

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

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This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Who would the “local security people” be – the police or the intelligence service?
2. What powers do they have?
3. What is the political tension like between North and South Korea?
4. What security checks are there at the airports for persons departing South Korea?

RESPONSE

1. Who would the “local security people” be – the police or the intelligence service?

It is difficult to ascertain, from the context in which the term “local security people” is used, whether it applies to the police or the intelligence service. In Korea, generally, the terms security forces or security apparatus may refer to the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA), National Intelligence Service (NIS), army, navy or maritime police personnel. Locally, and in context, the terms may refer to either the police or the NIS. According to the US State Department the “civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces” (‘National Police Agency’ 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/npa.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006 – Attachment 1; ‘National Intelligence Service’ 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006 – Attachment 2; ‘South Korea/North Korea: South Korea to set up joint command post to prevent defections to North’ 2005, *Yonhap*, 13 June www.bbcmonitoringonline.com – Accessed 21 June 2005 – Attachment 3; US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – Republic of Korea*, 8 March, [‘Introduction’] – Attachment 4).

2. What powers do they have?

In response to this question information is provided on the Korean National Police Agency and the National Intelligence Service.

Korean National Police Agency

The KNPA is under the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. It numbers about 93,000 with a national headquarters in Seoul, five special agencies, including the Maritime Police, 13 provincial headquarters, 220 police stations, and 3,389 branch offices. The KNPA is considered to be well disciplined and corruption and impunity were not major problems. There are no local municipal police systems or state police departments similar to those in some western nations (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – Republic of Korea*, 8 March, Sect.1.d 'Role of the Police and Security Apparatus' – Attachment 4; 'National Police Agency' 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/npa.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006 – Attachment 1).

According to the KNPA website its duties cover public welfare services, crime prevention, traffic control, national security and international crimes ('Missions' (undated), Korean National Police Agency website <http://www.police.go.kr/eng/index.jsp> – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 5).

The US State Department referred to police arresting and detaining suspects, interrogation, approving and attending demonstrations, restricting the movement of some former prisoners, attending domestic violence incidents, dealing with illegal immigrants and dealing with striking unionists (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – Republic of Korea*, 8 March, Sect.1.d 'Arrest and Detention', Sect.2.b 'Freedom of Assembly', Sect.2.d 'Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation', Sect.5 'Women', Sect.5 'National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities', Sect.6.b 'The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively' – Attachment 4).

Information on the Federation of American Scientists website notes that the police also perform "various surveillance activities to guard against the appearance of anarchistic ideology struggle; reappearance of anti-democratic and anti-government violence" ('National Police Agency' 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/npa.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006 – Attachment 1).

It is of interest that the US State Department reports on arrest and detention under the National Security Law (NSL) as follows:

However, rules regarding arrest and detention under the National Security Law (NSL) are vague. For example, the NSL defines espionage in broad terms and permits the authorities to detain and arrest persons who commit acts viewed as supporting North Korea and therefore deemed dangerous to the country. The NSL permits the imprisonment for up to seven years of anyone who "with the knowledge that he might endanger the existence or security of the state or the basic order of free democracy,

praised, encouraged, propagandized for, or sided with the activities of an antistate organization.” The legal standard for what constitutes “endangering the security of the State” is vague. Thus, persons could be arrested for the peaceful expression of views that the government considered pro-North Korean or antistate. Between January and August authorities arrested 16 persons for alleged NSL violations.

Because of the vagueness of the NSL and the invocation of classified security threat information regarding the Korean Peninsula, the government was relieved of the burden of proof that any particular speech or action in fact threatens the nation’s security.

The UN Human Rights Committee has termed the NSL “a major obstacle to the full realization of the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Proposals to annul or substantially revise the NSL were under review in the National Assembly (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – Republic of Korea*, 8 March, Sect.1.d ‘Arbitrary Arrest or Detention’ – Attachment 4).

A copy of an unofficial translation of South Korea’s *National Security Law* is attached (‘S Korea’s *National Security Law*’, The law came into effect on 25 February 1988 www.kimsoft.com/korea/nsl_en.htm – Accessed 13 January 1997 – Attachment 6).

