kozak, the Kremlin's man responsible for the North Caucasus, claimed the situation was perilous. By September 2005, President Putin noted that while the region has the highest number of law enforcement agents compared to the civilian population anywhere in Europe or North America, the number of terrorist events has escalated and forced disappearances proliferate."

Legal framework for current "counterterrorist" operation in the North Caucasus

- Since the beginning of the second war in Chechnya, the Russian government has denied there was a conflict in the North Caucasus
- As a result, international humanitarian law could not be applied to protect citizens during hostilities
- Law on combating terrorism and Shanghai Cooperation Organization documents used as legal justification for "counterterrorist operation" by Russian government
- However, law on combating terrorism is meant for short-term operations, has no ban on use of torture and does not allow federal army to be used in such operations
- In 2006, additional legislation on opposing terrorism adopted which gives authorities more power to use force and impose restrictions on civil liberties

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"In the very first paragraph of Russia's Periodic Report [to the UN Committee Against Torture] dealing with the armed conflict in the North Caucasus (par. 36), the State describes the legal framework for the "counterterrorist operation" by referring, in addition to Federal Law No 130-FZ of 25 July 1998 "On Combating Terrorism," to the documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, and the Agreement of States Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Concerning a Regional Counterterrorist Structure.

The reference to SCO documents[in Russia's report to the UN Committee Against Torture] is surprising, as this organization is guided by values which are strikingly different from those of the UN and European systems; for SCO the interests of the states prevail over human rights - which are declared to be part of the state's internal affairs. What we see here is an obvious conflict between the two legal concepts regulating the use of force by the state and human rights restrictions. However, upon a closer look at the situation, we see that the Russian Government is right in referring to SCO agreements, as its actions in the armed conflict zone were consistently incompatible with the international human rights conventions.

Starting from the early days of the Second Chechen War, the Russian Government has denied an armed conflict in the North Caucasus, thus preventing the application of the international humanitarian law. As a result, Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions was intentionally not applied to protect the local population.

The Federal Law against Terrorism contravenes the Convention by containing no ban on the use of torture. Moreover, art. 21 of the said Law relieves government agents of responsibility for causing harm to citizens. The Law fails to provide any legal remedies to the public nor any guarantees of fair criminal procedure. Thus, art. 24 provides for closed judicial hearings, without public access [...]

Any claims that the treatment of civilians in the conflict zone was consistent with the requirements of the European Convention for Human Rights (including restrictions of freedom and integrity of the person, freedom of movement, respect for private and family life, and

freedom of expression) made in par. 38 of Russia's report [to the UN Committee Against Torture] are unfounded, because Russia had not followed the established derogation procedure and had not declared a state of emergency. Reference to the Law against Terrorism, originally designed for local, short-term security operations, to justify long-term (more than six years) and large scale (tens of thousands of square kilometers) restrictions of human rights is arbitrary, reflecting an excessively broad interpretation of the law. While the said law defines a counterterrorist operation as local and limited in scale, it was used to justify large-scale military operations involving powerful weapons, and random attacks in the North Caucasus.

In fact, the use of the federal armed forces in the Chechen Republic is unlawful, because the Federal Law against Terrorism does not allow using the army in internal conflicts. The unlawful actions of uniformed forces are the cause of persistent and massive use of torture against civilians in Chechnya.

On 6 March 2006, the Russian President signed into force a new federal law – Law No 35-FZ "On Opposing Terrorism"; earlier, on 15 February, he had signed Decree No 116 "On Measures to Oppose Terrorism." Combined, these acts grant authorities even more power to use force, restrict human rights and civil liberties, and avoid accountability."

Prospects for peace (2007)

- Prospects for peace are bleak despite the fact that the general population is oriented towards peace
- Chechen resistance has stated readiness for peace talks several times
- Russian officials refuse to have peace talks with "terrorists," but call amnesty for rebel fighters
- Current Chechen president was appointed by Moscow and therefore lacks mandate for negotiations on behalf of Chechen people

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"[...] Following the death in July of [Chechen rebel leader Shamil] Basayev, the FSB head called on all members of illegal armed groups in Chechnya to lay down their arms within two weeks. The president of the Chechen Republic, Alu Alkhanov, subsequently declared August to be a month of reconciliation with fighters, ordered the creation of hotlines for members of illegal armed formations and promised that the rights of those who requested amnesty would be respected and that impartial investigations into their cases would be conducted and just decisions made. The amnesty period was subsequently extended several times, eventually to 15 January 2007.

An official text spelling out the conditions for the amnesty was adopted only in late September, when the Russian State Duma quickly passed a draft law put forward by President Putin. This law was applicable not only to members of illegal armed groups but also to Russian servicemen who had committed crimes "during the counter-terrorist operations in the territory of Russian entities within the Southern Federal District. However, persons who had committed grave and particularly grave crimes were excluded from the amnesty."

RFE/RL, 14 July 2006:

"Diplomatic representatives abroad of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria (ChRI) have drafted a manifesto addressed to participants of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. Meeting in Berlin on July 5, the representatives reaffirmed the readiness of the Chechen resistance to embark on immediate and unconditional peace talks to end the ongoing war and stabilize the situation across the North Caucasus [...]

Zakayev told RFE/RL's North Caucasus Service on July 14 that even though he was the one to sign the manifesto, the offer of peace talks has been approved by Chechen President Doku Umarov and by "all those who participate in the resistance." [...]

[The manifesto] stresses that while the Chechen people have fought in two wars for independence, and regard independence as the most fundamental guarantee of peace and their future security, they would agree to talks on an unspecified alternative solution to the conflict in line with international law.

The manifesto acknowledges that "the continuation of military activity and violence will not lead to a solution to the conflict," and advocates embarking on negotiations with Russia with no preconditions set by either side. Finally, it stresses the Chechen leadership's rejection of "all forms of violence" against civilians, including acts of terrorism.

Zakayev told RFE/RL on July 14 that the Chechen resistance to Russia will not weaken, and therefore neither the international community nor Russian President Vladimir Putin is capable of ending the fighting without resorting to peace talks.

"We have one goal. The war there [in Chechnya] cannot be ended without political negotiations. The resistance to Russia and the occupying forces in the republic will not abate, in that the Chechen people and the Chechen insurgents are unanimous," Zakayev said. "Neither Putin nor the international community is capable of changing that situation without talks." [...]

This is by no means the first time that the Chechen resistance leadership has signaled its readiness either for peace talks with Moscow, or for a settlement of the conflict that would bestow on Chechnya some undefined status that falls short of independence from the Russian Federation. [...]

President Putin and other senior Russian officials have continued to rule out any peace talks with "terrorists," a category in which they include both President Umarov and Zakayev."

Swisspeace, 31 October 2006:

" What are the prospects for peace in Chechnya? Conflict dynamics suggest they are dim. While in official Russian discourse the situation in the war-torn republic is "normalizing", realities on the ground suggest otherwise. Continued violations of human rights, well documented in reports by intergovernmental institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, respected non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the Russian "Memorial" and others, nourish growing fear and distrust towards Russia and its proxies. The social fabric of the Chechen society is disintegrating and the economic infrastructure of the republic is in ruins. A new generation of Chechen youth, which has experienced nothing but war and devastation, has emerged. Terrorism is proliferating and evidence suggests that the conflict is spreading outside Chechnya proper.

[...] A settlement of the conflict, understood as a negotiated agreement between Russia and a "unitary", coherent Chechen leadership is not possible today. On the other side a negotiated settlement would not be of much worth without the participation of representatives of the "Ichkeria" side. The incumbent, Russia-installed Chechen leaders, are not legitimate and lack a mandate to negotiate on the status of Chechnya on behalf of the Chechen nation."

Swisspeace, 3 May 2007:

"Chechen society is still in the transitional state from war to peace. It has become absolutely clear, nevertheless, that the population does not support armed insurgency any more. The new

generation is orientated towards values of peaceful life, economic prosperity associated with successful business and career-making."

The conflict in North Ossetia

Displacement from the inter-communal conflict in the Prigorodny district

- Stalin deported Ingush from the North Caucasus in 1944 and soon after transferred Prigorodny district from Ingushetia to North Ossetia
- In 1956 the deported Ingush were allowed to return but administrative and practical obstacles prevented return to the Prigorodny district in North Ossetia
- Despite the obstacles, many Ingush moved back to Prigorodny district and lived without residence registration
- Between 30,000 and 60,000 Ingush and 9,000 Ossetians were forced to leave the Prigorodny district as a result of violent conflict over the status of Prigorodny district in 1992

Prague Watchdog, 28 July 2006:

"The Prigorodny Region has always been regarded as being inhabited by the Ingush and part of Ingushetia and remained so until 1944 when it was ceded to North Ossetia. This occurred during the time the Ingush were being deported to Siberia and Central Asia. Although they were allowed to return to their homes in 1957, the Prigorodny Region was never returned to Ingushetia [...]

Current realities compel the authorities to find a solution, yet how exactly does the Kremlin intend to solve this conflict? The Ingush are certain the Prigorodny Region will be returned to them within a year, while the Ossetians are equally certain the question will never be raised. By doing so, this would set a dangerous precedent that would lead other regions within Russia to make similar claims.

On one hand, the Ingush are justified in demanding the return of land snatched from them in 1944. It basically appears to be a simple matter of returning their territory. However, that doesn't resolve the problem of the 50,000 Ossetians now in Prigorodny who would never tolerate living under Ingush rule. And the Ingush are also unlikely to back down. After all, their constitution states that "The restoration of (Ingushetia's) territorial integrity via political means is one of the tasks of the Ingush state."

This irritates the Ossetians, of course, who respond with slogans about the impossibility of Ossetians and Ingush living together in Ossetia. But in reality, they continue to live together, albeit cautiously, proving that slogans and appeals are worthless [...]

The danger of setting precedents has compelled the Russian government to freeze all territorial laws concerning so-called "repressed nationalities" (i.e. anyone deported en masse in the past). This was the policy under Boris Yeltsin and it's highly unlikely that his successor, with his "stability at any price", will change that.

Furthermore, there is also a serious legislative constraint. According to the Russian constitution, border revisions between republics require mutual agreement, confirmed via a referendum. For Ingushetia, this is an insurmountable obstacle since the Ossetians refuse to discuss Prigorodny's return."

Memorial, 31 March 2006:

"According to various estimates, 30 - 60,000 Ingushis were forced to leave their houses and look for refuge in Ingushetia as a result of armed conflict in Prigorodny District of North Ossetia and in Vladikavkaz. In 1992-1993 Migration service of Ingushetia asserted that 61,000 Ingushis fled Republic North Ossetia – Alania (RSO-A). On November 10, 1992 Galazov, the Chair of North Ossetian Supreme Soviet, verbalized the figure of 32,782 IDPs.

The difference in figures can be explained by the fact that before 1992 the percent of Ingush population living on the territory of North Ossetia without registration was very high. Due to the policy of restraint adopted by the republican authorities and to limitation of registration, practiced since 1982, Ingush for decades lived in Prigorodny district without registration in passport agencies. In 1992 these people appeared unable to prove the fact of their residence or property ownership in Republic North Ossetia-Alania (RNO-A). According to the Office of Special Representative, up to 50% of post-war Ingush housing had inadequate registration or no registration at all. When households expanded, new houses would not be added to books. Moreover, a widespread source of income for Ingush men until 1992 were seasonal works in Central Russia or Central Asia, where brigades spent several months a year doing (mostly construction) works. Up to 10,000 Ingushis could have been in this category of "unregistered" citizens. Thus, the situation that we face today originates from the politics of ethnic discrimination and mismanaged registration policy in 1970s, 80s and 90s."

IWPR, 30 March 2006:

"Stalin gave the Prigorodny district - originally an Ingush territory - to North Ossetia after he deported the Ingush and Chechen peoples en masse to Central Asia in 1944. When the Ingush republic was created in 1992, the lingering territorial dispute erupted into clashes between Ossetian and Ingush forces. Lasting just six days in October and November that year, the fighting killed at least 500 people. The ethnic Ingush fled, and although some have returned, many have been prevented from going back to their homes. The authorities in Ingushetia say there are 19,000 people involved, while those in North Ossetia put the figure at no more than 4,000. "

Hansen 1998, pp. 19-20:

"The conflict area of Prigorodnyi Raion extends from the suburbs of Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia east to the present Ingush border, less than 20 minutes from Chechnya. Like the Chechens, the Ingush were forcibly deported under Stalin in 1944. When Khrushchev signed a decree rehabilitating the deported peoples in 1956, the lands presently comprising Prigorodnyi Raion, which had been ceded to North Ossetia, were not returned to the newly reconstituted Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) despite their 90 percent Ingush makeup prior to the deportations. Administrative and practical obstacles, many of them engineered by Ossetian authorities, prevented many Ingush from again taking up residence on their former lands.

Tensions between the Ingush and Ossetians rose and fell through the 1970s and 1980s but exploded into the open with perestroika. Mass demonstrations and growing unrest led the Ossetian authorities to declare a state of emergency in Prigorodnyi in April 1991. Intercommunal violence rose steadily in the area of Prigorodnyi east of the Terek river, despite the introduction of 1,500 Soviet interior troops to the area. On April 26, 1991, in the last months of the Soviet Union, the Russian Supreme Soviet passed the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples that pledged a return to predeportation boundaries. Fearful of losing Moscow's support for a return of Prigorodnyi, Ingushetia opted to remain in Russia when Chechnya claimed independence. By this time, some 16,000 refugees from the conflict in South Ossetia, but who had primarily lived in other parts of Georgia, had fled north and took shelter in Prigorodnyi, significantly adding to the prevailing tensions. Ingush-Ossetian violence worsened and both sides began arming in earnest. According to human rights investigators, many of the worst incidents of intimidation and forced

eviction of Ingush occurred at the hands of South Ossetian refugees. In some cases, North Ossetian locals protected Ingush from those refugees.

Open warfare broke out in October 1992. Approximately 500 people died in a week of concentrated violence during which many homes, primarily belonging to ethnic Ingush, were destroyed or taken over. Russian interior forces actively participated in the fighting and sometimes led Ossetian fighters into battle. Estimates of displacement from Prigorodnyi vary widely, but between 34,500-64,000 Ingush were forced to flee to Ingushetia and 9,000 Ossetians to North Ossetia. Most Ossetians had returned as of 1998, but only a handful of Ingush had done so. IDPs from Prigorodnyi who found refuge in Ingushetia would later compete for space and aid with massive influxes of Chechen IDPs.

The conflict in Prigorodnyi Raion remains frozen amid low-level, back-and-forth violence against police officers and civilians, widespread hostage taking, and deepening animosities. New hope for peace and resettlement was kindled in 1997 with Russian-brokered agreements that set out plans for return and resettlement. However, at the time of this writing, IDP returns have been stalled by continued violence and have been further undermined by the curtailment of UNHCR's presence due to untenable security conditions."

For more details on the conflict, see also the May 1996 report from Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Human Rights Watch [The Ingush-Ossetian conflict in the Prigorodnyi region](#), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report ["Are Ingushetia, North Ossetia on verge of new hostilities?"](#), 28 March 2006 [Internet].

Prospects for resolution of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict over Prigorodny district (2006)

- Many agreements to resolve the conflict have come into force since 1993, though none have been implemented
- Tensions between Ingush and Ossetians increased after hostage-taking at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia in 2004
- Presidential envoy to the South Federal District was to have returned all Ingush IDPs to their homes by the end of 2006

Prague Watchdog, 28 July 2006:

"The current plan to resolve the dispute met with the approval of Dmitry Kozak, President Putin's envoy to the Southern Federal District. Kozak had been assigned the job of returning all Ingush refugees to their former homes in North Ossetia by the end of 2006. However, the Ingush accuse Kozak of having taken a pro-Ossetian position, and they've threatened to hold mass protests if his plan is not revised.

The problem seems to be that while more than 12,000 Ingush refugees are set to return to North Ossetia, they won't be going back to their native villages but to settlements that are being specifically built for them. This is the Ossetians way of preventing the Ingush from viewing these settlements as ancient Ingush villages; plus it will also sever the connection between the Prigorodny Region and Ingushetia.

Nevertheless, despite the Federal center's sudden decision to resolve this age-old conflict, experts predict that along with the old problems that will still have to be dealt with, new ones will arise. And both have a common denominator -- the historical enmity between Ingush and Ossetians.

Even Ingush President Murad Zyazikov, who rarely criticizes the actions of the federal leadership, recognizes that the plan does not uphold the rights of Ingush citizens [...]

During the past 13 years, numerous governmental commissions signed agreements about this conflict, the majority of which were never put in practice. This was due either to Moscow's disinterest in the matter or in not understanding its aspects. So these mountains of paper now reside in the archives, gathering dust.

While relations between these two nationalities are still complicated, the pinnacle of inter-ethnic hatred has been reached: even Beslan was unable to restore the level of their once mutual animosity. The Ingush and Ossetians sincerely want stability and peace, yet how can this be achieved without the political will of the Kremlin?

With the departure of Ingush President Ruslan Aushev (former Soviet general and critic of Moscow's policies towards North Caucasus), another general, the pro-Moscow Murad Zyazikov from the Federal Security Service (FSB), took over. The Ingush, of course, hoped he would help resolve their problem.

However this was not to be; tensions increased instead. The various military and police forces were given the green light to use repressive methods against guerrillas in the republic, even though their guilt or participation in the insurgency was highly doubtful. Needless to say, this has swept the Prigorodny question off the immediate political agenda.

After the events in Beslan, the federal authorities were finally reminded of the existence of the old Ingush-Ossetian conflict, which had again awakened serious fears. Were it not for the terrorist attack, this problem would have surely remained buried and forgotten. But now the situation threatened to spill over and lead to an explosion in North Ossetia and then in Ingushetia. This was probably part of the plan designed by the Beslan raiders, although many experts feel it is still too early to state that this plan failed."

Other causes of displacement in the Russian Federation

Violence against Chechens outside of North Caucasus (2007)

- Forty-six Chechen IDPs fled Kondopoga after Chechens and other ethnic minorities were attacked
- Attack was sparked by brawl between ethnic Russians and Chechens, in which two Russians died
- Most IDPs returned within 2 months
- Ethnically motivated attacks against foreigners, Jews, and dark-skinned migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia are increasing in Russia

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"According to statistics compiled by the Russian Analytical and Information Center SOVA, a total of 439 persons were victims of violence motivated by racial and ethnic hatred in Russia during the period January-November 2006. Out of these 44 died because of the injuries they sustained. Attacks were reported from across the country, but most occurred in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Victims of racist violence included foreign students, asylum seekers, refugees, migrants and minority members, as well as anti-racism activists and others viewed as sympathizing with foreigners or minority groups and therefore as being "unpatriotic".

News.ru, 2 November 2006:

"В Кондопогу вернулись почти все беженцы, покинувшие город после массовых беспорядков

Большинство чеченцев, уехавших из карельского города Кондопога после массовых беспорядков, произошедших там в начале сентября, определились с местом жительства, сообщили "Интерфаксу" в четверг в Духовном управлении мусульман (ДУМ) Карелии.

"Во время Священного месяца Рамадан 25 беженцев переселились в Петрозаводскую мечеть, остальные возвратились в Кондопогу", - отметили в ДУМ Карелии. На сегодняшний день все беженцы определились с местом жительства, одна семья уехала к себе на родину, а все остальные вернулись обратно в Кондопогу.

После сентябрьских беспорядков 46 человек были вынуждены уехать из Кондопоги, и около месяца проживали на территории летнего лагеря под Петрозаводском. И сначала беженцы в Кондопогу возвращаться не собирались. Одна из беженок сообщила в эфире радиостанции "Эха Москвы", что их "там никто не ждет, и никаких гарантий безопасности не дают", а рынок, на котором они работали, до сих пор закрыт и все договоры об аренде торговых мест расторгнуты. По ее словам, чеченцам в Кондопоге постоянно угрожали."

News.ru, 22 September 2006:

"Чеченцев, бежавших из Кондопоги, после недавних погромов, выселяют с турбазы под Петрозаводском, куда их эвакуировали. Как рассказала "Эху Москвы" одна из беженок, руководство санатория, требует, чтобы чеченцы возвращались обратно в Кондопогу, однако рынок, на котором они работали до сих пор закрыт.

"Нам сегодня сказали, чтобы мы возвращались туда, что там все спокойно, - сообщила в эфире радиостанции одна из беженок. - Но мы не можем вернуться, нас там никто не ждет, и никаких гарантий безопасности нам не дают".

По ее словам, чеченцам в Кондопоге постоянно угрожали, и они боятся за свою жизнь. Но кроме этого, добавила беженка, в Кондопоге чеченцам "просто нечего делать": рынок, где они работали, закрыт и все договоры об аренде торговых мест расторгнуты.

"Мы остались без копейки денег, нас бросили на произвол судьбы, и мы просто не знаем, куда нам идти", - заявила она. По словам женщины, для беженцев сейчас главная проблема, где найти новое пристанище. В Кондопогу они возвращаться не собираются."

RFE/RL, 6 September 2006:

"Last night, a sports school was torched in Kondopoga, a small city of 35,000 inhabitants in the northwestern Karelia Republic.

Reports say that one of the trainers employed there is of Caucasus origin and that several families from Central Asia were living in the school at the time.

The incident was the latest in a string of attacks against ethnic Chechens and other ethnic minorities in Kondopoga that has prompted dozens of Chechen families to flee the city.

The violence was sparked by restaurant brawl between ethnic Russians and Chechens last week that left two of the Russians dead. The restaurant, "Chaika," was owned by a Chechen man.

Angry mobs burned down the restaurant where the Russians were killed and destroyed a street market and several stores owned by Chechens and other people from the Caucasus.

The violence has been accompanied by street rallies in Kondopoga demanding the expulsion of immigrants.

Several nationalist parties have expressed support for the riots. Some reports claim these parties actually orchestrated them.

Aleksandr Belov, the leader of the radical Movement Against Illegal Migration, denies involvement in the rampage. But he backed the protests in Kondopoga during a news conference in Moscow on September 5.

"People gathered spontaneously to express their demands," Belov said. "Their demands were simple: [foreigners] get out of here, you have 24 hours. Why? You've come here without invitation and we're fed up with you. These are the two reasons behind the problems in Kondopoga and elsewhere."

[...] But the Movement Against Illegal Migration is not the only group to publicly support the events in Kondopoga.

Nikolai Kuryanovich, a deputy from the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, joined forces with Belov at the news conference.

This is the solution he proposed to tackle ethnic tensions in Russia.

"Once again, this time totally, subjugate the Caucasus and toughen migration laws," Kuryanovich said. "Total cleansing. All criminal elements must be brought to responsibility -- even destroyed -- like the president said. We are waiting for him to make good on his promise to 'wipe them out in the outhouse.'"

Kuryanovich also proposed to build what he called a "wall of China" that would separate the North Caucasus republics from the rest of Russia.

Despite President Vladimir Putin's silence, the crisis in Kondopoga has spiraled into a national issue [...]"

RFE/RL, 4 September 2006:

"Relative calm has settled over the industrial city of Kondopoga in Russia's northwestern Karelia Republic after clashes between Slavs and natives of the Caucasus on September 1-2 left two dead.

Police detained some 100 participants in the violent riots that broke out in Kondopoga after the August 30 incident between a group of ethnic Russians and Chechens at a restaurant, Chaika, owned by a Chechen man.

The fight, which by all reports began as a drunken brawl, sparked angry riots after two of the Russians involved were killed. Angry mobs of Russian youths subsequently attacked businesses run by non-Russians in an attempt to clear the town of all but ethnic Slavs.

Armed with Molotov cocktails, they stormed the restaurant and other Chechen-owned businesses, setting them ablaze.

On September 3, some 2,000 residents turned out at the Kondopoga square demanding that police expel Chechens and other ethnic minorities from the Caucasus from the town.

[...] The riots come as ethnically motivated attacks are on the rise in Russia. Foreigners, Jews, and dark-skinned migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia have all come increasingly under attack during the past several years.

The Karelia riots follow a market bombing in Moscow August 21 reportedly orchestrated by three young Slavs to kill non-Russians."

Meskhetian Turks under pressure to leave their settlements in Krasnodar (2007)

- Meskhetian Turks, expelled from Uzbekistan in 1989-1990, settled in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkariya
- The authorities have refused to issue them residence permits and citizenship, depriving them of access to land, employment and business opportunities
- Almost 11,000 Meskhetian Turks have left Krasnodar since 2004
- In 2006, Krasnodar authorities issued temporary residence permits to some Meskhetian Turks and employed discriminatory treatment less often
- Meskhetian Turks are still denied permanent residency in Krasnodar and some were reportedly fined by police for not emigrating

US DOS, 6 March 2007:

"Unlike previous years, Krasnodar Kray authorities did allow some Meskhetian Turks to obtain residence permits (propiskas) in Krasnodar Kray if they had obtained Russian passports in other regions. Meskhetian Turks without Russian passports were denied the right to register, however, which deprived them of all rights of citizenship to which they were entitled under the law. Krasnodar authorities continued to prohibit Meskhetian Turks who were not registered in Krasnodar from leasing land, obtaining employment or engaging in commercial activity. Because of the difficult conditions in Krasnodar, about 23,000 Meskhetian Turks applied for emigration to a third country, and Krasnodar officials cooperated in facilitating their departure. As almost 11,000 Meskhetian Turks departed from Krasnodar since 2004 human rights groups and other observers reported a significant decline in arbitrary fines, public statements, and other forms of harsh treatment used previously by authorities against the community. Authorities continued to refuse to grant permanent residency to those wishing to remain in Krasnodar, depriving them of the rights of citizenship to which they were entitled under the law. They and some other ethnic minorities living in Krasnodar were permitted only temporary registration and were subjected to special restrictions, such as being required to reregister every 45 days. There have been reports, however, that police continued to arbitrarily fine those who were not emigrating. Human rights NGOs reported that police stopped and checked persons who looked like Meskhetian Turks, immediately releasing those who declared their intention to emigrate and penalizing others."

US DOS, 8 March 2006:

"Krasnodar Kray authorities continued to deny the 10 thousand to 12 thousand Meskhetian Turks there the right to register as permanent residents, which deprived them of all rights of citizenship to which they were entitled under the law. They and some other small ethnic minorities living in Krasnodar were permitted only temporary registration and were subjected to special restrictions, such as being required to reregister every 45 days.

Krasnodar authorities also attempted to use economic measures to drive out the Meskhetian Turks who were not registered in Krasnodar. According to Memorial, they prohibited the

Meskhetian Turks from leasing land, obtaining employment or engaging in commercial activity. The Meskhetian Turks have subsisted by leasing land through local residents with registration, doing so primarily in other districts of Krasnodar Krai but also other regions including Rostov, Volgograd, and Kalmykia. Because of the difficult conditions in Krasnodar, several thousand Meskhetian Turks applied for emigration to a third country, and Krasnodar officials cooperated in facilitating their departure. There have been reports, however, that police continued to arbitrarily fine those who were not emigrating. Human rights NGOs reported that the police stopped and checked persons who looked like Meskhetian Turks, immediately releasing those who declared their intention to emigrate and penalizing others."

Legal definition of IDP in the Russian Federation

IDPs called "forced migrants" under Russian legislation

- The Russian government collects statistics based on the category of "forced migrant", a status created to provide protection to those displaced within Russia proper and those coming from former Soviet republics
- Other categories of displaced persons in the Russian Federation may also encompass internally displaced persons, such as the "formerly deported persons" or "ecological migrants"; those categories are not documented in this profile

Rossiskaya Gazeta, 28 December 1995:

"Federal Law On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation "on Forced Migrants"

[...] A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order."

CIS Conference, 11 June 1996:

"Categories of population movements identified by the CIS Conference which can include internal displacement:

"Internally displaced persons (4) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

Note (4) Working definition used by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (Document No. E/CN.4/1995/50 of 2 February 1995.)"

"Involuntarily relocating persons (7) are persons who are forced to relocate to the country of their citizenship as a result of circumstances endangering their lives, such as armed conflict, internal disorder, inter-ethnic conflict or systematic violations of human rights and who are in need of assistance to resettle in their countries of citizenship.

Note (7) In the Russian Federation, such persons are included in the category "forced migrants", which may also include 'internally displaced persons'."

"Formerly deported peoples are peoples who were deported from their historic homeland during the Soviet period. Some of the persons belonging to this category may be stateless. "

"Ecological migrants are persons who are obliged to leave their place of permanent residence and who move within their country, or across its borders, due to severe environmental degradation or ecological disasters."

Internal displacement as a result of human-made or natural disasters is not documented in this profile.

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Estimates of displaced persons range from 20,097 - 190,000 (2007)

- Range of IDP estimates: DRC 20,097; Federal Government 82,200; UNHCR: 158,905; UN OCHA: 190,000
- People were displaced from Chechnya and North Ossetia-Alania mainly to Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan
- Estimates of displaced persons predominantly include only those displaced by the second conflict in Chechnya
- No reliable data exists on exact figures

Number of Displaced Persons in the Russian Federation

Current Location	Government	UNHCR	UN OCHA	Danish Refugee Council
Dagestan	-	6,519 from second conflict in Chechnya (ICRC)	see Ingushetia	4,935
Chechnya	60,100 (Federal Government)	57,349 (Government)	150,000	-
Ingushetia	From Chechnya: 13,773 (Federal Government) From North Ossetia: 8,327 (Federal Government) 21,000 (Ingushetian Government)	From Chechnya: 18,468 from second conflict in Chechnya (DRC) From North Ossetia: 10,019	From Chechnya and North Ossetia in Ingushetia and Dagestan: 40,000 From North Ossetia: -	From Chechnya: 15,162 from second conflict in Chechnya From North Ossetia: -
Other Areas of Russian	-	40,000 from Chechnya	-	-

Federation		displaced in other regions of North Caucasus, Moscow and elsewhere due to second conflict 26,550 registered as forced migrants from Chechnya and displaced due to first conflict in Chechnya (Federal Migration Service)		
TOTAL	82,200 - 94,873	158,905	190,000	20,097

Dates of statistics are as follows:

Federal Government, 21 February 2006

UNHCR, 31 December 2006

UN OCHA, 7 December 2006

Danish Refugee Council, 31 July 2007

DRC, 31 July 2007:

Ingushetia

The number of IDPs in Ingushetia has decreased from approximately 140,000 in 2001 to some 15,000 in 2007. About 25 per cent of IDPs live in Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia, while the remaining 75 per cent live in private accommodation. In 2006, 3,362 persons returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia. From 1 January 2007 to 31 July 2007 another 635 had returned.

The number of IDPs in Ingushetia as reported by the DRC is the number of persons displaced by the first or second conflict in Chechnya, and who are registered to receive DRC assistance in Ingushetia.

Dagestan

According to DRC statistics of 31 July 2007, there were a total of 4,935 IDPs registered with DRC in Dagestan. Of this number, 1,949 reside in Kizlyarskiy district, 619 in Nogayskiy district, 956 in Tarumovskiy district and 1,411 in Khasavyurtovskiy district.

There are 2,608 females and 2,327 males, with 1,844 children and youth aged 18 years and under.

The majority of IDPs in Dagestan are of ethnic Avar background, followed by Chechens and Nogaytsy.

Of those registered by DRC, 2,000 IDPs in Dagestan are beneficiaries of DRC assistance.

Population figures: displacement as a result of the second conflict in Chechnya (since August 1999)

UN estimates some 160,000 IDPs in the Russian Federation (2007)

- UN estimate of the number of IDPs in the North Caucasus decreased by about 10 per cent in 2006
- 35 per cent of IDPs reside in Chechen Republic, 10 per cent in Ingushetia, 5 per cent in Dagestan, remaining IDPs in other areas of Russian Federation, according to UN

UNHCR, 1 June 2007:

"This table reflects only IDPs who are protected/assisted by UNHCR. These are also not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country [...]"

Country	Population start-2006 Total	Population end-2006 Total
[...] Russian Federation	170,500	158,900

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"There are at least 150,000 internally displaced persons in Chechnya and as many as 40,000 persons are also displaced in Ingushetia and Dagestan [...] The total war-affected population currently in [Chechnya], including IDPs, is estimated at 800,000 (or 2/3 of the Chechen population).

Around 6,500 Chechen IDPs remain in Dagestan where the authorities have not registered them due to a lack of federal funding."

UNHCR, 16 July 2007:

The UNHCR estimate of the number of IDPs at the end of 2006 includes:

"57,349 IDPs displaced within Chechnya itself [...]"

18,468 IDPs from the current hostilities in Chechnya, displaced in Ingushetia...

6,519 IDPs from the current hostilities in Chechnya, displaced in Dagestan...

40,000 IDPs from the current hostilities in Chechnya, displaced in other regions of North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia [...]"

26,550 IDPs officially registered as forced migrants in the republics of the North Caucasus [...]"

10,019 IDPs officially registered as forced migrants from the Prigorodny district [...]"

The sources used by UNHCR to compile these estimates include Migration Services, the Danish Refugee Council, the International Committee of the Red Cross. UNHCR makes its own estimate of the number of IDPs living outside of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya.

Government estimates 82,200 IDPs in Chechen Republic and Ingushetia (2006)

- According to the government, there are more than 82,200 IDPs in South Federal District, with 22,100 IDPs in Ingushetia and 60,100 IDPs in the Chechen Republic. This includes 8,327 IDPs who left North Ossetia-Alania after the 1992 Prigorodny conflict.
- All are citizens of the Russian Federation and are protected by the Russian constitution and Russian laws
- Large discrepancy between government and DRC/UNHCR figures since the government stopped registering IDPs from Chechnya in 2001

Government of Russian Federation, 13 October 2006:

"[...] В 2005 году проведена большая работа по сбору правоустанавливающих документов по проблемам вынужденных переселенцев. По инициативе ФМС России впервые за весь период постконфликтного урегулирования проведено анкетирование вынужденных переселенцев в целях установления их намерений по жилищному обустройству. Численность внутренне перемещенных лиц, находящихся в местах временного размещения на территории Северо-Кавказского региона, составляет 62 200 человек, в том числе 22 100 человек - в Республике Ингушетия и 60 100 человек - на территории Чеченской Республики. Все они являются гражданами Российской Федерации и находятся под защитой Конституции и законов Российской Федерации."

Government of Russian Federation, 21 February 2006:

"По состоянию на 8 февраля 2006 года, на учете в территориальных органах ФМС России в субъектах Российской Федерации, расположенных в пределах Южного федерального округа, состоит 62.5 тыс. вынужденных переселенцев (в том числе, 8327 лиц, пострадавших в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта) и более 82.2 тыс. внутри перемещенных лиц."

Government of the Russian Federation, 26 April 2005:

"Out of the total number of migrants the registered internally displaced persons account in the last four years for 38 per cent. Dynamics disaggregated by years are as follows: at the beginning of 2002 there were 626,600 registered internally displaced persons, in 2003 - 491,900, in 2004 - 352,100, in 2005 - 238,000 [...]"

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Large numbers of IDPs left Ingushetia to return to Chechnya in 2006 after a vigorous promotional campaign conducted by the Chechen government over the summer [...] After the campaign and a parallel process of physical verification of the presence of IDPs in Ingushetia, the authorities consider that no more than 7,700 Chechen IDPs remain in the republic and qualify for state assistance. However, according to the DRC/UNHCR registration system that has recorded arrivals of IDPs in Ingushetia since September 1999, the number of IDPs physically present could remain more than twice as high. This discrepancy can be partly explained by the fact that the Ingush authorities stopped registering IDPs from Chechnya in April 2001, while DRC and UNHCR continued. The DRC/UNHCR figure may also include people moving between the two republics so as to benefit from international aid and look for employment opportunities in Ingushetia [...] According to government sources, Ingushetia continues to host 8,000-20,000 IDPs from the Ingush/Ossetian conflict in the Prigorodny region."

Displaced persons in Dagestan and Ingushetia: 20,097 persons according to the Danish Refugee Council (July 2007)

- Number of IDPs in Ingushetia decreased from 26,155 on 31 December 2005 to 15,162 on 31 July 2007

- Most IDPs in Ingushetia are displaced from the Chechen Republic and live in private accommodation
- There are some 1300 IDP households in Dagestan dispersed among four districts

DRC, 31 July 2007:

DRC statistics show that as of 31 July 2007, there were 15,162 IDPs from the Chechen Republic living in Ingushetia in private accommodation and government-organized temporary accommodation.

Ingushetia

IDPs from Chechnya Registered by DRC to Receive Assistance in Ingushetia - 2007

Type of Housing	31 July 2007	30 June 2007	31 May 2007	28 April 2007	31 Mar 2007	28 Feb 2007	31 Jan 2007
Temporary settlement	3,883	4,020	4,063	4,184	4,227	4,687	5,207
Private accommodation	11,279	11,364	11,742	11,935	12,343	12,805	12,826
Total	15,162	15,384	15,805	16,119	16,570	17,492	18,033

IDPs from Chechnya Registered by DRC to Receive Assistance in Ingushetia - 2001-2006

Type of Housing	28 Dec 2006	31 Dec 2005	31 Dec 2004	31 Dec 2003	31 Dec 2002	31 Dec 2001
Temporary settlement	5,270	10,137	12,399	23,644	27,889	-
Private accommodation	13,198	16,018	22,771	36,177	55,570	-
Total	18,468	26,155	35,170	66,996	102,833	139,670

The number of IDPs in Ingushetia as reported by the DRC is the number of persons displaced by the first or second conflict in Chechnya, and who are registered to receive DRC assistance in Ingushetia.

Dagestan

According to DRC statistics dated 31 July 2007, there are a total of 4,953 registered IDPs in Dagestan.

Number of IDP households in Dagestan

District	Registered IDP Households 31 July 2007	Registered IDP Households 28 Apr 2007	Registered IDP Households 28 Dec 2006	Registered IDP Households 31 Oct 2006	Registered IDP Households 31 Aug 2006
Kizlyarskiy	424	503	504	498	489

Nogayskiy	162	169	166	166	169
Tarumovskiy	191	214	216	217	210
Khasavyurtovskiy	309	410	415	408	435
Total	1086	1296	1295	1289	1303

Disaggregated data: Dagestan (July 2007)

- Women make up about 55 per cent of the displaced population in Dagestan
- Approximately 50 per cent of the displaced population in Dagestan is ethnic Avar
- Children and youth comprise about 35 per cent of the displaced population

DRC, 31 July 2007:

Profile of IDPs in Dagestan

Sex/Age	Less than 7 years	7- 18 years	19-60 years	Over 60 years	Total
Female	193	850	1,519	187	2,608
Male	241	840	1,263	122	2,327
Total	434	1,410	2,782	309	4,935
Percentage	9	28	57	6	100

Identifying Factor	Number
Pregnant women	23
Lactating women	77
Infants (2006-2007)	23
Children (2004-2005)	193
Invalids	232
Orphans	8
Children with a single parent	62

Ethnicity	Families	Persons
Chechen	306	1392
Dargintsy	56	243
Russian	34	105
Nogaytsy	175	670
Avar	485	2400
Others	30	125
Total	1086	4935

Disaggregated data: Ingushetia (July 2007)

- About 55 per cent of displaced in Ingushetia are female
- There are approximately 1000 invalid IDPs living in Ingushetia
- More than 65 per cent of displaced in Ingushetia are ethnic Chechen

DRC, 31 July 2007:

IDPs living in Temporary Settlements and private sector

Sex/Age	Less than 7 years	7- 18 years	19-60 years	Over 60 years	Total
Female	705	2,082	4,757	815	8,359
Male	753	2,024	3,565	461	7,253
Total	1,458	4,106	8,322	1,276	15,162
Percentage	10	27	55	8	100

Identifying Factor	Number
Pregnant women	36
Lactating women	188
Infants (2006-2007)	237
Children (2004-2005)	611
Invalids	976
Orphans	39
Elderly with inadequate social support	25
Children with a single parent	673

Ethnicity	Families	Persons
Chechen	2,304	9,902
Ingush	1,249	5,159
Others	35	101
Total	3,588	15,162

Breakdown by ethnicity in Temporary Settlements

Ethnicity	Families	Persons
Chechen	757	3,275
Ingush	154	559
Others	17	46
Total	928	3,883

Breakdown by ethnicity in private accommodation

Ethnicity	Families	Persons
Chechen	1,547	6,627

Ingush	1,095	4,600
Others	18	52
Total	2,660	11,279

Several tens of thousands still displaced within Chechnya (2007)

- In 2007, most of the government-organised accommodation in Chechnya was located in Staropromyslovski and Oktiabrski districts and the bulk of the IDPs living there arrived in 2002, though some had arrived as late as 2006
- 60,000 people still displaced within Chechnya at the beginning of 2006
- 132,000 IDPs living in private sector in Chechnya were de-registered from the government list in 2005
- At the end of 2005, approximately 44,000 IDPs lived in government-organised accommodation

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"The survey captured almost all families de facto residing in 32 TACs and TSs in the republic of Chechnya. Overall, 2,894 families/ 12,752 persons were interviewed. It must be noted that this may represent a number of individuals significantly lower than the figures reported by the Migration structures, as the latter normally include persons nominally registered in TACs/TS but not factually residing.

Reflecting the number of TACs/TSs in each location, most of the population living in temporary accommodations in Chechnya is concentrated in the Staropromislovski District of Grozny (28.7%), followed by the Oktiabrski District (26.2%), the Leninnski District (16.9%). The smallest percentage of the population (less than 1%) resides in Samashki. These percentages do not change significantly when taking into consideration the number of families, rather than the absolute population.

According to the interviews, 13 temporary accommodations (40.6%) have a population comprised between 250 and 500 residents and 10 (31.2%) have less than 250 residents. The biggest TACs are located in the Oktiabrski District (Saihanova-Tabolskaia, 1,158 reported residents; Poniatkova 11, 882 reported residents) and in Assinovskaia (Centralnaia Usadba, 827 reported residents). The smallest accommodations are reported in the Staropromislovski District of Grozny (MKP Milana and MKP Saifulla, with 50 and 23 reported residents respectively).

Information on the length of the permanence of the family in the TS/TAC was retrieved during the exercise. Almost all TACs/TSs current residents (96.6%) report having settled in the collective accommodation as a consequence of the second Chechen conflict. The relative majority declared having arrived either in 2002 (21.4% of the total residents) or in 2003 (30.6%). Sustained arrivals have been reported also at the beginning of the conflict in 1999 (9.2%), in 2004 (13.9%) and in 2006 (13.9%). It is not difficult to detect that most of the arrivals coincided with critical events and the return trends from Ingushetia, with peaks either during the closure of the camps or during the recent promotional campaign.

The gender breakdown analysis shows that women represent 54.6% of the TACs/TSs residents, while men 45.4%.

As for age breakdown, 51.0% of the population is comprised between 19 and 60 years old, 32.9% between 6 and 18 years old, 12.3% is less than 6 years old and 3.8% represents the elderly population of 60 years old or more.

Out of the total respondents, 7.5% have been identified as having special needs, including serious invalidities (4.6%), widows/ers (2.4%) or orphans (0.5%). In addition, 956 families, i.e. 33% of the total families surveyed have been identified as single-headed.

More than 99% of the surveyed population is in possession of a valid identity document, a passport (61.5% of the total surveyed population), a birth certificate (37.0%) or a temporary residence certificate (0.7%).

Out of the surveyed population, some 11,481 persons (90.0%) reported to hold a registration with the Migration Service.

The gender breakdown is almost identical to the overall one (54.4% women, 45.6% men).

The geographic breakdown reflects the general population breakdown per region, with the exception of Gudermes, where only 13.4% of the surveyed population is in possession of the MS registration."

IHF 1 May 2007:

"At the beginning of the year [2006], about 60,000 persons who had been forced to flee from their places of residence remained displaced in Chechnya. Many of them resided in 32 temporary accommodation centers (TACs) and 14 areas of compact settlement for displaced persons, most of which were located in Grozny."

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"IDPs in the Chechen Republic can be broken down into three categories.

The biggest group, 132,000 persons from the total number of registered IDPs, resides in private accommodation. The only help that was previously given to this category of the population was bread distribution, in accordance with Resolution of the Government of the RF No. 163 of March 3, 2001, to the amount of six rubles per person a day. Bread distribution was stopped in August 2004. And in November 2005, according to the information of the leadership of the Chechen Republic Migration Administration, the said category of IDPs was struck off the state register.

The size of the second group of IDPs, who, according to the same Resolution of the RF Government No. 163, live in rented housing paid for from the state budget, numbered 1,313 families, or 7,432 people, by the end of 2005 [...]

As of the end of 2005, 6,346 families, or 36,850 people, were registered [...] in the 32 TAPs and 15 CAPs existing in the territory of the Chechen Republic. "

More than 30,000 IDPs from Chechnya outside of North Caucasus (2007)

- UN and US DOS estimates of people have left Chechnya and moved to other regions of the Russian Federation range from 30,000 to 40,000
- NGOs estimate that from 300,000 to 1,000,000 people moved from Chechnya to areas outside of North Caucasus in Russia since 1991

UNHCR, 16 July 2007:

"UN estimate of IDPs in other regions of Russia: 40,000."

US DOS, 6 March 2007, Sec. 2d:

"At [2006] year's end 20,070 IDPs from Chechnya were in temporary settlements or in the private sector in Ingushetiya; approximately 30,000 Chechen IDPs reportedly were elsewhere in the country, and an estimated 200,000 Chechens were living as IDPs within Chechnya itself. In addition to ethnic Chechen IDPs, almost the entire population of ethnic Russians, Armenians, and Jews left Chechnya during the strife of the past decade."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.24:

"The number of residents of Chechnya who can be counted among internally displaced persons [in areas of Russia outside the North Caucasus] is now, according to expert estimates by NGOs, between 300,000 and 1,000,000 people. Also rated among this group can be all citizens who have involuntarily left the Chechen Republic in the period since 1991 and till today [have] failed to find permanent housing and a job and receive full medical and social protection."

Population figures: displacement as a result of the conflict in North Ossetia

At least 10,000 people remain displaced from the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia) (December 2004)

- Statistics on the number of IDPs from Prigorodny district differ between the federal government, the government of Ingushetia and the government of North Ossetia
- According to UNHCR, Migration Services of North Ossetia counted about 1200 IDPs from Prigorodny district
- About 2300 IDPs from Prigorodny district live in Ingushetia, according to UN OCHA

UNHCR, 16 July 2007:

"Number of IDPs officially registered as forced migrants from the Prigorodny district: 10,019."

УВКБ ООН, 31 мая 2007 г.:

"Согласно данным Миграционного отдела Северной Осетии-Алании от 31 мая, в республике находились 77 беженцев (включая 73 из Грузии) и 13 942 вынужденных переселенца (включая 12 779 из Грузии)."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Additional priorities include assistance in finding durable shelter solutions for several thousand IDPs displaced from Prigorodny by the Ingush-Ossetian conflict of 1992, some 2,300 of whom live in temporary settlements in Ingushetia..."

Кавказский Узел, 18 июня 2007 г.:

"...по мнению [член комитета Совета Федерации по международным делам Василий] Лихачева, необходимо выяснить точное количество вынужденных переселенцев из Северной Осетии."

"У российской миграционной службы нет достаточного взаимопонимания с миграционными службами Северной Осетии и Ингушетии, они сильно расходятся по цифрам, - заметил"

Лихачев. - И мы поручили этим службам до конца месяца ответить на все проблемные вопросы и найти точную цифру количества беженцев". "

Время, 11 апреля 2006г.:

"-- Во Владикавказе считают, что в базе данных ФМС около 8 тыс. вынужденных переселенцев. Насколько я понимаю, эта цифра несколько ниже той, о которой ранее уже договорились вроде бы обе республики, -- около 10 тыс. человек.

-- Абсолютно верно. Согласно цифрам, которые заявляет ФМС, желающих вернуться около 10 тыс. А прогнозные данные с учетом вынужденных переселенцев, которым еще будет подтвержден их статус, -- 12 тыс. человек. Сейчас идет активный переучет. У нас на территории находится более 18 тыс. человек, которые вынужденно покинули территорию Северной Осетии. Но, к сожалению, не все смогли пройти процедуру переучета. Есть люди, которые уже получили от государства финансовую помощь, но в силу того, что их подворье находится в закрытом населенном пункте, они не могут туда вернуться. Эту категорию, к величайшему сожалению, ФМС не учитывает."

Government of the Russian Federation, 21 February 2006:

"В результате осетино-ингушского конфликта территорию Республики Северная Осетия-Алания покинуло свыше 40 тыс. человек."

Population figures: other situations of displacement

Number of internally displaced from the first conflict in Chechnya (2001)

- 169,000 displaced from Chechnya were officially registered as forced migrants between 1992 and 1999; about 114,000 of them remain registered as of June 2000
- Up to 300,000 ethnic Russians may have fled Chechnya during that period since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence, according to the government
- The Chechen diaspora throughout Russia may be 500,000 persons, the government estimates

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

Government of the Russian Federation, 17 January 2000:

"Before October 1991 (the actual date of D. Dudaev's rise to power) Chechnya's population was over 1 million persons including 744,500 Chechens (57.8%); 229,500 Russians (23.1%); 21,000 Ukrainians; 15,000 Armenians; 10,000 Nogayans; 6,000 Tartars and other nationalities.

In 1992-1994, as a result of a determined policy of forcing out the representatives of the non-title nation and the flight of the Chechen intellectuals to other entities of the Russian Federation about 250,000 persons left Chechnya. Out of this number 83,400 inhabitants (in 1992 - 21,588; 1993 - 39,823; 1994 - 22,008) were officially registered as internally displaced persons.

In 1995-1996, 53,700 more persons were registered as internally displaced (in 1995 - 33,769; 1996 -19,922). In the consecutive years the outflow from Chechnya continued. 32,849 inhabitants were registered as internally displaced persons (in 1997 - 15,160; 1998 - 13,007; in the first half of 1999 - 4,682). The actual number of those who have fled Chechnya was much higher since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence.

The Chechen population of Chechnya as of September 1999 was about 650,000 persons but for social, economic and other reasons about 50% of the Chechen inhabitants were practically permanently residing beyond the Republic's territory i.e. under 350,000 Chechens were actually living in the Chechen Republic.

The Chechen 'diaspora' in other regions of Russia reaches today 500,000 persons, including up to 250,000 in Moscow.

According to some estimates, the Russian population in Chechnya accounts now for no more than 20,000 persons i.e. has reduced 10 times as compared to 1991."

COE 23 January 2001, para. 5:

Other neighbouring regions, namely the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya, the Republic of Dagestan and the Stavropol region accommodate in total approximately 10 000 people displaced after the recent conflict. However, certain areas have been accommodating large numbers of Chechen IDPs since 1992. According to the Russian official figures, as many as 300 000 ethnic Russians have left the Chechen Republic since 1992. For example, in the Stavropol region alone, the number amounts to 76 000 people. The delegation visited some settlements of Russian IDPs from Chechnya in the area of Budennovsk constructed with the assistance of local communities. The Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration. Undoubtedly, living conditions in these settlements are much better than those in IDP camps and the majority of IDPs have been successfully integrated into the local communities. Many of them have found employment.

Federal Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, June 2001:

Internally displaced persons registered as "forced migrants":

"131,340 IDPs currently hold the forced migrant status, as of June 2001. 810 percent of them have been displaced from Chechnya, mostly as a result of the first 1994-96 Chechnya. Other have been displaced from other republics in northern Caucasus, mainly Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The IDPs ex-Chechnya are spread all over the Russian Federation, but most have settled in the North-Caucasus District; IDPs with forced migrant status from Prigorodny district of North-Ossetia are mainly in Ingushetia (14,158 persons as of June 2001)."

Statistical sources

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

IDPs living outside Chechnya and Ingushetia (2007)

- IDPs from Chechnya living in Stavropol Krai, Voronezh, Tver, Orenburg
- IDPs fled to Stavropol Krai since they had relatives or friends already living there
- The Federal Migration Service made some attempts to relocate IDPs to other regions of Russia
- IDPs are reluctant to travel beyond Ingushetia to areas where they are not welcome

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"In the Centers of Temporary Accommodation (CTA) for internally displaced persons from Chechnya in Tambov, Voronezh, Tver, and Orenburg Regions about 1,000 people have the forced migrant status."

Кавказский Узел, 4 декабря 2006 г.:

"Главным фактором размещения в [Ставропольском] крае и по его территории явились родственные связи: "родственники, друзья, жившие на данной территории или выехавшие вместе". Число мигрантов, намеренных остаться на постоянное жительство в крае увеличилось. Но решение "остаться здесь", скорее, вынужденно, часто сопровождаемое чувством обреченности, неуверенности.

Процесс интеграции по своим причинам и установкам переселенцев на оседлость в крае представляется согласно исследованию как вынужденный."

Кавказский узел, 6 апреля 2007г.:

"5 апреля вынужденным переселенцам из Чечни, проживающим в поселке Иноземцево (Ставропольский Край) передана гуманитарную помощь..."

UNHCR, February 2003, para. 29:

"In view of the overcrowded situation in Ingushetia, the Federal Migration Services (FMS) made some attempts, in 1999 and 2000, to relocate some IDPs to other regions of the Federation. Several hundred families thus voluntarily relocated to existing temporary accommodation centres in Tambov and Saratov regions, with the FMS covering transport costs (vouchers with train tickets were provided by the FMS). At the end of November 2002, some 573 persons were still being accommodated in various [Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs)] run by the Federal Migration Service (mainly in Tambov, Saratov and Moscow region). While originally the FMS intended to relocate more IDPs to other regions in central Russia, this project has not been as successful as the federal authorities expected. Firstly, most of the concerned regions do not have any sizeable Chechen community and were not enthusiastic with the prospect of having to provide accommodation to Chechen IDPs. Secondly, the Chechen IDPs themselves wish to remain close to their homes in Chechnya and are reluctant to travel beyond Ingushetia to regions where they are not welcome."

Displaced more than once: IDPs had to move several times since 1999 (2004)

- A 2004 Médecins sans Frontières study showed that the majority of IDPs respondents moved 2 to 5 times

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

MSF August 2004, p. 31:

"The first time of displacement, as well as the region of origin, is related to the intensity of the conflict. The majority said they were displaced in 1994 or 1999 (Chechnya: 41%, Ingushetia: 54%) implying that they are at least five years displaced. During this time the majority relocated two till five times (Chechnya: 92%, Ingushetia; 82%). The duration and frequency of displaced imply that the groups in both locations are qualified as 'chronically' displaced."

Villagers in mountainous areas forced to seek safety in plains (2007)

- Seven out of Chechnya's 15 districts are partially or totally mountainous or hilly
- About 2,500 people fled mountainous regions to various districts of Chechnya and mainly did so in 2001 and 2002
- Memorial did a survey of 105 families who fled to the plains from 20 mountainous villages in Chechnya, mainly in 2002 though some were displaced as late as 2006
- Extreme violence forced most villagers to leave and seek safety in plains; 25 interviewees had family members wounded, killed or disappeared
- Some mountainous villages have been completely abandoned
- Armed forces suspect mountainous villages to be a hiding place for Chechen fighters

Радио Свобода, 17 марта 2007 г.:

"Чтобы вы имели представление, 7 районов из 15 Чеченской республики частично или полностью входят в горную и предгорную зоны. То есть, естественно, это большая территория, и они не могли, конечно, иммигрировать в одну точку. Возьмем Гудермесский район, они разбросаны по всей Чеченской республике – и в Шелковском районе, и в Наурском районе, и в Гудермесском районе, и в городе.

Самый массовый поток населения был с гор на равнину в 2002 году. И в 2003 году только начали выдавать хлеб по линии миграционной службы, составлялись списки и выдавали. Вот только там был какой-то учет этих людей. А потом расформировали районные отделы миграционной службы, и абсолютно с тех пор никакого учета этих людей не ведется. Поэтому сказать, что такое-то количество ВПЛ, мы не можем. Но мы собираем сведения у местных жителей, которые говорят, к примеру, что в трех селах Чурчали до 2002 года было более 200 жилых домов и более 800 семей."

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"Обследование проводилось в местах массового расселения беженцев из горных сел: нескольких селах Гудермесского района: в селах. Ойсхара (13 семей), Верхний Нойбера (12), Нижний Нойбера (29), Гордали-Юрт (9), Кади-Юрт (6), Иласхан-Юрт (15) Гудермесского района, в самом Гудермесе (6) , а также в ст. Ильинская Грозненско-сельского района (14)[...]

Итак, нам удалось посетить 105 семей, выселившихся на равнину из 20 горных сел Чечни: из 10 сел Веденского района (Дарго, Тазен-Кала, Джани-Ведено, Гуни, Эрсеной Гезенчу,

Шерды-Мохк, Верхние, Средние и Нижние Курчали), 3 сел Курчалоевского (Хеди-Хутор, Эникале, Белты) и 7 сел Ножай-Юртовского района (Гордали, Бас-Гордали, Верхние Гордали, Гансолчу, Турти-Хутор, Малые Шуани, Хашты-Мохк). Почти 70% опрошенных составили выходцы из 6 сел: Тазен-Кала, Гезенчу, Шерды-Мохк, В.Курчали, С.Курчали и Гансолчу [...]

Во всех случаях (за единичными исключениями) выезд был связан с проведением так называемой «контррерористической операции». Большинство беженцев говорило о причинах выезда односложно и практически одно и то же: «обстрелы, зачистки». Различия в формулировках обусловлены в основном наличием специфического личного опыта (обычно трагического). Приведу часть более развернутых ответов о причинах выезда, хотя, по правде говоря, хотелось бы выписать их все. Эпиграфом к этой части доклада могут служить слова одного из жителей села Средние Курчали: «Никакого закона не было, находились между молотом и наковальней» [...]

Об уровне насилия по отношению к жителям горных сел свидетельствует тот факт, что 25 из 105 опрошенных сообщили о наличии убитых, раненых и пропавших без вести в своей семье, в том числе 7 семей заявили о 10 убитых, 14 семей – о 19 случаях похищения близких родственников, 12 опрошенных – о 17 членах семьи, получивших ранения. При этом специально вопрос об этом не задавался, так что в действительности число такого рода событий, видимо, было больше. Что касается избиений и издевательств со стороны военных, то, судя по рассказам беженцев, через это прошло практически все взрослое мужское население горных сел, - по крайней мере, тех, откуда выехали наши собеседники [...]

Большинство опрошенных - 66 из 102 (в 3 случаях время выезда не указано) - покинули свои села в 2002 г. Видимо, именно в это время насилие по отношению к населению этих сел достигло запредельного уровня. Некоторые села тогда полностью опустели (Гансолчу, три села Курчали, Гезенчу, Ширды-Мохк). Однако, и в последующие годы исход из горных сел, хотя и в значительно меньшем масштабе, продолжался. Трое из опрошенных нами беженцев покинули свои дома в 2006 г. Две семьи, выехавшие в конце 2006 г. из с. Гордали Ножай-Юртовского района, так объяснили причины своего переезда на равнину:

· «Дом разрушен, негде жить. И сейчас иногда бывают перестрелки и зачистки. До второй войны в селе было больше 100 дворов, сейчас в два раза меньше. Школа работает, а фельдшера нет. Глава администрации живет здесь /то есть на равнине/, в своем селе бывает наездами. Двух глав администраций, которые работали до него, убили неизвестные».

· «Волки подрали весь скот. Ружья для их отстрела держать не разрешают».

Одна из опрошенных семей выехала из с. М.Шуани Ножай-Юртовского района по причинам, не связанным с боевыми действиями. В этом селе в разгар войны опустело 80 домов, в мае 2006 г. из-за наступления оползня жители оставшихся 64 домов в течение суток были эвакуированы МЧС."

IWPR, 16 August 2006:

"Memorial reported that in 2002, two and a half thousand people from mountain villages in southeastern Chechnya were uprooted by fighting. However, because these people were displaced within Chechnya itself, their plight has not been dealt with by the republic's migration department [...]

The mountain villagers are mostly forced to live with relatives or in makeshift accommodation in other parts of Chechnya [...]

"In Nozhai-Yurt, Vedeno and Kurchaloi regions many villages have been deserted," said Khazmat Gadayev, who comes from one of Chechnya's mountain settlements. "The federal soldiers are

driving people out of the mountains on purpose. The village of Alkhazurovo was recently surrounded - they spent three to four days carrying out a 'mop up' operation there. They do it on purpose, to keep people in a state of fear. But people are sick and tired of war.'"

IWPR 17 February 2005:

"Usum-Kotar is situated close to a forest, making it vulnerable to Russian air or artillery strikes. The Russian military is suspicious of forested mountain areas in the south, which it believes are used as hiding places by guerillas loyal to rebel Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, warlord Shamil Basayev, and other commanders.

'Since the war began in the autumn of 1999, the Russians have been constantly bombing and shelling the mountain gorges and forest both in our district and across southern Chechnya. They're still doing it,' said Usumov.

'The locals were forced to flee, fearing for their own lives and those of their next of kin. Any village can be targeted at any time. Russian soldiers can break into your home any time, kill or kidnap you or your family members, and then vanish without a trace and no one will catch the perpetrators.'

[...]

Human rights activists have compiled an incomplete list of more than 20 villages that have been wholly or partially abandoned because of the conflict.

[...]

Memorial's Baisayev said, 'The exodus from the foothills and mountains peaked in 2001 and continued through 2002, when the cruellest mop-up raids were carried out.'

' These villages were subjected to the most inhuman treatment. Soldiers rampaged through the communities again and again, breaking into homes, and taking people away. All this was accompanied by incessant shelling and bombing. Villagers had no choice but to flee to more peaceful places on the plains.'

Many ordinary Chechens believe the Russian military is pursuing a coordinated policy to drive people out of the mountains as a way of undermining the rebels' support base.

'This theory was prompted by a certain document, which appeared on the internet at the beginning of the second Chechen War,' said Baisayev. 'The document, allegedly adopted by Russia's Security Council, called for all mountain villages between Bamut and Dargo to be liquidated,' he said.

The line between the two villages cuts across the map of Chechnya from west to east.

'The provenance of that document may be questionable, but subsequently, it was communities south of that line that were targeted in particularly heinous raids, forcing the locals to migrate to the plains,' he said.

Most recently, Russian federal troops launched a bomb and rocket attack on a forested area close to the village of Zumsoi on January 14-16. Memorial activists later established that the home of local resident Mahmud Tamayev was destroyed, and that three more locals had been taken away by soldiers. In the 'mop-up' raid that followed, federal soldiers allegedly stole cash and valuables from many homes. A similar attack happened in October 2003, and of the village's 56 homesteads, only 15 are now still inhabited.

Second Lieutenant Vladimir Yerofeev of the Russian security services insists there is no

coordinated policy to make the residents of mountain villages leave."

Для более подробной информации, обратитесь к статье ""Кормильцы боевиков" стали бомжами," Чеченское Общество, 7 августа 2007 г.

Elderly in Chechnya taken to old age home in North Ossetia (2007)

- Starting in 2000, some IDPs from Chechnya were housed in old age home in North Ossetia, though according to IDPs they were not given an option of where to settle
- Only 5 such IDPs were living in the home in 2007
- One elderly woman lost her apartment ownership documents, passport and work-record book during a grenade attack in 2000
- She has not received any compensation for the apartment she lost, she still does not have a passport, and she does not receive a pension for her 31 years of work

Prague Watchdog and Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 6 February 2007:

"Притеречная участковая больница расположена в Моздокском районе Северной Осетии. Это здание, в котором расположен 3-й пост сестринского ухода, где ухаживают за больными стариками, по-местному называют «стардомом». Сюда же в 2001 году поселили чеченских беженцев, искавших себе убежище от войны в соседних республиках и наше дшихкров в небольшой сельской больнице. А теперь в этих стенах им предстояло доживать свой недолгий век.

Как рассказала старшая медсестра Притеречной участковой больницы Людмила Суконцева, в 2001 году их было более 20 человек, позже некоторых перевезли в другие старческие дома, а некоторые со временем умерли. Сейчас осталось всего пять человек.

С 2000 года 68-летняя Неля Исагулова живет в этой больнице. Во время второй военной кампании в Чечне ей пришлось оставить свой дом и бежать, как она говорит, «искать счастья» в соседних республиках. Тогда-то и начались ее скитания. Со слезами на глазах женщина рассказала свою грустную историю. «В январе 2000 года в наш дом попала ракета, у меня сгорели все документы: домовая книга на квартиру, паспорт, трудовая книжка. Потом я ушла в Старую Сунжу». В январе 2001 года ее с другими беженцами сотрудники МЧС вывезли в село Знаменское и разместили в лагере для вынужденных переселенцев.

Неля Исагулова пробыла в лагере всего лишь месяц, здесь она заболела воспалением легких. 17 февраля администрация села Знаменское сообщила всем русскоязычным беженцам, что их повезут в Северную Осетию, при этом не разъяснила, куда именно. Только по прибытии в Притеречное Исагулова узнала, что ей предстоит жить в доме для престарелых. «Я была возмущена. Я еще не старая, чтобы меня в «стардом» определять. Могу сама за собой смотреть. Но меня никто не спрашивал» [...]

В Грозном Неля Исагулова прожила 40 лет, из них 24 года проработала на химическом заводе, а затем на базе хлебопродуктов. Ее квартира находилась в 4м микрорайоне по улице Ионисиани, где она до сих пор прописана. Компенсацию за утраченное жилье и имущество так и не получила, поскольку не сохранилось документов. У Нели Исагуловой до сих пор нет паспорта, она не может получить даже минимальную пенсию, хотя ее трудовой стаж насчитывает 31 год [...]"

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical safety and personal liberty

Ill-treatment in detention in Chechnya (2007)

- Torture and ill-treatment in detention in Chechnya are systematic, according to Human Rights Watch
- Such treatment is mainly used by law enforcement officials and security agencies in order to gain a confession, which is later used in court
- Ill-treated still affected by this traumatising
- Investigations into unlawful treatment during detention are ineffective
- Material conditions of detention reportedly on par with detention centres in the rest of Russia
- Government of Russia maintains there are no unofficial places of detention in Chechnya, though Memorial, Human Rights Watch and International Helsinki Federation argue otherwise

AI, 30 November 2006:

"Amnesty International Danish Medical Group's report documents that the extensive use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment takes place in Chechnya.

The Danish medical assessment thereby confirms the numerous reports from organizations all over the world, which for years have described the extent of torture and other human rights violations committed particularly by the Russian rulers - and to a lesser extent by ethnic Chechens - against Chechens in Chechnya.

The abuse took place between 1995 and 2005 and the torturers typically used torture methods that did not leave scars, such as psychological torture and near asphyxiation.

All 21 Chechens that were examined had been beaten with rifle butts and plastic bottles, among other things. 15 witnessed the torture of their fellow prisoners, 14 were threatened directly and indirectly, and 13 were handcuffed for prolonged periods of time. 11 were subjected to electric torture. 9 experienced near asphyxiation whereby among other things a gasmask was placed over their heads and the oxygen supply shut off until they fainted. 7 had to undergo mock execution and 5 were subjected to sexual torture just to name a few of the most frequently used torture methods.

The examined Chechens are today visibly affected by their traumatization and several of them fulfill WHO's criteria for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is a typical result of severe trauma such as torture."

COE, 13 March 2007:

"Since February 2000, the CPT has carried out numerous visits to the Chechen Republic. On the basis of its visit reports, the Committee has sought to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Russian authorities. On two occasions, in July 2001 and July 2003, the CPT felt obliged to have resort to its power to make a public statement*, in view of the failure to improve the situation in

the light of the Committee's recommendations. Almost four years later, that stage has regrettably been reached once again.

The most recent CPT visits to the Chechen Republic were organised in April/May and September 2006. The Committee found that in some respects – notably as regards material conditions of detention - there had been definite progress. Moreover, no allegations were received of ill-treatment of prisoners by staff of the penitentiary establishments visited.

However, the CPT remains deeply concerned by the situation in key areas covered by its mandate. Resort to torture and other forms of ill-treatment by members of law enforcement agencies and security forces continues, as does the related practice of unlawful detentions. Further, from the information gathered, it is clear that investigations into cases involving allegations of ill-treatment or unlawful detention are still rarely carried out in an effective manner; this can only contribute to a climate of impunity."

COE, 6 March 2007:

"Thomas Hammarberg [Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe] shared the information he received when visiting the prison of Grozny. Through his conversations with the inmates, he became increasingly convinced of the existence of the use of torture and ill-treatment by the law enforcement agents, whether republican or federal, during the investigative proceedings. According to detainees, undue pressure and torture are a widespread practice used to obtain admission on guilt. These depositions are then used as a basis for the handing down of court judgments.

"I got the impression that torture and ill-treatment are widespread in Chechnya. This undermines justice. If one is coerced into telling a lie and the court takes the deposition into account, this perverts the whole judicial system. Such practices must come to an end immediately", declared the Commissioner.

The Commissioner wishes that the procuratura and the representatives of civil society carry out frequent unannounced control visits in order to extract from the perpetrators of torture their feeling of utter impunity. In this struggle for legality, a lot depends on the leadership of the law enforcement agencies at all levels. They must encourage their subordinates to respect the law and bring the guilty to justice relentlessly."

COE, 15 March 2006:

"I [Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe] consequently began this last visit to Chechnya at the prison of Chernokosovo, whose immediate closure I had requested during my first visit in December 1999, at the height of the conflict, so ghastly had I found the conditions there shortly after its recapture from the Chechen authorities. The prison was not closed, but it has undergone significant improvements, so that today, the material conditions do not compare unfavorably to those I have observed elsewhere in the Federation.

The detainees I met with in private maintained that they were not ill-treated in the centre itself, but that it was not infrequent at the moment of their arrest and prior to their transfer to the facility.

Herein lay my interest in visiting the centre. Aware of such allegations prior to my visit, and the continuing pattern of disappearances, my concern was publicly to emphasise the importance of conducting law enforcement operations with the framework of the rule of law – such that all persons suspected of committing serious crimes be held in custody and transferred on remand to an official detention centre with the full respect for their rights and the guarantees enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and Federal Russian law."

HRW, 13 November 2006:

"While statistics on the scale of illegal detention and torture in Chechnya are unavailable, our research, taken together with that of the Memorial Human Rights Center and Nizhnii Novgorod Committee against Torture—two Russian human rights nongovernmental organizations—strongly suggests that torture and ill-treatment in detention in Chechnya are systematic.

In the majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch, pro-Moscow Chechen forces under the effective command of Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov—known as “Kadyrovtsy”—were responsible for the abuses; we also documented torture by personnel of the Second Operational Investigative Bureau (ORB-2) of the North Caucasus Operative Department of Chief Directorate of the Federal Ministry of Interior in the Southern Federal District.

Torture and other forms of ill treatment by ORB-2 personnel appear aimed at coercing confessions from detainees, which then lead to fabricated criminal charges and court convictions. Kadyrovtsy, by contrast, resort to such treatment to secure incriminating information about rebel forces from detainees whom they subsequently release or force to join their ranks. They have also taken hostage and mistreated relatives of alleged rebel fighters [...]

In the majority of cases we documented, victims of unlawful detention and torture were young males. We also documented a number of cases where the victims were women, elderly, disabled people, and minors, the youngest of whom was 13 years old.

Methods of torture used against the detainees include prolonged beatings, often with boots, sticks, plastic bottles filled with water or sand, and heavy rubber-coated cables; inflicting of burns with open fire or red-hot metal rods and wires, and widespread use of electric shocks. In addition, a number of interviewees told Human Rights Watch about psychological pressure, such as threats or imitation of execution or sexual abuse, as well as threats to harm their relatives [...]

ORB-2 was established in 2002 and formally charged with detecting, preventing and suppressing actions by organized criminal groups [...]

The ORB-2 holding cells were finally formally “legalized” as a temporary holding facility (IVS) in November 2004 by an internal order of the Ministry of Interior, but operational investigative bureaus do not figure in a supposed comprehensive list—contained in the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the Detention of Suspects and Accused Persons—of facilities authorized to hold detainees.

Human Rights Watch interviewed several dozen people who were detained and tortured at ORB-2 premises between 2004 and 2006, as well as their relatives and lawyers; they consistently told of ORB-2 personnel coercing confessions under brutal ill-treatment and torture; denying detainees access to lawyers of their choice; preventing medical documentation of signs of torture by denying access to doctors and keeping detainees in custody until the signs of torture fade and, if suspects sought to renounce their coerced confessions after they were transferred to remand custody, subjecting them to further ill-treatment as punishment and to force them to stand by the original statements.

In cases we researched, ORB-2 personnel seized persons, usually young males, from their homes, places of work, or the streets without identifying themselves or providing a warrant or any explanation. They then brought the detainees to the ORB-2 temporary detention facility and immediately started interrogating them.

In almost all cases, the detention was officially registered only after several days. During this time detainees’ families had no information on their relatives’ whereabouts, and the ORB-2 personnel interrogated the detainees in the absence of a lawyer, or with the participation of a lawyer appointed by ORB-2 personnel. According to the interviewees, the appointed lawyers ignored

their complaints about torture—although they saw the torture marks on their clients' bodies—and instead encouraged them to accept the charges.

During interrogations, ORB-2 personnel subjected the detainees to severe beatings, torture with electric shocks, suffocation, and threats or imitation of sexual violence. Most interviewees told Human Rights Watch that during these interrogations, which lasted for many hours, they were forced to confess to serious crimes, such as multiple murders or terrorist attacks, as well as to name other people allegedly involved with the rebel movement. In some cases, the confession had been prepared beforehand by the interrogators and contained exact dates, places, and identities of the victims. In other cases, the detainees themselves had to “choose” a crime and invent details that the interrogators would then record.

Once the confession was obtained and signed, the detainee was kept in the ORB-2 temporary detention facility for several days or sometimes weeks to allow any signs of torture, such as bruises or burns, to fade. The investigators would then transfer the accused to the remand prison (SIZO-1) in Grozny, where they stayed until and during trial.⁶

Several interviewees told Human Rights Watch that after being transferred to the SIZO, they complained to their lawyers or investigators about being tortured by ORB-2 personnel and tried to renounce their confession. They were then brought back to ORB-2, where the personnel would beat and abuse them with greater severity, forcing them to revert to their prior statements. Some interviewees said their lawyers often advised them to just accept the charges, believing this to be the only way to protect them from further abuse.

While initially detainees were usually charged with serious crimes, these charges were often dropped before or at trial. In the majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the charges were eventually reduced to “organization of or participation in illegal armed formations” or “unlawful possession or transfer of weapons” (articles 208 and 222 of the Russian criminal code) [...]

Kadyrov's units hold and torture detainees in premises that are not lawful places of detention. The detention has no legal framework, and detainees cannot exercise their rights guaranteed by Russian and international law, including access to lawyers or medical professionals. In the vast majority of cases, the family has no information of the detainee's whereabouts, unless they manage to obtain it through personal contacts with Kadyrov's forces.

In most cases, people detained by these forces are released without any formal charges brought against them—they are simply warned to keep complete silence about their ordeal unless they want to face even harsher consequences.

In some cases Kadyrov's forces use short-term, unlawful detention and torture to obtain information that could be useful in their counterterrorism operations against Chechen rebels. In others, torture is used to punish or intimidate families whose relative has joined the rebel movement (even if the relative had been killed, arrested, or surrendered to the authorities), people who sought justice for abuses by Kadyrov's forces, and individuals suspected of collaborating with Chechen rebels.

In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch, Kadyrov's forces also held former or active rebel fighters, but instead of prosecuting them forced them, under torture and threats of execution, to join their ranks. Finally, in a large number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch and other organizations, Kadyrov's forces seized and ill-treated, including through torture, relatives of rebel fighters and kept them hostage in order to force such rebels to surrender.

Human Rights Watch obtained detailed descriptions of at least 10 unlawful detention facilities—for the most part bases or private houses owned or used by regional commanders loyal to Kadyrov — in towns and villages throughout Chechnya. They include at least two different bases located in Kadyrov's home village of Tsentoroi; the ATC headquarters in the city of Gudermes; ATC bases in the villages of Tsotsin-Yurt, Mairtup, Geldagen, Novogroznyi, and Avtury; and facilities run by the Oil Protection Unit in Grozny and the village of Jalka.

Most detainees whom Human Rights Watch interviewed spent from several days to several weeks in detention. Those detained as hostages to compel the surrender of their relatives were held considerably longer, sometimes for many months. For example, seven relatives of Aslan Maskhadov were tortured at the Tsentoroi base, where they were held for six months, from early December 2004 to late May 2005.¹⁷

With very few exceptions, all interviewees who were detained by Kadyrov's forces told Human Rights Watch that they had been brutally tortured. The most common methods of torture they described were the use of electric shocks and beatings through punching, kicking and the use of clubs. Victims, interviewed separately, consistently described the administration of electric shocks through a portable device with a handle for producing electricity and wires that the torturers attached to the victims' fingers, toes, ears, or other body parts."

UN CAT, 21 November 2006:

"Mr. Goltayev [Government of the Russian Federation]: There were no unofficial places of detention in the Chechen Republic. The Government immediately investigated any reports of the existence of such places, but to date it had not been able to identify a single one [...]

Ms. Gaer, [UN] Country Rapporteur:

She had difficulty accepting the delegation's affirmation, in response to the allegations of detentions leading to disappearances, that such disappearances were the work of criminal groups disguised as law enforcement officials, and that there were no secret places of detention in Chechnya. In that case, she would have expected specific investigations to be under way. The relevant cases that had been heard by the European Court of Human Rights had all followed a similar pattern, starting with individuals being seen in - apparently genuine - military custody, and often ending with bodies being found in mass graves. That did not suggest a series of random incidents. She would welcome the delegation's comments on the recent report issued by Human Rights Watch that documented 82 cases of persons being held in 10 unlawful detention centres in Chechnya, namely private houses."

IHF, 12 May 2006:

"Now, in the seventh year of the armed conflict, many illegal places of detention still exist in the Chechen Republic. Most of them are run by forces operating under Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov (so-called "Kadyrovtsy"). One reason for this parallel penitentiary system is to obtain "confessions" and "testimonies" through cruel beatings and torture, which subsequently can lead to the official detention and persecution of the respective persons. A high number of such criminal cases are fabricated.

In the village Tsentoroy (Khosiy-Yurt), where the "Kadyrovtsy" headquarters is located, there are at least two illegal prisons functioning.

- One consists of concrete bunkers or boxes, and kidnapped relatives of armed Chechen fighters - parents, wives, brothers or even children - are held there as hostages.
- The second prison in Tsentoroy is evidently located in the yard - or in immediate vicinity - of the house of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Some of the other illegal prisons run by the "Kadyrovtsy" are:

- the premises of the "anti-terrorist centre" (ATC) in Gudermes

- the premises of the “anti-terrorist centre” (ATC) in Geldagan (Kurchaloevsky district)
- the premises of the “anti-terrorist center” (ATC) in Urus-Martan: in the buildings of the former RAIPO in the city center and in the building that used to belong to the regional Selkhoztehnika association opposite school nr 7
- the “anti-terrorist centre” in the western suburb of Avtury (Shalinsky district)
- the buildings occupied by the so-called “oil regiment” in Grozny’s Yuzhnaya street
- the base of a subdivision of the “oil regiment” in the Dzhalka village in the Gudermes region
- another “oil regiment” house, being opposite the house of their commander Adam Delimkhanov
- the base of PPSM-2 in Grozny next to the building of the ‘RTS Microrayon’
- the buildings of a technical college in the 12th district of the Oktyabrski region of Grozny
- in Achkhoy-Martan

The battalions “Vostok” (“East”) and “Zapad” (“West”), being part of the 42nd Mechanized Infantry Division of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), also use their premises as illegal prisons.

- premises of the battalion “Vostok” in Gudermes, on the territory of the former company PMK-6 (till spring 2006, “Vostok” had an additional premise in a food factory)
- premises of the battalion “Zapad” in the Staropromyslovski district of Grozny (till spring 2006 “Zapad” was based in the Transmash Factory); plus the territory of a subunit of them in the south-eastern part of Urus-Martan

The summary special groups (SSG) of the FSB of the Russian Federation, located in different districts of the republic, also run unlawful places of detention, inter alia in the following places:

- the premises of a former private enterprise in the outskirts of Katyr-Yurt village (Achkhoy-Martan district)
- a mill near the village Starye Atagi (Groznsky rural district)

The premises of a former food factory between the villages of Avtury and Geldagan also serve as a secret prison, run by a federal structure, but it is not clear which structure.

The main military base of the Russian army in Chechnya, Khankala, seems not any longer to be the major place, where illegally persons are kept.

Even official places for detention, like the temporary detention facility (IVS) at the republican and district level, are used as illegal places of detention, where the presence of several of its detainees are not properly registered. Kidnapped people are kept there, and beatings, torture and extrajudicial executions are perpetrated there as well. The legalization of ORB-2 - the Operational-Search Bureau of the North Caucasus Operative Department of the Chief Department of the Russian Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Southern Federal District, and opening of several ORB-2 sub-offices is disputed, as it opposes Russian federal law. There are confirmed reports that kidnapped persons are still being brought there and that it is still a place where torture is used systematically [...]

The summary special groups (SSG) of the FSB of the Russian Federation, located in different districts of the republic, also run unlawful places of detention. For example, in the Achkhoy-Martan district, based in the premises of a former private enterprise in the outskirts of Katyr-Yurt village, it is servicemen of this group that act as “death squads”. In the Groznensky rural district they use a mill near the village Starye Atagi. Both these places are of bad renown among Chechens. Suspected fighters are brought there, tortured and summarily executed. Local human rights NGOs are not aware of any cases where suspects, who had been brought there, were put to court trial afterwards, but they are aware of many extrajudicial executions perpetrated by the servicemen of these troops.

Kidnapping victims are also taken to the former food factory between the villages of Avtury and Geldagan, run by federal structures. The anti-terror center of the Shalinski region is now stationed there."

Memorial 16 May 2007:

"OSB-2 is located in Grozny, but there are a number of branches in other regions of Chechnya. They keep people who are arrested and detained in the local branches of OSB-2. According to the legal code of the Russian Federation, people who are detained and arrested cannot be kept in OSB-2.³ This legal norm was broken and they created a temporary detention facility, in violation of the legal code.⁴

We know of cases when people who were kidnapped were then "legalized" in OSB-2. After a day or two, or several weeks, these missing persons suddenly appeared in OSB-2s, as officially arrested. The employees of the ministry of domestic affairs and of the prosecutor's office either totally denied that these were cases of kidnapping, or claimed that the missing person was kidnapped by "unknown kidnappers" and then right after his release, he was arrested by the employees of OSB-2.

On no grounds can the existence of this unlawful Temporary Detention Facility (TDF) be justified or given any logical explanation, unless we consider that they needed to create special conditions in order to pressure the detained and arrested people (for example, by torture), in order to coerce the detainees into giving the "necessary" evidence. There are also some arrested people, mostly accused of crimes related to terrorism, who are transferred from lawful detention facilities to OSB-2 on a regular basis. They are usually kept for longer than 10 days, and there the investigators of the prosecutor's office conduct interrogations. Their attorneys complain, because during the interrogation the employees of OSB-2 are constantly present. When the attorneys ask OSB employees to leave the room where the accused is being interrogated, these employees usually answer with a rude refusal. Some attorneys also reported that when the interrogator of the prosecutor's office would leave, OSB-2 employees would start directly threatening them, reminding them about kidnappings and disappearances of a number of attorneys in the Chechen Republic in recent years. The attorneys noticed that during such interrogations, the evidence given by the accused sounded as if they were texts that the detainees had learned by heart, and that the OSB-2 employees who were present closely followed the words of the interrogated person. OSB-2 employees use all possible means to prevent private meetings of the accused with their attorneys. After the arrested person is transferred from OSB-2 back into the detention facility of Grozny, he or she usually reports to his/her attorney that it was impossible to give evidence that would be different from what the OSB-2 employees had forcefully suggested (the detainees reported that they were threatened with violence, if they were to say something different). Because the accused person remains on the territory of OSB-2 after the interrogation, the employees of OSB-2 taking part in investigating the crime have unlimited opportunities to coerce the person in to giving the "necessary" evidence- if they beat and torture their detainees, these detainees can be held long enough to cover up the evidence of physical abuse.

If the accused person were immediately transferred back to the (lawful) temporary detention facility, or even after the maximum possible period of 10 days, then it would be a lot more difficult to conceal the traces of tortures and beatings. However, people are often kept in OSB-2 for several months, until they give the investigators all of the "necessary" evidence, and until the traces of the tortures disappear."

Abductions decreasing in Chechnya (2007)

- Abductions in Chechnya believed to be committed by government officials and rebels
- They lead to unlawful detention, murder and disappearances, as well as the abducted being freed
- Government established database to register reported abductions in Chechnya
- Government officials and human rights activists have noted a decrease in abductions in Chechnya; Memorial attributes this to an order given by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov to stop abducting people
- Criminal cases lodged for some abductions; results largely inconclusive
- Abductions increasing every year in Dagestan

COE, 21 December 2005:

"Abductions, often followed by the "disappearance" of detainees and the theft or destruction of property at the hands of security forces (Chechen and Federal) are still occurring on a massive scale. On 2 October, at 4 p.m., the house where the Buraev family lived in Grozny was reportedly surrounded by more than one hundred operatives of the Ministry of Defence, the FSB and the Anti Terrorist Center (ATC) from the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny. They all spoke Chechen. At this time, Sazita Buraeva, her daughter Zarema Buraeva, aged 24, and her sons Ali and Baudin, aged 18 and 22, as well as Zarema's two small children (2 and 4 years old) were at home. After entering without introducing themselves, the servicemen made Ali and Baudin Buraev lie on the ground and beat them heavily while swearing. The mother tried to stop them, but the soldiers pointed their weapons at her. After one hour, the commander asked Zarema questions about her deceased husband (killed in April) and then made her follow them through the house. Zarema has not been seen since that moment. The servicemen took Ali and Baudin Buraev with them, "questioning" them, kicking them and beating them with their weapons as they moved toward their vehicles. Ali and Baudin were not able to stand normally after that treatment. When trying to interfere, Sazita was told by a soldier "You should consider yourself lucky not to be executed yourself". This was the last time Sazita saw her sons. Since that day Zarema Buraeva, Baudin Buraev and Ali Buraev remain "disappeared". The servicemen also "confiscated" 9.000 rubles, the TV set, the computer and several other valuables."