National Intelligence Service

The NIS is South Korea’s premier intelligence/security organisation responsible for internal and external national security (Moran, Jon 2003, ‘Making Intelligence Accountable: Legislative and Executive Oversight in Old and New Democracies: South Korea’s National Intelligence Service’, Paper prepared for the Workshop on “Making Intelligence Accountable”, September, p.5 http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_moran.pdf – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 7).

Information accessed from the Federation of American Scientists website mentions that the NIS’s missions and functions include the investigation of crimes affecting national security which include crimes violating the Military Secrecy Protection Law and the NSL. The laws prohibit the incitement of civil war, foreign troubles and insurrection (‘National Intelligence Service’ 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006 – Attachment 2).

According to Moran, the NIS has 7-9,000 members and three major sections – international affairs, North Korea affairs and domestic affairs. He notes that the domestic affairs section has an anti-communism bureau which investigates long-term North Korea agents in South Korea; a political department gathering intelligence on political funding (a source of corruption and links to the North); and a media department collecting information on TV and newspaper companies (Moran, Jon 2003, ‘Making Intelligence Accountable: Legislative and Executive Oversight in Old and New Democracies: South Korea’s National Intelligence Service’, Paper prepared for the Workshop on “Making Intelligence Accountable”, September, p.12 http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_moran.pdf – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 7).

Moran writes:

Each section is responsible for collecting information, planning and co-ordination, threat assessment and counter-intelligence and criminal investigation. The NIS has powers to get information from Ministries and other government agencies. The NIS has criminal investigation powers in areas related to national security. In practice this is a wide remit. Laws covering national security such as the National Security Law (hereafter NSL) and the Military Security Protection Law are wide in scope (Moran, Jon 2003, 'Making Intelligence Accountable: Legislative and Executive Oversight in Old and New Democracies: South Korea's National Intelligence Service', Paper prepared for the Workshop on "Making Intelligence Accountable", September, p.12 http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_moran.pdf – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 7).

The NSL is said to be the main law covering intelligence agencies. The law is very wide in scope and covers a wide definition of offences which the NIS is empowered to investigate. For example, Moran notes the "'anti-state' acts clause" can cover many acts which in other countries would be classed as political activities and might attract only surveillance (Moran, Jon 2003, 'Making Intelligence Accountable: Legislative and Executive Oversight in Old and New Democracies: South Korea's National Intelligence Service', Paper prepared for the Workshop on "Making Intelligence Accountable", September, p.17 http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_moran.pdf – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 7).

Moran also states that where there is a conflict of jurisdiction between the NIS and the police, the NIS has priority (Moran, Jon 2003, 'Making Intelligence Accountable: Legislative and Executive Oversight in Old and New Democracies: South Korea's National Intelligence Service', Paper prepared for the Workshop on "Making Intelligence Accountable", September, p.15 http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_moran.pdf – Accessed 2 November 2006 – Attachment 7).

3. What is the political tension like between North and South Korea?

Since North Korea's nuclear test on 9 October 2006 country sources indicate that, although tensions between South Korea and the North are rising, South Korea does not wish to make a move to cause instability in North Korea. South Korea's president, Roh Moo-hyun, as well as his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, has carried out a "sunshine" policy of engagement with the North. The policy seeks to bring about a state of peaceful coexistence in the Korean Peninsula by effecting changes in North Korea through reconciliation, cooperation, and mutual exchange. A key tenet of the "sunshine" policy is consistency, that is, aid and economic co-operation would continue, even through provocations and perceived lack of political progress.

RRT Country Research had recently prepared the attached response on the tension between North and South Korea (note: the response was prepared before North Korea's nuclear test on 9 October 2006) (RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response KOR30672*, 28 September – Attachment 8).

On 31 October 2006 North Korea agreed to resume the six-party talks (involving North Korea, China, USA, Japan, Russia and South Korea) on dismantling its nuclear programme. Although a firm date has not yet been set for the talks, South Korea welcomed the news that the talks are back on ('Talking again' 2006, *The Economist*, 2 November http://www.economist.com/world/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=8112173 – Accessed 3

November 2006 – Attachment 9; ‘Geopolitical Diary: A Return to Six-Party Talks’ 2006, *STRATFOR*, 1 November – Attachment 10).