COE, 13 March 2007:

"The CPT has received in the past a large number of reports about abductions (forced disappearances) and the related problem of unlawful detention in the Chechen Republic as well as other parts of the North Caucasian region. In the report on its visit in November/December 2004, the Committee called upon the Russian authorities to spare no effort in putting an end to the problem of abductions, and highlighted in this context the need to ensure that no illegal detention facilities are operated in the Chechen Republic. During the 2006 visits, the CPT's delegation sought, but was not able to obtain, specific statistics concerning abductions. However, it is evident from the information at the CPT's disposal that they continue to constitute a troubling phenomenon in the Chechen Republic and in many cases involve an element of unlawful detention.

In the course of the 2006 visits, the CPT's delegation again spoke with a number of persons who gave detailed and credible accounts of being unlawfully held – on occasion for prolonged periods – in places in the Chechen Republic. Frequent reference was made to facilities located in the village of Tsentoroy in the Kurchaloy district, run by armed formations allegedly operating under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov, the present Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic. In certain cases, formal complaints had been lodged with the prosecution services relating to unlawful detention and ill-treatment at Tsentoroy.

The CPT's delegation gained access to Tsentoroy on 2 May 2006, where it visited a compound which was under the control of a company of the 2nd Regiment of the Internal Affairs Patrol-

Sentry Service. The territory of the compound was surrounded by a high wall and comprised, inter alia, barracks, a gymnasium, and a large courtyard. The delegation discovered in particular two secure rooms half-full of wooden boxes of ammunition. Each of the rooms had concrete flooring and a small barred window with no glass pane.

The layout of the compound and, more specifically, the location and internal features of the secure rooms and adjacent ante-room, corresponded closely to descriptions which the delegation had received from persons who alleged that they had been held there (and subjected to various forms of ill-treatment).

At the end of the April/May 2006 visit, the delegation commented that there could be little doubt that persons had been detained in the above facilities in the past and called upon the Russian authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that there was no repetition of such unlawful detentions. The delegation also emphasised the need for thorough and expeditious investigations by the prosecution services into the complaints of which they had been seised involving allegations of unlawful detention and ill-treatment in facilities at Tsentoroy.

The Russian authorities' response of June 2006 was particularly surprising on this issue, it being claimed that "the prosecutor's office had not received any applications or complaints concerning unlawful detention of individuals in Ramzan Kadyrov's private household or in unregistered places of deprivation of liberty". Subsequently, the matter was clarified at the delegation's meeting with the Prosecutor of the Chechen Republic on 5 September; Mr Kuznetsov was adamant that there had been no complaints about unlawful (i.e. unregistered) places of detention at Tsentoroy, but acknowledged that complaints had been lodged of unlawful detention in places at Tsentoroy. The CPT considers that it is not appropriate to split hairs on matters of such importance. As for the complaints in question, the CPT noted that two criminal investigations which had been suspended in late October 2005 had been re-opened, on 4 September 2006 (see also paragraph 49).

Memorial, 1 June 2007:

"То, что еще зимой можно было пытаться объяснить некими «колебанием в пределах статистической погрешности», весной 2007 г. стало уверенной тенденцией. Речь идет о ключевой проблеме Чечни последних лет – проблеме похищений людей представителями силовых органов. В весенние месяцы похищения людей в Чечне практически сошли «на нет», и это впервые подтверждают не только официальные власти, но и правозащитники. В начале мая руководитель ПЦ «Мемориал» Олег Орлов заявил: «Впервые наблюдается резкое снижение числа похищений людей. До сих пор все сообщения такого рода были очень сильно преувеличены властями, но на этот раз это так. Мы, по крайней мере, это отмечаем». По мнению О.Орлова, чтобы решить эту болезненную проблему, властям достаточно было дать указание «силовикам» прекратить практику похищений.

«Мемориал» зафиксировал на территории Чеченской Республики за три весенних месяца 2007 г. похищения четырех человек, из которых двое были затем освобождены похитителями, а двое исчезли. Очевидно, что мы можем отмечать лишь часть таких преступлений. Тем не менее, для сравнения - за аналогичный период прошлого года «Мемориалом» были зафиксированы похищения 85 человек (<http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/misc/razr/12006.htm>).

Правозащитные организации неоднократно отмечали, что в последние годы похищения людей совершали, в основном, сотрудники различных силовых структур, созданных в процессе «чеченизации» конфликта. По всей видимости, в январе 2007 г. им был отдан руководством Чеченской Республики соответствующий приказ, о чем были смутные упоминания в прессе («Газета.Ру», 7.5.2007). И до этого правозащитники не раз указывали, что похищения людей – контролируемый властями процесс. Яркий пример тому – март

2003 года, когда в период подготовки к референдуму по конституции «машина» насильственного исчезновения людей была выключена на целый месяц. Следует отметить, что в тот период ответственность за похищения лежала, прежде всего, на представителях федеральных силовых структур, командированных в Чечню.

С другой стороны, одной из причин этих изменений стали и многолетние усилия правозащитников, обращавших внимание российской и международной общественности на проблему похищений, и неустанно оказывавших давление на федеральные и чеченские власти [...]"

Swisspeace, 23 May 2006:

"Kidnappings and disappearances continue to pose the most serious challenge to human security and remain the key problem of present-day Chechnya. Despite the fact that the overall number of abductions decreased in 2005 this issue remained in the focus of public attention, while reactions by the population to these cases became more vocal. There are grounds to believe that all sides commit these crimes, including members of the Chechen security forces and federal military. To resolve this problem, a special inter-agency commission was established within the republic's administration, a database on cases of disappearances was created, and activities on the search for missing people and the prevention of new abductions were intensified. 2500 cases of kidnappings are currently registered in the database."

UN CAT, 21 November 2006:

"Mr. Goltayev [Government of the Russian Federation]:

[...]Moreover, there had been a drop in the number of abductions in the Chechen Republic from 845 in 2002 to 108 in 2005. Of the total number of persons abducted in 2004 and 2005, 67 were linked to the activities of illegal armed groups. As part of counterterrorist operations, 1,931 criminal investigations relating to the abduction of 2,708 individuals had been initiated and gradual progress was being made in resolving the related cases. In 2005, the Office of the Procurator-General had prosecuted 25 criminal cases relating to abduction, which was twice the figure for 2004. Allegations of abductions and illegal detentions by government personnel were often exaggerated. In general, the victims of abductions were members of organized groups of criminals, abductions were often carried out by persons disguised in official police uniforms and most abducted individuals eventually returned home.

Ms. Belmir, [UN] Alternate Country Rapporteur [...]

In 2004, the European Court of Human Rights had examined 396 cases of abduction in Chechnya; in 24 cases the victims had been found dead while another 175 had disappeared."

RFE/RL, 21 June 2007:

"While the number of abductions reported on Chechen territory has apparently declined, the figure for neighboring Daghestan has increased sharply. At a press conference in Moscow on June 15, members of the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) cited data for southern Russia as a whole, and for Daghestan. That data showed 68 reported abductions in Daghestan in 2006, compared with 12 in North Ossetia, 10 in Ingushetia, and five each in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, kavkaz-uzel.ru reported on June 18. By contrast, there have been nearly 20 abductions in Daghestan "over a very short period" this year, according to MHG chair Lyudmila Alekseeva."

Мемориал, июня 2007 г.:

"Как и прежде, Дагестан содрогается от затяжной межклановой войны, доходящей уже до перестрелок между чиновниками, занимающими высокие посты [...]"

Однако, конфликты чиновников, как правило, вызываются не политической борьбой, а межклановым противостоянием [...]

Проблема похищений людей также актуальна для Дагестана [...]"

ITAR-TASS, 31 May 2007:

"The number of reports on kidnappings of people in Dagestan is rising with every passing year, said republican prosecutor Igor Tkachev at a closed meeting on this problem, which was held by Dagestan President Mukhu Aliev.

"For instance while in 2002, authorities registered 81 reports, in 2006 – already over 150 and during the four months of 2007 – 71 reports on kidnapping of people," the press service of the Dagestan president and the government quoted the prosecutor's words in its statement.

According to Tkachev, "if before 2003, people were abducted by crime families to wrest ransom, starting from 2003, authorities receive up to 50 percent of reports on abductions, connected with kidnapping of young girls for marriage"...

All in all, Dagestan authorities registered 42 cases of kidnapping people between 2001 and 2006 by persons in camouflage uniforms or introducing themselves as officers of secret services. As many as 23 criminal cases were instituted. Incidentally, out of 71 registered reports over the past four months of the current year, people in camouflage uniforms acted only in six cases as abductors. Two criminal cases were instituted in connection with the above facts. "It turned out later that the two cases of abductions were of criminal nature," the prosecutor emphasised.

The greatest number of reports on kidnapping people by persons in camouflage uniforms comes from the city of Khasavyurt and the Khasavyurt district, bordering Chechnya, where 12 criminal cases were started in connection with these facts between 2004-2006."

AI, 23 May 2007:

"According to information available to Amnesty International, by March 2005, 302 criminal cases had been opened into the abduction of civilians in the North Caucasus involving the use of military hardware or sweep operations. The Russian Federation fourth periodic state report to the UN Committee against Torture, considered by the Committee in November 2006, cites 23 criminal cases opened against military personnel for suspected "abduction" under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code.

The results of these official investigations into enforced disappearances have almost without exception been inconclusive. The public prosecutor's office typically opens a criminal investigation, under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code ("abduction"), when they are informed by relatives that someone has been detained or abducted. Thousands of such cases have been opened since 1999. Aslambek Aslakhanov, Adviser to President Putin, reportedly stated in April 2005 that from 1999 to 2004, 1,814 criminal cases had been opened into "the fact of disappearance" of 2,540 people. However, these investigations have, with one exception, never identified those individuals suspected of being responsible; the crimes are attributed to actions by unknown members of armed opposition groups, or unknown state agents [...]"

Memorial, 16 May 2007:

"Kidnappings which often result in untraceable disappearances, are one of the most terrible human rights violations in the Chechen republic. The impossibility to figuring out the destiny of the missing person forces his or her relatives and friends to constantly relive this tragedy in their memories; this makes the relatives and friends very susceptible to the propaganda of the terrorist groups and separatist fighters.

When considering kidnappings in general (including people who were later released) Memorial has information about the kidnapping of 2,018 inhabitants of the Chechen republic, as of 2002. Out of this number, 1,057 went permanently missing.

The monitoring of Memorial covers only 25-30% of the entire territory of Chechnya, and even in the areas covered, our information is probably not comprehensive. So, in order to get the real picture, our numbers should be multiplied from 2-4 times (according to different estimates). The extrapolation of our data and the analysis of the official data gives a similar result. Memorial can claim that the total number of people who went missing during the period of the second Chechen war (since the fall of 1999 until the present) as a result of kidnappings, unlawful arrests, and detentions, is more than 3,000 and it could be as high as 5,000 people. Unfortunately, we cannot give more precise numbers at this point- right now Memorial is working on creating a detailed and comprehensive database of missing persons. In most cases of kidnappings, everything points to the fact that the crime was committed with the help of the representatives of the state, or of the armed forces who are in collaboration with them. 90% of the criminal cases where the legal proceedings were commenced when people were kidnapped are not solved. At the same time, we can note that there is a certain systematic decrease in the number of kidnappings- and it is especially noticeable since 2005.

We suspect that these dynamics are probably connected to the final "chechenization" for the armed conflict and to the predominance of "latent violence" in Chechnya, which is registered neither by the human rights activist, nor, even more so, by the law enforcement bodies. We cannot be certain about how the overall number of kidnappings actually changed; however, the methods and tactics of the power departments have definitely changed: the majority of the kidnappings are committed by the security forces controlled by R. Kadyrov, as well as other local law enforcement authorities. As we have already said above, these structures do not need to murder all the kidnapped Chechnya residents or to make them "disappear" - usually they are able to extract all the necessary information after a few days of torture and beatings. On the other hand, the relatives of kidnapped individuals try to use all means to release them, and often the only way out is ransom; after this, neither the victim, nor his or her relatives complain to any official structures.

Recently, the percentage of people who were kidnapped and then disappeared, or whose corpses were found, has decreased. In 2002, when "mass cleansings" were at their peak, more than 80% of detained people got "lost". It is evident that the responsibility for most of these crimes is on the federal army, police, and special forces. As the process of Chechenization is developing, we observed a gradual decrease in the percentage of missing and murdered people among the kidnapped. This is a decrease of more than 35% over the last 2 years.

The greatest decrease in the number of kidnappings has occurred since January 2007. In our opinion, it is related to the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov gave very definite instructions to the leaders of the armed forces under his control to stop kidnappings. Consequently, most of the kidnappings in 2007 were probably done not by the armed forces but by the employees of OSB-2 or by the employees of the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSI)."

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"With time, as federal forces were taking the Chechen territory under their control and established a network of informants, their tactics changed - they switched from deployment near local communities and blanket "sweeps" to "targeted security operations," where armed, camouflaged and masked people arrived in armored vehicles with painted-over license plates in a local community, broke into specific homes - usually at night - detained and took away some of the occupants. Being more selective did not make them less cruel - the people they detained, or, more precisely, kidnapped, usually disappeared [...]"

People detained by [Chechen President Kadyrov's] troops “disappear” for the rest of the world; they are kept in secret prisons without any records of their detention; they are tortured to force “confessions” underlying fabricated criminal prosecutions. In about half of the cases the kidnapped people disappeared without trace, or their dead bodies were later found.¹⁰² Starting in 2004, threats of violence and hostage-taking against relatives have been widely used to force rebel fighters to surrender [...]

While currently sweep operations” are rare, abductions, “disappearances” and summary executions continue. Now they take place as part or as a result of “targeted security operations” which are not subject to any legal regulation or intentionally unregulated. Attempts to reform investigation and prosecution did not result in practical improvements in terms of preventing or investigating crimes, in particular “disappearances.”

The problem of “disappearances” in Chechnya remains acute. In most cases, people who “disappear” have been kidnapped by uniformed forces, rather than rebel fighters, and recently most of the uniformed kidnapers are locals. Currently we observe a slight decrease in the number of abductions documented by human rights defenders, but this decrease is not as significant as officials claim it to be. Partially, the decrease is due to “Chechenization” of the conflict, and the high latency of violence in the Chechen territory – avoiding documentation by either human rights defenders or law enforcement authorities.

Official data on the number of people who were kidnapped or “disappeared” are contradictory and incomplete.

It is true of general statistics as well. In September 2004, during a visit of the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights to Russia, the Office of the RF Prosecutor General informed him that over the past three years [apparently, since autumn 2001] in Chechnya, a total of 1,749 criminal investigations were launched into abductions of about 2,300 victims. On 13 October 2004, the acting Ombudsman in Chechnya, L. Khasuyev said that “over the last four years [apparently, since autumn 2000], more than 2,500 people have been kidnapped in the Republic.” On 27 December 2004, A. Arsenyev, Head of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in the Southern Federal District, said that “since the start of the anti-terrorist operation [i.e. since autumn 1999] in Chechnya, a total of 2,437 people were abducted and 347 freed by the law enforcement authorities.” In addition, in September 2005, Chechen President A. Alkhanov said that since 2000, a total of 1898 people disappeared. A month later, Head of the Chechen President’s Office for Constitutional Rights N. Nukhazhiev announced 2500 disappearances. In February 107 In November 2005, Memorial surveyed its staff in Chechnya. They found that between May and November 2005, when their staff went to the scene of crimes, victims refused to give information on the abuse they suffered in 30% cases in villages, and in almost 80% cases in the city of Grozny. Very often, all that human rights defenders could do was to document the crime – such as abduction or unlawful detention with subsequent release after a while - without any details.

In 2006, the same N. Nukhazhiev reported a total of 2780 disappearances over the entire period of conflict. However in early 2003, the lists of disappearances maintained by a working group of the Chechen Government contained more than 2800 names - so it almost looks like no one disappeared in Chechnya in three years.

The current official statistics look even less convincing.

Speaking about abductions in 2004, Chechen President A. Alkhanov said, “In 2003 there were 362 abductions. This year [i.e. 2004], 175 facts were reported. ... our measures resulted in 47 persons returned to their homes.” Two months before, the figure of 185 abductions was quoted at

the meeting of the Collegium of the Chechen Interior Ministry. Shortly before, Chechen Minister of Interior R. Alkhanov said that, “over the outgoing year 2004, abductions in Chechnya dropped by 40%.” On 21 January 2005, 168 abductions in 2004 were reported to the Ministry of Interior Collegium, which was supposed to mean that abductions had dropped by half as compared to 2003, where, according to the same official, 440 people were abducted.

Official statistics for 2005 and comparisons with 2004 share the same inconsistency.

In October 2005, President A. Alkhanov said that “since early [2005], a total of 143 abductions have been reported in the republic; whereas last [2004] year, 128 abductions were reported over a comparable period.” Ten days later, he said that “there is a general downward trend for this type of crimes in the republic.” A few days later President Alkhanov clarified that in fact, only 65 people were kidnapped in Chechnya in 2005, while most of the 143 had been kidnapped before, but the crimes were officially reported in the current year.¹¹⁶ In end-December he reiterated, “Abductions are on a downward trend; last year, there were 168 cases, and this year, there are 67 cases.”¹¹⁷ In January, he said, “A total of 77 abductions took place this year, while there were 213 such incidents last year.”

In view of these contradictory statements we are surprised that par. 98 of Russia’s report describes a “computer database created in June – September 2002 and regularly updated, with data on criminal proceedings into abductions and killings over the entire period of the antiterrorist operation”; this database is presented as a major breakthrough in the investigation of these serious crimes.

Data available to human rights defenders on abductions and “disappearances” in Chechnya are far less optimistic - please see below a summary table for 2002 to 2005, provided by Memorial Human Rights Center.:

Table 5. Summary Table on Abductions in the Chechen Republic

Year	Abducted	of them freed or ransomed	of them found dead	of them disappeared	of them under investigation
2002	537	90	81	366	
2003	497	157	52	288	
2004	448	206	24	210	8
2005	316	151	23	127	15
Total	1799	611	180	985	23

..

Enforced disappearances during second military campaign in Chechnya (2007)

- Number of enforced disappearances has decreased in Chechnya, but disappearances continue
- Many families have had more than one member go missing
- Cases may be underreported as victim's families are often reluctant to come forward and report disappearance
- Government has acknowledged extent of problem

- In 2005, Human Rights Watch concluded that enforced disappearances in Chechnya constitute crimes against humanity

AI, 23 May 2007:

"While the number of reported enforced disappearances has decreased, the incidence of "temporary" disappearance, when individuals are arbitrarily detained and held in incommunicado detention, while the authorities deny knowledge of their whereabouts, is high. During the incommunicado detention, the individuals are at very high risk of torture and other ill-treatment, in order to extract a "confession", after which they are transferred to another place of detention where their detention is logged [...]

Enforced disappearances by state agents and abductions by armed groups have been among the most shocking of human rights violations during the Chechen conflict; shocking both because of the scale on which this has taken place in the small republic, and because of the particular cruelty of this form of abuse[...]

In a small republic of around 15,000 km², with a population of less than one million people, it seems that everyone knows someone who has been forcibly disappeared or abducted, and many families have had more than one member go missing [...]

The Russian non-governmental organization (NGO) Memorial has logged over 2,000 individual cases of enforced disappearances and abductions in Chechnya. Its own research is conducted in one-third of the territory of the Chechen Republic, and therefore does not represent the full extent of the violations. Memorial has estimated that in fact, between 3,000 and 5,000 men, women and children have gone missing in the Chechen Republic following what they term as abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions since 1999. In the majority of those cases, state agents were allegedly responsible...

The pervading atmosphere of fear in the region has led to people being increasingly reluctant to come forward, with many families preferring to use unofficial channels to secure the return of their relatives. As a result enforced disappearances and abductions are under-reported. While the reported number of enforced disappearances and abductions has decreased over the past years, such incidents are continuing to take place in Chechnya today.

Russian and Chechen officials have to some extent recognized the scale and gravity of the problem. As of 1 March 2007, up to 2,800 persons were listed as abducted, disappeared and missing in Chechnya, according to the Ombudsperson for Human Rights of the Chechen Republic, Nurdi Nukhazhiev. As of April 2005, the prosecutor's office in Chechnya had opened 1,814 criminal cases into the enforced disappearance or abduction of 2,540 people in Chechnya.

A Commission for the search for abducted and missing persons has been established by the Chechen Parliament. The Commission is chaired by Duvakha Abdurakhmanov, Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, who has stated that the role of the Commission is to assist law enforcement agencies to do their job. He has been cited as telling relatives that the Commission would try to find out the fate of all missing persons by the end of 2007. The Chechen Ombudsperson has raised the issue, calling for a Federal Commission to be established by Presidential decree to tackle the failures in investigations.(3)

Since 1999, Amnesty International has documented dozens of such cases of individuals who were forcibly disappeared or abducted in Chechnya, or in neighbouring regions who are thought to have been taken to Chechnya. Some individuals were subsequently released. In other cases, their bodies were found, bearing signs of a violent death. However, in the vast majority of cases

the whereabouts of the individuals remains unknown and no one has been prosecuted for the crime...

Amnesty International has been following in detail the progress of investigations into dozens of cases of reported enforced disappearances in Chechnya. In each, the public prosecutor's office has opened an investigation but with no discernible results. For all the thousands of instances where individuals have been forcibly disappeared in Chechnya, Amnesty International is aware of only a tiny handful of cases in connection with which a state official has actually been prosecuted – and in no cases has a state official been prosecuted for the enforced disappearance itself.

Scores of people, despairing of finding justice in Russia, have turned to the European Court of Human Rights, but have faced additional intimidation, threats and violations as a result of this step."

HRW, 13 November 2006:

"Continued enforced disappearances in Chechnya are of interest to the committee because they place civilians outside the protection of the law, making them particularly vulnerable to torture. In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch during its recent missions and earlier, relatives of the "disappeared" later found the bodies of their loved ones in unmarked graves or other locations. In most cases, the bodies bore marks of torture.

Some of those detained by Kadyrov's forces later "disappear" without a trace. Based on extensive research, Human Rights Watch concluded in 2005 that enforced disappearances in Chechnya are so widespread and systematic that they constitute crimes against humanity. Memorial documented 316 cases of "abductions" in 2005. Of those, 127 "disappeared" without a trace and 23 were found dead, their bodies bearing marks of execution. While the number of reported cases of "disappearances" decreased in 2006, hundreds of people "disappeared" by Kadyrov's forces remain unaccounted for to date, and Human Rights Watch continued to document new cases of "disappearances," the latest of which took place in September 2006."

Hostage-taking in Chechnya (2006)

- Chechen servicemen take relatives of rebels hostage and keep them in illegal prisons

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"Hostage taking is used by Chechen uniformed personnel, primarily targeting relatives of rebel fighters (IAF members) to force the latter to surrender [...] Hostages are detained in illegal prisons located at deployment camps of Chechen pro-federal uniformed forces."

COE, 21 December 2005:

"Another frightening trend in Chechnya is that of hostage-taking of relatives of suspected rebel fighters in order to force them to give themselves up by threatening their relatives with murder and torture. Since the end of 2004, a growing number of arbitrary detentions, "disappearances" and abductions of family members of suspected rebel fighters has been reported by NGOs.

The most notorious case was the abduction in December 2004 of eight relatives, most of them elderly and in fragile health, of the Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, carried out in the

suburbs of Grozny by unknown armed persons most probably belonging to the so-called "Kadyrovtsy". Seven of them were released on 31 May 2005, after Maskhadov was killed in March. The eighth relative has been charged in connection with participation in an armed group. Officials in Chechnya have denied that they were responsible for the detention of the other seven individuals¹⁹.

Other cases were documented by NGOs. On 5 May 2005, members of security forces of the Chechen Republic reportedly detained three brothers, Adam Sherimbekovich Chersiev, Kureish Sherimbekovich Chersiev and Movla Sherimbekovich Chersiev, at the Oktiabrskoe settlement in the Grozny (rural) district. Relatives of the brothers were informed that the latter were kept as hostages, since one of the members of this family participated in the armed resistance, and that the condition of their release was the fighter giving himself up.

On 10 May 2005, members of security services reportedly detained 70-year-old Maret Usmanova Khutsaeva and her granddaughter Lipa Rashidovna Tsaeva, aged 16 or 17, from their home in the village of Gekhi, Urus-Martan district. The following day the two women returned home, having been released on the condition that Arbi Khutsaev, Maret Khutsaeva's son, give himself up to the authorities, and threatened that otherwise the men would return and detain Maret Khutsaeva again.

Such methods are totally unacceptable criminal acts which must be stamped out by the Federal and Chechen authorities. In this regard I was astounded to learn about the statement of the Russian Federation Prosecutor General Mr Ustinov made during a State Duma's hearing in November 2004, where he suggested taking hostages as a possible measure to fight terrorism. The taking of hostages by any person, terrorist or serviceman cannot be tolerated under any circumstances."

Unlawful killings in Chechnya (2005)

- Cases of unlawful killings in Chechnya by security forces documented by Council of Europe

COE, 21 December 2005:

"As regards unlawful killings of Chechen civilians by alleged members of the security forces, one terrifying case is that of the Arsanukaev family. In the night of 18 October 2005, masked and camouflaged security service personnel, reportedly Chechen-speaking, took away 65-year-old Salman Arsanukaev and his son Khamzat, aged 22, from their home in the village Pobedinskoe, and then killed them. In the evening both corpses, with marks of violent death, were found in a hole outside the village. On 2 October, another son of Salman Arsanukaev, Supian, had been killed in Grozny. Before that, in April, his brother Selim Arsanukaev had been detained and then killed : he was suspected of having murdered the head of administration of the Nadterechnyi district, and was shot dead supposedly when he attempted to escape from the police."

"Zachistki" continue; example of Zumskoi (2005)

- Targeted zachistka in Zumskoi, Chechnya in January 2005
- Village was under aerial attack with rocket and machinegun fire, then military servicemen landed and looted and destroyed property as well as abducted civilians

COE, 21 December 2005:

"Serious human rights abuses are still committed in the course of larger-scale military operation carried out by the federal forces, the so-called "zachistka". On 14-16 January 2005, in the Chechen village of Zumskoi, Itum-Kalinski district, a military operation was reportedly carried out, which involved shelling of the settlement by artillery. On 14 January, the village was subjected to aerial attack; as a result, one house (belonging to Akhmud Tamaev) was levelled to ground, and several other houses were seriously damaged. The same day, troops landed in helicopters, which had previously subjected the village to rocket and machinegun fire, regardless of the fact that there were no combatants in the village and no one resisted the attack. In the village, the military servicemen carried out a mop-up operation with looting, destruction of property and abductions of civilians. Late at night on 14 January the servicemen detained a local resident named Shirvani Nasipov. In the morning of 15 January two other men and a teenage boy were reportedly kidnapped: Magomed Emin Ibishev, Vakha Mukhaev and his 15-year-old son Atabi Mukhaev. They have not been seen since then."

Watch the film [Crying Sun](#), which details the zachistka in Zumskoi.

Insecurity spreads to other areas of North Caucasus (2007)

- Conflict and human rights abuses have spread to other republics in the North Caucasus, including Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria
- Ingushetia: no longer a safe haven for IDPs as collective centre residents subject to passport checks and additional federal troops sent in mid-2007 to counter rebel attacks
- Dagestan: terrorist attacks common and mostly politically motivated and directed at government officials, but civilians often suffer as well
- North Ossetia: tragic hostage-taking at school in Beslan in 2004, subsequent disappearance of ethnic Ingush in addition to Ossetians, no justice to date for victims rises level of tension between Ingush and Ossetians
- Kabardino-Balkaria: deadly armed attack in 2005 followed by call to expel all IDPs from Chechnya

COE, 21 December 2005:

"The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic has unfortunately not improved significantly since the adoption of my last report in October 2004. The conclusions made by the Assembly one year ago remain valid. There is no end to gross human rights abuses in Chechnya, in the form of murder, enforced disappearance, torture, hostage-taking, and arbitrary detention. In addition, the climate of impunity is spreading further, beyond the Chechen and Ingush Republics, into other regions in the Northern Caucasus, including North Ossetia and more recently Kabardino-Balkaria. During the past months a number of abuses took place in these republics that are reminiscent of those taking place in the Chechen Republic, and which have also remained largely unpunished. As I had warned in my previous report, the conflict in the Chechen Republic appears to be spreading like an epidemic, threatening the rule of law throughout the Russian Federation. Human rights violations of the type prevalent in the Chechen Republic have unfortunately spilled over into the neighbouring Ingushetia and subsequently into other republics in the Northern Caucasus.

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"From the onset, the armed conflict in the North Caucasus was not limited to the Chechen Republic - in 1999, hostilities started in Dagestan. Since around 2002, there has been a strong tendency of the conflict "spreading" to RF regions neighboring with Chechnya. As of today, some

forms of extremist activities and the “counterterrorist operation” have spread to most republics in the North Caucasus - such as Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino- Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia - and Stavropol Krai. Accordingly, the entire North Caucasus is affected by the “counterterrorist” practices, involving abductions, arbitrary detentions, torture, cruel and degrading treatment. This, in turn, further fuels the escalation of conflict [...]

Research Centre for East European Studies and Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007:

"Whether the relative calm in Chechnya can be transformed into a lasting and stable solution under Putin's successors is far from clear. For one thing, a number of grave problems continue to afflict the North Caucasus — pervasive corruption, the brutality of the local police and security forces, perennial government malfeasance, high levels of unemployment, a harsh clampdown on moderate Islamic groups, and the exploitation of ethnic tensions and intercommunal strife. These conditions have fueled extremism and political violence in republics like Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Although Putin's chief envoy in the region, Dmitrii Kozak, has made considerable headway over the past two years in dealing with some of these problems and defusing possible flashpoints, daunting obstacles remain. The general volatility of the North Caucasus tends to militate against greater long-term stability in Chechnya itself [...] The drop in the number of separatist military operations in Chechnya has been accompanied by a growth in such operations in other North Caucasus republics, particularly Dagestan and Ingushetia, which border Chechnya."

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"The security situation in the North Caucasus showed some improvement in 2006. The United Nations lowered its security alert level in Chechnya from Phase V to IV."

Jamestown Foundation, 1 August 2007:

"[...] Russian security officials are conducting various anti-terrorist drills in the North Caucasus almost non-stop and fresh units are being sent to the volatile region [...] In addition to the army, the police and the Federal Security Service (FSB) are also preparing for rebel attacks. RIA-Novosti-Dagestan news agency reported on July 26 that drills had taken place in Botlikh district of Dagestan. Policemen practiced defending their headquarters from a sudden attack. Kidnappings are on the rise in Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan and Chechnya, which means that the FSB is trying to collect as much information as possible about the plans of the rebels."

Ingushetia

COE, 21 December 2005:

"NGO's have documented a large number of human rights abuses, abductions and torture, that have taken place in Ingushetia [...] These abuses have sometimes been committed in the course of “special operations” to verify passports in refugee camps. Another worrying trend is that of abductions in Ingushetia of persons who are then taken away and detained in the Chechen Republic, sometimes in unofficial places.

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.19:

"For IDPs from Chechnya the Republic of Ingushetia in 1999 literally became an island of salvation...One can state with regret that today the situation is different...Sudden passport checks keep the inhabitants of CAPs [compact accommodation points] stressed out. Quite often detentions have been carried out with violations of the law and criminal cases being opened without any grounds...In addition to passport checks, special operations are conducted in CAPs and other settlements, involving large numbers of troops and hardware. Such operations are the harshest of all; they are carried out with a complete disregard for the law: armed men wearing masks do not introduce themselves to anybody; they arrive by vehicles with no license plates and

do not explain where they take away the people they detain. It is known that detainees are subjected to severe torture to force them to make required confessions."

RFE/RL, 1 August 2007:

"[...] But since [Ingushetian President] Aushev was replaced in a rigged election in April 2002, the republic has become increasingly unstable. Aushev's successor, career Federal Security Service (FSB) General Murat Zyazikov, promptly set about appointing his relatives and allies to prominent positions, Ingushetia's economy has nosedived and corruption has skyrocketed. Ingushetia depends on subsidies from Moscow for 88 percent of its annual budget; unemployment is estimated at 65-70 percent.

Moreover, Zyazikov has done nothing to support the demands to be permitted to return to their abandoned homes of the thousands of Ingush forced in October-November 1992 to flee the disputed Prigorodny Raion of neighboring North Ossetia to escape vicious reprisals at the hands of Ossetians backed by Russian Interior Ministry forces.

And, possibly taking advantage of Zyazikov's indifference, Interior Ministry and FSB personnel based in North Ossetia have over the past several years snatched scores of Ingush men, many of whom are never found either alive or dead. The human rights organization Memorial estimates that 400 people vanished without trace in Ingushetia between 2002-06.

Many young men, especially those whose relatives were abducted and disappeared, have flocked to join the ranks of the Chechen resistance, and took part in the multiple attacks in June 2004 on police and security facilities in which some 80 people died.

In recent weeks, attacks by militants aligned with the Chechen resistance on government and police facilities and the killings of local and republican government officials have become an almost daily occurrence. On July 21, gunmen opened fire on Zyazikov's motorcade in Magas, and on July 27, militants opened fire with mortars on an FSB base, killing at least one Russian serviceman."

Dagestan

Memorial, 16 May 2007:

"According to general Bariayev, the militants are "constantly moving from Dagestan to Ingushetia. They have their own routes".

In Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkesy there are numerous operations aimed at eliminating the militants during the winter. There were terrorist attacks, murders of bureaucrats, and also of religious leaders. According to the leaders of the federal forces in the Northern Caucasus, there are "two well prepared and highly conspiratorial terrorist groups in these republics." (Rossiskaya Gazeta, Feb 2nd, 2007)

During winter in Ingushetia and Karachaevo-Cherkesy, there was a whole set of operations aimed at neutralizing militant groups. Mostly these operations consisted in besieging the apartments and houses where the militants were staying. Often such sieges bring about the destruction of nearby apartments and houses, as well as death or wounds for peaceful civilians."

Russia Profile, 1 August 2007:

"[...] Today it is not Chechnya, but Dagestan that is the hotspot in the region. Reports from the area's largest republic now recall the "counterterrorism operation" in Chechnya [...] What is now happening in Dagestan, however, is not explained through any kind of framework, not even an

inadequate one. In the first half of 2006 alone over 70 terrorist acts were carried out. And, unlike terrorist acts in Chechnya, the majority of those in Dagestan are not anonymous in nature."

Swisspeace, 22 June 2007:

"The situation with crime in Dagestan continues to be acute. Nevertheless, conflictive events, for instance politically motivated attacks against policemen and demonstrative actions by the implacable opposition, have diminished [...] Most attacks are directed against officials [...] However, civilians often became victims of these operations too. Political control over the law enforcement bodies has been growing."

Swisspeace, 3 May 2007:

"The war between Islamist "jama'at's" (politically engaged criminal gangs) and the law enforcement bodies continues in the republic. It has lately become noticeable that the law enforcement bodies took the initiative. A series of successful operations was conducted resulting in arrests of many members of illegal armed groups and their supporters, as well as liquidation of several influential underground leaders. Secret caches of weapons are regularly found and illicit weapons confiscated from the population, which is reported to continue to possess large amounts of firearms. There were fewer terror attacks, but when they did occur, the response by the law enforcement bodies was better coordinated. It must be mentioned, however, that the Islamist fighters carried out some rather sophisticated attacks against the law enforcement officers. Judging by the latest action, the terrorists appear to be targeting the minister for interior A. Magomedtagirov."

North Ossetia

COE, 21 December 2005:

"In addition to Ingushetia, following the tragic terrorist attack on the school in Beslan on 1 September 2004 and the raid on Nalchik on 13 October 2005, Northern Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria also became the scene of human rights violations committed with impunity. For one year a growing number of abuses in these two republics has been reported."

IHF, 26 January 2007:

"After the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the majority of the Ingush inhabitants were forced to leave their places of permanent residence in the Prigorodny region. During the post-conflict years, a number of them returned to their houses. In spite of the fact that in many villages the situation remained complicated, as previously, life started returning to normal, and good neighborly relations were slowly reestablished between the Ingush and Ossetian inhabitants.

Unfortunately, after the terrible Beslan hostage taking the interethnic tension is again aggravated. Since some time ago Ingush inhabitants have started disappearing and the number of incidents of armed attacks against them increased..."

Кавказский Узел, 18 июля 2007г.:

"За два года здесь были похищены или пропали без вести 19 человек (12 жителей Пригородного района, три жителя Ингушетии, три жителя Чечни), один из которых впоследствии был найден убитым, а судьба остальных остается неизвестной. По всем этим фактам были возбуждены уголовные дела. Однако ни одно из этих тяжких преступлений против личности не раскрыто органами, в чем производстве находятся дела по их расследованию [...]"

Безнаказанность преступников и предположительно этнический характер совершаемых преступлений опасны возможным подрывом стабильности в регионе смешанного проживания людей различных национальностей. Именно случаи нерасследованных и

нераскрытых случаев этнического насилия способствовали эскалации межнационального противостояния, в конечном счете приведшего к осетино-ингушскому конфликту 1992 года."

Kabardino-Balkaria

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"From the onset, the armed conflict in the North Caucasus was not limited to the Chechen Republic - in 1999, hostilities started in Dagestan. Since around 2002, there has been a strong tendency of the conflict "spreading" to RF regions neighboring with Chechnya. As of today, some forms of extremist activities and the "counterterrorist operation" have spread to most republics in the North Caucasus - such as Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino- Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia - and Stavropol Krai. Accordingly, the entire North Caucasus is affected by the "counterterrorist" practices, involving abductions, arbitrary detentions, torture, cruel and degrading treatment. This, in turn, further fuels the escalation of conflict [...]"

On 13 October 2005, there was an armed attack against a number of government establishments in Naltchik. By official data, 35 law enforcement officers and 92 attackers were killed in the fighting. Most of the attackers were members either of the terrorist underground or of Jamaats.

In the second half of October, authorities convened "meetings of residents and workers' collectives" in many communities of Kabardino-Balkaria. The meetings were presided over by 144 local officials of the FSB, prosecutorial offices, and the Ministry of Interior. The meetings adopted resolutions to expel from the republic all family members of people involved in the 13 October attacks, all followers of "unconventional Islam," all migrants from the Chechen Republic, etc. The republic's authorities had to invalidate the scandalous "resolutions" following high-profile protests by human rights defenders."

For more information on abductions of Ingush in North Ossetia, see "Участники круглого стола "Права человека на Северном Кавказе" озабочены похищениями ингушей в Северной Осетии," Кавказский Узел, 16 июля 2007 г.

For more details on security operations in IDP camps, see also On the situation of Residents of Chechnya in the Russian Federation July 2005 - July 2006, Memorial, 31 July 2006.

For additional information on physical insecurity in Ingushetia, see Security sweep fails to stem violence in Ingushetia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 July 2007 and Dozens of Ingush women block road in protest of abductions, killings, Associated Press, 29 June 2007.

The Memorial bulletin "Situation in the zone of conflict in the North Caucasus winter 2006/2007: evaluation of human rights workers," 14 March 2007, also has information on the security situation in the North Caucasus.

Security situation in Ingushetia (2007)

- Large security sweep being conducted by government troops in mid-2007 in response to attacks against government targets
- Ingushetia has most number of abductions relative to population in all of North Caucasus
- IDP camps were targeted in "sweep" operations in Ingushetia

- Counterterrorist operation followed rebel attack in 2004, as did increase in human rights violations and growth of terrorist underground
- Temporary disappearances occur where detainees are tortured and forced to make a confession to later be used in court

IHT 25 July 2007:

"Russian authorities on Wednesday launched a massive security sweep in the volatile province of Ingushetia bordering Chechnya in response to increasingly frequent attacks against police and officials there, news reports said.

Russia's Deputy Interior Minister Arkady Yedeleev arrived in Ingushetia Wednesday to take charge of the security sweep he said was necessary to uproot "bandits" roaming the region who came from Chechnya, the Interfax news agency reported."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 19:

"For IDPs from Chechnya, the Republic of Ingushetia in 1999 literally became an island of salvation, the only place where their safety was ensured. One can state with regret that today the situation is different."

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"Since 2002, abductions and disappearances have been reported in Ingushetia - initially affecting mostly refugees from the neighboring Chechnya. Bodies were later discovered in the Chechen territory. In most cases, circumstances suggested involvement of uniformed personnel. "Security" and "sweep" operations began in refugee camps. Federal forces and units started to be deployed in Ingushetia. In 2003, escalation of violence in Ingushetia continued. Disappearances and deaths were reported not only among those "kidnapped by unidentified perpetrators," but also among officially detained or arrested individuals. "Sweep operations" targeted Ingush villages. Rebel fighters became more active as well. In 2004, an increasing number of "disappearances" affected permanent residents of Ingushetia. In many cases, circumstances suggested involvement of federal forces.

And finally, the "counterterrorist operation" in its Chechen format was fully established in Ingushetia following the rebel attack on the night of 21 to 22 June 2004. Whereas before the incident, there had been few cases documented by human rights groups where Ingush police was suspected to perpetrate grave violations of human rights, since then, such complaints have been documented on a massive scale.

After the Beslan school hostage-taking crisis, military and law enforcement officials, apparently, sought to demonstrate effective war against terrorism in the North Caucasus.

The patterns of fabricated criminal prosecutions and the "conveyor of violence" operate in Ingushetia along the same lines as in Chechnya, but with some specifics.

A detainee "disappears" sometimes for a few days, later to be "found" in remand prisons, often in the neighboring North Ossetia. Detainees are beaten and tortured to force confessions - such treatment has been reported to be common in facilities of Ingush UBOP and the Ministry of Interior, in Nazran GOVD, in the basement of the FSB building in Magas, in remand prisons in North Ossetia, and in illegal prisons. "The most experienced people insist that one cannot stand these tortures. Sooner or later, everyone will submit," says a lawyer serving this category of suspects. There have been cases where defendants were hospitalized in serious condition. Members of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) do not visit suspects in remand prisons. A lawyer provided by the investigator "helps" in fabricating criminal charges against the suspect. Usually, a lawyer hired by the family is given access to the suspect after the latter has

signed his "confession." Even though the lawyer may know about the illegal methods used against the defendant, he usually does not challenge them, fearing for his/her own safety. The defendant's confession of a crime is usually the only evidence against him. Courts interfere with any attempts by lawyers or defendants to point out to the jury that the confession has been obtained through the use of torture. Even in those instances where the use of violence against the defendant was raised in court, the judge was usually unable to detect the falsification, give an adequate legal assessment of the procedural violations, and pass a fair verdict.

These methods of "fighting terrorism" are not only illegal; they have consistently destabilized the situation and actually served to strengthen the positions of rebel terrorists. The entire population of the republic immediately learned about the cruelty of investigators and arbitrariness of judges. The terrorist "underground" has broadened its mobilization base through increased outreach to people who have been personally affected or seek revenge for the deaths and suffering of their family members. Still others are motivated to take up arms by their personal protest against violence and abuse perpetrated by uniformed personnel."

Memorial, June 2007:

"Обстановка в Ингушетии в течение 2006 г. и в начале 2007 г. оставалась нестабильной и часто взрывоопасной. Сообщения по Ингушетии были наиболее многочисленны в информационных сводках ПЦ «Мемориал» весной 2007 г. При этом данных о терактах и боестолкновениях с боевиками отсюда, сравнительно с Чечней, приходит немного. Основной проблемой республики вот уже более полугода остается противоправная деятельность не всегда идентифицируемых силовых структур, как местных, так и из соседних Чечни и Северной Осетии. Эта самая маленькая республика Северного Кавказа уверенно вышла на первое место по числу похищений людей по отношению к численности населения, оставив далеко позади Чечню. Согласно данным мониторинга ПЦ «Мемориал», в течение весны 2007 г. в Ингушетии были похищены 12 человек, часть из которых была позднее отпущена или обнаружена под следствием. В числе похищенных оказался и близкий родственник президента республики Мурата Зязикова Урусхан Зязиков (об этом: <http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2007/03/m75384.htm>), хотя его исчезновение вряд ли стоит связывать с деятельностью официальных силовых ведомств.

Другим явлением, создающим нервную обстановку в республике, являются уже несколько подзабытые в последние годы «зачистки»: проверки паспортного режима, проводившиеся в течение апреля-мая в селах Али-Юрт, Сурхахи, Гайрбек-Юрт, станице Вознесенская, городе Малгобек. Они продолжались от нескольких часов до нескольких дней и велись совместными силами федеральных и местных силовых структур (когда их ведомственную принадлежность возможно было определить). Хотя в ходе последних спецопераций силовики в целом не допускали грубого насилия в отношении населения, не грабили и не похищали людей, все же процессуальные нарушения в виде отказа представляться по форме, предъявлять документы, грубость и площадная брань в адрес местных жителей сопровождали эти мероприятия от начала до конца."

Prague Watchdog and Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 19 December 2006, p.7:

"22 ноября 2006 года стало известно о похищении двоих граждан Чеченской Республики, временно проживающих на территории Ингушетии. Оба были похищены и пропали без вести в обеденное время на территории РСО Алания.

Похищенные – Магомадов Абубакар Супьянович, 1985 года рождения, проживал в частном секторе села Кантышево, и Азиев Лема Вахаевич, 1983 года рождения, проживал в МКП «Кристалл»... К сожалению, это не единичный случай похищения людей чеченской и ингушской национальности в Северной Осетии после известных бесланских событий.

Родители всерьез обеспокоены пропажей своих сыновей и взывают о помощи ко всем, кто может как то прояснить эту ситуацию."

See also Теракты последних дней президент Ингушетии назвал "вызовом всей республике," 19 июня 2007 г.

"Kadyrovtsy" allegedly responsible for human rights abuses (2006)

- Human rights violations allegedly committed by "Kadyrovtsy", security service of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov
- In view of Council of Europe rapporteur on human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, Russian federal authorities are also implicated since they are responsible for the protection of all civilians

IHF, 12 May 2006:

"Kadyrovtsy" is a term used by the population of Chechnya – as well as members of the groups themselves - for members of the former so-called Security Service of the President of the Chechen Republic headed by Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the late President Akhmat Kadyrov, and now Chechen Prime Minister. This is the group now most feared by Chechnya's civilian population, more than federal servicemen. This Security Service was initially created as a personal security guard of the Moscow-appointed head of the Chechen administration, Akhmat Kadyrov, without any legal status, and gradually grew into a powerful military formation. It was commanded from the beginning by Ramzan Kadyrov. Some of its sub-units were legalized in 2004 and 2005 to become parts of different structures of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs. After Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in a bomb blast in May 2004, the Security Service was formally liquidated and most of the rest of its units integrated into the system of Russian law enforcement agencies and security authorities. Gradually, all structures of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs are falling under control of "Kadyrovtsy".

The total strength of the "Kadyrovtsy", which now include the "Second Road Patrol Regiment of the Police (PPSM-2)", the "oil regiment" and the "anti-terrorist centers" (ATC), is not disclosed. The estimations vary from 4 to 12 thousand people, although the last figure is probably an overestimation. Some are completely legalized into special structures of the Interior Ministry of Chechnya while others continue to exist in the form of paramilitary formations. By spring 2006, another reorganization of the "Kadyrovtsy"-structures started. Allegedly, the "anti-terrorist centers" (ATCs) are going to be closed down, and two new battalions will be formed: the battalions "Yug" ("South") and "Sever" ("North"). The announcement is that these two new battalions will be directly subordinated to the federal Ministry of Interior [...]

Particularly feared are the "Second Road Patrol Regiment of the Police (PPSM-2), named after Akhmat Kadyrov", and the so-called "Oil Regiment", headed by Adam Delimkhanov, Akhmat Kadyrov's former bodyguard, the main subdivision within the system of extra-departmental organs of the Interior Ministry of the Chechen Republic, comprising around 1,5 to 2 thousand persons by autumn 2005. Formally, PPSM-2 is aimed at ensuring security in the streets, while the "oil regiment's" official duties comprise the guarding of oil refineries, pipe-lines, oil products and other industrial sites. In reality, however, both structures are involved in so-called "anti-terrorist operations", accompanied by grave human rights violations.

Additionally, in 2005 so-called "Anti-Terrorist Centers" (ATC) were created in several Chechen districts. While so far they are not formally part of any power or law enforcement structure, they are also controlled by Ramzan Kadyrov.

Moreover, the people that emerged from these groups are now in charge of most of the police departments, including the Minister for Interior Ruslan Alkhanov himself, who was closely connected to Akhmed Kadyrov

By spring 2006, another (the third already) reorganization of the "Kadyrovtsy"-structures started. According to information that is available, the "anti-terror centers" (ATCs) are going to be closed down, and the persons belonging to this unit will most likely be transferred to the patrolling-duty regiments of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Chechnya. Out of this, two new battalions will be formed: the battalions "Yug" ("South") and "Sever" ("North"). On 2 May 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov, stated in a press conference that this process is finished, that these two battalions will be part of the 46th brigade of the federal Ministry of Interior troops. According to this information, the battalion "Yug" will be headed by Muslim Ilyasov, until now the leader of the "anti-terrorist centres" ATCs of the Gudermes region, will comprise 500 persons, and be based in the Vedeno district. The battalion "Sever", allegedly to be headed by Alimbek Delimkhanov, will comprise 700 persons and will be based in Grozny [...]

Usually, when the "Kadyrovtsy" - be it the so-called "oil regiment", the anti-terrorist center or anything else To be mentioned is also the "Baysorovtsy". After members of this group attacked members of OMON that were guarding the Christmas tree in Grozny resulting in the death of several people, this subdivision was again removed from the so-called local power structures. There is no new information available as to which department they now belong to. - kidnap or unlawfully detain people, they first bring them to the premises of their troops. Neither the relatives nor lawyers receive information about the whereabouts of the abducted persons. Thus, illegal methods of investigation can be applied over lengthy periods of time [...]

Apart from the "Kadyrovtsy" there are two Russian armed formations consisting mainly of ethnic Chechens. These battalions are part of the 42nd Mechanized Infantry Division of the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), these are the Battalions "Vostok" ("East") - with around 470 persons - and "Zapad" ("West") - numbering around 400 persons - whose task is to conduct military combat against the Chechen resistance. A certain percentage of soldiers serving in these divisions are not ethnic Chechens, but fighters assigned from other regions of Russia. The core of the "Vostok" Battalion ("*yamadaevtsy*"), commanded by Sulim Yamadaev, consists of former fighters from the "Second Battalion of the Ichkeria National Guards", who changed sides in the beginning of the second war and joined the federal forces. They are known to have participated in the abductions of people. The core of the "Zapad" Battalion ("*Kakievtsy*"), headed by Said-Magomed Kakiev, is built of Chechens who opposed the idea of independence from Russia and supported the federal forces already before the first war."

Research Centre for East European Studies and Center for Security Studies, 5 June 2007:

"Another factor that will clearly pose long-term problems is the federal government's reliance on "Chechenization" to supplement large-scale repression as the means of combating separatism in Chechnya. Starting in early 2003, Putin claimed that the pro-Moscow Chechen government led by Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov would take over much of the responsibility for preserving order in Chechnya with the aid of the local police and security forces. The Chechen guerrillas sought to prevent the pro-Russian government from establishing a firmer hold and repeatedly targeted police officers, especially the ones who (at Kadyrov's behest) had conducted mass roundups (*zachistki*) similar to those carried out by Russian troops. Many deadly bombings, shootings, and other attacks were directed against the Chechen police in 2003 and 2004, and in May 2004 the Chechen guerrillas planted a bomb that killed Kadyrov and other senior officials during a Victory Day celebration in the Chechen capital, Grozny. A subsequent wave of terrorist violence in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, combined with the federal commanders' distrust of Chechen officials, raised serious questions about whether Chechenization would remain a viable approach.

Putin, however, chose to continue moving ahead with Chechenization by giving ever greater authority to Kadyrov's son, Ramzan Kadyrov, a young and uneducated man widely known for his violent cruelty and for the egregious abuses committed by the roughly 15,000-strong security force he set up and oversaw, the so-called Kadyrovtsy. Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed a first deputy prime minister in the pro-Moscow Chechen government after his father's assassination and received a Hero of Russia medal from Putin in December 2004. In March 2006, Kadyrov became prime minister in the pro-Moscow government, and in February 2007 he was able to force Alu Alkhanov, who had succeeded Ahmad Kadyrov as Chechen president, to relinquish the presidency. A few weeks later, Ramzan Kadyrov became the new president, having reached the minimum age of 30 in October 2006. Kadyrov's consolidation of power has been strongly supported by Putin, despite the qualms of some of Putin's advisers, notably Igor Sechin.

In the short term, Kadyrov's consolidation of power has been a stabilizing factor in Chechnya. Using proceeds from a mandatory payroll tax on state-sector employees, Kadyrov has launched reconstruction projects in several urban areas, especially Grozny and his hometown, Gudermes, with impressive results. Funding for reconstruction in 2006 and 2007 was 500 percent higher than in 2004, when Kadyrov's father was assassinated. Equally important, in 2006 Kadyrov managed to convince hundreds of former guerrillas to switch sides and join the Kadyrovtsy. The federal government has had an amnesty program of its own for some time, but Kadyrov's personal assurances (and payoffs) to former rebels made a vital difference. Kadyrov has staunchly denied that the Kadyrovtsy ever engaged in kidnappings, torture, and other abuses for which they have long been known and feared, but he apparently did take steps in early 2007 to curb the worst of these excesses. In particular, the incidence of illegal abductions and "disappearances" declined significantly in the first several months of 2007. Nonetheless, although abuses and extralegal executions have been more carefully targeted against Kadyrov's perceived enemies (e.g., Movladi Baisarov) in 2007, normal legal procedures and restraints remain completely absent in Chechnya.

The future direction of Kadyrov's government in Chechnya remains highly uncertain. Soon after Kadyrov became president in early March 2007, he began bringing every significant administrative and security body in Chechnya under his de facto control and appointing close relatives to the highest positions, including Odes Baisultanov as prime minister and Adam Delimkhanov as first deputy prime minister. Kadyrov formed an Anti-Terrorist Commission in March 2007 with himself as the head of it, overseeing the Chechen Republic's branch of the FSB and other security units. Kadyrov has sought to bring all the security forces in Chechnya under his de facto control by eliminating or co-opting the Russian federal units that are still operating there (apart from the 50,000 or so federal troops that are not involved in day-to-day security, mostly in the federal Defense Ministry's 42nd Motorized Infantry Division and the federal MVD's 46th Internal Forces Brigade, both of which are to be permanently deployed in Chechnya). In particular, Kadyrov has sought to discredit the federal Operational-Investigative Bureau (OSB) No. 2, accusing it of having routinely used torture and committed atrocities in Chechnya. These accusations are well-founded but are also disingenuous. By voicing these allegations, Kadyrov not only hopes to shift blame from the Kadyrovtsy for the worst of the abuses, but also seeks to eliminate the only internal security organization in Chechnya that is not yet under his de facto control. In May 2007, Kadyrov formally asked the federal MVD to disband the OSB-2.

Kadyrov's bid to become the total and unchallenged ruler in Chechnya raises questions about what will happen in Chechnya over the longer term. Sechin and some other Russian officials have been skeptical about Kadyrov's long-term loyalty to the federal government, and they worry that over time, as he gains ever greater authority within Chechnya, he may press for independence or some other undesirable arrangement. Kadyrov's recent vigorous campaign against OSB-2, the spate of press reports in May 2007 claiming that he wants to bring Ingushetia under Chechnya's influence (and perhaps eventually merge the two republics, restoring a configuration that was abandoned after the Soviet Union broke apart), and his formal request that

Chechnya be granted a special status akin to that of Tatarstan have further stoked these suspicions."

COE, 21 December 2005:

"As mentioned before, a large number of human rights violations are allegedly committed by the so-called "Kadyrovtsy". On 21 September 2005, a "zachistka" was reportedly carried out in Novye Atagi by "Kadyrovtsy" who abducted five local young residents from the Umkhaev and Khapaev families. In June 2005, local residents of Argun discovered in a rock quarry the remains of a 25-year-old son of Ayna Usmanova, who had disappeared several days ago : he had been arrested by "Kadyrovtsy" and released two days later, after having been badly beaten; he was ordered to return in some days later for interrogation, which he did, and was never seen or heard of again. On 26 November 2004, in the village of Germenchuk of Shali district, police colonel Rivzan Abzatov and his collaborator Khabib Guduev were shot dead by unmasked killers, two of whom were clearly identified as belonging to the "Kadyrovtsy". In my view [Council of Europe rapporteur on human rights violations in the Chechen Republic], the "Chechenisation" of human rights violations, which are attributed more and more frequently to the so-called "Kadyrovtsy", does not exonerate the Federal authorities, which remain responsible for the protection of all Russian citizens, including those living in the Chechen Republic."

COE, 15 March 2006:

"[Mr. Ramzan Kadyrov, then acting Prime Minister and the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights] met for a private meeting during which we discussed two topics. First, the need to put an end to the illegal acts attributed to the forces under his [Kadyrov's] command - in particular, the so-called "anti-terrorist security forces", composed primarily of amnestied combatants – and the need to identify and prosecute those responsible.

Mr. Khadyrov declared that he was well aware that "there were problems of this kind", but that measures to purge this force of uncontrollable elements were being considered at the same time as how to integrate its members into formal local or federal law enforcement structures. Concerning their general conduct, Mr. Khadyrov referred, by way of example, to an operation that he had personally led the night before that had resulted in the arrest of a group of persons, amongst which there was an individual suspected of having collaborated in the assassination of his father, who had since been handed over to the competent authorities. Mr. Khadyrov added that he did not have any secret prisons under his control."

Inadequate governmental investigations into human rights abuses (2007)

- Over the entire period of the "second Chechen war" 103 servicemen faced trial for crimes against Chechen civilians as of mid-2005; the majority received symbolic penalties including fines and probation
- Courts started working again in Chechnya in early 2001, but are not independent; prosecutor not willing to work on cases in which Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's forces are implicated
- Lack of effective prosecutions has resulted in a climate of impunity

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"Notably, in most cases of abduction, were human rights defenders were able to interview witnesses and clarify the circumstances, both the circumstances and the witnesses pointed to involvement of federal forces or other uniformed forces under their control (the use of armored vehicles, unhindered transit through checkpoints, etc.) [...]"

Even in the 188 out of the 2,722 cases, where, according to Russia's report, charges were

brought against specific Chechens, with subsequent convictions and sentencing, very often we have reasons to doubt the findings of preliminary and judicial investigations. For example, prosecutors reported successful investigation of the killing, in the night of 29 to 30 November 2002, of Malika Umazheva, former head of administration in Alkhan Kala; members of an IAF were convicted and sentenced for the crime. However, according to Umazheva's relatives, federal servicemen arriving in an APC took her out of the house into the courtyard and killed her there. At the same time, four more APCs were cruising the village. Notably, rebel fighters do not have armored vehicles.

Russia has a dual system of criminal investigation: military prosecutors investigate crimes committed by servicemen under the command of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior Internal Forces, and the FSB. Crimes committed by civilians or the Ministry of Interior staff (other than Internal Forces) are investigated by local prosecutorial offices, which are not allowed to investigate crimes by the military. Whenever a local prosecutorial office forwards a criminal case file to a military prosecutor's office, the latter can refuse to accept it and to follow through with the proceedings, without giving any reasons for such refusal. So most cases where investigations were closed or suspended "due to impossibility to identify the suspects" remain the responsibility of local (civilian) prosecutors who are not allowed, by definition, to investigate such cases properly [...]

Over the entire period of the "second Chechen war" 103 servicemen faced trial for crimes against Chechen civilians as of mid-2005. Eight of them were found not guilty. Thus, for example, the court acquitted four servicemen of GRU Spetsnaz (Captain Ulman and others) prosecuted for shooting detainees - peaceful civilians. With regard to three defendants, the court dropped the case due to decriminalization of the act in question. Twenty more servicemen were amnestied, - including for example, a contract serviceman who opened fire out of pure malice, killing a woman and wounding another one. 27 servicemen, most of whom committed murders of peaceful civilians while off-duty, were sentenced to various prison terms, ranging between one year of settlement colony to 18 years of strict regime prison. The absolute majority, however, received purely symbolic penalties, such as probation (including perpetrators of rape, robbery, extortion, torture of unlawfully detained civilians, theft, deliberate destruction of property, etc.), fines (for beating, unlawful detention of prosecutorial staff, etc.), and internal disciplinary sanctions.

As of mid-2005, a total of 34 police officers were convicted for crimes against civilians. Just as the army personnel, most police officers were sentenced to "symbolic" punishments. Only seven received real prison terms, others (including those guilty of drunk shooting and killing or wounding innocent people; extortion, bribes, threats of murder, "hooliganism," etc.) were sentenced to probation.

Proceedings are still underway in a high-profile case of massive killings by federal servicemen of peaceful civilians in Staropromyslovsky District of Grozny, in Alkhan-Yurt, and in Novye Aldy. There have been no effective criminal investigations in any of the found massive burial sites.

The law enforcement officers seem to harbor no misconceptions as to who abducts people. Thus, the "Analysis of the Current Status of Operational Environment in Relation to People Abductions on the Territory of Oktyabrsky District of the City of Grozny from 1995 to September 2006" (see Annex for quotes) says that 9 people were abducted by the criminal groups, 58 – by the officers of Oktyabrsky temporary department of internal affairs, and 15 – by other military formations [...]

The ineffectiveness of Russia's judicial system is manifested in particular in its inability to put an end to the impunity of uniformed personnel committing crimes against civilians. A dramatic example of such failure of the Russian judiciary is the high-profile Ulman case mentioned in the sub-section on Impunity of Federal and Local Uniformed Personnel in this section of the report.

Four members of the special-task force of the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU), including Captain Eduard Ulman, Captain Alexander Kalagansky, Ensign Vladimir Voyevodin and Major Alexey Perelevsky are charged with murder of six Chechen civilians on 11 January 2002 in the village of Dai, Shatoy district of Chechnya. Two jury trials have acquitted them. However, Ulman, Kalagansky and Voyevodin do not deny killing the civilians, but argue that they had followed Perelevsky's orders. Perelevsky confirms that he gave that order and they're witnesses to that event. However, Perelevsky, in turn, claims that the order was initially radioed to him but a higher-in-command in charge of that special operation, Colonel Plotnikov. Plotnikov, on the other hand, denies this allegation and there is no evidence to prove that the order did come from him [...]

Courts, which formally resumed their functions in the Chechen Republic in early 2001, were not adequately staffed until 2004. But even today, the investigative and judicial systems are unable to ensure access to justice, because courts are not independent, and are often involved in falsifying criminal prosecutions. In turn, prosecutorial bodies with their dual functions of investigating crimes and supervising over investigations are not willing to investigate and expose false prosecutions due to the conflict of interests."

HRW, 13 November 2006:

"One of the main factors contributing to the widespread pattern of illegal detention and torture in Chechnya is the total lack of accountability for perpetrators.

The perpetrators themselves—be they ORB-2 personnel or Kadyrov's forces—try to ensure that their abuses do not come to light by threatening their victims into silence. Indeed, few victims or witnesses dare to report instances of torture to the authorities, such as the prosecutor's office, and in many cases refuse to speak to human rights organizations.

During our last two research missions to Chechnya Human Rights Watch found that witnesses were extremely scared to talk about their experiences, fearing retribution. Those who agreed to relate their story did so under strict condition that we withhold any details that would allow the authorities to identify them.

In many cases Human Rights Watch found that the perpetrators were so confident that there would be no consequences for their abuses that they did not wear masks or otherwise attempt to conceal their identity. In fact, a number of witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they knew their tormentors by name, or at least would be able to identify them. These witnesses, however, did not dare to report this information to prosecutorial authorities, and were, in some cases, considering personal revenge against the perpetrators.

In torture cases researched by Human Rights Watch prosecutors and courts took no action to bring the perpetrators to justice. In particular, those who had been tortured by ORB-2 personnel said that their injuries sustained as a result of torture were documented by doctors at SIZO-1, and that these documents were presented during court hearings. The courts, however, appeared to disregard this evidence altogether, and took no action to ensure that the allegations of torture were duly investigated and the perpetrators held to account.

The prosecutor's office, which under Russian law should be the primary body to investigate allegations of torture in detention, also did little or nothing to address the allegations of torture in cases researched by Human Rights Watch. In rare cases where victims dared to launch a formal complaint with the prosecutor's office, the prosecutors refused to open a criminal investigation, stating that the facts reported by the victim "have not been confirmed by the preliminary inquiry" conducted by the office [...]

Russian authorities occasionally provide statistics on investigations and prosecutions of military and police personnel for crimes committed in the context of the conflict in Chechnya. The Memorial Human Rights Center and the International Helsinki Federation analyzed this data, and found that only a handful of cases reach trial and that the vast majority of the defendants are eventually acquitted, amnestied, or receive minimal or suspended sentences.³¹ Regarding torture, Human Rights Watch is aware of only one case in which an official was convicted for physically abusing someone in custody.³²

The climate of impunity is worsened by the persistent efforts by Chechen and Russian authorities to close Chechnya to outside scrutiny. Most unlawful places of detention run by Kadyrov's forces are off limits to journalists or international experts visiting the region. Moreover, in several instances when outside observers were allowed to visit these facilities, such as the Tsentoroi bases, the authorities removed the detainees from the premises prior to the visit. A number of witnesses told Human Rights Watch about being moved to another base or simply driven away and kept in cars for several hours when a "delegation" was expected to visit the base where they were being detained.

On May 1, 2006, a CPT delegation was denied access to the village of Tsentoroi, which led it to take "the exceptional measure of interrupting the visit," which was resumed following assurances from the president of the Chechen Republic. The delegation gained access to Tsentoroi in the early afternoon of May 2.³³

When visiting officials were allowed to meet with detainees in such lawful detention facilities such as ORB-2, they perceived that the detainees "did not feel they could speak freely."

Russia's refusal to agree to the terms of reference of the UN special rapporteur on torture caused him to postpone indefinitely his visit to Russia and Chechnya, planned for October 2006. The refusal concerned the special rapporteur's conducting unannounced visits to detention facilities and interviewing detainees in private."

Memorial 16 May 2007:

"A certain counterbalance with regard to the absolute power of Kadyrov's clan in the Chechen Republic could be created by the Republican Public Prosecutor's Office which is responsible directly and exclusively to the Public Prosecutor's General of the Russian Federation. Russian officials and authorities have on numerous occasions reported that a number of criminal cases relating to crimes committed by the Ministry of Interior forces have been initiated. However, in reality the prosecuting authorities of the Chechen Republic do not willingly investigate the crimes committed by Kadyrov's people."

AI 23 May 2007:

"When someone is detained or abducted, the authorities' immediate reaction has usually been woefully inadequate. And once an investigation is opened, the steps taken to investigate the crimes are largely ineffective. The prosecutor's office appears unable to identify suspects and cases are routinely suspended. Cases are opened and suspended numerous times. A lawyer working in Chechnya told Amnesty International that in fact in the majority of cases of enforced disappearance in his district (over 200, since 1999) the circumstances of the initial detention were such that it would be possible for the prosecutor's office to successfully investigate and identify suspects. However, investigators have failed to take basic steps to track down the owners of vehicles or question members of the security forces, and so far not a single one of the investigations into these 200 cases has been completed. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances reported in January 2007 that it "continues to be concerned about suspension of investigations in disappearance cases and wishes to remind the Government of its obligations to conduct thorough and impartial investigations for as long as the fate of the victim of enforced disappearance remains unclarified."(10)

In addition, the authorities appear unable to guarantee the safety of lawyers, witnesses or even investigators in cases of enforced disappearance, which severely hampers the possibility of effective investigation. serious human rights violations continue to be reported...

One significant problem has been that the district civilian prosecutor's offices do not have jurisdiction to investigate the activities of military forces (of the Ministry of Defence, the FSB or the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Thus, in cases where military involvement is suspected, the investigation is handed to the military prosecutor's office to investigate. The military denies involvement, and the case is referred back to the civilian prosecutor's office. The case is effectively stuck in a legal limbo for years and fails to progress.

According to lawyers acting on behalf of families of missing people, the civilian prosecutor's office has no authority to require members of the military to attend questioning. Joint investigative groups formed of civilian and military prosecutors do not appear to have resulted in improved investigations...

Everyone who seeks justice for human rights violations in Chechnya faces a climate of hostility and menace. People searching for missing relatives are no exception. As a result, witnesses in enforced disappearance cases have been reluctant to come forward and relatives are increasingly hesitant to speak openly to human rights monitors...

Families searching for their relatives have received death threats and anonymous phone calls. Some have reportedly been "advised" in a threatening manner by officials from the prosecutor's office not to continue their search. Family members have been detained and beaten. Some have themselves become the victims of enforced disappearance. Due to fears for the security of the individuals concerned, it is not possible to make public many of the names or other details that would identify those individuals...

To Amnesty International's knowledge, of the thousands of criminal cases opened, in only one has a person been convicted in connection with the enforced disappearance of a person in Chechnya, whose whereabouts remain unknown. The lack of effective prosecutions has resulted in a climate of impunity...

Furthermore, according to human rights monitors working in Chechnya, little or nothing is being done to identify the bodies buried in the numerous mass graves around Chechnya. No systematic work is being done to exhume, in accordance with international standards, the 52 registered mass graves in the republic. According to human rights monitors and the CPT, the Republican Forensic Medical Bureau in Grozny does not yet perform autopsies or other essential functions."

Swisspeace, 23 May 2006:

"The share of arbitrary, unjustified and, in some cases, purely illegal forceful actions against the civil population on the part of the government sector, however, is still relatively high. At the same time, the degree of adequate reaction to such excesses has increased substantially. Victims receive compensations, offenders are brought to justice [...]"

The new phase of the post-conflict period is characterized by a growth in peaceful protests staged by different groups of civilians in Chechnya. Cases of peaceful and open demonstrations against acts of arbitrariness committed by law enforcers, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, bribe-taking and other unlawful practices by road police, and - generally - abuses of citizens' rights by officials, became more frequent."

Russian court rulings on human rights abuses in Chechnya by federal forces (2007)

- Russian federal military killed six civilians in Chechnya, according to decision of Russian court
- Another Russian officer was found guilty of murdering a Chechen woman

RFE/RL, 14 June 2007:

"A military court in southern Russia has sentenced four soldiers for killing six civilians in Chechnya [...]"

The case, which failed to secure convictions in two earlier civilian jury trials, is seen as a test of Moscow's willingness to acknowledge atrocities by federal troops. The court in Rostov-na-Donu handed down sentences ranging between nine and 14 years. The stiffest sentence went to Eduard Ulman, who was commanding the unit in January 2002, when the soldiers opened fire on a civilian vehicle and killed the survivors, including a pregnant woman.

Nikolai Gulko, a judge with the North Caucasus District Military Court, said Ulman was sentenced to serve a 14-year term at a high-security correctional facility. Today's ruling is complicated by the fact that Ulman and two of the other three defendants were tried in absentia. The three men failed to turn up for a hearing in April and have not been seen since. Major Aleksei Perelevsky, the only defendant to appear in court, received a nine-year sentence. The others received sentences of 11 and 12 years. Prosecutors had requested terms ranging from 18 to 23 years [...]"

Human-rights defenders in Moscow said today's court decision sends an important message to the Russian military that summary justice is not excusable. Murad Musayev, a lawyer for the families of the slain civilians, said justice would not be served until the three absent soldiers are located and forced to carry out their sentences. "We're pleased with the guilty verdict, but of course we wish it could be carried out immediately," Musayev said. "But we hope that law-enforcement agencies are pursuing those convicted and will find them soon." Lawyers for the defendants say they don't know the location of the three missing soldiers, who have been placed on a federal wanted list [...]"

BBC, 25 July 2003:

"A Russian officer has been convicted of murdering a Chechen woman and sentenced to 10 years in jail.

Colonel Yuri Budanov admitted killing Kheda Kungayeva in March 2000, but claimed he was temporarily insane.

Last December, a court in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don accepted his defence and acquitted him.

But that verdict was overruled in February by Russia's supreme court, which ordered a retrial.

The judge in the new trial ruled on Friday that Budanov was of sound mind at the time of the killing and found him guilty of kidnapping, murder and abuse of power."

European Court of Human Rights concludes investigations of Russian authorities are inadequate (2007)

- European Court of Human Rights finds Russian investigations inadequate because of long delays, omissions in people questioned and a failure to conduct thorough and prompt inquiry into complaints

ECRE, 22 March 2007:

"On 24th February 2005 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgments on the first six Chechen cases from six residents of Chechnya whose relatives died at the hands of Russian troops or who suffered as a result of Russian military action in 1999 and 2000. In each of the cases, the Court found Russia in violation of several key articles of the ECHR, including Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture). The Court, in particular, stressed in its judgments that the Russian authorities had failed to carry out adequate investigations into the circumstances of the deaths of the applicants' relatives' cases. NGOs report that Russia's response to the European Court's judgments in these cases has not been swift or adequate in terms of the actions it has taken or proposes to take. Similar cases have followed and there is now quite substantial case law against the Russian Federation from the Court."

COE, 12 June 2007:

"Since 2005 a number of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court") have found important violations of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention") by Russian security forces during anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000. The judgments relate to:

- the failure to present any justification for the use of lethal force by the state agents in respect of the applicants' relatives and one of the applicant's sons (violation of Article 2)2;
- the failure to prepare and execute anti-terrorist operations involving the use of heavy combat weapons with the requisite care for the lives of civilians (violations of Article 2)3;
- the failure to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the deaths or alleged deaths of the applicants' relatives or allegations of torture and lack of an effective remedy in these respects (violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13)4;
- the state's responsibility for the unacknowledged detention of the applicant's son and his subsequent disappearance and the authorities' failure to provide the applicant with any plausible explanation in this respect for more than 6 years, notably through the criminal investigation not opened until 1 and a half years after the event (violations of Articles 3 and 5)5;
- unjustified destruction by the security forces of the property of one of the applicants in the course of a anti-terrorist operation (violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1)6."

Demos, 29 November 2006:

"Центр «Демос» предлагает Вашему вниманию обзор самых интересных и показательных решений Европейского Суда по жалобам из России за последний год. За это время Европейский Суд по правам человека вынес 128 решений по жалобам из России. Проанализировав все эти решения, эксперты Центра «Демос» пришли к выводу: основная причина обращений россиян в Страсбург – недостаточная эффективность государственно-правовой машины в нашей стране[...]

В 1998 году Россия признала юрисдикцию Европейского Суда по правам человека, а жители России получили возможность обращаться в этот международный судебный орган. На сегодняшний день более 47 тысяч россиян пожаловались в Страсбург на нарушения своих прав. Страсбургских решений по жалобам на Россию уже 192. Причем 128 из них были вынесены за последний год – с октября 2005 по ноябрь 2006.

Среди россиян, выигравших в Страсбурге, – пенсионеры и олигархи, жены убитых в Чечне ОМОНовцев и члены банды Гелаева, заключенные и судьи в отставке, и многие другие. Список российских проблем, попавших на рассмотрение в Европейский Суд, не менее разнообразен: тут и невыплаченные пенсии, и бесконечные судебные тяжбы, и

ограничения в правах из-за отсутствия прописки, и переполненные тюрьмы[...]

Разумеется, Страсбург сталкивается и с совершенно вопиющими нарушениями прав человека в России. Постоянным «поставщиком» таких жалоб является Чечня. Судом были приняты решения против России уже по девяти «чеченским делам». И здесь речь идет об исчезновениях людей, внесудебных казнях и пытках. Впрочем, на то, что пытаются, жалуются не только чеченцы. Жители других российских регионов, например, нижегородец Михеев, ставший инвалидом-колясочником после «допроса» в милиции, тоже обращаются в Страсбург. Но крайне важно – и это особо подчеркивается и в решениях Европейского Суда – что все такие дела не были адекватно расследованы органами прокуратуры. То есть пострадавшие не стали бы искать правосудия в Европе, если бы наши правоохранительные органы внимательно отнеслись бы к их жалобам и наказали виновных."

ECHR, 26 July 2007:

"On the facts of the case, it was clear that they had been taken into custody in apparent good health and their bodies had been found later showing signs of having met a violent death. The Court considered it established that the two brothers had died while detained by the federal forces. Given the absence of any plausible explanation the Government had failed to account for their deaths during their detention and the Russian State's responsibility for these deaths was therefore engaged. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 2.

Investigation into the killings

As to the effectiveness of the investigation carried out into the killing of the Musayev brothers, the Court first noted that despite the family's numerous complaints and enquiries, the authorities had made no attempt to investigate the circumstances of the detention and disappearance of Ali and Umar Musayev during the period when they remained missing. Moreover, although the authorities had been made instantly aware of the brothers' deaths, the official investigation had not commenced until more than two months after the detention of the applicants' relatives and more than a month after the discovery of their remains.

Once the investigation had been opened it had been plagued with inexplicable shortcomings in taking the most essential steps. In particular, no forensic examination or autopsy of the bodies was ever carried out. The investigation could only be described as dysfunctional when it came to establishing the extent of the military and security personnel's involvement in the deaths of the applicants' relatives. It did not appear that any meaningful efforts had been undertaken to investigate the possible involvement of such personnel in the murder. Furthermore, there had been a substantial delay in granting the status of victim to Mrs Musayeva.

Finally, the investigation remained pending from October 2000 to August 2002, when it had been suspended for over two years and not resumed until October 2004. After that it remained pending at least until August 2006. Between October 2000 and August 2006 the investigation was adjourned and reopened at least seven times. The prosecutors on several occasions ordered certain steps to be taken, but there was no evidence that those instructions had ever been complied with.

In the light of those defects and with regard to the inferences drawn from the Government's submission of evidence, the Court concluded that the authorities had failed to carry out a thorough and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Ali and Umar Musayev. There had therefore been a further violation of Article 2. [...]

It had been established that the brothers had been apprehended on 8 August 2000 by federal servicemen and had not been seen until 13 September 2000, when their corpses were found.

The Government had produced no formal acknowledgement of or justification for their detention during the period in question. Ali and Umar Musayev had thus been victims of unacknowledged detention in complete disregard of the safeguards enshrined in Article 5. This constituted a particularly grave violation of their right to liberty and security enshrined in Article 5."

ECHR, 10 May 2007:

"Lack of effective investigation

[...]The investigation was opened 11 days after the men were detained, a delay which was in itself liable to affect the effectiveness of the investigation of a crime such as abduction, where crucial action had to be taken in the first days after the event.

The investigation was dysfunctional and plagued by inexplicable delays in performing the most essential tasks. In a period of five-and-a-half years, it was adjourned and reopened at least six times and transferred from one prosecutor's office to another on at least five occasions for no apparent reason. Mr Akhmadov's wife was not granted victim status in the proceedings and his mother, notwithstanding her victim status, was not properly informed of its progress.

The Court noted with great concern that a number of cases had come before it which suggested that the phenomenon of "disappearances" was well known in Chechnya. A number of international reports pointed to the same alarming conclusion. Although the body of the "disappeared" person was eventually discovered in the applicants' case, it was more than a year after his arrest and not in any way down to the efforts of the law-enforcement authorities.

Moreover, the stance of the prosecutor's office after the news of the detention was communicated to it by the applicants significantly contributed to the likelihood of the deceased's disappearance, as no necessary steps were taken either in the crucial first days or weeks after detention, or later. Their conduct in the face of the applicants' justified complaints created a strong presumption of at least acquiescence in the situation and raised strong doubts as to the objectivity of the investigation. The Court found that the law-enforcement machinery's failure to take the necessary steps effectively put the "disappeared" person outside the protection of the law, a situation which was totally unacceptable in a democratic society governed by the principles of respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Concluding that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and death of Shamil Akhmadov, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2 concerning the lack of an effective investigation.

Article 3

[...]The Court therefore found that the applicants suffered distress and anguish as a result of the disappearance of their son and husband and of their inability to find out what had happened to him or to receive up-to-date information on the investigation. The manner in which their complaints had been dealt with by the authorities had to be considered to constitute inhuman treatment. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 in respect of the applicants.

Article 5

The Court had found it established that Shamil Akhmadov was detained by State servicemen on 12 March 2001 during a security operation in Argun and was not seen alive again. The Government had not provided any explanation for his detention or any documents of substance from the domestic investigation into his apprehension. The Court thus concluded that he was a victim of unacknowledged detention.

The Court further considered that the authorities should have been more alert to the need for a thorough and prompt investigation of the applicants' complaints that their relative had been detained and taken away in life-threatening circumstances. However, the authorities failed to take prompt and effective measures to safeguard Mr Akhmadov against the risk of disappearance.

Consequently, the Court found that Shamil Akhmadov was held in unacknowledged detention without any of the safeguards contained in Article 5, which constituted a particularly grave violation of the right to liberty and security enshrined in Article 5."

ECHR, 27 July 2006:

"The inadequacy of the investigation

The Court noted that, the investigation was opened a year and five months after the events at issue and was plagued by inexplicable delays. Furthermore, it appeared to the Court that most of the actions necessary for solving the crime occurred only after December 2003, when the applicant's complaint was communicated to the Russian Government. The Court found that those delays alone compromised the effectiveness of the investigation and could not but have had a negative impact on the prospects of arriving at the truth.

The Court also noted a number of serious omissions including, in particular, the failure to identify or question some of the servicemen in charge of the detainees. Many of the omissions were evident to the prosecutors, who ordered certain steps to be taken. However, their instructions were either not followed or were followed with an unacceptable delay.

In the light of those circumstances, the Court found that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and presumed death of Mr Yandiyev and held that there had been a violation of Article 2 [...]

The Court further considered that the authorities should have been alert to the need to investigate more thoroughly and promptly the applicant's complaints that her son was detained by the security forces and taken away in life-threatening circumstances. Instead they failed to take prompt and effective measures to safeguard Mr Yandiyev against the risk of disappearance. Moreover, the Court noted that as late as December 2000 the authorities continued to deny the involvement of federal servicemen in Mr Yandiyev's apprehension.

Accordingly, the Court found that Mr Yandiyev was held in unacknowledged detention in the complete absence of the safeguards contained in Article 5 and that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security of person guaranteed by that provision."

For additional decisions against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights, visit their [website](#).

Reprisals against applicants to the European Court of Human Rights (2006)

- Chechen applicants to European Court of Human Rights are harassed and even threatened with murder
- One applicant was abducted and murdered in 2005

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 6:

"Harassment against applicants to the European Court of Justice continues, along with pressuring of witnesses, torture of prisoners, coerced confessions, self-incriminations and incrimination of other people and huge sentences for crimes not committed."

COE, 21 December 2005:

"I [Council of Europe rapporteur on human rights violations in the Chechen Republic] am also extremely concerned about reports that a number of Chechen applicants to the European Court of Human Rights have been subjected to reprisals. Such reprisals have ranged from harassment and threats up to the murder of applicants or their close relatives (Zoura Bitieva, who had lodged a complaint with the Court in May 2000 - No 57953/00 – and whose complaint was declared admissible by the Court on 20 October 2005²², and Anzor Pokaev, whose father Sharfudin Sambiev filed an application in July 2003 - No. 38693/04²³). It appears that Chechen victims of human rights violations not only have extremely limited access to justice in the Russian Federation, but also that their lives are endangered when they attempt to seek justice through international mechanisms.

Since my last report, new allegations of persecution of applicants to the European Court of Human Rights or their family members, including the killing of an applicant, have been brought to my attention. The most shocking case is that of the abduction and subsequent murder of Said-Khusein Magomedovich Elmurzaev. Elmurzaev had filed an application with the Court after the body of his son, Idris, was found on 9 April 2004 at the outskirts of the Serzhen-Yurt village among eight other mutilated bodies. On 2 April 2005, armed men abducted Said-Khusein Magomedovich Elmurzaev and another of his sons Suleiman Sayd-Khuseinovich Elmurzaev from their houses in the village of Duba-Yurt. The perpetrators reportedly wore camouflage uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. On 8 May 2005, the body of Said-Khusein Magomedovich Elmurzaev was found in the Sunzha River near the settlement (stanitsa) of Ilyinska in the Groznenskiy district.

[...] These serious crimes which have been committed against applicants and family members of applicants to the European Court of Human Rights have not yet been elucidated. Such acts are totally unacceptable, and must be a clear priority for law enforcement authorities to investigate, as they may deter applications to the European Court of Human Rights, which is the centrepiece of the human rights protection mechanism established by the European Convention on Human Rights. I am therefore pleased that our colleague Christos Pourgourides, in the report that he is preparing on the member states' duty to cooperate with the European Court of Human Rights, will cover cases of reprisals against applicants to the Court and their families. In my view, it is a clear failure to co-operate with the Court if a member country does not ensure the safety of applicants from reprisals."

Civilians exposed to mines and unexploded ordnance in Chechnya (2007)

- Mines in agricultural lands have been disarmed
- As of end of 2006 over 3000 civilians were killed or injured by landmines or unexploded ordnance in Chechnya since 2005
- IDPs and returnees are exposed to a high risk as they move through, return or resettle in affected areas

Swisspeace, 22 June 2007:

"At the end of May, it was announced that the disarming of mines on agricultural lands has been completed (over 62 hectares in total have been cleared). The total number of mines and other devices that have been disarmed and destroyed was 412."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"According to the UNICEF-managed IMSMA (Information Management System for Mine Action) database, as of end-October 2006, some 3,061 civilians (including 753 children) had been killed or injured by landmines and UXO in Chechnya since 1995. In addition, landmines and UXO aggravate the social and economic vulnerability of the population, including by hindering access to agricultural land and increasing the existing challenges to the physical reconstruction of houses, factories, and infrastructure. In March 2006, UNICEF, in cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, USA) undertook an in-depth analysis of victim data. Large percentages of children and adults were injured while traveling or performing basic income-generating or livelihood-supporting activities (farming, tending animals, collecting wood, food or water)...Casualty rates are likely to further increase in 2007, in light of the continuing return of IDPs (and their probable intention to restore their destroyed housing) as well as the foreseen increase in economic activities. Therefore, republican, regional and federal authorities should recognize that addressing the mine/UXO threat in a structural manner is key to the fulfillment of the planned socio-economic recovery of the republic...Authorities, in fact, have not yet provided

tangible indications that a comprehensive clearance program is about to be launched. Meanwhile, some demining is being conducted by the federal army, but with the main aim of facilitating the troops' safe movement."

For more details about landmines in Chechnya, consult the [Landmine Monitor Report 2006](#), 13 September 2006, International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

See also, "[Chechen partisans continue laying mines and explosives](#)", 18 April 2003, Prague Watchdog, [Internet] and [On the situation of residents of Chechnya in the Russian Federation](#), 31 July 2006, Memorial, [Internet].

Discrimination of Ingush in North Ossetia-Alania (2007)

- Ingush residents in North Ossetia believe they are being persecuted on ethnic grounds, according to International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

IHF, 26 January 2007:

"After the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict, the majority of the Ingush inhabitants were forced to leave their places of permanent residence in the Prigorodny region. During the post-conflict years, a number of them returned to their houses. In spite of the fact that in many villages the situation remained complicated, as previously, life started returning to normal, and good neighborly relations were slowly reestablished between the Ingush and Ossetian inhabitants.

Unfortunately, after the terrible Beslan hostage taking the interethnic tension is again aggravated. Since some time ago Ingush inhabitants have started disappearing and the number of incidents of armed attacks against them increased...

During their missions in the North Caucasus, IHF representatives more than once traveled to the Prigorodny region. Unfortunately, we have yet to ascertain that the local authorities made no real efforts to investigate these crimes, and to find and punish those who are guilty. Especially disturbing is the fact, that in some cases it is precisely the law enforcement bodies themselves that allegedly were subjecting to the unlawful persecution of Ingush families living here.

Such facts, and also some candid insults by representatives of North Ossetian power structures addressed to the ethnic Ingush people, create the impression among Ingush inhabitants that they are being ethnically persecuted."

Discrimination and harassment of Chechen IDPs in other parts of the North Caucasus

- Hostile sentiment among local residents towards Chechens who settled in central Russia
- Inter-ethnic clashes in Stavropol between Chechens and Russians in mid-2007 in which 2 Russians and 1 Chechen died

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 30:

"Animosity towards Chechens who settled down in central Russia has become a permanent feature. From time to time it turns into pogroms and massive inter-ethnic clashes."

Russia Profile, 6 June 2007:

"On May 24 [2007], in the Promyshlenny District of the city of Stavropol, there was a mass confrontation between Chechens and Russians involving 100 to 300 people. The police were forced to intervene in order to prevent widespread public violence..."

In fact, the Stavropol Territory is itself subject to complex ethnic pressures, although in the past conflicts centered around the Armenian and Greek minorities in Mineralnoye Vody, tensions along the border with the Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia and in the rural regions in the south and east of the territory, which share a border with Chechnya and Dagestan. Now Stavropol has made its mark."

Reuters, 5 June 2007:

"Hundreds of locals rallied in the town of Stavropol in southern Russia on Tuesday, demanding the eviction of ethnic Chechens, witnesses and media said, reviving memories of racial riots in other parts of the country. Thousands of people gathered earlier on Tuesday at the funerals of two young Russians knifed by unknown attackers on Sunday in this leafy town of some 350,000 residents, 1,700 km (1,060 miles) south of Moscow and bordering volatile Chechnya. Many people in the town, populated mainly by Slavs, believe Chechens killed the two Russians in revenge for the murder of a Chechen man on May 24 in clashes between local Chechens and Russians. Hundreds of people gathered in Stavropol's main square, responding to calls in leaflets "to hold a Slav gathering"."

Treatment of Chechens in Russian areas outside of the North Caucasus

- IDPs from Chechnya have more difficult situation than migrants from CIS countries since they fled a military conflict, many have lost relatives and growing negative attitude towards Chechens
- Xenophobia in Russia largely due to dislike and mistrust of people from Caucasus, and mostly Chechens
- Chechens outside of North Caucasus subject to discriminatory practices of law enforcement officials and Memorial is convinced this is increasingly the case throughout Russia
- It is tradition for Chechen women to wear gold jewellery, but people in areas outside of North Caucasus believe these women must be rich

Prague Watchdog, 26 June 2007:

"Russia has recently witnessed several major outbreaks of ethnic violence, mostly between ethnic Russians and Chechens. Of most importance here are two events, in Kondopoga (September 2006) and recently in Stavropol (May-early June 2007), which indicate a serious ethnic and, implicitly, social tension in Russia, recent improvements notwithstanding..."

It is this fear and dislike of people from the Caucasus, especially Chechens, that has contributed enormously to the general xenophobic thrust of Russian society...

In late May and early June, Stavropol, a city in the south of European Russia near the border of Chechnya, was marked by large-scale ethnic rioting. It was the worst - or at any rate one of the worst - riots of this kind since Kondopoga. The event indicated the continued high level of ethnic, social, and, in a way, regional tension.

As in the case of Kondopoga, the riot erupted with a brawl between a group of Russians and what Russians usually call "people of Caucasian nationality," mostly Chechens. Both groups had called

for reinforcements; and soon enough the brawl was transformed into a virtual battle with up to 300-400 people involved. The police seemed to be watching with a sort of indifference. Still, when the rioters attacked the police, the riot police arrived and engaged with the crowd. As a result, dozens of people were seriously injured, and one Chechen was killed.

A few days later, two Russian boys were killed; allegedly their throats were slit. The crime was attributed to Chechens, and several hundred people rallied on one of the squares and put forward a variety of demands, from protection from ethnic violence to an end to corruption. They also demanded - as in the case of Kondopoga - the creation of grassroots detachments, the "druzhina", to maintain order...

The implications of these events are hard to assess, and it is of course also difficult to make accurate predictions about the future. Still, they indicate the continuous instability in post-Soviet society and may possibly be the harbinger of things to come, especially in the case of a rapid decline in oil prices and oil revenues for Russia.

And there are other immediate repercussions. This general hostility of ethnic Russians to "people of Caucasian nationality," especially Chechens, has stimulated the continuous violence and terrorist activities in the Caucasus, including Chechnya. These acts of violence have created a strong fear of terrorism in Russian society, amplified by the fact that the fear of real or imaginary terror has often in reality been a kind of sublimation of many other fears. And in this the Russians, of course, are not alone."

United Nations Human Rights Council, 30 May 2007:

"The Special Rapporteur concluded that while there is no State policy of racism in the Russian Federation, the Russian society is facing an alarming trend of racism and xenophobia, the most striking manifestations of which are the increasing number of racially motivated crimes and attacks, including by neo-Nazi groups, particularly against people of non-Slav appearance originating from the Caucasus, Africa, Asia or the Arab world; the growing level of violence with which some of these attacks are carried out, resulting in some cases in the death of the victim...the rise of anti-Semitism as well as other forms of religious intolerance, in particular against Muslims; the existence and the increasing importance of political parties with racist and xenophobic platforms; and the virtual correspondence of the social, economic and political marginalization with the mapping of ethnic minorities and other discriminated groups in the Russian Federation...

The dissemination of racist and xenophobic ideas and stereotypes by an increasing sector of the media is contributing to portraying a negative image of certain communities and fostering feelings of intolerance and xenophobia within the population. Racist and xenophobic messages are said to be openly disseminated both by mainstream and "specialized" media, despite the reinforcement of criminal law provisions in this field, and can particularly be found in the association of Roma and Tajiks with drug trafficking and organized crime, Caucasians - in particular Chechens - with extremism and terrorism, or immigrants in general with unemployment of Russians, criminality and social precarity...

With the situation in Chechnya, the attribution of several attacks in the territory of the Russian Federation to Chechen groups, the generalization of the association between Caucasians and terrorism and extremism - particularly by extreme right political parties, the media and to a certain extent the Russian authorities - and a general trend of islamophobia, Caucasians and Central Asians have, according to civil society organizations, become major victims of manifestations of racism, discrimination and xenophobia [...]

In the months that followed the visit, the Special Rapporteur was informed by human rights organizations of manifestations of growing intolerance and hostility towards Caucasians, particularly Chechens, in the city of Kondopoga, in the Republic of Carelia, during the first days of September 2006, and towards the Georgian community, following the arrest in Georgia of four Russian military officers on 27 September 2006. The Special Rapporteur intends to follow up on the allegations received."

ECRI, 16 May 2006:

"As concerns Chechens living outside the Chechen Republic, ECRI expresses its deep concern at many reports alleging that Chechens have been the target of discriminatory measures on the part of the authorities. Such discrimination is reported to occur particularly as regards policing and the administration of justice...[ECRI] wishes to recall here that these issues concern among others, discriminatory and abusive identity checks in the street, searches of premises, fabrication of fake evidence resulting in the imprisonment of innocent persons and arbitrary refusal of residence registration stamps. ECRI also notes with concern that the majority population increasingly associates Chechens and other Caucasians with terrorists. Most Chechens and other Caucasians are therefore under suspicion, a situation which brings about cases of racial discrimination, for instance in housing and employment sectors, racist hate speech expressed in public, particularly in the media, and even racist violence, sometimes followed by the death of the victims. The pressure on Chechens becomes apparently stronger in the aftermath of each terrorist attack against the Russian population."

Society for Threatened Peoples, 27 February 2007:

"The Russian Federation is going through rapid growth of aggressive Russian nationalism. Ethnic xenophobia increased dramatically. The majority of Russian citizens share xenophobic views... Violence has become increasingly demonstrative. Murders in dark alleys are replaced by murders in public places in broad daylight. The number of hate crimes is highest in Moscow and St. Petersburg. With regard to the victims, one can state that only dark skinned people who are relatively rare in Russia and highly noticeable have a higher risk of being targeted than people from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Increasingly, though, also anti-fascists, punks, rappers and anti-racism activists become victims of attacks. Even though the Russian law enforcement agencies make an effort to get a hold on the perpetrators, there still is some degree of impunity. It also seems as if court sentences do not stop the xenophobic groups from action against their victims."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.24:

"Several quite serious conflicts have been registered in the region over the past few years, which resulted in local Cossacks taking decisions at the gatherings to "evict Chechens from the territory of the district," – it happened in the Kletsky District and the Surovikino District.

Often local residents – and not only in the Volgograd Region, but in other areas as well – look askance at women from Chechnya, who have expensive jewelry. Not been aware of traditions of those people, they think that they must be very rich.

However, historically, there has never been stability in the Caucasus, so, starting from her birth people there always try to buy a girl gold items, so that in the future it could be her reserve for a particularly difficult situation. Therefore, every woman in the Caucasus always has earrings and rings, which she always wears to keep them always at hand, since in a difficult situation they are a means of survival for her entire family

[...] The situation of IDPs from the Chechen Republic can be described as being more difficult as compared to migrants from the CIS countries, due to the following reasons:

- IDPs have arrived from the combat operations zone, having suffered a serious stress;
- virtually all of them have been deprived of property and even personal belongings;

- many people have lost their relatives;
- because of the growing xenophobia, the attitudes of local people towards former residents of the Chechen Republic are often negative;
- units of the Ministry of Defense and the Interior Ministry forces, involved in hostilities in Chechnya since 1994, are suffering losses and this also gives rise to negative attitudes towards IDPs; and
- historically, the Cossacks in Russia have been suppressors of "non-Russians" and residents of the majority of districts of the Volgograd Region see themselves as Cossacks.

Studying the situation of residents of Chechnya who have become forced migrants since the start of hostilities in 1994, we are becoming increasingly convinced that in every region of Russia IDPs from Chechnya, especially ethnic Chechens, find themselves outside the law and are subjected to cruel discrimination on the part of the authorities and the society.

A significant portion of th[ose who have left the North Caucasus to live elsewhere in Russia] have so far failed to integrate themselves into local life on the territory of Russia...There are no organizations in Russia which would provide internally displaced persons with housing, jobs or financial support. Since 1999, a forced migrant status has been the only thing that gives IDPs a hope to get a minimum support from the state and also serves as some guarantee that his social rights could be fulfilled."

Prague Watchdog, 11 May 2007:

"The Russian special services have blamed Chechens for a planned bomb attack in Moscow. Several men, Chechen nationals, have already been detained.

One of the detainees is Umar Batukayev, a 24-year-old student at the Academy of Economics and Law. His father, Abdul-Rashid Batukayev believes that his son has nothing to do with what happened...

"An elderly woman who was out walking her dog on Profsoyuznaya Street found a car in which there were explosives. After that, they began to round up all the young Chechens living nearby, ostensibly to ascertain the owner of the car. My son also discovered that he'd been followed all the way from school. He asked them what they were doing and they said they were from the Federal Security Service (FSB), and immediately seized him. Then they came to our place and conducted a search, but they didn't find anything either at our place or on him. It's an attempt to frame us by making out that he's the owner of the car. It's just another round of harassment of Chechens," Batukayev's father said.

On Wednesday May 9 Russian police announced that a terrorist attack involving a car bomb had been prevented in Moscow. And today the FSB has announced the arrest of a "terrorist group mainly composed of migrants from the North Caucasus".

The "Chechen trace" - the blaming of persons of Chechen ethnicity for major crimes - was used intensively at the beginning of the second Chechen war in order to prepare the population psychologically for a new military campaign."

Prague Watchdog, 29 October 2006:

"Ethnic Chechens living in the village of Yandyki in the Limansky district of the South Russian province of Astrakhanskaya Oblast, where just over a year ago inter-ethnic riots took place, are still suffering from pressure on the part of local nationalists.

Almost every day the places where Chechens live are subjected to the throwing of stones, bottles and notes containing threats that if they do not leave the district and the Oblast they may expect to be killed.

The authorities do nothing, claiming they are unable to establish the identity of the authors of these notes, but most of the Chechens tend to the view that they are quite simply turning a blind eye to the problem. Because of all this the Chechens, the majority of whom were born and grew up in Yandyki, are living in a virtual state of siege. "They can't just drop everything and leave, since nearly all of them earn their livelihoods from sheep, cows and horses", says Leyla Abdulazizova, one of the residents.

The situation in Yandyki became particularly inflamed after events in Karelia's Kondopoga. Chechens could not go out into the street without encountering jeers and threats by their Russian and Kalmyk neighbours. "It's not that they refuse to greet us, but rather that we feel something terrible may happen against us. We seek protection from the authorities, but they don't give us any. We feel a hostile attitude around us," says Leyla.

It may be useful to recall how these events began. It all happened along the usual lines. In mid-August 2005 an everyday dispute between Chechens and Kalmyks provoked riots and anti-Chechen pogroms in this village. On August 18 almost all the young people and adults armed themselves with baseball bats and pieces of steel gridding and fencing and then marched through the village, beating Chechen men and women within an inch of their lives. Six houses in which Chechens lived were set on fire. As a result they were left more or less homeless, robbed at a single stroke of all they had accumulated and acquired over long years.

It all ended in the much-trumpeted trials of twelve Chechens who were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, while two Kalmyks accused of arson were given short sentences.

Yandyki's Chechen residents appealed to various official bodies, demanding that the damage inflicted on them in the course of the pogroms be acknowledged and compensated for. They even appealed to President Putin in an open letter, demanding to know once and for all whether they were citizens of Russia like the representatives of other ethnic groups, with all the responsibilities and rights that entailed. If the answer was yes, they asked for compensation, and for a guarantee of safety so they could continue to live in the Oblast. But there has been no reaction.

It should be noted that this is not the first anti-Chechen pogrom in the Limansky district of Astrakhanskaya Oblast. Before the outbreak of the first Chechen war in 1993, on Fisherman's Day, a holiday that is usually accompanied by the consumption of enormous quantities of alcohol, the residents of one of the villages set fire to several houses and beat up many Chechens. The incident was later investigated and those responsible were punished after the intervention of the oblast authorities and sharp statements by Ichkerian President Dzhokhar Dudayev, with threats to stop deliveries of oil and fuel to the district."

Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 15 August 2005:

"The level of xenophobia remained constantly high in the first half of 2005. According to different sociological surveys the percentage of supporters of xenophobic viewpoints fluctuated between 50 and 60 percents. Among the nations - top targets of population's dislike and hostility are, first of all, Chechens (14.8%), Azeri (5.1%), Armenians (4.1%) and migrants from the Caucasus in general (6.0%).

Mass migration from the Caucasus and Central Asia resulted in clash of mentalities and together with shortcomings in migration policy promoted aggravation of negative attitudes towards the immigrants. Two Chechen wars accompanied by anti-Chechen campaigns in mass media also

played a significant role in the growth of xenophobia. The country still lacks the state policy of combating xenophobia and activities of radical nationalists."

For more information about the Kondopoga riots, please see "[Russia: Clashes in Karelia underscore mounting ethnic tensions](#)," RFE/RL, 4 September 2006.

For more details on the treatment of Chechens in other parts of Russia see the [report of the Human Rights Ombudsman for the year 2006 \(Доклад Уполномоченного по правам человека в Российской Федерации за 2006 год\)](#) and the [Open Society Institute's 2006 report "Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro"](#).

Significant reconstruction in Chechnya (2007)

- Grozny has undergone visible reconstruction, with repaired houses, pathways, alleys, boulevards and parks
- Argun and Gudermes have also been reconstructed
- However, indoor plumbing and sewerage is lacking, hostilities continue and a climate of fear prevails

Caucasian Knot, 26 July 2007:

"Tatiana Lokshina, head of the "Demos" Centre, told about the life of the modern Grozny; some quotations are given below:

"The appearance of Grozny is a heap of repaired houses; it includes beautiful pathways, alleys, boulevards and mini-parks. ...These are the positive moments, which cannot remain unnoticed in today's Grozny. On the other hand, there is an ocean of absurdity. For example, fountains are playing in the city, but there is no water in the taps and the sewerage is inoperative.

[...] Chechnya is still overwhelmed by the atmosphere of fear. People understand that they are now allowed to speak freely and as much as they would about the crimes committed by employees of federal forces in the Chechen Republic before 2004, but they cannot even open the mouth on the crimes related to the actions of local power agencies."

Research Centre for East European Studies, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 5 June 2007:

"In the short term, Kadyrov's consolidation of power has been a stabilizing factor in Chechnya. Using proceeds from a mandatory payroll tax on state-sector employees, Kadyrov has launched reconstruction projects in several urban areas, especially Grozny and his hometown, Gudermes, with impressive results. Funding for reconstruction in 2006 and 2007 was 500 percent higher than in 2004, when Kadyrov's father was assassinated. Equally important, in 2006 Kadyrov managed to convince hundreds of former guerrillas to switch sides and join the Kadyrovtsy. The federal government has had an amnesty program of its own for some time, but Kadyrov's personal assurances (and payoff s) to former rebels made a vital difference. Kadyrov has staunchly denied that the Kadyrovtsy ever engaged in kidnappings, torture, and other abuses for which they have long been known and feared, but he apparently did take steps in early 2007 to curb the worst of these excesses. In particular, the incidence of illegal abductions and "disappearances" declined significantly in the first several months of 2007. Nonetheless, although abuses and extralegal executions have been more carefully targeted against Kadyrov's perceived enemies (e.g., Movladi Baisarov) in 2007, normal legal procedures and restraints remain completely absent in Chechnya."

BBC, 4 June 2007:

"Since then there has been increased investment in reconstruction projects and the shattered city of Grozny is being rebuilt. While Russia is keen to highlight these signs of rebirth, sporadic violence continues."

COE, 6 March 2007:

"The Commissioner [for Human Rights of the Council of Europe] was pleased with the important progress made in the field of reconstruction of villages and cities, more particularly Grozny. He was also pleased to witness the revival of schools and hospitals. These are indispensable steps to be taken in order to implement one of the recommendations, aiming at economic reconstruction, expressed in reports of the first Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles (CommDH(2001)3, CommDH(2006)4). Thomas Hammarberg expressed the hope that these first steps be followed through and that they will lead to the creation of jobs that have been unavailable to the Chechen population. This would enhance the socio-economic situation of the Chechen Republic."

The Independent, 6 March 2007:

"Blackened, fissured and sad, the ruins of Grozny, the war-scarred capital of Chechnya, have stood almost untouched for over a decade, a must-see for a handful of curious catastrophe tourists.

A chilling monument to man's power to wreak destruction of biblical proportions on his environs, its shattered tower blocks and factories have been compared with the remnants of Stalingrad, Hiroshima and Dresden.

But if you want to see the ruins of Grozny you'd better hurry; 12 years after Russian jets first began to "downgrade" the city, a new metropolis is rising from the ashes of the old one. Brick by brick, apartment block by apartment block, and street by street, Grozny is being reborn [...]

Bankrolled by the Kremlin's petrodollars, the reconstruction is part of President Vladimir Putin's grand plan to bring stability to a corner of the world associated exclusively with war.

Mr Putin is hoping that the project will win hearts and minds and go some way to erasing the memories of two conflicts that pitted Russian against Chechen and cost the lives, by conservative estimates, of 100,000 civilians and 10,000 Russian troops.

It is a process that casts Ramzan Kadyrov, the newly appointed Kremlin-backed President of Chechnya, as "Ded Moroz" (Russia's equivalent to Father Christmas), handing out keys to flats as a king might hand out alms. State-controlled TV talks of little else. Where before there was only war and misery, now, the newscasters explain, there are only new schools and hospitals.

Though technically still classed as "a zone of counter-terrorism activity", Russia's mantra is that life in Chechnya is getting back to normal. And Grozny's renaissance is, it says, proof of that "normalisation". But piecing back together what is left of the Chechen capital is not an overnight job. Its 80,000 Soviet-style apartment blocks were carpet-bombed, shelled and riddled with gunfire in some of the fiercest fighting since the Second World War [...]

In the city centre, a huge mosque is taking shape, its four pipe cleaner-like minarets piercing Grozny's grey sky. When completed (by Turkish workers), the redbrick mosque will be one of Europe's largest, giving this mostly Muslim region a striking place of worship.

Across town, the finishing touches are being made to the city's airport. On Thursday, regular flights between the Chechen capital and Moscow are due to resume for the first time in more than a decade. A gleaming, silver-and-green metal and glass structure, the facility would not look out of place in Europe [...]

Grozny's pièce de résistance, however, is Akhmat Kadyrov Square. Landscaped with grass lawns and paved pathways, a statue of the late Kadyrov Snr dominates, defended around the clock by a two-man, Kalashnikov-wielding honour guard.

Wrought-iron street lamps illuminate the square after dark, and in the summer residents eat ice-cream at a cafe or perch on the rim of a large fountain.

Strolling across the square after picking up her eight-year-old daughter from the newly built school, Milana Alieva says the quality of her life has improved beyond recognition. "I didn't think it [Grozny] would change so quickly. I returned in 2004 and, as you can see, my child studies at that school over there which bears no traces of war. Just one year ago all this was ruins," she adds, pointing to a row of restored apartment buildings.

But though much has been done, Grozny remains very much a work in progress.

Cranes loom over the skyline, builders balance on pulley-operated platforms plastering facades, and there are still thousands of buildings in need of attention. "We're working 24 hours a day," explains Eli Isaev, Chechnya's Finance Minister.

"We have begun rebuilding three cities. We have already fully restored Argun and Gudermes and in the centre of Grozny the work is almost completed."

COE, 15 March 2006:

"It is equally evident that a certain economic revival is taking place. It is possible to see many new and reconstructed houses and much building going on particularly outside of Grozny, markets springing up, cafes, petrol stations, restaurants and shops opening up; there is traffic and bustle in the streets. Local NGOs are establishing themselves. Unemployment, however, remains extremely high, particularly for the young, and a number of buildings, streets and infrastructures remain to be restored."

For information on the reconstruction of the capital city of Chechnya, see also "[Grozny's potemkin villages](#)," Prague Watchdog, 27 April 2007.

Military action in Chechnya (2007)

- Hostilities in Chechnya have reduced, but hostilities continue in Chechen mountains, despite the fact that authorities say military action is over
- Forced displacement continues from the mountains
- Armed clashes, vehicle bombings and other violent incidents are still frequent
- Both pro-Russian and separatist fighters continue to commit human rights abuses
- Conflicting data on the number of separatist fighters remaining
- There are 52 mass graves in Chechnya according to Chechen Human Rights Commissioner

IWPR, 16 August 2006:

"Sporadic military action is continuing in the mountains of Chechnya, despite the official proclamation of peace.

"Certain villages are still being bombed and shot at," said Shamil Tangiev, head of the human rights organisation Memorial in Grozny. "People do not understand why this is happening, since the authorities have announced several times that military action in Chechnya ended in 2002; that

there is peace in the republic; a government has been formed; there is a legal system and law and order has been re-established.

"Unbearable living conditions mean that we are seeing constant displacement from the mountains to the plains of the republic. In the on-going clashes between the federal soldiers and the fighters in Chechnya's mountainous areas, the civilian population is generally the victim." [...]

"The military does what it likes here," said the villager. "They blow up houses, if they are of no strategic use to them, especially if there is no one living in them. But in spite of all this, many people, especially the elderly, want to go back to their homes. They want to be buried next to their ancestors.""

Swisspeace, 22 June 2007:

"The process of pacification in Chechnya continues, although slowly and with some set-backs [...] Secret caches of weapons are systematically being uncovered and destroyed. In the first quarter of 2007, 140 members of illegal armed groups were arrested, 27 were killed, and over 100 fighters surrendered [...] Armed clashes with illegal armed groups continued and therefore conflictive events remain on a relatively high level [...] Data on the number of members of illegal armed groups continuing the resistance appear to be contradictory. According to the military commissioner of Chechnya Gen. Leonid Krivonos, approximately 300 fighters and their direct supporters are active in Chechnya at present. They operate in small groups of 10-12 men. In 2005 the number of fighters was below 700 and in 2006 it was 400. Other official sources offer a differing assessment of the current number of fighters - up to 800."

Swisspeace, 31 October 2006:

"The bombing of villages and cities has stopped for the moment, bringing relief to the inhabitants. The bombing of mountainous regions, however, goes on."

Memorial 23 May 2007:

"Despite the fact that there are many signs of peaceful life in Chechnya, the armed conflict is still not over, although it has been greatly reduced. In the Fall of 2006, the militants suddenly became more active, and there were a number of attacks on the army and "militsia" (police) in the mountain regions.

In November, the commander of the United Armed forces, Colonel-General Yevgeny Bariayev repeated in a meeting in Grozny the statistic mentioned by the army three years ago- saying that, "there are around 700 militants in Chechnya." Bariayev stressed that, "many young people join the unlawful armed forces. The number of militants is growing. This situation cannot be solved only by the effort of the army and militsia." And he did not exclude that, "Certain heads of administration are flirting with the militant troops."

AI, 23 May 2007:

"The Chechen Republic, in Russia's North Caucasus region, is officially "back to normal". After a referendum on a constitution for Chechnya in March 2003, subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in the republic, and an amnesty for members of armed opposition groups, officials insist the conflict is over. The republic is the scene of a massive rebuilding project. Funds are being poured into the region to rebuild buildings and infrastructure wrecked during the military campaigns in the republic launched by the Russian federal forces in 1994 and again in 1999.

The recently appointed President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has stated that Chechnya is the "quietest region in Russia" and the safest. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, dispute that claim. While large-scale military operations have been reduced, the conflict continues and both sides are still committing human rights abuses..."

Increasingly over the course of the conflict, Chechen security forces have been implicated in enforced disappearances, since the establishment in Chechnya of a Moscow-backed civilian administration. The interim head of government appointed in 2000 by President Putin, Akhmed Kadyrov, later was elected President of the Chechen Republic in October 2003. His Security Service was headed by his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, who subsequently became Prime Minister and is now President of Chechnya. Members of this security force as well as other armed men in informal groups under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov, became known locally as the Kadyrovtsy, and have allegedly been responsible for numerous serious human rights violations including enforced disappearances. Another Chechen security force, the so-called "oil regiment", was formerly part of the Security Service of the President of the Chechen Republic. Formally charged with ensuring the security of oil installations in the republic, it has also reportedly been implicated in enforced disappearances and unlawfully detaining individuals on its base. In addition, Russian federal forces permanently deployed in Chechnya, headed by ethnic Chechen commanders and including ethnic Chechens in their number, the Vostok (East) and Zapad (West) battalions (part of the Ministry of Defence's 42nd Motorized Infantry Division), are alleged to be responsible for serious human rights violations, including enforced disappearances...

There remain a large number of federal forces based in Chechnya, including from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, in the mountainous areas, the federal border guards, part of the FSB. However, it is those security structures made up of ethnic Chechens, which are reportedly carrying out the majority of operations against members of Chechen armed opposition groups, during which enforced disappearances and other serious human rights violations continue to be reported.(6) The Russian Federation's Ombudsperson for Human Rights, Vladimir Lukin, has recently reportedly expressed concern that people still go missing in the Chechen republic.(7) Between December 2006 and February 2007, Memorial gathered information on the abduction or arbitrary detention of 26 people. Of these, 14 were released or bought out by relatives; three were found dead; four remained missing; and five were later "discovered" to be in detention undergoing investigation. These figures do not reflect the full picture."

IWPR, 12 July 2007:

"In his first public address to the people of Chechnya, the republic's pro-Moscow president Ramzan Kadyrov announced on July 9 that the fighting had "finally and irreversibly" ended. Chechnya was now "the most stable region in the North Caucasus", he said.

That same day, however, rebel fighters carried out an attack on a Russian military convoy in the mountainous Vedeno region of southeastern Chechnya. They blew up an armoured troop carrier that was escorting a group of trucks transporting soldiers, and then raked it with automatic fire. According to official reports, three soldiers were killed and five injured in the raid.

A few days earlier, a group of soldiers investigating minefields near the village of Agishty in the same region came under attack. One soldier was killed and several were wounded.

Such reports suggest that at the very least, the armed insurgency in the mountains of Chechnya has not been defeated and that a summer campaign by the militants is under way..."

Prague Watchdog, 5 July 2007:

"Despite the apparent calm and serenity, the situation in the Chechen Republic is starting to deteriorate. The local law enforcement agencies and the military have significantly intensified their activities..."

Meanwhile, reports are arriving from various parts of the republic, particularly the mountainous part, that small groups of guerrillas have been seen near population centres. A few weeks ago it was even claimed that the separatists had set up their checkpoints in the vicinity of one or two

villages in the Grozny district. Mention was even made of the village of Prigorodnoye, which is located just a few kilometres south of the Chechen capital [...]

The precise number of separatist guerrilla units operating in the Chechen Republic still remains unknown. Different agencies and authorities quote radically different figures. This spring, Ramzan Kadyrov announced that there only a few dozen local guerrillas and a couple of hundred Arab mercenaries were still active. Then a top Russian general, deputy interior minister Arkady Yedelev, assessed the strength of the Chechen separatist forces at about 450 "bayonets", divided into 37 "bandit groups".

ECRE, 22 March 2007:

"NGOs have also expressed concerns that the "Chechenisation"²⁸ of the conflict, repercussions against those who have applied to the European Court of Human Rights and the continuing atmosphere of impunity in Chechnya now mean that those who have suffered torture and other inhumane and degrading treatment are now much less likely to report it to NGOs and other bodies. They prefer to keep quiet and pay bribes in the hope of having the bodies of their loved ones returned to them.

In short the situation has not changed significantly since October 2004 when UNHCR spoke of the grounds for "serious concern, due to targeted persecution including arbitrary detentions, widespread violence, insecurity and violations of human rights, as well as ongoing hostilities significantly affecting the civilian population and leading to continued forced displacement".

BBC, 16 June 2005:

"A top human rights official in the Russian-backed administration in Chechnya says there are more than 50 mass graves in the troubled republic. Nurdi Nukhazhiyev told the BBC that tens of thousands of civilians had "disappeared" since 1999... "We have identified 52 mass graves. We've been raising the question of exhuming the remains and doing DNA analyses for three years now," said Mr Nukhazhiyev, who heads the Council of Human Rights Organisations of Chechnya. "The absence of suitable medical facilities here makes this impossible.""

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"In the name of fighting terrorism, gross human rights abuses continued to be committed in Chechnya, and the rest of the North Caucasus region.

...Forces subordinate to [prime minister Ramzan] Kadyrov - the so-called "Kadyrovtsi" - as well as other local pro-Moscow forces, and to a lesser degree also federal forces, continued to engage in abductions, detention in secret prisons, "disappearances," torture and falsification of criminal cases with almost complete impunity. Similar abuses were also reported from other republics in the North Caucasus, and displaced persons from Chechnya who remained in neighbouring republics were subject to pressure to return to Chechnya.

While in 2006 there were no Chechen rebel attacks on civilians, the rebels continued to ambush federal police and military as well as pro-Moscow Chechen units. The rebel movement was, however, considerably weakened by the deaths of the rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Abdul Khakin-Saidulaev."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"While the security situation is gradually improving against the background of some social and economic rebound, unlawful and violent acts continue to pose a protection challenge in the post-conflict environment of Chechnya and the neighbouring republics. This prevalence of lawlessness is not inconsistent with conflict and post-conflict conditions elsewhere, and in Chechnya and its neighbouring republics it makes protection a challenge by all partners. As an illustration of the

challenge, at least 53 civilians disappeared in Chechnya in the first half of the year according to the Chechen Ombudsman's office; the human rights organization Memorial put the number at 125. During the same period, at least 45 cases of assassination in Chechnya also were reported. These forms of lawlessness are a serious threat to individuals and to the recovery of society. They are also indicative of a wider problem of human insecurity.

On the positive side, as regards security conditions, the assistance agencies operating in the North Caucasus were able in 2006 to capitalize on the improved security environment in Chechnya compared with 2-3 years ago. The United Nations lowered its security rating for Chechnya from Phase V (evacuation) to Phase IV (emergency operations) at the end of July 2006. This has allowed the UN agencies to increase the number of day-missions into Chechnya to about 12 per month - from a maximum of 8 under Phase V...As 2007 approached, the UN is revising its security protocol and taking administrative steps toward the establishment of a UN office in Chechnya...Seven international NGOs now have offices in Grozny.

Notwithstanding those improvements, assistance agencies have faced some operational difficulties in the conduct of their humanitarian and recovery projects in the North Caucasus in 2006. While the security situation has improved over the past two years, the climate of violence continues to place aid workers at risk. Since 2004, at least six local aid workers were abducted in the region. Three of them were later found dead, two were released, and one, detained in 2006, is still missing.

[...] The security situation in the North Caucasus remains unpredictable. While there is a perceptible improvement of the security situation in the Chechen Republic, the neighbouring Republic of Ingushetia continues to record an increased number of incidents of violence and attacks against law enforcement and government authorities. The killing of the important leaders of non-state armed groups or separatist movements has put those groups further on the defensive. However, they still retain the capability to organize well-coordinated strikes against security forces. The pressure mounted by the federal and Chechen security forces on the non-state armed groups, coupled with the recently approved amnesty by the State Duma, may be seen as contributing to the improvement of the security situation in the Chechen Republic. According to official reports, more than 200 non-state fighters responded to the amnesty call and surrendered before the LEA."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 6:

"There is not even a minimum safety level provided for residents in the Chechen Republic...The security situation remains the biggest concern for residents of the Chechen Republic [...]"

Nominally the residents of TAPs are granted better security than other residents of Chechnya, since they are provided with security guards. To provide security for IDPs two to three guards from the MVD contract security are deployed in every TAP building for a 24-hour duty. However, many TAPs have been subjected to armed attacks, with guards been unable to call for reinforcement because they did not have radio sets. Besides, they were unable to repel the attacks independently. Following a number of incidents where weapons were seized from TAP guards by armed individuals, the MVD leadership decided against giving weapons to them altogether [...] It should be noted that even with unarmed guards residents on the premises of a TAP are nevertheless much safer than outside of the settlement, where they can be abducted and killed [...]"

Russian officials are saying that the situation in Chechnya has stabilized and transition has been made to the phase of rebuilding its social and economic spheres. However, if this situation is to be called stable, one has to admit that it is a stability of lawlessness and fear."

UN CAT, 21 November 2006:

"Mr. Goltayev [Government of the Russian Federation]:

While it was true that in the Chechen Republic the number of recorded terrorist crimes had risen from 389 in 2004 to 427 in 2005, and that the total number of recorded crimes for 2005, which stood at 6,802, had risen by 21 per cent over the previous year, its overall crime rate was among the lowest of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation: 220.5 crimes committed for every 100,000 persons."

Swisspeace, 23 May 2006:

"Nevertheless, the situation in Chechnya cannot be regarded as completely normal and safe. Armed clashes, vehicle bombings and other violent incidents are still frequent. There are many cases of arbitrariness from military servicemen towards the civilian population, including abductions, "accidental" firings at houses, etc., although the number of the most serious and violent incidents has decreased notably. Chechnya has entered a new period of post-conflict recovery. In late January 2006 president Putin acknowledged that fact stating that "the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya is over and the situation in some other republics of the North Caucasus is now of greater concern to the federal center."

See also [Chechen Society Today, №3](#), [Prague Watchdog](#) and [Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 7 May 2007](#), and [Chechens suffer torture "hell"](#), [Transitions Online, 24 May 2007](#).

Children vulnerable and targeted by armed groups as a result of conflict (2007)

- Young men with relatives who are former or active militants are vulnerable to armed forces
- Some young men voluntarily join Chechen rebels
- Chechen fighters allegedly enlist children into their ranks or use them to plant landmines
- Boys under 18 detained during "sweep" operations by Russian and pro-Moscow forces
- Chechen boys under 13 put in filtration camps where they are subject to physical and sexual violence
- There are some 1000 street children in Chechnya

RFE/RL, 1 August 2007:

"Many young men, especially those whose relatives were abducted and disappeared, have flocked to join the ranks of the Chechen resistance, and took part in the multiple attacks in June 2004 on police and security facilities in which some 80 people died."

Caucasian Knot, 26 July 2007:

"Magomet Khambiev, former Maskhadov's Minister of Defence who is now a respectable member of the Chechen Parliament, said not so long ago that according to his sources the number of young men who joined militants from January to April 2007 was about 300. What happens in reality? If the data on a young man has got into the database of power agencies, their members start to 'pull him up.' ...Especially vulnerable are those young men who happen to have active or former militants among their relatives."

US DOS, 6 March 2007:

"There were reports that boys under 18 were detained as part of targeted raids and security sweeps conducted by Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen forces in Chechnya.

Troops in Chechnya reportedly placed Chechen boys ages 13 and older in filtration camps where some reportedly were beaten and raped by guards, soldiers, or other inmates. The women's

action group White Kerchief (Belyy Platok) reported that some federal forces kidnapped children in Chechnya for ransom."

UN CRC, 23 November 2005:

"[...] The Committee is also concerned about reported cases of arrests and disappearances by security agents of young persons suspected of being associated with insurgency groups."

Prague Watchdog, 23 March 2007:

"The Chechen Interior Ministry's "Operation Homeless Child" has identified 1,000 children who are involved in vagrancy. Even allowing for the fact that the republic has experienced two wars, this figure is a very large one.

In the scramble for the political dividends to be obtained from various amnesties, reconstruction projects and other much-bruited activities, street children have escaped the attention of Chechen society and the Chechen leadership.

But even now, when a peacetime mode of existence is becoming quite clearly established, the numbers of such children are increasing rather than the reverse. Over the past year, some 800 of them have been discovered. And about a thousand parents have been taken to court for child neglect [...]

The lives of such children have a rather narrow focus, which is centred mostly on begging, stealing, or at best a job at a gas station. Many of them start smoking or experimenting with alcohol at any early age. The most common activity is glue-sniffing. Before the war, foreign cameramen could literally "smell out" the places where such children were hiding, and the estranged faces of young drug addicts often appeared in the world's television news.

Rustam was only 10 when the second war began. His was the usual fate of the neglected child : divorced parents, a bad stepmother, a drunken father. Now he is almost 17. He has a job as an ancillary worker on a construction site, and earns around 300 roubles (about \$12) a day. He is going to get married. He likes to remember the time when he was homeless. "They were the freest years of my life," he jokes.

"For example, there are an awful lot of homeless kids in the village of Chernorechye [on the outskirts of Grozny], where I live. They live in basements and abandoned houses. I know some of them. I even tried to drag one of them out of there. I told a police officer I knew, and he took the boy home. But then he ran away from home again. Now he's in custody, charged with a criminal offence. A lot of kids end their childhood like that – behind bars."

He is sure that such children bring shame on all Chechens, who have always been proud of their traditions. When adults see street children, they pretend not to notice them, and some just swear at them.

At one point, Rustam was put in a children's home in Ingushetia. But a few days later he ran away from there. He said he didn't like it when the staff shouted at him. He thinks it's a good thing that the children's homes are being closed down, because the children in them were not being educated but morally crippled."

Women suffer from rape and cruel treatment (2006)

- In one case of ill-treatment during detention documented by Amnesty International two Russian soldiers repeatedly raped a Chechen woman, in addition to other cruel treatment; another woman was made to go naked

AI, 30 November 2006:

"Case 9.

Torture history. 34-year-old Chechen woman who was arrested in her home in the spring of 2005 and detained for two days by Russian troops who were masked during her arrest. The examinee was transported to an empty house, blindfolded and her hands were tied behind her back. The examinee was interrogated about the other inhabitants of her village, among other things, and was tortured during the interrogation. The abuse consisted of electric shocks from an old hand generator that looked like a telephone; the examinee was raped several times by two persons and kicked in the chest and lumbar region of the back, and subjected to random blows. The examinee felt that she was "treated like a dog." The examinee was further threatened that next time her children would be detained too...

Case 17

Torture history. 44-year-old Chechen woman who was detained for 5 days in 2001 in a Russian military building. She was subjected to daily blows and kicks all over her body, her head was knocked against the wall, she was dragged down the stairs in a prone position, made to go naked, received death threats to herself and her family, was handcuffed and blindfolded and subjected to mock execution [...]"

Physical security in collective centers (2007)

US DOS, 6 March 2007, Sec. 2d:

"Throughout the year security forces continued to conduct security sweeps and passport checks at temporary settlements in Ingushetiya housing IDPs from Chechnya. These sweeps sometimes led to reports of human rights abuses or disappearances.

Following rebel attacks across Ingushetiya in 2004, federal forces conducted sweeps in several settlements housing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Chechnya. Human rights groups reported cases in which military personnel beat or verbally abused persons during these sweeps; however, the 20 IDPs they arrested were all released. Human rights groups also reported that several dozen Ingush and Chechens disappeared in Ingushetiya. As with similar operations in Chechnya, reports of beatings, arbitrary detentions, and looting usually followed security sweeps.

...Many IDPs reported that guards at checkpoints forced them to provide payments or harassed and pressured them. "

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 12:

"Nominally the residents of TAPs are granted better security than other residents of Chechnya, since they are provided with security guards. To provide security for IDPs two to three guards from the MVD [Ministry of Interior] contract security are deployed in every TAP building for a 24-hour duty. However, many TAPs have been subjected to armed attacks, with guards been unable to call for reinforcement because they did not have radio sets. Besides, they were unable to repel the attacks independently. Following a number of incidents where weapons were seized from TAP guards by armed individuals, the MVD leadership decided against giving weapons to them altogether...

Sudden passport checks keep the inhabitants of CAPs stressed out. Quite often detentions have been carried out with violations of the law and criminal cases being opened without any grounds...

In addition to passport checks, special operations are conducted in CAPs and other settlements, involving large numbers of troops and hardware. Such operations are the harshest of all; they are carried out with a complete disregard for the law: armed men wearing masks do not introduce themselves to anybody; they arrive by vehicles with no license plates and do not explain where they take away the people they detain. It is known that the detainees are subjected to severe torture to force them to make required confessions."

For examples and details of such attacks and special operations see On the situation of residents of Chechnya in the Russian Federation, Memorial, 31 July 2006.

For other examples which occurred in temporary accommodation centers in Ingushetia, see also [Information Bulletin №1005](#), Council of Nongovernmental Organizations, 23 May 2007, "[A Chechen lady-refugee kidnapped from a TRC in Ingushetia](#)," *Caucasian Knot*, 27 January 2007 and "[Two refugees from Chechnya kidnapped in Ingushetia](#)," *Caucasian Knot*, 21 June 2006 and "["Mop-up" at refugee camp in Ingushetia](#)," *Prague Watchdog*, 30 June 2005.

Law enforcement and military units in Chechnya (2007)

- Since 2003 security agencies established in Chechnya and manned with local residents, also called the "Chechenization" of the conflict
- Local Chechen residents now carrying out operations against rebels
- Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's security force organized between Second Police Patrol and Point Duty Service Regiment and Neftepolk, which are under the Ministry of Interior
- Vostok and Zapad battalions of federal Ministry of Defense staffed with ethnic Chechens
- Operative Searching Bureau N 2 (OSB-2) of the Ministry of Interior Affairs in the Southern Federal District also in operation in Chechnya
- Presence of federal forces in Chechnya remains significant

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 39:

"In the last two years the authorities have succeeded in the so-called "Chechenization" of the conflict: security agencies staffed with local residents have been set up, to which a significant block of powers to carry out illegal violence was transferred.

Following the death of Akhmad Kadyrov on May 9, 2004, the presidential security service, which consisted of ethnic Chechens and was under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov, was dissolved. The Second Police Patrol and Point Duty Service Regiment (PPSM-2) and Neftepolk [oil regiment] were formed, staffed with officers from the former security service. Both units are nominally parts of the Interior Ministry (MVD). The task of PPSM-2 is to ensure law and order in public places, while Neftepolk's mission is to guard oil installations and other industrial facilities. They are not tasked with combating terrorism; however, both regiments participate in detentions of people and are used in operations targeting illegal armed groups.

In 2005, the so-called "Anti-Terror Center" (ATC) was launched, which does not belong to any of the officially existing security agencies under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Also active in Chechnya are Vostok [East] and Zapad [West] battalions, which are staffed with Chechens and are part of the RF Ministry of Defense's 42nd Motorized Infantry Division. In addition to ethnic Chechens, they have a certain portion of soldiers redeployed from other regions of Russia.

All these and other smaller armed units have been fighting turf wars for their place in the overall power structure of Chechnya."

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"Another important recent development has been "Chechenization" of the conflict. In 2003-2005, uniformed units made of ethnic Chechens were formed in the Chechen Republic. Alongside regular police, specialized units were set up to combat rebel fighters; these units are granted the power to use unlawful force.

The largest professional uniformed force manned by ethnic Chechens reports to Ramzan Kadyrov. It consists of numerous units scattered over the Chechen territory; earlier, they were integrated in the so-called Security Service (the service per se no longer exists formally in Chechnya, but the term has survived and is now widely used both by local civilians and uniformed personnel to describe all of Kadyrov's units). The Security Service (SS) was originally set up as personal security guard of Akhmat Kadyrov, and did not enjoy any legal status then; after three years, however, it grew into a powerful, well-armed force. In 2004 – 2005, SS units were legalized mostly as parts of various Chechen Ministry of Interior divisions. Former rebel fighters make up a large proportion of SS units -

wounded, disillusioned, captured - they had hoped to benefit from the declared amnesties to return to peaceful life; instead, they were recruited to SS units, often through torture and threats of violence against family members. Those who refused, "disappeared," falling victim to summary executions. This practice continued even after the expiration of the last amnesty. In addition to "Kadyrov men" and their subordinate groups, two ethnic Chechen battalions operate in Chechnya; they are Vostok [East] Battalion (aka "Yamadayevev men" after their commander Sulim Yamadayevev) and Zapad [West] Battalion (aka "Kakyevev men" after Said-Magomed Kakyevev) and form part of the 42-th Motorized Artillery Division of the RF Ministry of Defense. Besides ethnic Chechens, these battalions include servicemen from various Russian regions. Over the past two years, members of the said forces have been promoted to virtually all key positions in the Chechen Ministry of Interior."

HRW, 13 November 2006:

"Most Chechen government law enforcement and security units originate from the personal security service of the late Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, which was headed by his son, Ramzan, who has since become prime minister of Chechnya. After Akhmad Kadyrov's assassination in 2004, this security service was disbanded, and its personnel were gradually reassigned to different branches of the Ministry of Interior of the Chechen Republic, including the Second Regiment of the Checkpoint Guard Service of the Police (PPSM-2) and the Oil Protection Unit ("Neftepolk") of the Extra-departmental Protection Service (UVO). They were also assigned to the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC), which itself was disbanded in April 2006, with personnel reassigned to two battalions of Interior Troops of the Russian Federal Ministry of Interior.

Despite changes in formal affiliation, these units continue to be loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov personally and to some of his closest allies, such as Adam Demilkhanov, head of the Oil Protection Unit and currently the vice prime minister of the Chechen government.

These units operate in a questionable legal framework. PPSM-2 and the Oil Protection Unit routinely participate in security operations, even though they do not appear to be authorized by law to do so, and make use of ATC bases, even after the ATC was disbanded.¹⁴ More important, PPSM-2, the Oil Protection Regiment, and ATC personnel detain people, holding them secretly at

unlawful detention facilities, and use illegal methods of interrogation, including torture and ill-treatment.

Another law enforcement structure in Chechnya are the local police departments (ROVD), whose top personnel for the most part were installed by Kadyrov to ensure his control over the police force. ROVD personnel process detainees within the criminal justice system and have lawful detention facilities, but personnel at some police stations—for example, in the villages of Kurchaloi, Shali, and Achkhoy-Martan—have become notorious for torture of detainees. For example, during our last two research trips to Chechnya, Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of people who had been detained and tortured by personnel of the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD.

Despite the gradual “legalization” of Kadyrov’s forces, detention at their facilities—both official and unlawful—and torture continue unabated to date. During our September 2006 mission to the region Human Rights Watch documented 82 cases of torture by these forces, 54 of which happened in 2006. The most recent of these cases were from summer and early fall of 2006.”

Prague Watchdog, 23 April 2007:

“There is still a large military presence in Chechnya, and it continues to perform the same functions as before: the fight against so-called “international terrorists” and the maintenance of constitutional order in the republic. During the past two years, which have radically reversed the situation with the armed resistance, the numbers of servicemen have not greatly diminished [...]

However, the Russian military does not occupy a central place in the everyday realities of Chechen life. To be sure, Chechen and federal law enforcers still continue to carry out joint special operations together, but in the event of a successful outcome all the laurels go to the Chechens, even though it remains an undeniable fact that the current Chechen government derives its power from the military.”

Memorial 16 May 2007:

“The presence of the Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic remains significant although their size has been considerably reduced over the past years.

The troops deployed in the republic on a permanent basis are: the 42nd Motor Shooting Division of the Ministry of Defence of the RF (around 15 thousand people) and the 46th separate operative brigade of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation and in the mountainous regions: the forces of the Federal Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia. In addition to these, elements of other forces of the Russian Ministry of Interior and special task units of the Ministry of Defence are deployed in Chechnya on a temporary basis.

The data concerning the size of the United Military Forces in the Chechen Republic are controversial. Even the data provided by the Command of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation and those provided by the Ministry of Interior differ significantly.

The majority of the troops belonging to the Russian Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence deployed in the Chechen Republic now spend more time on their deployment bases and rarely participate in active operations against militant groups. The exception would be the special task units who still actively operate in the mountainous areas.

The main operations against militants groups and underground groups are now carried out by law enforcement forces predominantly consisting of ethnic Chechens. Only recently most of these units had no legal status at all, however, by the end of 2006 the vast majority of them had been legalised in the process of “Chechenisation” of the conflict and were nominally assigned to one or another law enforcement structure...

In November 2006 the only pro-federal armed group which was not under Kadyrov's control has been liquidated. The group was lead by Mowladi Baysarov, who himself was finally assassinated...

Nevertheless, not all military and law enforcement units operating on the territory of the Chechen Republic are controlled by Kadyrov.

The battalions East and West consisting predominantly of Chechens and belonging to the 42nd motorised infantry division of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation are also deployed on the Chechen territories and are under the command of Kadyrov's adversaries of long standing Yamadayev and Said-Magomed Kakiyev.

Among other forces operating in Chechnya are the ill-famed Operative Searching Bureau N 2 (OSB-2) of the North Caucasus Operative Department of the Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs in the Southern Federal District. This armed unit which is not answerable to the local authorities and which widely resorts to torture in order to "knock" out false confessions and to trump up charges and criminal cases is currently the bone of contention between the federal and the local authorities."

AI, 23 May 2007:

"There remain a large number of federal forces based in Chechnya, including from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence, internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, in the mountainous areas, the federal border guards, part of the FSB. However, it is those security structures made up of ethnic Chechens, which are reportedly carrying out the majority of operations against members of Chechen armed opposition groups, during which enforced disappearances and other serious human rights violations continue to be reported."

Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement continues to be de facto restricted (2003-2004)

- Although federal legislation abolished sojourn or residence authorization (propiska), many regional authorities continue to apply restrictive local regulation or practices
- The impact on Chechen IDPs is that they continue to be severely restricted in their possibilities to reside legally outside Chechnya and beyond Ingushetia
- Authorities in Moscow and Krasnodar Kray appear to have the most restrictive practices
- Lack of registration and documents bars IDPs' access to essential services, such as health care, pensions and allowances, education for the children, and jobs

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

Gannushkina 2004, p. 54:

"The Russian Constitution states in Article 27 that:

(1) Everyone who is lawfully staying on the territory of Russian Federation shall have the right to freedom of movement and to choose the place to stay and reside. (2) Everyone shall be free to leave the boundaries of the Russian Federation. The citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to freely return to the Russian Federation.

In light of the tsarist-era restrictions on movements of the subjects of the Empire, as well as of the Soviet-era 'propiska' regime, the Russian government found it necessary to issue a law in 1993

regarding freedom of movement. The basic concept under this federal law has been to establish a system of registration at the place of sojourn (so-called '*temporary registration*') or at the place of residence (so-called '*permanent registration*'), whereby citizens notify the local bodies of interior of their place of sojourn/residence, as opposed to the former '*propiska*' regime, which empowered the police authorities to authorise (or deny) citizens to sojourn or reside in a given location.

Although federal legislation officially has abolished '*propiska*' requirements, many regional authorities of the Federation nevertheless apply restrictive local regulations or administrative practice. Relevant in this context is the partial failure of the State organs responsible for control of the legality of administrative acts (e.g. the Russian Federation Constitutional Court and the Commissioner on Human Rights of the Russian Federation, or Ombudsman) to effectively correct the violations of federal legislation on freedom of movement perpetrated by the various constituent entities of the Federation. In its October 2000 special report '*On the Constitutional Right to Liberty of Movement and Freedom to Choose a Place of Sojourn and Residence in the Russian Federation*,' the Russian Federation Ombudsman deplors that

violations of constitutional rights to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's place of sojourn and residence by government bodies are due not only to regulations of constituents of the Russian Federation being contrary to federal legislation regulating this constitutional right, but also to unlawful law-enforcement practices,

which are, by nature, more difficult to document and thus to contest before the courts of law.

As a result of the imperfect transition from the *propiska* regime to a registration system, local authorities throughout the Russian Federation retain the possibility to determine modalities of implementation, sometimes in a restrictive manner, of freedom of movement and choice of place of sojourn or residence. This is particularly the case in regions attempting to protect local labour markets, to control internal migration movements, or to prevent the settlement of economically or politically '*undesirable*' migrants. The impact of this on Chechen IDPs is that they continue to be severely restricted in their possibilities to reside legally (i.e., with requisite residency registration) outside Chechnya and beyond Ingushetia." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 20-23)

"The problems of registration with internal affairs organs (*propiska*) have always been acute in Russia. Now wishing to comply with the RF law 'on the right of citizens to freedom of movement and choice of place of stay and residence,' local authorities promulgate their own unconstitutional norms or limit registration in practice. In this regard, Moscow and Krasnodar Krai remain the worst offenders. Yet other subjects of the federation, following suit, create a host of problems for arriving citizens, particularly for residents of Chechnya. Harsh additional requirements, which were a major topic in previous reports (fingerprints, photographs en face and in profile, additional verifications) remain in effect and no longer surprise anyone or arouse particular indignation." (Ganushkina 2004, p. 35)

"Lack of registration or registration at a place other than one's actual place of residence are the most frequent reasons for the persecution of Chechens, and emigrants from the Caucasus more broadly, according to the Moscow police. At the same time, registration remains an almost intractable problem for the majority of Caucasians in Moscow." (Ganushkina 2004, p. 53)

"Lack of registration results in a multitude of problems for Chechens, which complicates their stay in the capital to a significant extent. Apart from the constant danger of being detained and fined for residence without registration, such problems include lack of access to free medical assistance and the impossibility of collecting government pensions and allowances, problems with enrolling children in schools and kindergartens as well as getting jobs."

IDPs from Chechnya face limitations to their freedom of movement in Northern Caucasus (2003)

- Multiethnic republics in northern Caucasus have been reluctant to receive IDPs from Chechnya
- The republic of Kabardino-Balkaria imposes a ban on the sojourn or residence of Russian citizens from other regions who do not have close family ties with residents
- Slavic regions of Stavropol and Krasnodar have also enforced limitations to the sojourn and residence of non-ethnic Russians
- In North Ossetia-Alania, local restrictive administrative practice prevents Chechen IDPs from sojourning in that republic

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

UNHCR February 2003, paras. 42-47:

"For the purpose of examining the availability of internal relocation beyond Chechnya elsewhere in the northern Caucasus, one should differentiate between those regions where the majority of the population is non-Slavic or of Muslim faith (Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Tcherkessia) and those regions where the majority is Slavic or of Christian faith (North Ossetia-Alania, Stavropol Krai and Krasnodar Krai).

The Republics of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia are multi-ethnic and are regularly confronted with tensions among the various communities. The current conflict in Chechnya was sparked with the infiltration of Chechen rebel groups into Dagestan followed by military confrontation with Dagestani and federal armed forces. Dagestan is currently hosting approximately 8,000 IDPs. Since the beginning of the conflict, Chechen fighters have used the mountainous areas of Dagestan, which borders Chechnya, as base camps. Dagestan has been reluctant to receive any additional IDPs from Chechnya. In May 2002, a powerful anti-personnel mine was detonated at a military parade in the town of Kaspiisk, killing 45 persons. The authorities blame Chechen rebel commander Rappani Khalilov for this attack.

The situation in the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia is characterised by ethnic tensions and political rivalries between the two constituent nationalities (Kabards vs. Balkars and Karachais vs. Cherkess). These two republics are mainly concerned with maintaining the equilibrium among their respective constituencies. This equilibrium is particularly fragile in Karachai-Cherkessia, where a terrorist bombing occurred on 24 March 2001 in Agidehabl village. The Federal authorities blamed Chechen fighters for the incident. Kabardino-Balkaria has been regularly cited by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation for violating the Constitution as well as federal legislation on freedom of movement and choice of place of sojourn and residence of citizens. Pursuant to a 1994 resolution adopted by the Parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria (amended in 1997), a direct ban (still in force) was imposed on the sojourn or residence in Kabardino-Balkaria of Russian citizens from other regions of the Federation who do not have close family ties with Kabardino-Balkaria residents.

Both the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions have been sanctioned several times by the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, as well as cited by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, for violating constitutional and federal legislative provisions related to freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of sojourn or residence. In particular, the Russian Federation Ombudsman in the October 2000 Special Report "*On the constitutional right to freedom of movement and freedom to choose a place of sojourn and residence in the Russian Federation,*" notes that

the Law of Krasnodar Krai on the Registration Procedure Relating to Sojourn and Residence in Krasnodar Krai implies that a person who arrives in the territories of [this constituent] of the Russian Federation and who does not have kinship or ethnic and cultural ties [in Krasnodar Krai] will face considerable difficulties in realising his/her right to freely choose his residence in [this territory].

The problem for Chechen IDPs who wish to settle or even sojourn in these two regions is not limited to restrictive local regulations. Historically, these two regions have been the bases for Russian expansion and conquest of the Caucasus. There are traditionally strong Russian nationalistic feelings among the local population of these two regions, where Cossack groups as well as the far right Russian Nationalist Union (RNU) are well established and organised. IDPs from the previous 1994-96 conflict present in these regions (where they were granted forced migrant status) are generally ethnic Russians and some of them are actively engaged in anti-Chechen campaigns. Stavropol Krai has been targeted by various terrorist acts presumably connected to the Chechnya conflict and the July 1995 attack, during which a group led by Shamil Basayev seized 1,500 hostages in the Budenovsk town's hospital (Stavropol Krai), remains a traumatic memory for the resident population.

The situation is different in North Ossetia-Alania. It is not so much local restrictive *regulations* on residence registration but rather local restrictive *administrative practice* that is preventing Chechen IDPs from sojourning in that republic. The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania is a Caucasian Republic composed essentially of Ossets (Caucasian people mainly of Christian faith) and ethnic Russians, with a significant Ingush (Muslim) minority. Most of the 35,000 Ingush were driven out of North Ossetia-Alania (to Ingushetia) during the 1992 inter-ethnic riots in Prigorodny district. More than half of them has returned since then, but returnees are encountering various obstacles with their re-registration at their place of former residence in Prigorodny. There are approximately 7,000 Chechen IDPs in North Ossetia-Alania, most of whom reside in the district bordering Chechnya (Mozdok). This is a cause of concern for local authorities who fear that the presence of Chechens puts at risk the ethnic balance in the district."

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

Food

Number of food aid recipients reduced in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2006)

- 70 per cent of monthly household budget is spent on food
- Number of food assistance beneficiaries decreased by half in Ingushetia and by one-quarter in Chechnya

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"[...] Some agencies had to adjust their 2006 programs because of late or insufficient funding. WFP, for example faced a critical funding situation in the beginning of the year, and as a result its local

stocks were depleted and General Food Distributions came to a halt. This left the needs of some 143,000 beneficiaries unattended to for 3-4 months. Upon arrival of new food shipments in April 2006, WFP and cooperating partners conducted a verification exercise which reduced the number of planned beneficiaries by 52% in Ingushetia and 24% in Chechnya for the rest of the year. Reductions were based on assessment of beneficiaries' coping strategies. In order to provide continued assistance to the 95,000 most in need, WFP felt obliged to cut food rations under the General Food Distribution. These cuts did not affect the Food-for-Education Program, while Food Fund beneficiaries were drastically cut [...]

Nearly 80 percent of the surveyed sample in both republics failed to reach the Russian Federation poverty cut-off level of US\$2.25 per person per day, and average income was reported to be as low as US\$1.31 per person per day. Monthly household expenditure is dominated by the food bill, which accounted for almost 70% of total monthly expenses."

Most vulnerable IDPs remain dependent on food aid (2007)

- De-registration of IDPs from Migration Services list in Chechnya and Ingushetia led to loss of food assistance from state for more than 138,000 IDPs
- Applicants for compensation for lost property and housing forfeit their right to state food assistance, as well as other benefits
- Most vulnerable persons continue to need food assistance

Action contre le faim, 31 July 2007:

"...access to food still remains a problem for the most vulnerable."

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"In July [2006], 80% of IDPs included on lists of recipients of humanitarian aid in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia were removed from the lists, with the argument that they did not reside in this area anymore. This measure affected more than 6,000 people."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Needs assessments in 2006 indicate that basic food relief is still important to some of the most vulnerable. While major reconstruction efforts have generated income opportunities for parts of the population, such progress has been concentrated in the urban areas. In rural areas, livelihoods have stagnated due to lack of investment and the prevailing insecurity [...]"

New Temporary Settlements were opened for the returnees [to Chechnya], but mostly to serve as food distribution points for IDPs residing in private dwellings."

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"[P]eople who have filed applications for compensations are struck off the registers for food allowances at TAPs[...] This results in IDPs, deprived of support, borrowing money against their compensation. When they are eventually paid the compensation, the IDPs have to spend it on repaying their debts and sustaining their everyday lives."

Memorial, 17 May 2006:

"Due to shortage of living spaces in state-sponsored centers for temporary residence, the majority of IDPs (132, 000) had to provide for their shelter themselves. The only assistance they received from the state was a daily supply of bread (for 6 rubles/20 cents/per person per day). In November 2005 this category of IDPs was deregistered by the federal migration services and they are no more counted as forced migrants."

Details of food aid in Ingushetia (2005)

- In 2005, residents of Temporary Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia received 1kg of flour, 500 g of sugar, 1 litre of vegetable oil, 11 tins of stewed food, 7 tins of evaporated milk; this was for a period of 2 months
- IDPs must appear individually to receive food aid and pay for their own transport to the distribution point
- Some recipients sell the food assistance

Мемориал, 30 сентября 2005 г.:

"Необходимо отметить, что гуманитарную помощь по линии УДМ ВПЛ получают регулярно. Хотя и здесь не обходится без проблем. С начала этого года УДМ Ингушетии ввела новые правила, согласно которым коменданты МКП должны сами приехать на склад УДМ в Назрани и получить помощь для всех жителей подведомственного им городка. Однако в первые месяцы лета от этой практики снова отказались: теперь каждый человек обязан лично присутствовать на складе во время выдачи и сам расписываться в накладной. Но УДМ не предоставляет автомобили для доставки выданной беженцам гуманитарной помощи к месту их проживания. Чтобы нанять транспорт и развезти ее, с каждой семьи собирают деньги. На практике возник и другой способ решения этой проблемы. Некоторые беженцы тут же, не отходя от склада, продают полученную помощь. Покупателями зачастую становятся сотрудники УДМ, причем закупка производится ими по ценам вдвое ниже, чем в подписанных беженцами накладных.

В ходе последней раздачи (середина августа) выдавалась гуманитарная помощь за апрель и май 2005 года. В расчете на одного человека было выдано:

муки - килограмм;

сахара - 500 гр.;

масло растительного - литр;

тушенки - 11 банок (по 330 гр.);

сгущенки - семь банок (по 400 гр.)"

Shelter and non-food items

Clothing and utility supplies in Ingushetia (2005)

- Government provided one packet of clothing for 4 people along with food assistance
- Electricity supply in Temporary Settlements varies and outages sometimes affect both IDP settlements and the private sector
- No access to firewood near Temporary Settlements

Мемориал, 30 сентября 2005 г.:

"В дополнение к продовольственной посылке была выдана одежда из расчета - один пакет на четыре человека. Если в семье более четырех человек, выдавали два пакета. Примечательно, что организовать примерку при получении одежды сотрудники УДМ не могут, что приводит к различным казусам: взрослым достаются детские вещи, а мужчинам - женские [...]"

В различных МКП ситуация с подачей электричества складывается по разному. В Сунженском районе, например, люди говорили, что им приходилось оставаться без электричества по нескольку дней. Но в этом они были не одиноки: света не было и в частном секторе. С начала этого года не отмечены случаи, когда какой-нибудь МКП был отрезан от линии электропередачи, не считая МКП «Танзила», где, как отмечалось ранее, находятся те, кто снялся с учета УДМ и числится как вернувшийся в Чечню. Соответственно, потребление электроэнергии здесь выше, чем отводится на количество реально проживающих людей. Хозяину двора как-то удастся решать эти проблемы, и подача электричества, пусть и на время, но все же регулярно производится.

До конца июня с проблемой нерегулярного энергоснабжения сталкивались и жители МКП «Иман» (с. Аки-Юрт). Отключения, как объясняют сотрудники УДМ, были связаны с задолженностью. Однако в летний период случаи, когда лагерь оставался без света больше, чем на несколько часов, не отмечались. Беженцы склонны считать, что в летний период потребление энергии небольшое, и поэтому о них на время забыли. Они обеспокоены и полагают, что с наступлением холодов вновь столкнутся с проблемами отключения электричества. Для жителей МКП «Иман» этот вопрос особенно актуален, учитывая, что и с газоснабжением там бывают большие перебои. В начале лета, к примеру, представители «Ингушгаза» и вовсе хотели отрезать лагерь от газоснабжения, якобы, из-за задолженности. Тогда главе администрации села не без усилий удалось урегулировать этот вопрос.

Вокруг лагеря - одни поля, жителям неоткуда возить дрова, чтобы отапливать помещения и готовить пищу. Из-за слухов о предстоящем отключении газа (а слухи часто сбываются) беженцы составляют обращения в различные международные гуманитарные организации с просьбой выдать им электрические плитки. Но насколько они им помогут, неизвестно, т.к. совсем не ясно, как будут обстоять дела с электричеством. Но люди знают по опыту, что одновременное отключение и газа, и электричества - это все же редкость, и приобретением плиток пытаются как-то обезопасить себя на время холодов."

Electricity and gas cuts in Maisky, North Ossetia (2007)

- Electricity and gas frequently cut off in Maisky, reportedly due to Government of Ingushetia arrears totaling more than 400,000 roubles
- Government of Ingushetia made some payments, but this did not always mean the electricity was turned on

Кавказский Узел, 14 июня 2007 г.:

"С конца 1992 года по сей день, беженцы прожили в этом жутком лагере, который не был обеспечен ничем. Там рождались и болели дети. Только полтора года назад мы туда поставили медицинский пункт.

Там постоянно отключали электричество и газ, потому, что теоретически, платить должны были за них осетинские власти, а платили ингушские, но Ингушетия - дотационная республика и средств не хватало. Всё, что там происходило, не соответствовало закону", - поясняет глава "Гражданского содействия".

Кавказский Узел, 6 мая 2006 г.:

"Несколько дней назад отключено электроснабжение лагеря ингушских беженцев в поселке Майский Пригородного района Северной Осетии.

По некоторым данным, отключение произведено из-за накопившегося за электроэнергию долга в размере около 400 тысяч рублей. На прошлой неделе, благодаря усилиям ингушской стороны часть задолженности удалось погасить - правительство Ингушетии выплатило за беженцев более 130 тысяч рублей. Однако подача электроэнергии в МКП до сих пор не возобновлена. В настоящее время в вагончиках по-прежнему отсутствует тепло, а дети вынуждены делать уроки при свечах.

"Давление газа в печках очень слабое, и вагончики в основном отапливались за счет электронагревательных приборов. Сейчас вот уже вторую неделю (с 27 апреля) сидим без электричества. В помещениях прохладно, нет возможности готовить горячую пищу. Свет в вагонные окошки проникает слабо, и школьники даже днем вынуждены делать уроки при свечах. Мы слышали, что ингушское правительство выплатило часть нашего долга за электроэнергию, но почему-то свет нам до сих пор не дали", - говорят беженцы.

Городок вынужденных переселенцев на окраине с. Майское стихийно образовался после осетино-ингушского конфликта. В момент образования в нем находилось более 200 жилых вагончиков, в которых проживало 230 семей. МКП не является административной единицей и не имеет официального статуса и его жители лишены предусмотренных федеральным законодательством льгот. До сих пор ни власти Северной Осетии, ни Федеральная миграционная служба не взяли на себя обязательства по возмещению расходов за потребленную жителями городка беженцев электроэнергию, а сами беженцы сделать это не в состоянии. По этой причине проблема с отключением электроэнергии существует здесь постоянно. Время от времени власти Ингушетии погашают долги беженцев, однако полностью решить эту проблему так и не удалось."

Accommodation statistics of IDPs living in Ingushetia (2007)

- Most of the Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia house 25 IDPs or less
- The majority have lived in the Temporary Settlements since 1999

- Others arrived more recently, in 2005 and 2006 perhaps showing that private accommodation is too expensive for some IDPs
- Approximately 54 per cent of Temporary Settlement residents are women; 46 per cent are men and 83 per cent of all residents are ethnic Chechen

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"As far as the size, most of the TSs (30 TSs / 37.1%) hosts less than 25 IDPs, 20 TSs (24.6%) have an IDP population comprised between 25 and 50 individuals, 18 TSs (22.2%) between 50 and 100 IDPs, 5 TSs (6.2%) between 100 and 200 and only 8 (9.9%) host an IDP population bigger than 200 individuals.

As in the Chechnya exercise, for each family, the year of arrival to the TS was recorded. Results show that most of the resident families (46.2%) reported to have started residing in the TSs in 1999, or in the year 2000 (9.2%), i.e. largely since their arrival to Ingushetia. Other sustained arrivals were recorded in the years 2003 (13%) and 2004 (9.6%) respectively, mostly in connection with the closure of the tented camps. Interestingly, some arrivals were also reported in 2005 (2.3%) and 2006 (3.1%), possibly marking the fact that accommodations in private dwellings are becoming increasingly expensive for the most vulnerable families.

The gender breakdown analysis shows that women represent 54.2% of the TSs residents, while men 45.8%.

As for age breakdown, 53.5% of the TS resident population is comprised between 19 and 60 years old, 30.9% between 6 and 18 years old, 9.6% is less than 6 years old and 5.9% represents the elderly population of 60 years old or more.

As for ethnicity, some 83% of the TS resident population in Ingushetia is represented by Chechen families, as opposed to some 15.7% that qualify themselves as Ingush. Other nationalities (Russian in particular) represent a negligible part of the TS residents (0.1%). The findings of the survey largely recall the records of the UNHCR/DRC database.

Out of the total respondents, 277 persons (4.9%) have been identified as having special needs, including serious invalidities (2.2%), widows/ers (2.4%) or orphans (0.3%)."

Poor living conditions in collective shelters in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan (2007)

- Main issue raised by IDPs during UNHCR survey in Ingushetia is poor living conditions in Temporary Settlements, followed by lack of accommodation and jobs
- Tent-like camps were abolished in Ingushetia in 2004 and IDPs moved into Temporary Settlements, which are garages, workshops of former industrial plants and former livestock farms
- Living conditions in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Chechnya are better than those in Ingushetia, though families with 5 to 6 members live in one room
- Threat of eviction for IDPs in collective accommodation in Dagestan
- Temporary Accommodation Centres have not been a temporary measure

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"In Ingushetia, the survey on the IDPs' situation in Temporary Settlements captured 1,097 families/5,710 persons residing in 81 TSs on the territory of the Republic [...]"

In an effort to analyse protection-related concerns among the IDPs in TSs, families were asked to identify in order of priority the main two problems encountered in their daily presence in Ingushetia.

39.3% of the 1,097 surveyed families did not report any particular problem in their daily existence in Ingushetia, while some 60.7% expressed having one or more issues of concern related to their permanence in the republic. The unsatisfactory living conditions in the TSs was the issue mentioned more often as the primary concern (38.9% of the respondent population), followed by the lack of accommodations in Ingushetia (17.9%), the lack of job opportunities (17.6%) and the loss of MS registration allowing free residency in the TSs (15.6%). On the contrary, only minority segments of the population identified problems such as the lack of documentation – in particular SR – (4.2%) and the lack of social services (3.6%) as problematic issues. Interestingly, fear for personal security was only mentioned as a primary concern by the 0.3% of the population, while problems with the community/authorities/neighbours were never mentioned as a primary source of apprehension.

These percentages do not change significantly when considering the frequency with which these concerns were mentioned in general, as first or second problem. In this case, the conditions in the TSs continue to prevail (30.6% of all answers), together with the lack of job (31.1%). The latter problem was in fact mentioned most frequently as the second most important issue affecting negatively the life of the IDP families residing in TSs in Ingushetia (47.8% of the most expressed second main problem)."

UN Commission on Human Rights, 26 January 2006:

"Allocation of shelter in the TACs [in Chechnya] is based on a 3.2 m2 per person rule. As a result, strangers may have to share a small unit."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 19:

"After tent camps were shut down in 2002-2004, compact accommodation points (CAPs) were set up on the territory of the Republic of Ingushetia with the help of international organizations, including some new centers, where IDPs were invited to move. These small settlements, totaling 67 and having a total capacity of slightly more than 12,000 are housed in unsuitable buildings: garages, shops of shut-down factories, on the premises of former cattle farms, etc [...]"

Substandard living conditions, lack of money and lack of adequate social support are constituent elements of the lives of IDPs [...] For instance, in Kristall CAP in the city of Nazran, a complex of houses on the left side of the settlement stands right above a ravine. Loose soil cannot stand the load and are crumbling. In some homes the back walls have already collapsed. The dwellers have patched the holes with cardboards; in some homes they have carpeted them [...] the main danger is that the soils continue crumbling and this presents a real danger of houses falling down into the ravine, which might cause serious injuries and even loss of life.

Temporary Accommodation Points (TAPs) are mostly housed in restored brick buildings that were previously used as hostels. TAPs are much more suitable for living than camps and CAPs. Living conditions there have not been changed since the time when people were first housed there in great haste. The living rooms are very crowded; many people have to sleep on the floor. Families of five or six live in small rooms. People tend to their basic needs in one and the same room: preparing meals, taking a shower, doing the laundry, etc. All this contributes to unsanitary conditions. Most TAPs lack sewage, shower rooms and laundries. It should be noted, however, that having recognized the seriousness of this problem, the Migration Agency of the Chechen Republic started to provide vehicles to take people to bathhouses on a weekly basis. It must be

said that the IDPs for whom there was no room in TAPs, often live in conditions that are much worse than these."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"While most IDPs in Ingushetia reside in private dwellings, 35% of them still live in Temporary Settlements (TS). The Migration Services subsidizes 32 of the 80 TSs so that IDPs there live free of charge. Living conditions in the TSs however remain sub-standard. Surveys conducted during the year indicate that most IDPs intend to return to Chechnya but are as yet unable to do so. An estimated 20% of IDPs wish to integrate locally but lack land and shelter support.

[...] According to government sources, Ingushetia continues to host 8,000-20,000 IDPs from the 1992 Ingush/Ossetian conflict in the Prigorodny region. Close to 2,000 of them still reside in collective accommodation. Their "Forced Migrant" status entitles them to some governmental support, such as limited temporary or permanent housing, but it is insufficient to cover their needs. In 2006, the authorities in North Ossetia-Alania revised the compensation mechanism and allocated land, opening up possibilities to achieve durable solutions. Yet, the unrestrained return of the displaced to their areas of origin in Prigorodny district still remains a contentious issue [...] The federal government has announced that solutions for these IDPs will be found by the end of 2006.

[...] About 90% of [the 6,500 IDPs in Dagestan] reside in private accommodation, while the rest live in precarious conditions in unsubsidized collective accommodation. The owners of some of the buildings used as collective accommodation may vacate them in 2007, adding to the residents' concerns about their future prospective.

[...] Naturally, the shortage of housing is a problem of a scale that can be tackled only by the government. Similarly, the establishment of employment opportunities at places of return and of appropriate infrastructure in urban centers (the most popular place of IDP return) require grand initiatives and a long-term development return.

[...] The neighbouring Republic of Ingushetia continues to host a residual displaced population, which the international community estimates at 19,000. In January 2007, some 30% of this IDP population will reside in precarious collective accommodations.

In Dagestan, IDPs lack federal support, and the Protection Working Group has been unable to work with the government to find durable solutions. Nearly 10% of the estimated 6,500 IDPs reside in precarious conditions in collective accommodation, which is not subsidized by the migration authorities.

[...] Despite these new strategies much of the population of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan resides in sub-standard accommodation and more than 150,000 persons remain displaced within the Chechen Republic. The government-supported temporary accommodation centers have proved not to be temporary, and many are still in need of significant upgrading."

Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007:

"At the beginning of 2004 MSF undertook quantitative surveys among the displaced populations in Chechnya and neighbouring Ingushetia [...] This gives a samples size of 257 households in each location [...] In Ingushetia, the population to be surveyed was divided over 143 spontaneous settlements (tent-like arrangements within empty buildings) [...] In Chechnya, the target population was those living in 20 TACs. Surveys were carried out in Ingushetia (January 2004) and Chechnya (February 2004) [...] In Ingushetia, lack of proper shelter (C: 11, 4.3%, I: 108, 38.2%) and inability to keep warm (C: 47, 18%, I: 113, 40%) was reported more frequently than in the Chechnen settlements. The two sites were equally poor in terms of toilet facilities (C: 184, 72.4%, I: 255, 90.1%) and food was a problem for one in ten (C: 34, 13.3%, I: 32, 11.3%). Almost

all respondents were dependent on charity. It should be noted that while the TACs were intended for short stay only, a substantial number of people had been there for one to two years (87, 34.1%, n = 255), or longer (33, 12.9%).

Private housing in Chechnya (2007)

- In 2006, the Chechen government counted 6732 IDPs (1277 families) living in private dwellings in Chechnya
- Over 150,000 private homes and about 73,000 apartments were fully or partially destroyed during the fighting in Chechnya
- Chronic shortage of housing in the Chechnya; available housing is of poor quality

Regions.ru, октябрь 2006 г.:

"Напомним, что по последним данным комитета Правительства ЧР по делам внутриперемещенных лиц в частном секторе республики на условиях найма жилья сейчас проживает 1277 семей (или же 6732 человек)."

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"The problems of housing quality and access to drinking water are particularly urgent in the Chechen Republic. Destruction during the armed conflict has led to a chronic shortage of housing. What is left standing is inadequate in quantity and quality, lacks dependable public utility infrastructure, and is poorly maintained. Over 150,000 private homes and about 73,000 apartments were fully or partially destroyed during the fighting. A further 2,092 private homes were destroyed and 2,335 were seriously damaged by flooding in 2002. In November 1994 living space per person in the Chechen Republic was 18 sq m per person (above the national average of 15.7 sq m per person). Total floor space of housing in the Chechen Republic today is only 12,973,000 sq m or 11.75 sq m per permanent resident. The Russian average is 19.29 sq m per person.

Current financing of residential construction in Chechnya is insufficient due to low per capita purchasing power and inadequate budget revenues. The housing problem is also aggravated by:

- slow and poor-quality construction work;
- weakness of the local building industry;
- lack of regional planning documents for the Republic;
- inadequate urban planning documentation for new housing and ineffective urban development;
- lack of ready sites for residential construction;
- underdeveloped residential and capital investment markets, and lack of modern mechanisms for regulating them and stimulating their development;
- lack of a system of loans on special terms for purchase of housing."

Housing of IDPs from mountainous areas in Chechnya (2007)

- According to a Memorial survey, 58 of 105 IDP families from mountainous villages have their own housing, while others live with relatives or acquaintances, rent or spend the night at the homes of various local residents
- Some families pay 500 roubles a month to rent a house while others pay 1000, 1500 and 2000 roubles

- Some local residents gave IDPs housing for free out of sympathy for their situation, but only for a short time
- IDPs who own homes managed to do so in various ways, including by receiving government compensation for lost property and housing, selling cattle, taking a loan, inheriting a land plot and then building with the help of family members and neighbours
- Other IDPs have half-built houses since the compensation they received was not enough to build an entire house and they lack funds to continue building
- One cow gives from 15,000 to 20,000 roubles and land plots cost 25,000 to 100,000 roubles

Memorial and Civic Assistance Committee, 13 March 2007:

"«Живут в чужом доме». Эта фраза часто звучала в разговорах коллег из «Мемориала» и наших помощников из числа беженцев как очевидный признак неблагополучия. Для большей части опрошенных этот уровень неблагополучия уже остался в прошлом: 58 семей из 105 имеют на равнине свое жилье. Остальные 47 распределились так: 19 семей живут в домах родственников (в том числе одна семья – в купленном родственниками железном вагончике, непригодном для проживания), 7 семей – у знакомых и малознакомых местных жителей, 18 снимают жилье, двум семьям жилье предоставлено местными жителями на условиях последующего выкупа, одна семья никакого жилья не имеет - ночует то у одних, то у других местных жителей.

Стоимость аренды жилья по московским меркам – ничтожная: из 9 человек, назвавших стоимость аренды, 3 семьи платят за дом 500 р. в месяц, 4 семьи – по 1000 р., одна – 1500 рублей и еще одна – 2000 р. Однако, в условиях, когда регулярные денежные доходы в лучшем случае сводятся к пенсии в размере 2000-3000 рублей, или к пособию по безработице в размере 700 рублей, а иногда и вовсе отсутствуют, ежемесячная выплата даже такой арендной платы за жилье может представлять определенную проблему.

Одна семья снимает за 500 рублей двухкомнатный облицованный кирпичом саманный дом в с. Иласхан-Юрт, другая - часть большого кирпичного полуразрушенного дома в п. Ойсхара, а третья - бетонный цокольный этаж из 2 комнат в пос. В.Нойбера.

За 1000 рублей снимают и хороший кирпичный дом в п. Ойсхара, и маленький саманный домик с окнами, затянутыми вместо стекла пленкой, в том же поселке, и крохотный деревянный домик в Гудермесе. За 2000 р. семья из 13 человек снимает трехкомнатный кирпичный дом в с. Н.Нойбера.

Совершенно очевидно, что разница в стоимости аренды определяется не только местонахождением и качеством жилья, но и наличием каких-либо неделовых отношений между хозяином и нанимателем - знакомства или едва прослеживаемого родства: в таких случаях сдают, конечно, дешевле, не увеличивают плату, снисходительно относятся к просрочке платежей. Некоторым беженцам местные жители (не родственники и не знакомые) предоставили жилье бесплатно – просто из сочувствия к их положению.

Однако многие из тех, кто живет в чужом доме бесплатно, все же находятся в напряжении - либо из-за необходимости в скором времени освободить жилье, на использование которого у хозяев есть другие планы, либо из-за того, что чувствуют неудобство, стесняя хозяев или вынужденно нарушая традиции. В одной из семей я почти физически ощутила, какое постоянное смущение (до страдания) испытывает глава семьи - человек с развитым чувством собственного достоинства – из-за того, что вынужден жить в доме у родственников жены. Поэтому для всех, кто живет в чужих домах, включая вдов с несколькими детьми на руках, главная забота - построить свой дом.

Каким образом реализуют это стремление беженцы, чьи материальные возможности должны быть, по характеру их положения, крайне скудны? Думаю, что читатель, как поначалу и мы, с некоторым недоумением узнал о том, что большинство беженцев из горных сел проживает в своих домах. Что же это за беженцы? И действительно ли они бедны, если оказались в состоянии построить себе дома?