On 1 November 2006 the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported:

North Korea Pyongyang launched first nuclear test 9 October, escalating fears of regional instability and forcing U.S. and other powers to confront reality of weaponised North Korea. UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 14 October, calling on North Korea to end its nuclear program and imposing sanctions. China and South Korea demurred on full slate of sanctions, while Pyongyang said unwilling to return to talks unless U.S. withdraws financial sanctions imposed in September 2005. North agreed return to 6-party talks 31 October, due by year-end, but short-term prospects for settlement dim. World Food Programme warned of humanitarian disaster if food stocks not bolstered before winter (International Crisis Group 2006, ‘North East Asia’, *CrisisWatch*, 1 November, No. 39, p.6 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2006/cw39_final.pdf – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 11).

STRATFOR noted, on 25 October 2006, that “amid rising tensions following North Korea’s nuclear test” South Korea’s Unification Minister had offered to resign and that the Defense Minister and the Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister had already resigned (‘S. Korea: Unification Minister Resigns’ 2006, *STRATFOR*, 25 October – Attachment 12).

Two other *STRATFOR* reports commented on the attitude of the South Korean government towards the nuclear test as follows:

...South Korea is far more worried about a conventional war than North Korean nukes, and does not want the government in Pyongyang to fall under any circumstances. The task of integrating a post-Communist North Korea with the South would cripple South Korea for decades. The South Koreans are not happy North Korea tested a nuke, but they are not about to do anything to destabilize the situation (‘Geopolitical Diary: The Non-Reactions to the North Korean Test’ 2006, *STRATFOR*, 13 October – Attachment 13);

and

South Korea: Seoul does not want Pyongyang to have a nuclear device, but it also does not want the slightest chance of a war with North Korea – South Korea’s industrial heartland is too close to the border. Nor does Seoul want the regime in Pyongyang to fall; the idea of the South taking responsibility for rebuilding a shattered North Korea is not attractive. The South Koreans didn’t want the North to acquire nuclear weapons, but they were not prepared to act to stop Pyongyang, or to destabilize the regime (Friedman, George 2006, ‘North Korea and the Limits of Multilateralism’, *STRATFOR*, 17 October – Attachment 14).

On 24 October 2006 *Jane’s Intelligence Review* wrote on South Korea’s reaction to the tests:

Seoul’s dilemma

South Korea faces the most difficult decisions of all the members in the six-party mechanism. The administrations of President Roh Moo-hyun and his predecessor Kim Dae-jung have invested enormous actual and political capital in their ‘sunshine’ policy of engagement with Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear test has exacerbated the already apparent internal and external pressures on Seoul.

Internally, criticisms of the engagement policy have grown. Demonstrations, while involving relatively small numbers of protesters, have been a noisy regular feature in downtown Seoul since the test. However, the so-called 'south-south' divide over the engagement policy toward the North is often misunderstood. While the policy does provoke passionate debate, the vast majority of Koreans are in favour of engagement with North Korea. The issues that divide them are the nature and degree of that engagement, and the lack of reciprocity from Pyongyang, which gains considerably from South Korea's ethnic and fraternal solidarity and largesse. South Korean public opposition to the North's nuclear test, therefore, has to be seen in parallel with widespread opposition to the Bush administration and disagreement with what is seen as a dangerous attempt by Washington to undermine the democratically elected South Korean government's chosen policy and destabilise the already tense situation. Pyongyang's nuclear test, of course, has massively increased the South Korean public's fear of further conflict on their small, densely populated peninsula.

Externally, the biggest problem for Seoul will be the strain imposed on its already difficult relationships with friends and foes. The contradiction between the demands of Korean ethnic solidarity on the one hand and loyalty to its closest long-standing ally and friend on the other has been rendered more acute than ever by Pyongyang's test. Further, the raised tensions after the test, coupled with the lack of reciprocity from North Korea, despite an already approved USD1 billion-plus 2006/07 South Korean aid budget, are sharp reminders of Seoul's lack of relative political weight in the nuclear stand-off between Washington and Pyongyang.