Один беженец в селении Добыча (п. Ойсхара), на мой вопрос, как же он смог построить дом, не имея регулярных денежных доходов, ответил, что дом обошелся ему почти бесплатно: он продал свой скот (двух коров и быка) и на вырученные деньги построил саманный дом с помощью пятерых братьев (40). Думаю, что этот ответ можно рассматривать как своего рода формулу строительства чеченского саманного дома, хотя в ней и отсутствуют некоторые элементы. Но сначала о том, что в ней есть.

Скот. Действительно, для тех беженцев, которым удалось пригнать с гор свой скот, он стал основным капиталом, который они могли использовать для приобретения земельных участков и строительства жилья. Из 58 семей, построивших себе дома, 10 сообщили, что продали ради этого свой скот. При этом специально вопрос о том, на какие средства строились их дома, беженцам не задавался. Так что, расстаться со своим скотом, чтобы обрести собственную крышу над головой, возможно, пришлось и другим беженцам. (Правда, в результате они остались без основного источника их существования).

Средняя цена коровы или быка в Чечне – от 15 до 20 тысяч рублей. Значит, нашему беженцу из п. Добыча удалось выручить за свой скот 50-60 тысяч. Могло ли этих денег хватить на строительство дома?

Вряд ли, но за эти деньги он мог в начале 2001-2002 гг. получить земельный участок и приобрести часть тех стройматериалов, которые требуют денежных затрат.

Вопрос о стоимости земельных участков не был включен в опрос, но многие беженцы говорили об этом сами. Затраты на получение участков сильно различаются в зависимости от времени и места их получения. В первые годы после переселения горцев на равнину они могли получить участки за 2500 руб. (Кадии-Юрт), 8000-10000 руб. (Ойсхара), 15 000 руб. (В.Нойбера). Сейчас участки в этих местах стоят 60-100 тысяч рублей. В Иласхан-Юрте нам говорили о покупке земли за 25 тысяч рублей, в Ильинской - за 35 и 50 тысяч.

Второй важный элемент упомянутой «формулы» - саман. Подавляющее большинство домов беженцев выстроено из саманного кирпича: 36 из 58. Беженцы делают этот кирпич сами – из глины и соломы - и его изготовление им ничего не стоит, либо требует минимальных денежных затрат. Часто изготовлением кирпича занимаются женщины, которым помогают подростки. Реже встречаются и несколько дороже обходятся турлучные дома: глиняные дома на деревянном каркасе. Собственные турлучные дома были у трех опрошенных нами семей беженцев. Хозяин одного из них построил его из материалов своего разобранного старого дома в горах.

Те, у кого есть какие-то дополнительные средства, облицовывают саманные дома кирпичом: такие дома выглядят наряднее и престижнее сереньких саманных домиков с торчащими из стен «хвостиками» соломы, но с точки зрения тепла и прочности существенных преимуществ они не имеют. 9 из опрошенных нами семей имели облицованные кирпичом саманные дома в собственности.

И наконец, третий элемент «формулы» строительства беженского дома: помощь родственников. Элемент очень важен: об участии родственников – денежными средствами и трудом - в строительстве их домов упоминали многие беженцы. Некоторые говорили о том, что строить дом им помогали соседи. Но участие это в Чечне настолько естественно и

традиционно, что наверняка в той или иной степени им пользовались все, кто строил свои дома, просто не всем пришло в голову упомянуть об этом. Двум вдовам с детьми дома были построены братьями покойных мужей (5, 27). Некоторым родственники приобрели или отдали свои земельные участки (16,43,78,98). Семье одного парня, потерявшего оба глаза и правую руку при взрыве мины, участок под строительство дома подарил друг (43).

Однако, не у всех беженцев был скот, не у всех есть родственники, способные помочь деньгами, да и те, у кого все это было, вряд ли могли полностью покрыть все затраты на строительство только за счет этих источников. Судя по результатам опроса, у беженцев есть только два способа раздобыть недостающие средства: получить компенсацию или взять деньги в долг. 20 из 58 семей построили жилье, благодаря получению компенсации. 9 семей, чтобы построить дома, влезли в долги, и теперь ждут компенсации, чтобы расплатиться.

Опрос дает некоторое представление и об общих размерах затрат на строительство.

Вот, например, как беженцы определяли источники средств на строительство саманных домов:

- компенсация 65% + бесплатный участок (подарил брат-16),
- компенсация + бесплатный участок (мать отдала участок, полученный до войны - 22),
- продал много скота (36),
- скот (маленький дом в одну комнату, за участок заплатили 25 тысяч - 18),
- компенсация +скот (в том числе за участок 35 тысяч рублей – 6) ,
- компенсация 50%.+ долг + скот (в т.ч. за участок 30 тысяч рублей - 50).

О стоимости саманных домов, облицованных кирпичом, говорит тот факт, что один из опрошенных истратил на облицовку всю компенсацию, полученную, конечно, не целиком (46).

Затраты на строительство турлучного дома: компенсация + долг 150 тысяч рублей (46). У владельца кирпичного дома остался невыплаченный долг в размере 300 тысяч рублей (41).

Шесть семей живут в недостроенных домах: четыре – в саманных, две – в бетонных подвалах своих будущих домов, накрытых шифером (39,54). Эти два подземных жилища производят на свежего человека особенно сильное впечатление.

Еще 8 семей, живущих в чужих домах, сообщили, что были вынуждены прекратить начатое строительство из-за отсутствия средств.

Одна семья купила в п. Ойсхара участок за 25 тысяч, заготовила саманный кирпич для дома (все лето делали), но он пропадает, потому что денег на фундамент нет: ждут компенсацию, чтобы продолжить строительство (31).

В то же время некоторые семьи, получившие компенсацию, начали на нее возводить дома, но столкнулись с тем, что не могут завершить строительство (таких семей 6). Причина в том, что размер компенсации в ее усеченном за счет взяток виде заведомо недостаточен, а других средств у этих семей нет.

- «На компенсацию купили участок, начали строить, заложили фундамент и купили часть материала для крыши. На остальное не хватает средств» (71)
- «Получили 230 тысяч компенсации. Деньги ушли на фундамент и на покупку участка 8 соток» (82).

Рост цен – особенно на земельные участки – приводит к тому, что получение компенсации все в меньшей степени решает проблему строительства нового жилья.

А если эту усеченную и все более обесценивающуюся компенсацию приходится еще делить с другими родственниками или расходовать на насущные нужды, перспективы строительства жилья становятся еще более туманными: «Получила 140 тысяч (пополам с братом), отдали долги, проели, построить дом не можем» (30).

Остается отметить, что в с. Иласхан-Юрт действуют и другие причины, мешающие горцам строить жилье: как рассказал один беженец, он купил участок, заложил фундамент, но строить дальше ему не разрешают! (26)."

Для дополнительной информации, читайте статью "Кормильцы боевиков" стали бомжи, Чеченское Общество, 7 августа 2006 г.

Shelter situation in other areas North Caucasus (2007)

- While about 50 per cent of IDPs have their own housing in Stavropol Krai, the problem is with the quality of housing since many live in cottages, rent apartments, live in wagons, garages, barracks and at the place where they work
- In Inozemtsovo, Mineralnaya Voda region, some IDPs live in a building with no water, gas, heating or roof
- Thanks to assistance from humanitarian organizations and local administration, these IDPs were given essential items and help with fixing the roof

Кавказский Узел, 4 декабря 2006 г.:

"Жилищная проблема [в Ставропольском Крае] остается для переселенцев одной из наиболее острых. Это особенно красноречиво выражено в информации, отраженной в ответах на открытые и полуоткрытые вопросы. Так, 52,6 процентов опрошенных имеют собственное жилье: "частный дом, времянка, квартира", однако, жилищная проблема связана не только с невозможностью иметь собственное жилье, но и с плохим качеством того, что стало называться собственным за прошедшее время. Значительная доля мигрантов в своих ответах обозначили негативное состояние их "приспособленного" жилья. Согласно "открытой информации", это - использование сезонного, временного, малоприспособленного жилища - 72 ответа, в том числе: "Живем на даче" (32 ответа), "Снимаем квартиру в общежитии, жилище, построенное общественной организации и т.д." (31 ответ), "в вагончике", "в оборудованном гараже", "в организации, где работаю", "в бараке" (9 ответов)".

Кавказский Узел, 20 июня 2007 г.:

"...в регионе Кавказских Минеральных Вод до сих пор существуют места компактного поселения вынужденных переселенцев из Чеченской Республики. Так, одно такое поселение находится на территории поселка Иноземцево. Проживающие там люди ежедневно сталкиваются с огромным количеством проблем: в помещении, где они постоянно живут, нет воды, газа и отопления, осенью прошлого года снесло крышу, у людей не хватает денег на обустройство быта. Благодаря совместным усилиям СРОБО «Вера Надежда, Любовь» и Управления Верховного Комиссара по делам беженцев Организации Объединенных Наций (УВКБ ООН) людям неоднократно предоставлялась гуманитарная помощь в виде посуды, постельного белья, одежды, обуви и других предметов первой необходимости. В прошлом году помощь переселенцам оказало Ставропольское краевое отделение Российского детского фонда. Помогала с ремонтом крыши местная администрация."

Closing of Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia (2007)

- Government plans to close Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia were reversed after international appeals
- Pressure on IDPs in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya with government promises of transportation, shelter, supplies and money that seldom materialized

- IDPs living in Temporary Settlement Erzi Lada in Nazran, Ingushetia had to find alternative accommodation after Migration Services did not renew the lease of the building

IDMC/Memorial, 10 October 2006:

"In autumn 2005, it became clear that the authorities intended to close down the IDP Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia without providing the residents with any alternative accommodation in Ingushetia or in other regions of the Russian Federation. Following a resolution of the Ingushetian Chief Sanitary Inspector "On closing down Temporary Settlements of IDPs from the Chechen Republic on the territory of the Republic of Ingushetia", the owners of the properties on which the Temporary Settlements are situated received notice that they would no longer receive rent payments from the Department of Migration Affairs of the Ingushetian interior ministry, which would also stop paying bills for electricity, water and gas. Hence the life support systems for IDPs would be cut off even before they left the Temporary Settlements. As noted above, after international appeals the Migration Department gave private assurances that the Temporary Settlements would not be closed before the end of the winter. UNHCR has received an assurance that the authorities will consult with it before closing the Temporary Settlements. Nevertheless, the official government position is that the Temporary Settlements should be closed."

UN Commission on Human Rights, 26 January 2006:

"There are worrying reports of Russian and Ingush authorities forcing Chechen refugees in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya, or pressuring them to leave through harassment, threat and reduction of humanitarian assistance in the camps. Several IDP settlements have been closed, forcing the IDPs to find shelter elsewhere. The Government has offered incentives to return, including promises of help with transportation, shelter in a TAC, some humanitarian supplies and a certain amount of money. However reports from returnees indicate that these promises seldom materialize and that they are faced with inadequate housing and no means of making a living. Part of the problem is allegedly caused by corruption. People in the region reported that federal money transferred to the region for compensation and rebuilding has allegedly been misused by local authorities."

Кавказский Узел, 7 сентября 2006 г.:

"Как сообщил председатель Комитета по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев Асламбек Апаев, из ПВР беженцев из Чечни "Эрзи-Лада", расположенного в г. Назрань (Ингушетия) в районе "экажевского круга" недавно были выселены все обитатели. Причиной выселения людей послужило то, что Управление Миграционной службы отказалось продлить договор аренды помещений с владельцем фирмы "Эрзи-Лада".

Как говорится в сообщении "Совета неправительственных организаций", поступившем в редакцию "Кавказского узла", в настоящее время здесь остается только две семьи беженцев из Чечни. Остальные были вынуждены искать себе новое жилье."

Living conditions in Novy, North Ossetia (2007)

- More than 1000 people (289 families) live in Novy, a government-organised purpose built establishment for IDPs from Prigorodny district
- Living conditions in Novy better than in Maisky, according to representative of Civic Assistance Committee
- Authorities rent land to IDP resettlers in Novy and according to IDPs, they must build a house on the land within 3 years or the land could be taken from them

- With lack of employment opportunities in the village, many IDPs must take loans to pay for essential items and are worry they will not be able to build a house within 3 years
- Some families resettled to Novy have bought a cow and have planted gardens
- About 200 IDP resettlers held meeting to protest electricity outage in Novy; electricity was restored that same evening

Кавказский Узел, 14 июня 2006 г.:

"Председатель Комитета "Гражданское содействие" Светлана Ганнушкина считает, что Майский был давно обречён. По её словам, жизненные условия в посёлке Новый намного лучше.

"Есть семьи в Новом, которые уже коров купили, огород посадили. Они живут во "временках", но приличных вполне. Им дали землю в аренду. Предполагается, что когда выстроят капитальные строения, то тогда они земля перейдет к ним в собственность", - полагает Светлана Ганнушкина.

Кавказский Узел, 3 апреля 2007г.:

"1 апреля вынужденные переселенцы ингушской национальности, проживающие в поселке Новый Пригородного района Северной Осетии, провели митинг протеста в районе федеральной трассы "Кавказ".

Об этом [...] рассказал председатель Комитета по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев Асламбек Апаев. По его словам, вынужденные переселенцы вышли на акцию в связи с тем, что в поселке в течение двух суток было отключено электричество.

"В поселке Новый проживают вынужденные переселенцы, проживавшие ранее в различных населенных пунктах Пригородного района РСО-Алания. Их переселили сюда из разных пунктов временного размещения, расположенных как на территории Осетии, так и Ингушетии, пообещав решить все проблемы и создать нормальные условия для проживания - говорит он. Реальность же оказалась далеко не такой, как ожидалось".

"Газа в поселке практически нет, так как газифицировано чуть более десятка из примерно 300 установленных здесь для вынужденных переселенцев вагончиков. Поэтому люди для обогрева помещений вынуждены пользоваться электронагревательными приборами. По непонятным причинам в Новом в течение двух дней не было электричества, и люди начали буквально вымерзать в своих комнатках. А ведь здесь находится очень много детей, женщин и стариков. Доведенные до полного отчаяния вынужденные переселенцы вышли на акцию протеста и хотели заблокировать федеральную трассу "Кавказ", - рассказывает собеседник.

"В митинге участвовало около 200 человек. Затем туда прибыли представители местных властей и сотрудники силовых структур. Последние потребовали, чтобы митингующие немедленно разошлись, - сказал Апаев. Мне позвонили знакомые проживающие в поселке Новый и попросили немедленно приехать, поскольку ситуация там начинала накаляться. Мне удалось убедить людей не предпринимать действий по блокированию автотрассы, поскольку их акция не была санкционирована властями, и дело вполне могло дойти до применения силы. Ближе к вечеру свет в поселок все же дали".

Как стало известно, в поселке Новый проживает 289 семей (более тысячи человек), вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, покинувших свои дома после осетино-ингушского конфликта осени 1992 года."

Кавказский Узел, 3 августа 2006 г.:

"По словам беженцев, при переселении из Майского в п. Новый им обещали создать все необходимые для нормального проживания условия: выделить земельные участки, подвести к новому месту жительства коммуникации, в первоочередном порядке решить вопросы выплаты денежных средств на строительство жилья. Однако, утверждают они, на сегодняшний день ни одно из этих условий не выполнено.

"Как оказалось, земельные участки нам выделили не в собственность, а в аренду на 3 года. Вроде как все в рамках закона, но у нас имеются серьезные опасения. По истечении трех лет, если мы не построим на этих участках капитальные жилища, можем их лишиться. Средств на строительство у нас нет, а с получением государственной поддержки возникают серьезные трудности [...] Во-первых, органы миграционной службы отказываются продлевать статус вынужденных переселенцев и каждый из нас вынужден вступать в долгую судебную тяжбу", - говорится в тексте обращения вынужденных переселенцев."

Largest IDP camp in North Ossetia closed (2007)

- Maisky was the only Ingush village not affected by the Ingush-Ossetian conflict; displaced Ingush began to settle there in 1994 and up to 2000 IDPs lived there
- Prigorodny district court ruled in 2006 that the camp was located on pasture land and that it should be closed; IDPs living in Maisky were to move to the government-organised purpose built village Novy
- Some IDPs left Maisky voluntarily while others insisted on returning to their original place of residence instead of moving to Novy
- Maisky IDP camp closed in June 2007 by force; remaining 5-7 families refused to move voluntarily

Memorial, 28 June 2007:

"On June 13 2007 the authorities of North Ossetia have finally liquidated the largest camp of IDPs from Prigorodny District of North Ossetia, Mayski. The remaining 5-7 families of IDPs were moved to the new settlement Noviy at the border of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Now on the site of the future settlement former IDPs live in wagons [...]"

The camp was closed in compliance with the ruling of Prigorodny District Court, the verdict was implemented with application of force-IDPs refused to move voluntarily. Their demands remain unchanged: to return to places of their permanent residence in Prigorodny district of North Ossetia.

On June 13 at around 8 a.m. representatives of Ministry of Emergencies, police officers, militiamen and representatives of administration of Prigorodny District and of Migration Service of North Ossetia arrived to the outskirts of Maysky village. The refugee camp was encircled and construction workers and Ministry of Emergencies personnel started to dismantle the refugee wagons, where remained several families (around 20 people).

According to IDPs, they refused to leave their wagons and then militiamen resorted to physical force and started to drag people outside. When one of the IDPs Isa Akhriev threatened to set himself on fire together with the wagon, the militiamen beat him up with sticks and kicked him, put hand cuffs on him and placed him in a bus. Several women tried to help Akhriev, but militiamen used physical force against them as well [...]"

The decision on liquidation of the Majski camp was made by Prigorodny District Court of Republic North Ossetia-Alania on December 26 2006. The court obliged the heads of 19 families, who at the time remained in Majski to clear the illegally captured land, where the camp was located and to move their wagons to Novy settlement created in 2006 at the border of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The IDPs did not attend the court hearings, although they were notified two days in advance.

The court hearings went on without their participation and the decision was handed over to one of the IDPs. Magomed Tsurov, the commandant of the Majski camp, on January 19, although the decision came to force on January 15 2007. Thus the IDPs were denied the possibility to appeal the decision of the district court within the time period, stipulated by law.

In the end of February 2007 the IDP camp Majski was visited by deputy Executive Representative of the President in the Southern Federal Okrug, Viktor Ampilogov. At that time 27 people resided in the camp, and the camp itself was for over a year cut off electricity and gas. Recognizing the legality of the court decision, Ampilogov ensured the IDPs that the camp would not be resettled by force. IDPs repeated their demands to return to places of permanent residence in North Ossetia.

In March Ampilogov again visited the majski camp accompanied by journalists and representatives of temporary commission. The head of administration of Yuzny village B.Kasaev officially handed representatives of 5 families from Yuzny the keys of the houses. The IDPs were offered to return, and assured that their houses were released from their illegal residents. After the ceremony of handing over the keys Ampilogov and the members of the commission left the camp. The ceremony was broadcast on the Ossetian TV.

The same day four owners of the camp went to Yuzny. They were disappointed to see that in three of the houses lived the refugees from South Ossetia, who illegally captured this housing after the conflict. Refugees from South Ossetia were surprised by the news of their resettlement. According to them, no one informed them that they had to leave. The keys given to Ingush IDPs turned out to be a fiction as they did not fit the doors of any of the illegally captured houses.

The fourth house, located at Pochtovaya street 18, belonging to Kushtov Degomed Abdurakhmanovich turned out to be destroyed.

IDP camp Majski was created in 1994 on the order of President of Republic Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev. The first wagons were located in a vacant space near the railroad at the outskirts of Majski village on the territory of North Ossetia at the border with Ingushetia. Majski was the only settlement of Prigorodny District with Ingush population not affected by the Ingush-Ossetian conflict in 1992. Since 1994 over 2000 IDPs from Prigorodny have resided there.

IDP families moved into Majski up until 2006. The camp received its largest number of IDPs in 1997 and then in 1999 after the war broke out in Chechnya and many Ingush who found refuge with their relatives in Grozny 1992 had to flee again. In 2004 1235 people lived in the camp. Human Rights organizations have repeatedly stated that the living conditions in Majski do not meet the minimal standards of human shelter.

Majski accommodated only a small part of IDPs from Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz, who are still awaiting for return to their native villages. The majority of these IDPs remain in temporary accommodation centers in Ingushetia.

Кавказский узел, 18 мая 2007 г.:

"Сегодня в 10 часов утра в городке беженцев в поселке Майский в Северной Осетии началась беспрецедентная акция по насильственному выселению вынужденных ингушских переселенцев. Об этом говорится в поступившем в редакцию "Кавказского узла" пресс-релизе "ЧКНС".

По словам председателя Комитета по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев Асланбека Апаева, в акции приняли участие до трехсот сотрудников правоохранительных органов Северной Осетии, вооруженных автоматическим оружием, которые стали ломать и вывозить вагончики, где проживали ингушские беженцы.

По свидетельству очевидцев, большинство из них были в масках, вели себя крайне грубо и вызывающе. Предварительно они оцепили городок, а затем начали выкидывать из домов вещи, ссылаясь на решение суда Пригородного района, предписывающее освободить территорию, занимаемую вынужденными переселенцами, отведенную якобы под пастбище.

За день до этого, в городок беженцев в сопровождении милиционеров приезжали механизаторы на тракторах и хотели вспахать землю, сообщает источник.

На данный момент из собственного дома уже насильно выселена Цицкиева Хава, проживающая в городке беженцев. Два вагончика, в которых проживали члены ее семьи, погружены автокраном и вывезены из городка в поселок Новый.

Сообщается, что акцией командует некто Имран Вагапов, один из заместителей полпреда Президента РФ в ЮФО Д.Козака по урегулированию так называемого осетино-ингушского конфликта.

Как уже сообщалось ранее, большинство семей, проживавших в городке беженцев в поселке Майский, были вынуждены переселиться в поселок Новый. Некоторым из них пришлось переселиться из-за давления со стороны осетинских властей. В данный момент, по данным "ЧКНС", в городке беженцев в поселке Майский проживают 8 семей численностью до 30 человек.

"Самое обидное для нас, - говорят беженцы, - что мы оказались один на один со своими проблемами, никто из сотрудников МВД Ингушетии и руководства республики не стал вмешиваться в противоправные действия властей Северной Осетии".

Газета.ru, 20 мая 2007 г.:

"Из городка переселенцев в поселке Майском (граница Ингушетии и Северной Осетии) выселили семью ингушских беженцев, сообщил житель поселка, вынужденный переселенец Амир Бербузаров. По его словам, «подъехал ОМОН, милиция» и «насильно» перевезли два вагончика, в которых проживала семья Хавы Цицкиевой «в другое место». «Суть операции заключалась в том, что людей, которые хотят вернуться в места прежнего проживания, не пускают и насильно перевозят в другие поселения, резервации», - считает Бербузаров. Он добавил, что сейчас в поселении осталось 8 семей, «но находиться там невозможно, так как давно отключены свет, газ, вода».

В поселке Майский в вагончиках живут ингуши, проживавшие до осетино-ингушского конфликта в разных селах Пригородного района. Власти Северной Осетии с 2006 года настаивают на переселении жителей в специально созданный поселок Новый. Вынужденные переселенцы настаивают на возвращении в родные села.

Government vacating Temporary Accommodation Centres in Grozny (2007)

- On the order of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, all temporary accommodation centres in Chechnya to be closed by end of 2007
- Government officials have been visiting Temporary Accommodation Centres and requesting IDPs to return to their original place of residence or offering them permanent shelter or land plots
- However, according to some IDPs, their wishes or the state of their original housing have not always been properly considered and in some instances, government officials have threatened or used force to evacuate residents of the centres

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"On 19 April 2006, Chechen Prime Minister Kadyrov demanded that TACs located on the territory of Chechnya be closed as soon as possible, arguing that such camps were "a nest of crimes, drugs and prostitution." He also asserted that displaced persons prefer to stay in camps and receive humanitarian aid instead of earning their own living. The same day he ordered the establishment of a special commission to control the standards and rules of residence in the TACs.

Following Kadyrov's comments, Chechen law enforcement authorities began raiding TACs, and these operations continued throughout the summer. By exercising pressure, such as withholding water and food supply, the authorities sought to pressure residents to leave and more than 4,000 people reportedly had their names struck from registration lists. A total of nine TACs were vacated by the end of the summer.

It appeared that one rationale behind the "cleansing operations" targeting the TACs was to facilitate implementation of plans to have 10,000 Chechen IDPs residing in Ingushetia return to Chechnya in 2006. IDPs in Ingushetia were also subject to pressure to return."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"In Chechnya [in 2006] the government took measures to close Temporary Accommodation Centers (TACs) hosting IDPs, and to facilitate the return of IDPs to their places of origin. A special commission was established to verify physical presence in TACs and the condition of IDPs' former housing, and thus to identify IDPs no longer in need of state assistance. As a result, the Migration Services de-registered IDPs who had habitable accommodation. The initial implementation of this plan was imperfect. The checks on the condition of houses were not accurate, and the wishes of IDPs unwilling to return to their native villages were disregarded. These shortcomings were rectified, and the residents of the second group of TACs that were closed were provided with alternative shelter in other temporary accommodations. The closure of TACs was put on hold in July when it became apparent that the plan to close the TACs left insufficient accommodation facilities for IDPs returning from Ingushetia. New Temporary Settlements were opened for the returnees, but mostly to serve as food distribution points for IDPs residing in private dwellings. By Fall, 26 TACs were left in Chechnya, hosting around 30,000 IDPs, and 23 TSs served around 17,000 IDPs."

Memorial, 17 May 2006:

"[...] However, compared to the previous years, the situation of IDPs has deteriorated in 2006. If previously the authorities simply left them without attention, failed to provide for adequate shelter and special needs of IDPs, in the spring of 2006, there was launched a campaign for "liquidation" of the very problem of IDPs in the Chechen Republic [...]"

In May 2006 the turn came of the third category of IDPs in Chechnya, residents of temporary residence centers (TRCs), who used to be in the best position compared to others. As of March

of 2006 their numbers amount to 48. 326 people (32 TRCs (ПБП) and 14 places of compact settlements (МКП)). In spring 2006 the republican authorities launched a campaign aimed at liquidation of TRCs. In the media the republican officials announced that the refugee environment had a degrading impact on the Chechen culture. Thus, the Chair of the Chechen government, Ramzan Kadyrov made it clear that all TRCs should be liquidated in the nearest future, since TRCs were "the nest of crime, drug addiction and prostitution". The majority of the residents of TRCs have their houses intact, thus they have the opportunity to return home. "The people have become lazy, they do not want to work, and women living there have forgotten what household chores mean", - said Ramzan Kadyrov. It does not suit Chechens to live in such places, all Chechens have relatives, who should host the IDPs - considers the Chechen prime-minister.

Such announcements were received by the local authorities as a directive to action. Thus, Mr. Astamirov, the head of administration of Staropromyslovky district in Grozny, where most of the TRCs are located, declared that the temporary residence centers had to be cleared, since they were needed for schools and polyclinics. In order to implement this decision Astamirov created a special "commission", which carries out night checking raids in TRCs. Those IDPs who are not present during the checks are being issued acts of eviction. Being absent for medical treatment is not taken as an excuse by the commission.

On the directive of Ramzan Kadyrov, in May 2006 all the commandants of the TRCs have been replaced. The change of commandants was justified by the necessity to rid of corrupt administration which made money on humanitarian aid for IDPs. Nonetheless, IDPs themselves understand that the change of commandants was aimed at installing administration loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, and prepared to liquidate the TRCs.

The general anxiety is intensified by visits by representatives of district administrations and personnel of militia who come and try to persuade people to return to their places of permanent residence, but do not promise them anything in return [...]

Thus, in 2005-2006 several tendencies, characteristic of the federal policy towards Chechen forced migrants in the region can be identified:

1. Chechen IDPs are squeezed out of the neighboring regions (Ingushetia, Dagestan, Georgia) to Chechnya;
2. In Chechnya IDPs are insistently induced to move from the administrative centers to the regions of their origin, where they cease being regarded as IDPs (even though they do not live in their houses and oftentimes in their villages).
3. Under various pretexts IDPs are en masse deregistered (deprived registration according to form -7)
4. A campaign is unfold for closure of temporary residence centers for IDPs in Chechnya."

Prague Watchdog, 10 May 2007:

"By September this year, all temporary accommodation centres (TACs) within the Chechen Republic are scheduled to be disbanded and their inhabitants paid compensation, allocated housing or plots of building land or given other necessary assistance.

For the implementation of this task, last year the then Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov set up a special government commission to monitor the observance of the rules and regulations of residence in the TACs. According to some sources, during the year of its work on the republic's territory seven TACs were closed down and more than 4,000 people were taken off the migration service's register. The migration service representatives said that this resulted in savings of more than 120 million roubles.

According to data supplied by the Russian federal migration service's Chechnya section, in early April 2007 there were 25 TACs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) registered in the republic, containing 28,806 individuals or 5,069 families.

[...] The situation with regard to the rights of internally displaced persons living in TACs was discussed recently at a meeting of representatives of local and international non-governmental organizations with the human rights ombudsman of the Chechen Republic.

[...] "Both the NGOs and the Chechen human rights ombudsman's office are receiving a lot of appeals from IDPs who complain that they've been unfairly taken off state benefits and are being evicted from the TACs where they're living, even though they have nowhere to go. We also have evidence that some TAC residents are being forced to take themselves off the register, and some citizens are being made to sign documents without knowing what's in them. We've been discussing all this with the Chechen human rights ombudsman," one of the meeting's participants told Prague Watchdog.

However, the republic's authorities say that no family of IDPs will be left without a roof over their heads. Work is currently being carried out in the TACs to bring a greater degree of exactitude to the lists of people who have accommodation of their own, and those who need it."

Council of Non-Governmental Organizations, 11 July 2007:

"One of these days 20 IDP families were "voluntary-compulsorily" evicted from the TAC, located in the settlement of Kalinin in the city of Grozny. The authorities also plan in the nearest future to evict 30 families. Earlier, actions on eviction of IDPs from occupied premises were undertaken in a number of other TACs in Grozny and Argun.

In particular, such "actions" were carried out in the TACs in the settlements of Michurin and Kirov as well as the TAC situated on Malgobekskaya Street. Thus, representatives of authorities evict from TACs even those families which have no own habitation or whose houses were destroyed during the military actions. The people are allocated the land plots for construction, however neither building materials, nor any means for construction of habitation is given."

Council of Non-governmental Organizations, 27 June 2007:

"On June 21, representatives of local authorities and employees of power structures started violent actions on eviction of the displaced people from of some of TACs in Grozny. In particular, officials from Urus-Martanovski district using blackmail and threats tried to withdraw some families registered the TAC "Okruzhnaya". (Information Release no 1034 from 21 June).

According to some information, the reason for the abrupt activation of officials undertaking of illegal actions towards displace people is the instruction received "from above" saying in the shortest terms to resettle people and liquidate all TACs. All heads of district administrations and settlements were strictly told to take out within several days and to accommodate inhabitants of their districts. Trying to implement the "valuable instruction", representatives of authorities began to demand from inhabitants of TACs to sign the applications that they are ready to return voluntary to the places of permanent reside and request to remove them from the list of food beneficiaries. There is information that some IDPs signed empty forms, the others were threatened to be applied some measures, and some people were convinced that was just a formality.

The IDPs were demanded within three-seven days to release premises occupied by them. The officials promised to pay them within one month all compensations, and during 10 days to repair their habitation. Those IDPs who do not have their own habitation were offered to move temporarily to their relatives or acquaintances. Some of the residents of TACs were granted land

plots for construction, but no assistance is intended to be provided to purchase building materials or construction of houses.

Indignant with such attitude of officials the IDPs, majority of whom are large families, single mothers with children and families with disabled members, began to appeal for the help to various human rights and public organizations. The situation around the IDPs was on the agenda of the meeting of the working group, in which the representative of UNHCR Jo Hegenauer took part. The latter stated about inaccessibility of such actions.

Nevertheless, the similar action was carried out on June 21 in the TAC "Okruzhnaya" as well as on the very day against several families living in the TAC in Argun. Employees of the administration of Gudermeski district took out several families from this camp. Five of them were accommodated in Gudermes, in a former hostel on Locomotivnaya-street. This building is now in an emergency condition.

According to the people, the premises in which the family of Khabilovs (there are three small children in the family) was placed lack glasses in the windows. According to IDPs, living conditions of residing on the new place are even worse than in the one where they lived until recently.

The IDPs living in Grozny TACs also note, that officials demand from the people to release the premises in spite of the fact that most of them have no place to move in. Thus, attempts of the people to explain the situation remain without attention.

So, a family of Magomadovs lives in the TAC situated on 47, Kirov-street. There are six children in the family, and one of the children suffers epilepsy attacks. Magomadovs were granted a land plot in Uru-Martan, but they have neither means, nor opportunities for construction of a house. Here also Kokka Beksultanova lives, who in 1991 was compelled to move to the Chechen Republic from Stavropol krai as the prosecutions on the national basis had started there. The family rented apartments and was registered at their friends. The husband of Beksultanova died in 1999 and she takes care of her blind mother. They do not have their own living space in the Chechen Republic.

The TAC on Koshevoi-street, in the settlement of Mayakovski. Gumiyat Basirova takes care of her four children alone. Three of those children are under-age. Her husband died several years ago. The family moved to the Chechen Republic in 1998 and does not possess own habitation. The family of Shavkhalovs is also living in this TAC consists of seven persons. The head of the family is sick, the elder children has no work. The family is registered in a two-room apartment belonging to the mother of Shavkhalov's wife. There are already four people living in this apartment. They do not have their habitation. Madina Akhmadova living in the TAC on Koshevoi-street has oncological disease and registered in the neuropathology department. She was injured in 1995. She was operated 12 times. Now, she registered in the place of her friends.

According to inhabitants of TACs, officials of various levels are not interested in the problems faced by the IDPs. Instead of assisting the needy people, offering them more or less a comprehensible solution or a way out of this situation, representatives of authorities chose the simplest and accessible to them way - threats, blackmail and an deceit."

Council of Non-governmental Organizations, 22 June 2007:

"On June 20, in the Argun TAC, located in the former building of a technical college, employees of one of power departments arrived and in the categorical form demanded from the inhabitants of the TAC to immediately release the premises. This information was received from inhabitants of the TAC. Thus, the attempt of the people to explain, that they had no habitation to move to,

was ignored by the militaries. "Securities" demanded, that people would get out of the TAC, does not matter, where, to relatives or friends, and release building of the TAC.

Khava Nikaeva, mother of six children, the invalid of the 1-st group, lives in this point. One of her sons, who has got three children, was evicted from the room occupied by him. Nikaeva herself is in the wheel chair. The other son also is disabled, and, according to her, now is taken for operation. Earlier Nikaevs lived in Kalmykia, and returned to the Chechen Republic just before the military actions and lived in Staropromyslovski district of Grozny. They rented a cottage in the area of the settlement of Tashkala. In Chechnya the family has not got their own habitation.

At the beginning of the military campaign Nikaevs left to Ingushetia and lived in IDP camps. After liquidation of TACs in Ingushetia, Nikaevs moved to Argun. They were promised to resolve all existing problems. The relatives of Nikaeva's husband live in the settlement of Berkat-Yurt, however they do not have any conditions to accommodate the members of her family. The administration of the settlement refused to grant a land plot or habitation to Nikaevs family, explaining that they have no such opportunities. Now the large family of Nikaevs as well as Musaevs (Information release № 1034 from 21 June 2007), risk to remain without a roof due to the fault of officials who by all means try to follow the instruction of the leadership of the republic to liquidate all temporary accommodation centers of IDPs by the end of this year.

Today on June 22, the TAC in Argun was again visited by employees of one of the power departments of the republic. The residents were told to immediately begin cleaning the premises occupied by them. They were offered to move to their relatives, friends or anywhere."

УВКБ, 31 мая 2007 г.:

"В конце мая были закрыты два ПВР (в Самашках и Грозном). Всем ВПЛ было предложено альтернативное жилье. Однако некоторые ВПЛ отказались переезжать в предложенное альтернативное жилье по причине его удаленности от мест их работы. Вопрос закрытия ПВР также поднимался 15 мая на встрече представителей УФМС РФ по ЧР, правительственной Комиссии, отвечающей за тот процесс, местных администраций, УВКБ ООН и участников сектора жилья (местных и международных организаций). УФМС РФ по РЧ призвал участников сектора жилья рассматривать потребности ВПЛ, проживающих в ПВР, в первую очередь. УВКБ ООН получило запрос о предоставлении сборных домиков семьям ВПЛ, имеющим земельные участки. В свою очередь представители органов власти заявили о своей готовности предоставить постоянное жилье всем уязвимым семьям, проживающим в ПВР."

Кавказский узел, 22 марта 2007г.:

"19 марта 2007 года в ПВР, расположенного по улице Малгобекская в столице Чечни, прибыла комиссия в составе представителей администрации Ленинского района и работников Ленинского РОВД. Об этом сообщает Чеченской комитет национального спасения.

Оказалось, что комиссия должна была предложить, а в случае необходимости и заставить жителей ПВР написать заявления на имя и.о. начальника УФМС России по Чеченской Республике А.Х. Дударкаева, следующего содержания: "В связи с выездом по месту основного жительства прошу Вас снять с регистрационного учета по форме №7 меня и членов моей семьи в составе..."

Когда же люди начали возмущаться подобным к себе отношением, работники администрации пригрозили выселить всех жителей ПВР до первого апреля 2007 года, независимо от того, напишут они заявления или нет.

Обитатели ПВР пытались объяснить членам комиссии, что им некуда идти, кроме как на улицу, но им возразили, сказав, что у каждого найдутся родственники, дальние или близкие, братья и сестры, которые из приютят...

Люди готовы покинуть ПВР, если им предоставят хоть какое-то жилье..."

Caucasian Knot, 6 June 2006:

"[...] on June 5, after nine in the morning, officials of Staropromyslovski district administration and of the migration service of the Chechnya capital came to the TS. According to Natalia Estemirova, employee of the "Memorial" HRC who visited the camp of internally displaced persons, the administration officials announced that the TS must be disbanded as soon as possible, because the building should be used as a kindergarten, i.e. according to its specified purpose. The residents would be allocated places for living in other TSs of the district. The migration service officials stated that this was not their initiative but the district administration was entitled to such actions. The talk got heated. The refugees declared that they did not want to move from one TS to another and, if they were evicted, they would go to Ingushetia and ask president Ziazikov for shelter.

The Staropromyslovski district administration officials asserted that there was a list of places for resettlement. "The residents claim that they will be moved to inferior conditions as compared to the existing ones. The authorities want them to sign applications for resettlement, not having seen the new dwellings. People assume that there is a dirty trick somewhere. Those who resided in Staropromyslovski district of Grozny previously were promised to be allocated flats, from 20 to 50, but no concrete addresses were mentioned. The flats were to be allocated to disabled persons, labour veterans and other individuals entitled to privileges. There was also a promise to allocate land plots, construction materials, etc. However, people, knowing the value of such promises, did not entirely believe them. Even given this, an allocated land plot does not solve the problem because some dwelling must be built on it. There are people who applied for land plots two or three years ago, but no one has received them so far. They also promised to promptly pay compensation for the lost dwelling, but nobody believes it either. Those who have not resided in the district were not promised anything on the ground that the administration of the districts of their origin must deal with them," said Natalia Estemirova. [...]"

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.8:

"Starting from April this year, a campaign of shutting down TAPs on the territory of the Chechen Republic has been pursued. On April 19, 2006, the [prime minister] of the Government Ramzan Kadyrov held a meeting with the head of the Migration Service Asu Dudarkayev and superintendents of TAPs. At the meeting Kadyrov announced his intention to close all temporary accommodation points, since, citing his own words, they are "nests of crime, drug abuse, and prostitution. [Kadyrov] said that people have become lazy and do not want to put their homes in order. He also cited the opinion of the military who claim that members of illegal armed groups stay in TAPs for the night.

In fact, TAPs are mostly inhabited by lonely elderly people, including Russian elderly women who have nowhere to go, and by mothers of many children."

Для дополнительной информации, обратитесь к "В Чечне выселяют вынужденных переселенцев," Кавказский Узел, 23 июня 2007 г. и "В Грозном продолжается работа по ликвидации ПВРов," Чеченское общество, 8 июля 2007 г.

Most IDPs in Chechnya and Ingushetia still in need of permanent shelter (2007)

- Main obstacle to leaving the Temporary Accommodation Centres is lack of provision of adequate housing by the government
- Many IDPs unable to obtain compensation and although they have a land plot, they cannot afford to buy or rebuild housing
- Compensation program has not solved housing crisis; some 52,000 families in need of permanent shelter in Chechnya

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"The survey captured almost all families de facto residing in 32 TACs and TSs in the republic of Chechnya. Overall, 2,894 families/ 12,752 persons were interviewed [...]

Overall, only a minor portion of the families (0.2%) refuse to leave the TAC/TS at any condition.

Out of the 2,894 families surveyed, 1,212 (41.9%) stated that only one condition would be sufficient to move out of TAC/TS. The most prominent unique condition was the provision of adequate housing by the Government (60.7%) followed by the general need of having the accommodation reconstructed (19.6%), by the opportunity to receive shelter material (10.6%) and by the possibility to receive compensation for the destroyed property (4.5%). Other conditions have been only minimally expressed. Table 17

For the rest of the surveyed TACs/TSs resident families (58.1%), more than one condition was necessary to vacate the TAC/TS. Overall, considering also the respondents that have expressed more than one condition to be able to leave the TAC/TS, 5,515 answers were collected. The circumstance that appears more frequently (25.7%) is again the provision of adequate living conditions by the Government, followed by the possibility to obtain shelter material (24.0% of all conditions mentioned) and by the provision of land plot (14.2% of all expressed conditions). Interestingly enough, the condition of a full restoration of security conditions in the areas of origin has very seldom been mentioned as an accessory circumstance to voluntary leave the TAC/TS (0.2% of all conditions mentioned). The necessity to obtain another temporary form of accommodation (e.g. a box tent), was never mentioned as a unique primary need, but it appears associated with the fulfilment of other conditions in 6.8% of all answers gathered."

NGO Shadow report, 28 February 2006:

"The residents of Chechnya who have received the compensation and still do not have housing, nor employment, nor do they receive social allowances are compelled to spend the received amount on food or apartment rents. This does not solve their housing problem in any way. The rents are so high that the compensation is hardly enough to rent housing for a year. Besides, the issue of registration emerges."

Prague Watchdog, 10 May 2007:

"The contingent of people living [in temporary accommodation centres] varied, ranging from those who had accommodation of their own but tried to live on state benefits or receive free housing, all the way to those who had never had accommodation or who lost it during the two military campaigns. For various reasons they are now unable to obtain the compensation that is due to them, but are not in a position to rebuild their own accommodation independently.

Tamara S., 52, is a female resident of a TAC located on Malgobekskaya street in Grozny's Oktyabrsky district. She has four children, two of whom are minors. All five members of the family live in one small room. When they are gathered together there is hardly room to move.

[...] A month ago, her TAC was disbanded. Of the 98 families living there, 40 were placed on the acutely needy list. Some of these families have received apartments from the "refused housing" fund of Grozny's Staropromyslovsky district, while others have been allocated plots of land in the areas where they lived before the war, as well as a sum of money to build a house.

"Our family wasn't put on that list on the grounds that we have our own plot of land in the locality where we're registered. We do indeed have some land there, but the house needs to be built, and where are we going to get the money for that when we're only just barely able to make ends meet? We approached the "Vesta" NGO and asked them to let us at least have a prefabricated dwelling in the short term. But even that request was refused: we were told it was because there are no communication facilities in our plot's vicinity," Tamara says."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"While all shelter agencies agree that permanent shelter solutions are required the overall need has been unmet. In 2006, over 1,500 requests for temporary shelter (box tents) were received by UNHCR who were able to provide 600. While not a permanent shelter solution the return of people to their property, albeit in temporary shelter, is part of the recovery of communities...As agreed in the Shelter Working Group, there is still a need for a type of prefabricated housing to allow people to return to their property pending the completion of their permanent homes.

[...] The Shelter Working Group also notes that prices for construction materials increased at a rate of 20% this year, requiring more funds to assist the same number of beneficiaries."

Council of Non-Governmental Organizations, 20 January 2007:

"According to the information, received from an employee of the Ministry of housing and communal services of the Chechen Republic, currently more than 52 thousand families are in need of the habitation on the territory of the republic. During military actions on the territory of the republic approximately 58 % of the available housing has been destroyed and damaged.

Many residents of the republic expected to restore the destroyed houses after receiving of compensations. However, the constant delays and postponing of terms of delivery of compensations to the citizens of the republic for the the lost habitation and property, the notorious "payment" to officials which comprises from 30 up to 50 percent out of the sum meant for compensations, a sharp rise in prices for building materials, etc. in any way do not promote the solution of a problem of restoration of a private sector.

Payments of monetary compensations to the residents of the Chechen Republic for the habitation and property lost during military actions at a rate of 350 thousand roubles, have started in the Chechen Republic in 2003."

See also *Comprehensive Household Economic Survey of Internally Displaced Persons from Chechnya, residing in Ingushetia, Danish Refugee Council, April 2005 and Представители ООН довольны решением проблемы жилья на Северном Кавказе, Вести Северный Кавказ, 18 апрель 2007г.*

Housing solutions for some IDPs living in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Chechnya (2007)

- Over 750 apartment blocks ready for habitation in Chechnya, though two-room apartment costs approximately US 50,000
- Chechen Republic established programme "Housing for every needy family"

- Needy families include those living in Temporary Accommodation Centres and 100 renovated and furnished apartments supplied for seriously needy families in May 2007
- In another program, needy families who were living in Temporary Accommodation Centres were distributed among 85 one- and two-floor cottages renovated by the government in a village supplied with electricity and gas
- However, some claim to have ownership documents for these houses and have tried to solve the issue through the courts, but with no success

Swisspeace, 22 June 2007:

"The ration of new housing construction is currently 80% higher than for the same period last year. In the first quarter, 8,000 sq. m. of housing was constructed, not including the restoration of parks, schools, and hospitals. According to official data, 756 blocks of flats are now ready for habitation (1,822,567 sq. m.).

Real estate prices in Grozny and its suburbs have risen several times in recent years due to the peace oriented nature of the population. Today a traditional "Soviet" land-plot of 600 sq. m. around Grozny costs from \$10,000 to \$30,000. A two room apartment in a block of flats is up to \$50,000. Just a while ago, these prices were three times lower."

Кавкайский узел, 2 мая 2007г.:

"1 мая в Старопромысловском районе столицы Чечни состоялось торжественное открытие жилого поселка для многодетных и малоимущих семей, ранее проживавших в пунктах временного размещения вынужденных переселенцев.

Об этом сообщил источник в администрации города Грозного...

"Поселок состоит из 85-ти одно- и двухэтажных коттеджей. Здесь имеются газ, вода и свет, - говорит он. - Часть средств на строительство этого поселка было выделено из федерального бюджета. А вторая половина - банковский кредит, выданный под гарантии правительства Чечни. Кроме того, на деньги, выделенные из общественного фонда имени Ахмата Кадырова, в квартирах была установлена мебель."

...Согласно неофициальным данным, строительство данного коттеджного поселка, который принадлежал одному из крупных промышленных предприятий Чечни, было начато еще во времена СССР...Однако после развала Союза, все строительные работы здесь были свернуты.

Тем не менее несколько десятков человек имели документы на это жилье, где оставалось сделать только внутреннюю отделку, установить двери и окна, а также подвести воду, электричество и газ. Теперь же решением руководства Чечни коттеджи отданы бывшим обитателям пунктов временного размещения, не имевшим собственного жилья.

Как рассказал один из жителей чеченской столицы, те граждане, которые имеют документы на это жилье, выданное еще в конце 80-х - начале 90-х годов прошлого века, пытались добиться решения этого вопроса путем обращения в судебные органы и прокуратуру, но везде получили отказ. "Насколько я знаю, как минимум 23 человека имеют все необходимые документы, подтверждающие их право на жилье в этом поселке. Причем выданы они были более 16-ти лет назад. Просто за это время произошло две войны, были другие причины, по которым люди не смогли собственными силами произвести ремонт и заселиться в свои квартиры. Теперь же они остались ни с чем," - утверждает он.

"Обращения в суд, прокуратуру и другие инстанции с просьбой восстановить справедливость, ни к чему не привели. Никто не хочет заниматься этим делом, потому что боятся. Говорят, что решение о выделении жилья в этом поселке бывшим беженцам принял Рамзан Кадыров, поэтому пытаться оспаривать его бесполезно," - сказал источник."

Кавкайский узел, 17 апреля 2007г.:

"Президент Чеченской Республики Рамзан Кадыров поручил комиссии по соблюдению прав и норм проживания в пунктах временного размещения реализовывать программу "Жилье каждой малоимущей семье."

"Мы должны уделить особое внимание малоимущим семьям, на их долю выпало немало горя: пережить две военные компании, потерять жилье - это нелегкая доля," - отметил глава республики...

"Поэтому преимущественное право на жилье должны иметь жители пунктов временного размещения, многодетные семьи и инвалиды..."

Как сообщили "Домострою" в пресс-службе президента ЧР, в целях исполнения предписаний Кадыровы сегодня из отказного фонда восстанавливается около 100 квартир для остро нуждающихся жителей пунктов временного размещения. Это жилье будет не только отремонтировано, но и благоустроено на средства регионального общественного фонда имени Ахмата Кадырова...

Уже в мае текущего года из ПВР в жилые дома города переедут сто семей, лишившиеся своего жилья во время боевых действий в Чечне."

Evictions from Temporary Accommodation Centers outside of North Caucasus (2006)

- Some 1,000 IDPs from Chechnya settled in Temporary Accommodation Centres (TAC) outside of North Caucasus
- Forced migrant status of IDPs expired after a five-year term in 2005 and an extension was denied
- Other IDPs lost forced migrant status because they receive compensation for lost property and housing
- Those without forced migrant status were evicted from TACs in Tambov and Tver, sometimes by force

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"The total number of Chechen IDPs who were resettled into temporary accommodation centers (TACs) located outside the North Caucasus is approximately 1,000 people. In 2005, their situation worsened dramatically.

Those migrants whose five-year term since the date of receipt of a forced migrant status has expired are denied extension of this status by local Directorates of the Federal Migration Service (FMSDs). In the Tambov and Novgorod TACs migrants who received compensations for lost housing and property, have also been stripped of their forced migrant status. The Tambov Region Migration Administration issued Regulation No. 114 of June 6, 2005, whereby all the individuals without a forced migrant status were to be struck off from the Form No. 7 Register. After that the TAC administration filed claims with the court demanding eviction of IDPs.

As of today, all the people without a forced migrant status have been evicted from the Tambov TAC. Only two families have stayed, who have a court's decision to suspend the execution. No ethnic Chechens without a forced migrant status have been left among the dwellers of the TAC. It should be noted that none of those evicted have returned to Chechnya: they are renting apartments and work, as a rule, as salespeople in the markets [...]

In the Tver region, similar decisions were taken by the court in regard of nine families, or 42 people, from Serebryaniki TAC. In April this year, their eviction was carried out by armed OMON troops [...]

On April 20, 2006, Kulsum Shavkhalova and her daughter, Petimat, went on a hunger-strike in protest over the court decision to evict them from the TAC. Shavkhalova with her two daughters and three grand-daughters lived in Serebryaniki for six years. Members of the Shavkhalova family are reluctant to return to Chechnya, where their relatives were killed before their eyes. A year ago, the Shavkhalova family was stripped of registration at the TAC. The migration service officials keep refusing to take documents for compensation from Shavkhalova and her daughter Petimat Khatayeva, since they do not have a residence permit. They are counseled to register at someone's place in the Tver Region, but the family does not have money to rent housing and besides, Chechens are denied registration here and local people are extremely hostile towards them...

A few days after they went on a hunger-strike, an observer from the Novaya Gazeta newspaper Vyacheslav Izmailov, who came to Serebryaniki, convinced the women to stop the hunger-strike. He had negotiations with the new head of FMSD for the Tver Region Vadim Ivanov to have a temporary registration certificate re-issued to Shavkhalova's family and their documents for compensation registered. However, the intervention of the prominent journalist has helped only to postpone the eviction. Members of Shavkhalova's family have never been registered at Serebryaniki and their documents for compensation have been turned down. All the TAC dwellers are worriedly waiting for the ripples caused by the newspaper article to calm down and the pressure on them to resume.

The evicted dwellers are advised to return to Chechnya, where they have nowhere to live, since their homes are in ruins. Today there are no rooms even at TAPs, as the campaign to shut them down is in full swing [...]

Currently, only ten families have been left at Serebryaniki TAC."

See also "[Переселенцы на улицы](#)," *Новая Газета*, 11 мая 2006 г.

Government determination of housing needs of TAC residents (2007)

- Government officials conduct verifications of Temporary Accommodation Centers to determine list of actual residents as well as those who have received compensation or have accommodation of their own
- People who have received compensation or have their own housing are de-registered from the Migration Services list
- From this verification, the government aims to determine the number of people in need of housing
- Very poor families will be given first priority for housing

US DOS, 6 March 2007, Sec. 2d:

"In April Chechen Prime Minister Kadyrov announced that all temporary accommodation centers in Chechnya should be closed because they fostered drug addiction, prostitution, and other criminal behavior and because many persons living there could return to their homes. According to the UNHCR, five temporary accommodation centers across Chechnya were closed during the year [2006], with many of those residents moving to other centers (see section 5)."

Prague Watchdog, 10 May 2007:


"The working group is made up of representatives from more than twenty districts of the republic. Their aim is to make a check of those IDPs who are registered in their areas, have received compensation for lost housing, or have accommodation of their own. On the basis of their reports we'll be able to establish the exact number of people who are in need of housing. This information will be passed to the governmental commission, so it can take appropriate action.

...Both the commission and the working group were specially created so that when people leave the TACs, they're not just put out on the street, but are helped to resettle. We all realize that the republic today is unable to find housing for those who need it. And so we're addressing this issue in stages. The first priority is given to the problems of the very poor families. Some of the issues are solved by the allocation of plots of land, so that people can build houses for themselves gradually," Prague Watchdog was told by a member of the working group.

"People who already have housing of their own are taken off the state benefit register. For example, since January this year more than 20,000 people have been removed from it. Of the remaining 5,069, about 400 families have filed for compensation but have been unable to get it because at the time of filing their applications they weren't registered as living in those homes. This is a problem the republic's government has taken to the federal authorities, and I think it will soon receive a favourable resolution.

[...] The "Vozrozhdenie" (Revival) cottage village in the Staropromyslovsky district of the Chechen capital is also intended for residents of TACs which are being closed down. The complex of 85 apartments is located near the highway crossing the republic. The apartments have gas, water, electricity, and access roads. On May 1, 84 families of internally displaced persons moved into them.

However, the number of those in need of housing is much greater. How and with what financial resources the republic's authorities will solve this problem no one knows. For the fact remains that to this day there is not a single integrated programme for the rehabilitation of IDPs. Nor are funds for this purpose included in the republic's budget.



Meanwhile, according to various data, there are still 3,000 to 5,000 IDPs from Chechnya in compact accommodation points in Ingushetia. Until recently, the issues connected with the return of these people to their homeland was being dealt with by the IDP committee which was specially set up for this purpose in 2005.

A few weeks ago, following a decision by the Chechen government, this committee was abolished. The belief in the republic is that the committee had completed its task and there was no need for its continued existence. So far the return of IDPs from Ingushetia has been spontaneous. People are coming back and making their own arrangements for resettlement in their homeland."

Caucasian Knot, 24 June 2007:

"[...] On the order of the head of administration of Grozny Muslim Khuchiev, allocation of municipal apartments to citizens was temporarily stopped. The reason is that after the conducted inspections in a number of TRFs located in Grozny numerous facts of swindling have been revealed. The facts are related to the situation, when citizens who have their own flats and houses are living in the camps as forced migrants and claim for reception of municipal housing," a source from the city administration told the "Caucasian Knot" correspondent.

According to his story, at night on June 18 Mayor of the Chechen capital Muslim Khuchiev, and Aпти Alavdinov, head of the Department for Fighting Economic Crimes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Chechnya, together with representatives of district administrations conducted checks in the TRFs of forced migrants located in Michurin and Chernorechye villages (Oktiabrskiy and Zavodskoj Districts of the city of Grozny).

During the inspection voyage it was found out that some of TRF residents have their own housing facilities; others have no city registration, but, nevertheless, apply for reception of apartments in Grozny. Besides, facts have been established of fictitious divorces of married couples with the aim to receive two separate apartments.

"Allocation to citizens of municipal apartments will be renewed only after thorough examination of the persons who have submitted corresponding documents on reception of apartments or land plots within the city boundaries. First of all, it refers to the citizens who are living in TRFs, since municipal housing facilities were allocated basically to them," the official from the capital of Chechnya said."

See also [Chechen Society Today, №3](#)

Discrimination against displaced Chechens reportedly impedes their access to accommodation in Moscow (1999-2001)

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

US DOS March 2002, sect. 5:

"Chechen IDP's and the Civic Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment."

US DOS 25 February 2000:

"Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Civic Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment. The St. Petersburg Times in April [1999] reported that a similar pattern of discrimination exists against person from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg, although the housing law forbids discrimination, according to human rights lawyer Yuriy Shmidt, the chances of a would-be tenant winning a lawsuit are low because there is no legal precedent."

Health

Health system slowly recovering in Chechnya (2007)

- Public health centres in Chechnya were largely destroyed during the conflicts
- Health clinics have restarted services and there was an increase in health service capacity in 2006 in Chechnya
- However, health establishments remain understaffed, underequipped with shortages of water and electricity and poor sanitation facilities
- Health of population is still poor relative to the rest of Russia; disease is 10 times more prevalent than before the conflicts
- The ill face numerous obstacles to getting medical treatment including having to pay for services, poor availability of proper drugs and difficulties of reaching health centres and leaving family behind and the absence of specialized services in Chechnya
- Health systems in Ingushetia, Dagestan, North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria weakened because of IDP populations living there

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Agencies working in the Health Sector noted an increase in health service capacity in 2006, attributable to the government efforts to strengthen the primary health care system. Nevertheless, the health status of the population, which can be considered as an indicator of wellbeing, continues to be poor, with maternal and infant mortality rates in Chechnya and Ingushetia being two to four times higher than in the Russian Federation as a whole. While maternal mortality has decreased in both Ingushetia and Chechnya, anemia and iron deficiency remain at epidemic levels among pregnant and lactating women in both republics. Infant mortality in Chechnya has increased from 15.6 per 10,000 births in 2005 to 17.7 per 10,000 in 2006, as compared to 10.4 as the Russian Federation average, with neonatal mortality accounting for 63.8% of infant mortality.

[...] The general health status of the people in the North Caucasus republics still compares unfavourably to the Russian Federation average. Due to the collapse of the health system, access to health care is limited and the quality of health services is poor throughout the region. The health system suffers from a lack of technical, administrative and managerial skills among staff; a lack of specialized and basic medical equipment, furniture and consumables; the dilapidated state of health facilities; and in frequent cases poor water and electricity supply and sewage.

Public health needs remain greatest in Chechnya as a post-conflict area. The presence of large IDP populations in Dagestan and Ingushetia puts pressure on an already weak health system. North Ossetia-Alania and KBR require institutional capacity building and development, especially in terms of human resources for health strategic planning, which is an important component of health system development [...]

[...] The capacity building of health managers to develop strategies of health service delivery is one of the main challenges in the North Caucasus. The fragility of the overall health sector and of the public one in particular, already worsened by the crises in the region, has been exacerbated by the on-going effort of the federal authorities to decentralize and delegate the management of health activities to republican levels. The local health systems have been unable to cope with the increased demand from the vulnerable population, and the public health system has been overwhelmed by the burden influencing the modalities for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the destroyed health system in the affected areas.

[...] The absence of access to specialized health care services continues to be one of the most critical health sector problems in Chechnya and to a lesser extent in Ingushetia and Dagestan. Patients in need of specialized health care need to seek specialized services outside the republic, but the majority of the population cannot afford the high costs of outside medical treatment. In the first six months of 2006, over 4,450 people were referred to other regions of the Russian

Federation mostly for oncology, abdominal and cardiovascular surgery, urology, ophthalmology, and haemodialysis treatment."

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"As in the education sphere, the problems of morbidity and mortality [in Chechnya], which are linked to the state of public health, are difficult to solve in view of high depreciation and destruction of social infrastructure and weakness of easily accessible health care. Although the public health, education, and social security systems have restarted operations in the Republic, services are still not up to modern standards. There was widespread destruction of public health establishments, particularly in towns, during military conflict in the Republic. Medical services, particularly polyclinics and emergency assistance, are still provided in rural areas. However, density of the polyclinic network in certain districts of the Republic is only 20% of national standards. This makes it impossible to provide medical services at a satisfactory level. According to the Republic's Ministry of Public Health, disease is now 10.15 times more prevalent than before the war. Many medical services are provided in partially destroyed buildings; there are shortages of diagnostic equipment; and many clinics and hospitals lack running water, electricity, and sanitation."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 9:

"The overall state of the health care system does not allow to arrange for proper provision of services to IDPs. Medical institutions experience shortages of medicines and equipment."

On April 18, 2006, Republican Maternity Home No. 2 was officially inaugurated in the city of Grozny...However, the medical services provided at maternity homes come at a cost. In an interview to the Caucasian Knot Internet media's correspondent a Chechen woman described the operations of maternity homes in Chechnya using the following words:

"Here you have to pay for everything. You have to pay for the bed, pay for injections, pay for examination. You pay separately to the midwife, to the doctor, to the nurse, and this runs into something around three-and-a-half to five thousand rubles (105-155 euros). If you do not pay no one will give attention to either the mother or a newborn baby."

The IDPs, like most other residents of Chechnya, simply do not have that amount of money...

Because of the lack of medical assistance, unsatisfactory living conditions, and consequences of stress, children and adults often fall ill."

MSF, 12 January 2006:

"Many local health personnel fled the republic in search of a better life elsewhere. As a consequence, the once-envied Soviet system of rural health posts that fed larger hospitals is hopelessly understaffed [...]"

"Anaemia is very frequent. I think of it as a social illness in fact, as is it is so common where living conditions are bad, unemployment is high and nutrition is inadequate. We've been living in a constant state of alarm in Chechnya for so long that it ages and exhausts us and our physical health suffers [...]"

"Our work only really scratches the surface. We know that lots of the ill people who come to us need extensive tests and inpatient care. But after the way that they have suffered, they often have no money, and I know that if I tell them to go to hospital they won't."

"It's not just the money but also lots of other things, like the poor drugs and the logistical difficulties of getting there and leaving the family behind. So I try to do my best, and at least make sure that, if I can't cure someone, I can prevent them getting worse."

State of health for IDPs and access to health care (2007)

- Stress of displacement provokes poor health, as do conditions in Temporary Accommodation Centres
- More than half of IDPs in Stavropol felt healthy in 2000, whereas 40 per cent felt healthy in 2006; the number of very ill more than doubled in the same time period
- No major problems for IDPs from mountainous villages to use health services, but some IDPs must pay if their residence is not registered with the local authorities

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The housing of thousands of IDPs in temporary accommodations characterized by shortages of potable water, lack of adequate sanitation, crowded living conditions, and poor waste removal exposes them to an increased risk of water-borne and air-transmitted communicable diseases...The vaccination coverage of IDPs and the general population has been improving but still needs sustained attention from international health partners. The incidence of infectious diseases that can be prevented through vaccination, such as smallpox, is growing. The rate of rabies is increasing and is connected to the absence of planned immunization and the insufficient supply of vaccines...Laboratory conditions are inadequate throughout the region, mainly due to shortages of basic reagents and equipment and insufficient knowledge and practical skills among staff."

Кавказский Узел, 4 декабря 2006 г.:

"Формальные возможности получения традиционных медицинских услуг [в Ставропольском Крае] для переселенцев имеют положительную динамику, но не снижает остроты проблемы, связанной с состоянием их здоровья, которое имеет ухудшение у значительной части опрошенных. Если в 2000 году больше половины вынужденных переселенцев чувствовали себя вполне здоровыми или вполне здоровыми (55,8 процентов), то в 2006 году - всего 38,7 процентов, остальные - нездоровыми и очень больными. Причем количество "очень больных" увеличилось более, чем в два раза - с 4,4 процентов до 10,6 процентов. Ученые делают выводы, что здесь требуется дополнительные услуги реабилитационного и профилактического характера.

Стрессовый характер миграции объективно провоцирует последствия нездоровья, усугубленные неблагоприятными обстоятельствами социально-экономического и иного характера.

Ухудшение здоровья, характерное для большинства респондентов, не может рассматриваться подтверждающим индикатором положительной интеграции и интегрированностью мигрантов в новое сообщество."

Memorial and Civic Assistance Committee, 13 March 2007:

"Медицинская помощь

Мы задавали ВПЛ из горных сел и вопрос о доступности медицинской помощи. Нам показалось, что каких-то серьезных проблем именно в отношении доступности местной медицины для беженцев нет (изучение вопроса о ее качестве не входило в задачу обследования).

Только 15 человек на вопрос, получают ли они помощь в местной поликлинике бесплатно, ответили отрицательно. Двое из них уточнили: «Тем, кто не прописан, медпомощь не оказывают бесплатно». При этом один положительный ответ звучал так: «Бесплатно, но

платить немного надо» (40). Наиболее точными мне представляются два ответа: «в ФАПе принимают бесплатно, в Гудермесе нет» (Иласхан-Юрт), «В Ойсхара – бесплатно, в Гудермесе – платно» (29, 33). ФАПы – фельдшерско-акушерские пункты, существующие сейчас во многих селах Чечни. Работающие там фельдшера действительно принимают больных бесплатно. Да и трудно было бы им за ту небольшую помощь, которую они в состоянии оказать, брать деньги со своих односельчан. В большом селе Ойсхара работает не ФАП, а маленькая участковая больница. Персонал таких сельских больниц также слишком тесно связан родственными и соседскими узами с местным населением, чтобы брать плату за свои услуги. Иное дело врачи, работающие в поликлиниках и больницах второй столицы Чечни - Гудермеса: там больные «платят, хотя на дверях написано, что бесплатно». (В Гудермесе по распоряжению главного врача района в лечебных учреждениях развешаны объявления о том, что медицинская помощь предоставляется бесплатно). В то же время необходимость вносить некоторую плату, похоже, не вызывала у наших собеседников большого протеста: то ли потому, что плата невелика, то ли потому, что это кажется в порядке вещей."

Mental health of displaced adults and children is poor (2007)

- Nearly all IDPs interviewed for a 2004 Médecins sans Frontières study were suffering from somatic complaints, anxiety/insomnia, depressive feelings or social dysfunction
- These conditions are a result of the conflict, though displacement itself and length of stay in temporary accommodation centres are also factors
- State of mental health of children in Chechnya nearing critical because of post-war syndrome and lack of parental attention
- Mental health services are suffering the most as a result of the conflict: two hospitals in Chechnya offer psychiatric care, rural areas have inadequate psychiatric services
- To cope with psychological stress IDPs resort to denial, prayer and support of family members respective

Prague Watchdog, 2 June 2007:

"According to specialists, the psychological condition of children in Chechnya today is close to critical. "Several factors are involved, but two basic ones can be singled out," Kheda, a female child psychologist, told Prague Watchdog.

"One is so-called post-war syndrome, when people return from a state of depression to a normal condition, and all the deprivation and suffering they have endured during the war is reflected in them and though them in their children. Because of their fragile psychological make-up, children are more vulnerable to this syndrome than others."

"The second factor is the transitional period to so-called peaceful life. The children's parents try to make up for time that was lost because of the war and put all their effort into earning money for the family. In pursuit of material goods they deprive their children of simple parental attention. The kids don't get the motherly affection they need at that early age just as much as they do oxygen," the psychologist says.

The doctor explains that the children develop an unconscious desire to draw attention to themselves by the most radical methods. Without realizing it, they are simply taking revenge on adults simply for the fact that things are not the same for them as they are for their peers.

The authorities are aware of the magnitude of the problem and are making attempts to remedy the situation, as they know that when they grow up, such children could easily be recruited to join

the ranks of the armed resistance. "The only social guarantee that will work where these children are concerned is the payment of state benefits," an official government statement says.

For this reason the authorities are trying to open child rehabilitation centres. A few days ago one such centre for children and adults opened in Gudermes, and this summer another will open in Grozny, catering for 200 people."

**WHO, 5 March 2007:
"Psychiatric care**

Psychiatric care is provided through two hospitals, in Samashki – 180 beds and Darbanhi – 180 beds. The building of the Republican psychiatric dispensary is not reconstructed.

In Grozny there are 3 psychiatrists (or 7%). In rural area psychiatric services are carried out by neuropathologists and 4 districts do not have one at all. Children psychiatrist rate is 9%. District psychiatrist rate is 35%. Psychiatrist staffing is 0.2 (average RF – 1.5).

In 2006 there were detected new 317 cases (in 2005- 253). Psychiatric morbidity is 4.7 (in 2005 – 5.2 and average RF – 5.2).

In 2006 there were admitted 1203 patients in two psychiatric hospitals. The most common conditions are schizophrenia (49%), mental deficiency (32%), etc. Rehabilitation means except drugs are absent. In 2006 1779 psychiatric patients were admitted as disabled. Early psychiatric disability is continuously growing."

Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007:

"At the beginning of 2004 MSF undertook quantitative surveys among the displaced populations in Chechnya and neighbouring Ingushetia [...] Surveys were carried out in Ingushetia (January 2004) and Chechnya (February 2004) through systematic sampling. Various conflict-related factors contributing to ill health were researched to obtain information on displacement history, living conditions, and psychosocial and general health status [...]"

The average length of displacement was five years. Conditions in both locations were poor, and people in both locations indicated food shortages (Chechnya (C): 13.3%, Ingushetia (I): 11.3%), and there was a high degree of dependency on outside help (C: 95.4%, I: 94.3%). Most people (C: 94%, I: 98%) were confronted with violence in the past. Many respondents had witnessed the killing of people (C: 22.7%, I: 24.1%) and nearly half of people interviewed witnessed arrests (C: 53.1%, I: 48.4%) and maltreatment (C: 56.2%, I: 44.5%). Approximately one third of those interviewed had directly experienced war-related violence. A substantial number of people interviewed – one third in Ingushetia (37.5%) and two-thirds in Chechnya (66.8%) – rarely felt safe. The violence was ongoing, with respondents reporting violence in the month before the survey (C: 12.5%, I: 4.6%). Results of the general health questionnaire (GHQ 28) showed that nearly all internally displaced persons interviewed were suffering from health complaints such as somatic complaints, anxiety/insomnia, depressive feelings or social dysfunction (C: 201, 78.5%, CI: 73.0% – 83.4%; I: 230, 81.3%, CI: 76.2% – 85.6%). Poor health status was reflected in other survey questions, but health services were difficult to access for around half the population (C: 54.3%, I: 46.6%).

Most respondents believed the conflict had triggered mental disturbance or feelings of being upset (C: 205, 80.1%; I: 189, 66.8%). To cope with their psychological distress people responded that their first most important coping

strategy was 'turning their head' (a local term meaning to deny a problem exists) (C: 123, 48.1%, I: 131, 46.3%). In the second response category the preferred option was prayer (C: 137, 53.5%, I: 131, 46.3%). A third and last stated option was the support of the family members (Table 6).

For displaced populations, the length of stay in temporary (and often precarious) accommodation is associated in other studies with higher likelihood of developing symptoms of psychological distress [22-24]. The average length of being displaced in both locations was five years. Most people had to move at least two times.

Chronic exposure to traumatic events is associated with higher levels of mental health problems and poorer physical health [25,26], and witnessing and self-experienced extreme violence is also associated with psychosocial and mental health problems, including depression [27], generalised anxiety disorder [30], and post-traumatic stress disorder [11,12,31,32]. Both survey groups had experienced similar levels of violence since the start of the conflict (exposure, witnessed, self-experienced), possibly contributing to ill health outcomes."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The importance of psychosocial assistance, including in cases of gender-based violence, as well as the health services available for conflict-affected people cannot be underestimated.

Displacement and poverty in an unstable and volatile environment are conducive to psychosomatic conditions, aggravate stress, and increase the number of adolescents and children in need of professional psychological care. Mental health services, including psychosocial rehabilitation, are among those suffering the most from the crises in the North Caucasus."

Health situation of women and children in Chechnya (2007)

- Almost every woman in Chechnya is diagnosed with 2-3 chronic conditions, the most common is gynecological conditions, including genital inflammation
- Many pregnant women do not see health service workers during pregnancy; maternal and infant mortality rates in Ingushetia and Chechnya are 2 to 4 times higher than in the rest of Russia
- Poor reproductive health and sterility is growing in Chechnya while the birth rate was about twice as high as in Russia as a whole
- According to UN, nutrition response urgently needed: high level of acute malnutrition among children in Chechnya and Ingushetia aged 6-59 months because of inadequate diet, chronic health problems, poor drinking water and obstacles to accessing health care
- Many health services for children were still not functioning in 2006, though number of children and teenagers with health conditions decreased by 10 per cent
- Number of disabled children increased 15 per cent from 2005 to 2006

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"[...] Maternal and infant mortality rates in Chechnya and Ingushetia are two to four times higher than in the rest of the Russian Federation...Population coverage by nurses, district pediatricians,

and gynecologists is low and many pregnant women remain unseen throughout their pregnancy. Iron-deficiency anaemia is highly prevalent in pregnant and lactating women as well as in children. Poor follow up of children and women's health as a result of poor health awareness presents an additional challenge. The WFP/UNICEF VAM assessment points to a high level of acute malnutrition at 10 percent among surveyed children in Chechnya and Ingushetia aged 6-59 months, with severe wasting affecting more than two percent of these children. Severe wasting can lead to increased mortality and needs to be addressed. Acute malnutrition in the region is due not only to food shortages but also to the interaction of several factors, including inadequate diet, chronic health diseases, and poor access to health care and good quality water. Limited breastfeeding practices may also be a compounding factor; only 20 percent of women breastfeed their children up to the recommended six months. Psychological stress is often quoted as a reason for inadequate nursing. These findings, which need to be followed-up by more specific assessments, seem to indicate that a nutrition response is urgently needed. The awareness of mothers and other primary child caregivers on breast-feeding practices remains low. The absence of sufficient infrastructure and adequate equipment and drugs to properly treat newborns, children and pregnant women, together with the lack of knowledge among responsible health staff, leads to the high prevalence of early childhood illnesses. Alarming indicators of mother and child health are early age child disability, the number of out-of-town referrals, late hospitalizations, and pathologies at child delivery (up to 40%)."

WHO, 5 March 2007:
"Mother and child health care

In 2006 children population (0-17 years) was 399.737, or 34.4% of total population.

Infant mortality in 2006 is 18.4 per 1000 live born (average RF – 11.5%). The main mortality factors are perinatal period health problems and congenital pathologies (both account for 32.1%).

In 2006 there is a high rate of pregnancy complications (82%) linked with anemia (74.2%).

General children morbidity was 59.411 per 100.000 children population. There is a slight decrease compared with 2005.

General teenager morbidity has decreased on 10% than in 2005.

TB children (0-14 years) morbidity was 11.7. TB teenager (15-17 years) was 21.2. In 2006 there were 67 children with first time active TB form registered.

There are 645.584 women registered in Chechnya in 2006, including 170.902 girls (under 17 years). There are 332.070 reproductive age women (or 28.5% of total population). Practically each woman is diagnosed with 2-3 chronic conditions. The most common is gynecological morbidity. In 2006 2050 women were diagnosed with genitals inflammation. A serious indicator of poor reproductive health is a high number of surgeries on female genitals (17% of all surgeries), including oncology diseases. Sterility has been growing in the Republic with some 510 per 100.000 female population.

There are 287 gynecologists in Chechnya, or 4.4 per 10.000 women. There are 254 pediatricians.

In 2006 there were treated 16.138 children and 438 children were referred for out of town medical treatment.

Pediatric services

In 2006 there were 399.737 children in 2006 (5.5% higher than in 2005), or 35% of total population. In 2006 there were born 25.395 children, of which 307 were with congenital pathologies. Among children with congenital pathologies prevailing number is cardio-vascular conditions (28), nerve system (25), etc.

Birth rate in 2006 was 22.3 (average RF – 10.4), in rural area – 24.8, in town – (10.2). The highest birth rates are in Nozhai-Yurt (25.3) and lowest in Sharoi (9.8%).

There still no functioning many children services. In 2006 there were opened newborn pathology for 60 beds in the Republican children hospital and 40 beds in the Republican maternity hospital. In 2006 children hospital N2, Shatoi CDH, including pediatric ward, were reconstructed.

In 2006 the number of pediatric hospital beds increased on 18.8% but still lower twice than average RF.

There should be a mechanism of opening more day time outpatient pediatric facilities.

Some 1180 children received sanatorium treatment in 2006.

Average pediatric bed duration is 12.0 (rural area) and 15.4 (urban). The duration depends largely on the complications, late hospitalization and late medical treatment.

In 2006 the Republican children hospital (310 beds) admitted 6791 patients, including 5322 from rural area.

In 2006 there were 254 pediatric doctors in Chechnya, including 166 – pediatricians and 130 – district pediatricians. The pediatrician staffing is 48.7%. The neonatology staffing is 11.4 (in 2005 – 8.7). Average pediatrician serves 2.408 children. Some 150.000 children are serviced by 130 available pediatricians.

84 pediatricians have necessary qualification category (50.6%). In 2006 57 pediatricians took part in certified training courses through national health priority plan.

In 2006 pediatricians observed 93.538 more children than in 2005, including 46.840 sick children. Some 60.7% of home visits were made to observe children. General children (under 14 years) morbidity got reduced on 11.1% linked to reduction of endocrine system diseases (21%) and digestive system (28.2%). There is a reported reduction of “conditions in perinatal period” and traumas. There is an increase in congenital pathologies (74%), anemia (30.6%), respiratory (21.3%) and oncology (12.5%).

General teenager morbidity decreased on 10.3% linked with reduction of infectious (36.3%), anemia (8.3%).

There is still remaining problem of children psychiatric health. Diabetes has increased on 28%. The overall worsening of population health dictates early disability. There are 14.268 disabled children, or 1890 (15.2%) higher than in 2005. Disability per 10.000 children population is 356.9 or 1.8 times higher than in 2005. Newly detected in 2006 – 2.512. Among disabled children the most common morbidity are nerve system (22.2%), eye (17.4%) and congenital pathologies (9.5%). Psychiatric disturbances are 4.5 in 2006 as opposed to 3.7 in 2005. There are minimum children disabled prevention and rehabilitation activities.

Infant mortality increased by 15.7% through neonatal (16%) and post-neonatal mortality increase (14/2%). Infant mortality is 18.4 and varies from 7.9 in Achkhai-Martan and 41.7 in Nozhai-Yurt.

Neonatal mortality accounts for 64.9% in infant mortality and 1.3 times higher than average in Russia. Neonatal mortality in urban area is 23.0 and rural – 11.6. The highest neonatal mortality is in Shatoi district – 31.8. Neonatal mortality is structured of asphyxia (25.3%), pneumopathy (24%) and congenital pathologies (16.4)."

Number of cases of tuberculosis and cancer increasing in Chechnya (2007)

- Number of cancer cases increasing in Chechnya
- Low detection rate of cancer since half of all cases are detected in later stages
- Most common forms of cancer are lung, stomach and skin cancer
- Tuberculosis was a serious health threat for all of North Caucasus in 2007
- Number of tuberculosis cases in Chechnya is more than 3 times as high as the average for Russia because of poor living conditions, migration, high number of prisoners in prison system, poor state funding of tuberculosis program

WHO, 5 March 2007: "Oncology

In 2006 there were registered some 2.987 new oncology cases. There is a continuous growth of oncology index among population – 0.6% in 2006 (0.4% - men, 0.8% - women). Oncology morbidity is 236 per 100.000 population (men – 260.3; women – 205.2; average RF – 330.5).

The most common oncology morbidity among men are pulmonary (24%), stomach (12.4%), skin (8.9%), prostate gland (5.3%), colon (5%), etc. Among women are mammary (19.3%), skin (12.9%), stomach (8.5%), colon (6.7%), uterus (6/7%), uterus cervix (5.2%) and ovary (5%).

In 2006 there were 9.052 registered as dispensary oncology patients. There is an extremely low detection as 50% of all cases get detected in late phases. The number of patients died in the first year of diagnosis is continuously growing and reached 36% in 2006."

Tuberculosis

TB epidemiology situation gets worsened in Chechnya. The main factors are low population living standards, population migration, increasing number of people in risk factor groups, including HIV and large number of people in penitentiary system. Low state funding of TB programme adds to the problem as well. TB situation in Chechnya is classified as tense despite the latest trends of stabilization.

TB incidence is 366.2 per 100.000 population (average RF – 101.3).

TB in penitentiary system is critical where TB rates are 31 times higher than Chechen average. 40% of first-time registered are active TB patients and as well with fibro-cavernous TB form.

Dual TB and HIV infection is on growth. There are new 11 cases registered in 2006.

There are some 4.258 patients registered with the Republican TB hospital, including 269 children. In 2006 only 902 new TB cases were registered. There is a remaining problem of low TB detection among local population. More than 25.6% of first time registered patients require immediate and active TB treatment.

In 2006 population medical observations covered only 11.6% of population and TB was only detected in 96 out of 136.709 cases. This is an indication of low quality of PHC system in TB detection.

Disability from TB is increasing as well with new 500 people in 2006.

At present TB services are provided by 21 TB doctors against 120 required. TB doctor rate is per 10.000 population is 0.2 (average RF – 0.7)."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Tuberculosis (TB) remains a serious public health threat for the year 2007 in all North Caucasus republics, especially Chechnya. TB-related problems (morbidity, mortality) have been annually increasing. In Chechnya, the incidence of TB has increased from 178.4 per 100,000 in 2001 to 856.5 in 2006. Only minimal TB prevention and detection activities take place. The migration of infected and/or partially treated patients to and from Chechnya increases the risk of spreading the disease. The number of default patients stopping TB treatment is on the increase, which hampers follow up and increases multi drug resistance. The dual TB/HIV rates are of high concern in Chechnya and Ingushetia.

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"[In Dagestan the] active tuberculosis prevalence rate was 62.2 per 100,000 in 2006 (up from 57.8 per 100,000 in 2004). In certain districts and cities such as Makhachkala, Kizilyurt, Kizlyar, and Khasavyurt, the incidence of first time active tuberculosis exceeds the average republican indicator by a factor of 1.1–1.8. A particularly alarming trend is the growing incidence of bacillary tuberculosis (up by 31% from 16.4 per 100,000 people in 2005 to 21.6 per 100,000 in 2006). There have been some positive results from a regional target programme for the period 2003–2007, which aims to combat tuberculosis and is organized by the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service together with relevant ministries and government departments. The tuberculosis mortality rate fell by a factor of 1.4 to a level of 15.4 per 100,000 from 2000 to 2006, and the active child tuberculosis prevalence rate fell by a factor of 1.3 to 17.2 per 100,000 population."

High rate of diabetes as well as urogenital and cardiovascular disease in Chechnya (2007)

- Every year about 100,000 people are registered with cardiovascular disease, but the infrastructure for treatment in Chechnya remains inadequate
- Diabetes one of most common disorders in Chechnya
- Incidence of urogenital disease has doubled since 2000 for adults

WHO, 5 March 2007:

"Cardiovascular diseases

There are some 93.993-100.000 people registered with cardiovascular diseases each year in Chechnya. In 2006 cardiovascular mortality was 151.3 per 100.000 population, or 1.940 people (in 2005 – 149.4).

Cardiovascular diseases account for 55.3% of all mortality cases, 43.2% - disability and 87% - temporary loss of working capacity (трудоспособность).

The main causes of cardiovascular diseases leading to high mortality are ischemic heart disease and cerebrovascular diseases caused by hypertension.

Ischemic heart disease accounts for 47.1% of all mortality cardiovascular cases.

There are some 26.840 people registered with hypertension problems, or 30 people per 100 population. There is a likely expectation that the real figures reach 250.000 people, or 30% of all population.

At present there is no special cardiology centre as well as specialized cardiology units in the Republic.

There are 125 cardiology hospital beds against 310 required.

The level of cardiology assistance is low and inadequate. Surgical assistance to cardiology patients is provided outside of Chechnya. Some 1.080 patients were referred for out of Chechnya medical treatment. There are some 1.293 cardiology patients dispensary registered and requiring constant specialized care and treatment not available in the Republic. It is estimated that cardiology needs are only 10% met in Chechnya at present time.

The federal funded programme on hypertension does not function practically in Chechnya. The Chechen MoH developed the Republican programme on hypertension for 2008-2011 and requires Government's approval [...]

Diabetes

Diabetes is one of the most common morbidity in Chechnya. There is 4.5% population registered with diabetes. In 2006 there were 6.003 diabetes patients registered, including 93 children. Real figures are expected to be 3-4 times higher. Problems linked to low levels of staffing, or 16 endocrinologists in the Republic [...]

Nephrology / Urogenital diseases

In the last years there is an increase in the spectrum of nephrology diseases, including first time and chronic conditions. Nephrology morbidity has increased twice among adults since 2000 (2.3 times – among children and 2.7 times – among teenagers). The increasing nephrology cases among children and teenagers are of high concern, especially when leading to early disability and acute kidney deficiency. At present, there is one 30 beds nephrology department at the Republican clinical hospital which provided treatment to 844 people in 2006. There is a need to expand nephrology services and ensure necessary health workers' training. "

Decrease of prevalence of some infectious diseases in Chechnya (2007)

- Prevalence of infectious disease has decreased in Chechnya due to immunization program and improved quality of drinking water and food
- No registered cases of diphtheria and measles in 2006 and number of rubella and whooping cough cases decreased by half
- Rate of infection of parotitis, influenza, tuberculosis and HIV remain high

WHO, 5 March 2007:

"In 2006 there has been a first time positive tendency to the decrease of the most common infectious morbidities. This is linked to the reconstruction efforts throughout the Republic. There is

a better system of provision of quality drinking water and food products. There is an increased awareness among local population on personal hygiene issues.

In 2006 there were registered 72.535 infectious diseases' cases (in 2005 – 85.013). Infectious morbidity was reduced by 1.2 times. Children infectious morbidity reduced from 68.2% in 2005 (58.101) to 65.7 in 2006 (47.701 cases).

In 2006 out of 72 forms of infectious diseases registered in Russian Federation only 30 were registered in Chechnya (41.6). This is still an indicator of epidemiology instability but represents a positive dynamic in situation improvement. There is still a complicated epidemiology situation in acute intestinal infections, parotitis, influenza, acute respiratory infections, TB and HIV.

	2006		2005	
	Absolute	Per 100.000	Absolute	Per 100.000
Typhoid	0	0	0	0
Salmonella	5	0.5	28	2.8
Dysentery	175	17.5	195	19.5
Acute intestinal infections, confirmed	82	0.8	127	1.2
Acute intestinal infections, non-confirmed	3.010	301.0	3.028	302.8
Diphtheria	0	0	0	0
Whooping cough	13	0.1	24	0.3
Measles	0	0	8	0.8
Rubella	52	0.5	79	0.7
Parotitis	340	34.0	281	28.1
Leptospirosis	8	0.8	31	2.9

Acute intestinal infections decreased from 1.1. to 5.2 times. Typhoid has not been registered in Chechnya as in other neighboring Republics. There is a reduction of salmonella and dysentery but acute intestinal infections are still higher than average in RF and southern federal district, especially considering that its etiology is unclear due to the absence of laboratory diagnostics in the Republic.

There is an improvement in 6 vaccine controlled infections earlier detected in Chechnya and no longer in 2006 such as diphtheria, polio and measles. There is a double reduction in rubella and whooping cough cases. But there is still a high incidence of parotitis.

The progress in controlling epidemiology situation is largely linked to the immunization programme covering 97.6% of population."

HIV/AIDS in Chechnya and Dagestan (2007)

- More than 380,000 people registered as having HIV in Russia
- About 800 people living with AIDS in Chechnya, including 152 women and 22 children, and 880 registered as HIV-positive in Dagestan; these figures are lower than the Russian average
- Centre for HIV/AIDS prevention and control in Chechnya was nearing completion in 2007
- Main reason for HIV spread in Dagestan is drug use and high youth unemployment rate
- Number of HIV cases increased by 3-4 times among IDPs and the local population in Ingushetia in 2001

Interfax, 15 May 2007:

"There are more than 380,000 registered HIV carriers in Russia, the rate of HIV and AIDS in Russia continues to rise, and so does the AIDS-caused mortality rate, the government's medical watchdog Rospotrebnadzor said.

"In 2006, 38,839 news cases [of HIV] were registered. In the first four months of 2007, 15,122 cases were registered, which is 7% more than the number for the same period last year," the agency said in a press release.

Intravenous drug use remains the principal source of HIV infection, and the younger part of this category of drug addicts is showing the most rapid HIV growth rate, Rospotrebnadzor said.

It said the number of people diagnosed with fully-blown AIDS in 2006 was 54% higher than that the year before."

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"According to the Republican AIDS Centre, there were 880 officially registered HIV-positive individuals in Dagestan in December 2006, of whom 75–80% were drug addicts. The main disease centres are the towns of Derbent, Makhachkala, and Dagestanskie Ogni. Over 100 new HIV cases were registered in the Derbent District in 2006. This is related to the fact that drugs are smuggled from the South through Derbent. The high youth unemployment rate also plays an important role. In all, 105 deaths from AIDS have been registered in the Republic, 85% of which were among people aged 20–30 years. Medical and public awareness work (including via media) is being carried out in order to combat HIV in Dagestan, including provision of HIV tests (about 180,000–200,000 HIV tests are carried out annually). A regional AIDS programme is being implemented alongside the national programme."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The HIV prevalence in Chechnya and Ingushetia is still lower than the Russian average but is steadily increasing, including HIV mortality. More pregnant women are being detected. In Chechnya only, the mid-year HIV incidence rate has increased from 41.9 per 100,000 in 2005 to 57.3 in 2006 (the HIV rate was 10.3 in 2004 and 7.0 in 2003)."

WHO, 17 July 2007:

"Reconstruction of a building, which will host the republican Centre for HIV/AIDS prevention and control in the Leninsky district of the Chechen capital, is at the final stage, according to a worker of the republican Ministry of Health. The HIV/AIDS Centre will be located in the building that used to belong to a kindergarten. The main repairs of the building have been finished. Funds were provided by the public Akhmat Kadyrov foundation. The republican Centre for HIV/AIDS prevention and control will include a polyclinic for the HIV-positive, a special laboratory, a diagnostic centre and other services. According to official data, at present there are some 800 people living with AIDS in Chechnya, among them 152 women and 22 children."

WHO, September 2001:

"HIV/AIDS update: The first cases of HIV were officially registered in Ingushetia in 1999. In 2000, their number increased considerably. In January-July 2001, 102 new cases (of them 29 IDPs) of HIV were registered, bringing the official total number of HIV-infected in the republic to 160, of them 36 (23%) were IDPs from Chechnya. According to the head doctor of the republican HIV/AIDS center, they are experiencing major difficulties while working with the IDP population, as usually two to four weeks pass from the moment when the analysis is taken to Nazran to when the confirmation is received from Rostov-upon-Don, where screening for HIV is carried out. During this period, IDPs often either move within Ingushetia or return to Chechnya, leaving no opportunity to inform them of the results of their analysis, with the danger that should they be positive, they will continue to infect other people. The major constraint is the lack of testing

reagents to effect HIV screening in the republican HIV/AIDS centre in Ingushetia. Should they be available, it would be possible to decrease the diagnosis period from 2-4 weeks to 3-4 days."

Incidence of sexually transmitted infections increasing in Chechnya (2007)

- Number of cases of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) continues to increase in Chechnya and actual number could be higher because of poor detection systems and non-registration
- Most common STIs are trichomoiiasis, syphilis and chlamidia
- The spread of STIs is due to displacement, poor diagnostic and treatment capacity, lack of education and employment, drug and alcohol abuse

WHO, 5 March 2007:

"In 2006 there were registered new 1.953 STI cases, or 167.9 per 100.000 population (average RF – 732.1). The most common STI morbidity includes trichomoniasis (42.2%), syphilis (20%), chlamidia (16.3%), and gonorrhoea (15%). There is a continuous growth of STI cases in the Republic. The real figures are expected to be higher as there is a traditional problem of non-registration and low state system of STI detection, treatment and prevention. At present, the services are largely available through privately owned clinics."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Migration and displacement, combined with a lack of education and employment, are associated with the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and risky behaviour such as drug and alcohol abuse. The promotion of safe reproductive health practices is at its lowest. The HIV prevalence in Chechnya and Ingushetia is still lower than the Russian average but is steadily increasing, including HIV mortality. More pregnant women are being detected. In Chechnya only, the mid-year HIV incidence rate has increased from 41.9 per 100,000 in 2005 to 57.3 in 2006 (the HIV rate was 10.3 in 2004 and 7.0 in 2003). With respect to STIs, the situation is critical, as the capacity of health facilities to diagnose and treat them is virtually non-existent as reflected by increasing cases of congenital syphilis and mortality cases of late syphilis complications. The testing of blood for transfusions remains a challenge in both Chechnya and Ingushetia. In both republics available reserves at the blood banks are insufficient and technical capacity for testing is not appropriate."

Ingush health Ministry reports on status of children and women (2003)

- Infant mortality in Ingushetia is twice higher than the average in the Russian Federation
- Prevailing diseases among IDP children are caries, respiratory and blood diseases
- Vaccination coverage remains low among IDPs

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

UNICEF 31 July 2003:

"The Ingush Ministry of Health released a report on the health status of children and women in the republic. According to the data report, in 2002 children accounted for 32.7% of the total population. The number of children born was 8,116, of which 2,534 were IDPs. Among the main causes of child mortality, the MoH mentioned pathologies of the perinatal period, as well as acute respiratory diseases (including pneumonia), traumas, acute intestinal diseases and congenital

defects. The infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births in Ingushetia stands at around 28, i.e. twice higher than the average in the Russian Federation.

The all-Russian clinical examination of children conducted in 2002 demonstrated that the first three diseases prevailing among IDP children in Ingushetia were caries (affecting 50% of the children examined), respiratory diseases (12 %), and blood diseases (10%)."

UNICEF 16 August 2003:

"With regard to the epidemiological situation in Ingushetia, the local SES [Sanitary Epidemiological Station] reported about the extremely low vaccination coverage achieved among the IDPs residing in camps and temporary settlements. The vaccination campaign carried out by the local health care workers during the second quarter of 2003, in fact, turned out to be insufficient, which has led to the further deterioration of the measles situation. The SES, for instance, revealed that only 7 out of 462 children residing in the 'Altievo' IDP settlement in Nazran were vaccinated against measles; as a consequence, more than 80 children suffered from measles in June and July. According to the SES estimates, only 18% of the children residing in 'Tanzila', 'Kamaz Centre', 'Logovaz', and 'Internationalnaya' settlements were vaccinated against measles."

Water and sanitation

Water situation in Ingushetia and Dagestan (2007)

- IDPs need better water, sanitation and disinfectant materials in Ingushetia and Dagestan
- Humanitarian organisations deliver water to IDPs; not all bath houses and laundry facilities function in IDP settlements because of a lack of water
- IDPs believe the prospect for improvement in water supply and sanitation facilities is bleak since they hear the settlements will be soon closed
- Water supply system in Dagestan does not meet the needs of the general population

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"In Ingushetia and Dagestan, the government's capacity to provide water and sanitation services to the IDP population has been limited. Despite the efforts of local district administrations, IDPs' needs in terms of basic water and sanitation services as well as sanitary and disinfectant materials also remain to be adequately addressed. The majority of people continue to rely on the assistance provided by humanitarian agencies [...]"

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"Sustainable supplies of safe drinking water are a very urgent problem, and half of people in the Republic [of Dagestan] currently drink water that does not meet hygiene norms. Over a third of water supply systems do not meet sanitary and hygiene standards. The republican capital of Makhachkala, where over 30% of the population lives, has severe difficulties with water supplies, particularly during the summer. The October Revolution Canal is not sufficient to meet water needs of the population of Makhachkala, and construction work has therefore begun on a third branch of the Miatlinskoe water conduit, which should solve the problem."

Мемориал, 30 сентября 2005 г.:

"В первую очередь, жалобы поступают от жителей все того же «Иман» [в Ингушетии]. В лагере нет водопровода, и воду привозят раз в два дня сотрудники МКС (Международного Комитета Спасения). Этого количества воды не хватает. Особенно после того, как по

просьбе жителей организация «Движение против голода» построила две бани и прачечную. Одна баня возведена непосредственно в самом лагере, другая - на территории МТФ, в трех километрах от «Имана», но относится к нему. На сегодняшний день бани чаще всего бездействуют. Некому поставить дополнительные емкости, чтобы обеспечить достаточное количество воды. Даже при наличии этих емкостей все вопросы не будут сняты, поскольку не решена проблема завоза воды. У МКС недостаточно техники, чтобы снабжать лагерь водой. По этой причине не обеспечена водой и старая баня, что была построена несколько лет назад бельгийским подразделением «Врачей без Границ». Несколько организаций обещали предусмотреть в своем бюджете установку дополнительных емкостей для бани и прачечной. Люди с надеждой ждут, что это произойдет еще до наступления холодов.

Серьезные проблемы с водой и у населения МКП «Агроснаб». Уже несколько месяцев, как водоснабжение перекрыли из-за большой задолженности соседнего «Спиртзавода» перед водоканалом. При основании лагеря была достигнута договоренность, что он будет подключен к трубе, которая подает воду на это предприятие, у которого в то время не было никаких проблем с платежами. Но за последний год задолженность «Спиртзавода» стала проблемой для МКП и отражается на его населении самым непосредственным образом. Труба принадлежит заводу, его представители не разрешают коменданту «Агроснаба» установить кран, который позволял бы подавать в лагерь воду напрямую. Из-за этого коменданту не оставалось ничего другого, как обратиться в МКС с просьбой о доставке воды в лагерь транспортом. Но у этой организации острая нехватка автомобилей, и график привоза воды нарушается. Лето в Ингушетии в этом году выдалось засушливое и жаркое. «Агроснаб» расположен в открытом месте, где с одной стороны поле, с другой - различные мелкие заводы. Постоянные ветры поднимают и заносят на его территорию пыль; невозможно помыться, постирать одежду, что является причиной аллергических реакций у многих его обитателей. Есть в лагере и баня, и прачечная, но они простаивают из-за отсутствия воды.

Для того, чтобы провести отдельный трубопровод потребуются значительные средства. Комендант лагеря обращался в несколько различных организаций, была составлена смета, выяснилось, что стоимость одних только труб составит около двухсот тысяч рублей, не говоря уже о предстоящих затратах на сварку и рытье траншей.

Многие работы молодежь лагеря согласна была взять на себя, но не нашлось организации, которая была бы готова оплатить покупку необходимых материалов. По слухам, в ближайшие годы все МКП на территории Ингушетии собираются закрыть. Беженцы полагают, что по этой причине ни одна международная гуманитарная организация не хочет тратить на беженцев деньги. Люди не уверены в завтрашнем дне, несмотря на то, что УДМ продлил договор с хозяином «Агроснаба» до апреля 2006 года."

Water and sanitation needs of IDPs in Chechnya remain unmet, despite efforts (2007)

- Some IDPs get better bath and sanitation facilities in Grozny
- IDPs previously traveled several kilometres to use another bath house once every two weeks
- Thousands of IDPs in Chechnya still do not have adequate sanitation facilities in Temporary Accommodation Centres
- 40 per cent of people living in Grozny do not have access to running water
- Half of Grozny's population relies on water transported by humanitarian organisations
- Water supply systems in Chechnya does not meet the needs of the population

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"[...]On the other hand, much remains to be done to repair and establish adequate infrastructure beyond repairs to public buildings, according to Chechen authorities and independent assessments. Large parts of the population in Chechnya, for example, continue to lack access to running water, including 40% of Grozny's residents.

[...] The centralized public water supply system in Chechnya (particularly in Grozny), including water treatment and distribution stations as well as the network of water pipes, remains in a poor shape and still fails to meet the population's basic needs in water services. In 2006, Grozvodokanal and Chechvodokanal, the main public water providers in the republic, made further efforts to rehabilitate parts of the water supply system, but both city and rural water networks remain in a critical situation. Almost half of Grozny's population, including schoolchildren, hospital patients, residents in TACs and urban areas, still rely on water trucking provided (at a high cost) by humanitarian organizations.

[...] Beneficiaries in hospitals, health facilities, schools, kindergartens, and residents in urban and rural areas continue to suffer from poor sanitation services. According to Vesta's monitoring findings, thousands of internally displaced persons residing in TACs in Grozny and rural districts systematically lack adequate sanitation services, as all existing TACs remain wither in a poor state or totally dysfunctional. Lack of laundries, showers, baths, toilets and latrines is of extreme concern, both to humanitarian agencies and governmental structures. The latter, with their low capacity are not capable to respond adequately to the needs of the people.

[...] The Chechen government, in particular, defined its [water and sanitation] sector priorities for 2007 as follows: sufficient potable water supply to the population; maintenance of sanitation standards through sewage and waste disposal; establishment of solid waste re-cycling system in Grozny."

PHO, 22 December 2006:

"Polish Humanitarian Organisation has completed the construction of two bath houses in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Grozny. They were equipped in showers and laundries. For the last few years about 29% of damaged piping was reconstructed. Despite the efforts, two out of three Grozny inhabitants have difficulties in getting water.

Temporary Accommodation Centres are located in the buildings of student hostels and dormitories. As the result of war activities they were cut out of municipal water-sanitation systems. So far, the inhabitants of the TAC in 12 Poniatkowa Street, every day had to cover a distance of several kilometers to get to the other bath house. A special bus that transported them to sanitary points was small and crowded, they had to wait in long queues. They could only use the bath houses once a fortnight due to the large number of expectants. The TAC in 96 Miczurina Street, where a second bath house was constructed, was in a slightly better situation, however the hygienic conditions were far from basic sanitary standards."

PHO, 18 September 2006:

"Sanitation conditions in TACs are far from acceptable standards. There are 23 such facilities in Grozny, in most cases multi-storeyed blocks of flats. People who are accommodated in such blocks of flats are not provided with bath/shower facilities, that normally enable people to keep personal hygiene. The situation of IDPs has not changed significantly since their return from neighbouring republics. Apart from a solid roof over their heads they were provided with almost nothing more. Lack of water and of effective canalisation increases suffering from harsh accommodation conditions. Flats are overcrowded. Temporary, by definition, settlements became home to IDPs for long years, and perspective of change seems to be far in time, when looking at progress of rehabilitation of the city and problems with corruption when war compensations are to be paid. Water supplies are performed by the way of trucking; only few places have temporary access to water from water plant. Till this moment PHO have provided 4 TACs with hygienic

points (bath and laundry). PHO plans to continue this kind of activity and by End of November 2006 will construct 2 additional hygienic points in Grozny. Also ACF is planning to provide some TACs in Grozny with hygienic points, however thanks to bilateral consultations overlaps will be avoided."

Poor environmental and personal hygiene (2007)

- Proper methods of solid waste disposal not being observed
- Garbage pick-up remains a problem in Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia, as well as in Chechnya
- General population is not using safe personal hygiene practices

WHO, 17 July 2007:
"Republic of Ingushetia

-Water and sanitation in spontaneous settlements

Following up the previous discussion of water and sanitation maintenance in spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia, IMC noted about the meeting with the Ingush Migration Service where all problems were raised and identified. IMC reflected that trash utilization remained a big problem throughout the settlements."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"[...] The social disruption and the population displacement generated by more than a decade of violence have also contributed to decrease of the population's knowledge of safe personal hygiene and sanitation practices, which has led to the prevalence of inappropriate behaviours and to the rising threat of epidemics. A low level of awareness of safe environmental hygiene, including proper methods of solid waste disposal, also remains evident [...]"

PHO, 18 September 2006:

"Critical situation refers to garbage disposal and to problem of waste dumps all around Grozny. The main streets have been cleaned, authorities presented the community some parks and flowered avenues, but there is still a lot of rubble in the backyards of damaged houses and blocks of flats. Private sector consists of areas of one/two-storey houses and just like in other regions/places in Northern Caucasus is served by tractors with trailers or dump trucks. Inhabitants collect garbage into common plastic-bags. Afterwards, approximately two times a week, the mentioned equipment collects these bags from the streets. As this service has never been provided free of charge, residents of private sector try to get rid of waste on their own. In some cases, private equipment is engaged in these activities. In municipal sector because of lack of containers and maintained garbage sites, people throw away garbage in spontaneously chosen areas, where they remain abandoned. Such places in the city are a seat of vectors and a source of epidemiological danger. Progress of removing garbage from the city will be slow and ineffective until regular garbage disposal system is re-established at the level foreseen for a big city. Rehabilitation of garbage disposal system in Grozny is in progress, but for the moment it still cannot be considered as sufficient. Significantly better situation refers to Oktiabrskiy District, where the International Rescue Committee (IRC) maintains some manually loaded garbage trucks. PHO maintains 342 containers located at TACs, schools and health care facilities in all four Grozny Districts with four garbage trucks. Much more difficult situation is in municipal areas of blocks of flats, where garbage disposal is based on a system of located there garbage containers served by garbage trucks operating under management of LAPUs. In 2005 PHO handed over to LAPUs 290 garbage containers.

According to data received from the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities Management, all four districts of Grozny are short of garbage containers, which could permit to keep the sanitarian situation in the city under control. There are 940 General data provided by MHPUM includes 290 garbage containers handed over by PHO to LAPUs from Staroproyslovsky and Leninsky districts in last project. garbage containers spread in 117 different locations, but according to the research done by the municipal service, there should be 925 containers more. All four districts are serviced by 24 garbage trucks (5 in Oktyabrskiy, 5 in Leninskiy, 7 in Staropromyslovskiy and 7 in Zavodskoy_Districts), but only 12 of them are designed to remove the garbage from the containers automatically – the rest of them are ordinary trucks and the garbage must be loaded manually by means of shovels etc. Moreover municipal services maintain special technical teams including excavators, bulldozers, and trucks. Every month one district of Grozny is served in the matter of garbage dumps liquidation. Month-per-district schedule comes from shortage of relevant specialized equipment. According to the data of municipal service, almost 211 090 cu. m. of garbage and waste from dumps were removed during 2005."

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Ingushetia

Displaced children attend regular Ingush schools (2007)

- 73,000 students enrolled in 113 schools, that often work in 2 or 3 shifts
- Displaced children used to be schooled in "parallel" schools since Ingush schools could not receive all children for lack of space
- These displaced children were integrated into the Ingush school system by the 2006-2007 school year
- Almost 40 per cent of displaced children do not attend school regularly
- Number of displaced children in Ingush schools has decreased as families return to Chechnya
- Council of Europe concerned about children living in remote and impoverished areas of Ingushetia not being able to access schools

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Similar structural problems affect access to education opportunities, as well as the quality of services provided for children in Ingushetia and Dagestan. In the latter republic, some 416,000 children are enrolled in 1,664 schools with 389 primary schools located in mountainous rural areas. In Ingushetia, 73,000 students are enrolled in 113 schools, often working in 2 or 3 shifts. However, the VAM exercise found that over 33% of children aged 7-15 in Ingushetia were not attending school regularly either. The situation is particularly critical for displaced children, 37.5% of whom are not attending school regularly. It should be noted that the integration in the mainstream education system of the 1,200 displaced children hosted in the remaining UNICEF-supervised 'parallel' schools in Ingushetia was successfully completed in summer 2006. In terms of educational achievements, the VAM found no indication that femal education is disadvantaged in Chechnya and Ingushetia. On the contrary, girls seem to have a slightly higher school achievement record than boys."

UNICEF, 31 July 2006:

"All 12 'parallel' schools for IDPs located in Ingushetia, which have been supported by UNICEF and international NGOs since 2000, ceased to exist, while the actual integration into the Ingush education system of the 1,500 children who remained registered by the end of the last school year is in progress. In July and August all IDP children remaining in Ingushetia are supposed to be registered by their parents in the local schools that have been designated to absorb them. UNICEF started the process of procuring stationery and school furniture to support the children's integration process."

UNICEF, 31 August 2006:

"The UNICEF education team also visited several IDP settlements in Malgobekski and Sunzhenski districts, so as to monitor the process of integration of IDP children from Chechnya into the mainstream schools of Ingushetia. All meetings and interviews with parents, settlement managers and children confirmed the positive development of the integration process. Local education department representatives were also invited to attend those meetings, during which parents and children were assured that all IDP students would be accommodated in existing schools by 1 September. During the monitoring visits, UNICEF also found out that the number of

children ready for integration was lower than expected, due to the steady return of families to Chechnya and the growing (though still insufficient) availability of education opportunities for returnee children in the republic.

In order to facilitate the process of integration, UNICEF agreed with the Ingush MoE to support the physical rehabilitation of one building (6 classrooms) in secondary school n. 2 in Karabulak as well as the refurbishment of the laundry/shower rooms in boarding school n.1 in Nazran. Within the integration preparatory process, meetings were also held by UNICEF with UNHCR and Vesta, with a view to ensuring the best possible safeguard of the IDP children and families' protection needs and avoid any possible misunderstanding/ misinterpretation of the integration efforts."

Мемориал, 30 сентября 2005 г.:

"Начало нового учебного года принесло новые проблемы для обитателей МКП на территории Ингушетии. Комендант «Агроснаба» Имран Тутаев говорит, что в подведомственном ему лагере решением ЮНИСЕФа в феврале будущего года школа будет закрыта. На просьбу предоставить детям возможность доучиться до конца учебного года руководители представительства этой авторитетной международной организации сказали, что они не могут решить этот вопрос положительно из-за сокращения финансирования.

В «Агроснабе», с учетом вновь прибывших после наводнения, 24 ученика с 1-го по 7-ой класс и семь учеников с 8-го по 11-й. Проживающие здесь четыре семьи изъявили желание вернуться в Чечню сразу после закрытия школы. Свое решение они мотивировали тем, что у них в семье пятеро учащихся и главное, что их держало в лагере - это посещение детьми занятий. Расстояние до ближайшей школы Карабулака - больше пяти километров. Транспорта от лагеря до города практически никакого нет, и это расстояние детям беженцев из «Агроснаба» придется преодолевать пешком.

Во многих других МКП вопрос со школой решился положительно благодаря комендантам, которые сумели договориться с руководителями местных школ. Их директора соглашались принять детей ВПЛ, возможно благодаря тому, что за последний год число детей уменьшилось - многие семьи вернулись в Чечню. В наиболее крупных лагерях, таких как «МРО Рассвет», «ЛогоВАЗ», продолжают функционировать школы. В школу, расположенную в «ЛогоВАЗе», имеют возможность ходить и дети всех близлежащих МКП, таких как «Танзила», «Кристалл».

Здание школы на территории МКП «Иман», которую построила Австрийская организация «Hilfswerk», было передано в ведение местной школы.

Одна из самых главных проблем для родителей, у которых есть дети школьного возраста, - приобретение письменных принадлежностей и учебников. Раньше решение этой проблемы брали на себя международные гуманитарные организации. Но в последнее время они стали сворачивать или сокращать свою деятельность на территории Ингушетии, ВПЛ и их дети ощущают это на себе очень остро."

Council of Europe, 2 May 2007:

"The Advisory Committee [on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities] is concerned about difficulties encountered by children living in remote and economically impoverished settlements, whose parents cannot afford to transport them to school...Children belonging to the Dargin minority in Stavropol *krai* also face severe difficulties in this regard, as do the children of Chechen and Ingush displaced persons living in temporary accommodation in Ingushetia.

...There is increasing awareness of the specific educational needs of the children of refugees and internally displaced persons, whose numbers are growing in many Russian cities and towns. For instance, five secondary schools in Moscow have been working jointly since 2003 with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Russian Federation to facilitate the social, linguistic and cultural integration of refugee children."

Chechnya

Capacity of the educational system is limited despite recent progress (2007)

- Improvements to education system visible in Chechnya in 2006 with repaired schools and high enrollment rate
- However, over 40 per cent of children 7-15 years of age are not going to school every day, schools in remote areas are still in need of repair, teachers require additional technical skills and availability of study materials and furniture is inadequate
- Return of IDPs putting further constraints on education system in Chechnya

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"In Chechnya, the education system has witnessed some visible progress in 2006, as the republican government managed to attract and allocate additional federal funds for its recovery. According to the Chechen Ministry of Education, while only 54 schools and kindergartens were rehabilitated (mostly without central heating, water and power supply) within the Federal Special Program during the period 2000-2005, in 2006 alone some 46 facilities (schools, kindergartens, sport schools, children recreational centers and houses for teachers) were physically repaired, with the installation of latrines, gas supply and heating systems included. Official statistics from the Chechen Ministry of Education indicate that 98% of school age children (215,000 pupils) - including boarding schools and over 13,000 young people attending evening schools - are currently enrolled in 456 ordinary and 24 evening primary and secondary schools in the republic. Significant gaps, however, remain. According to the preliminary findings of the recent WFP/UNICEF VAM exercise, over 41 % of children aged 7-15 in Chechnya are not attending school on a regular basis. The disruption of school infrastructure, extensive population displacement, and economic hardship seem to be the root causes of this alarming situation. Many schools located in remote areas are still damaged or dilapidated, while classes are often organized according to 2 or even 3 shifts per day. The steady return of IDPs is further compounding the limited reception capacity of the education system. In addition, the availability of textbooks, stationery, school furniture and other educational materials, although recently improved, remains insufficient, particularly in rural schools. Strengthening the technical capacity-building of teachers also remains an outstanding issue. New updated versions of Chechen textbooks should be printed and distributed, so as to support the children's knowledge of their mother tongue."

IDP children do not face administrative barriers to go to school in Chechnya (2007)

- About 300 youth living in TACs may learn to be accountant, driver or office worker
- School in Chechnya divided into 3 shifts, with lessons being 30 minutes each
- IDPs from mountainous areas surveyed by Memorial did not report any administrative problems with their children going to school; though some reported material problems as it costs from 3000 roubles to equip one child with clothing books and other supplies

- According to one mother, school performance is low because of the interruption during the conflict
- The majority of IDP youth from mountainous areas interviewed by Memorial did not finish high school
- Some IDP youth went on to post-secondary education, though many who wanted to could not afford it
- Education system in Chechnya requires urgent attention

Кавказский Узел, 26 декабря 2006г.:

"Молодежь из числа вынужденных переселенцев из пунктов временного размещения (ПВР) в Чечне сможет бесплатно приобрести различные специальности.

В следующем году в Чечне будет начата реализация программы по обучению молодежи из числа обитателей ПВРов специальностям делопроизводителя, бухгалтера и водителя. Об этом стало известно от работника Департамента занятости населения республики...

В общей сложности планируется обучить около трехсот жителей пунктов временного размещения (расположенных в городах Грозный, Аргун и райцентре Ачхой-Мартан)..."

Memorial and Civic Assistance Committee, 13 March 2007:

"Образование

Образовательный блок включал в себя вопросы о доступности среднего, профессионального и высшего образования. * Оказалось, что каких-либо бюрократических проблем с доступностью среднего образования нет. Несмотря на то, что большинство школ в Чечне переполнены, занятия ведутся в 3 смены, а уроки по 30 минут, ни один из опрошенных не сказал, что его ребенка не приняли в школу из-за отсутствия места или регистрации, как это бывает, например, в Москве.** Но несколько человек упомянули о проблемах материального характера. Некоторые жаловались на то, что в школе выдают бесплатно только часть учебников или не выдают вовсе. В одной семье два мальчика ходят в школу в одной одежде, благо учатся в разные смены (91). Выше приводилось сообщение о том, как женщина все лето делала на продажу саманные кирпичи (а это очень тяжелая работа), чтобы собрать своих детей в школу (40). В другой семье нам рассказали, что на подготовку четверых детей к школе (одежду, ранцы, учебники, письменные принадлежности) истратили 13 тысяч рублей, при этом купить им зимнюю обувь так и не смогли (32). То есть, чтобы собрать одного ребенка в школу, надо 3-4 тысячи рублей. При отсутствии регулярных денежных доходов это для многодетных чеченских семей действительно серьезная проблема, с решением которой справляются не все: в двух семьях нам сообщили: дети не ходят в школу, потому что нет денег на одежду (77,92).

Одна из женщин, с которыми мы разговаривали, обозначила другую серьезную проблему: «Все дети ходят в школу, но учатся плохо из-за пропусков в военное время» (33). Думаю, что то же самое могли бы сказать многие.

Часть молодых людей, чьи школьные годы пришлось на период активных боевых действий, вообще не смогли закончить школу, так как занятия в горных школах почти не велись из-за постоянных обстрелов, многие школы были разрушены.

По предложению сотрудников гудермесского офиса ПЦ «Мемориал», мы спрашивали беженцев, есть ли в семье молодежь, не получившая среднего образования. Выяснилось, что такие молодые люди есть в 15 из 105 опрошенных семей. Наиболее неблагополучной в этом отношении оказалась станица Ильинская, где в половине опрошенных семей есть

молодежь, не сумевшая закончить школу. В одной семье двое детей вообще не ходили в школу (2). В другой три дочери проучились только 3 класса, хотя и имеют документы о 9-летнем образовании. Девочки хотели бы учиться. (6). В третьей семье четверо детей не закончили школу из-за боевых действий (11). В четвертой – пятеро детей окончили 8-9 классов из-за того, что семья после выхода с гор переезжала несколько раз с места на место, прежде чем обрела постоянное жилье (13).

В составе опрошенных семей ВПЛ, проживающих в Ильинской, мы насчитали 31 человека в возрасте от 16 до 24 лет. Так вот, 20 из них, то есть больше 60 %, не смогли получить среднее образование. Вечерней школы в Ильинской нет, так что нагнать упущенное в горах молодежи негде.

В Гудермесе удалось опросить только 6 семей. Из 10 членов этих семей в возрасте от 16 до 24 лет школу не смогли закончить 6. Причем «четверо получили аттестаты, но образование не получили» (45). Две из трех семей, где есть недоучившаяся молодежь, также прибыли из с. Тазен-Кала.

В с. Иласхан-Юрт ситуация существенно лучше. Из 10 молодых людей в возрасте от 16 до 24 лет школу не закончили четверо. Трое ходят в вечернюю школу, а один сам не захотел учиться дальше.

В п. Ойсхара лишь в одной семье нам сообщили о детях, не получивших среднего образования. То же самое – в с. Гордали-Юрт. В селах Верхний и Нижний Нойбера, а также в с. Кади-Юрт в опрошенных семьях таких детей не оказалось*.

Проблемы получения высшего образования затрагивают, конечно, меньшее число людей. О том, что дети не смогли после окончания школы продолжить образование из-за отсутствия средств, сообщили 7 человек.

- «Сын отлично окончил школу, хотел поступать в мединститут, но не смог – не было денег» (3)
- «Один сын поступил в Нефтяной институт, но не смог учиться из-за недостатка средств, другие тоже хотели бы учиться – нет возможности» (10).
- «Дочь хотела бы поступить в медколледж, но он платный, не может заплатить 25 тысяч рублей за поступление» (47).

Однако, четверо молодых людей из опрошенных семей все же учатся: один молодой человек в Грозном в Нефтяном институте, заплатив за поступление 7500 рублей, другой обучается в Гудермесе с ежегодной оплатой в 7000 рублей, два юноши бесплатно учатся в бухгалтерском колледже в Нойбера. И один 47-летний мужчина в прошлом году закончил истфак ЧГУ.

Возможно, студентов и тех, кто желает ими стать, было бы больше, если бы не одно обстоятельство, о котором напоминает замечание одной из наших собеседниц: «Все дети получили специальности, а работы нет» (62).

* Однако, в действительности дело обстоит иначе. Представительство ПЦ «Мемориал» в Гудермесе провело специальное исследование в селах Курчалой, Нойбера и Ойсхара и выяснило, что многие родители купили для своих детей аттестаты о среднем образовании или же дети прошли по школьным коридорам, не получив знаний. Почти в каждом селе есть 20-25 подростков, не умеющих даже читать и писать. Для решения этой проблемы «Мемориал» совместно с «Каритас Франции» организовал для таких подростков в с. Самашки Ачхой-Мартановского района и в пос. Ойсхара курсы ускоренного обучения и ищет средства для открытия таких курсов в других селах."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The pre-school education sector also constitutes a cause for concern. In Chechnya, as of today, 93 kindergartens cater for some 7,400 children aged 3-6. While UNICEF, Caritas, WVI and IRC managed to create and support over 50 Children Centers for some 3,000 children in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the vast majority of their peers (around 75,000) do not have access to pre-school education, due to lack of kindergartens and financial resources."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 10:

"Children of IDPs often do not attend school; in some cases parents cannot adequately prepare children for classes because of lack of money; others do not attend school because they have fallen badly behind in classes; still others are not allowed by their parents to attend remotely located schools for safety reasons. Schools which enroll children of IDPs are overcrowded and experience shortages of school textbooks."

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"The problem of access to education has several dimensions in the Chechen Republic. One of them is loss of educational establishments. Many schools (including six technical colleges and general secondary schools and four specialized secondary schools in Grozny) and the majority of pre-school establishments have been closed. About 460 secondary schools are currently operating in the Republic with 13,000 teachers. This is roughly equal to pre-war levels, but the condition of schools today is entirely different: the teachers work in extremely difficult conditions and pupils in some districts have only 10% of the necessary textbooks. Over 152 schools are using temporary facilities. The education system in Chechnya requires urgent attention in order to support reconstruction of the Republic's industry and meet real demands of the regional economy."

UN CRC, 23 November 2005:

"The Committee remains concerned that children living in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus (and in particular internally displaced children) remain very deeply affected by the conflict, in particular with regard to their rights to education and health. "

IDP children go to summer camp (2007)

- In 2005 some 1000 children living in Temporary Accommodation Centres in Chechnya went to summer camp in Kabardino-Balkaria
- Chechen government organised travel

Кавказский Узел, 1 сентября 2005 г.:

"31 августа около 500 детей из ПВРов (пункты временного размещения) вынужденных переселенцев в Чечне выехали на отдых в Кабардино-Балкарию.

Об этом сообщил сотрудник аппарата президента и правительства Чечни. По его словам, поездка детей вынужденных переселенцев в летний лагерь отдыха организована правительством республики [...]

По словам собеседника, всего летом текущего года в летних лагерях побывало около тысячи детей из 32 пунктов временного размещения вынужденных переселенцев на территории Чечни."

Poor state of schools in mountainous areas (2007)

- State of schools in mountainous areas depends on the village and the will of people there to build a new life
- In one village, a woman rents two rooms of her house as classrooms
- Schools suffer from lack of teachers since there is a shortage of housing
- Teachers do not talk about the conflict with the children other than what is in the educational curriculum
- Many children's parents were killed or went to fight with the rebels during the conflict
- Foreign language in almost all schools in mountainous areas is Arabic; teachers also try to speak to children in Russian

Русский репортер, 17 мая 2007 г.:

"В Чечню меня взяли по блату: знакомые из Комитета помощи беженцам «Гражданское содействие» поехали туда исследовать школы в горных селах. Нужно было понять, какие школы больше всего нуждаются в помощи и в какой именно. Я увязалась вместе с ними. Это дало мне возможность увидеть очень много чеченских школ, поговорить с массой людей, побывать в десятке разрушенных горных селений. При этом, надо признаться, я была далеко не самостоятельна — многое мне пришлось видеть глазами тех, с кем я ездила. Нашими проводниками были сотрудники чеченских отделений «Мемориала», у них мы и жили. Все они очень симпатичные люди: Идрис в Аргуне — веселый и несуразный, ни про кого не говорит плохо; Хасан в Гудермесе — мягкий, интеллигентный, переживающий за всех; Шамиль в Грозном — серьезный молодой аскет, его родители погибли во время войны, братья и сестры уехали в Ингушетию, теперь он живет один в большом холодном доме, единственным украшением которого являются расклеенные по стенам желтые карточки с английскими словами. Всех этих людей объединяет безоговорочное желание оказывать помощь — в общей обстановке страха и абсурда это очень важный мотив остаться в Чечне. «Будем притворяться, как будто ничего не было», — с печальной улыбкой говорит Хасан, который всю войну провел в Гудермесе; хотя его самого судьба пощадила, увиденное и услышанное травмировало молодого чеченца почти как личный опыт [...]

За четыре дня мы посмотрели двадцать две школы в четырех горных районах. Это очень много. Почти все школы в итоге слились у меня в голове в одно холодное помещение с сине-белыми стенами, украшенными многочисленными портретами Кадырова-младшего и его же афоризмами. Кто это все вешает? «Попробуй не повесь!» — отвечают директора. Среди этих школ были и образцово-показательные, с ремонтом и детской площадкой, и совсем унылые, где жизнь еле теплится. Почти везде жалуются на нехватку кадров. «Было бы жилье, учителя сюда бы поехали, — говорят в РОНО. — Вон Кадыров, рассказывают, привез в свой Беной русских учителей, положил им зарплату 15 тысяч, они работают... А у нас ставка — две-три тысячи в месяц». Иностранный язык почти во всех школах — арабский. Преподаватель арабского, как правило, ведет факультативы по Корану и уроки этики, на которых рассказывает детям о чеченских традициях. В одной из школ Веденского района имам собственными руками сложил печку. Еще почему-то все говорят про ремонт спортзала: казалось бы, зачем бегать в душном помещении, когда вокруг чистый горный воздух и прекрасная природа, но нет — подросткам некуда девать энергию, говорят учителя, нужен спортивный инвентарь. Оказывается, для чеченцев спорт вообще очень важен, особенно вольная борьба. В некоторых школах есть психологи, и, как правило, они действительно занимаются с детьми.

Вот, пожалуй, и все отличия от среднестатистической российской школы. Впрочем, ситуация в разных населенных пунктах неодинаковая, многое зависит от состояния села и готовности людей строить здесь новую жизнь. Например, в селе Ушкалой школа с трудом помещается в маленьком домике учителя, а в соседнем селении, всего в паре километров

отсюда, есть огромное здание, оснащенное дюжиной компьютеров — но учиться в нем некому: почти все жители с детьми уехали на равнину. Директор школы, пожилая усталая женщина с потухшим взглядом, рассказывает, как ученица школы погибла от осколка, как ее, директора, водили на расстрел, а дети увязались за ней — и только по доброй воле какого-то командующего всех отпустили. Я вспоминаю последнюю фразу изложения, которое читала в тетрадке одной чеченской девочки: «И Пугачев оставил Гринева в покое». Мы пытаемся выяснить у директора, чем можно помочь этой школе. «Да ничего не нужно. Загородку поставьте железную, а то нашу изгородь из дерева коровы опрокидывают» [...]

В школе 72 ученика, занятия проходят в три смены. Учителей химии, физики и русского языка нет. Эти предметы ведут другие преподаватели. «Как же так? Они же этого не знают...» — «Ничего, прочитает учебник, расскажет детям». Директор дает уроки информатики на единственном в школе компьютере, кроме того, ведет уроки труда и физкультуры. Мальчиков до шестого класса он обучает навыкам земледелия, с седьмого по девятый — строительному делу, а в старших классах — вождению своего собственного автомобиля. Иностранного языка нет. «Раньше был учитель арабского, но его арестовали. Потом отпустили, но он уже сюда не вернулся». Питание здесь, как и в большинстве чеченских школ, гуманитарное — от организации World Vision. Кашу варят в учительской на электроплитке. Раньше готовили на молоке — как нетрудно догадаться, тоже директорском — но недавно Зелимхан продал своих коров, поэтому молочная каша в школе теперь большая редкость. Над плиткой на стене висит зеркало, а над ним — трогательная надпись: «Учитель! Посмотри на себя. Улыбнись! И иди на урок».

Насколько я поняла, в традиционном чеченском обществе школа — это не антитеза семьи, а как бы ее продолжение. Здесь нет проблем с дисциплиной, учителей принято слушаться: они уважаемые в селе люди. При моем появлении ребятишки неизменно встают, и это каждый раз меня коробит — но они всегда встают в присутствии старших. С другой стороны, и к детям здесь, как везде на Кавказе, отношение другое: их редко наказывают, стараются выполнять их желания. В хорошем, но очень редком варианте, как в Гансолчу, чеченская школа — это нечто вроде сельского клуба, где взрослые учат детей тому, что умеют сами [...]

Почти все занятия в первых трех классах — это уроки русского языка, дети его ведь совсем не знают. Да и чему там учиться в начальной школе? Там же, насколько я помню, одна ерунда. Но вместе с элементарным словарным запасом дети усваивают чужие для них аксиомы, стиль мышления и систему абстрактного знания: «Человек — разумное существо», «Волга впадает в Каспийское море», «Математика — царица всех наук» и так далее.

«Не поймут по-русски — скажем по-чеченски, потом опять по-русски. Встречая ребенка, говорим ему: «Доброе утро. Как дела?» Стараемся по-русски. Им же самим это нужно, им же... жить...» — смущенно признается директриса школы села Химой Шаройского района. Школа занимает половину жилого дома — во второй половине живут хозяева, сдающие в аренду две класса. В одном из них, съевшись и уставившись в парту, сидит оказавшаяся в центре внимания единственная тринадцатилетняя девочка. «Вторая смена — остальные заболели», — объясняет директриса. Сейчас она занимается с девочкой математикой. На вид они ровесницы; прожившая много лет в Ростове 25-летняя директриса в кокетливой джинсовой юбке иногда кажется даже моложе, чем зажатый сельский подросток в платке[...]

При желании придраться можно почти к любому горцу. Почти все они так или иначе имели отношение к боевикам. Для многих это родственники, кто-то пустил переночевать, кто-то давал еду. Правовой чеченец, вообще говоря, должен принять любого — тем более трудно отказать человеку с оружием. «Мы были между двух огней, — говорят беженцы из

горных сел. — Утром приходили боевики, вечером — федералы». Нетрудно догадаться, что на уроках истории тема российско-чеченских отношений здесь вообще не затрагивается. «Я боюсь что-то сказать, — говорит учительница истории в селе Харачой, одном из самых напряженных в Веденском районе. — У многих детей здесь родители погибли, у кого-то — ушли к боевикам. Рассказываю только то, что предписано учебной программой: в таком-то году имели место такие-то военные действия. Если я скажу что-то больше, меня могут не так понять»."

Children in collective centres cannot attend school (2004)

- There has been no measures for the schooling of children newly returned from Ingushetia
- Poverty prevents displaced families from sending their children to school

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

Ganushkina 2004, p. 24:

"No continuing education has been organized for schoolchildren relocated to temporary placement points on Chechen Republic territory. First of all, there is no agreement between Chechen authorities and nearby schools regarding the admission of arriving children. Frequently, schools already operating beyond capacity refuse to accept more children. Secondly, when leaving the tent camps in the Republic of Ingushetia, many schoolchildren had to leave their textbooks, and they are not being given new ones. And parents do not have the means to buy these textbooks for their children. Many children do not attend school because their refugee life has caused them to fall so far behind. Many cannot attend school because they do not have clothes to wear."

UN OCHA October 2004, Projects, p. 36:

"Most returnees are unable to provide their children with sufficient material base, which would enable them to attend schools. VESTA's ongoing monitoring of the situation in the TACs reveal that a high number of children currently residing in the TACs are not attending schools regularly, because of the lack of basic season clothing."

Other areas

Separate schooling in some villages of Prigorodny district, North Ossetia (2006)

- North Ossetian authorities introduced separate schooling for Ingush and Ossetians since feared inter-ethnic clashes

Memorial, 31 March 2006:

"Important role in perpetuation of this division is played by the system of separate schooling, practiced in some villages (eg. Chermen) of Prigorodny district. The decision to introduce separate education was taken by the authorities out of fear of possible clashes on national grounds. However, the teachers at schools with mixed classrooms (Dongaron, Kurtat) explained to "Memorial" monitors that there have been no ethnically colored conflicts in their schools."

Displaced Chechen children in Moscow are denied access to schools (2004)

- Children continue to be denied access to day-care centres and schools in Moscow because their parents lack residence registration, despite the issuance in 2001 of a directive that confirmed such registration was no longer needed
- Law enforcement officials question students about their parents in Moscow and St. Petersburg

NGO Shadow report, 28 February 2006:

"Starting with the first war in Chechnya the Moscow schools stopped admitting children from other cities whose parents had no registration in Moscow. When in 1995 Shamil Basaev's troops occupied a hospital of Budennovsk, the Moscow educational committee came to a determination that schools should admit children from Chechnya only as long as their registration is valid (at that time temporary registration was not given for more than 45 days), should not question them in class, nor grade their class work, nor issue secondary education certificates to them. Families with many children did not receive children's allowances: moneyed assistance to buy school uniform, as well as free lunches and tickets.

On 21 September 1999 the Moscow Educational Committee issued Order No. 567 'On the Reinforcement of Security at Educational Institutions'. Para 1.1 of the order reads as follows: "Children from other cities can be admitted to secondary education institutions and boarding schools only as long as their parents have registration." The order referred to the children that had fled from bombardments of the new war and was issued on the day following the recommencement of military operations in Chechnya. In December 2000 the court overruled Para 5 of the registration instruction as contradicting the law. However, it was no sooner than in late 2001 that the Moscow Educational Committee circulated instructions No. 2-13-15/20 of 12 October 2001, in which it informed school directors that registration was no longer needed. Nevertheless, the committee instructed schools to inform the police about parents without registration. In schools of Moscow and St. Petersburg it is a regular practice that law enforcement officials interrogate children about their parents. One such interrogation took place in school No. 286 of Moscow on 24 October 2004.

Directors of Moscow schools and day-care centers continue the practice of non-admission of children whose parents have no registration in the city. "

Council of Europe, 2 May 2007:

"In its first opinion, the Advisory Committee [on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities] encouraged the authorities to address difficulties as regards access to education faced by persons belonging to national minorities in a number of regions, particularly certain displaced populations."

More than 100 IDP children face obstacles to going to school in Dagestan (2007)

- In Kizlyarski district, more than 100 children from the IDP camp "Nadezhda" do not go to school for second year in a row because of "indifference of authorities"
- Dagestan has one of highest numbers of youth in education in all of Russia and Dagestan has received more subsidies through the national education project than most other regions

ТВ Центр, 7 сентября 2006 г.:

"В Кизлярском районе Дагестана из-за безразличия чиновников более сотни детей из лагеря беженцев «Надежда» в сентябре так и не смогли пойти в школу. Призывы людей о помощи власти игнорируют уже второй год. Беженцы доведены до отчаяния и готовы на крайние меры. Эти ребята из лагеря беженцев «Надежда» в Кизлярском районе Дагестана в этом году в школу так и не пошли. Им попросту негде учиться. В этой палатке жители лагеря предлагали устроить начальную школу для детей. Тем более что среди беженцев немало педагогов. С этой просьбой обращались в различные инстанции, но дальше разговоров дело не пошло. Началось все в июне 2005 года. Тогда жители станицы Бороздиновская Чеченской республики (уроженцы Дагестана) в результате вооруженного конфликта с чеченцами покинули свои дома. Они разбили лагерь на территории Кизлярского района Дагестана. Прошло уже больше года, в лагере родилось 8 детей, а положение беженцев не изменилось."

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"Dagestan outranks many of Russia's major cities by numbers of young people in education. The Republic currently has 1,664 educational establishments with 415,664 students. There are 20 higher educational establishments and over 30 branches of various higher educational establishments, whose main facilities are in other parts of Russia. There are over 100,000 students at higher educational establishments. Dagestan has received more subsidies through the "Education" national project than most other Russian regions. Over 660 million roubles were invested by the federal government in Dagestan's education system in 2006. The share of spending on education in the Republic's budget increased from 23% in 2001 to 31.2% in 2006."

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Integration of IDPs constrained by large-scale poverty in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2004)

- Despite some socioeconomic progress in Chechnya, access to food, shelter and essential services is problematic
- Unemployment in Chechnya is the highest in Russia, while agricultural land is heavily polluted by landmines and UXO
- 90 percent of the displaced households in Ingushetia are unemployed or under-employed
- Plans are made by UNDP to support integration needs of IDPs in Ingushetia, through an "area-based" approach
- Donors remain reluctant to support infrastructure rehabilitation in Chechnya
- Payments of pensions have improved in Chechnya


UN OCHA October 2004, pp. 6-7:

"The humanitarian situation remains precarious and complex. Hundreds of thousands of people are still reliant on basic relief supplies provided through the CAP and complementary humanitarian programs. Additionally, the prevailing atmosphere of human insecurity amid the political and social flux is felt by a population still too deeply traumatized by past episodes of violence and lawlessness. Protection of civilians thus also remains a priority, arguably the principal challenge, for the 2005 CAP.

Although there has been some socioeconomic progress in Chechnya, the population's food and shelter needs are still significant, and access to water and sanitation facilities as well as to health, education and other social services is often problematic. Many people in Chechnya are displaced, with their homes destroyed, and very few have jobs. Unemployment in Chechnya (at an official rate of 80%) is the highest in Russia. In addition, Chechnya remains one of the areas of the world most heavily polluted by landmines and unexploded ordnance.

Approximately half of the population of Chechnya lives in conditions of material poverty, even by the low standards of the Chechen average household—the poverty threshold being 21-33 roubles (US \$0.70-1.10) per person per day. The latest large-scale poverty study conducted by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) at the end of 2003 confirmed this, as well as disaggregating five economic zones in Chechnya separated geographically and by unequal income opportunities (see map). The concentration of poor households is in economic zone III in central Chechnya south of Grozny. The DRC study and ongoing household surveys also help identify disproportionately vulnerable demographic groups, among them very young children, handicapped, and pregnant or lactating women."

Distribution of poor households in Chechnya by economic zone



Source: ORC Survey, 2003

UN October 2004, p. 49:

"The Mid-Year Review of the 2004 CAP identified economic recovery as a priority for greater activity in 2005. The challenge is twofold: 1) to avoid a 'gap' in programming between humanitarian relief and longer-term recovery efforts, and, 2) to support local authorities and civil society in their agenda of socioeconomic development. Substantial efforts are routinely made by aid Agencies to assure sustainable benefits of their projects, but this work will be better coordinated and more purposive in 2005. In June 2004, a multi-Agency mission led by UNDP and UNHCR to consider sustainable reintegration of the area's large number of IDPs introduced a new impetus by recommending an 'area-based approach,' with economic recovery and poverty reduction providing the engine for stability. This response plan builds on recommendations of that mission, e.g., for development of information management tools and pilot projects to guide durable reintegration and livelihoods-enhancement strategies.

An inter-Agency team of recovery experts, led by UNDP, was deployed in the North Caucasus in October 2004, and is working closely with government and aid-community partners on improved coordination and development of an integrated area recovery strategy. The new measures in recovery assistance are being piloted first in Ingushetia, where a depressed rural economy and inadequate infrastructure are stressed from the large numbers of IDP groups arriving there since the early 1990s. Although the official caseload of registered unemployed totals only 16% of the workforce, general unemployment is estimated by the Ingushetia Government¹ to be much higher, up to 53%, and aid Agencies estimate that the numbers of officially unemployed and occasionally informally employed persons, together, could reach 73%. Among IDPs in the republic, the level of unemployment and under-employment is up to 90%. IDP families seeking to return or integrate into poverty-affected areas face constraints in terms of job availability, their access to local networks, marketable skills, and tools. They and the communities they live in need economic opportunities if they are to advance in human security and avoid further conflict. The numbers and types of economic recovery activities undertaken in the area thus far have been modest, underscoring the urgent need for additional as well as expanded initiatives supporting economic recovery.

In Chechnya, the Federal Government has already engaged in recovery planning, and it has made a stronger commitment to infrastructure rehabilitation for 2005. Agencies participating in the CAP provide modest support to this effort through ongoing projects. However, notwithstanding the Federal and international assistance, the recovery of industrial, agricultural, financial, commercial, and public infrastructure continues to be slow. Unemployment among Chechens of employable age is estimated at 80%. Access to financial and productive capital for job creation and income generation is extremely limited. In the present context, insecurity may constitute the greatest impediment to progress."

Displaced Chechens face difficulties with integration in other parts of Russia (2006)

- IDPs in Russia outside of North Caucasus rely on state benefits
- Employers refuse jobs to Chechens for lack of registration
- Ethnicity is increasingly openly acknowledged as reason for refusal of employment

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.24:

"A significant portion of th[ose who have left the North Caucasus to live elsewhere in Russia] have so far failed to integrate themselves into local life on the territory of Russia...There are no organizations in Russia which would provide internally displaced persons with housing, jobs or financial support. Since 1999, a forced migrant status has been the only thing that gives IDPs a hope to get a minimum support from the state and also serves as some guarantee that his social rights could be fulfilled."

Ganushkina 2004, pp. 58-60:

"Although the law forbids turning down job applications for reasons unrelated to the worker's qualifications, such as ethnicity or place of residence, in practice both of these factors constantly serve as a barrier for Chechens in their job search, the former (ethnicity) to a much greater extent than the latter (registration). Both employers and workers think that the absence of registration is perfectly legal reason to turn down a job application. Most of them react with surprise and even doubt when told that this is not a legal basis for denying employment. But openly refusing a candidate on the basis of his or her ethnicity is something most employers didn't dare do, preferring to give the candidate some other kind of reason for the rejection. However, recently Chechens have been told the real reason in a straightforward fashion; ethnicity, is more and more frequently named when they are shown the door. In so acting, employers expect understanding and often get it. People get used to such a situation and begin to see it as a norm.

[...]

It can be said for certain that over the last year the financial situation of Chechens (particularly IDPs) in Moscow and the city's environs has grown worse. A group of Chechens, having either failed to find jobs or lost them were deprived of the opportunity to rent housing in Moscow and provide for their families, and so returned to Chechnya – to ruins or to the houses of relatives already teeming with people. Those who remain in Moscow can barely make ends meet."

Economic recovery slowly starting in North Caucasus (2006)

- Many people have moved from depending on humanitarian assistance to relying employment income
- Numerous obstacles to business remain, such as poor access to credit and low purchasing power of consumers
- Youth make up 30-40 per cent of population, but face a lack of work opportunities
- 2005 DRC survey showed that the biggest expense of IDPs from in Ingushetia has been food, most families have at least one member earning an income and most IDP pensioners return to Chechnya to collect their pension

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Although many economically disadvantaged and conflict-affected groups in the region have restarted economic activities and have thus begun the transition from dependency on humanitarian assistance to active employment, among

the dissuading factors for doing business in the region entrepreneurs note primarily access to finance but also funding conditions, legislative environment, access to information, purchasing power of local consumers, unfavorable legal framework and lack of skilled professionals.

Enhanced access to credit is at the top of the government priorities. Most entrepreneurs today access financial resources not through banks, as they lack the required collateral, but by borrowing from family, friends or private lenders. Even these sources of finance, as research shows, are becoming more "commercialized" when the borrowers have to pay interest. In order to boost employment and enhance livelihoods in the region, there is an urgent need to provide alternative sources of accessing credit through e.g. micro-credit funds, cooperatives, and/or establishing leasing mechanisms. Entrepreneurs also face problems at the conceptual level and lack skills to formulate business concepts and develop business plans necessary for accessing credit.

The lack of employment opportunities is a critical issue for the youth who represent 30-40% of the population and the bulk of the unemployed in the region. While young people have energy, creativity and relevant skills, there are no targeted mechanisms in place in order to ensure that young people find and seize opportunities for decent and productive work that will allow them to become independent and responsible citizens."

DRC, April 2005:

"Biggest expense since arrival in Ingushetia

Surveyed households have been asked to indicate their biggest source of expense since arrival in Ingushetia. 5,478 households (83%) state that it has been food, 492 households (7%) clothes, 515 households (6%) drugs, 124 (2%) utilities, and 45 (0.7%) rent. The remaining reply that their biggest source of expense since arrival has been transport, car, education, funeral, rehabilitation of damaged shelter, and expenses related to children. Some respondents may have understood the question as related to the biggest single instance of expense since arrival instead of the biggest aggregate source of expense.

Income from permanent jobs, casual labour, and trading

4,445 (67%) of the surveyed households have at least one member earning an income, as 41% of the surveyed adults have either a permanent job, make casual earnings, or trade at the market, whereas the unemployment rate of the surveyed adults comes to 59%, with 53% for males and 64% for females. 33% of the surveyed households have no working or trading family members. These households depend on state allowances, humanitarian aid, and other coping mechanisms. This is the case for 32% of those living in temporary settlements, 42% of those living in the private sector for free, and 26% of those living in the private sector paying rent. Some of these households could be the 15 children-only households registered as separate households while living with relatives (see pg. 10).

State allowances

Pensioners: 2844 households (43%) receive pension. 78% collect their pension in Chechnya and the average amount comes to RR 1,215, while 22% receive their pension in Ingushetia, with the average amount coming to RR 1,575, or in other parts of RF (0.2%) where the average amount comes to RR 1,349.

Child allowance: 3,575 households (54%) receive child allowance. The average amount of child allowance comes to RR 72.4. Some households who need to collect this money in Chechnya might choose not to do so due to transportation costs.

Stipend: 140 households (2%) receive stipends in their institutions. The average size of stipends comes to RR 338."

Dagestan: IDPs have various sources of income (2007)

- Dire poverty in Dagestan, with 70 per cent of people under 30 years of age unemployed
- DRC survey shows that IDPs in Dagestan have various sources of income, including temporary jobs and social benefits
- ICRC has helped some people in Dagestan to start their own business

DRC, 28 February 2007:

"Nowadays IDPs in Dagestan survive due to different sources of income. Thus, we witness rather clear subdivision according to the districts:

Kizlyarsky – live on incomes from temporary job (trading on market, agriculture, construction services);

Nogayskiy – on social payments (pension and benefits); Khasav-Yurtovskiy – on incomes from trading (there is a large regional market in Dagestan, providing temporary job for quite a number of IDPs).

However, the above-mentioned sources of income are available just for the small part of the IDPs total number. Temporary job as a source of income in Kizlyarsky district is an exception (members of every third family are temporarily employed on the market)."

District	Total	Social payments	Trading	Household effects	Temporary job	Job	Assistance from relatives
Kizlyarski	165	7	4	10	53	5	1
Nogayski	41	4		2			1
Tarumovski	68	4	3	6	8		3
Khasav-Yurtovski	128	2	16		9	2	
Total	402	17	23	18	70	7	5

UNDP, 15 March 2007:

"Dagestan currently has problems in all spheres of its economy. The Republic has suffered a serious economic decline, caused by general instability in the North Caucasus region and Russia's financial and economic crisis, and its industry and agriculture have had difficulty adapting to

market conditions. A transport and energy embargo in 1995–2001, caused by events in Chechnya, had serious negative impact on Dagestan's economy and social sphere. The Republic remains dependent on federal subsidies (which account for 76.8% of total budget spending) and on profits from the unregistered "shadow" economy. Dagestan has a larger share of people who have not yet attained working age (32.6%) than almost any other Russian region, and the share of disabled children in this age group (3.59%) is the highest in the country. About 70% of people in Dagestan depend on welfare.

Dagestan's dire poverty is largely due to the critical state of its labour market. The able-bodied population is growing faster than the number of jobs, so Dagestan continues to experience a

labour oversupply. The total number of unemployed by ILO criteria in late 2006 was 267,500 or 27.7% of the able-bodied population. In late 2006, 55,900 people or 5.7% of the able-bodied population were registered at state employment offices. The situation in the Republic's upland districts is particularly difficult with average unemployment rates of 11.5–12% (compared with 4.2% in the plains). The average unemployment rate in urban areas is 2.3%, while the unemployment rate in rural areas (which account for about 84% of registered unemployment) is almost six times the national average [...]

Unemployment is one of the key problems in Dagestan and it has particular impact on women and young people. The high share of young people among the unemployed is due to shortage of jobs and high selection criteria among employers. Up to 70% of young people under the age of 30 do not have a registered job and are considered to be unemployed on account of their inadequate levels of education and professional training, suggesting that further improvements are needed in the system of professional and specialist training. Recent growth of labour demand has not solved the problem: employers continue to select employees on the basis of age and work experience, while unemployed individuals, particularly young people, are making increasing demands as regards working conditions and wages."

ICRC, 6 September 2006:

"One hundred and fifty families of displaced persons from Chechnya living in Daghestan have been given the opportunity to start their own businesses with the assistance of the ICRC. Since the beginning of 2006, ten families have taken the plunge [...]"

Aminat and her daughter fled Chechnya during the conflict and settled in Daghestan. Until recently she had been receiving humanitarian aid from the ICRC. When she was presented with the opportunity to become the owner of a cafe in the suburbs of Khasavurt, she seized the occasion.

Our land cruiser enters the courtyard and stops near a four-story building. The door on the ground floor is open and people can be seen through the windows. No one is coming out to greet us, which is no surprise, as the lunch rush is on. The cafe is packed full with employees from neighbouring businesses and organizations. Although the cafe is located in a relatively quiet street, Aminat enjoys a good number of visitors every day.

Aminat is one of ten people who decided to give up humanitarian aid and start their own business. "In the beginning, I was wondering if I would be able to manage," she says. Making food for people is not easy – it has to be tasty, served quickly and should not cost much." As it turns out, the cafe's clientele highly appreciate Aminat's cooking, which in fact is not surprising, as she puts all her heart into it.

"People in Daghestan love kurze (Caucasian ravioli)," explains Aminat, as she drops a big portion of it into boiling water.

"I now have the opportunity to earn a living. I do not make big profits, but I receive regular income. It allows me to think about my future and the future of my daughter," says Aminat."

Youth in North Caucasus most idle youth in Russia (2006)

- North Caucasus has the youngest population in Russia; this is a major asset
- But North Caucasus also has highest percentage of youth neither in school nor work

- Youth in North Caucasus face lack of employment opportunities, growing health risks
- Biggest obstacle to youth employment in North Caucasus is mismatch between skills youth have and jobs available

World Bank, 31 December 2006:

"The North Caucasus is the most disadvantaged region in the Russian Federation. The region is characterized by high levels of poverty (over 40 percent in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan);¹ large youth populations (21 per cent in Southern Russia and 36 percent in the Republic of Ingushetia);² poor educational preparation for the job market and low youth employment rates (26.5 percent in the Southern Federal Region as a whole³); significant linguistic and ethnic diversity; and the presence of numerous security risks, including that of violent conflict

and religious extremism. In addition to unsuccessful school-to-work transitions, youth nationwide, as well as in the North Caucasus face an array of growing health risks that include substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), the spread of infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS), lack of knowledge about health issues, and, in Ingushetia, malnutrition.

Despite acute development gaps, the North Caucasus has a major asset that Russian Federation as a whole does not: young people. It is the region of the country with the youngest population. The Russian State Committee for Statistics estimates that the population of the Russian Federation in 2006 is 142.5 million, down from almost 148.3 million in 1996— a decrease of roughly 5 million over a ten-year period. The population is, moreover, currently decreasing by approximately 700,000 a year. Not only are fewer people being born in Russia—the current fertility rate is below the replacement level—but many working-age members of the population are dying at young ages due to a catastrophic rise in non-communicable diseases (especially cardiovascular disease) and injuries [...]

Youth in the North Caucasus have the highest rate of idleness (percentage of youth neither in school nor work) in the country, ranging from two to seven times the national average of 10 percent.

- The biggest obstacle to youth employment is the skills mismatch between the educational system and the job market, together with corruption in the educational system. Too many youth are being trained in professions in which there are no jobs. As a result, young people desperately need practical job experience and skills.
- Young people are interested and motivated to pursue self-employment, but require additional support and training to do so.
- Whereas most young people in the region strongly identify with their religious traditions, they clearly recognize the threat of Islamic extremism. They advocate higher-quality private religious education and better training of religious leaders as potential means of combating extremism.
- In addition to Islamic extremism, young people consider the corruption of republic and local authorities, including local police forces, an important security threat to their communities."

Greenhouse project in Ingushetia increases self-reliance of IDPs (2006)

- Greenhouse project helped IDPs gain new skills and improve food security

IMC, 8 January 2006:

"The efforts of the people of Nazran to design and build a greenhouse to provide year round nutrition in a harsh environment exemplify long-term development and sustainability within this

community. This programme has developed a set of skills among community members that are transferable to many work situations and environments

The “Metalshop” is a spontaneous settlement located in Nazran, Ingushetia that provides a temporary home for approximately 700 internally displaced people (IDPs) affected by the conflict in Chechnya. Most of the residents have been living in this settlement since 2000

IMC's health care programmes in Nazran led the way for a Community Mobilization Programme (CMP), which was initiated in 2001 to assist the displaced people from Chechnya to create a project to better their lives nutritionally, socially, and psychologically

The programme follows basic steps. Teams of “community mobilizers” carry out the field implementation of the programme. These teams consist of two members each and are assisted by a construction and engineering specialist. The implementation process includes: an introduction, an election of a governing body of community representatives (called a Community Action Group or CAG), a situational assessment to identify the community's problems and resources, project design, implementation, monitoring including a maintenance plan, and evaluation.

The first phase consisted mainly of environmental improvement projects such as new latrines, laundries, water sources, and living block rehabilitations. These projects served a dual purpose -- initially providing a tangible outcome for the community as well as bonding the CAG into a cohesive working group. These initial projects have proved the strength of the community when it acts as a whole.

A second phase was aimed to promote and enhance the self-sufficiency of this IDP population. During a series of meetings, community members voiced their concerns about the lack of year-round nutritional balance. With this issue in mind, the CAG recognized a unique resource within the settlement itself -- a greenhouse specialist from Grozny -- and began plans to build a greenhouse. As this project moved forward, IMC supported the effort by providing materials and managerial support, with community members handling the majority of the actual coordination of labour and output."

Remaining IDPs most vulnerable (2006)

- IDP settlements have now become pockets of poverty and the most vulnerable IDPs live there
- Remaining IDPs are landless, homeless, without social networks
- IDPs face socio-economic difficulties specific to their situation
- Returnees to Chechnya and general residents of Chechnya in similar social situation

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"According to the WFP-led VAM exercise, the remaining IDP settlements are becoming pockets of severe poverty. IDPs survive on the margin of society and are among the most vulnerable in the surveyed sample. While the majority of the displaced population has moved back to Chechnya or integrated effectively in Ingushetia, the remaining IDPs are landless, homeless and without assets; their traditional safety nets and kin-based networks have been weakened by warfare."

Council of Europe, 2 May 2007:

"The Advisory Committee [on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities] notes that particular socio-economic difficulties, inconsistent with the principles of Article 4 of the

Framework Convention, are faced by persons belonging to minorities that have been internally displaced by war."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 9:

"The social situation of residents of Chechnya and IDPs who returned home is in effect similar. According to the Chechen Republic Ministry for Economic Development, there are up to 400,000 unemployed people in the Republic, which makes 65% of the able-bodied population."

Various sources of income for IDPs from mountainous areas (2007)

- IDPs from mountainous areas work as Arabic language teacher, guard, dishwasher, village administrator, teacher, cleaner, veterinarian
- Women and teenagers work, in addition to men
- Women usually work as plasterers, make mud bricks or in business; many men work on temporary construction jobs
- On average, interviewed IDPs earn from 2000 to 5000 roubles per month
- Social benefits are main source of income for both IDPs and the general population, not employment income
- Poor soil conditions in Chechnya as a result of armed conflict

UNDP, 15 May 2007:

"The armed conflict had negative impact on soil quality in many districts of the Republic, mainly through pollution of soils by oil products. The worst oil pollution is found around facilities for filling, storing, and transporting oil products, fuels and lubricants and around fuel and energy plants at which accidents have occurred. Such pollution is mainly due to depreciation of oil infrastructure, particularly oil storage tanks and fuel pipelines."

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"Когда мы задавали беженцам вопрос о работе, они считали, что речь идет о постоянной работе в организации, как это было в советские времена, а не о каком-то более или менее постоянном занятии, дающем определенный доход. Поэтому положительно на этот вопрос ответили только те, кто работает в бюджетных организациях. Оказалось, что работающие в этом смысле есть в 9 семьях из 105 опрошенных, и таких людей на 339 трудоспособных членов этих семей всего 11 человек. Поэтому не составляет труда их перечислить, указав размеры их зарплаты:

учитель арабского языка – 2000 руб., охранник - 10000 руб., две посудомойки с зарплатой по 1200 руб., управделами сельской администрации – 4000 руб., учитель средней школы – 2000 руб., санитарка – 1200 руб., учитель и завуч средней школы - 6400 руб., фельдшер – 3800 руб., ветврач – 2500 руб., без указания профессии – 3500 руб.

О наличии временных (сезонных или эпизодических) заработков сообщили члены 71 семьи, однако, возможно, не все сочли необходимым сказать об этом. Большинство мужчин в теплое время года работают на стройках. Об этом сообщили 58 человек. 5 сказали, что подрабатывают на сельскохозяйственных работах, Один занимается жестяными работами (делает ворота), трое занимаются торговлей, двое - перевозками. Не только мужчины, но и некоторые женщины и даже подростки используют любую возможность, чтобы подработать. Женщины обычно занимаются штукатурными работами, изготовлением саманных кирпичей, торговлей. Приведем некоторые содержательные высказывания о том, как беженцы зарабатывают на жизнь.

- «Муж работает на стройках в Грозном, и сын с ним работает. Когда есть работа, их вызывают. Денег пока не платят. Но на уразу дали 10 тысяч рублей» (2)

- « С прошлого года не работал. Жена обмазывает дома глиной» (7)
- « Месяц назад за строительство фундамента получил 7000 р. До этого 3 месяца был без работы. Держим 3 коровы (подарили родители). Покос арендуем у совхоза. Помогаю в сезон арендаторам и за это тоже получаем сено» (9)
- «Держим скот – 6 голов. Иногда работаем на стройке» (11)
- «У мужа есть трактор, на нем по найму пашет весной и осенью, в другое время работы нет» (Очень бедная семья -18).
- «Взял в аренду грузовик, заработка почти нет, предложение превышает спрос» (30)
- «Летом работал на стройках, заработал, чтобы собрать детей в школу /в семье четверо школьников/ и на питание. Занял 40 тысяч и купил автобус, хотел возить людей, но не получилось» (32)
- «Подрабатываем чисткой орехов» (42)
- «Чтобы собрать четверых детей в школу, жена сделала летом на продажу несколько тысяч саманных кирпичей» (40)
- «Покупаем-продаем скот. Сыновья (школьники) разбирают разрушенные дома на кирпич и продают его» (43)

Судя по рассказам беженцев, средний размер заработка в основной сфере их занятости – строительстве – колеблется от 2 до 5 тысяч рублей в месяц. Если работа есть в течение всего строительного сезона, можно заработать 12-30 тысяч рублей (33, 49,65,72,88,95). Однако, при том, что строительными навыками в Чечне обладает большинство мужчин, а многие 40-50-летние мужчины имеют и значительный опыт, нажитый в довоенное время, найти работу на весь сезон удастся, конечно, далеко не всем.

Итак, работа в Чечне – для большинства жителей, а не только для ВПЛ – в настоящее время не является источником регулярных денежных доходов. Таким источником служат пока только социальные выплаты: пенсии, пособия по безработице, пособия на детей. Если ежемесячную зарплату получают, как уже говорилось, только в 9 опрошенных семьях, то пенсии - в 61 семье, а пособия по безработице – в 63-х. При этом 16 семей на момент опроса вообще не имели регулярных денежных доходов. (Пособия на детей в виду их ничтожного размера не учитывались). Еще 26 семей не имели иных регулярных доходов, кроме пособия по безработице. Размер этого пособия небольшой: в ходе опроса назывались суммы от 450 до 740 р. Правда, для семей, с большим количеством трудоспособных, эти пособия могут сложиться в приличную сумму. Например, мы беседовали с семьей, в которой это пособие получали одновременно 9 человек. Но это – редкость. В большинстве семей пособие по безработице получает 1-2 человека, что на бюджет семьи серьезного влияния не оказывает. Получать его можно трижды по 6 месяцев с полугодовыми перерывами.

Мы провели грубый подсчет: сложили названные беженцами суммы регулярных месячных доходов - зарплаты, пенсии, пособия по безработице (в тех случаях, когда размер пособия не был указан, брали его обычный размер – 700 руб.). Полученную сумму разделили на общее количество членов опрошенных семей, то есть на 661. Получилось, что в среднем регулярные денежные доходы на 1 человека составляют в этой группе беженцев чуть менее 500 рублей или 18 долларов в месяц. При этом

- 16 семей не имеют вообще регулярных денежных доходов,
- 42 семьи имеют доход до 500 рублей на одного человека в месяц (в т.ч. 14 семей – менее 200 руб. на человека),
- 37 семей получают ежемесячный доход в размере от 500 до 1000 руб. на человека,
- 10 семей имеют доход свыше 1000 руб. на одного человека.

Таким образом, 48 семей (55 % опрошенных) либо вообще не имеют регулярных денежных доходов, либо имеют совершенно ничтожный доход до 500 р. в месяц, то есть находятся на грани выживания. 37 семей (35%) получают несколько большие, но весьма скромные доходы до 1000 р. на человека в месяц. И только 10 семей (около 10 %) имеют доходы свыше 1000 рублей на человека в месяц. Но ни у одной из этих семей доходы не

достигают прожиточного минимума, установленного постановлением ВРИО президента Чеченской Республики Р.Кадырова от 28 февраля 2007 г. на уровне 3132 рублей.

6 из 10 семей, получающих доход свыше 1000 рублей на человека в месяц, по чеченским меркам совсем маленькие - 3-4 человека - и состоят в основном из пенсионеров. Самый большой доход - 2233 руб. на одного человека - получает семья из трех человек, двое из которых - инвалиды, а единственный трудоспособный получает пособие по безработице (89).

Впрочем, надо иметь в виду, что такие небольшие пожилые семьи, как правило, тратят на себя только часть своих доходов, поскольку служат донорами других родственников - более многочисленных и молодых семей. Такие семьи, как подтверждает и наше обследование, находятся сейчас в Чечне в наихудшем положении. Пенсий они не получают, заработков нет, поэтому они вынуждены регулярно принимать помощь от родителей и других родственников-пенсионеров. Об этом нам многократно приходилось слышать и в ходе этой поездки, и раньше - во время бесед с беженцами и жителями Чечни.

Относительное благополучие остальных 4-х из 10-ти семей, имеющих доход свыше 1000 руб. на человека в месяц, основано на том, что они получают деньги из 2-3 источников (пенсия + пособие + зарплата, или пенсия + зарплата). Обладателем второго самого большого душевого дохода (2118 рублей) оказалась семья из 11 человек, потерявшая четверых мужчин, похищенных в 2002 г. Семья состоит из пожилой женщины, вдовы одного и матери трех похищенных, единственного оставшегося у нее сына, трех вдов-невесток и 6 внуков и внучек, одна из которых - ребенок-инвалид. В этой семье сразу 7 человек получают пенсии (в том числе 5 - по потере кормильца) и 3 человека (редчайший случай!) имеют работу: единственный мужчина работает охранником в одной из резиденций Р.Кадырова, получает 10 000 р., и две молодые женщины моют посуду за 1200 рублей в месяц (34). Вот откуда «богатство» этой семьи.

При крайней недостаточности денежных доходов некоторым подспорьем для ВПЛ служит подсобное хозяйство. К сожалению, мы не включили в опрос эту тему, поэтому она возникала в беседах с беженцами лишь эпизодически. Вот, например, запись, сделанная в Иласхан-Юрте: «Летом работаю на стройке. Держим 2 коровы, сено покупаем. Землю под огород не дают» (17). Или пугающе обыденное сообщение беженца, живущего в многолюдном п. Ойсхара под Гудермесом: «Корова выручала, недавно подорвалась на mine недалеко от дома» (41).

Обстановка во многих домах, где мы побывали, также свидетельствует о бедности. Правда, почти нигде бедность не бьет в глаза - ее камуфлирует характерные для чеченских домов идеальный порядок и чистота. Но все же она проглядывает в отсутствии каких-либо предметов не первой необходимости (кроме телевизоров - они есть почти у всех), в том, что везде висят одни и те же дешевенькие ковры и занавески, в том, что почти ни в одном доме нет детских игрушек. Иногда мы заставили людей за едой и видели на столах часто только самодельный хлеб, чай и сахар, реже сыр и масло. Известно, что чеченцы - мясоеды. Мы обошли больше 100 чеченских домов и, кажется, ни разу не уловили запах мяса.

Income generation activities of IDPs from Chechnya (2007)

- ICRC has helped some people in Chechnya to start their own business

IWPR, 14 June 2007:

"Petemat Umakhanova, 35, is tired of being a victim.

She has had to bring up four children on her own in Grozny ever since her husband disappeared in 2004. What money she has had - just 2000 roubles (around 75 US dollars) a month - has come in benefits from the state and the Red Cross.

Now she is branching out, and has asked the Red Cross for credit to help set up her own business.

"I applied to purchase a freezer and foodstuffs," she said. "I'm tired of living on the humanitarian aid alone. I want to have a business of my own, earn money and maintain my family properly."

She is part of a trend in Chechnya, where both local residents and NGOs are keen to move away from being dependent on aid to building a local economy. The war in Chechnya, which has rumbled on since 1994, is now all but over. But it has devastated the infrastructure and economy of the region and most people are unemployed.

In 2005, the United Nations drew up a plan to help Chechnya develop for itself. The UN and other organisations like the Red Cross have started giving small loans to Chechens and those in neighbouring regions that have also seen bloodshed between local insurgents and Russian forces.

Abubakar Tashayev, manager of the Red Cross microfinance programme, said recipients of the assistance in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan could start their own businesses to improve the living standards of their families.

"This will allow a family to realise its potential and stop being dependant on humanitarian aid," said Tashayev.

In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross launched 86 microeconomic projects. In 2006, that number was 379. In 2007, it is focusing on encouraging trade, and plans to have dozens of projects like Umakhanova's going by the end of the year.

Each lucky family receives 1000 Swiss francs (around 23000 roubles) to put its business together.

"A person who wants to start a business of his own should take the initiative," said Tashayev. "He applies for a mini-project, draws up a business plan. Then our organisation conducts a feasibility check and provides him with the necessary equipment."

If the project proves promising in the six months after it takes off, the organisation will sign an agreement with the businessman, allowing him to use the equipment for free thereafter.

Banata Mustafimova is someone who has already benefited from the programme. She asked the Red Cross for sewing equipment, and now she runs a sewing workshop and employs several people."

Participation

Restrictions to the voting rights of IDPs from Chechnya living in Ingushetia (2005)

- IDPs from Chechnya living in Ingushetia could vote in Chechen parliamentary elections, but only at their area of permanent residence in Chechnya

- In the past an election post was established in the area bordering Ingushetia and Chechnya

Кавказский Узел, 24 ноября 2005 г.:

"Внутриперемещенные лица из Чеченской Республики, временно проживающие на территории Ингушетии, смогут принять участие в голосовании на парламентских выборах, но только по месту постоянной регистрации в Чечне.

Об этом корреспонденту "Кавказского Узла" сообщили в офисе Представительства Чеченской Республики в Республике Ингушетия. По словам сотрудников данного ведомства, в настоящее время чеченская сторона решает вопрос о предоставлении бесплатного автотранспорта для доставки людей к избирательным участкам.

"Раньше для этих целей, в приграничном с Ингушетией Сунженском районе Чечни открывались дополнительные избирательные участки. В этом году такая мера не предусмотрена. Все вынужденные переселенцы, желающие принять участие в выборах парламента Чечни, смогут это сделать, но исключительно по месту постоянного проживания. Для этого 27 ноября им необходимо будет выехать в тот район, где они прописаны, и проголосовать. Вопрос о том, будет ли избирателям предоставлен бесплатный автотранспорт, пока еще не решен", - отметили в Представительстве ЧР."

Recommendations of the Brookings/SAIS Project on Internal Displacement regarding IDPs' voting rights in the Russian Federation (2004)

- Brookings recommends several steps to respect IDPs' voting rights, including presence of domestic and international observers, dissemination of information on voting procedures to IDPs

Brookings November 2004, p. 53:

"As a result of the unresolved state of the conflict in Chechnya, elections occur in a general context of insecurity. An overall political settlement is critical to establishing conditions of security enabling voters, including IDPs, to freely and fully exercise their right to vote. In addition, the following recommendations are made to safeguard IDP voting rights:

- *Allow* displaced voters to cast absentee ballots without having to return to Chechnya to obtain an Absentee Voting Certificate.
- *End* the continued application of the *propiska* internal residence regime, which hinders IDPs' ability to vote in places other than their permanent area of residence.
- *Clarify* the rules and procedures for absentee voting and ensure that these are fully implemented.
- *Ensure* that IDPs have adequate and timely information on the procedures, including absentee voting, available for them to exercise their right to vote.
- *Allow* domestic and international observers safe and unhindered access to monitor the electoral participation of IDPs, both within and outside of Chechnya.
- *Assess* the current situation of the Ingush IDPs from North Ossetia, in particular their voting rights in local, regional and national elections."

Access to courts

Lack of rule of law (2007)

- Progress in strengthening judicial system, but slow consolidation of rule of law
- High level of corruption in judicial system, local government and federal subsidy distribution

Swisspeace, 22 June 2007:

"The level of corruption, especially in the judicial system and local self-governance as well as in the entire system of distributing the targeted federal subsidies, remains very high. There is, however, a transition from corrupt practices in the use of armed violence-based appropriation, which was wide spread during the war, to a comparatively more peaceful way of accumulating wealth, such as extortion by officials. This of course leads to utter frustration and occasional aggression on the part of the population, especially among youths."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Although progress has been made in strengthening the judicial system, the slow consolidation of the principle of rule of law raises serious protection concerns. Legal recourse remains difficult for large numbers of citizens, and particularly those made most vulnerable by displacement or localized violence. In this respect, one of the challenges for international organizations will be to find ways to interact with and increasingly engage with law enforcement structures and the judiciary."

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

Documentation needs

More than 35,000 persons displaced from Chechnya have the status of forced migrant (2004)

- The vast majority of the forced migrants from Chechnya were displaced during the first Chechen conflict (1994-1996)
- Very few of the persons displaced since 1999 have been granted the status
- Up to 450,000 persons have fled as a result of the 1994-1996 conflict in Chechnya, according to governmental estimates

UNHCR 23 February 2005, 30 September 2004, 21 August 2003, 3 March 2003:
Total of forced migrants originating from Chechnya (Figures from the Federal Migration Service

31 October 2002	30 June 2003	30 June 2004	31 December 2004
67,000 persons	60,284 persons	43,406 persons	35,389 persons

"As a result of the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya, some 162,000 IDPs, mostly of Russian ethnicity, were granted the status of forced migrant in the 79 administrative divisions of the Russian Federation. The status of forced migrant is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of displaced persons in their new place of residence, through the allocation of special allowances, assistance with housing, job placement, loans, and related support.

At the beginning of the 2000 some 240,000 person had been displaced from Chechnya. Very few of those displaced as a result of the current conflict have been granted forced migrant status. Although precise information is not available, government statistics indicate that between 30 September 1999 and 31 December 2002 some 13,232 persons were granted forced migrant status. Because of protracted procedures, this number also includes IDPs from the 1994-96 conflict granted forced migrants status in the past few years." (UNHCR February 2003, paras. 10-11).