October's events will therefore prove to be the biggest test yet of Seoul's 'sunshine' policy with North Korea. With external allies pressing for tougher sanctions and isolation of the North, and internal opinion divided over the level of engagement required, Seoul faces a difficult balancing act between these conflicting and diverging poles. One of the key tenets of the 'sunshine' policy was always consistency – in other words, that aid and economic co-operation would continue despite provocations or perceived lack of political progress. In the medium term, this may well prove to be true, but Washington's influence on Seoul is likely to encourage a harder line in the short term than the South has previously been willing to follow ('Nuclear fallout: international responses to North Korea's test' 2006, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 24 October – Attachment 15).

The Economist has also reported:

Though Mr Roh's government has given its approval to stiff American-led sanctions against North Korea, which were passed by the UN Security Council on October 14th, it in fact shows little appetite for confrontation. That is partly because many South Koreans share a blind faith in the ultimate benign nature of the North's brutal regime – about which they are remarkably ill-informed. On October 25th North Korea said the South's participation in the sanctions would be a "declaration of confrontation" for which it would pay "a high price".

Most Southerners think the North's crude nuclear capability does not represent a big new threat to them. North Korean artillery, after all, has long been positioned within range of Seoul's northern suburbs. Meanwhile, South Korea's predominant political consensus, says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul, is to seek gradual change north of the border in ways that might eventually narrow the vast income gap between the two sides. Tightening the screws too far risks goading Mr Kim to strike back. A collapse of the regime, followed by reunification, would impose unbearable costs on the South. Even the opposition GNP, says Park Jin, a member of the party, believes in maintaining dialogue with the North, while adding some pressure.

It is a path that is likely to lead South Korea increasingly into conflict with America, which wants stiffer confrontation with the North. In annual bilateral defence talks last week in Washington, DC, America's secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, pressed South Korea to join the American-led Proliferation Security Initiative, which is designed to interdict ships carrying material for weapons of mass destruction. The South Korean government is vacillating, fearing that this would rile the North and so increase the nuclear threat ('Testing times' 2006, *The Economist*, 26 October http://www.economist.com/world/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=8086794 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 16).

4. What security checks are there at the airports for persons departing South Korea?

Information on the Lonely Planet website notes that the international airport is in Incheon, 60 kms from Seoul. The Gimpo international airport in Seoul operates mostly domestic flights with a limited service to Japan. International airports in Busan and Jeju have services to China and Japan. In this RRT Country Research Response information is provided on Incheon International Airport ('South Korea Transport: Overview' (undated), Lonely Planet website <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/destinations/asia/south-korea/transport#> – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 17).

[Lonely Planet guidebooks strive to provide travellers everywhere with reliable, comprehensive and independent travel information. Lonely Planet authors are seasoned travellers who are also writers and researchers. Travellers can also submit information on a voluntary basis. The guidebooks provide general information on the country's history, culture, environment, health and language. The guidebooks also provide information on cities and towns with reference to accommodation, transport and entertainment. Lonely Planet guidebooks provide useful maps of regions, cities and towns. Most Lonely Planet guidebooks are updated on a two-year cycle. Lonely Planet can be a useful research tool for general background information only such as the location of a place of worship in a town, the address of a post office, the contact details of a hospital, the time taken to travel from A to B etc. **Care should be exercised when using Lonely Planet for any other reason.]**

The information below on departure procedures, including security checks, was accessed from Incheon International Airport's website. Also, a virtual tour of departure and arrival procedures is located on that website at: http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iiia?_scode=C1202030900&fake=1162522970712.

The following steps are taken in departing Incheon International Airport:

1. Boarding Check-in

Boarding check-in procedures are set out in: 'Boarding Check-in' 2006, Incheon International Airport website http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iiia?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162519475412 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 18.

The check-in counters are located on the third floor of the building. A plan of the third floor is attached ('3rd floor' (undated), Incheon International Airport website http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iiia?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162520343791 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 19).