"The former Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation assessed that some 450,000 persons had fled the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. It is further estimated that most non-Chechen IDPs did not return to Chechnya after that conflict." (UNHCR January 2002. para. 60)

"There are no separate statistics for IDPs from the first 1994-96 conflict and IDPs from the current conflict. The total number of IDPs from Chechnya officially registered as forced migrants was 87,258 as at 31 December 2001. The only way to figure-out how many of those are IDPs from the 1994-96 conflict is to deduct from this figure the number of IDPs from Chechnya who were granted the 'forced migrant' status since the beginning of the second conflict, assuming that all those who obtained FM since September 1999 are new IDPs, which is not automatically the case. Statistics from 1998 and first half of 1999 indicate that persons were still being granted the 'forced

migrant' status, presumably from the previous conflict, as a result of protracted status determination procedures). So, if we deduct 12,000 IDPs who got the 'forced migrant' status from September 1999 until December 2001, to the total number of 87,258 forced migrants from Chechnya, we get approximately 75,000 IDPs from the first conflict still registered as 'forced migrants'." (UNHCR 1 April 2002)

For more information on the "forced migrant" status, see "An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of 'forced migrant'" [Internal link]

Various types of registration for IDPs (2003)

- IDPs should have both residence registration with the local office of the Ministry of Interior and registration under Form 7 with the Migration Services in order to access all state assistance and services available to them
- Residence registration permits access to rights such as medical care, education, birth registration and social benefits
- Despite not having residence registration, some IDPs managed to register children in school and access medical care
- IDPs who are registered under Form No. 7 are included in government IDP statistics and are eligible to receive state humanitarian assistance

UN OCHA November 2003, p. 151

Registration by the departments of visas and registrations under the Ministry of Interior (OVIR): Under the 1993 RF Law on Freedom of Movement, every citizen of the Russian Federation shall be registered by interior organs at his/her *place of residence* and, in case of temporary stay in another location, at his/her *place of sojourn*. The registration system is aimed at facilitating the enjoyment by citizens of their rights in their place of residence or sojourn. Possession of registration conditions access to medical care, education, social allowances, etc. Non-possession of registration in one's place of sojourn is an administrative offence that can be punished by a fine. While several thousand IDPs are not properly registered at their 'place of sojourn' in Ingushetia, this has generally not affected their access to medical care or education services. However, several instances were documented where registry offices (ZAGS) refused to issue birth certificates for babies born from IDP parents who did not have sojourn registration in Ingushetia.

Temporary identification documents: The legal age in Russia for possession of an identification document (in Russian: 'passport') is 14. Local bodies of the Interior have been issuing temporary identification documents (so-called Form 2П) to IDPs who were not in possession of (internal) passports (e.g. because they had lost it). Form 2П is of limited validity (generally six months) and is renewable. Issuance in Ingushetia of identification documents ('passports') to teenagers turning 14 and of temporary identification documents to IDPs who had lost them, has been an essential endeavour of the local bodies of the Interior: it greatly enhanced the freedom of movement of the concerned IDPs, by allowing them to visit (or return to) Chechnya or travel onwards to other regions of the Russian Federation."

UNHCR February 2003, paras. 66-70:

"An internal instruction was reportedly issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior in November 1999 not to issue or renew identity documents to IDPs from Chechnya, allegedly to prevent possible Chechen militants or infiltrators from obtaining official documents. This measure limited freedom of movement for undocumented IDPs outside Chechnya, given the registration regime

applicable in Russia, which requires all Russian citizens to register with the local bodies of the Ministry of Interior if they sojourn outside their place of permanent residence. Undocumented IDPs were also unable to return to, or visit, Chechnya, for fear of being detained at military checkpoints.

Form No. 7, entitled '*Registration of a family arriving under emergency situations*,' is issued by the local migration bodies for the purpose of statistics and distribution of Government's humanitarian assistance. It is provided for under Letter of Instruction No. 19 of 31 March 1997 issued by the Federal Migration Service. It is not an identity document. It is meant to be used by the migration authorities during situations of mass influx and reception, on the territory of the Russian Federation, of citizens who left their place of permanent residence for reasons stipulated under Article 1 of the Russian Federation Law '*On Forced Migrants*'. Form No. 7 is issued to all members of a family including children above the age of 14 years. Persons who are under 14 years of age are recorded on their parents' form."

UNHCR, January 2002:

"Under Point 2 of the [Article 1 of the 1995 Federal Law '*On Forced Migrants*'], it is further stipulated that, '(...) shall be recognised as a forced migrant (...) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation and came to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation'. Hence, persons who were displaced within Chechnya itself (approx. 160,000) cannot, under the current law, do not qualify for forced migrant status."

For more information on the "forced migrant" status, see "An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of 'forced migrant'" [Internal link]

Many IDPs in Ingushetia are registered, but obstacles remain (2007)

- A UNHCR survey showed that 65 per cent of those interviewed who were living in Temporary Settlements in Ingushetia were registered with the Migration Service, 83 per cent had registered their residence with the local authorities and 5 per cent had forced migrant status
- While IDPs are no longer refused registration in Ingushetia, the cost of the application has increased, it must be renewed every 6 months and the procedure differs by district
- It is difficult for some IDPs to reach the offices to register in Ingushetia since they are located far from the Temporary settlements
- Ingush authorities stopped registering newly arrived IDPs in April 2001, but UNHCR helped IDPs gain access to documentation and rights in Ingushetia without having to return to Chechnya

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"In Ingushetia, the survey on the IDPs' situation in Temporary Settlements captured 1,097 families/5,710 persons residing in 81 TSs on the territory of the Republic [...]"

64.9% (3,708 persons) out of the surveyed population reported holding a registration with the Migration Service. Out of this segment of the population 54.4% are women while 45.6% men. The geographic breakdown prorated by the population per district shows that most of the IDPs registered with the MS reside in the Nazran Municipal district (69.7%) and in the Sunzhenski District (69.3%) whereas the lowest percentage are registered in Malgobeski (41.6%). However, when looking by Temporary settlements, the fluctuations are even higher, with some TSs – especially those without a contract with the MS – where de facto none of the IDPs is registered.

It is interesting to notice that 291 IDPs residing in TSs in Ingushetia (5.1% of the overall persons surveyed) possess a Forced Migrant Status. As a rule, IDPs from the second Chechen conflict were not granted the status of Forced Migrants. It is to be assumed that these are either IDPs from North Ossetia/Prigorodny displaced twice, in 1992 from the Prigorodny District and subsequently from Chechnya, or some IDPs who managed to be granted the status through some expedients.

The survey also enquired on the possession by IDPs of a Temporary Registration on the place of Sojourn Registration (SR), legally binding for all Russian citizens residing for a prolonged period outside the place of permanent registration (Propiska). After the merging of the Passport and Visa Service within the branch offices of the Migration Service, the possession of the SR has been object of numerous screenings by the migration authorities. The lack of SR has been occasionally used to de-register IDPs from the assistance lists, allowing for free residence in TSs. During the survey, 4,720 IDPs reported to be in possession of a SR, i.e. 82.7% of the IDP population surveyed (53.7% women). The highest percentage in relation to the overall IDP population per district (92.8%) is reported in the Sunzhenski district and the lowest (42.3%) in the Malgobek district."

ECRE, 22 March 2007:

"Those living in CAPs [in Ingushetia] often have difficulty getting registered with the offices of the Ministry for Interior Affairs, suffer passport checks and special operations involving armed troops."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 19:

"Getting registered with the Interior Ministry offices remains a separate acute problem. Recently there have been less denials of residence registration; however, the procedure itself has become more costly. In the town of Karabulak, temporary registration for one person costs 250 rubles (7.5 euros). This includes costs of photographs and forms and a state duty. Travel fares from distantly located CAPs (compact accommodation points) to the place of registration are to be added to this sum. If, for example, there are six adult children in the family, the registration will cost 1,500 rubles (approximately 45 euros) - an enormous sum of money for IDPs. Given that the registration has to be extended every six months, one can understand how serious this problem is.

For IDPs remaining in the ruined camp of Iman (the village of Aki-Yurt, the Malgobek District), the issue of getting a temporary registration is particularly pressing. This CAP is located far from the district capital, transport service between the village and Malgobek is irregular and a one-way ticket costs 17 rubles (0.5 euros). To get registered, one needs to travel there several times. People are not able to pay even the travel expenses, let alone all the rest of the expenses that accompany the registration process. Meanwhile, passport checks are conducted at Iman, too, and everyone who does not have a registration are regularly taken to a local police station. "

Мемориал, 30 сентября 2005 г.:

"В настоящее время почти все беженцы сумели зарегистрироваться. Тем не менее, регистрация продолжает оставаться одной из острых проблем ВПЛ. Сотрудники, уполномоченные регистрировать беженцев, под любым предлогом пытались им в этом отказать. Проблема была решена после неоднократных коллективных обращений через коменданта лагеря. В регистрации перестали отказывать, но увеличилась стоимость самой процедуры. Причем в каждом районе республики она разная."

UN OCHA November 2002, p. 9:

"The Government of Ingushetia has maintained strong cooperation with the humanitarian community and is continuing to allow those displaced from Chechnya and residing in Ingushetia the same level of access to the health care and education systems that is available to their own citizens. The Chechen branch of the Passport and Visa Service (PVS) opened an office in

Sleptsovskaya during 2002 thus allowing those IDPs in Ingushetia not having official documentation or passports the possibility to obtain new ones. This has increased the possibility for movement for IDPs both within the region and throughout the Russian Federation."

UN OCHA, 30 November 2001:

"The federal migration authorities, as of April 2001, halted the registration of new IDPs leaving Chechnya. This has been preventing IDPs' access to temporary shelter and government assistance. UNHCR has been addressing this matter by mediating with the authorities on a case-by-case situation. Another issue of concern to displaced persons is the issuance of identity documents to undocumented displaced persons in Ingushetia. UNHCR is continuing to advocate on behalf of IDPs and provide support to enhance national mechanisms for the issuance of legal documentation. On 2 November, the visa and passport department of the Ministry of Interior set up an office for IDPs from Chechnya in Nazran. IDPs who lost their documents now have access to the Ministry of Interior and are no longer obliged to go to their former place of residence to obtain new documents. This is an important improvement in finding a solution to the legal status of IDPs."

Documentation situation of IDPs in Chechnya (2007)

- A UNHCR survey showed that 90 per cent of IDPs interviewed in Chechnya were registered with the Migration Services, though in Gudermes only 13 per cent had such registration
- Almost all interviewees had an identity document, while 62 per cent had a passport and 37 per cent had a birth certificate

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"The survey captured almost all families de facto residing in 32 TACs and TSs in the republic of Chechnya. Overall, 2,894 families/ 12,752 persons were interviewed [...]"

More than 99% of the surveyed population is in possession of a valid identity document, a passport (61.5% of the total surveyed population), a birth certificate (37.0%) or a temporary residence certificate (0.7%).

Out of the surveyed population, some 11,481 persons (90.0%) reported to hold a registration with the Migration Service. The gender breakdown is almost identical to the overall one (54.4% women, 45.6% men). The geographic breakdown reflects the general population breakdown per region, with the exception of Gudermes, where only 13.4% of the surveyed population is in possession of the MS registration."

De-registration of IDPs in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2007)

- Federal Migration Services in Chechnya and Ingushetia conducted a verification exercise of IDPs from Chechnya living in government-organised and private accommodation in 2006 and 2007
- IDPs not present during the verification were given 10 days to confirm their residency with officials, otherwise they would be deregistered from the Migration Services list
- 132,000 IDPs living in private accommodation in Chechnya deregistered by the authorities in 2005
- UN has received requests from IDPs for legal support with respect to deregistration

IA Regnum, 13 March 2007:

"С 21 по 25 февраля 2007 года, федеральными миграционными службами Чеченской Республики и Республики Ингушетия была проведена проверка списков вынужденных переселенцев из Чеченской Республики, временно проживающих на территории Ингушетии в местах компактного проживания (МКП) и в частных секторах на предмет их нахождения по месту временной регистрации. В результате мониторинга, проведенного региональным общественным движением ЧКНС, удалось установить, что сотрудники федеральных миграционных служб передали уведомление сроком на 10 дней тем вынужденным переселенцам, которые на момент проверки не находились по месту временной регистрации с тем, чтобы они за этот срок смогли восстановиться в списках ОФМС РФ по Республике Ингушетия.

Вынужденные переселенцы были предупреждены, что если они не явятся в течение 10 дней в ОФМС РФ по Республике Ингушетия, их снимут с учета. В итоге проверок в этом и других МКП на территории Назрановского района, с учета в ОФМС РФ по Республике Ингушетия было снято 24 человека. В Сунженском районе было снято с учета 28 человек. Это те 52 человека, которые не явились в обозначенный срок в ОФМС РФ по Республике Ингушетия.

В общем, уведомление было направлено 536 вынужденным переселенцам, из них - по Назрановскому району 396 вынужденным переселенцам и по Сунженскому району -140."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Many IDPs have requested legal support to challenge the outcome of the government deregistration process. A re-verification exercise will take place in 2007."

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"[...] The biggest group [of IDPs in Chechnya] are 132,000 persons from the total number of registered IDPs, resides in private accommodation. The only help that was previously given to this category of the population was bread distribution, in accordance with Resolution of the Government of the RF No. 163 of March 3, 2001, to the amount of six rubles per person a day. Bread distribution was stopped in August 2004. And in November 2005, according to the information of the leadership of the Chechen Republic Migration Administration, the said category of IDPs was struck off the state register."

Кавказский Узел, 20 июля 2006 г.:

"[...] в результате посещения Ингушетии представителями "Комитета по делам внутриперемещенных лиц Чеченской Республики" в Малгобекском районе Ингушетии из списков получателей гуманитарной помощи исключены 80 процентов беженцев.

Это стало возможным потому, что "Комитет по делам внутриперемещенных лиц Чеченской Республики" составляет акты о том, что люди в МКП на территории Ингушетии не проживают и поэтому им не положена гуманитарная помощь. Делается это независимо от того, проживают они здесь или нет. Все направлено на то, чтобы выдать беженцев из МКП и частных секторов в Ингушетии.

По последнему сообщению источника информации, цифра исключенных из списка на получение гуманитарной помощи беженцев только в частном секторе Малгобекского района Ингушетии составляет 5 940 человек."

Memorial, 17 May 2006:

"Due to shortage of living spaces in state-sponsored centers for temporary residence, the majority of IDPs (132, 000) had to provide for their shelter themselves. The only assistance they received from the state was a daily supply of bread (for 6 rubles/20 cents/per person per day). In

November 2005 this category of IDPs was deregistered by the federal migration services and they are no more counted as forced migrants."

Mix of registration situations among IDPs from mountainous areas (2007)

- About 40 per cent of IDPs from mountainous areas interviewed by Memorial have problems with registration
- However, the situation varies from village to village; in some villages most IDPs have registration while in others none are registered
- Some IDPs without registration are fined, but with the help of Memorial, some IDPs received a certificate from the local administration confirming their residence which helped prevent them being fined
- IDPs believe the authorities prefer they return to their original place of residence and not stay where they are and therefore refuse to register them where they are living now
- IDPs from mountainous areas without registration have problems obtaining documents for land and home ownership
- Some IDPs did not try to register since they did not have money to pay the necessary fees and bribes, they were intending to return to their original homes or wanted to receive compensation for lost property and housing
- Many IDPs from the mountains stay registered at their original residence hoping they will receive compensation for their destroyed homes

Memorial and Civic Assistance Committee, 13 March 2007

"Регистрация

Беженцам задавался вопрос, есть ли у них проблемы с регистрацией или с ее отсутствием. Ответы на этот вопрос представляется необходимым рассмотреть достаточно детально, поскольку регистрация традиционно используется в России как инструмент ограничения прав граждан. По тому, как обстоит дело с регистрацией, можно судить об отношении к беженцам со стороны местных властей.

Ильинская

Ситуация с регистрацией выглядит в селе достаточно благополучно: все опрошенные в этом селе семей, кроме одной (прописанной в Грозном), зарегистрированы временно (6) или постоянно (7). О проблемах с регистрацией заявили трое. Один беженец сообщил: прописан в Ильинской «временно, хотел постоянно прописаться, глава администрации с. Тазен-Кала /откуда он выехал/ отговаривает, хочет, чтобы он вернулся; хотел прописать детей, чтобы получили участки - отказ» (6). Другой сообщил, что не может прописаться постоянно из-за того, что нет денег на оформление дома, да и временная регистрация обходится в 300 р. на человека, что при отсутствии регулярных денежных доходов составляет проблему. (9) Третий сказал, что не может прописаться постоянно из-за отсутствия средств (13). А еще в одной семье нам сообщили, что в Ильинской прописана только часть семьи, а взрослые сыновья не хотят здесь прописываться, потому что собираются вернуться в горы (10)

Иласхан-Юрт

В селе Иласхан-Юрт картина совершенно другая: никто из опрошенных ВПЛ не имеет регистрации. Как сообщили нам в одной семье, несколько месяцев назад глава местной администрации собрал сельский сход, чтобы тот «легитимизировал» его решение не регистрировать переселенцев. При этом за отсутствие регистрации их штрафуют (21). Другой беженец сказал, что к сельской администрации по поводу регистрации «боится даже близко подойти, опасается, что вернут в село», откуда он приехал (20). И эти опасения не пустые: в один дом уже приходили люди в погонах, угрожали выселением (18).

Как пояснили коллеги из «Мемориала», глава администрации Иласхан-Юрта, человек, близкий к Р.Кадырову, стремится во что бы то ни стало выполнить его требование о возвращении переселенцев в горы, не считаясь ни с их намерениями, ни с отсутствием реальной возможности возвращения в разрушенные села. Однако, проблема с регистрацией беженцев в Иласхан-Юрте имеет более сложный характер. Дело в том, что земельные участки, на которых стоят их дома, они либо получили (за деньги) у предыдущей администрации села без какого-либо оформления, либо приобрели – так же без оформления – у местных жителей, тоже не имевших документов на эту землю. Нынешняя администрация отказывается закрепить за беженцами земельные участки, что не позволяет им получить документы и на свое жилье. Все 9 семей, проживающих в Иласхан-Юрте в собственных домах, не имеют документов на жилье, не могут в нем ни зарегистрироваться, ни его продать и опасаются принудительного выселения. В таком же положении, по сведениям ПЦ «Мемориал», находятся и другие живущие в селе семьи ВПЛ.

Ойсхара

Опрос не дает возможности составить определенное представление о ситуации с регистрацией беженцев в этом селе. Из 13 опрошенных зарегистрирован, причем временно, только один. При этом четверо вообще не обращались по поводу регистрации: «Не пытались и проблем не было», - заявил один (30). Три семьи не регистрируются из опасения потерять компенсацию за жилье в горах. При этом семь человек сообщили об отказе в регистрации.

- «Когда были зачистки, просили прописать – отказали, сейчас тоже хотели бы прописаться, чтобы получить участок, но знают, что никого не прописывают» (33)
- «Здесь пока не прописывают, говорят: надо подождать, почему – не знает, нет разрешения сверху» (41)

В п. Ойсхара назвали две проблемы, связанные с отсутствием регистрации: невозможность получить земельный участок под застройку (три человека) и необходимость ездить за пособиями по безработице и на детей в горы. О каких-либо других проблемах из-за отсутствия регистрации здесь не говорили.

Гудермес

Из беженцев, проживающих в самом Гудермесе, нам удалось опросить лишь 6 семей (в том числе четыре – в пригороде Кундухово). У одной семьи есть временная регистрация. Три семьи сами не стремятся зарегистрироваться, потому что хотят вернуться в горы, а также из-за компенсации. Двое сообщили об отказе в регистрации:

- «Постоянно прописываться не хотим, думаем вернуться домой, а временно – отказывают. В прошлом году дважды забирали всей семьей в милицию» (46).
- «Временная регистрация есть у одного брата, а другим отказывают. При этом грозят штрафом. В паспортном столе говорят: возвращайтесь в свое село» (47).

По информации представительства ПЦ «Мемориал» в Гудермесе, сотрудники местного РОВД отказывали ВПЛ в регистрации, ссылаясь на указание сверху, при этом регулярно проводили рейды и «штрафовали» их за отсутствие регистрации. «Мемориальцы» привлекли к этому внимание прессы и добились от начальника РОВД обещания, что с этой практикой будет покончено. Но, видимо, он не твердо держит свое слово.

В.Нойбера

В с. В.Нойбера картина также достаточно пестрая. Из 11 человек, давших ответ на вопрос о регистрации, трое имеют постоянную прописку, трое – временную, один сообщил, что не имеет средств на оформление дома в собственность и взятку за прописку (все вместе стоит 5 000 рублей), еще одна семья не регистрируется, опасаясь потерять компенсацию, две семьи сообщили об отказе в регистрации (но одной семье дали обещание в 2007 г. прописать) и одна семья имеет вместо регистрации справку из местной администрации. Эти справки начали выдавать беженцам по просьбе «Мемориала», чтобы защитить их от преследования за отсутствие регистрации во время «зачисток».

Н.Нойбера

В этом селе было опрошено наибольшее число семей беженцев – 29. 11 из них зарегистрированы по месту жительства, 5 – по месту пребывания, 13 – не имеют регистрации (5 из них получили справки). Проблемы с регистрацией беженцы описывают следующим образом:

- «не регистрируют, есть негласное указание не прописывать, выдают справки для проверок, чтобы не забирали федералы» (63),
- «регистрируют неохотно, надо платить» (68),
- «оттуда не выписывают, здесь не прописывают» (82).

Можно предположить, что оформить постоянную прописку удалось тем беженцам, кто успел построить жилье и обратиться по поводу регистрации при прежней администрации. Новая администрация вынуждена действовать в соответствии с заявлениями Р.Кадырова о необходимости возвращения беженцев в горы и, возможно, негласными указаниями не регистрировать их на равнине. При этом, как водится, в отдельных случаях указаниями начальства пренебрегают за определенную сумму.

В селе Гордали-Юрт мы опросили 7 семей, 3 из которых зарегистрированы по месту жительства, две сами не снимаются с учета в горах, опасаясь остаться без компенсации. Нет регистрации у двух семей, но одна лишь в декабре 2006 г. переехала в село.

В с. Кади-Юрт было опрошено 8 семей. Из них только три имеют прописку (постоянную), остальные не зарегистрированы, при этом двое беженцев заявили о том, что «власти не препятствуют регистрации» (99,100), а один сообщил: «В прошлом году не разрешили (зарегистрироваться), сказали, что запретили» (103).

Подводя итоги, следует констатировать, что значительное число опрошенных ВПЛ из горных сел (45 из 105) испытывают проблемы с регистрацией, и источник этих проблем - в стремлении властей принудить беженцев к возвращению на прежнее место жительства."

IWPR, 16 August 2006:

"[...] Markha Akhmadova, head of the demographics department of the government statistics agency Chechenstat, told IWPR, "The mountain villagers want to go home to their own land, but the army is there. They can't let them into their villages because they still haven't been de-mined and it's simply too dangerous to live there."

Akhmadova said it is impossible to determine how many people have moved from one village to another, since they stay registered in their original homes in order to get compensation for their destroyed property.

The villagers' main request is for rehabilitation work to begin so they can go home.

Ruslan Musayev, a regional government official in Grozny, told IWPR reconstruction work would be finished by the end of the year in Yarysh-Mardy. But villagers say they see no signs of progress. And other villages have the same complaints."

Some IDPs receive documentation in North Ossetia while others face obstacles (2007)

- IDPs living in the purpose-built village Novy, North Ossetia-Alania were issued passports with a stamp showing their registration in Novy
- From August 2006 to April 2007, approximately 1000 ethnic Ingush IDPs received residence stamps
- Some IDPs were refused passports with residence registration since they were not registered at a particular house before displacement
- IDPs originate from areas which have now been declared an environmentally protected zone and are forbidden from returning there
- Many IDPs from Prigorodny district were settled in Maisky, which is located on the territory of North Ossetia but administered by Ingushetia; Migration Services in Ingushetia issued these IDPs with forced migrant status
- In a letter to the Moscow Helsinki Group, IDPs from Prigorodny district explain that they have been denied registration at their place of residence and face financial and bureaucratic obstacles to formalise home ownership, renew passports and extend forced migrant status
- IDPs who insist on returning to their original residences exhausted all legal possibilities in North Ossetia and resorted to a hunger strike to bring attention to their situation

Кавказский узел, 27 апреля 2007г.:

"Сегодня в поселке Новый Пригородного района Северной Осетии рабочая группа завершила очередной прием граждан из числа вынужденных переселенцев [...]"

"В поселке Новый в прежнем режиме и без каких-либо срывов осуществляется документирование вынужденных переселенцев - выдаются паспорта с проставлением штампов о регистрации по месту жительства, и в ранее выданные паспорта также проставляются штампы о регистрации. При возникшей необходимости собранные материалы передаются в территориальные органы миграционной службы для принятия решения," - детализировал деятельность своих коллег офицер Управления Федеральной миграционной службы.

[...] Некоторые граждане, которые обратились по поводу документирования и проставления штампа о регистрации по месту жительства, получили отказ от представителей миграционной службы.

"Речь идет о тех гражданах, которые на момент конфликта являлись детьми, и у них, естественно, отсутствовали паспорта и иные правоустанавливающие документы. Они не были зарегистрированы в домовладениях, расположенных в с. Терк, Черночеречное и других населенных пунктах, которые уже находятся в водоохранной зоне Владикавказа," - заявил представитель ФМС.

По словам офицера, в указанной водоохранной зоне никто не живет, а строения, оставшиеся после конфликта, уже не пригодны для жилья. Кроме того, существующее законодательство исключает какую-либо возможность регистрации вновь прибывших граждан в разрушенном домовладении.

За период с 1 августа по 31 декабря прошлого года лицам ингушской национальности выданы 614 паспортов с проставлением штампов о регистрации по месту жительства, и в ранее выданные паспорта проставлено 143 штампов о регистрации по месту жительства. С начала 2007 года выдано 255 паспортов с проставлением штампов о регистрации по месту жительства, и в ранее выданные паспорта проставлены 65 штампов о регистрации по месту жительства."

Кавказский Узел, 14 июня 2007 г.:

"Майский — это самоорганизованный посёлок на территории Северной Осетии. Там жили жертвы конфликта. Они остались в поле развития этого конфликта, в поле борьбы.

Власти Ингушетии, фактически, поселили их произвольно на территорию, которая официально относится к РСО-А. Выдали им удостоверения вынужденных переселенцев миграционной службы Ингушетии. Осетия отказывалась ими заниматься. "

IDPs from villages of Terek, Yuzhnoe, Chernorechenskoe, Ir and Oktyabrskoe, 18 July 2006:

"Президенту Международной Хельсинской Федерации по правам человека Алексеевой А. М. от вынужденных переселенцев из РСО-Алания с.Терек, с. Южное, с.Чернореченское, с.Ир, с.Октябрьское

ОБРАЩЕНИЕ

Мы, граждане РФ, проживающие в РСО-Алания с 1992 года, являемся вынужденными переселенцами. После осетино-ингушского конфликта живем в ужасных, нечеловеческих условиях, в маленьких, тесных вагончиках, под высоковольтными линиями. Начиная с 1992 года, полностью игнорируются наши права и свободы, закрепленные в международно-правовых документах и в Конституции РФ. Вот уже более 13 лет мы не можем добиться соблюдения своих прав: - получить регистрацию по месту жительства; - вернуться в свои дома, расположенные в 10-15-ти км от нашего городка "беженцев"; - добиться оформления своих домовладений; - получить или обменять паспорта; - получить мед. обслуживание. Нам, жителям населенных пунктов Пригородного района РСО-Алания, не выдаются паспорта, а если и выдаются, то без штампа о регистрации по месту жительства. Отказывают в оформлении домовладений. Искусственно создаются препятствия в продлении статуса вынужденных переселенцев. Постоянно издаются новые постановления по вопросу вынужденных переселенцев, которые противоречат друг другу и которые вводят людей в заблуждение. Мы требуем элементарного человеческого отношения со стороны властей Осетии. У нас не политические требования, а социальные и правовые. Власти Осетии, которые должны поддерживать и защищать свой народ, изгоняют его, делают все, чтобы коренные жители - ингуши не возвращались в свои родные села. Мы обращались во все компетентные инстанции Осетии с вышеизложенными проблемами, но нерешение наших проблем вынудило нас объявить официальную и бессрочную голодовку. С целью обратить внимание федеральных властей, в частности, президента РФ В.В. Путина, так как мы уверены, что В.В. Путин дезинформируют о состоянии дел в Пригородном районе. Но и тут мы оказались в информационной блокаде. Ни одно из центральных и местных СМИ не озвучило наши требования, хотя мы объявили голодовку с 5-го июля. А власти РСО-Алания пытаются представить нашу акцию как политическую, "спровоцированную под давлением деструктивных сил РИ". Так, в газете "Северная Осетия" от 15 июля 2006 года под №128(24679), пресс-служба Министерства РСО-Алания по делам национальностей утверждает, что "процесс ликвидации последствий конфликта постоянно осложнялся деструктивными действиями некоторых представителей Республики Ингушетия". Хотя на самом деле осетинские власти постоянно предпринимают всевозможные ухищрения с целью недопущения возвращения вынужденных переселенцев в свои родные села, впервые в истории человечества придумав тезис о невозможности

совместного проживания с ингушами. Наша голодовка спровоцирована постоянным игнорированием проблем ингушей - вынужденных переселенцев из РСО-Алания. Просим Вас посодействовать в решении наших проблем, связанных с нарушениями прав человека и довести наши проблемы до мирового сообщества."

Кавказский Узел, 3 августа 2007 г.:

" [...] Затем мы вынуждены обходить бюрократов в органах местного самоуправления и адресных столах, собирая различные справки. И везде нам либо напрямую отказывают в выдаче необходимых документов, либо чинят дополнительные препятствия. Далее возникает необходимость подтверждения факта проживания и владения недвижимостью [...] Так как факт владения недвижимостью устанавливается по месту ее нахождения, мы вынуждены обращаться в суды РСО-Алания. Но там за каждое судебное решение в пользу ингуша требуют две тысячи долларов США [...] Эти и другие препоны приходится преодолевать лишь для того, чтобы собрать пакет документов, необходимых для получения государственной помощи", - пишут они."

IDPs in Dagestan and Kabardino Balkaria with no registration face problems (2003)

- Most IDPs in Dagestan are not registered by the authorities, which restricts access to housing, employment and social services
- IDPs in Kabardino-Balkaria should have permanent registration in the republic in order to register marriages and births, as well as lease, buy, sell property

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

ICRC July 2002 Daghestan, p. 16:

"The majority of Chechen IDPs have no official registration in Daghestan, while the Authorities officially report no IDP in the Republic. This lack of formal acknowledgement and resultant lack of documentation/registration results in limited access to employment, social services and housing, as well as increased risks of harassment and exploitation for the IDPs. Even though the [residents affected by the hostilities] do not face the same extent of difficulties related to registration, they do continue to face limited access to work and services due to the consequences to the impact of their poverty."

RFE/RL 13 January 2003:

"The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has introduced temporary restrictions on immigration to its territory, RTR reported on 11 January. Civil-registration offices will no longer register marriages if either of the spouses is not permanently registered in the republic. In addition, a ban has been imposed on issuing birth certificates for babies whose parents are not permanently resident in the republic, anon nonresidents will also not be able to lease, buy, or sell property."

IDPs from Chechnya living outside of North Caucasus face obstacles in obtaining documents and registration (2006)

- Chechens outside of Chechnya face obstacles to register at their place of residence in Russia
- Lack of registration increases the vulnerability of ethnic Chechens and Caucasians in Moscow

- Two Chechen IDPs in Tverskoi oblast declared a hunger strike after a court ordered them to leave the temporary accommodation centre since they had no registration with the Migration Services
- Until 2003 IDPs from Chechnya had to return to Chechnya to receive their internationally acknowledged passport, though in practice this is often still the case since IDPs are not always informed that they can receive this document at their de facto place of residence
- Regarding the internal passport, IDPs still registered in Chechnya must return to renew this document

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"The problem of getting registered anywhere outside the Chechen Republic is very acute for Chechens. A landlord has to be strongly motivated and have a good knowledge of the laws and stamina to get the police agencies register a Chechen family at his place of residence. Besides, this process is very time-consuming. Often police officers, who are obliged to regularly visit homes where Chechens reside, threaten the owners of rented housing with trouble. This leads to the situation where in most cases landlords refuse registration to Chechens and prefer either to turn down the inconvenient tenants or allow them to rent housing, but without registration. Even when landlords give their consent, which is quite rare, a struggle to get registered can go on for months, if not years...

In denying registration to Chechens, officials from passport offices often invent requirements which are absent from the residence registration rules. For instance, a resident of Grozny Said-Magomed Shaptukayev, who is living in Moscow after a kidney transplant operation, has failed to get registered at his friends' place. Officials at the passport office said he needed to prove his kinship to the apartment's owner and get an approval for registration from the Directorate of the Housing Policy Department. The requirements were utterly absurd and unlawful, but only a superior agency, to which human rights activists turned, was able to prove it to the passport office staff...

In Moscow registration of Chechens, when it is done, is accompanied with a humiliating procedure, which includes getting a permit for registration from the head of the local police precinct, special check of the criminal record, compulsory fingerprinting, and making full face and profile "mugshots." And if a registration certificate is ultimately issued, a file is created on virtually every Chechen, like on a potential criminal.

While getting registered for families who have support of local friends and are constantly monitored by prominent human rights organizations is such a burdensome process, those who fail to get in touch with human rights activists and persuade the landlords to show persistence have no chance to get registered...

The absence of registration creates numerous problems for migrants from Chechnya. They are denied access to free medical services, although virtually all of them do need them. The consequences of stress and hard living conditions experienced during the hostilities are causing serious illnesses in children and adults. The law guarantees provision of urgent medical help, however, it is often accompanied by humiliation of human dignity, particularly, when assistance is provided to women who are giving birth – records are made in their medical documents about the absence of place of residence.

People are denied opportunity to get a job with a duly executed employment contract, which worsens the already poor financial situation of families.

With the introduction of Law No.122, receipt of state allowances and pensions becomes impossible in the absence of registration. Getting children enrolled in kindergartens and sometimes in schools also becomes more difficult."

Кавказский Узел, 22 апреля 2006 г.:

"Две женщины - беженцы из Чечни - объявили бессрочную голодовку, желая привлечь внимание властей и общества к своему положению. Об этом в эфире радиостанции "Эхо Москвы" сообщила одна из голодающих Кульсун Шавхалова.

По словам К.Шавхаловой, она с двумя дочерьми и двумя внуками уже 6 лет проживают с детьми в Центре временного размещения (ЦВР) переселенцев из Чечни "Серебряники" в Тверской области.

"Нас уже как год сняли с регистрации, суд принял решение о нашем выселении, - рассказала она. - В миграционной службе говорят, что срок нашего проживания здесь закончился, но мы, как вынужденные переселенцы, имеем право жить в центре временного размещения до тех пор, пока не получим компенсацию за утраченное жилье и не обустроимся".

Говоря о реакции администрации ЦВР на объявление голодовки, К.Шавхалова сказала, что директор центра "угрожала принять к ней меры, оштрафовать". "К нам не пригласили ни медсестру, ни врача, - заметила она. - Между тем, если я еще держусь, моя дочь Петимат Хатаева больна, и ее состояние здоровья ухудшается". К.Шавхалова добавила, что из ЦВТ уже выселено 5 семей беженцев из Чечни, "кому-то удалось устроиться у родственников, некоторые живут на вокзале".

An update on this case could not be found among the sources consulted.

NGO Shadow report, 28 February 2006:

"In Russia there are no institutions responsible for providing forced migrants with housing, employment or moneyed assistance. Since 1999 the forced migrant status has been the only instrument that can give them some hope for a minimal state assistance as well as a minimal guarantee of their social rights.

Between 1991 and 1996, that is before and during the first Chechen war, about 150,000 residents of the republic were granted the forced migrant status (equal to the status of an IDP in the Russian law). Between October 1999 (beginning of the second Chechen war) and the end of 2001 the status was acquired by only 12,464 persons of all those who abandoned the republic during this period. At the same time, the official statistics registered 568,449 persons who had to leave the Chechen Republic due to the de-facto emergency situation. The RF Ministry of Federation, Nationalities and Migration Policies admitted that "the overwhelming majority of those granted the forced migrant status did not belong to the titular ethnic group", in other words they were not ethnic Chechens. The denial to grant the status to the Chechens was grounded on the "absence of signs and circumstances provided by Article 1 of the RF law 'On forced migrants'". Consequently, nowadays the authorities interpret the concept of "forced migrant" in a way different from that in 1996 when "mass disorders" were frequently recognized as a sufficient ground for granting of the status.

In some cases migration service officials directly admit that they have been instructed not to give the forced migrant status to the Chechens since they are not victims of ethnic, confessional or political discrimination. In certain regions, the few families who can supply documentary proof of their loyalty to the Russian authorities and their direct co-operation with them under the pro-Moscow Zavgaev administration of Chechnya in 1994-1996 or of being persecuted by Muslim fundamentalists and bandits are lucky exceptions. As a rule, a positive outcome can only be obtained through bringing an action before a court.

Outside the Chechen Republic the Chechens are confronted with another serious problem – that of registration (propiska) at a place of residence or stay. A landlord needs to have an extremely strong motivation, a good knowledge of laws and a lot of energy to have a Chechen family registered in his living place. Besides, it normally takes quite a lot of time. Frequently, militia officers, instructed to inspect the domiciles of the Chechens, threaten the landlords with possible hardships to come once they let the Chechens in. All this results in that the landlords are unwilling to have the Chechens registered and either refuse them housing or let them in without registering [...]

To obtain official documents, a passport in the first place, has been among the most problematic tasks. Most frequently, rejections to issue passports to forced migrants are motivated by a directive of the passport and visa service of the RF Ministry of the Interior that concerns all IDPs from Chechnya, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Until 2003 people had to return to Chechnya to exchange or get new passports be they 14-year-old adolescents, mothers with infants, or young men who would be sent to filtration camps if they had no passport on them while passing through check points in the North Caucasus.

On 24 May 2003 the Ministry of the Interior issued Order No. 347 that provided Russian citizens with an opportunity to receive passports outside a place of permanent residence (propiska) but rather where they lived de facto. Nominally, it allowed residents of Chechnya to receive documents without having to return to the republic. However, in practice this order was never implemented at a broad scale. Local passport and visa services would often fail to inform people about this possibility.

Today, everyone registered in Chechnya needs to return to receive internal passports and most probably be faced with mortal danger and flourishing corruption. To receive an internal passport in Chechnya, one needs to pay a sum equivalent €50-100, while the “gratitude” for getting a passport for traveling abroad costs €400-500. Yet greater sums are paid for passports issued outside of Chechnya, which often prove to be fraud.”

Lack of documentation deprives IDPs of state benefits and assistance (2007)

- Absence of registration means IDPs have limited access to medical care, employment, social assistance
- Without registration, IDPs also risk being detained and fined
- IDPs who left Chechnya as a result of the second conflict face more difficulties in receiving pensions than those who left during the first conflict
- Russian Constitutional Court ruled that citizens should not need registration in order to enjoy their rights

Memorial, 31 July 2006:

"Temporary registration or the absence of registration results in plenty of new problems:
– IDPs are denied access to free medical assistance, although virtually all IDPs do need such help. Because of the consequences of stress and unsatisfactory living conditions, experienced during the hostilities, children and adults often develop serious diseases. The incidence of tuberculosis, oncological diseases, gastrointestinal infections and nervous disorders is high among IDPs. Hard life, insufficient diet and the absence of skilled medical assistance lead to tragedies. Provision of urgent medical help is guaranteed, however, it is often accompanied by humiliation of human dignity, particularly, when assistance is provided to women who are giving

birth: records are made in their medical documents about the absence of place of residence, i.e. they are placed into the category of homeless persons, tramps.

– IDPs cannot get jobs, which worsens the already poor financial situation of families: according to the information from the regional Education Committee, children of migrants, including IDPs, account for approximately 80% of the total number of children who do not attend school.

– It is very difficult (and in rural areas virtually impossible) for IDPs to receive social assistance in the absence of permanent registration.

NGO Shadow report, 28 February 2006:

"The lack of registration prevents citizens from the realization of the basic social rights. In addition to having a constant risk to be detained and fined, people are often deprived of the access to free health care, the right to receive state pensions and allowances, the right to employment, the right to secondary school education and access to day-care centers."

[...] As a consequence of the lack of registration problems with pensions arise frequently. Those migrants who left Chechnya and registered for pensions outside its territory before December 1997 now receive pensions even if they do not have registration. However, others, including those who abandoned the republic after the recommencement of military operations in the fall of 1999, can receive pensions outside Chechnya only provided that they have registration and can present their pensioner's files. Meanwhile, the majority of the migrants were forced to leave during military operations that prevented them from taking their pensioners' files with them. Along with the informal prohibition to register the Chechens, this circumstance deprives from getting even the minimal pension nearly all pensioners and disabled persons from Chechnya who now reside outside its territory."

ACCORD/UNHCR June 2002, p, 259:

"The Constitutional Court has reminded once and for all that registration or absence of registration should not be linked to the enjoyment of rights. So in theory one does not have to show one's registration to be able to get medical care, but in practice it does not work this way. To enrol one's children at school one needs to have registration. An employer cannot employ someone who is not registered; eventually the registration is asked for by any potential employer. Hence, in practice most of the basic civic rights are linked to the possession of registration. If someone's place of residence registration is Grozny and he wants to register his sojourn somewhere else, but the authorities do not want to register him there, basically he is not only a second class citizen, but - using the absurd neologism - an illegal citizen. Difficult as this situation is to imagine, it is the sad reality for many IDPs."

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Family unity

Over 2000 people kidnapped since 2002 (2007)

- Over 2000 people kidnapped from 2002 to March 2007, almost two thirds were murdered or disappeared

Memorial 23 May 2007:

"Kidnappings which often result in untraceable disappearances, are one of the most terrible human rights violations in the Chechen republic. The impossibility to figuring out the destiny of the missing person forces his or her relatives and friends to constantly relive this tragedy in their memories; this makes the relatives and friends very susceptible to the propaganda of the terrorist groups and separatist fighters.

When considering kidnappings in general (including people who were later released) Memorial has information about the kidnapping of 2,018 inhabitants of the Chechen republic, as of 2002. Out of this number, 1,057 went permanently missing.

The monitoring of Memorial covers only 25-30% of the entire territory of Chechnya, and even in the areas covered, our information is probably not comprehensive. So, in order to get the real picture, our numbers should be multiplied from 2-4 times (according to different estimates). The extrapolation of our data and the analysis of the official data gives a similar result. Memorial can claim that the total number of people who went missing during the period of the second Chechen war (since the fall of 1999 until the present) as a result of kidnappings, unlawful arrests, and detentions, is more than 3,000 and it could be as high as 5,000 people. Unfortunately, we cannot give more precise numbers at this point- right now Memorial is working on creating a detailed and comprehensive database of missing persons. In most cases of kidnappings, everything points to the fact that the crime was committed with the help of the representatives of the state, or of the armed forces who are in collaboration with them. 90% of the criminal cases where the legal proceedings were commenced when people were kidnapped are not solved. At the same time, we can note that there is a certain systematic decrease in the number of kidnappings- and it is especially noticeable since 2005."

Reports of Chechen men separated from their families at the Chechen-Ingush border and checkpoints (2000)

- Males between ten and sixty rigorously checked in detention centres in Chechnya or not allowed access back to Chechnya

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

HRW 12 January 2000:

"Human Rights Watch strongly condemned today a new Russian order forbidding male Chechen refugees the ages of ten and sixty from entering or leaving Chechnya. Today border police began enforcing the order at checkpoints and border crossings.

The new order gives rise to fears that the Russians may undertake mass detention in 'filtration camps,' where many Chechens were systematically tortured during the 1994-96 Chechen war.

'Chechen males are now effectively trapped in a dangerous war zone,' said Holly Cartner, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. 'It is fundamentally unacceptable to deny civilian males, including children as young as ten, the right to flee from heavy fighting. And it's against international standards.'

Following a Chechen counteroffensive and significant Russian military setbacks in early January, General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander for the North Caucasus Group of Forces, reportedly blamed the Russian 'mistakes' on 'our soft-heartedness.' On January 11 he ordered that only children under ten, men over sixty, and girls and women would henceforth be considered refugees. Gen. Kazantsev also ordered males between ten and sixty to be rigorously checked in detention centers for guerilla affiliation.

In the first Chechen war, Russian forces operated three official detention centers in Grozny, Mozdok, and Pyatigorsk, although many smaller camps existed unofficially throughout the region. These centers were known as 'filtration camps' because fighters were supposed to be 'filtered' out from civilians; they became notorious as centers for systemic torture, beatings and ill-treatment of thousands of Chechen males.

Soldiers at the main Chechen-Ingush border crossing confirmed to Human Rights Watch that they had received orders to turn back all men between the ages of ten and sixty who tried to enter or leave Chechnya, and Chechen civilians told Human Rights Watch that their male family members were stranded as a result. Datu Isigova, a refugee from Grozny, told Human Rights Watch that she was forced to leave her eleven-year-old son, Arbi, and her husband, Suleman, inside Chechnya today due to the new restrictions. Zura Mumayedova, a mother of three from Shatoi who arrived by bus at the Chechen-Ingush border on January 11, told Human Rights Watch researchers that four men she had been traveling with were ordered off the bus by Russian border guards, citing the new restrictions on Chechen males. Held at the border overnight, Mumayedova said that 'the Russian soldiers said that no men aged between ten and sixty would be allowed through.' She stated that the border guards prevented a fifty-nine-year-old man from crossing the border. She said that two boys, aged twelve and thirteen, made it past the border guards into Ingushetia only by concealing themselves on the bus. Other refugees reported that many other men had been turned back from the border, and that mothers with young children had often decided not to cross the border because they did not want to leave their young children behind.

Chechen men on the Ingushetia side of the border have been separated from their families, unable to cross back into Chechnya. Thirty-six-year-old Vayit Zagayev told Human Rights Watch that he arrived in Ingushetia in late December to get medicine for his bed-ridden mother and to obtain supplies for his family, currently living in Katyr-lurt. Russian border guards today refused to allow him into Chechnya. Mauli Murtadaliyev, also thirty-six, said that the border guards would not let him escort the body of a deceased female relative back to Chechnya for burial."

IDPs from Chechnya living in Stavropol visit graves of relatives in Chechnya (2006)

- On Orthodox Easter, IDPs from Chechnya living in Stavropol visited the graves of their relatives in Chechnya
- For many years these IDPs could not visit cemeteries in Chechnya because of risks to their physical security
- Chechen authorities organised and paid for this trip, guaranteeing the physical safety of IDPs during the visit

Кавказский Узел, 26 апреля 2006 г.:

"В день Пасхи православные вынужденные переселенцы из столицы Чечни Грозного, проживающие на территории Ставропольского края, посетили могилы своих предков на оставленной родине.

Как рассказал председатель ставропольской региональной ассоциации вынужденных переселенцев и беженцев "Соотечественник" (располагающейся в городе Пятигорске) Вадим Алеманов, идею организации поездок на кладбища Грозного и других населенных пунктов бывшей Чечено-Ингушетии активисты этого общественного объединения вынашивали довольно долго. На территории края проживает более 200 тысяч вынужденных переселенцев, и большая часть из них - из Чеченской Республики. В течение многих лет эти люди не могли посетить могилы своих родственников, не рискуя своей собственной жизнью. Поэтому с большой радостью новые ставропольчане услышали новость о том, что правительство Чеченской Республики взялось за организацию таких поездок, обещая им обеспечение безопасности сотрудниками МВД и комендатуры Чеченской Республики.

"Из Пятигорска в Грозный организованно выехало тридцать человек, - рассказывает Вадим Алеманов. - Всего же из Моздока в Грозный направилось три автобуса. Всех прибывших в столицу республики распределили по группам и расселили в пунктах временного размещения во всех районах города. Правда, изначально предполагалось, что нас расселят в воинской части города. Все было очень хорошо организовано, к нам относились и организаторы акции, и жители ПВРов очень дружелюбно. Для всех прибывших были организованы автобусы ко всем кладбищам города Грозного. Я посетил центральное кладбище, на котором похоронены мои родители. Главные дорожки кладбища были расчищены, но найти могилы конкретных людей в глубине кладбища все еще остается очень сложно. Я, например, с трудом нашел свои".

Помимо кладбища прибывшие в Грозный бывшие его жители смогли побывать возле своих домов, а также посетили открывшийся после ремонтно-восстановительных работ православный храм Михаила Архангела.

"Я благодарен руководству Чеченской Республики за предоставление такой возможности, - говорит председатель ассоциации "Соотечественник", - и надеюсь, что подобные поездки будут организовываться регулярно".

Напомним, что все расходы, связанные с проездом питанием и проживанием гостей на территории Чеченской Республики взял на себя общественный региональный фонд имени Ахмата Кадырова."

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Loss of property and animals by mountain villagers (2007)

- In a survey done by Memorial of IDPs from mountainous areas, many IDPs fled partially or totally destroyed housing
- Almost half of the houses of those interviewed had been totally destroyed by the time of the survey
- Most IDPs did not directly say who was responsible for their loss of housing, though some named the military
- IDPs explained their houses were blown up, bombed, set on fire, stolen, looted, ruined
- Cattle was lost during hostilities and some IDPs blame federal forces, though landmines may also have been a factor

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"На вопрос о состоянии оставленного в горах жилья 87 человек ответили, что жилье разрушено. Однако, в качестве причины (чаще - одной из причин) выезда отсутствие жилья назвали только 9 человек. Как это объяснить? Очевидно, тем, что в момент выезда из села у многих жилье было еще цело или разрушено лишь частично, а полностью было разрушено потом. Об этом нам сообщили 36 из 87 человек, заявивших об отсутствии жилья в горах. Возможно, количество таких ответов было бы больше, если бы вопрос был поставлен более корректно. В нашем опросном листе он звучал так: «В каком состоянии оставленное жилье?». Такой вопрос скорее имеет в виду современное состояние жилья, а не то, в каком оно было оставлено при выезде. Только при обработке и анализе опросных листов стало ясно, что это - разные вопросы и что в постановке того и другого есть смысл.

Особенно поразительно выглядят ответы беженцев из трех сел Курчали: на вопрос о состоянии жилья 7 из них ответили просто, что их жилье разрушено, и еще 23 сообщили, что их жилье разрушено после выезда. Таким образом, из 34 опрошенных жителей этих сел, у 30 жилье было разрушено, причем в подавляющем большинстве случаев – уже после того, как жители покинули село. Видимо, эта ситуация была характерна и для других сел. Вот, например, ответ одного из жителей с. Гансолчу: «Все ушли, оставшиеся дома сожгли».

Кто же, как и, главное, зачем разрушал дома в опустевших селах? Ответ на вопрос «кто?» достаточно очевиден, хотя беженцы об этом, как правило, прямо не говорили. Впрочем, в двух-трех случаях виновники разрушения жилья были названы: «Все разворовали военные: крышу, кирпичи, окна, двери» (83, В.Курчали). Способы разрушения жилья беженцы описывали по-разному: взорвали, разбомбили, сожгли, растащили, разграбили, разорили (формулировки «сожгли» и «разграбили» встречаются чаще других). Эти формулировки явно указывают на два различных процесса. Один – стихийный: мародерство и пьяное озорство военных. Второй процесс – сознательное систематическое уничтожение жилья в опустевших горных селах. Очевидно, это - один из методов так называемой «контртеррористической операции», направленный на то, чтобы вытесненное с гор путем постоянных обстрелов и зачисток население не вернулось в свои дома. Подтверждением этому служат и некоторые высказывания военных, воспроизводимые

беженцами: «Каждый день зачистки бомбежки. При зачистке говорили: Зачем здесь живете? Все равно вас здесь не оставят!»(100, В.Курчали).

Еще один характерный сюжет, встречающийся в рассказах беженцев, - уничтожение военными скота. Упоминаний о таких фактах значительно меньше, чем о разрушении жилья. Но это не значит, что и в действительности таких фактов было меньше, так как мы, к сожалению, специально не спрашивали об этом. Приведем некоторые упоминания об уничтожении скота:

- Джани-Ведено: «Дом бомбили с самолета. Скот перебили. Было много скота» (2)
- Ширды-Мохк: «17 голов скота уничтожили после того, как БТР наткнулся на растяжку» (73)
- В.Курчали: «Всю скотину федералы уничтожили» (78).

Количество и характер упоминаний об уничтожении скота не позволяет с уверенностью утверждать, что скот не только становился случайной жертвой обстрелов, мин, или неслучайной жертвой мародерства и мести военных, но и подвергался уничтожению, так сказать, «по приказу» - как основной источник существования горцев с целью вытеснения населения из горных сел. Это обстоятельство требует дополнительного изучения."

Great need for property and housing among IDPs in Chechnya and Ingushetia (2007)

- UNHCR interviewed residents of government-organised temporary accommodation in Chechnya and Ingushetia; about 13,000 people in Chechnya and about 6,000 people in Ingushetia
- Approximately 99 per cent of interviewees in Chechnya said their original housing is totally or partially destroyed; the majority of this housing is in Grozny and is not currently occupied
- 50 per cent of interviewees in Chechnya reported they did not own any land or housing, and 40 per cent of this group was single-headed households
- In Ingushetia , 40 per cent of interviewees did not own property or housing and out of those who did own property and housing, 72 per cent were totally destroyed and 25 per cent partially destroyed

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"The high birth rate in the two republics, and thus the relative quickly formation of new families which may not be able to resort to their pre-conflict accommodations, aggravate the problem. Out of the 50.9% and the 39.9% of the families surveyed in Chechnya and Ingushetia that report having no property, 38.5% in Chechnya and as many as 86.1% in Ingushetia declared to have resided with parents' before the displacement.

Survey results from Chechnya

The survey captured almost all families de facto residing in 32 TACs and TSs in the republic of Chechnya . Overall, 2,894 families/ 12,752 persons were interviewed [...]

In Chechnya, if the level of total or partial destruction of dwellings declared by the surveyed population is confirmed at the tune of 98.9% of all houses and flats currently owned by TACs residents (77.8% totally destroyed), the abrupt closure of TACs now announced for mid August 2007 may still put families in difficulty. This is particularly true for the Grozny area, where 67.5% of all totally or partially destroyed properties reported by TACs/TSs residents are located and for particular TACs/TSs, where the possession of destroyed properties in relation to the resident population is close to 50%. The intention to discontinue the TACs/TSs should also take into

consideration the situation of properties' ownership, particularly in some relatively collective accommodations (75 families or above) where it emerges that more than 50% of the residents does not owe any property.

Despite the ongoing efforts and the initiatives of reconstruction and of land allocation, the tasks for the authorities continue to be vast. They should not be limited to the Grozny area, even though this is undoubtedly the area where most of the TACs/TSs residents have their property – flats in particular (95.4% of all declared flats). Authorities have to ensure a wider coverage of the territory of the Republic to guarantee fair conditions to all displaced population [...]

[...] In its core part, the survey aimed at identifying for each surveyed TAC/TS resident family whether the family possess an immovable property, the type of property (house, flat, empty land), and the level of destruction of the property (completely destroyed, partially destroyed or intact), All these elements are deemed to directly affect the possibility to vacate the TAC/TS and return to the areas of origin or other areas of choice.

Each respondent family was asked to report on all properties owned, whether by the head and/or by other family members currently residing in the TAC/TS. More than one answer was therefore possible on the type of property owned. Families who were found not in possession of any property were asked about the reasons for this situation [...]

Out of the total 2,894 families interviewed as TAC/TS residents, 1,472 families declared that they are not in possession of any form of immovable property (house, flat or landplot), while 1,619 positive answers related to the possession of housing/land property were collected. Considering that negative answers were unique, whereas positive answers could have been multiple, the conclusion is that 50.9% of the families residing in TS/TACs have no ownership over housing or land.

Most of the families with no property are residing in the Staropromislovski District of Grozny (32.5%), followed by the Oktiabriski District (24.8%) and the Leninski District (14.9%). However, these figures are influenced by the fact that these districts are the most densely populated. Analogously, if looking at the absolute number of answers, the highest number of persons without properties resides in the Saihanova Tabolskaia TAC in the Oktiabriski District (121 families). However, when measuring lack of property against the number of families surveyed in each TAC/TS, the most problematic property situations seems to be for the residents of the MKP Milana in the Staropromislovski District (80% of residents with no property), followed by the TAC Sahzavodskaya in Argun (77% of residents with no property), the TAC Kalzova 2 and Maiakovaskaga 140A again in the Staropromislovski District (71.9% and 67.1% of families with no property respectively).

Out of the 1,472 families who reported not to own of any property, 36.6% are single headed families (539 families). This represents 33% of the overall number of families surveyed and 56.4% of the single headed families surveyed. Most of the single headed families without property have been detected in the Soviestskaya TAC in Sernovodsk (6.4% or 61 families), followed by the Poniatkova TAC in the Oktiabriski District (4.6% or 44 families) and by the TAC Saihanova in the same district (4.4% or 42 families). If the number of single headed families with no property is compared with the TAC/TS population, the highest incidence is in the Kalzova 1 TAC in the Staropromislovski District (33% of overall resident families), followed by the Soviestskaya TAC in Sernovodsk (32.2%) and by the TAC Novatorov-17 also in the Staropromislovski District. Although a direct link cannot be established, it cannot be excluded that some of the most vulnerable cases may fall into this category and be found in these locations.

Out of the 1,271 TACs/TSs residents who declared not to be in possession of the MS registration, 1,157 (91%) comes from families who declared not to possess any house/flat/land-plot. Persons with no MS registration and who are members of families with no property represent 9.1% of the TACs/TSs residents, with peaks in the Gudermes Depovskaia TAC, where 81.3% of the population at the same time is with no property and no MS registration. As for single headed families, a direct connection with vulnerability is not always immediate, though the incidence to find vulnerable cases in this group may be higher.

To analyse the possible solution on alternative accommodation, the enquiry was further developed to detect the reasons why families residing in TACs/TSs are not in possession of lodging/land. The relative majority of the 1,472 families (38.5%) stated that they were residing in the parent's house before becoming TAC/TS residents. As for the remaining, 24.7% were residing at relatives or friends, 13.7% were renting their lodging, 8.9% were residing in a municipal building, and 7.5% were hosted at the spouse's former house. In addition, 3.9% of the respondents indeed owned some form of real estate property but subsequently lost their rights over it. Finally, 2.4% TS/TACs residents currently with no proper declared to have been residing out of the Republic. The latter group is likely represented by the refugees returned from Georgia in 2005 and 2006. An irrelevant number of respondents (0.1%) reported to have resided in a not better specified "other place" or their case was not assessed (0.3%).

1,619 positive answers on the availability of property by families (one or more members) were given during the survey. Considering the number of families interviewed (2,894) and the number of families reportedly with no property (1,472), it can be inferred that some 1,422 families (49.1% of the surveyed families) have ownership over a house/flat or land plot and that at least 197 families (6.8%) gave multiple answers, i.e. reported that the family owns more than one property, normally through different family members.

According to the numbers of positive answers on property availability that were collected, the highest percentage of housing or land-plots are held by families currently residing in TACs/TSs in the Oktiabrski District (28.3% of answers), followed by the Staropromislovski District (25.8%) and by the Leninski District (19.1%). It has however to be considered that these Districts are the ones hosting the most numerous and densely populated TACs/TSs.

When looking at the single TACs/TSs, the highest number of families that reported to own at least one property is registered in the Saihanova Tabolskaia TAC in the Oktiabrski District (127 families), followed by the TAC Centralnaia Usadba in Assinovskaia (102 families). And yet, these results have to be compared also in relation to the number of resident families per TAC. In this case, the highest percentage was registered in the families of the Michurina 116 TAC in the Leninski District (75.9% reporting at least one form of property), followed by families in the TAC Greidernaia of Samashki (70%) and by families residing in the TAC Hmelnizoga (69.7%) also located in the Leninski District. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the TAC Milana in the Staropromislovski District (hosting however only 10 families) and Sahzavodskaya 29 in the Argun District.

[...] On legal-related issues, the survey enquired also about the status of double occupancy of houses and flats owned by TACs/TSs residents. Only 0.6% of the 793 houses are reported to be currently occupied and 1.9% of the 587 flats. This result is likely linked to the fact that most of the properties are still inhabitable. It can then be inferred that the main legal dispute are not so much on forcible evictions, but rather on the presence of conflicting property ownership documentation.

For each destroyed houses or flat reported by one or more family members, a question was made on the compensation process and its results. As expected, the submission of application for compensation is a common action taken by the 78.1% of the TACs/TSs residents owning a partially or completely destroyed house or flat. The percentage varies from 85.4% for housing

properties, to 68.1% for flats. However, a quite different result appears when considering the outcome of the process. According to the TACs/TSS' residents' replies, compensation has been received for only 19.4% in relation to the total number of applications submitted. This represents 15.2% of the total number of totally or partially destroyed houses and flats. There is no significant difference when considering the two types of immovable property separately: 19.3% of the application submitted for destroyed houses and 19.6% for destroyed flats have been successfully accepted [...]

Survey results from Ingushetia

In Ingushetia, the survey on the IDPs' situation in Temporary Settlements captured 1,097 families/5,710 persons residing in 81 TSs on the territory of the Republic [...]

Out of the 1,097 respondent families [in Ingushetia], some 438 families (39.9%) reported not being in possession of any housing/flat or even land plot either in Chechnya or in Ingushetia, as opposed to some 659 (60.1%) were found to hold at least one property.

Most of the families without property reside in the Sunzhenski District (37.2%) and in the Nazranovski district (33.3%). Yet, when data are prorated by the IDP resident population in TSs per district, the percentage fluctuates between 51.7% in Karabukak and 36.8% in Sunzhenski district.

As for the reasons for the lack of any housing/flat or land plot in any of the Republics, the largest majority of the 438 respondents (86.1%) affirmed having lived in the house of parents or relatives in Chechnya, which is now either totally destroyed (33.1% of the families with no property), partially destroyed (17.1 %) or even habitable (18.3%) but likely not sufficient to host newly created or enlarged families. 5.9% of the IDP families with no forms of alternative accommodation lived in municipal buildings before the displacement, or were renting an accommodation (4.3%). A minority (2.5%) declared having been in possession of a form of immovable property but subsequently lost the ownership rights, or affirmed having resided in the spouse's house before arriving in Ingushetia (1.1%).

The survey tried to elaborate on cases that either may deserve a special attention due to the particular family situation or that may have some additional difficulties to be included in governmental shelter plans for returning or for integrating IDPs. On the one hand the survey tried to put in correlation the presence of single headed families with no property. Even if the inference cannot be automatic, this match of circumstances may conceal a higher than average degree of vulnerability, particularly in case of single mothers. Out of the 218 singleheaded families residing in TSs in Ingushetia, 106 were found also not having any property title. This represents 9.7 % of the overall IDP families residing in TSs, 11.9% of all the population in TSs where single headed families have been detected and 48.6% of all single headed families. In absolute terms, most of the families reside in the Nazran Municipal District (36.8% of all single headed families with no property), followed by the Sunzhenski District (30.2%) and the Karabulak District (18.9%). When the presence of such families is put in relation with the TS population size, relatively higher percentages are registered in Malgobek (19.7%) and Karabulak (14.4%) districts. The latter ranking is probably influenced by the fact that those two districts have the higher percentage of IDPs without MS registration.

A second query put in relation the IDP population not registered with the Migration Service and at the same time part of a family with no ownership of property in Ingushetia or in Chechnya. The lack of MS registration may in fact be an obstacle for integration/reintegration as de facto it excludes the person from any form of State assistance linked to the displacement/return situation¹⁸. In these circumstances, the lack of property may represent an aggravating factor, or at least it may indicate that these families will have to rely largely on the assistance of other

humanitarian actors. The results of the survey show that 1,816 IDPs residing in TSs in Ingushetia were found in this situation. This represents 32.5% of the overall population of TSs where families with no property were recorded. While in absolute terms the Sunzhenski and the Nazran municipal district presents the highest number of cases of this type (655 and 569, i.e. 36% and 31.3% of the overall persons with no MS registration), the highest percentage in relation to the TSs' population by district was found in Malgobek (53.1%) and Karabulak (46%) [...]

Multiple answers were possible to identify the type of property owned by one or more family members, as in the Chechnya exercise. 706 existing houses/flats/land-plots were recorded among the 659 families reporting to have some form of immovable property either in Chechnya or in Ingushetia. 98.3% of the reported properties (694) are located in Chechnya and only 1.7% (12 cases) is located in Ingushetia. 63.7% of all declared properties are individual houses in Chechnya (450), 24.1% are flats in Chechnya (170) and 10.5% are land plots in Chechnya (74). Only 1.3% (9) and 0.4% (3) of the one or more properties owned by families residing in TSs are either empty land plots or shelter under construction in Ingushetia. Regular monitoring in Ingushetia shows however that the low incidence of possession of land-plot may not represent the full reality, as more IDPs families may indeed possess land plots but they are not documented [...]

As in the Chechnya exercise, the survey attempted to identify also the level of destruction of the reported properties in Chechnya owned by IDPs currently residing in TSs in Ingushetia. Out of the 450 houses identified as belonging to one or more members of IDPs families residing in TSs in Ingushetia, 73.1% are reported as totally destroyed (329), 24.4% are partially destroyed (110) and only the remaining 2.4% (11) are habitable. As for the 170 flats owned by the families, 67.5% are reported as completely destroyed (115), 27.7% as partially destroyed (47), and only 4.7% (8) are declared habitable. Cumulatively, 71.6% of the 620 houses and flats in Chechnya are inhabitable, 25.3% are partially destroyed (including 5.8% in the process of rehabilitation) and only some 3.1% of the accommodations owned by displaced populations living in TSs in Ingushetia are habitable [...]

The survey further identifies the geographical distribution of the houses/flats and landplots owned by IDPs residing in TSs in Ingushetia. As for the 694 properties reported as owned by IDPs in Chechnya (64.8% houses, 24.5% flats and 10.7% land-plots), 46.4% of them (322) are reported to be located in Grozny and close-by area, 23.5% (163) in the Achoy-Martan District, 9.9% (69) in the Urus-Martan District, 7.9% (55) in the Groznenski District and the rest in other 11 districts of the Republic. However, different proportions emerge when considering the specific type of dwelling and the level of destruction. For houses the mentioned breakdown is roughly respected, with the Grozny district gathering 36.9% of all reported 450 houses and the Achoy-Martan district hosting 29.6%. When it comes to flats the prominence of Grozny as the main location stands out (89.4% of the 170 flats reported as property in Chechnya). As for the declared 74 land-plots, the Achoy-Martan District records the highest concentration (33.8%), followed by Urus Martan District (21.6%) and only after by the Grozninski District (12.2%).

As for the geographical analysis of the destruction level of IDPs' reported properties in Chechnya, Grozny and the Grozninski District dominate for the presence of destroyed dwellings. 52.9% of all totally or partially destroyed properties Grozny urban area and 62% when considering also the Grozny outskirts), again followed by Urus Martan and Achoy-Martan districts."

Reports of widespread looting by Russian forces inside Chechnya (1999-2001)

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

HRW 14 November 1999:

"Russian forces have looted homes in several of the districts under their control, Human Rights Watch said today. Internally displaced persons interviewed at the Chechen-Ingush border told of widespread looting in Sernovodsk (near the border), Ermolovskii (southwest of Grozny), and in the Naurskii district (north of the Terek river).

Dozens of people interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that their homes had been stripped of all foodstuffs and valuables -- sometimes including the floorboards -- by groups of armed soldiers, who sometimes came ready with military vehicles to carry away their loot.

'Looting was a terrible problem in the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya,' said Holly Cartner, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division. 'It is a violation of international humanitarian law, and it must be stopped.'

Soldiers have not only looted basic food supplies stored for winter, but also taken anything of value from homes, often after their inhabitants have fled. As displaced persons have begun to filter back into Russian-controlled areas, they have found their homes emptied. Some of those people have then returned to Ingushetia in search of food and shelter."

For information on looting and pillages, see for instance: "Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya", Human Rights Watch, February 2002

Two compensation programs for property and housing lost during Chechen conflicts (2006)

- Government passed two decrees to pay compensation for housing and properties lost during both Chechen conflicts
- Decree #404 allows for fixed amount of compensation for victims of both conflicts permanently residing in Chechnya, 350,000 roubles
- Under Decree #510 the amount of compensation is calculated based on a formula and only those having left Chechnya permanently may apply
- Only those with totally destroyed housing may apply under both programs

UNHCR, 7 August 2003:

"On 4 July 2003, the RF Prime Minister Kasyanov signed Decree # 404 "On the procedure for implementation of compensation payments for the lost housing and property of permanent residents of the Chechen Republic who were victimised as a result of the resolution of the crisis in the Chechen Republic". The Decree extends to victims of the first Chechen conflict (1994-96) by defining lost housing as "housing irremediably destroyed from 12 December 1994 onwards". This decree is based on an earlier presidential decree, which was adopted to compensate the victims of the 1994-96 Chechen conflict: Presidential Decree # 898 of 5 September 1995 "On additional compensation payments to persons victimised as a result of the resolution of the crisis in the Chechen Republic". Subsequent to the 1995 presidential decree, a governmental decree was adopted to regulate the payment of compensations to the victims of the 1994-96 Chechen conflict: RF Government Decree # 510, of 30 April 1997. As it stands, there are now two separate governmental decrees, deriving from the same Presidential Decree # 898, and which are aimed at providing compensation to the victims of the 1994-96 and current conflicts. To the extent that the recent Decree # 404 does also cover the victims of the first conflict, the relation between the two decrees is being examined in this Information Note [...]

In comparison with Decree # 510, which contained a formula for determining the exact amount of compensation, the new Decree # 404 foresees a fixed amount of compensation (Article 2): RUR 300,000 (approx. USD 10,000) for lost housing (immovable property) and RUR 50,000 (approx. USD 1,700) for lost property (belongings, movable objects). Both types of compensation (housing and property) are linked to each other, meaning that if an individual is eligible for compensation for lost housing, he/she is automatically entitled to the RUR 50,000 compensation for lost property. This compensation can be considered a lump-sum payment, as it does not depend on the value of the lost housing and/or movable property. However, what triggers the eligibility to compensation is the fact of lost housing, irrespective of whether movable property was effectively destroyed or not. A contrario, if the housing was not destroyed but the damage was inflicted only to movable property (cars, cattle, etc.), the victim will not be eligible to compensation at all under Decree # 404. Decree # 404 further establishes a time frame for the payment of compensations, according to which the payments should be implemented in the course of 2003 – 2004 [...]

As was mentioned above, the new Decree # 404 regulates the payment of compensations to victims of both conflicts, permanently residing in Chechnya, whereas Decree # 510 provides compensations to victims of the first conflict having left Chechnya permanently. Therefore, there is one group which, in the current legal framework, is deprived of the right to compensation: the victims of the second conflict who have left Chechnya permanently (i.e. who cancelled the registration at their place of permanent residence – Chechnya – and who re-registered at their new place of permanent residence elsewhere in the Russian Federation).

Swisspeace, 31 October 2006:

"Chechens can apply for compensation payments for households and properties destroyed by military actions. However, the sum of 350 thousand roubles, allocated in 2003, by no means indemnifies the people for their losses. Furthermore, 14% of this sum was lost due to inflation caused by enormously increased costs for building materials. Finally and most importantly, the issue of moral damage compensation has so far largely been ignored."

NGO Shadow report, 28 February 2006:

"At present there are two government regulations on compensations for housing lost in Chechnya. RF Government Regulation No. 510 of 30 April 1997 established the maximal compensation of 120,000 rubles for those who abandoned Chechnya and gave up their housing on its territory. Today this sum equals €3,500, which is at least five times less than it was before the financial crisis of 1998.

Regulation No. 404 of 4 July 2003 established compensations as high as 350,000 rubles, or €10,000. The payments are carried out slowly and are repeatedly discontinued for long time intervals [...]"

Receipt of compensation (2007)

- From 35,000 to 50,000 families from Chechnya have received compensation
- Most requested type of assistance by IDPs living in government-organised temporary accommodation is compensation for lost property and housing; the majority have applied under Decree #510 of 30 April 1997
- While UNHCR reported in 2007 that about 80 per cent of IDPs interviewed who were living in government-organised temporary accommodation are waiting for a decision on their application, Memorial reported in 2006 that only 10 per cent had applied for compensation
- TAC residents are first in line to receive compensation and land plots

Government of the Russian Federation, 26 April 2005:

"In tandem with the Chechen Republic, the compensation provision to internally displaced persons continued in other regions of Russia, where in line with resolution No. 510 of April 30, 1997 of the Government of the Russian Federation On the Procedure of Compensation for the Loss of Housing and/or Property of Citizens Who Became Victims of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic and Who Left It Forever the offices of the Federal Migration Service in 2004 paid compensation to 5,280 victim families. Since the beginning of the work 43,819 applications on the loss of housing and/or property in the Chechen Republic have been registered. By the beginning of 2005, 35,179 families received compensation. 4,703 families stay on the list."

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"As for the support to put an end to the displacement situation, IDPs report an allegedly bleak picture, despite their efforts. Out of the 1,097 families surveyed, 983 (89.6%) declared not having received any form of assistance. Some 448 (40.8%) declared having submitted applications for different types of governmental support but only 46 families (4.2% of the overall families and 10.3% of the applicants) in fact reported to have received assistance.

The most requested type of assistance (85.9% of the 448 applicants, or 35.1% of the overall TSs' families) has been the compensation for lost housing and property, according both to Decree # 510 of 30 April 30 1997 (150,000 RR); Decree # 404 of 4 July 2003 (350,000 RR). Interestingly, more families (48.4% of the overall applicants or 35.1% of the overall TSs families) seem to have resorted to the Decree # 510 and a slightly inferior part (37.5% of the overall applicants or 15.3% of the overall TSs families) to the Decree # 404. 5.6% and 5.1% of the overall 448 applicants from Ingushetia have applied to land plot either in Chechnya or in Ingushetia. 2% of the applicants requested housing subsidies, for which there is no current existing programme in any of the Republics, and only 0.2% of the IDP families residing in TSs in Ingushetia who have applied for State assistance have asked for a room in a TAC in Chechnya [...]

The continuity and regularity of the compensation process remains an issue in Chechnya and needs to be ensured to satisfy the still significant segment of applicants from TACs/TSs (78.1% of all families possessing a totally or partially destroyed property) who have applied and who may rely on this support as a start-up for the reconstruction or as a complement to the assistance received from international actors involved in shelter projects."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The government of Chechnya has promised to ensure all TAC residents have housing assistance, enabling them to vacate and close the TACs. In order to facilitate this process, the authorities have taken special preliminary measures, such as listing residents of TACs as priority recipients of compensation for lost housing and property, as well as the allocation of land plots to displaced families who never had their own property. According to official data, the number of TAC residents eligible for compensation is 1,060 individuals, of which 300 applications have been processed and are ready for payment."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 6:

"[...] Out of the total number of IDPs living in TAP [temporary accommodation points] on the territory of the Chechen Republic, i.e. of 39,000 people, only 3,600 persons have applied for compensation. Of them the housing of only 2,500 people has been put on the lists of destroyed property, which is a prerequisite to qualify for payment of the compensation. And only 977 families so far have received the compensation [...]

All in all, 39,000 families have been paid compensation, which corresponds to 14 billion rubles allocated to these purposes in the federal budget."

Кавказский Узел, 5 июня 2007 г.:

"[...] Согласно имеющейся информации, за прошедшие годы компенсации получили около 50-ти тысяч граждан республики."

Serious flaws in the implementation of the compensation programme in Chechnya (2007)

- Compensation program riddled with corruption, including false applications and pressure to pay bribes to officials upon receipt of compensation
- Officials pretend to have lost submitted documents and then find them once the applicant has agreed to pay the official a percentage of the compensation, usually 50 per cent
- Only those with fully destroyed housing are qualified to receive compensation
- IDPs who have applied for compensation are stricken off the register to receive food assistance and many must then borrow money while waiting for their compensation
- Government inspection of homes not always done accurately; some homes deemed in habitable when they are not
- Compensation amount not enough to rebuild housing
- People who received compensation are expected to vacate the Temporary Accommodation Centres, with reportedly little consideration for those who have not rebuilt their houses
- Many IDPs have lost hope in receiving compensation while others are counting on receiving it sometime

Мемориал, 19 января 2007 г.:

"[...] Между тем, компенсационные выплаты за утерянное жилье (350 тыс. руб.) с начала 2005 г. практически приостановлены. Люди, уже подписавшие заявления на компенсацию и исключенные из списков ВПЛ, остаются предоставленными сами себе, занимая деньги под будущую компенсацию. Компенсации в значительной мере тратятся на откаты, взятки чиновникам и текущие расходы [...]"

Кавказский Узел, 9 июня 2007 г.:

"В Чечне группа мошенников похитила крупную часть средств, выделенных для выплат компенсаций за разрушенное жилье и утраченное имущество, сообщает "Интерфакс" со ссылкой на МВД Чеченской Республики.

Согласно сообщению агентства, в ходе расследования уголовного дела в сфере компенсационных выплат было установлено, что некий гражданин, объявленный в розыск в составе организованной группы, подал документы о наличии разрушенного жилья в доме центра Грозного. Ему удалось получить 4 млн 900 тыс. рублей на имя 14 местных жителей, которые не были осведомлены о происходящем."

Memorial and Civic Assistance Committee, 13 March 2007:

"Все слышаны о том, что процесс приема документов на компенсацию и ее выплаты сопровождается в Чечне серьезными злоупотреблениями. Опрос позволяет добавить лишь некоторые краски к этой картине.

Один из беженцев не подал документы на компенсацию, потому что «не смог заплатить за акт разрушения 15 тыс. руб.». Многие из тех, кто сумел подать документы, через некоторое время узнали о том, что их документы потеряны, и им пришлось собирать их вновь, неся соответствующие расходы. Но часто сведения об утрате документов оказывались

ложными, и документы «находились» после того, как заявители давали или подтверждали свое согласие дать взятку.

- «Документы приняты в 2003 г. в Веденском районе, все время теряются и не находятся, пока не пообещаешь часть компенсации» (67)
- «Сдавали документы на компенсацию в 2003 г. - есть расписка, теперь их не могут найти, так как не согласились на 50%» (74)

Судя по количеству упоминаний о потере документов, это один из наиболее распространенных способов вымогательства со стороны чиновников, ведающих выплатой компенсаций. Складывается впечатление, что особой алчностью отличается в этом отношении администрация Веденского района, которая постоянно теряет документы и требует самый высокий процент «отката» – 50% (41, 62).

Понятно, что согласиться на такой процент могут либо те, кто, не имея жилищных проблем, вместе с чиновниками делает на компенсациях бизнес, либо те, кто оказался в безвыходном положении, как беженка из с. Гансолчу. Ее семья получила только половину компенсации: «негде было жить, поэтому пришлось согласиться» (50). Те же, кто имеет характер и возможность упорствовать, ждут годами (41). Некоторые уже не надеются на компенсацию (37). Но большинство потерявших жилье - а в таком положении тысячи - все же рассчитывают когда-нибудь ее получить, и если эти надежды будут обмануты, это может вызвать серьезное недовольство."

Prague Watchdog, 24 November 2006:

"On November 14, Sultan Isakov, a high-ranking official of the Chechen government's Compensation Committee, was detained on suspicion of extorting a large bribe, law enforcement representatives said.

Two days after this, in an interview for the Interfax news agency, Yuri Rosinsky, head of the FSB's press service in the Chechen Republic, announced that FSB officials and the Chechen prosecutor's office had implemented "a package of measures for the struggle against corruption in the institutions of authority and control."

"Within the framework of these measures we have detained an organized criminal group which was extorting money that had been paid to Chechen residents as compensation for lost housing and property," he said. "One of the group's members, Emidin Khamatkhonov, was arrested while receiving 175,000 rubles from a resident of the city of Urus-Martan."

[...] "It's no secret in the republic that ever since the payouts of compensation began in 2003 there has been corruption and open extortion. Officials have been taking 15,000 rubles as payment for preparing the necessary package of documents from people who weren't actually eligible for compensation. After they got their compensation money from the bank those people also had to part with half of it, to the tune of 175,000 rubles. That's the system that's been in operation all these years, and it continues to operate. No official will turn down a 'feeding trough' of that kind," he is convinced.

[...] A source in the Chechen presidential office says that from 2003 to the present day more than 46,000 of the republic's citizens have obtained compensation for housing and property lost in the course of military operations. The Compensation Committee has received a total of 142,000 applications.

Three months ago the compensation payments were halted on the order of Ramzan Kadyrov. It was announced that this step had been taken because of the need for checks to be made on the legality of documents filed by Chechen subjects. Eli Isayev, the republic's finance minister,

recently announced that the payments will soon be resumed, and will be completed by the end of 2007."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.11:

"To vacate space at TAPs families which receive the compensation are struck off the registers for food allowances and are mandated to move out of TAPs within a short period of time. Arguments of the IDPs that they need time to restore their housing fall on deaf ears with officers of migration agencies. To get a stock of rooms in TAPs, inspections are also carried out to look into the condition of housing inhabited by IDPs before the start of the hostilities.

The Chechen Republic Cabinet Committee for IDPs announced that it had inspected 3,287 addresses and drawn up 1,098 reports on housing that was inspected and found suitable for living. However, the checks made by members of NGOs revealed that before they left Chechnya, many IDPs lived in rooms left by other people or at their relatives' homes, i.e. they do not own the homes located at the specified addresses, while their own homes had been destroyed back in the first wave of hostilities, in 1994-96. Therefore, they have nothing to restore and nowhere to move. Besides, there are doubts as to whether those inspections were carried out in good faith. For instance, a family hostel in the Mayakovskogo settlement (city of Grozny), wiped from the face of the earth during the hostilities and with a mosque already erected on the site where it once stood, was also included in the list of housing suitable for living.

It should be noted that after a series of meetings between angered inhabitants of TAPs and governmental officials and interventions of members of human rights organizations, eviction from TAPs of dwellers who received the compensation was suspended.

Simultaneously, people who have filed applications for compensations are struck off the registers for food allowances at TAPs. The order to this effect has been given to the head of the Chechen Republic Migration Agency by the leadership of the Federal Migration Service of Russia. This results in IDPs, deprived of support, borrowing money against their compensation. When they are eventually paid the compensation, the IDPs have to spend it on repaying their debts and sustaining their everyday lives.

[...] Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 404 of July 4, 2003 set the amount of payment to be made in Chechnya in compensation for lost housing and property at 350,000 rubles (approximately 10,000 euros) per family per one completely destroyed structure. No compensatory payments are payable for housing which has been found restorable. Payments are made very slowly, with periodic interruptions for a long period of time. Besides, the Chechen Republic leadership openly admits that people in Chechnya have to repay 30% to 50% of the compensation's amount as a bribe to have it awarded, which is also noted in [Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights] Mr. Gil-Robles' report. All in all, 39,000 families have been paid compensations, which corresponds to 14 billion rubles allocated to these purposes in the federal budget."

[...] The difference in compensations for lost housing and property paid to those residing in the Chechen Republic and those who decided to never return there has become an additional traumatizing factor for IDPs. Resolution of the Government of the RF No. 510 of April 30, 1997 set the minimum amount of payments in compensation for lost housing at 120,000 rubles, which amounted before the 1998 default in Russia to approximately 20,000 US dollars. Today it is impossible to buy housing for a family with that sum of money, which does not exceed 4 to 5 thousand dollars.

According to Resolution of the Government of the RF No. 404 of July 4, 2003, the amount of payment made in the Chechen Republic in compensation for completely destroyed housing stands at 300,000 rubles.

Since the majority of those who have left Chechnya, never to return, are ethnic Russians, the issue is raised of discrimination of ethnic Russian citizens versus Chechens, which drives a wedge between the people who were once neighbours and creates conditions for a new confrontation. And it is forgotten in the process that between 1997 and 2003 no compensations at all were paid in Chechnya.

[...] [In areas of Russia outside the North Caucasus], subsidies that are allocated for forced migrants to buy housing are negligible. For instance, in Udmurtia, the disbursed amounts of 16 to 20 thousand rubles can buy virtually nothing even in remote villages. In the Volgograd Region, a family of three to four people gets 80 to 100 thousand rubles, while the price of one square meter of housing in the region is between 8 and 10 thousand rubles and in the city of Volgograd it hits 17 thousand and more. Therefore, with the allocated money such a family can buy only ten square meters of housing outside the region's capital or five square meters in Volgograd.

[...] Besides, payments under Resolution No. 510 are made very slowly. Since 1997, only 39,000 families have received the compensation. Of course, this results in the situation when thousands of families of former residents of the Chechen Republic, irrespective of their ethnic origin, are left without shelter across Russia.

It is impossible to buy housing with the miserable sum of that compensation. This fact was acknowledged by the RF Supreme Court."

COE, 15 March 2006:

"Corruption remains rife, affecting even the compensation money for the reconstruction of destroyed property."

Compensation payments to IDPs on hold (2007)

- Compensation payments on hold since 2005 because federal funds have not been allocated and the list of recipients has not been finalized
- Those who lost property and housing due to military hostilities will not receive compensation in 2007
- The Chechen republican budget has not received funds for paying compensation

Кавказский Узел, 5 июня 2007 г.:

"В текущем году жители Чечни, потерявшие в ходе военных действий свое жилье и имущество, не смогут получить полагающихся им по закону компенсационных выплат [...] Дело в том, что в республиканском бюджете таких средств не заложено. Этой проблемой занимается руководство республики, но решить эти вопросы, пока не удалось [...] Согласно имеющейся информации, за прошедшие годы компенсации получили около 50-ти тысяч граждан республики."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 6:

"[...] Payments of compensation for lost housing and property are virtually suspended everywhere. The country which spent 10 billion roubles on a few days of the G-8 Summit, has allocated about 20 billion roubles to date to compensate for housing of its citizens that it had ruined itself. [...]"

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"[...] However, the process of compensation payments has been suspended for more than a year, awaiting Compensation Commission approval of the final list and provision of more federal funds."

Compensation not enough to build a house in Chechnya (2007)

- Average price to build a house in Chechnya is several tens of thousands of dollars
- Price of construction materials rising all the time as Chechnya is in a construction boom
- Compensation of 350,000 roubles inadequate to build a proper house
- Supreme Court decision said those who had received compensation should not lose access to additional housing assistance from the state

Grouping of Russian NGOs, 30 November 2006:

"It is impossible to purchase any housing with the trifling sum of compensation. The fact was admitted by the RF Supreme Court. The court decision of 31 October 2002 excluded from RF Government Regulation No. 510 the provision that persons who had received the state compensation for their housing lost in Chechnya forfeited their right to any other state assistance in housing [...]"

Prague Watchdog, 18 July 2007:

"The most daunting issue for anyone building a house is the skyrocketing price of construction materials: cement, brick, and timber. In contrast to other Russian regions, the average price of building a house in Chechnya is several tens of thousands of dollars. This is partly due to Chechens building solid bases for all their buildings, using two or three times the normal amount of cement. Oddly enough, if the foundation is all that is left of a ruined building, the owner still can say he owns a house.

There is a steady import of bricks and cement to Chechnya, as they are now the prime building materials. With careful financing, an ordinary construction base 1.5m high can be done for \$4,000 or \$5,000. A sack of cement costs 240 roubles. However, some builders find it financially beneficial to import cement from Volgograd and sell it to Chechens at a higher price; locally made cement is cheaper. The price of used bricks is three roubles whereas the imported ones go for 10-15 roubles.

A single-storey four-room house requires a minimum of 6,000 bricks. After the bricklayer has been paid, consideration must be given to the finish, the windows, doors, and water and gas connections. Costs can become astronomical, so that there is a constant battle to find the money for completion

The compensation of 350,000 roubles for destroyed property is extremely small; it doesn't even begin to pay for a fraction of the suffering a person has experienced. No one knows why this sum was decided on, but nearly every one who has received it finds it insulting. At present, it's enough to enable the members of a family to build a cottage somewhere near the village of Selmentauzen, located between the Argun and Vedenogorges, where no one will notice the family's impoverished state."

Forced migrants from CIS receive benefits different from IDPs from Chechnya (2006)

- IDPs from Chechnya lose IDP status after receiving compensation and therefore, other government assistance for IDPs

- According to a representative of organization that assists forced migrants, forced migrants from the CIS are able to keep their legal status for some 10 years and can access government subsidies during this time
- Those receiving compensation are obliged to find residence where compensation was issued and for the number of family members applied for
- IDPs deciding to live outside of Chechnya receive less compensation than those deciding to return to Chechnya
- Two IDPs challenged this difference in compensation payment in Stavropol Krai, but were unsuccessful

Кавказский Узел, 15 декабря 2006 г.:

"Вынужденные переселенцы из Чечни и других регионов Северного Кавказа имеют гораздо больше трудностей в России, нежели переселенцы из стран СНГ. Об этом корреспонденту «Кавказского узла» сообщила председатель российского Фонда помощи беженцам «Соотечественники» Алла Якунина. По ее словам, основная проблема заключается в том, что, получая компенсацию, которая в несколько раз меньше необходимой на жилье суммы, вынужденные переселенцы лишаются своего статуса, а значит, и государственной поддержки. «У переселенцев из стран СНГ также есть в России проблемы с жильем, однако иметь свой статус, который обеспечивает им субсидии от правительства, они могут в течении 10-15 лет. Что касается категории беженцев из Чечни, к примеру, то они такой возможности не имеют. Те жалкие 120 000 рублей, выплачиваемые им на покупку жилья и не соответствующие реальной его стоимости, лишают их права на помощь со стороны государства» - сказала Алла Якунина."

Кавказский Узел, 30 ноября 2006 г.:

"[...] По словам правозащитников, сегодня вынужденным переселенцам выдаются мизерные «субсидии», или компенсация, как их еще называют, на которые невозможно купить даже сарай в деревне, не то что квартиру. Причем, получая деньги, человек обязан найти жилплощадь соответственно количеству членов семьи, а также в том районе, где выдавалась компенсация. Это значит, что если семья состоит из пяти человек, а выдали компенсацию в Южном округе Москвы, то будь добр приобрести жилплощадь в девяносто квадратных метров в Южном округе Москвы, что, как известно, почти невозможно. И то, что компенсация составляет сто тысяч рублей, никого не волнует [...]"

Кавказский Узел, 17 августа 2005 г.:

"Сегодня, 17 августа, в Ставропольском краевом суде состоялось слушание сразу двух гражданских дел вынужденных переселенцев из Чечни, проживающих в Ставропольском крае и требующих от правительства Российской Федерации справедливой компенсации за оставленное жилье в городе Грозном. Обоим вынужденным переселенцам в их требованиях было отказано.

Оба истца, ранее проживавшие в Грозном и выехавшие оттуда в Ставропольский край в связи с военными действиями и непосредственной угрозой их жизни, оставили там благоустроенное жилье. За это жилье они в прошлом году по Постановлению правительства РФ № 510 от 30 апреля 1997 года "О порядке выплаты компенсаций за утраченное жилье и/или имущество гражданам, пострадавшим в результате разрешения кризиса в Чеченской Республике и покинувшим её безвозвратно" получили компенсации в размере 120 тысяч рублей каждый. В своих заявлениях оба вынужденных переселенца считают, что российским Правительством нарушены права, данные им статьей 19 Конституции РФ, в которой провозглашено равенство прав и свобод человека и гражданина независимо в том числе и от места его жительства. Дело в том, что 4 июля 2003 года Правительство Российской Федерации принимает Постановление № 404, в котором определяет сумму компенсации за утраченное жилье для жителей Чечни в 300 тысяч

рублей. В нем же соответствующим ведомствам поручается в двухмесячный срок подготовить изменения по размерам компенсаций в вышеуказанное Постановление № 510. Предполагалось, что суммы компенсаций прежним и настоящим жителям Чечни будут одинаковыми. Но до сих пор правительство никаких изменений не приняло, а сумма стоимости соответствующего оставленному в Чечне жилья в Ставрополе превосходит сумму компенсации в восемь-десять раз [...]

Районный суд, рассматривавший дело первой вынужденной переселенки, с февраля месяца, момента принятия заявления, провел десять заседаний, и, в конце концов, в мае вынес отрицательное решение по этому делу. В суде против требований переселенца выступали представители Управления по делам миграции ГУВД Ставропольского края, Правительства Ставропольского края, Министерства финансов Российской Федерации в лице Управления Федерального Казначейства по Ставропольскому краю и Правительства Российской Федерации [...]

Состоявшиеся сегодня два заседания суда Ставропольского края не отменили решения районных судов по делу вынужденных переселенцев. Однако, на этом, как говорит В. Целовальников, ни сами переселенцы, ни его организация не остановятся. В ближайшее время ими будет направлена жалоба в Верховный Суд РФ."

Compensation for IDPs from North Ossetia (2007)

- Forced migrants who lost their homes as a result of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in 1992 are eligible for government support for housing construction under Resolution #274 of 6 March 1998 and according to amendments in October 2006
- Some IDPs living in Maisky reported they had received money for their homes in Prigorodny district
- Regional Federal Migration Services offices decide on applications

Правительство Российской Федерации, 8 января 2007 г.:

"Вопрос: Какая государственная поддержка оказывается вынужденным переселенцам, лишившимся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта в октябре – ноябре 1992 года в жилищном обустройстве?"

Ответ: ФМС России в рамках Постановления Правительства Российской Федерации от 6 марта 1998 г. № 274 «Об оказании государственной поддержки гражданам Российской Федерации, лишившимся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта в октябре-ноябре 1992 г.» (с изменениями от 16 августа 2002 г., 30 декабря 2005 г.), осуществляет возложенные, по оказанию государственной поддержки в жилищном обустройстве при условии получения ими в установленном порядке статуса вынужденного переселенца. Принятие решения по оказанию государственной поддержки в жилищном обустройстве вынужденным переселенцам, лишившимся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта в октябре-ноябре 1992 года, осуществляет Межрегиональное управление ФМС России расположенное на территории РСО - Алания по адресу: г. Владикавказ, пр. Коста, д. 34 и на территории Республики Ингушетия по адресу: г. Назрань, ул. Московская, д.30. Для получения государственной поддержки необходимо обратиться в УФМС России по

Республике Северная Осетия-Алания либо Республике Ингушетия. Для получения свидетельства в Межрегиональное управление ФМС России."

Время, 11 апреля 2006 г.:

"В городке беженцев в Майском есть люди, которые говорят, что уже получили деньги за свои дома и квартиры в Пригородном районе."

Российская Газета, 25 октября 2006 г.:

"Председатель Правительства Российской Федерации
М. Фрадков

Изменения, которые вносятся в постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 6 марта 1998 г. N 274

[...] б) пункт 7 дополнить абзацем следующего содержания:

"Вынужденный переселенец, лишившийся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта, не подавший до 1 декабря 2006 г. в территориальный орган Федеральной миграционной службы заявление об оказании государственной поддержки либо не представивший до 1 июля 2007 г. в территориальный орган Федеральной миграционной службы документы, указанные в пункте 8 настоящего Положения, реализует свое право на оказание государственной поддержки в порядке, предусмотренном законодательством Российской Федерации о вынужденных переселенцах.";

[...] "а) имевшим на 2 ноября 1992 г. жилое помещение на праве собственности или получившим его в собственность в порядке наследования после 2 ноября 1992 г. от члена семьи - вынужденного переселенца, лишившегося жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта, и изъявившим желание вернуться в места прежнего проживания, - в форме субсидии на восстановление разрушенного индивидуального жилья.";

в подпункте "б":

абзац первый изложить в следующей редакции:

"б) имевшим на 2 ноября 1992 г. жилое помещение на праве собственности или получившим его в собственность в порядке наследования после 2 ноября 1992 г. от члена семьи - вынужденного переселенца, лишившегося жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта, и покинувшим место прежнего проживания безвозвратно, - в форме субсидии на приобретение готового или строительство нового жилого помещения с предоставлением для строительства земельного участка при условии передачи в установленном порядке оставленного по месту прежнего проживания на территории Республики Северная Осетия -Алания или Республики Ингушетия земельного участка (участков) и находящегося на нем жилого помещения (помещений) или незастроенного земельного участка (участков) на безвозмездной основе в муниципальную собственность.";

[...] в абзаце первом слова "В договорах купли-продажи жилого помещения либо договора подряда на строительство или восстановление жилья" заменить словами "В договоре купли-продажи жилого помещения, либо в договоре подряда на строительство или восстановление жилья, либо в договоре о целевом использовании бюджетных средств";

[...] "Оплата затрат на строительство или восстановление жилья собственными силами вынужденного переселенца осуществляется по мере представления получателем свидетельства о предоставлении государственной поддержки в территориальный орган Федеральной миграционной службы документов, подтверждающих расходы на

строительство или восстановление жилья, в порядке, установленном Министерством внутренних дел Российской Федерации в соответствии с пунктом 13 настоящего Положения.

Предельный срок строительства жилья собственными силами определяется исходя из срока действия свидетельства о предоставлении государственной поддержки.."

Limited compensation for destroyed properties in Dagestan (2002-2003)

- In Dagestan, 90 percent of the local residents who had their houses destroyed received substantial compensation
- Villagers complain that compensation was insufficient or was not paid

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

ICRC July 2002, Dagestan, p. 21

ICRC economic security survey in Dagestan (July 2002)

"State compensation for damages and loss of housing and property during the hostilities has been promised by both the Dagestani and Chechen authorities. Over 80% of the [residents affected by the hostilities] and other 90% of the IDP [households] report that their house was damaged or destroyed during the hostilities. Almost 90 % of [the residents affected by the hostilities] who had damaged houses have received substantial compensation, although only 1% of IDPs have received compensation for their damaged/destroyed houses in Chechnya.

Compensation funds received by the [residents affected by the hostilities] have been largely used to either purchase a new house, rebuild/repair the damaged house or repurchase lost possessions, enabling the majority of these [households] to regain their self-sufficiency, although some of these funds have been put into savings and play an important role in the monthly economy of these [households]. The majority of both [the residents affected by the hostilities] and IDP [households] who have not yet received their entitlements are economically vulnerable and the lack of ownership of a house, land and productive assets continues to negatively impact on these [households]."

IWPR, 19 July 2003:

"Four years ago, the Dagestan mountain village of Tando was briefly at the centre of world attention, as the then Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin publicly praised the residents for their spirited resistance to Chechen militants.

Those clashes in the west of Dagestan marked the beginning of the second war in Chechnya in October 1999 - and also the swift political rise of Putin, who was elected Russian president soon after.

However, Tando still lies in ruins. The village was destroyed in the fighting and only a few piles of stones mark its former location in a mountain gorge. And, along with the residents of a further three villages which suffered during the clashes, its people complain that they have been forgotten.

Today, 126 families live in the new village of Tando, built from scratch near what used to be the orchard of a collective farm. It was too dangerous to rebuild in the old location, as locals still give a wide berth to the ruins of their former homes for fear of mines.

Five people - some of them children - have been killed by ordnance in the Botlikh district in the past two years.

The lives of the villagers here were turned upside down in August 1999, when groups of heavily armed Chechen guerrillas led by warlord Shamil Basaev and his Saudi comrade-in-arms Khattab invaded. Brandishing the banner of fundamentalist Islam, they declared Dagestan an independent Islamic state.

Russian troops, backed by heavy artillery and warplanes, drove the Chechens out in September. Putin personally took charge of the operation, and within a month, federal forces were moving back into Chechnya.

Three more villages - Rakhata, Ansalta and Shodroda - are around a kilometre away from the district administrative centre Botlikh, which found itself in the thick of fighting in 1999. Unlike Tando, these villages survived, but the damage was very heavy and life has not yet returned to normal.

More than a thousand families live in Rakhata. Aside from a few crippled armoured personnel carriers littering the streets, there is little reminder of the fierce fighting that took place here four years ago. In Ansalta, which has a similar population, many houses are still in ruins.

The government promised to compensate the local residents whose homes were destroyed or badly damaged. However, many families affected say they have only received small sums for repairs. In Shodroda, 83 people were never compensated for their lost property. In Ansalta the figure is 60 and in Rakhata, 42.

One Botlikh district official, who would give his name only as Abdurakhman, told IWPR, 'The district court has been flooded with claims from the local villagers, and I have been personally involved in 150 hearings.'

Majid Gamzatov from Rakhata used to keep a shop, but this was looted and destroyed during the fighting - and he's now out on the street.

He claimed that the lists of villagers entitled to compensation were drawn up clandestinely by local officials, saying, 'They told us nothing, and did not show us any papers.'

'No one knew what they were entitled to. Many villagers were gullible enough to trust the officials and no one claimed anything,' he said, adding that he and his five brothers were eventually granted a one-off compensation sum.

Some villagers in the district lost their entire apricot harvest - for many, their only form on income - in the fighting, but the government has not compensated private businessmen such as fruit farmers. Junaud Omargajiev from Ansalta is a tractor driver with five children who worked hard to provide two houses for his extended family. All of his property - including four cows - was destroyed in the fighting. While one home remained standing after the initial assault, the guerrillas seized it for use as a field hospital, and later wrecked it completely.

He received around 1,300 US dollars per family member in damages for the lost house, and only around 40 dollars for the cattle. 'I never even tried to claim compensation for my second house,' he said. 'A government official warned us that each family would be compensated for only one.'

Villagers who believe that they have been cheated besiege government offices every day to press their claims, which are believed to exceed 1.7 million dollars. But in most cases, officials simply shrug their shoulders and say they are unable to help."

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return to Chechnya

IDPs face obstacles for return to mountainous villages (2007)

- Main obstacles to return to mountainous villages are lack of physical security, destroyed housing, lack of public infrastructure and issues making cattle rearing difficult
- Hostilities still happening in southern mountainous areas of Chechnya

IWPR, 16 August 2006:

"In the village of Yarysh-Mardy in the hills south of the Chechen capital Grozny there is no sign of life.

Yarysh-Mardy used to have a population of 620, a school, a library, a cultural centre, a post office and a mosque. Now there is nothing.

All the houses were completely destroyed back in 1999, at the beginning of the second Chechen campaign. Since then, the village has become overgrown with vegetation and has become a closed zone. There are dangers everywhere - mainly so-called "butterfly mines", dropped from aeroplanes, and unexploded ordnance.

Even the few wild animals you see are wounded or maimed: wild boars and pigs that are missing a leg, birds with no wings or hares without ears.

This is a picture of devastation repeated across the hills of Chechnya. Although the authorities in Moscow have declared the war against rebels won, the residents of these villages say they see no prospect of getting back to normal life any time soon [...]

Sporadic military action is continuing in the mountains of Chechnya, despite the official proclamation of peace.

"Certain villages are still being bombed and shot at," said Shamil Tangiev, head of the human rights organisation Memorial in Grozny. "People do not understand why this is happening, since the authorities have announced several times that military action in Chechnya ended in 2002; that there is peace in the republic; a government has been formed; there is a legal system and law and order has been re-established.

"Unbearable living conditions mean that we are seeing constant displacement from the mountains to the plains of the republic. In the on-going clashes between the federal soldiers and the fighters in Chechnya's mountainous areas, the civilian population is generally the victim."

The mountain villagers are mostly forced to live with relatives or in makeshift accommodation in other parts of Chechnya.

Memorial reported that in 2002, two and a half thousand people from mountain villages in southeastern Chechnya were uprooted by fighting. However, because these people were displaced within Chechnya itself, their plight has not been dealt with by the republic's migration department.

Markha Akhmadova, head of the demographics department of the government statistics agency Chechenstat, told IWPR, "The mountain villagers want to go home to their own land, but the army is there. They can't let them into their villages because they still haven't been de-mined and it's simply too dangerous to live there."

Akhmadova said it is impossible to determine how many people have moved from one village to another, since they stay registered in their original homes in order to get compensation for their destroyed property.

The villagers' main request is for rehabilitation work to begin so they can go home.

Ruslan Musayev, a regional government official in Grozny, told IWPR reconstruction work would be finished by the end of the year in Yarysh-Mardy. But villagers say they see no signs of progress. And other villages have the same complaints.

"In Nozhai-Yurt, Vedeno and Kurchaloi regions many villages have been deserted," said Khazmat Gadayev, who comes from one of Chechnya's mountain settlements. "The federal soldiers are driving people out of the mountains on purpose. The village of Alkhazurovo was recently surrounded - they spent three to four days carrying out a 'mop up' operation there. They do it on purpose, to keep people in a state of fear. But people are sick and tired of war."

Musayev described how the village of Kharsenoi has been so completely razed that not even the foundations of houses remain. "There was shooting there every night," he said. "They said they were shooting at the detachment of Doku Umarov's [the rebel leader of Chechnya]. The residents still haven't been allowed back there."

Musayev said that in two other villages, Zumsoi and Bugaroi, federal troops had rounded up all the young men in a barn and threatened to set fire to it so that the fighters would not have any support. "Because of this ceaseless tyranny, almost everyone left a long time ago," he said. [...]

"The military does what it likes here," said the villager. "They blow up houses, if they are of no strategic use to them, especially if there is no one living in them. But in spite of all this, many people, especially the elderly, want to go back to their homes. They want to be buried next to their ancestors."

The Russian federal armed forces would not comment on the claims made by villagers and there is no mechanism for the villagers to complain.

Memorial says soldiers never reveal which units they are serving in and it is virtually impossible to bring them to account. For example, after an air strike and mopping-up operation against the village of Zumsoi last year, three adult men and a 15-year-old boy were detained and have not been seen again.

Shamil Tangiev of Memorial said that many villagers would accept the stationing of military units in mountain villagers, "so that there would be no opportunity for fighters to be there and people will not be accused of collaborating with the armed groups. And they can be helped in rebuilding so that they can begin to put their life in order. But so far the authorities have not responded properly".

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"В завершение беженцам задавался вопрос, планируют ли они возвращаться на прежнее место жительства, и, если планируют, то при каких условиях.

На этот вопрос было зафиксировано 102 ответа: 52 человека ответили отрицательно, 11 – положительно, а 39 выразили готовность вернуться в горы при определенных условиях.

Оценивая результаты этого опроса, необходимо иметь в виду политический и культурный контекст, в котором он проводился. Как уже говорилось, власти республики подталкивают людей к возвращению в горы, не подготовив для этого самых элементарных условий. Отвечая на наш вопрос, беженцы нередко в той или иной форме реагировали на это давление: кто-то отвечал сдержанно или уклончиво, кто-то, напротив, с вызовом, как бы возражая тем, кто пытается принять решение за него. В то же время преданность родным местам, стремление вернуться туда, как бы далеко и надолго не забросила судьба, – важнейший элемент культуры чеченцев.

Итак, почему же половина опрошенных нами беженцев не имеет намерения возвращаться в горы? Первое и самое главное – страшно. Так одним словом определила причину своего нежелания возвращаться в горы женщина из с. Хашты-Мохк (98). Этот мотив звучал практически во всех разговорах с беженцами. Страшно – из-за продолжающегося насилия со стороны военных. Страшно выйти за село – из-за мин.

Страшно жить в пустом селе, если что случится, некого будет звать на помощь. Страшно – из-за того, что в село стали забегать расплодившиеся за годы войны дикие животные.

Второе и не менее важное – некуда возвращаться, нет жилья. Об этом также говорили почти все, кто решил остаться на равнине.

Третье – невозможно заниматься скотоводством, главным источником существования в горах, – из-за мин и уничтожения скота военными.

Четвертое – отсутствие элементарных современных условий существования: дорога, свет, газ, школа, медпункт...

Многие говорили, что пока не собираются возвращаться. Их решение носит временный характер и может измениться с изменением ситуации. Так что часто между решением не возвращаться в горы и намерением вернуться туда при определенных условиях нет длинной дистанции.

Однако большинство из тех, кто готов вернуться в горы, называют вполне конкретные условия. И эти условия состоят в устранении тех причин, которые заставляют их земляков отказаться от мысли о возвращении в родные села. Это – безопасность, восстановление жилья и инфраструктуры.

Часть беженцев в качестве условия возвращения в горы справедливо называют непосредственную помощь им со стороны государства в строительстве жилья и обзаведении, в том числе – в восстановлении поголовья скота, уничтоженного военными или распроданного самими беженцами для того, чтобы выжить на равнине...

Помимо этого, властям республики, если они хотят, чтобы горцы вернулись в свои села, необходимо иметь в виду еще одно обстоятельство. Как сказала одна женщина, на равнине они «почувствовали вкус к спокойной жизни». И заметила, что здесь «школа лучше». То есть они почувствовали также и вкус к более благоприятным, чем в горах, условиям существования (школы, врачи, магазины, дороги и многое другое). Жизнь в горах, даже в мирное время, скуднее и труднее, требует большей выносливости, больших физических сил и более скромных потребностей. В этом смысле характерна реплика одной женщины на вопрос о возможном возвращении: «Была бы помоложе и поздоровее, там силы нужны» (96). Тем, кто привык к более современным и комфортным условиям существования, уже нелегко будет вернуться в суровый горский быт. Может быть, этим объясняются разногласия в одной семье: муж хочет вернуться, а жена – нет. Но муж понимает, что «женщине там трудно: газа, ничего нет» (57).

Третий случай получил в республике некоторую известность. Дело в том, что жители полностью разрушенного села Тазен-Кала предприняли попытку вернуться в горы под влиянием уговоров со стороны главы администрации Веденского района, товарища Р.Кадырова, активно проводящего в жизнь его требование вернуть беженцев к местам их прежнего жительство. Выезд мужчин в горы был согласован с местным комендантом, который обещал их не трогать. Тем не менее, примерно через месяц после начала работы в селе они были арестованы. По-мнению коллег из Правозащитного центра «Мемориал», работающих в Чечне, возвращение людей в свои села противоречит интересам военных, так как может помешать им контролировать ситуацию в горах, ограничивает их свободу действий. Вероятно, этот случай должен был остановить многих беженцев, думающих о возвращении в горные села...

Как показал наш опрос, некоторое общее влияние на характер ответов о возвращении оказывает только возраст. Оказалось, что среди людей старше 60 лет большинство (7 из 11 опрошенных) не намерено возвращаться в горы, среди людей в возрасте от 45 до 59 лет больше половины (25 из 42) хотели бы вернуться, среди людей в возрасте от 30 до 44 лет больше половины (17 из 30), напротив, не желают возвращаться, и еще меньше желающих (6 из 16) среди молодежи в возрасте до 30 лет.

Видимо, старики не хотят возвращаться из-за бытовых трудностей и отсутствия медицинской помощи. Молодым в горах, с одной стороны, скучно, с другой – страшно. И в равнинной части Чечни молодежи некуда себя девать, но все же круг общения там шире, можно прогуляться по улицам, заглянуть на рынок, в школу. В городах и больших селах кое-где сейчас есть интернет-кафе, спортивные секции. В горах, конечно, ничего этого нет. И на равнине молодые мужчины – главный объект охоты со стороны вооруженных людей в масках и без. Но в горах, где фактически продолжаются боевые действия, молодые люди находятся в еще большей опасности. Только люди среднего возраста, которых не мучают болезни и не дают скучать житейские заботы, более других склонны думать о возвращении в горы в надежде наладить привычные способы добывания средств к существованию."

Радио Свобода, 17 марта 2007 г.:

"Когда они уезжали оттуда, это действительно были акты отчаяния. Они бросали часть домов, которые были еще целы. За эти годы эти дома обветшали уже сами по себе, и разобранными военными, которые там дислоцируются. Фактически им возвращаться некуда, у них нет домов. Государство должно им помочь восстановить, во-первых, свои дома, восстановить дороги, провести газ, свет, очистить родники. И потом еще одна проблема, о которой никто не волнуется, это размножение диких животных: шакалы, волки, дикие кабаны уже открыто бродят по этим селам и на людей уже нападают. А у людей нет даже охотничьего оружия, они не могут пользоваться им. Раньше этим целенаправленно занимались, отстреливали. Так что условий для проживания у них даже при очень большом желании сейчас нет, государство должно им помочь это сделать [...] Существует минная опасность – это тоже одна из причин того, что люди не могут вернуться в свои села. Естественно, основным фактором, не дающим вернуться людям к своим очагам, является все-таки безопасность в первую очередь. А вернуться в свои села у них желание очень огромное."

See also "[Chechens yearn to return to mountains](#)," Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 5 April 2007.

Returnees from Ingushetia become internally displaced within Chechnya (2007)

- Number of returnees to Chechnya increased considerably in 2004
- People returning to Chechnya are accommodated to collective temporary centres
- MSF had concerns about how return process was managed and whether health and well being of returnees were taken into account in planning for return

Conflict and Health, 13 March 2007:

"Recent developments in the Caucasus have overtaken the situation surveyed in early 2004, with the authorities rapidly

closing the spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia and sending the IDPs back to the Temporary Accommodation

Centres (TACs) in Chechnya. Our survey data showed that many who returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia were simply changing their status from being IDPs outside to being IDPs inside Chechnya. The fate of those IDPs accommodated in TACs remains an important longer-term question. As of March 2007 concerns remain about how the authorities manage the return process and whether considerations on the wellbeing and health of this group are being taken into account while planning this process."

Pattern of return to Chechnya (2006)

- Some 3300 persons returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia in 2006 after a vigorous governmental promotional campaign for return
- Only some of the IDPs who returned to Chechnya were able to find room in Temporary Accommodation Centres and Compact Settlements
- In 2007, IDPs being moved out of temporary accommodation by government and being offered apartments or land plots if they have not received compensation for lost property and housing
- Double demand for shelter still exists; temporary accommodation during displacement and permanent shelter for durable solutions
- Return is accomplished in phases, with male households returning first

Мемориал, 19 января 2007 г.:

"Между тем, положение беженцев по-прежнему остается не простым. Бытовая неустроенность, безденежье, отсутствие необходимой социальной поддержки являются привычными атрибутами существования ВПЛ. Только часть из вернувшихся в Чечню смогла найти пристанище в ПВР и МКП. Реальная вместимость пунктов размещения ВПЛ значительно меньше, поэтому около трети зарегистрированных состоит там лишь на довольствии, проживая фактически в частном секторе. ПВР в настоящее время интенсивно закрываются."

UN Commission on Human Rights, 26 January 2006:

"UNHCR explained that the large number of women IDPs is mainly due to the phased return of IDP families to Chechnya, whereby male heads of household return first; and the ongoing flow of Chechen male IDPs seeking asylum abroad."

In 2006, 3,306 persons returned to Chechnya from Ingushetia.

Number of DRC Beneficiaries Returned from Ingushetia to Chechen Republic - February 2007

District Arriving to in Chechen Republic	Number	District Leaving from in Ingushetia	Number
Achkhoy-Martanovskiy	22	Aki-Yurt	0
Vedenskiy	0	Karabulak	24
Groznenskiy	14	Malgobek	27
Groznenskiy-ECHO	6	Nazran	29
Zavodskoy	12	Nasyr-Kort	23
Leninskiy	23	Pilevo	8
Nadterechny	0	Psedakh	0
Naurskiy	0	Sagopshi	7
Oktyabr'skiy	40	Sleptsovsk	111
Staropromyslovskiy	78	Surkhakhi	0
Sunzhenskiy	21	Nesterovskaya	22
Urus-Martanovskiy	23	Vosnesenskaya	1
Shalinskiy	13	Galashki	4
Total	544	Total	465

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"Large numbers of IDPs left Ingushetia to return to Chechnya in 2006 after a vigorous promotional campaign conducted by the Chechen government over the summer. UNHCR and NGOs assisted a large number of IDPs voluntarily returning with emergency shelter to facilitate their initial reintegration in Chechnya. After the [Chechen government return] campaign and a parallel process of physical verification of the presence of IDPs in Ingushetia, the authorities consider that no more than 7,700 Chechen IDPs remain in the republic and qualify for state assistance. However, according to the DRC/UNHCR registration system that has recorded arrivals of IDPs in Ingushetia since September 1999, the number of IDPs physically present could remain more than twice as high.

Surveys conducted during the year indicate that most IDPs intend to return to Chechnya but are as yet unable to do so. An estimated 20% of IDPs wish to integrate locally but lack land and support.

...The main obstacles for return according to the [WFP-led VAM] survey are the destruction of shelter and the lack of employment or income-generating opportunities in Chechnya.

...The government of Chechnya has promised to ensure all TAC residents have housing assistance, enabling them to vacate and close the TACs. In order to facilitate this process, the authorities have taken special preliminary measures, such as listing residents of TACs as priority recipients of compensation for lost housing and property, as well as the allocation of land plots to displaced families who never had their own property.

In 2006, the desire of the displaced to return home and resume normal lives was clearly evident. Government officials placed the return of IDPs to Chechnya as their highest priority. A closer review of the results from assessments done by the humanitarian agencies illustrate the constraints to return or integration. Many IDPs in the different republics:
 Have completely destroyed homes and will wait for the government to restart its payment of compensation for completely destroyed houses;
 Are newly formed families and have never had homes or apartments and need to be included into a new government housing program;

Are unable to integrate in Ingushetia without government support through a comprehensive local integration program;

Must rely on borrowed resources or humanitarian assistance until they can access government programs.

...Permanent solutions for many will be found in the coming year, but there will still be large numbers of IDPs unable to return or integrate due to lack of shelter.

This double demand for shelter, i.e. temporary accommodation during displacement and permanent housing for durable solutions, still remains a tremendous challenge...Also, next to security concerns, the lack of shelter is still the most serious constraint cited by IDPs hoping to return."

Swisspeace, 3 May 2007:

"The program on facilitating the return of IDPs has entered a new phase. Last year approximately 7,000 IDPs returned to Chechnya including 89 people from Georgia. By early 2007 the total number of returnees reached over 57,000 people. More than 50 temporary accommodation centers for IDPs were created as an interim measure. The authorities have recently begun activities aimed at closing the temporary accommodation centers and providing these people with proper housing through financing the reconstruction of destroyed homes or granting apartments."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.8:

"Most internally displaced persons (IDPs) had to return to the Chechen Republic; partly because they trusted the promises by the authorities to pay them compensation as a matter of priority, partly because of fear to be left without any shelter at all. Only part of them managed to find shelter in the 32 temporary accommodation points (TAPs) and 15 compact settlements (CAPs), in which approximately 37,000 people have been registered. The real capacity of accommodation centers for IDPs is much lower, therefore about a third of the registered receive only food allowances there, living actually in private accommodation."

Government of the Russian Federation, 13 October 2006:

"74. ...Процесс возвращения внутренне перемещенных лиц по мере стабилизации ситуации на территории Чеченской Республики значительно активизировался. Это касается не только жителей Чеченской Республики, проживающих в субъектах Российской Федерации, но и тех, кто находится за рубежом. За период совместной работы в этом направлении удалось снять все палаточные городки на территории Республики Ингушетия и создать более достойные условия проживания для более 60 100 человек, возвратившихся на территорию Чеченской Республики. Процесс возвращения указанной категории лиц на территорию Чеченской Республики продолжается.

75. В последние три года отлажена и эффективно действует система государственной поддержки внутренне перемещенных лиц. Лицам, возвращающимся к местам прежнего проживания, выделяется транспорт, оказывается помощь по оплате проезда и провоза багажа. Для их размещения в Чеченской Республике за счет средств федерального бюджета восстановлены и функционируют 32 пункта временного размещения (в том числе 22 - в городе Грозном). Кроме того, в Шелковском и Сунженском районах, а также в городе Грозном создано 14 объектов под места компактного проживания. Всего в Чеченской Республике построено 46 благоустроенных общежитий, в которых проживает более 48 000 человек (в том числе около 22 000 детей). Все общежития подготовлены для проживания граждан в зимних условиях, обеспечены электро- и газоснабжением, привозной питьевой водой, отопительными системами."

Regions.ru, 18 октября 2006 г.:

"Основной поток внутривосемещенных лиц покинувших Чеченскую Республику во время военных действий уже возвращен на родину. Только из Республики Ингушетия в

ближайшее время возвращено 14 185 человек. В настоящее время правительственной комиссией ведется большая работа по возвращению остальных 7 тыс. проживающих в соседней Ингушетии, из которых скорей всего вернется только 1000 человек. Остальные 6000 человек (в основном представители ингушской национальности) по всей вероятности останутся жить в Ингушетии на постоянной основе", - сообщил председатель Народного Собрания Парламента ЧР Д. Абдурахманов."

Lack of housing and jobs are holding IDPs back from returning to Chechnya(2007)

- Displacement continues mainly because of lack of housing and jobs at original place of residence

DRC, 28 February 2007:

"Respondents identified the following reasons in favour of staying in Dagestan:

- Security issues - in Kizlyarsky (33% of those staying for permanent residence in the district) and Tarumovsky (24%) districts;
- Absence of own shelter in Chechnya - in Nogayskiy (up to 50% of those staying), in Khasav-Yurtovsky (about 35%), in Tarumovsky (21%);
- Unemployment in Chechnya - in Kizlyarsky (21% of those staying) и Khasav-Yurtovsky districts (16%);
- Totally destroyed house – Tarumovsky (26% of those staying) and Kizlyarsky (15%);
- Would like to settle down in Dagestan – Khasav-Yurtovsky (up to 26% of those staying)

Other reasons take a small part of the total.

District	Security	No shelter	No work	Destroyed shelter	No relatives	Want to stay in D	Overseas
Kizlyarski	45	17	34	26	13	4	
Nogayski	2	7	2	2			
Tarumovski	6	6	2	7	2		
Khasav-Yurtovski	3	10	5	1	1	8	1
Total	56	40	43	36	16	12	1
% of those staying(144)	39%	28%	30%	25%	11%	8%	1%

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"In all North Caucasus republics the reasons for protracted displacement remain a major concern for the international community in general and the protection actors in particular. Many of the reasons can be attributed to lack of shelter and job opportunities, but IDPs often cite security and protection concerns related to weak rule of law structures. These concerns are also voiced by many of the returnees to the Chechen Republic."

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"[...] 95.8% of the 593 IDPs families residing in TSs in Ingushetia and willing to return to Chechnya declared that the lack of accommodation is their major obstacle to return [...]"

It is visible that considerations related to accommodation prevail over strict "protection" and personal security issues in both republics. The restoration of security guarantees in the areas of origin account for only 0.2% of all answers on the condition to vacate the TSs/TACs in Chechnya.

Analogously, only 0.3% of the IDP families still residing in TSs in Ingushetia have mentioned personal security concerns as their current main problem in Ingushetia and 3.5% of the IDPs willing to return to Chechnya consider personal insecurity as a concern, with this percentage decreasing to 0.4% of the would-be returnees when it is considered as the first obstacle to the return."

UN Commission on Human Rights, 26 January 2006:

"Apart from the primary concern of security, many IDPs in Ingushetia do not want to return to Chechnya as the majority of houses in Chechnya, particularly in Grozny, have been completely or partially destroyed, both as a result of fighting and deliberate destruction by Russian forces or Chechen fighters, and if their homes have not been destroyed, other people may have taken possession of them. In these circumstances, returning IDPs would be forced to live in temporary accommodation centres (TAC). There are not enough TACs and the living conditions are precarious, there is no water, electricity, gas and sanitary facilities, and they are overcrowded."

Return from Dagestan to Chechnya (2007)

- More than half of IDPs living in Kizlyarsky district said they would stay in Dagestan, while in other districts only 30 per cent intend on staying in Dagestan
- Construction of housing is most pressing issue for those planning to return to Chechnya

DRC, 28 February 2007:

"402 forced migrants households from Chechnya, residing currently in Dagestan (DRC covered districts) have been surveyed. It makes 1/3 (about 36%) of all DRC food beneficiaries in Dagestan. The survey has been implemented by FSR field assistants on distribution points while distributing food relief. The survey was conducted anonymously, thus having no impact on DRC beneficiaries lists. Thus the survey is supposed to have a relatively high level of precision [...]"

More than a halve (about 55% of IDPs) in Kizlyarsky district are going to stay in Dagestan. It is explained by the fact, that the temporary settlements in the district are occupied by former villagers of Kenkhi settlement, Sharoysky district of Chechnya (Avar sub-nationality of Dagestan). The majority has moved to those places to be closer to their relatives, that have removed to Dagestan a time earlier for permanent residence. The process of removing started in terms of active military actions in Chechnya, 1994-1996. The second flow of migrants was caused by the second military campaign of 2000 year and catastrophic landslide in June, 2002, that had destroyed a lot of houses.

Regarding other districts, just 20-30% of IDPs intend to stay in Dagestan. The same situation we witness in the Ingush Republic, with just 20-30% of Chechen IDPs willing to stay for permanent residence in Ingushetia (absolute majority is represented by Ingush nationality).

Return to Chechnya

District	No	Yes
Kizlyarski	90	75
Nogayski	11	30
Tarumovski	18	50
Khasav-Yurtovski	25	103
Total	144	258
%	36%	64%

The term of returning has been variously determined by different households. Many of those, that have expressed endeavor to turn back in 3 years, probably would like to stay in Dagestan, but have problems with shelter in Dagestan. They hope to buy their own accommodation or adjust their current one (reconstruct it, add an extra premise e.t.c.) in 3 years. The rest 72% (1year+3 years) are probably waiting for improving of security situation in Chechnya and are currently rehabilitating their shelter in Chechnya. Chapter IV of the given report elaborates on the main problems, returnees to Chechnya face with.

When Planning to Return

District	1 year	3 years	After 3 years
Kizlyarski	31	18	26
Nogayski	10	14	6
Tarumovski	24	18	8
Khasav-Yurtovski	27	42	34
Total	92	92	74
% of those turning back (258 households)	36%	36%	29%

Absolute majority of IDPs (of 258 households) are going to turn back to the points of previous residence. Just 8% of returnees are going to change point of residence. The main reasons for the willing to change place of residence, when being back to Chechnya, are mentioned below. For 80% of Kizlyarsky district IDPs landslides (Kenkhi settlement) are crucial, for Nogaisky IDPs –destroyed houses, for Tarumovsky IDPs-security, for Khasav-Yurtovsky- all noted reasons almost equally.

District	No	Yes
Kizlyarski	8	67
Nogayski	2	28
Tarumovski	4	46
Khasav-Yurtovski	7	96
Total	21	237

The most essential problems for IDPs, planning to return to Chechnya in the nearest 3 years, are:

- necessity of construction/reconstruction of shelter (from 31% of returnees in Tarumovsky up to 56% in Khasav-Yurtovsky districts);
- unemployment (from 10% in Khasav-Yurtovsky up to 50% in Nogaisky);
- search of new shelter (obviously willing to move to new place of residence in Chechnya) from 10% of returnees in Kizlyarovsky up to 20% in Tarumovsky and Khasav_yurtovsky districts).
- necessity of other sources of income (from 3% in Kizlyarsky up to 18% in Tarumovsky).

District	Shelter reconstruction	Job placement	Search of shelter	Other sources
Kizlyarski	45	55	14	4
Nogayski	29	30	1	
Tarumovski	29	30	19	17
Khasav-Yurtovski	75	11	24	20
Total	178	126	58	41

% of 258 households	69%	49%	22%	16%
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Long-term plans of IDPs who are living in Ingushetia (2007)

- Most IDPs living in temporary accommodation in Ingushetia intend to return to Chechnya; about 25 per cent plan on staying in Ingushetia
- IDPs who want to stay in Ingushetia are doing so because of lack of housing in Chechnya and security concerns, and not to interrupt the school year

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"Out of the 1,097 surveyed families, 54.2% (593 families) declared their intention to return to Chechnya, 24.3% (268 families) opted for the possibility to integrate locally in Ingushetia, whereas 21.5% (236 families) declared to be still undecided. This relatively high percentage of undecided families can maybe be explained by the fear of IDPs that the results of the survey be used to cut them off from humanitarian assistance in case of a clearcut choice, despite the introductory explanation on the aim of the exercise that monitors were instructed to give before every interview. However, it may also be assumed that the uncertainty is referred rather to the timing of return than to the decision per se.

In absolute terms, most of the IDPs willing to return are currently residing in TS in the Sunzhenski district (45.5% of all IDPs planning to return) and in the Nazran municipal district (33.7%) and less in the other districts (12.0% Karabulak, 4.7% Malgobek and 4.0% Nazran Rural District).

As for those who express their preference for local integration, 32.2% are currently residing in Nazran municipality, 26.6% in the Karabulak district, 23.2% in the Sunzhenski district, 12.7% in Malgobek district and a residual 5.2% in the Nazran rural area.

The undecided population is most numerous in the Sunzhenski district (46.8%), followed by the Nazran municipal area (43.5%) and with only residual groups in the other districts.

However, these percentages are influenced by the size of the IDP population in the districts. When considering the IDPs expressed intentions in relation to the overall IDP population residing in the TSs of the district, the results are more balanced. Out of the IDPs residing in TSs in the Sunzhenski (443 families) 60.9% are intentioned to return, 14.0% are considering local integration as the most likely solutions and 26.1% did not express a definite preference. In the Nazran Municipal district (389 IDP families residing in TSs), 51.4% expressed their intention to return, 22.1% to integrate and 26.5% are still undecided. In the rural area of Nazran (41 families in TSs), 58.5% of the IDPs residing in TS consider the return to Chechnya as the preferred solution, 34.1% are opting for local integration and only a residual 7.3% have not yet decided. In the Malgobek (73 families in TSs) and Karabulak districts (151 families in TSs) the segments of the IDPs who are willing to locally integrate are proportionally prevailing over the would-be returnees. 46.6% of the overall TSs residents in Malgobek and 47.0% of the residents of TSs in Karabulak prefer to remain in Ingushetia, as opposed to 38.4% and 47% who declared their intention to return and some 15.1% and 6.0% of IDPs who did not come up with a definitive intention [...]

As for the possible accommodation options on which IDPs count upon return, out of the 593 families that expressed this intention, 52.8% (313 families) intend to return to their own damaged housing, 12.5% (74 families) to parents' or relatives' empty land-plot, 8.9% (53 families) to their own empty land-plot, 5.1% (30 families) to a rented house/flat and 5.1% to a land-plot assigned by the Government. Only 6.6% (39 families) is expressing their will to return to TACs if rooms are available, and 2.4% (11 families) are declaring their intention to return to their own habitable accommodation.

For IDPs who expressed this intention, the survey also enquired on the destination of return to Chechnya. The relative majority of the 593 families opting to return (37.4% - 222 families) indicated Grozny urban area as their intended destination, 24.1% (143 families) the Achoy-Martan district, 15.7% (93 families) the Urus Martan region, 7.1% (42 families) the Grozinski region and 5.1% the Shali (30 families) district. Only minor segments of the IDP population currently residing in Ingushetia and willing to return will likely settle in the 10 other selected districts [...]

IDPs residing in TSs in Ingushetia and expressing the firm intention to return to Chechnya were given the possibility to express their two most serious obstacles to return, in order of priority. 543 (91.4%) of the families expressed at least one option, and 470 (79.1%) of the families associated also a second condition. The overwhelming majority (95.8%) of the 593 IDPs families put the lack of accommodation in Chechnya at the forefront of their concerns. The lack of job opportunities in Chechnya turned out to be the most acute second difficulty, quoted by 68.3% of the would-be returning population. Lack of accommodation and job are also the first two conditions when considering the whole amount of answers given (51.4% and 33.1% respectively)."

DRC, 28 May 2007:

"During the winter 2007, DRC conducted survey of IDPs from Chechnya, residing in Ingushetia. Field staff of DRC has surveyed selectively (at random) heads of IDPs' households, which are DRC food beneficiaries and reside in Ingushetia. The survey was conducted at DRC distribution points. The aim of given survey was to define the attitude of IDPs to the process of return to Chechnya.

Return to Chechnya

About 64 % of IDPs from Karabulak and up to 82 % of IDPs from Malgobek are planning return to Chechnya. The percentage of returning IDPs varies in different locations of Ingushetia. It is interesting, that the percentage of IDPs wishing to return is lower in district centers (Malgobek, Nazran, Sleptsovsk, Karabulak) and in some locations of Sunzhensky district. The reason is that IDPs planning to integrate in Ingushetia (mostly ethnic Ingush) preferred to reside in bigger locations, as there is better access to housing and work places. As the villages Kantishevo, Barsuki and Troitskaya can also be considered as big locations, probably, reasons are the same. The situation in Muzhichi is different. Given village is remote from the main centers of IDPs accommodation, and most of the IDPs either returned to Chechnya, or moved to compact accommodations in Sleptsovsk. The residual groups of IDPs in Muzhichi are ethnic Ingush, planning to integrate in Ingushetia.

In total, approximately 21% of surveyed IDPs (table 1) expressed their wish to stay in Ingushetia on permanent basis.

Return to Chechnya, households

Table.1

District	Village	Families	Planning return to Chechnya, families	%

Karabulakskiy	Karabulak	11	7	64%
Malgobekskiy	Aki-Yurt	9	7	78%
Malgobekskiy	V-Achaluki	10	10	100%
Malgobekskiy	Voznesenovskaya	11	11	100%
Malgobekskiy	Zyazikov-Yurt	4	3	75%
Malgobekskiy	Inarki	2	2	100%
Malgobekskiy	Malgobek	23	10	43%
Malgobekskiy	N-Achaluki	6	6	100%
Malgobekskiy	Novy-Redant	2	2	100%
Malgobekskiy	Psedakh	18	16	89%
Malgobekskiy	Sagopshi	7	7	100%
Malgobekskiy	S-Achaluki	12	11	92%
Total Malgobekskiy district	104	85	82%	
Nazranovskiy	Ali-Yurt	4	4	100%
Nazranovskiy	Al'tievo	10	10	100%
Nazranovskiy	Barsuki	13	6	46%
Nazranovskiy	Gazi-Yurt	3	3	100%
Nazranovskiy	Gamurzievo	6	6	100%
Nazranovskiy	Dolakovo	7	6	86%
Nazranovskiy	Kantyshevo	8	4	50%
Nazranovskiy	Nazran'	54	31	57%
Nazranovskiy	Nasyr-Kort	21	20	95%
Nazranovskiy	Plievo	10	9	90%
Nazranovskiy	Surkhakhi	6	6	100%
Nazranovskiy	Ekazhevo	10	10	100%
Nazranovskiy	Yandare	7	7	100%
Total Nazranovski district	159	122	77%	
Sunzhenskiy	Arshty	7	6	86%
Sunzhenskiy	Galashki	1	1	100%
Sunzhenskiy	Muzhichi	3	1	33%
Sunzhenskiy	Nesterovskaya	3	3	100%
Sunzhenskiy	Sleptsovsk	181	149	82%
Sunzhenskiy	Troitskaya	21	12	57%
Sunzhenskiy	Chemul'ga	4	4	100%
Total Sunzhenski district	220	176	80%	
Total	494	390	79%	

Households planning to return to Chechnya were asked when they plan to return. Out of them, from 40 % to 60 % have not yet decided when to return, because of various reasons. The vast majority of households in Karabulak intending to return (about 60 %) are planning to do it during one year. The same time frame was stated by 30 – 40 % of IDPs in other districts of Ingushetia (diagram 1).

The uncertainty in dates of return can be explained by the active recovery work in Chechnya. Also, there are many households that didn't decide yet whether to return or stay in Ingushetia.

There are different reasons of non-return of Chechen IDPs residing in Ingushetia. Generally, reasons were the same in all districts. The main reasons are:

- Lack of housing (sold, completely destroyed, didn't own housing);
- Partly destroyed housing;

- Education of children (at schools and university). Some surveyed households stated that they are waiting for the end of the school year to return.
- security. A large number of surveyed households stated "security" as one of the reasons for non-return. Given problem was considered as the main in 2000-2003 year, but now its priority shifted to 3-4 places. About 13 % of surveyed households mentioned availability of work in Ingushetia (permanent and temporary) as the reason of non return.

The majority of surveyed households plan to return to own households. About 10 % have to search for the new housing (buying of house, living with relatives).

IDPs intending to return encounter some problems. Those who had the opportunity to accommodate in Chechnya already have left Ingushetia. The rest IDPs are unable to return because of lack of housing. They will have to construct, reconstruct or purchase new housing. IDPs in Sunzhensky district mention lack of work places and unemployment more often than problems with housing. Security situation was stated as the only one problem by 6 households in Karabulak and 13 households in Malgobekskiy district. In most cases, security issue is mentioned along with other problems. IDPs from Nazranovskiy district mentioned security problems more often than IDPs from other districts."

Return to the Prigorodny district (North-Ossetia)

Return of some Ingush displaced remains problematic (2007)

- Some Ingush IDPs have managed to return to their homes in Prigorodny district while others have not
- Some of the houses of IDPs are occupied by refugees from Georgia while others are located in "water conservation zones," which are off limits from settlement
- IDPs from Prigorodny district living in Maisky were ultimately forcibly settled to the government-organised purpose built settlement, Novy after Prigorodny district court deemed Maisky part of an agricultural pasture zone

Memorial, 31 March 2006:

"On December 13 1993 the President of the Russia Federation adopted a Decree № 2131 "On the measures to return refugees and forced migrants to places of permanent residence on the territories of Republic North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic". The Decree stipulated IDP return to 4 settlements of Prigorodny District - Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoje, Kurtat.

The process of IDP return started in August 1994. By then 6,463 out of 9,045 registered Ossetian IDPs have returned to the places of their permanent residence. The return of the remaining 2,582 people was a matter of funds for reconstruction of destroyed housing, which were soon found and the problem resolved.

The process of return of Ingush IDPs was impeded by the Ossetian authorities and the Ossetian population of in the localities. The authorities of North Ossetia often ignored the agreements they signed, while former Ossetian neighbors met Ingush returnees with demonstrations of protest, showered IDP convoys with stones and heavy objects. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Ingushetia has registered numerous cases, when as a result of assaults on IDP convoys, Ingush returnees were either injured or killed⁷. The report by the advisor to the President of the Republic of Ingushetia M. Buzurtanov addressed to then incumbent President of

Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev, states that in the period of March 1998 to December 1999, the return of Ingush IDPs was disrupted 94 times. None of the participants in these assaults on IDPs were punished according to law.

In spite of difficulties Ingush IDPs returned home. Presently, Ingush return to 13 villages of Prigorodny district. Before the Ingushis lived in 29 settlements of Prigorodny district, however, after 1992 Ingush families expressed an intention to come back only to 16 villages. IDPs refuse to return to villages, where Ingush population is not numerous or settled in a dispersed manner [...]

Monitoring regularly carried out by HRC "Memorial" in Prigorodny District revealed that in 2002-2004 the situation had significantly changed for the better. The most favorable psychological climate is in the villages, where the return has happened, particularly, where the Ingush and the Ossetian settlements are not fragmented into ethnic enclaves, with each quarter having mixed Ingush-Ossetian population (eg. Dongaron, Kurtat). Interviews with the locals revealed that most easily the contact is established by middle aged generation of 40-50, who have previously had the experience of mutual communication, most infrequent contacts are among youth. Teenagers and youth, whose socialization was shaped by the conflict and post-conflict experience, avoid interaction [...]

In spite of the general reduction in tension in the area as a whole, there remains a number of settlements where the return is not going on. These are the so-called "problematic" settlements, where, according to the authorities of RNO-A, the "moral-psychological climate" for the return of Ingushis is not "ripe". Problematic villages of Prigorodny district are: Terk, Chernorechenskoje, Oktyabr'skoye, Ir, (partly) Yuzhny, (partly) Chermen, the middle part of the village, (partly Tarskoje), right side of the village, (partly) Kambileevskaia, three streets.

In Vladikavkaz, the return occurs very slowly, in spite of the fact that a number of families managed to restore voluntarily the right to ownership of their flats. Thus, according to the Office of the Special Representative, by the end of 2003, 113 flats in Vladikavkaz were returned to their previous owners of Ingush nationality voluntarily or in an administrative way (through courts). Some families restored their right of property ownership in Oktyabrskoje town, however, according to the information at our disposal, they do not reside in their apartments, but rent them out to tenants. According to the Ministry for Nationalities of Republic of Ingushetia/

Problematic villages also include the settlements, which fall into the so-called "water-protection area". According to the According to Statute №186 Government of RNC-A of July 25, 1996, 5 villages (Terk, Chernorechenskoje, Yuzhny, Balta and Redant) belong to the so called "zone of sanitary protection of sources of drinking water supply". Households in this area are to be destroyed and their residents - resettled⁹. 80% of the housing aimed for destruction belong to Ingushis. Presently all the Ingush residents of the area remain forced migrants. The Ingush side considers that the zone of sanitary protection of Ordzonokidzovsky water reservoir is significantly inflated with the aim to prevent the repatriation of Ingush IDPs, the Ossetian side insists that the problem is purely environmental and has no political dimension to it. Human Rights groups have repeatedly turned to the federal authorities with appeal to pass a politically neutral decision on delineating the borders of the water protection zone, but so far the federal center considered it impossible to interfere."

Мемориал, июня 2007 г.:

"Нестабильность в Ингушетии серьезно осложняется так и не преодоленными до конца последствиями конфликта 1992 года в Пригородном районе Северной Осетии. Проблема Пригородного района сейчас сконцентрирована вокруг пос. Майский. Власти Республики Северная Осетия-Алания (PCO-A) стремятся скорее переселить оставшиеся в нем ингушские семьи в специально созданный для ингушей пос. Новый, находящийся по соседству. Пока на месте будущего поселка в поле стоят вагончики и временки. Но

республиканским властям важно показать федеральному центру, что те ингушские вынужденные переселенцы, которым до сих пор не давали возможности вернуться к местам своего прежнего жительства, теперь готовы строить дома на новом месте.

В конце весны в Майском продолжали оставаться от 15 до 23 ингушских семей (около 100 человек), опасаящихся с переездом потерять статус вынужденного переселенца, что не позволит им претендовать в дальнейшем на господдержку в приобретении нового жилья (www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2007/04/m78467.htm). В случае с пос. Майский представители властей Северной Осетии ведут себя достаточно корректно. Однако проблема возвращения части ингушей в ряд населенных пунктов Пригородного района и Владикавказ не решается. Чтобы привлечь внимание федеральных властей на свои проблемы 30 мая голодовку у здания Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания РФ объявили ингушские беженцы, прибывшие в Москву еще 14 мая. Однако голодовка была приостановлена уже на следующий день после того, как беженцев принял вице-спикер верхней палаты Александр Торшин и сенатор от Ингушетии Василий Лихачев. А. Торшин пообещал, что проблема Пригородного района будет рассмотрена в СФ не позднее 14 июня 2007 г. («Ингушетия.Ru», 31.5.2007)."

Кавказский Узел, 18 апреля 2006 г.:

"Граждане ингушской национальности возвращаются в населенные пункты Пригородного района Северной Осетии. Из стихийного городка беженцев, что на окраине поселка Майского люди добровольно переселяются в села Куртат, Дачное, Камбилеевское и в поселок Новый, сообщает корреспондент ИА REGNUM.

Безопасность переселенцев обеспечивают сотрудники Пригородного райотдела милиции и другие силовые структуры Северной Осетии. Обстановка в зоне осетино-ингушского конфликта не вызывает беспокойства во властных структурах Северной Осетии. "В поселке Новом мы чувствуем себя в безопасности. Дежурят здесь милиционеры круглосуточно, которые надежно обеспечивают общественный порядок. Нас больше тревожат экономические трудности, все жители поселка относятся к малоимущим, но поддержки со стороны властей нет. К нам приезжают на дорогах автомашинах разные чиновники, обещают оказать помощь продовольствием, однако нас обманывают. Новый глава администрации Пригородного района Георгий Джюев и его многочисленные заместители отказываются решать проблемы вынужденных переселенцев. У нас нет газа, вода по трубам идет ржавая. Приезжал к нам и полпред Президента России Дмитрий Козак, но позитивных перемен в поселке нет", - сказал отец шестерых детей Идрис Мальсагов.

"Похоже, мы снова оказались заложниками в руках политиков. В глаза нам говорят одно, а делают все наоборот. Наша семья сюда переселилась с надеждой на лучшую жизнь, но, как видно, ошиблись. Дали вагончик и 10 соток земли. Раньше проживали в с.Октябрьское, имели собственный дом. Пусть власти возместят нам убытки, нанесенные в результате трагических событий осени 1992 года. Мы прекрасно понимаем, что сразу невозможно решить все наши проблемы, но что-то надо делать для того, чтобы улучшить нашу жизнь. Нам нужны рабочие места. Сегодняшние трудности используют отдельные политики в своих собственных интересах. Находятся "сердобольные" люди и в Ингушетии, которые нас обвиняют в соглашательстве с властями Северной Осетии. Из-за таких горе-политиков мы и стали беженцами", - заявила бывшая учительница Лариса Цолоева.

Тем не менее, как сообщал ранее корреспондент "Кавказского узла", осетинские власти утверждают, что эти неудобства носят временный характер. По их словам поселок уже нанесен на карту Северной Осетии, в нем действует прописка. В поселке отведена земля под 400 земельных участков. В него уже проведены свет и вода. Вопрос о газоснабжении

решается. Для обеспечения правопорядка и безопасности в поселке установлен пост мобильного отряда МВД России."

Время, 11 апреля 2006 г., Таймураз Касаев:

"...есть три вектора, по которым мы [государство] работаем с вынужденными переселенцами. Первый -- лица, у которых нет никаких препятствий к возвращению. Они готовят документы, представляют их в правительство Северной Осетии, мы их отработываем. Если нет проблем с обустройством, пожалуйста, заселяйтесь. Вторая группа -- это лица, у которых нет правовой основы к возвращению. Вот пример: есть некто Сухов, который хочет вернуться в домовладение, официально оформленное за Касаевым. Этот Сухов должен обратиться в судебные органы и доказать свои права, и после этого мы готовы с ним вести разговор. И третья группа людей -- те, у кого есть препятствия к возвращению. Например, он участвовал в конфликте 1992 года, и на него возбуждены уголовные дела, и его визит, или визит его семьи, может так или иначе обострить общественно-политическую ситуацию, по крайней мере пока. Хотя мы проводим работу по созданию морально-психологических условий.

--Есть еще так называемая водоохранная зона к югу от Владикавказа, куда возвращение невозможно...

-- Да, села Терк и Чернореченское входят в число 1251, имеющих право на возвращение. Они не отказываются, но не пишут заявлений. Решение по водоохранной зоне принято, оттуда отселены все -- осетины, русские, армяне. Кто хочет, пусть обжалует его в суде, но в этом деле поставлена точка.

-- Кем принято решение?

-- Администрацией Владикавказа, правительством Северной Осетии. Проведены неоднократные экспертизы, которые подтвердили законность и правомочность принятого решения. Хотя, если бы проблема «водоохранки» скинулась, остальные вопросы были бы решены в очень короткий срок..."

Время, 11 апреля 2006г., Магомед Мархиев:

-- В Пригородном районе есть как раз такая ситуация изъятия земли в связи с созданием водоохранной зоны.

-- Я скажу одно: люди -- сами вынужденные переселенцы из Терка и Чернореченского -- категорически настаивают на том, чтобы их вернули туда, где они жили.

-- Чем обусловлена эта настойчивость? Ведь, насколько известно, мэрия Владикавказа предлагала им участки там же, к югу от города, только на левом берегу Терека. Они не согласились.

-- Они заявляют, что водоохранная зона установлена не в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации. Кроме того, если есть зона санитарной охраны питьевого водоснабжения, то эта зона состоит из трех поясов. В первом поясе жить категорически запрещено. Во втором можно жить с ограничениями, в третьем -- то же самое. Территория населенных пунктов, в которых проживало до 95% ингушей, полностью включена в первый пояс. Люди говорят, что не согласны с этим. Если этот пояс привязан к каким-то определенным точкам на местности, они готовы отойти за эту линию и поселиться рядом. Но они не хотят ни в Новый, ни в Майское...

- А какова ситуация с «закрытыми» селами, о которых г-н Козак сказал, что их не должно быть?

-- Дмитрий Николаевич дал поручение, чтобы я передал списки людей, которые изъявляют желание вернуться в населенный пункт Ир. 113 заявлений мной переданы и в правительство Северной Осетии, и в межрегиональное управление ФМС. Я проинформировал и Южный федеральный округ о том, что заявления переданы. Есть поручение завести людей в ближайшее время. По Камбилеевке принято решение по восьми семьям из городка беженцев в Майском. Люди обрадованы. Но в Октябрьское и Южный пока не заехала ни одна семья. Хотя мы надеемся, что все-таки будет решение проблемы. Так больше продолжаться не может."

Кавказский Узел, 30 марта 2006 г.:

"В ближайшее время в поселок Ир Пригородного района Северной Осетии планируется вернуть более 20 семей ингушских беженцев..."

Напомним, что поселок Ир входит в число так называемых "закрытых" для ингушей населенных пунктов Пригородного района Северной Осетии, где, по мнению осетинской стороны, "не созрел морально-психологический климат". До начала вооруженного конфликта 1992 года здесь проживало более 200 ингушских семей, на данный момент ни одному жителю села не удалось вернуться домой.

Главный федеральный инспектор по Ингушетии сообщил собравшимся, что с администрацией данного населенного пункта есть предварительная договоренность о возвращении в селение более чем 20 семей беженцев. При этом, по некоторым данным, списки возможных "возвращенцев" будут согласовываться с осетинской стороной, что вызывает некоторые опасения у вынужденных переселенцев."

Caucasian Knot, 18 June 2006:

"We remind you that a small town of refugees in the suburb of "Maiskiy" settlement was formed after tragic events of autumn 1992, when tens of thousands of Ingushes were forced to leave the territory of the Prigorodny District of North Ossetia.

It was mainly inhabited by the residents of the so-called "closed" or "problematic" settlements, return to which was impossible in the opinion of the Ossetian party, and also the citizens who earlier occupied the municipal housing. In total, the refugees' camp sheltered over 220 families of forced migrants.

During 13 years of its existence, the settlement that arose as a spontaneous camp did not manage to acquire the official status of a temporary accommodation centre and was not entered into the balance of any state structure. Formally, the camp was located in the territory of the RNO-A, however, actually it was organized and supported by the authorities of the Republic of Ingushetia.

Attempts to compel refugees to leave the settlement were undertaken by North-Ossetian authorities periodically, and strengthened last spring, when the "Novy" settlement was founded for the refugees in the border with Ingushetia.

The relocation of the refugees into the new settlement was carried out according to the plan developed by the Office of Russian President in the South Federal District (SFD), according to which the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict should have been liquidated this year.

However, not all the refugees agreed with this solution of their problems. Part of them refused to move, insisting on return to the places of their former residence in the Prigorodny District. They sent their demands practically to all the bodies of local and federal power, repeatedly went out to public protest actions, held hunger strikes, however, with no results.

In the beginning of this year the Prigorodny District Court made a decision on demolition of the spontaneous settlement and clearing the occupied land for arable usage; the decision made the basis for a complete liquidation of the small camp of the forced migrants.

It is necessary to note also that now a group of forced migrants from "Maiskiy" is in Moscow. The representatives of the refugees are holding meetings with the Russian power structures, insisting that a chance should be given to them to return to those villages of the Prigorodny District, where they had lived before the conflict of 1992.

Yesterday, the group of migrants picketed the building of the Council of Federation in Moscow, where the issue on the situation in the Prigorodny District should have been considered.

According to certain sources, Bashir Kodzoev, deputies of the State Duma from Ingushetia came out to the picketers and told them that in June a commission of the Council of Federation would be set up and arrive to the Prigorodny District for studying the situation and drawing recommendations on solving the refugees' problems...

The "Caucasian Knot" has already informed that today the last five families, who had refused to leave their camp and insisted on return to the places of their permanent residence in the territory of North Ossetia, were forced out of the "Maiskiy" settlement.

The dwelling trailers where they lived have been transported to the "Novy" (New) settlement, where over 250 families of forced migrants from different settlements of the Prigorodny District are already deployed.

The power action of their resettlement was conducted by about 150 employees of law enforcement bodies of North Ossetia, court marshals, representatives of the administration of the District, Department of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (RNO-A), Ministry for Emergencies and other agencies."

Prague Watchdog, 19 June 2007:

"Aslambek Apayev, head of the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Displaced Persons, has written a letter to international organizations asking them to assist in addressing the problem of these settlers, as there remains no other way to draw the authorities' attention to the refugees' plight.

"The Ossetian-Ingushetian conflict, in which tens of thousands of people suddenly lost their homes and hundreds were brutally murdered and went missing, took place in 1992. However, neither the federal nor the local authorities are taking any real steps to bring about the return of people to their places of residence in North Ossetia's Prigorodny district, to compensate them and solve other social issues," says Apayev.

"For all these years, people have really been living in conditions that are inhuman. They cannot obtain identity documents, and are denied residence permits. The children of displaced persons are deprived of the opportunity to study, enrol in universities and so forth. The local authorities and the leadership of the Southern Federal District have more or less washed their hands of these problems. Instead of helping people they now move them from one temporary refugee camp to another, by violent means. That way, of course, the problem is not resolved. It's merely driven inwards. But sooner or later some solution will have to be found," the human rights defender says.

"Dozens of people appeal to us daily for help. People want only one thing – to return to their homes, to live where they lived before the tragic events. Yet despite the fact that Moscow has

adopted several decrees and resolutions for the need for the return of displaced persons to their homes, the local authorities do everything they can to stall this process. Moreover, there is the absurd idea that Ossetians and Ingushes can't live together. That's a lie, because ordinary citizens can do nothing. It's being done by all sorts of officials and politicians who are making money and reputation out of the wretchedness and suffering of other people," he says."

Council of Europe, 2 May 2007:

"The process of assisting the return of Ingush displaced from their homes in Prigorodny district, and compensating them for loss of property, following the 1992 conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania, has been underway for several years now. The Advisory Committee [on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities] is encouraged by the information it has received concerning the successful integration of returning Ingush in certain mixed Ingush-Ossetian villages.

...The Advisory Committee is disturbed by reports it has received concerning the extremely poor living conditions of internally displaced persons who remain inside Ingushetia and in "Majskii" camp, inside the border of North Ossetia-Alania.

...The Advisory Committee notes that the remaining problems affecting the return of displaced Ingush, which include a lack of a consensus on the number of Ingush who have the right to state assistance in resettlement, are aggravated by the failure to find a political solution to the territorial dispute. The uncertainty which consequently hangs over the fate of Prigorodny district fuels speculation thus adding tension to the process of return."

RFE/RL, 9 September 2004:

"Initial reports on 1 and 2 September [2004] that the militants who seized over 1,000 hostages in the North Ossetian town of Beslan included Chechens and Ingush immediately sparked concern that the incident could trigger major clashes between the Ossetians and Ingush. While reports of Ossetian reprisals against Ingush in North Ossetia have so far proven false, both ethnic groups fear that tensions could erupt into violence at any time

[...]

The Russian government, however, apparently failed to make good on Yeltsin's promise of increased aid. Two years later, in July 1999, [President of Ingushetia] Aushev threatened to suspend all talks with North Ossetia until earlier agreements on measures to defuse tensions were implemented. In April 2001, between 5,000-10,000 Ingush staged a rally in the Ingush capital, Nazran, to demand that President Vladimir Putin take steps to facilitate their return home, including declaring presidential rule in both Vladikavkaz and Prigorodnyi Raion.

[...]

Aushev, however, alienated Putin by his support for Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov after Russia launched a new war against Chechnya in the fall of 1999, and in December 2001 he announced his resignation (see 'RFE/RL Caucasus Report,' 3 January 2002). Aushev's successor, former Federal Security Service (FSB) General Murat Zyazikov, has been less vocal in lobbying the interests of the Ingush displaced persons. True, in October 2002 Zyazikov and North Ossetian President Aleksandr Dzasokhov signed a major 'Agreement on the Development of Cooperation and Good-Neighborly Relations' intended to 'mark the beginning of a new stage' in bilateral relations. That document obliged both sides to take the necessary measures to eliminate the consequences of the 1992 clashes, including expediting the repatriation of Ingush fugitives; preventing the creation of illegal armed or separatist groups; and establishing mechanisms for consultations to prevent the emergence and escalation of new tensions, according to ingushetia.ru. It also stressed the commitment of both republics to peace throughout the North Caucasus and to preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

[...]

One major obstacle appears to be that the Ingush insist on returning to their old homes, many of which have since been taken over by Ossetian refugees from Georgia, while the North Ossetian

authorities are eager to persuade them to move to new housing in other districts of the republic. Nor is it clear precisely how much new housing has been made available, and whether federal funds earmarked for that purpose are being embezzled in North Ossetia as they are in Chechnya."

Government of the Russian Federation, 13 October 2006:

"79. Указом № 1285 Президента Российской Федерации от 6 октября 2004 года "О мерах по совершенствованию деятельности государственных органов по развитию отношений между Республикой Северная Осетия-Алания и Республикой Ингушетия" на ФМС России возложены новые задачи, связанные с вопросами урегулирования последствий осетино-ингушского конфликта. В целях выполнения поставленных задач, в том числе по организации мероприятий по жилищному обустройству вынужденных переселенцев, лишившихся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта в октябре-ноябре 1992 года, создано Межрегиональное управление ФМС России (с местом дислокации в городе Владикавказе). В результате осетино-ингушского конфликта территорию Республики Северная Осетия-Алания покинуло свыше 40 000 человек. На сегодняшний день нуждаются в жилищном обустройстве 8 327 человек, состоящих на учете в Межрегиональном управлении ФМС России. ФМС России подготовлено и 30 декабря 2005 года правительством Российской Федерации принято постановление № 846 "О внесении изменений и дополнений в постановление № 274 правительства Российской Федерации от 6 марта 1998 года" (постановление № 274 правительства Российской Федерации от 6 марта 1998 года "Об оказании государственной поддержки гражданам Российской Федерации, лишившимся жилья в результате осетино-ингушского конфликта в октябре-ноябре 1992 года")."

Для более подробной информация "В Ингушетии недовольны планом по размещению вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района," Кавказский Узел, 25 февраля 2006 г.

Figures for return to Prigorodny district (2007)

- Since 1994, over 24,000 people, or 4,616 families, have returned to Prigorodny district
- In May 2007, Federal Migration Services reported that 104 people returned to Prigorodny district; 46 went back to their original homes

УВКБ, 31 мая 2007 г.:

"Межрегиональный департамент Федеральной миграционной службы сообщил о возвращении 104 человек (24 семей) в Пригородный район Северной Осетии-Алании. Из них 46 человек (13 семей) возвратились на места прежнего проживания, в то время как 58 человек (11 семей) переехали на новые места. Таким образом, всего с 1994 года в Пригородный район возвратились 24 399 человек (4 616 семей)."

Reconciliation needed in return areas in North Ossetia (2006)

- Climate of mistrust prevails between Ingush and Ossetians and this could spark conflict
- Of 8000 IDPs from Prigorodny district, 4000 have no legal ownership of their former homes

IWPR, 9 August 2006:

"The most neglected conflict in the Caucasus is showing worrying signs of heating up, after a string of violent attacks last month and angry protests by refugees.

North Ossetian leader Taimuraz Mamsurov has accused officials from neighbouring Ingushetia of deliberately stirring up the dispute between the two autonomous republics over the disputed Prigorodny district, which erupted in violence in 1992.

The North Ossetian leadership has decided to allocate 210 land plots for forcibly displaced people in Prigorodny district," North Ossetian nationalities minister Taimuraz Kasayev told IWPR. "In a short period, we have managed to resolve major organisational, financial, material, and technical problems, which will allow us to accommodate citizens of Ingush nationality."

However, a strong atmosphere of distrust is preventing a smooth return of the refugees and the violence has continued. A senior Ingush police official, Amirkhan Akhsoyev, died after being attacked in Maisky on August 2.

"There are forces that are doing all they can to set the Ingush and Ossetians against each other," warned Myrat-Haji Tavkazakhov, leader of the Muslim community in North Ossetia. "This should not be allowed. All disputed issues should be resolved peacefully."

Mikheil, a resident of the village of Tarskoye in the Prigorodny district, agrees, blaming politicians for stirring up the dispute. "We go to mosques and ask God to protect people from trouble. It is time to bury the axe of war deep in the ground. No one hinders us from doing this. The Ingush and Ossetians want to live without conflicts," he said.

Alan, an Ossetian resident of Ir, said he was worried. "The federal authorities are speeding up the return of the Ingush to our villages but, for some reason, no one has asked us whether we want this or not. Isn't it us who have to live with them? The officials create the problems and the people have to pay for them," he said."

Время, 11 апреля 2006г.:

"-- Реально ли выполнить поручение президента России об окончательном урегулировании конфликта до конца 2006 года?

-- Первая задача -- навести порядок в наших отношениях с ингушской стороной. У нас полное взаимопонимание с руководством ФМС, хотя какие-то цифры нас и коробят. Но мы понимаем, что они решают задачу в абсолютно правовом поле. Другое дело, что нельзя решать проблему обустройства, когда, с одной стороны, говорится, что две республики должны жить в мире и дружбе, а на сопредельной территории во всяких средствах массовой коммуникации нас буквально долбят. И даже судебные решения выносят об отторжении территории Пригородного района от Северной Осетии. Как можно работать в таких условиях? Если мы хотим решать задачу и хотим добрососедских отношений, надо всем работать вместе. Есть очень большие вопросы, требующие правового решения. По нашим данным, из 8000 вынужденных переселенцев у 4000 нет правовых оснований претендовать на жилищное обустройство."

Resettlement

Pressure on IDPs to leave Maisky (2007)

- IDPs forcibly resettled from Maisky to Novy, North Ossetia

- Maisky village closed for settlement since Prigorodny district court ordered that it is part of an agricultural pasture zone
- Prior to resettlement, IDPs were subject to pressure to move including electricity shortages

Council of Nongovernmental Organizations, 14 June 2007:

"Утром 13 июня сотрудники правоохранительных органов РСО-Алания блокировали лагерь вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, расположенный в пос. Майский.

Затем к месту, где располагались вагончики с вынужденными переселенцами были подогнаны подъемные краны и грузовые автомашины «КАМАЗ». Невзирая на протесты людей, вагончики стали грузить на автомашины. При этом две семьи, в знак протеста против насильственных действий представителей властей, закрылись в своих вагончиках. Однако это не остановило участников «спецоперации» по ликвидации городка беженцев. Вагончики были погружены на «КАМАЗы» вместе с находившимися там людьми.

По информации, полученной от сотрудников Комитета по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев, в ходе данной акции был жестоко избит и задержан вынужденный переселенец Иса Ахриев. Пострадали также и две обитательницы ликвидируемого лагеря – Фатима Джоутханова и Фатима Куштова."

Кавказский Узел, 14 июня 2007 г.:

"Городок беженцев на окраине поселка Майский, в котором проживали вынужденные переселенцы из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, прекратил свое существование.

Накануне из МКП в принудительном порядке вывезены последние пять семей, которые отказывались покинуть городок, настаивая на возвращении в места прежнего постоянного проживания на территории Северной Осетии.

Жилые вагончики, в которых они проживали, перевезены в поселок Новый, где уже размещены более 250 семей вынужденных переселенцев из различных населенных пунктов Пригородного района.

Как уже сообщал «Кавказский узел», в силовой акции по их выселению участвовали около 150 сотрудников правоохранительных органов Северной Осетии, судебные приставы, представители администрации района, УФМС по РСО-Алания, МЧС и других служб.

Расформирование МКП произведено по решению суда Пригородного района РСО-Алания, предписывающего освобождение «незаконно занятых беженцами пахотных земель».

По словам вынужденных переселенцев, ликвидация городка «Майский» сопровождалась грубым нарушением прав его обитателей. «Мы пытались воспрепятствовать этому, но наши усилия ни к чему не привели. Милиционеры были настроены решительно. Людей вышвыривали на улицу, а вагончики погружали в КАМАЗы и вывозили в п. Новый», - рассказывают вынужденные переселенцы...

Попытки вынудить беженцев покинуть поселение предпринимались североосетинскими властями периодически и усилились после того, как весной прошлого года на границе с Ингушетией для них был создан поселок Новый.

Переселение беженцев в новый поселок проводилось в соответствии с подготовленным полпредством президента РФ в ЮФО планом, по которому уже в этом году процессе ликвидации последствий осетино-ингушского конфликта должен был завершиться.

Однако не все беженцы согласились с таким решением вопроса. Часть людей отказалась переселяться, настаивая на возвращении в места прежнего проживания в Пригородном районе. С этими требованиями они обращались практически во все органы местной и федеральной власти, не раз выходили на публичные акции протеста, устраивали голодовки, однако так ничего и не добились.

В начале текущего года Пригодный районный суд вынес постановление о сносе стихийного поселения и освобождении занимаемых земель под пашню, которое и послужило основанием для полной ликвидации городка вынужденных переселенцев."

Кавказский Узел, 16 марта 2007 г.:

"Из стихийного городка Майский в Северной Осетии, где 13 лет проживали пострадавшие в ходе осетино-ингушского конфликта, будут выселены согласно вступившему в силу решению суда последние семьи, которые принципиально отказываются покидать поселение...

"Речь идет о решении суда о переносе временного жилья, которое было незаконного установлено на землях сельхозназначения. Вагончики переселенцев будут перенесены из Майского в близлежащий п. Новый, где в отличие от стихийного городка есть газ, свет и вода, проведены дороги и коммуникации".

Кавказский Узел, 27 апреля 2006 г.:

"В поселке Майский около 70 семей беженцев-ингушей остались без света. Таким образом власти Северной Осетии пытаются заставить людей переехать на постоянное место жительства в другой поселок Новый. Об этом в эфире "Эха Москвы" рассказал сотрудник Правозащитного центра Мемориал Тамерлан Акиев.

Акиев отметил, что вся эта история с переселением беженцев началась еще в начале года, когда в феврале в Ростове было подписано соглашение между двумя субъектами РФ - Ингушетией и Северной Осетией - о возвращении беженцев ингушской национальности к местам своего прежнего проживания в Северной Осетии до конца года. Предусмотрено, что люди будут переезжать и в новые поселки, если вернуться домой не будет возможности. В марте этот план переселения начал реализовываться именно с поселка Майский. Часть беженцев переехала в поселок Новый, 70 семей согласны вернуться только в свои дома.

В поселке Майский на границе Северной Осетии и Ингушетии 13 лет в ожидании возвращения на родину в Пригородный район проживали 1235 беженцев ингушской национальности. Как пишет "Ингформ бюро", в течение последних двух месяцев представители миграционной службы Северной Осетии занимались планомерным уничтожением поселка. Железные вагончики, из которых и состояли "улицы" этого стихийного городка, цепляли краном, и увозили на пахотные земли в поселок Новый. Тем, кто отказался переезжать и настаивал на возвращении к местам своего прежнего проживания, власти Северной Осетии угрожали отключить свет и газ.

Как рассказали жители разгромленного городка, люди, отключившие свет, приехали на специализированной машине, без предварительного предупреждения. Отключив свет, они уехали в сторону Северной Осетии, так и не объяснив причину своих действий. Беженцы считают, что эти действия напрямую связаны с их отказом переезжать в поселок Новый. Отметим, что в ближайшее время ночная температура воздуха в регионе не поднимется выше 3 градусов тепла. По словам беженцев, в ближайшее время осетинские власти грозят отключить и газ, который сейчас хотя бы немного согревает обитателей железных коробок."

Для более подробной информации "Насильственное выселение вынужденных переселенцев из п. Майский пригородного района," Комитет по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев, 13 июня 2007 г.

IDPs in Maisky protest government resettlement to Novy (2007)

- 5 IDPs from Prigorodny district launch hunger strike in Nazran in 2006, demanding return to their original place of residence and compensation for lost housing and property
- Their demands still not met, IDPs from Prigorodny district launch another hunger strike in Moscow in May 2007

Комитет по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев, 23 июня 2007 г.:

"В п. Майский Пригородного района продолжается акция протеста против насильственного выселения вынужденных переселенцев в п. Новый. Люди не уходят, не смотря на то, что их вагончики уже вывезли. Строят шалаши, жгут костры..."

Вынужденными переселенцами было написано Заявление на имя Эксперта Московской Хельсинкской группы по Северному Кавказу Асламбеку Апаеву, после чего, последний было написано Обращение от их имени к Мировому сообществу, в том числе: Генеральному секретарю ООН г-ну Пан Ги Муну, Верховному Комиссару Совета Европы по правам человека г-ну Томасу Хамембергу, Верховному Комиссару ООН по правам человека г-же Луизе Арбур, Президенту Международной Хельсинкской Федерации г-ну Ульриху Фишеру, Председателю Московской Хельсинкской группы по правам человека Людмиле Алексеевой."

Информационный центр СНО, 19 июня 2007 г.:

"Днем 16 июня у здания представительства главного федерального инспектора по Ингушетии Владимира Трубицина в г. Назрань началась акция протеста вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района РСО-Алания. Участники акции разбили на территории представительства две палатки и объявили голодовку. Первоначально в акции принимали участие пять человек.

Участники голодовки требуют от властей вернуть их в места постоянного проживания на территории Северной Осетии и выплатить вынужденным переселенцам компенсации за утраченное жилье и имущество. Несколько дней ранее представители осетинских силовых структур в принудительном порядке переселили несколько семей, оставшихся в лагере вынужденных переселенцев в пос. Майский во вновь создаваемый пос. Новый в Пригородном районе РСО-Алания.

По некоторым данным,, 17 июня вынужденные переселенцы прекратили голодовку, после того, как представители местных органов власти обещали во всем разобраться и оказать им помощь. Согласно другой информации, позже акция голодовки была возобновлена."

Кавказский Узел, 18 июня 2007 г.:

"Акция протеста вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, начавшаяся 16 июня у здания представительства Главного федерального инспектора по Республике Ингушетия, продолжается до сих пор.

Участниками пикета стали выходцы из так называемых "проблемных" населенных пунктов Пригородного района Северной Осетии, а также сел, включенных в "водоохранную зону" и потому закрытых для возвращения ингушей. Всего более 30 человек.

Они призывают власти помочь им вернуться домой и выплатить компенсации за утраченное жилье и имущество. Пятеро участников акции разбили на территории представительства палатки и объявили бессрчную голодовку...

Один из участников акции Мовсар Батаев рассказал корреспонденту "Кавказского узла": "Мы требуем от властей выполнения законодательных актов и постановлений, касающихся вынужденных переселенцев из Пригородного района.

А именно: выплаты компенсаций за утраченное в ходе осетино-ингушского конфликта жилье и имущество и возвращения в те населенные пункты, откуда нам пришлось бежать в 1992 году..."

По словам Батаева, сегодня к протестующим вышел и.о. руководителя межрегионального Управления ФМС РФ Владимир Нифонтов. Убедить людей разойтись ему не удалось.

Ожидается также, что для встречи с беженцами в Назрань прибудет заместитель полномочного представителя Президента РФ в ЮФО Вагапов...

Напомним, что это уже не первая акция протеста переселенцев. 30 мая они начали голодовку перед Советом федерации в Москве. После того, как сенаторы пообещали им рассмотреть этот вопрос на одном из своих заседаний, беженцы прекратили акцию.

Тем не менее, в Совете Федерации считают, что голодовка ничего не даст. "Ни голодовка, ни другие агрессивные формы протеста не смогут разрешить проблему беженцев из Северной Осетии", - заявил член комитета Совета Федерации по международным делам Василий Лихачев.

"Это проблема не политического свойства, а практического, - отметил он. - Ее надо сидеть и решать с ручкой и блокнотом".

По словам сенатора, "работа по урегулированию проблемы осетинских беженцев, проживающих в Ингушетии, ведется", но главная трудность в том, что "несколько тысяч семей требует возвращения в родные дома, часть из которых разрушена, часть занята выходцами из Южной Осетии".

Избитые судебными приставами при переселении ингушские беженцы подают жалобу в Общественную палату и на имя российского омбудсмена Владимира Лукина.

Newsru.com, 15 июня 2007г.:

"Беженцы требуют восстановить их в правах и решить вопрос возвращения в места своего проживания. "Мы намерены обратиться в Общественную палату, к уполномоченному по правам человека в РФ с просьбой разобраться и принять меры, направленные на решение вопросов ликвидации последствий так называемого осетино-ингушского конфликта", - приводит ИТАР-ТАСС заявление переселенцев. При этом беженцы подчеркивают, что "не намерены переселяться в насильно навязываемое им место проживания - поселок Новый".

IWPR, 9 August 2006:

"Last month, a group of Ingush refugees in the settlement of Maisky on the border between the two republics began a hunger strike that lasted 24 days, demanding they be allowed to return to their former homes.