The website has also listed the check-in counter locations for the various airlines using the airport ('About check-in counters' (undated), Incheon International Airport website Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162519475412 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 20).

2. Baggage Check-in

Baggage check-in procedures are set out in: 'Baggage Check-in' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030800&fake=1162520356516 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 21.

The baggage check-in is located on the third floor of the building. A plan of the third floor is attached ('3rd floor' (undated), Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162520343791 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 19).

3. Departure Cards

How to fill out a departure card is set out in ('Preparing an (sic) Departure Card' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030200&fake=1162521334806 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 22).

Since 1 November 2005 Korean citizens only need to fill out a departure card which is submitted to the departure immigrations officer. A copy of an arrival/departure card is also attached ('Republic of Korea E/D Cards' (undated), Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030200&fake=1162521334806 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 23).

4. Quarantine Declaration

Quarantine declaration procedures are set out in Attachment 24('Quarantine Declaration' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030300&fake=1162521372550 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 24).

The quarantine location is on the 2nd floor ('2nd floor, 1st floor' (undated), Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030300&fake=1162521372550 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 25).

5. Customs Declaration

Customs declaration procedures are set out in Attachment 26 ('Customs Declaration' 2006,

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030400&fake=1162521768902 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 26).

Customs declaration is located on the third floor of the building. A plan of the third floor can be found in Attachment 19 ('3rd floor' (undated), Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162520343791 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 19).

6. Security Screening

Security screening procedures are set out in Attachment 27 ('Security Screening' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030500&fake=1162522450853 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 27).

7. Departure Immigration

Departure immigration procedures are set out in Attachment 28 ('Departure Immigration' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030600&fake=1162522508359 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 28).

8. Boarding

Boarding procedures are set out in Attachment 29 ('Boarding' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030700&fake=1162522729012 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 29).

9. Passenger Service Charge/Passenger Departure Tax

Fees and exemptions for the Passenger Service Charge and Passenger Departure Tax are set out in Attachment 30 ('Passenger Service Charge/Passenger Departure Tax' 2006, Incheon International Airport website

http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030900&fake=1162522970712 – Accessed 3 November 2006 – Attachment 30).

In August 2006 security levels were tightened at Korean airports due to a bombing attempt at London's Heathrow Airport. Security levels were increased from "blue" to "yellow" – red is the highest level, followed by orange, yellow, blue and green ('Incheon Airport daily travelers exceed 100,000' 2006, *Korea.net news*, 13 August – Attachment 31; 'Security Check Doubled for US-Bound Flights' 2006, *Korea Times*, 16 August – Attachment 32).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Region Specific Links

Chosun Ilbo <http://english.chosun.com/>

Dong-A Ilbo <http://english.donga.com/>

Korea Times <http://times.hankooki.com/>

Topic Specific Links

Korean National Police Agency <http://www.police.go.kr/eng/index.jsp>

Search Engines

Google search engine <http://www.google.com.au/>

Online Subscription Services

Jane's Intelligence Review

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database)

BACIS (DIMA Country Information database)

REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database)

ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports)

RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. 'National Police Agency' 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/npa.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006.
2. 'National Intelligence Service' 1999, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 18 July, Federation of American Scientists website <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis.htm> – Accessed 1 November 2006.
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http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2006/cw39_final.pdf – Accessed 3 November 2006.
12. 'S. Korea: Unification Minister Resigns' 2006, *STRATFOR*, 25 October.
13. 'Geopolitical Diary: The Non-Reactions to the North Korean Test' 2006, *STRATFOR*, 13 October.
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15. 'Nuclear fallout: international responses to North Korea's test' 2006, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 24 October.
16. 'Testing times' 2006, *The Economist*, 26 October
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18. 'Boarding Check-in' 2006, Incheon International Airport website
http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030100&fake=1162519475412 – Accessed 3 November 2006.
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28. 'Departure Immigration' 2006, Incheon International Airport website
http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030600&fake=1162522508359 – Accessed 3 November 2006.
29. 'Boarding' 2006, Incheon International Airport website
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http://www.airinfo.co.kr/iacms/pageWork.iaa?_scode=C1202030900&fake=1162522970712 – Accessed 3 November 2006.
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