"My friends and I had to resort to extreme measures and declared a hunger strike," said Ruslan Kushtov. "Our rights have been violated since 1992. Ossetian refugees from Georgia live in the house that I personally own in Yuzhny on the edge of Vladikavkaz and my family has to shift about in railway carriages. Why do we have to put up with this?"

"We have been offered money to give up our homes but we are not selling our homeland," said Idris, who comes from the outskirts of Vladikavkaz, but now lives in the Ingush village of Karabulak...

The hunger strike was called off after the North Ossetian authorities promised they would register the refugees in their former addresses. But there is a big gap between formal registration and actually receiving a home to live in."

Комитет по защите прав вынужденных переселенцев, 17 июня 2007 г.:

"Сегодня, 17 июня 2007 г. в г. Назрань бессрочная голодовка, начатая вчера, была прекращена по просьбе властей. Представители руководства республики пообещали разобраться в проблеме."

Кавказский Узел, 31 июля 2006г.:

"Вынужденные переселенцы, проживающие в городке беженцев "Майский" в Северной Осетии, решили приостановить акцию протеста. 30 июля они объявили о том, что сворачивают продолжавшуюся уже четвертую неделю голодовку."

Такое решение участниками акции принято после того, как власти Северной Осетии выполнили часть их требований. А именно, началось решение вопроса выдачи паспортов с пропиской в местах прежнего постоянного проживания. Некоторым участникам акции паспорта уже выданы на руки. При этом представители Паспортно-визовой службы РСО-Алания, прибывшие на встречу с беженцами, заверили собравшихся, что в ближайшее время удостоверения личности получают также и остальные жители МКП "Майский".

Кроме того, по предложению осетинской стороны беженцы приступили к составлению списков жителей населенных пунктов Пригородного района, желающих вернуться на родину. Вынужденные переселенцы надеются также, что будет решена и проблема бывших жителей "водоохранной зоны". Напомним, что этот пункт входил в число требований голодающих."

Мемориал, 13 июля 2006 г.:

"30 июня 2006 года жители городка беженцев в пос. Майский Пригородного района Северной Осетии объявили о подготовке к акции голодовки. Данная акция проводится в знак протеста против затягивания процесса возвращения беженцев к местам их прежнего проживания на территории Северной Осетии."

3 июля 11 человек начали голодовку.

В начале марта 2006 года в соответствии с планом, принятым и подписанным руководителями РСО-Алания и Ингушетии 8 февраля 2006 года в Ростове-на-Дону, УФМС РФ преступило к расформированию лагеря беженцев в пос. Майский. Согласно этому плану намечен ряд мер, направленных на возвращение беженцев из Северной Осетии до конца 2006 года. Один из пунктов этого плана предусматривает создание новых поселений для ингушей на территории Северной Осетии. Большая часть семей беженцев из пос. Майский была перевезена в пос. Новый, созданный в открытом поле между населенными пунктами Майский и Чермен. Оставшиеся семьи в старом городке беженцев, отказались переезжать в новый поселок, настаивая на возвращении к местам своего прежнего проживания. В настоящее время в лагере проживает около 70 семей беженцев из

Пригородного района (изначально в этом лагере проживало 236 семей, 1235 человек из 15 населенных пунктов Осетии). 27 апреля в лагере беженцев в Майском был отключен свет. В середине мая электроснабжение было возобновлено, после того, как Министерство финансов Ингушетии изыскало не предусмотренные бюджетом средства и погасило задолженность беженцев по электричеству.

По состоянию на 10 июля голодовка в лагере продолжается. В акции принимает участие 10 человек (мужчины); остальные жители городка поддерживают требования голодающих. По словам врача, работающего в лагере беженцев, у некоторых из участников акции началась интоксикация и появилась аритмия. К участникам акции несколько раз приезжали представители властей Северной Осетии и пытались уговорить людей отказаться от крайних мер. Люди намерены продолжать голодовку до тех пор, пока их требования не будут удовлетворены."

Кавказский Узел, 26 мая 2007 г.:

"Вечером 25 мая в Москве безрезультатно закончилось совещание у заместителя руководителя Администрации Президента России Владислава Суркова с руководителем группы беженцев из Пригородного района Амиром Бекбузаровым. Об этом сообщает Ингушетия.ру.

Во встрече также принимали участие полпред Президента РФ в ЮФО Дмитрия Козака, его заместитель Виктор Анпилогов, президент Ингушетии Мурат Зязиков, президент Северной Осетии Таймураз Мамсуров, другие должностные лица.

Никаких конкретных решений на совещании принято не было...

Поняв, что на данном мероприятии он не сможет добиться результата, Бекбузаров трижды обращался к Владиславу Суркову с просьбой организовать ему и другим беженцам приём у Президента России Владимира Путина. Сурков сначала сослался на то, что сделать это проблематично, но после последней просьбы, пообещал, что постарается помочь организовать встречу.

Прибывшие в Москву депортированные из Пригородного района намерены продолжить акции протеста. В настоящее время они решают, какие акции и где проводить. Возможно, будет объявлена голодовка, проведены пикеты и другие протестные мероприятия.

Узнав об отрицательном результате встречи у Суркова, из Пригородного района в Москву намерены выехать для участия в акциях протеста еще несколько сот беженцев, которых осетинские власти не допускают в свои сёла."

For more information on the hunger strike in Moscow in May 2007, see ["Ингушские беженцы объявили голодовку у здания Совета Федерации в Москве," Кавказский Узел, 30 мая 2007 г.](#), and ["Ингуши продолжают акцию протеста в Москве," Кавказский Узел, 28 мая 2007 г.](#) and ["Совет Федерации рассмотрит проблему ингушских беженцев из Северной Осетии," Кавказский Узел, 12 июня 2007 г.](#)

For more information on the hunger strike in July 2006, see ["В Ингушетии продолжается голодовка беженцев в городке "Майский"," Кавказский Узел, 27 июля 2006г.](#) and ["Ингушских беженцев просят не портить отчетность", Радио Свобода, 20 июля 2006г.](#)

For more information on displaced persons in Maisky and the responses of some IDPS to resettlement, see also ["В поселке Майском, расположенном в зоне осетино-ингушского конфликта, продолжается голодовка 12 ингушских беженцев," Радио Свобода, 20 июля 2006г.](#)

Ingush IDPs still obstructed from returning; some forcibly resettled (2007)

- IDPs living in Maiskoye for over 13 years after the Ossetia-Ingush conflict
- IDPs ordered to leave Maiskoye and move to new settlement "Novy"
- Prigorodny district court decided that it was illegal for IDPs to live in Maiskoye
- Some IDPs insisted on returning to their original homes in Prigorodny district

Кавказский Узел, 14 июня 2006 г.:

"Власти должны были обеспечить ингушским беженцам из Северной Осетии возможность возвращения в свои родные сёла. Так прокомментировала корреспонденту "Кавказского узла" председатель Комитета "Гражданское содействие" Светлана Ганнушкина ликвидацию посёлка Майский Пригородного района Северной Осетии, где проживали ингуши, изгнанные из своих сёл во время осетино-ингушского вооружённого конфликта 1992 года.

"Давно уже пора создать нормальные человеческие условия жизни для этих людей. А их опять переселяют в какое-то жильё, непонятно - то ли временное, то ли постоянное. Правильнее было бы обеспечить им возможность вернуться в свои дома. Если не в "водоохранную зону", то, во всяком случае, открыть им три села: Ир, Южное и Октябрьское", - считает С. Ганнушкина, руководящая всероссийской программой "Миграция и право" Правозащитного центра "Мемориал" и являющаяся членом Совета по правам человека при Президенте РФ.

Напомним, что согласно постановлению Правительства РСО-Алания населенные пункты Терк, Чернореченское, Балта и Редант-II, в которых преимущественно проживали этнические ингуши, вошли в "зону санитарной охраны источников питьевого водоснабжения" и, якобы, во избежание загрязнения воды, было принято решение об отселении проживавших там людей. По мнению беженцев, данное решение является необоснованным и преследует цель не допустить возвращения ингушей в свои дома...

Как уже сообщал "Кавказский узел", городок беженцев на окраине поселка Майский, в котором проживали вынужденные переселенцы из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, прекратил свое существование.

Накануне из него в принудительном порядке вывезены последние пять семей, которые отказывались покидать городок, настаивая на возвращении в места прежнего постоянного проживания на территории Северной Осетии.

Жилые вагончики, в которых они проживали, перевезены в поселок Новый, где уже размещены более 250 семей вынужденных переселенцев из различных населенных пунктов Пригородного района.

В силовой акции по их выселению участвовали около 150 сотрудников правоохранительных органов Северной Осетии, судебные приставы, представители администрации района, УФМС по РСО-Алания, МЧС и других служб.

Расформирование лагеря беженцев произведено по решению суда Пригородного района РСО-Алания, предписывающего освобождение "незаконно занятых беженцами пахотных земель".

По словам вынужденных переселенцев, ликвидация городка Майский сопровождалась грубым нарушением прав его обитателей. "Мы пытались воспрепятствовать этому, но наши усилия ни к чему не привели."

IWPR, 30 March 2006:

"Ethnic Ingush people forced to flee their homes in North Ossetia more than a decade ago are protesting against plans by the Russian government to resettle them in what they call a "reservation", saying it has reneged on a commitment to let them go home.

The refugees, or more accurately IDPs (internally displaced persons), are backed by the authorities in Ingushetia, North Ossetia's neighbour. Some have lived in Ingushetia since they were displaced by the short but bloody conflict in 1992, but the group that will be most immediately affected is the community living in a makeshift shantytown near the village of Maysky, just inside North Ossetia.

Most of the Ingush IDPs say they want to return to their ancestral homes.

In theory, Moscow is committed to allowing the IDPs to go home. But it has to contend with considerable resistance to the idea from North Ossetia.

Many of the Ingush villages in North Ossetia still remain officially off-limits to the IDPs, but others are designated "open" and people have been able to return.

Ingushetia's government, meanwhile, alleges that the North Ossetian and Russian authorities are deliberately making conditions difficult in these villages so as to discourage IDPs from coming back. Some villages have no employment opportunities, medical services or educational facilities. Ingush authorities say at least ten returnees have been abducted and have disappeared without trace over the past few months.

The Kozak plan calls for the closure of temporary townships like the one at Maysky by April 1 this year. The IDPs would be moved to a settlement, called Novy (New), currently being built by the Russian and North Ossetian authorities, close to the existing camp at Maysky.

The new site is in Ossetia's Prigorodny district, but it is not what the IDPs have in mind when they dream of going home. And in order to be granted a plot of land in Novy, they must renounce all claim to their old home...

In Maysky, the mood is a mixture of unease, belligerence and weariness. Most of the IDPs here say they will refuse to leave, whatever the authorities tell them to do.

Ruslan Kushtov, 43, who fled his home near Vladikavkaz in 1992, lives with his wife, two sons and his 19-year-old disabled daughter in a disused railway carriage. He says three Ossetian families have been occupying his home in the village of Yuzhny since the Ingush conflict. Ironically, these families are themselves refugees from another conflict, between Georgia and the breakaway republic of South Ossetia.

Kushtov has been offered a plot of land in Novy, but he says he is not interested.

"I can only envision my life as being in Yuzhny. That is my home place," he said.

The authorities have threatened to disconnect electricity and gas supplies to Maysky on the April 1 deadline. But Kushtov says, "That's nothing. My ancestors lived without electricity and gas. There's a lot of firewood." "

Кавказский узел, 29 апреля 2007 г.:

"28 апреля в МКП "Майский", где проживают вынужденные переселенцы из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, вновь прибыли судебные приставы и напомнили беженцам об истечении срока, отведенного им на переезд из городка в поселок Новый. Об этом корреспонденту "Кавказского узла" сообщил сегодня один из жителей МКП. По его словам, каких-либо действий по насильственному выселению людей с территории Майского в этот день предпринято не было...

Житель МКП рассказал также, что 28 апреля текущего года в поселке Новый вновь сорвалась намеченная на этот день встреча вынужденных переселенцев с представителями Рабочей группы УФМС РФ по РСО-Алания.

"По предварительной договоренности с членами Рабочей группы, в субботу, 28 апреля, в поселке Новый должна была состояться встреча жителей "водоохранной зоны" с представителями УФМС РФ по Северной Осетии. Беженцы собирались обсудить с ними вопросы дальнейшего жилищного обустройства на территории Северной Осетии, проблему выдачи паспортов с прописками, а также высказать своё несогласие с существующими правилами подачи документов на оказание господдержки. У вагончика, где Рабочая группа проводит прием, собралось более 100 человек, однако представителей УФМС РФ на месте не оказалось", - сообщил он.

Напомним, что в Рабочую группу УФМС РФ по РСО-Алания входят сотрудники Управления Федеральной миграционной службы по Республике Северная Осетия-Алания, представители министерства по делам национальностей и паспортно-визовой службы. На территории п. Новый, в специально отведенном для этого помещении, они проводят прием вынужденных переселенцев по вопросам паспортизации."

РИА Новости, 31 мая 2007 г.:

"Группа ингушских беженцев в четверг прекратила начатый накануне митинг у здания Совета Федерации в Москве, сообщил РИА Новости сенатор от Ингушетии Василий Лихачев.

"Сегодня мы вместе с вице-спикером верхней палаты парламента Александром Торшиным приняли представителей этой группы, и после этого они приняли решение прекратить митинг протеста у здания Совета Федерации", - сказал он.

Лихачев сообщил, что группа беженцев из Ингушетии в составе 40 человек прибыла в Москву еще 10 дней назад. Они приехали для проведения акции протеста в связи с тем, что не могут вернуться в свои дома и села в Пригородном районе и Владикавказе, которые покинули еще в 90-х годах из-за осетино-ингушского конфликта.

По словам сенатора, в 2002 году было выпущено специальное распоряжение о возвращении жилищ ингушским беженцам. "Но вопрос так и не был решен, по сути, беженцев подвели", - сказал он.

...А 13 июня мы проведем заседание комиссии Совета Федерации по международным отношениям, на котором обсудим сложившуюся ситуацию", - сообщил сенатор."

СНО, 26 May 2007:

"In first part of May 18 in the settlement of Maiskoe of Prigorodny district of North Ossetia employees of power structures conducted the action on eviction of the internally displaced

persons (IDPs). According to the information, received from the employee of the Committee on protection of IDPs' rights, more than 200 workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ossetia armed by small arms were involved in "operation" against the IDPs.

Completely having blocked the small town of refugees, "securities" started taking away carriages in which the IDPs lived. They motivated their actions saying that, allegedly, there is a decision of court according to which the territory, where the refugees settled down, should be released as it should be used either for growing crops, or pasture.

As it became known, on May 18 the family of Tsitskiev was evicted from IDP camp in Maiskoe to the settlement of Novy, allocated for residence of IDPs from Prigorodny district of North Ossetia. Currently only 8 IDP families remain in Maiskoe. The people live in inhuman conditions as gas, water and electric supplies are off in the settlement.

During past several years the IDPs from Prigorodny district of North Ossetia tried to gain from ossetian authorities the permission to return to the places of their permanent reside. However, instead of it they are offered residence in one IDP camp or another."

Радио Свобода, 20 июля 2007 г.:

"В поселке Майском, расположенном в зоне осетино-ингушского конфликта, продолжается голодовка 12 ингушских беженцев. Они требуют предоставить им возможность вернуться домой, в Пригородный район Северной Осетии. Беженцы не соглашаются на переселение в создаваемый специально для них поселок Новый.

Ингушские беженцы проживают в приграничном поселке Майском почти 14 лет. Они не могут вернуться в свои дома, расположенные в селениях Пригородного района и на юго-восточной окраине Владикавказа. Некоторые дома давно стёрты с лица земли, в других обосновались беженцы, но уже из Грузии и Южной Осетии. Несколько бывших ингушских населенных пунктов попали в так называемую водоохранную зону Владикавказа, после чего проживание в них было официально запрещено.

Кремль в конце прошлого года поставил руководителям Северной Осетии и Ингушетии задачу: полностью устранить последствия межнационального конфликта и решить проблему беженцев до конца 2006 года. Руководство Южного Федерального округа и власти Северной Осетии беженцам из посёлка Майский предложили компромисс: они переселяются в специально создаваемый для них через дорогу небольшой поселок Новый и отказываются от своих прежних домов. На компромисс пошли далеко не все. 12 человек 5 июля объявили бессрочную голодовку.

Член совета международного правозащитного центра «Мемориал» Александр Черкасов в эти дни находится в зоне осетино-ингушского конфликта. По его словам, беженцы не могут понять причин, по которым территория их прежнего проживания объявлена природоохранной зоной. «Жители этих сел недоумевают, почему нельзя их поселить дальше от реки и почему нельзя обеспечить им возможность посещения родовых кладбищ, - говорит Александр Черкасов. - То же самое с выдачей паспортов. Без паспортов и без регистрации они лишены доступа к массе социальных благ, которые должны быть им обеспечены согласно Конституции. Речь идет и о возвращении в отдельные населенные пункты Северной Осетии. Дело в том, что как раз в тех населенных пунктах, где восстановлено совместное проживание ингушей и осетин, обстановка куда спокойнее и куда менее напряжена, чем в тех, где, по сути дела, созданы ингушские гетто. Вчера один из участников голодовки был госпитализирован»."

Кавказский узел, 26 апреля 2007г.:

"Вынужденным переселенцам из Пригородного района Северной Осетии, проживающим в городке беженцев на окраине поселка "Майский" вынесено очередное предупреждение. До 27 апреля текущего года они должны освободить занимаемую ими территорию, иначе их выселят в принудительном порядке.

Об этом, как утверждают беженцы, заявили представители Пригородного районного подразделения Управления Федеральной службы судебных приставов по РСО-Алания и администрации района, которые на днях побывали в городке. По их словам, судебные приставы в ультимативной форме потребовали от них в срок до 27 апреля освободить занимаемую ими землю и перенести свои жилые вагоны в новое поселение. В противном случае к ним могут быть применены меры силового воздействия.

Напомним, что ранее Пригородный районный суд Северной Осетии вынес решение о незаконности пребывания переселенцев на территорию Майского. Из стихийного поселения, где они проживали последние 13 лет после начала осетино-ингушского конфликта, беженцам предлагают переселиться в организованный для них поселок Новый.

К настоящему времени сюда уже перевезено более 100 семей из Майского, которые отказались от возвращения в места прежнего проживания, и те, кто до конфликта проживал в муниципальном жилье (общежитиях). Однако в Майском же по-прежнему остается от 10 (по официальным данным) до 17 (по данным самих беженцев) семей, которые настаивают на возвращении в свои дома в Пригородном районе СО. Следует отметить также, что уже более пяти месяцев МКП отключен от света и газа.

Жители МКП всерьез обеспокоены, что их вынудят покинуть городок, По их мнению, в случае переселения в поселок Новый они лишаются последней надежды на решение своих проблем."

For more information on Ingush IDPs from North Ossetia who are living in Ingushetia, see [В Назрани объявили бессрочную голодовку беженцы-ингуши из Северной Осетии](#), Вести Северный Кавказ, 16 июня 2007 г.

Resettlement in Dagestan (2007)

- Some IDPs from Borozdinovskaya village in Chechnya have purchased land and housing in Dagestan
- Some of these IDPs have also received compensation for lost housing and property

Caucasian Knot, 6 July 2007:

"According to the available data, many refugees [from Borozdinovskaya village] have purchased land plots and housing facilities in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt Districts, while according to the official data of the administration of the Shelkovskoy District, people received compensation for 32 households at a rate of 300,000 roubles each, 72 persons got their passports deregistered and left the district...

As to providing the refugees from Borozdinovskaya with land plots in the territory of Dagestan for resettlement, the authorities of the Republic have no such rights and opportunities," the Secretary of the Security Council of Dagestan has concluded....

[At a meeting with the secretary of the Dagestan Security Council] the refugee group was told that a joint commission from representatives of power bodies of two Republics would be formed in the

near future to solve the problem of paying out compensations to the village refugees for their abandoned houses."

Resettlement in Chechnya (2007)

- All four districts of Grozny are undergoing major construction and renovation
- Tens of IDP families who were formerly living in temporary accommodation were settled in village of cottages "Vozrozhdeniye"
- Government is planning to hand over 3000 apartments to IDP families

Мемориал, июня 2007 г.:

"[...] Масштабные строительные и восстановительные работы ведутся во всех четырех районах Грозного. Ранее в Ленинском районе были восстановлены два микрорайона, а в Старопромысловском - открыт коттеджный поселок "Возрождение", куда были переселены десятки семей, ранее проживавших в пунктах временного размещения. Только в Октябрьском районе столицы Чечни к началу лета 2007 г. планируется сдать в эксплуатацию более трех тысяч квартир. Около двухсот чеченских семей, проживавших в пунктах временного размещения, к 1 мая получили жилье в новом поселке «Рамзан». Поселок возводят в Старопромысловском районе Грозного («Независимая газета», 11.4.2007). До конца мая в Октябрьском районе Грозного должны были быть сданы в эксплуатацию 83 жилых многоэтажных дома на 3400 квартир. Всего в 2007 г. планируется ввести в эксплуатацию 720 восстановленных и 27 жилых домов общей площадью свыше 2,2 млн. кв. м. Кроме того, в эксплуатацию вводятся инфраструктурные объекты – супермаркет, торгово-выставочный комплекс, универмаг, центральная мечеть, спорткомплекс им. А.А. Кадырова, студенческий городок, музейный комплекс, государственный концертный зал и т.д. Все это строится заново.

Делается попытка наладить учет и распределение жилья в Грозном. В марте была создана специальная комиссия по проверке законности проживания нынешних владельцев в квартирах. Необходимость такой проверки была вызвана многочисленными случаями самозахвата пустующих квартир в предыдущие годы. Объявлено, что место незаконных жильцов займут наиболее нуждающиеся беженцы из ПВРов («Независимая газета», 26.3.2007) [...]"

Some IDPs opt to stay in Ingushetia and not return to Chechnya (2007)

- One quarter of IDPs living in Ingushetia opt to stay and not return to Chechnya
- IDPs see shelter support as essential to their integration
- Only a few IDPs responded that they could integrate without assistance

UNHCR , 30 June 2007:

"Out of the 1,097 surveyed families, 54.2% (593 families) declared their intention to return to Chechnya, 24.3% (268 families) opted for the possibility to integrate locally in Ingushetia, whereas 21.5% (236 families) declared to be still undecided [...]"

Among the IDP families who opted for the local integration in Ingushetia, 43.5% was not willing or able to express a definitive idea on the preferred location, 25.1% indicated the Nazran municipal area, 14.6% the Sunzhenski District, 11.6% the Malgobek District and only a minor segment of

the TSS residents declared their preference for the Karabulak District and the Nazran countryside. These percentages may vary according to the district where IDPs are currently residing in the TSS but in general it is visible that IDPs who are opting to integrate are inclined to remain in the same district. For instance, 81.8% of the IDPs willing to integrate in Karabulak are currently in TSS in the same district. The percentage is 96.8% for Malgobek, 87.2 % for the Sunzhenski district, 70.1% for the Nazran municipality and 66.7% for the Nazran rural district. Only in these last two areas more mixed results are reported, likely due to the proximity of the locations.

The survey enquired about the conditions that IDPs deem essential to integrate in Ingushetia. 55.8% of the 267 families willing to integrate identified the need for shelter support from the international actor as the main condition and 37.5% demanded shelter support from the Government. Overall, only very few IDP families declared that they are self-reliant in their integration effort. Conversely, more than 93% of the IDPs willing to remain in Ingushetia declared that they need some form of housing assistance. Surprisingly, given the results on the property survey, very few IDPs (2.6%) expressed the need for the allocation of a land plot from the Government. Such result can be maybe explained with the fact that the land property dimension was not taken into full consideration by IDPs while answering, or rather included in the general request for shelter support [...]

93.3% of the 267 families opting for local integration in Ingushetia are declaring that shelter support either form the international actors or by the Government is the main necessary condition to settle permanently and put an end to their situation of displaced [...]

Yet, a major problem in Ingushetia remains the bleak perspective for a quick realisation the local integration plans of 24.3% of the IDP families residing in TSS, especially for those IDPs who do not have construction land or who cannot rely on family accommodation and support. The numerous governmental declarations – the last one at the end of 2006 – on the inception of special programmes to support the local integration through land allocation and housing subsidies must now to turn into reality. The risk is to face a “silent majority” of displaced families remaining in Ingushetia but disappearing from the Government records – and thus being cast out from the State and the international assistance - without a permanent solution being found for them. Such an unfortunate event is already visible with the IDPs residing in private accommodations, who were not the object of this survey."

DRC, 28 May 2007:

"Many IDP households have adapted to situation and worked up some coping mechanisms for living in Ingushetia. The considerable part of IDPs' income (50-70 %) is humanitarian aid from different International Humanitarian Agencies. 20-30% of surveyed households earn an income from temporary and permanent work. 5-10% of interviewed households receive assistance and approximately the same number of households receive social allowances (pensions, children allowances).

As it was mentioned above, approximately 21 % of surveyed households would like to stay in Ingushetia on permanent basis. The reasons are described in table 2. The main reason is absence of housing in Chechnya. Up to 85 % of IDPs wishing to integrate in Ingushetia already have lost their houses in Chechnya (sold or refused it under the program “Refused Housing”). 26% have obtained own housing in Ingushetia. 46 % of households state security as one, but not the single reason for non-return."

Reasons for non-return to Chechnya

Table.2

District	Security	Housing	Work in Ingushetia	No housing in Chechnya	No work in Chechnya
Karabulakskiy	4	2	1	5	1

Malgobekskiy	21	18	6	20	
Nazranovski	16	2		37	7
Sunzhenski	7	5	3	26	
Total	48	27	10	88	8
% total	46%	26%	10%	85%	8%

Successful integration of the ethnic Russians displaced from Chechnya in the Stavropol region (2000)

- Integration of IDPs in Stavropol Krai depends on personal characteristics of IDPs and their immediate surroundings, according to social research body
- Macrostructures such as government bodies and social organizations do not play a significant role in the integration process

Кавказский Узел, 4 декабря 2006 г.:

"Процесс интеграции вынужденных переселенцев на Ставрополье фактически зависит от личностных качеств и их микроокружения. Макроструктуры - органы власти, общественные организации - не играют роли в этом процессе значительной роли. Почти все надежды и намерения мигрантов остаются несбывшимися, среди них - трудоустройства, жилищное обустройство, образование детей, получение ссуд и субсидий. Это, как отмечают ученые, составляет внутреннюю напряженность и психологическую проблему. В целом, определяя свое социально-психологическое самочувствие, 59,1 процент респондентов отмечают, что их "беспокоят многие проблемы, решение которых вызывает большие затруднения".

Сравнительный анализ ответов на вопрос "Как Вы считаете, в какой мере Вам удалось приспособиться к местному сообществу?", которые дали участники опроса в 2000 и 2006 году представляет парадоксальную картину: в настоящее время вынужденные переселенцы оценивают степень своей приспособленности ниже, чем в 2000 году. Если тогда вполне приспособившихся и отчасти приспособившихся было соответственно 25,8 и 53,7 процентов, то сейчас - 9,3 и 28,9 процента.

"Анализ показателей интеграции вынужденных переселенцев в Ставропольском крае позволяет утверждать, что, несмотря на снижение количественных показателей миграции, связанной с притоком вынужденных переселенцев и беженцев, эта проблема далека от разрешения. В контексте комплекса показателей можно говорить даже об ее обострении", - считают ученые Северо-Кавказского социального института."

Non-ethnic Chechens resettle outside Chechnya (2003)

- Almost all non-ethnic Chechens have left Chechnya during the first conflict and resettled elsewhere in the Russian Federation
- The Government of Ingushetia is willing to facilitate the local integration of some 30,000 ethnic Ingush displaced from Chechnya
- Ingush families from Chechnya were allocated plots of land by the Ingush government and received construction materials from international agencies

UNHCR February 2003, paras. 71-74:

"In November 1991, when independence was unilaterally proclaimed, Chechnya-Ingushetia still formed a single Republic with a population of approximately 1,270,000 persons. According to the 1989 census, some 16 nationalities were represented in that Republic, including 734,000 Chechens, 293,000 Russians and 163,000 Ingush (all three nationalities representing 94% of the total population, and each of the other nationality components representing 1% or less of the population).

The Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation assessed that some 450,000 persons fled the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. It is further estimated that most non-Chechen IDPs did not return to Chechnya after that conflict. According to estimates, in the beginning of 2000, some 240,000 persons were displaced outside of Chechnya (some of whom returned to Chechnya since then), including some 30,000 ethnic Ingush, who fled to neighbouring Ingushetia and who are still staying in that Republic. The Ingush Government has declared on several occasions its willingness to facilitate the local integration of ethnic Ingush IDPs from Chechnya. Some projects have started, with the support of UNHCR, to facilitate the local integration of (primarily ethnic Ingush) IDPs from Chechnya.

Official statistics provided by the Federal Migration Service indicate that 13,232 IDPs from Chechnya were granted forced migrant status in some 79 regions of the Russian Federation between 1 October 1999 and 31 December 2002. According to information available to UNHCR, from its implementing partners as well as from local human rights NGOs, those IDPs from Chechnya who were granted forced migrant status as a result of the current conflict are almost all ethnic Russians. Such information is partly corroborated by looking at the regions where forced migrant status was granted. For the most part, these are regions where traditionally there is no Chechen resident community. At the same time, UNHCR is aware of isolated instances where Chechens displaced by the current conflict were granted forced migrant status (having claimed fear of persecution from Islamic fundamentalists).[70]

Some local NGOs defending the rights of forced migrants report that ethnic Russian IDPs are not always well received by the local population and local authorities in their areas of destination. Many of them have reported difficulties in obtaining issuance or renewal of sojourn registration. However, there is no indication of widespread police harassment, as is the case in many regions for Chechen IDPs. In those regions that condition sojourn registration upon the presence in that territory of close relatives, ethnic Russian IDPs may be able to rely upon the presence of family members displaced during the previous 1994-96 conflict."

[Footnote 70: UNHCR is aware of one case in Pyatigorsk (Stavropol Krai) where an ethnic Chechen, Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian Federal forces, was granted forced migrant status on such grounds by the court of law, after being denied status by the local migration service in a first instance administrative decision.]

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Access to North Caucasus

Monitoring efforts of humanitarian organisations constrained (2007)

- Security conditions in the North Caucasus improved in 2006 and the UN decreased its security alert level from V to IV
- Despite this improvement, there is a threat of kidnapping and UN and ICRC staff travels with armed escorts; this made it difficult for UNHCR to monitor individual cases
- Mountainous areas in the south of Chechnya are high-risk for travel
- In North Ossetia, the government imposed an alternate route for Vladikavkaz-based staff working in Ingushetia in addition to bureaucratic obstacles to visit project areas

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

"In the northern Caucasus, during the second half of the year, overall security conditions continued to improve, with a decline in the number of security-related incidents. However, despite the lowering of the UN security alert level and the prospect of easier access for humanitarian staff to the displaced in Chechnya, heavily armed security escorts were imposed by the Russian authorities on UN staff movements, thus hampering their monitoring tasks. As a result, it became extremely difficult to follow up on individual cases and to monitor the registration of returnees from abroad. Similarly, restrictions on the movements of humanitarian staff hampered access to beneficiaries and impeded the monitoring of integration projects in North Ossetia-Alania."

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The mountainous region in the south of Chechnya is still considered high-risk for travel, and thus is accessed by only a few humanitarian workers.

[...] The administrative environment in which aid workers operate has seen certain changes in 2006. A directive issued in North Ossetia-Alania in the spring changed the daily transit route of all Vladikavkaz-based staff working in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and made access to some project sites in North Ossetia-Alania impossible without special approval from republic officials. A new directive was also issued in Chechnya but it did not dramatically change the requirements already in place for NGOs and UN agencies. These directives were announced as special security precautions limiting the movement of foreigners in the North Caucasus in line with new Federal legislation on anti-terrorist activities. In late-July high-profile armed escorts were introduced for UN mission convoys into Chechnya [...] NGOs working in Chechnya continue to need routing ('marshrutny') lists/passes, but some NGOs find these disruptive rather than facilitative in their assistance activities. The marshrutny lists regime was initiated by NGOs in 2004 to ease their passage through inter-republic checkpoints. Unfortunately, NGO staff feel that an increasing amount of paperwork has been put in place for them to obtain the passes. Others feel that they periodically are placed under excessive scrutiny by local government.

[...] During 2006, security for the increasing number of UN missions to the Chechen Republic remained manageable, and the UN was not directly targeted by any of the parties to the conflict in the area. While kidnapping remains a perceived threat, "being in the wrong place at the wrong time" remains the primary threat to UN personnel operating in the North Caucasus. Uninterrupted VHF and HF radio communications remain a prerequisite for the safe conduct of UN operations, particularly in the southern districts of the Chechen Republic.

[...] An Inter-Agency Security Assessment Mission (IASAM) to the North Caucasus was successfully conducted in April 2006, and the team submitted their findings to the UNDSS NY. Based on the recommendations of the IASAM, the UN Secretary General approved security phase changes in July 2006 for the republics of the North Caucasus, the main one being the reclassification of the Chechen Republic from Security Phase V to Security Phase IV. The change in the security phases is an important step in the intended increase of recovery-oriented and developmental activities in the region. This will also facilitate greater access to all sectors of the Transitional Workplan, which will in turn enable the agencies to conduct adequate protection and assistance, and long-term recovery programs.

Planning for the UN operations in the Chechen Republic under Phase IV has been completed including identification of staff and equipment for initial deployment in Grozny. UNDSS, with the help of federal and local LEAs in the North Caucasus, will continue to provide a safe and secure environment for the implementation of UN operations. The increased access of UN personnel and the establishment of a UN office in Grozny are planned to take place in a phased manner. Starting with an initial deployment of a limited number of national staff with overnight halts and several-day missions, the ultimate objective is to establish a UN office in Grozny. Simultaneously, the number of missions of international staff will also increase."

Swisspeace, 31 October 2006:

"Security guarantees for international organizations, Western NGOs and their local staff have been the bone of contention between them and the Russian government. On the one hand, the security situation remains precarious and this necessitates escorts provided by the interior ministry. On the other hand, this implies that the freedom of movement is inevitably restricted, that all contacts are known, and that background security checks on staff and partners are extensive. While such checks may be necessary, there are concerns about how this information may be used.

[...] due to the risk of kidnapping, since 1999 the ICRC makes use of armed escorts all over the Northern Caucasus. Despite these security problems, the ICRC runs a major humanitarian operation consisting of two pillars. The first is its humanitarian program, including protection and assistance activities for the vulnerable population affected by the conflict in Chechnya. The second aims at the promotion of international humanitarian law (IHL).

[...] The distressing security situation in Chechnya as well as in the neighbouring Republics and the fact that a great part of the infrastructure has been damaged or even destroyed exacerbate the activities and the implementation of the various programs. As a result access to vulnerable people is often difficult."

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p.7:

"Colonel-General Yedelev, Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Russian Federation and Head of the Regional Operational Headquarters for Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the Northern Caucasus Region, issued Directive No. DR-2-dsp. "On Ensuring the Legal Regime for the Stay of Foreign Nationals in the CTO Zone" of June 2, 2006. The Directive has an appended Regulation "On Procedure Regulating the Stay of Foreign Nationals, Members of Foreign Non-Commercial Non-Governmental Organizations (FNNOs) and Members of Foreign Media on the Territory of the Chechen Republic". The Regulation defines the procedure regulating the stay, movements and registration of foreign nationals, missions, and members of FNNOs and foreign media who temporarily stay in the Chechen Republic. In addition, this Regulation provides for punishment for all the above mentioned categories, as well as for heads of host organizations and citizens in case of their failure to comply with it.

The complexity of registration rules that are proposed, the requirement for every foreigner to have a route plan, "examination and registration" measures, and the recommendation to agree with the Federal Security Service Directorate (UFSB) for the Chechen Republic candidacies of local residents who are recruited, coupled with the monstrous language in which the Directive and the

Regulation are written, can lead to the situation when the stay of foreign nationals on the territory of the Chechen Republic can become impossible."

Prague Watchdog, 6 January 2007:

"Renewed bribery at the sadly well-known "Kavkaz" checkpoint located on the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has stopped again after the Federal Security Service (FSB) intervened [...]

"Ever since the very beginning of the war, the „Kavkaz“ checkpoint has been notorious for its policemen collecting exorbitant tribute from people wishing to pass through it. A self-styled „tariff“ of fees ranging from 10 to 50 roubles was even developed. The practice had continued almost until this past summer when policemen, apparently from the Kirov region, were deployed at the checkpoint. At that moment everything changed and the bribe-taking stopped. "They've even hung up a notice warning that an attempt to offer a bribe is a criminal offence," says Souleiman, a 47-year-old mini-bus driver from Grozny [...]

According to an unnamed human rights defender, the main reason for the bribe-taking is the juridical illiteracy of the local population. "People are so tired of it all that they're ready to pay 50 or 100 roubles if that will get them where they need to be more quickly. It's most likely a peculiar war syndrome from the early years of the so-called "counter-terrorist operation“, during which law enforcers at checkpoints arbitrarily detained people and subjected them to torture and insults. Some people disappeared without trace, while others were freed for ransom. Even now Chechen residents fear and distrust law enforcers, seeing them more as a source of possible danger than as representatives of law and order who are summoned to defend their rights," he is convinced.

"Residents of Chechnya, especially the young, have only a very faint notion of their rights and duties. They don't know, for example, that policemen checking their documents must first of all introduce themselves. Or that the absence of a military registration stamp in one's identity document is not a crime. Or that no one has the right to detain people at checkpoints without sticking to certain law procedures and so on. And unscrupulous policemen make use of this," said the human rights defender."

International NGOs operating in North Caucasus under pressure (2006)

- International NGOs subjected to unexpected inspections, though dialogue with authorities helped the situation
- Some international NGOs put activities on hold while they waited for the outcome of the re-registration process under the 2006 amended law on NGOs

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"The international NGOs working in the North Caucasus are all accredited, and make regular reports on their plans and activities. Nonetheless, their offices are often visited with unannounced inspections by persons claiming to be law enforcement officials investigating irregularities - "claiming" because while some identify themselves, others refuse to produce identification. Remedies to such administrative/operational difficulties are always sought locally, and in 2006 the dialogue with government officials to remedy problems did improve.

The 2006 amendments to the Russian NGO laws created quite a high level of anxiety among the affected international NGOs. However, it is hoped that the interruptions of humanitarian and

development assistance during re-registration will be slight. At the time that this document is being finalized, all 15 international NGOs working in the North Caucasus, and required to re-register, had submitted their applications for re-registration. Ten had been notified of the positive outcome of the process. The remaining five had not yet been notified of completion of the process. While several NGOs voluntarily suspended their operations pending finalization of the process, others that had planned to continue operating in Chechnya did not obtain the approved 'marshrutny' list granting them access to the republic in November."

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Legal background

An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of "forced migrant"

- Internally displaced persons (except as a result of natural or human-made disasters) globally fall under the category of 'Forced Migrant' as defined in the Law of 20 December 1995
- Forced migrant status is also open to involuntary migrants from former Soviet Republics with Russian citizenship or who could obtain it by virtue of being former Soviet citizens
- The status is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of displaced persons in their new place of residence but does not preclude return

Law on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation on "Forced Migrants", 20 December 1995:

Article 1. Notion of "forced migrant"

"1. A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order.

Taking into account the facts stipulated in point 1 of the present article, the following persons shall be recognised as a forced migrant:

- 1) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a foreign state and came to the Russian Federation;
- 2) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation and came to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation.
3. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a foreign citizen or a stateless person, permanently staying on legal grounds on the territory of the Russian Federation, who left the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of the Russian Federation for reasons set forth in Point 1 of the present Article;
4. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a citizen of the former USSR, who used to reside on the territory of a former constituent republic of the USSR, who received refugee status in the Russian Federation and lost it, as he had acquired the Russian citizenship, upon availability of factors which prevented him/her from settling down on the territory of the Russian Federation during the time when his/her refugee status was in force."

"As a result of the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya, some 162,000 IDPs were granted the status of forced migrant, in approximately 80 regions (subjects) of the Russian Federation. The status of forced migrant is primarily meant to facilitate the integration of such persons in their new place of residence, through the allocation of special allowances, assistance with housing, job placement, loans, and related support [7]".

Footnote [7]: "The status of forced migrant does not preclude voluntary return to the former place of permanent residence. Indeed Article 7.2(5) of the Law on Forced Migrants imposes upon local executive bodies the obligation to 'render assistance to a forced migrant at his/her request in the return to his/her former place of residence'." (UNHCR January 2002, para. 11)

See also [Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995 \(unofficial translation\) \[Internal link\]](#)

The Russian version of the Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995, is available on the website of [Memorial \[Internet\]](#)

For the validity of statistics based on the forced migrant status, see "[Populations figures of the Federal and regional Migration Services flawed by inconsistent practices](#)" [Internal link]

National response

The legal framework: the Law on Forced Migrants

- The status of "forced migrant" is granted to the victims of forced displacement within the former Soviet Union
- Beneficiaries receive assistance to their integration, although return can also be supported
- Only non-Chechens displaced by the first conflict in Chechnya have been given the status

In 1993, the state authorities adopted a law on forced migrants, which creates a status for victims of forced displacement following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. According to the law (as revised in 1995), the status is to be granted to both persons who wanted to resettle in the Russian Federation from one of the former republics of the Soviet Union, as well as those Russian citizens who were displaced within the Russian Federation itself. The status of "forced migrant" is primarily meant to facilitate integration in new places of residence, including through the allocation of special allowances, assistance with housing, job placement, loans and related support. However, the status also imposes on local executive bodies to "render assistance to a forced migrant at his/her request in the return to his/her former place of residence." (article 7.2(5) of the law). (UNHCR February 2003, UN CHR 24 February 2004)

The law has been inconsistently applied to people displaced within the Federation as a result of the armed conflicts in Chechnya. Some 162,000 people displaced during the 1994-1996 Chechen conflict were granted the status. Those displaced during the second Chechen conflict from 1999, mostly ethnic Chechens, have been largely excluded from the status. Applications to the status which are based on allegations of mistreatment by federal forces, lost property and "mass violation of public order" were rejected by the migration authorities on the grounds that the anti terrorist operations conducted by the Russian government in Chechnya do not constitute a "mass violation of public order". The authorities also do not consider that the federal forces who conduct such operations commit violations of public order. (UNHCR February 2003) The forced migrant

status, which is granted for an initial period of 5 years, is rarely renewed, explaining for the decreasing number of forced migrants in recent years (Ganushkina 2004).

The forced migrant status determination procedure is conducted by the territorial organs of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) under the Ministry of the Interior.

The full text of the [Law on Forced Migrants](#) in Russian is available on the website of Memorial [Internet]. For the English version, see the bibliographical references (under Rossiskaya Gazeta)

Government efforts help only some IDPs (2007)

The federal and Chechen governments have made a notable effort to assist IDPs from Chechnya by providing pensions and children's allowances, paying compensation to those whose houses were totally destroyed and allocating funds for permanent housing. In 2006, a human rights commissioner post was established in Chechnya and the Chechen government joined a protection working group that brings together international and national actors to ensure protection of IDPs' rights. A shortcoming of these efforts, however, is that compensation payments have been suspended, government promises of land plots for returnees have not always been fulfilled, and a government IDP committee was dissolved in early 2007.

For its part, the North Ossetian government has allocated land plots for Ingush IDPs in Novy, a village it had established for displaced people. The federal government has also devoted significant attention to IDPs from Prigorodny district and has achieved results including the increased return of IDPs to their place of origin or settlement in Novy. The government, however, has used force against IDPs in order to enforce court decisions deeming certain villages in Prigorodny to be district water conservation and pasture zones, thus denying some IDPs their wish to return to their former homes or to stay at their current residence.

The government in Dagestan has allowed IDPs from Chechnya to remain on its territory, but the Migration Service of the federal government has not granted them legal status, apparently due to lack of funds. In some cases, the local government in Dagestan has not registered the residence of some IDPs. This group of IDPs therefore must pay for their accommodation and faces obstacles to accessing social services and benefits.

The federal government has included "forced migrants" in a national housing programme established by decree in 2006. Those registered as persons in need of housing by the Migration Service's list are entitled to a housing subsidy issued from the federal budget, proportional to the number of members in the family and based on a government figure for the cost of one square meter of housing.

Для более подробные информации, обратитесь к статьям "Делегация Совета Федерации посетила Северную Осетию," Вести, 20 июля 2007 г., "Беженцы, живущие в Северной Осетии, получают земельные участки," Вести, 22 декабря 2005 г., "В Ростове-на-Дону обсудили проблемы переселенцев осетино-ингушского конфликта," Кавказский Узел, 17 июля 2007 г. и "Почти 300 семей переселенцев из зоны осетино-ингушского конфликта получают господдержку," Regnum, 17 июля 2007 г.

Reconstruction plans for Chechnya: limited impact (2006)

- Development plans in North Caucasus guided by "National Priority Projects"

- Large contributions from federal budget, but slow reconstruction progress

UN OCHA, 12 December 2006:

"As in all other regions of the Russian Federation, federal and regional spending in key social sectors is increasingly guided by the "National Priority Projects" on healthcare, education, affordable housing, and agriculture formulated by the President of the Russian Federation in September 2005. The corresponding federal programs represent a variation of the approach previously used in the federal targeted programs. The National Priority Projects initiative, nonetheless, seems to have helped consolidate development plans for the North Caucasus.

In September 2006, President Putin issued a decree setting up a Commission for "Improving the Socio-Economic Situation in the Southern Federal Okrug" and he empowered its chairman, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian Federation President for the Southern Federal Okrug, to consider and amend requests for federal financing from the republics before they are sent to the federal government. The federal and regional authorities are now finalizing a draft federal targeted program "South of Russia" for 2008-2011, which will be a source of federal funding. While in 2006, the total amount of federal transfers to the North Caucasus will reach 100 billion rubles (approx. US\$3.74 billion), federal funding for the region is expected to increase twofold in 2007. Also in 2006, the Russian Cabinet adopted a decree to clear wreckage and dismantle demolished buildings in Grozny. The decree is being implemented with federal funding, and the Minister of Economic Development and Trade has indicated that over 700 million rubles (appr. US\$26.2 million) would be assigned by the end of this year, and 940 million rubles (appr. US\$35.2 million) in 2007.

...The office of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian Federation President for the Southern Federal Okrug has taken the central position in coordinating much of the prioritization and funding for recovery and development in the composite republics. The Deputy to the Plenipotentiary Representative, Mr. Alexander Pochinok, outlined the following Government priorities during the September 2006 all-stakeholders' planning workshop on the 2007 Transitional Workplan.

Facilitating the involvement of the business community...
 Solving the remaining social issues...
 Supporting agricultural development...
 Building the capacity of local governance structures...
 Supporting rehabilitation of the communal infrastructure...
 Supporting small and medium enterprises...
 Ensuring long-term solutions for IDPs

...Much attention has been drawn to the slow rate of socio-economic recovery and reconstruction in the North Caucasus and to the incongruence between rate of progress and increases in contributions from the federal budget."

International response

International community focuses on humanitarian response and advocacy

- The UN response to the humanitarian crisis in the Northern Caucasus is under the leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator
- Sectoral lead agency for protection and shelter issues is UNHCR

- The response of donors to the UN consolidated appeal for Chechnya is generous
- Human rights treaty bodies and regional organisations have voiced their concerns on the situation of IDPs in the Northern Caucasus

The international response to the humanitarian crisis in northern Caucasus is coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator, with the support of OCHA. Specific sector working groups are led by one international agency, as shown in the table below.

Sector Working Group	Chair and Secretariat
Protection	UNHCR
Food Security and Agriculture	WFP
Shelter	UNHCR
Health	WHO
Water and Sanitation	UNICEF
Education	UNICEF
Mine Action	UNICEF
Peace and Tolerance	UNICEF
Governance	UNDP
Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation	UNDP

In 2006, the UN and its NGO partners began to change their focus from emergency to development activities in the North Caucasus, while continuing to acknowledge that the conflict-affected population still needs humanitarian support. As a result, the 2007 Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan for the North Caucasus includes development activities such as economic growth and governance, in addition to humanitarian activities like health, shelter and education. Meanwhile, some international actors have indicated their departure from the North Caucasus, including UN OCHA, which will close its office at the end of 2007.

As lead agency for the protection of IDPs in the North Caucasus, UNHCR, with the help of partner NGOs, provides shelter assistance and legal counselling for IDPs, monitors the situation of IDPs in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, and carries out independent verifications of cases of evacuation from TACs. Support to IDPs from Prigorodny district in North Ossetia is limited to *ad hoc* interventions such as housing support in Ingushetia and legal assistance on the right to return.

Other humanitarian organisations that directly assist IDPs include the Danish Refugee Council (in the areas of shelter, food and protection), the International Committee of the Red Cross (healthcare), Médecins Sans Frontières (healthcare), the Polish Humanitarian Organisation (water and sanitation) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (housing and healthcare). The work of several international NGOs in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan was interrupted in 2006 by their efforts to comply with a new law governing foreign NGOs. In some cases, this meant delays in assistance to IDPs. However, by 2007 most international NGOs in the North Caucasus had managed to resume their work.

Various institutions at the Council of Europe have continued to express concern over the lack of respect for human rights of institutions in the North Caucasus. In a 2006 resolution, the Council's Parliamentary Assembly identified Chechnya as the most serious situation of human rights violations of all Council of Europe member states, and stated that the security forces produced a sense of anxiety rather than security among the population. In March 2007, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture issued its third public statement on torture in Chechnya, a measure rarely invoked and used only when a party fails to cooperate or refuses to improve the

situation. By mid-2007, the Council of Europe's European Court of Human Rights had handed down 14 decisions on cases from Chechnya. The court found federal troops guilty of human rights abuses such as torture, enforced disappearances and illegal detention and ordered the Russian government to pay compensation to claimants.

Recommendations from international NGOs (2007)

- Amnesty International makes recommendations to Russian government, Chechen government and armed Chechen opposition groups on investigations into enforced disappearances, mass graves, arbitrary detention, torture, among others

AI 23 May 2007:

"Recommendations to the government of the Russian Federation:

Condemn ongoing enforced disappearances, and end them immediately;

Ensure that all past and current allegations of enforced disappearances are promptly, thoroughly, independently and impartially investigated and that, where there is sufficient evidence, anyone suspected of responsibility for such crimes is prosecuted in proceedings which meet international fair trial standards; ensure renewed and effective criminal investigations into all those cases where the European Court of Human Rights has found the investigation has been flawed;

Consider assigning the civilian prosecutor's office with the jurisdiction to investigate all cases of suspected enforced disappearances, whichever military, security or law enforcement agency is suspected of being involved; and provide the civilian prosecutor's office with the mandate and authority necessary to be able to effectively investigate all such cases;

Ensure that prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations into all sites of mass graves in Chechnya are immediately carried out by forensic experts in line with UN guidelines on the disinterment and analysis of skeletal remains; make available adequate resources, including by establishing an autopsy service at the forensic laboratory in Grozny; and seek and accept offers of assistance and cooperation from international experts, both in carrying out the work itself, and in training local personnel engaged in the work;

Create a single authoritative and comprehensive database of the names and details of all individuals who have gone missing, who have been subjected to enforced disappearance, or abducted in Chechnya since 1999, and create a single official database logging details of all unidentified bodies found in Chechnya. Make both databases public and accessible to relatives of these people;

Ensure the protection of all those who have petitioned the European Court of Human Rights and initiate independent and thorough investigations, without delay, into all allegations of reprisals in relation to applications filed with the European Court of Human Rights;

Sign and ratify without delay and without any reservations the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, make declarations pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 recognizing the competence of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances to receive communications from individuals and states and enact effective implementing legislation;

Facilitate the long-standing requests for visits to the Russian Federation, including Chechnya, by the UN Special Procedures, in accordance with their long-established terms of reference for missions, in particular the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances by setting dates for them to undertake missions in the near future.

Recommendations to the Chechen authorities:

Put a stop to arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearances in Chechnya;

Ensure all detentions in Chechnya are carried out in accordance with proper procedures, meeting the strict requirements of international law and standards, including by ensuring detaining officials are identifiable by wearing visible ID numbers and for the registration numbers of vehicles to be

clearly visible; ensuring all detentions are properly logged; providing medical examination of detainees on entering, transfer and release from detention, and ensuring accountability for any violations of such procedures;

Condemn and end the use of secret detention, close all secret places of detention and ensure officials from the prosecutor's office have unhindered access to all places of detention;

Ensure no one faces reprisals for seeking the truth about the fate of their disappeared relative; establish safeguards against reprisals in order to protect all complainants, including those who submit complaints to the European Court of Human Rights;

Work together with the federal authorities and international experts to exhume the sites of mass graves in Chechnya in accordance with international standards. Ensure the sites are protected from any interference pending such exhumation;

Work together with the federal authorities to create a comprehensive database of the names and details of all individuals who have gone missing, who have been subjected to enforced disappearance, or abducted in Chechnya since 1999 and to create a single official database logging details of all unidentified bodies found in Chechnya;

Provide full reparation, including restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, to the victims and their families.

Recommendations to Chechen armed opposition groups

Stop all direct and targeted attacks on civilians as well as indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks;

Ensure full compliance with and respect for international humanitarian law. "

Recommendations from the Council of Europe (2007)

- Council of Europe publicly states that some governments, states that are members of the Council of Europe and the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers (CoM) have repeatedly failed to address human rights violations in Chechnya and calls for the CoM to relaunch monitoring of human rights in Chechnya
- Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture makes recommendations to Russian government on ill-treatment in detention and effective investigations for complaints

COE, 21 December 2005:

"The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights is deeply concerned that a fair number of governments, member states and the Committee of Ministers have failed to address the ongoing serious human rights violations in the Chechen Republic in a regular, serious and intensive manner – despite the fact that such violations still occur on a massive scale in a climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic and, in some cases, in neighbouring regions.

The Committee urges the Committee of Ministers to confront its responsibilities in the face of one of the most serious human rights issues in any of the Council of Europe's member states. It should relaunch its monitoring of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic – which has been at a standstill since spring 2004 – and discuss the consequences of Russia's insufficient co-operation with the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as well as take "specific action" on the 1994 Declaration on compliance with commitments, as requested by the Assembly in 2003. Otherwise, the committee warns, the lack of effective reaction by the Council's executive body could seriously threaten the credibility of the whole Organisation."

COE, 13 March 2007:

"[...] After each of the visits in 2006, the CPT's delegation immediately made detailed written observations. The reactions of the Federal authorities were not commensurate with the gravity of

the Committee's findings, and the same is true of the comments which they have recently made in response to the report on the two visits adopted in November 2006. Although displaying an open attitude on subsidiary matters related to conditions of detention, the Russian authorities consistently refuse to engage in a meaningful manner with the CPT on core issues. This can only be qualified as a failure to cooperate.

The public statement procedure set in motion by the CPT in October 2006 covered in particular the issues of ill-treatment by staff of ORB-2 (Operational/Search Bureau of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia responsible for the Southern Federal Region), unlawful detentions and the effectiveness of investigations into cases involving allegations of ill-treatment. Detailed recommendations have been made by the CPT on each of these subjects; to date, they have received at most a token response and in many respects have quite simply been ignored. Instead of reformulating in this statement the issues concerned, the CPT has chosen to make public the relevant extracts of its visit report and of the Russian authorities' comments; the Committee believes that this material speaks for itself.

The CPT remains committed to continuing its dialogue with the competent authorities, at both Federal and Republican level, in relation to the Chechen Republic and is prepared to organise further visits to that part of the Russian Federation. However, for such activities to be worthwhile, all sides must be willing to play their part fully in the light of the values to which the Russian Federation has subscribed.

[...] the CPT recommends [that the Russian authorities]:

- take immediate action to put a stop to the ill-treatment of suspected or accused persons by staff of ORB-2, both in Grozny and in the inter-district divisions of the agency. That action should include:

- relocating elsewhere the IVS facility currently situated on the premises of ORB-2 in Grozny;

- ensuring that any person apprehended by ORB-2 staff is, without delay, placed in an IVS facility;

- making mandatory the presence of an investigator attached to the relevant prosecution service when ORB-2 staff are involved in any investigative activity requiring direct contact with a detained person;

- ensuring strict compliance with the right to have a lawyer present during all questioning or other investigative activities conducted with the participation of the suspect or accused;

- delivering to all ORB-2 staff the clear message that the ill-treatment of detained persons will be the subject of severe sanctions;

- ensuring that any complaints or other information indicative of possible ill-treatment by ORB-2 staff are the subject of an effective investigation (see also section II.A.4 below).

- ensure that effective investigations are carried out into all complaints and other information indicative of the unlawful detention of persons:

- in facilities located in the village of Tsentoroy;

-in the military facility (the "Vega base") located in the outskirts of Gudermes (see paragraph 30);

-at the Headquarters of the Vostok Battalion of the 42nd Division of the Ministry of Defence;

-in any other facility located elsewhere in the Chechen Republic.

-that immediate steps be taken to ensure that all investigations into cases involving allegations of ill-treatment meet fully the criteria of an "effective" investigation as established by the European Court of Human Rights;

-that, when persons lodge complaints about the manner in which they were treated whilst in the custody of a law enforcement agency, all subsequent investigative activities concerning those complaints be carried out in a safe environment, away from the law enforcement agency at which the ill-treatment was allegedly inflicted. Further, for so long as a preliminary inquiry or criminal investigation into possible ill-treatment is underway, the persons concerned should under no circumstances, for any investigative purpose, be returned to the custody of the law enforcement agency where it is alleged the ill-treatment was inflicted;

-that judges considering a request on the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody immediately order a forensic medical examination and bring the matter to the attention of the relevant prosecution service whenever there are grounds to believe that the person brought before them could have been the victim of ill-treatment;

-that a mode of delivery be established which ensures timely submission to the prosecuting authorities of reports drawn up by SIZO establishments on physical injuries recorded at admission;

-that persons who allege ill-treatment in custody, or their lawyers or doctors, be able to have a medical examination by a doctor from an official forensic establishment carried out without prior authorisation from an investigating or judicial authority."

Recommendations from UN organisations (2007)

- UNHCR makes recommendations to the Chechen authorities on IDP return, reconstruction in the republic, temporary accommodation, land allocation, compensation program, among other topics
- UNHCR makes several recommendations to the Ingush authorities, including on local integration and return of IDPs from Chechnya, temporary accommodation, de-registration of IDPs from Migration Services lists
- UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances expresses concern that some investigations of disappearance cases are suspended
- UN Committee against Torture gives Russia guidance on illegal detention and enforced disappearances and calls for effective, impartial investigations into such cases

UNHCR, 30 June 2007:

To the authorities in Chechnya:

- Extend the process of reconstruction to all areas of the republic to respect the will of IDPs to freely choose their place of return;

- Adopt a gradual approach to the TACs/TSs closure, and consider the results of this survey to prioritise the timing/order of TACs/TSs closure after having identified permanent shelter solutions for the TACs/TSs residents;
- Intensify initiatives of land allocation with developed infrastructures and of complementary shelter support, in particular for the newly created families and in general for those IDPs and returnees who never had properties;
- Guarantee full access and use of the land-plots recently allocated to former TACs/TSs residents by providing the granted land with adequate infrastructures;
- Match the promotion of the return of IDPs from Ingushetia and of refugees from abroad with the provision of sufficient alternative accommodations in Chechnya for returnees lacking their own dwelling and with the support for shelter rehabilitation programmes for returnees owning destroyed dwellings;
- Ensure alternative temporary accommodations at least for a first period upon return;
- Resume and speed up the process of compensation;
- Ensure that hindrances in property-related administrative and judicial processes (e.g. compensation payments, resolutions of legal disputes over contested properties/documentation) are minimised and that property-related processes implemented by the Government are fair and transparent;
- Utilise this survey by adopting approaches which take into consideration the availability of property for construction and the level of shelter destruction reported by each family in the surveyed population;
- Integrate efforts with the humanitarian/development actors to find synergies that can have a positive impact on the overall research of solutions for returnees and IDPs;

To the authorities in Ingushetia:

- Design a federally-approved programme to support the local integration of the residual IDP population in Ingushetia, both the 25% surveyed as still present in TSs and willing to remain in the republic and the segment residing in private accommodations;
- Adopt a gradual policy in discontinuing the contracts for the maintenance of TSs and continue to ensure adequate living conditions for the residual IDP families until permanent housing solutions are available in Ingushetia or in Chechnya;
- Respect principle voluntary return and continue to work with the Chechen authorities to facilitate the return only upon the realisation of concrete solutions to the accommodation problem of the returning population;
- Tackle the problem of IDPs with no properties but willing to integrate in Ingushetia through a policy of allocation of land with infrastructure and of support to individual shelter construction, with a particular attention to families – including newly created ones - who may not have other coping mechanisms;
- Provide adequate infrastructure to those areas where land allocation initiatives to facilitate local integration have been carried out in the past (e.g. Berd Yourt) to allow the completion of housing construction and the permanent residency of the integrating families;
- Acknowledge that the ongoing process of de-registration of families from State/Migration Service assistance lists is leaving “out of the records” a sizeable number of families that may still have specific needs and plan for their inclusion in programmes of social support for destitute people;
- Integrate efforts with the humanitarian/development actors to find synergies that can have a positive impact on the overall research of solutions for returnees and IDPs;

To Shelter Agencies including UNHCR:

- Use the findings of the survey to guide the 2007 shelter programmes, in particular for the selection of areas and of beneficiaries.
- Within the framework of the North Caucasus-based Shelter Working Group, continue to define common strategies and share information/data and approaches to maximise the impact of the

residual housing programmes implemented in the region by the actors of the Working Group, which will likely be terminated at the end of 2008.

• Within the framework of the North Caucasus-based Protection and Shelter Working Groups, continue to advocate for a stronger commitment of the federal, regional and republican authorities to assure durable solutions for IDPs, through material assistance (shelter and income-generation) as well as through the strengthening of mechanisms to guarantee the full realisation of civil, social and economic rights."

UN HRC, 25 January 2007:

"359. The Working Group is deeply concerned about the new cases [of enforced disappearances] that continue to occur in the Russian Federation. The Working Group encourages the Government to respond to its general allegation letter (see paragraph 353) and to take steps to clarify outstanding cases, including the large number of unresolved cases arising from the conflicts in the

Northern Caucasus. The Working Group reiterates to the Government its obligation under the Declaration to prevent and to terminate all acts of enforced disappearance and to prosecute alleged perpetrators.

360. The Working Group welcomes the invitation by the Government of the Russian Federation to the Working Group to conduct a country visit, and looks forward to finalizing dates as soon as possible.

361. The Working Group continues to be concerned about suspension of investigations in disappearance cases and wishes to remind the Government of its obligations to conduct thorough and impartial investigations "for as long as the fate of the victim of enforced disappearance remains unclarified", in accordance with article 13, paragraph 6, of the Declaration."

UN CAT, 6 February 2007:

"The State party should ensure that no one is detained in any unofficial place of detention under its de facto effective control. The State party should investigate and disclose the existence of any such facilities and the authority under which they have been established and the manner in which detainees are treated. The State party should publicly condemn any resort to secret detention and prosecute anyone engaged in or complicit in this practice.

The State party should take all necessary measures to prohibit and prevent abductions and enforced disappearances in any territory under its jurisdiction, and prosecute and punish the perpetrators.

The State Party should ensure effective use of joint investigative groups including representatives of both military and civil (territorial) Office of the Public Prosecutor until such time as the competence and jurisdiction of any case can be determined and ensure the right to fair trial to all suspects. The State party should conduct a thorough and independent inquiry into the methods used in holding facilities in ORB-2 when questioning prisoners.

The State party should conduct prompt, impartial and effective investigations into all allegations of torture and ill-treatment in these and other facilities, including examination of medical reports supplied to court cases documenting mistreatment, and ensure that persons responsible are subject to prosecution with appropriate sanctions.

Reiterating its previous recommendation, the State party should clarify the applicable legal regime that currently prevails in the Chechen Republic, as there is no state of exception and there is also a non-international armed conflict in progress. Such clarification could provide individuals with an effective means of seeking redress for any violations committed, so that they will not be caught in a

vicious circle of various military and civilian departments and agencies with differing degrees of responsibility

The State party should ensure that any counter-terrorism measures taken with regard to the Chechen Republic and any other territory under its jurisdiction, remain in full conformity with the Convention's prohibitions against torture and ill-treatment. The State party should establish safeguards against reprisals in order to protect all complainants, including, inter alia, those who submit cases on torture or disappearances to the European Court of Human Rights or under article 22 of the Convention."

European Court of Human Rights rulings on Chechnya (2007)

- European Court of Human Rights makes multiple rulings on cases regarding Chechnya and finds Russia responsible for ineffective investigations, inhuman and degrading treatment and deaths and ordered that Russia pay monetary compensation to the applicants

ECHR, 26 July 2007:

"[...] Despite all that, and notwithstanding the domestic and international public outcry caused by the cold-blooded execution of more than 50 civilians, almost six years after the tragic events in Novye Aldy no meaningful result whatsoever has been achieved in the task of identifying and prosecuting the individuals who had committed the crimes. In the Court's view, the astonishing ineffectiveness of the prosecuting authorities in this case can only be qualified as acquiescence in the events. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the murders of the applicants' eleven relatives [...]"

EHRAC, 26 July 2007:

"On 5 February 2000, Yusup Musayev was a witness to nine killings, seven of them his relatives. Suleyman Magomadov and Tamara Magomadova alleged that three neighbours witnessed the burning of a house belonging to their relatives. The neighbours discovered the remains of Suleyman's brothers, Salman and Abdula Magomadov in the cellar of the house. Khasan Abdulmazhidov and his wife, Malika Labazanova complained of the shooting of Khasan's sister and brother, Zina Abdulmezhidova and Khuseyn Abdulmezhidov.

In its judgment the Court concluded that the applicants' relatives were killed by Russian servicemen of the St Petersburg OMON (special police forces). However, it was highly critical that:

"no explanation has been forthcoming from the Russian Government as to the circumstances of the deaths, nor has any ground of justification been relied on by them in respect of the use of lethal force by their agents."

The Court was particularly critical of the Russian authorities' conduct of the investigation into the events of 5 February 2000, finding there was "a series of serious and unexplained delays and failures to act..." including the failure to promptly identify victims and possible witnesses and to take statements from them.

The Court also found that Russia had subjected Yusup Musayev to inhuman treatment (in violation of Article 3) as he had witnessed the extrajudicial execution of several of his relatives and neighbours, was himself threatened at gunpoint, and that the response of the authorities to these events had been "wholly inadequate".

ECHR, 5 July 2007:

"The Court noted with great concern that a number of cases had come before it which had suggested that "disappearances" were well known in Chechnya. In the context of the conflict in Chechnya, a person detained by unidentified servicemen without any subsequent acknowledgment of their detention, could be regarded as being in a life-threatening position. The lack of reliable or official news about Mr Alikhadzhiyev for over six years supported that assumption. None of the steps necessary for an effective investigation had been taken in the crucial first days and weeks after his detention and that had significantly contributed to the risk of his disappearance. Moreover, the authorities' reaction to the applicant's complaints led the Court to presume that there had been tacit agreement with the situation and made it doubt as to the objectivity of the investigation.

In conclusion, the Court considered that it had been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Alikhadzhiyev was presumed dead following his detention by State servicemen. Having noted that the authorities did not submit any plausible explanation as to what had happened to him after his detention or given any reasons to justify the use of lethal force by their agents, it followed that his death could be attributed to the State [...]

The investigation into Mr Alikhadzhiyev's arrest had not been opened until more than two months after his arrest. Once started, it was plagued by inexplicable delays: notably, in questioning key witnesses; granting victim status to the applicant and trying to find the units which had participated in the arrest. The Court found that those delays clearly went beyond what could be tolerated in dealing with a crime such as abduction, where crucial action had to be taken immediately after the event.

Furthermore, other important measures had never been taken. Neither the units which had participated in the operation nor the location to which the detainees had been transported had ever been identified. Local officials, the military or police were never questioned about the operation. No questions were asked either about the announcement made in the press by a high-ranking military officer.

The applicant had not been informed of the investigation's progress, the only information occasionally communicated to her over a period of about four years had concerned the adjournments and reopening of the proceedings. Supervising prosecutors had criticised the investigation and ordered certain steps to be taken, but it appeared that those orders had either been ignored or carried out with exaggerated delay.

The Court therefore found that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and presumed death of Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev [...]"

EHRAC, 5 July 2007:

"Today, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia directly responsible for the disappearance of Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev, the former Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, in May 2000, in violation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court found that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Ruslan must be presumed dead following his unacknowledged detention by State servicemen.

The Court also found violations of Articles 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), and 13 (right to an effective remedy). It awarded the applicant 40,000 euros as moral damages. The applicant, Zura Alikhadzhiyeva, Ruslan's mother, was represented by the London-based European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC) and the Russian NGO, Memorial.

On 17 May 2000, Ruslan was detained at his home in the presence of his family. He was 38 at the time and was married with four children. Five of Ruslan's neighbours were also arrested on the same day. The Court found that "the fact that a large group of armed men in uniform, equipped with military vehicles and helicopters, proceeded in broad daylight to apprehend several persons at their homes in a town area strongly supports the applicant's allegation that these were State servicemen".

From statements made by the neighbours, who were released the following day, it is known that they, and Ruslan, were blindfolded and taken to a nearby location where they were held in an underground room, hit on the head with an iron rod and questioned by masked servicemen.

The Court found that Ruslan's detention was not logged in any custody records and that there was no official trace of his subsequent whereabouts or fate. This was held to be:

"a most serious failing, since it enables those responsible for an act of deprivation of liberty to conceal their involvement in a crime, to cover their tracks and to escape accountability for the fate of a detainee".

ECHR, 27 July 2006:

"The applicant submitted that in August 1999 her son went to Grozny, Chechnya, and that she had not heard from him since.

On 2 February 2000, she saw her son being interrogated by a Russian officer in a television news programme about the capturing of the village of Alkhan-Kala² (also called Yermolovka). She later obtained a full copy of the recording, made by a reporter for NTV (Russian Independent TV) and CNN. At the end of the questioning the officer in charge gave instructions for the soldiers to "finish off" and "shoot" the applicant's son. The CNN journalists who filmed the interrogation later identified the interrogating officer as Colonel-General Alexander Baranov, the commander of the troops which captured Alkhan-Kala.

Immediately after 2 February 2000 the applicant began a search for her son, visiting detention centres and prisons and applying to various authorities. In August 2000 she was informed that her son was not being held in any prison in Russia.

In November 2000 a military prosecutor issued a decision not to open a criminal investigation into Mr Yandiyev's disappearance. A month later the same prosecutor stated that there were no reasons to conclude that military servicemen were responsible for the actions shown in the videotape [...]

The Court noted that, the investigation was opened a year and five months after the events at issue and was plagued by inexplicable delays. Furthermore, it appeared to the Court that most of the actions necessary for solving the crime occurred only after December 2003, when the applicant's complaint was communicated to the Russian Government. The Court found that those delays alone compromised the effectiveness of the investigation and could not but have had a negative impact on the prospects of arriving at the truth.

The Court also noted a number of serious omissions including, in particular, the failure to identify or question some of the servicemen in charge of the detainees. Many of the omissions were evident to the prosecutors, who ordered certain steps to be taken. However, their instructions were either not followed or were followed with an unacceptable delay.

In the light of those circumstances, the Court found that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and presumed death of Mr Yandiyev [...]

Concerning the applicant's complaint regarding the suffering inflicted upon her in relation to her son's disappearance, the Court noted that the applicant was Mr Yandiyev's mother, and had seen her son, on video, being questioned and led off by soldiers following remarks inferring that he would be executed. Furthermore, despite her requests, the applicant had never received any plausible explanation or information as to what became of her son following his detention. The Court found that those facts caused her to suffer distress and anguish. It further considered that the manner in which her complaints had been dealt with by the authorities could be construed as amounting to inhuman treatment [...]

The Court further considered that the authorities should have been alert to the need to investigate more thoroughly and promptly the applicant's complaints that her son was detained by the security forces and taken away in life-threatening circumstances. Instead they failed to take prompt and effective measures to safeguard Mr Yandiyev against the risk of disappearance. Moreover, the Court noted that as late as December 2000 the authorities continued to deny the involvement of federal servicemen in Mr Yandiyev's apprehension. Accordingly, the Court found that Mr Yandiyev was held in unacknowledged detention in the complete absence of the safeguards contained in Article 5 and that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security of person guaranteed by that provision."

Prague Watchdog, 27 July 2007:

"At the Moscow press conference, Oleg Orlov, the chairman of the board of the Memorial Human Rights Centre, announced that if today's verdicts – one on Novye Aldy and the other on the "Musayeva and Others" case – are counted, 14 rulings on Chechen cases have now been issued by the European Court of Human Rights.

Memorial lawyer Natalya Kravchuk added that there were several interesting features in the Court's [Musayev and Others] ruling. "They include the recognition of the right of the victims' relatives, who witnessed their deaths, to compensation for mental suffering. It appears that in the course of the Chechnya-related cases there has been a development in jurisprudence. These cases set precedents which will benefit not only ourselves, but also human rights defenders from other countries."

[...] Baisayev says that premeditated crimes of this type also take place elsewhere in the world."For example, on Oct. 23, 1993, a Croatian unit raided the Bosnian village of Stupni-do, where more than 500 people lived. 37 civilians were killed as a result of the raid. This case is striking, as it bears a complete similarity to what happened in Aldy. It was the same thing – unjustifiable atrocities and violence by the military. However, the people who were guilty of the massacre got their due. Ivica Rajic, the officer in command of the detachment, was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment by the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the group commander, Tihomir Blazkic, got 45 years. But we see no such desire on Russia's part to punish those who are guilty. On the contrary, when they finally did manage to establish the identity of one of the people involved in the "mop-up" at Aldy, an OMON officer named Banin from St Petersburg – he escaped, and is now a fugitive."

[...] A Memorial worker who wished to remain anonymous noted that the number of applicants with various complaints against the security forces has recently declined sharply. In his opinion, this is due to the fact that the crimes have mainly been committed by local security officials, who intimidate the relatives of those who have been killed or abducted, threatening all the members of the families with extremely unpleasant consequences if they apply to human rights workers."

AI 23 May 2007:

"The European Court issued its first ruling in a case concerning enforced disappearance in Chechnya on 27 July 2006. In Bazorkina v. Russia, the Court ruled that the Russian Federation

had violated the right to life and the right to liberty and security as well as the right to an effective remedy (Articles 2, 5 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The case was brought by Fatima Bazorkina, the mother of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiev, who disappeared in February 2000. The court also ruled that the manner in which Fatima Bazorkina's complaints were dealt with by the authorities constituted inhuman treatment (Article 3).

The European Court has issued rulings in two other cases of enforced disappearance where the victim's whereabouts remain unknown: Baysayeva v Russia, and Imakayeva v Russia. A third case, Luluyev and others v Russia, concerns the enforced disappearance of three women whose bodies were discovered several months later in a mass grave near the Russian federal military base at Khankala. A fourth case, Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, concerned the enforced disappearance and killing of Shamil Akhmadov. In all these cases, the European Court has ruled the Russian government has violated fundamental rights, including the right to life and the right to an effective remedy."

For information on other ECHR judgments on cases relating to the conflict in Chechnya, visit the [ECHR website](#). or the [EHRAC website](#).

See also "[Rights court orders Russia to pay damages in Chechnya killings](#)," Washington Post, 27 July 2007.

NGO response

NGOs play a key role in the provision of assistance and protection to IDPs in the Northern Caucasus (2007)

- Local and national human rights NGOs monitor the situation of IDPs in Northern Caucasus, despite threats to their security
- NGOs provide assistance to IDPs in the rest of the Russian Federation
- 15 international NGOs are present in the Northern Caucasus
- International Human Rights NGOs have documented human rights violations during the Chechen conflict

In the North Caucasus, the role of national and local NGOs has been instrumental for the protection of Chechen IDPs. They implement humanitarian assistance programmes, generally with the financial support of international organisations. However, this is not done without risk. Local NGOs and human rights advocates in the North Caucasus are exposed to serious threats, such as attacks and abduction.

Local and national NGOs are also very active to provide support to IDPs in the rest of the Russian Federation. In urban centres, organisations such the Civic Assistance Committee in Moscow, provide legal advice and social assistance to IDPs and other migrants, helping them to access public services, social allowances and the judicial system (see website of [Civic Assistance Committee](#) [Internet]). With the support of the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Russian Red Cross also provides support to migrants, including IDPs, in several regions of the Russian Federation.

Although exposed to insecurity, bureaucratic obstruction and intimidation, international NGOs are present in the northern Caucasus. They usually implement at least some of their programmes as

implementing partners of inter-governmental organisations. In the sector of food assistance, the Danish Refugee Council, Islamic Relief and People in Need Foundation have been among the major partners of WFP and FAO in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Since 2000, the Danish Refugee Council has developed and maintained a database on IDPs in Ingushetia and vulnerable groups in need of assistance in Chechnya and Dagestan, providing regularly updated statistics on these groups (see website of the [Danish Refugee Council in the Russian Federation](#) [Internet]).

International human rights have also been strong advocates for IDPs. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Helsinki Federation have visited Ingushetia and Chechnya on several occasions since the beginning of the second conflict and documented in details the plight of IDPs and civilians populations in northern Caucasus.

In 2006, amendments to a law governing NGOs in Russia came into force, requiring re-registration of international NGOs. All 15 international NGOs operating in the North Caucasus were successfully registered, though their work was slowed during the process.

Recommendations for international and Russian NGOs (2007)

- Memorial recommends that international and Russian NGOs, as well as UNHCR pay particular attention to IDPs from mountainous areas and that the European Commission allocate funds for settlement of such IDPs in the plains and in the mountains, when the conditions allow

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"Международным, иностранным и российским гуманитарным и правозащитным организациям

1. Обратить внимание на ВПЛ из горных сел как группу населения Чечни, имеющую специфические проблемы и потребности и нуждающуюся в помощи.
2. УВКБ ООН - рассмотреть вопрос о признании этой группы мигрантов в качестве ВПЛ и включить ее в свой мандат.
3. Другим гуманитарным организациям - разработать и осуществить программы помощи ВПЛ, в том числе такие, как
 - помощь семьям, имеющим детей школьного возраста, при подготовке детей к учебному году,
 - помощь в получении среднего образования молодежи, не прошедшей курс общеобразовательной школы из-за военных действий,
 - помощь выпускникам средних школ в получении профессионального образования,
 - помощь наиболее способным выпускникам средних школ в получении высшего образования,
 - помощь в организации малых предприятий и создании рабочих мест.
4. Еврокомиссии - рассмотреть вопрос о выделении средств на помощь ВПЛ из горных сел в обустройстве на равнине и в горах – в случае их добровольного возвращения.
5. Действующим в Чечне правозащитным организациям оказывать ВПЛ помощь в защите их прав, в том числе в вопросах регистрации, получения социальной и медицинской помощи, выплаты компенсаций, предоставления и закрепления земельных участков. Обратить особое внимание на ситуацию с регистрацией, выделением и закреплением земельных участков в с. Иласхан-Юрт."

Pressure on human rights defenders and NGOs (2006)

- Amendments to law governing NGOs came into force in 2006 and slowed the work of international NGOs in Chechnya and Russia
- Human rights activists faced pressure, including tax threats, administrative inspections, arrests
- National NGO staff working in Chechnya abducted in 2006

ECRE, 22 March 2007:

"Meanwhile, changes to the law governing NGOs in the Russian Federation caused delays in the work of several international NGOs working in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The same legislation has caused severe concerns for Russian NGOs working on human rights issues in Chechnya, who up until the present day have been the main source of monitoring the situation there."

IHF, 1 May 2007:

"Human rights activists were subjected to growing pressure. They faced, inter alia, threats, defamation in state and state-controlled media, arbitrary tax controls and other administrative inspections, arrests and interrogations, searches of their homes and offices, politically motivated charges and abuse. The situation was most critical for human rights defenders working in the North Caucasus, as well as groups based elsewhere that addressed issues relating to the so-called anti-terrorism activities conducted in this region. Among these groups was the Russian Chechen Friendship Society.

...New problematic provisions to the 2002 anti-extremism law were adopted in July, reinforcing concerns that the law may be interpreted to impede legitimate civil society activities. In recent years, there have been several cases in which anti-extremism provisions have been used against outspoken civil society activists and groups.

The situation with respect to freedom of association worsened significantly in 2006, and civil society groups experienced growing difficulties in carrying out their activities.

Restrictive amendments to the laws on non-commercial and public organizations, which were adopted in late 2005, came into force in April. This legislation provided for enhanced oversight of NGOs, in particular those receiving funding from abroad. It, *inter alia*, introduced stricter registration procedures and new cumbersome reporting obligations for NGOs and vested the authorities with wide powers to close down NGOs, thus opening up an avenue for arbitrary and discriminatory measures. All foreign NGOs operating in Russia were required to re-register by mid-October, a deadline which hundreds of groups failed to meet, frequently because of technical and bureaucratic difficulties created by authorities. While these groups were granted additional time to revise or complement their applications, they were forced to suspend their activities pending a re-consideration of their cases.

Restrictive tax legislation also created serious obstacles for the activities of NGOs, and numerous leading NGOs well-known for their critical positions were subjected to punitive measures by tax authorities, such as lengthy inspections resulting in the imposition of high fines. "

Memorial, 31 July 2006, p. 48:

"The head of the organization Let's Save the Generation Murad Muradov and a member of this organization Ismayil Kadayev were abducted on April 15, 2005, by officers from an unidentified security agency when a special operation was conducted in the Ippodromny Micro-District of the city of Grozny.

On April 9, 2006, at around 12:00 p.m., at the intersection on the Sernovodsk-Assinovskaya "Caucasus" federal highway, unknown people abducted Aslan Israilov and Bulat

Chilayev. Bulat Sultanovich Chilayev (born 1979), lives in the town of Sernovodsk and works at the human rights organization Civic Assistance Committee in the program of medical assistance for sick people from Chechnya...Despite all the efforts that have been taken, A. Israilov and B. Chilayev have not been found."

See also "NGO temporarily closes doors after office raid," *The Moscow Times*, 23 April 2007.

Recommendations to the federal and Chechen governments (2007)

- Memorial recommends that the Russian and Chechen governments register IDPs from mountainous villages and refrain from pressuring them to return to their original place of residence, renew compensation program for IDPs from the mountains and ensure the program runs without corruption, allocate them land plots for construction of housing and extend the reconstruction program to mountainous areas

Мемориал, 15 марта 2007 г.:

"Правительствам Российской Федерации и Чеченской Республики

1. Принять меры к прекращению практики отказов ВПЛ из горных сел в местах их нынешнего расселения в оформлении регистрации, в предоставлении бесплатной медицинской и социальной помощи, выделении земельных участков под строительство.
2. Отказаться от политики и практики давления на ВПЛ из горных сел с целью принуждения их к возвращению на прежнее место жительства.
3. Возобновить выплату компенсаций ВПЛ из горных сел. Принять меры к исключению коррупции в процессе выплаты компенсаций.
4. Исключить возможность применения насилия по отношению к мирному населению и нанесения ущерба его имуществу со стороны расквартированных в горах воинских подразделений.
5. В качестве необходимых подготовительных мер для добровольного возвращения ВПЛ
 - организовать масштабные работы по разминированию в горных районах Чечни,
 - провести масштабные работы по восстановлению инфраструктуры в горных районах Чечни,
 - Правительству РФ - принять решение о выделении средств из федерального бюджета для оказания помощи ВПЛ из горных сел на переезд, строительство жилья и обустройство."

References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Known references to the Guiding Principles (2007)

Updated information on this topic could not be found among the sources consulted.

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None

Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

<p>UNHCR survey on the shelter situation and property status of IDPs living in temporary accommodation in Ingushetia and Chechnya: "The Guiding principles on Internal Displacement place great emphasis on the freedom for IDPs to choose to return to their areas of origin or to integrate locally in the areas of current displacement. At the same time, the Principles emphasise clear responsibilities for the national authorities by remitting on them the "primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country" and by requesting them to "endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons"."</p>
Source: UNHCR
Date: 30 June 2007

<p>Official support to the Guiding Principles: In a meeting with the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs, Dr. Francis Deng, Deputy Foreign Minister Fedotov noted that the Federal Government accepted its responsibility vis-à-vis the displaced and intended to continue to cooperate with the United Nations. He stated that the Government saw the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as helpful in the legal protection of IDPs. He stressed that it was important also to have a national framework to address the IDP issue, and that it should be based on existing international human rights and humanitarian instruments. The Representative shared a copy of Guiding Principles: Annotations by Professor Walter Kälin, which had been translated into Russian. The Annotations illustrate how the Guiding Principles are based on and rooted in binding international law.</p>
Source: The Representative of the UN Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Francis M. Deng
Date: September 2003
Documents: Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Francis D. Deng, Addendum, Profiles in Displacement: the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/2004/77/Add.2, 24 February 2004 [Internet] Guiding Principles: Annotations, by Professor Walter Kälin (Russian version) [Internet]

<p>International Conference on Internal Displacement in the Russian Federation: The Conference was organized by the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Moscow-based NGO "Partnership on Migration", and the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement. The 70 participants included government experts and officials who deal with issues relating to forced migration, representatives of local NGOs and displaced communities, local academics and lawyers, representatives of regional and international organizations and international NGOs working in the country, as well as international experts, including Francis Deng, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. The Guiding Principles were acknowledged as a useful tool for the development of a migration policy framework and for the review of existing legislation and regulations. Participants also recommended that the Guiding Principles should serve as a framework for training and education seminars.</p>
Source: The Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement - Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences - Partnership on Migration
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Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

The Guiding Principles have been translated into the Russian language.

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