



TBBC Programme Report : January to June 2007  
including funding appeal



# Introduction

This six-month report describes the programme and activities of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) during the period January to June 2007.

TBBC is a consortium of currently ten NGOs from eight countries working to provide food, shelter, non-food items and capacity-building support to Burmese refugees and displaced persons. It also engages in research into the root causes of displacement and refugee outflows. Membership is open to other NGOs with similar interests. TBBC's head office is in Bangkok, with field offices in the border towns of Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot and Sangklaburi.

TBBC works in cooperation with the Royal Thai Government and in accordance with regulations of the Ministry of Interior. It is an active member of the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand, committed to coordination of all humanitarian service and protection activities with the other 19 NGO members of CCSDPT and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. TBBC's programmes are implemented through partnerships with refugee committees, community-based organisations and local groups.

TBBC's programme is evolving as circumstances change, seeking to promote the self-reliance of displaced people through the utilisation and development of their own resources in preparation for long-term solutions. TBBC will be willing to support voluntary repatriation of the refugees when the situation allows safe and dignified return to Burma, and to assist, as appropriate, in their subsequent rehabilitation.

TBBC is a company limited by guarantee in England and Wales, Company number 05255598, Charity Commission number 1109476. TBBC's registered office is at 35 Lower Marsh, London SE1 7RL.

## TBBC's Strategic Plan Objectives, 2005-2010

- To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter and non-food items for displaced Burmese people.
- To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation, embracing equity, gender and diversity.
- To empower displaced people and their communities by supporting and strengthening their capacities.
- To advocate with and for the people of Burma to increase understanding of the nature and root causes of conflict and displacement, in order to promote appropriate responses and ensure their human rights are respected.
- To develop organisational resources to enable TBBC to be more effective in pursuing its mission.



Wan Pieng Fa (June 2007)

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
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
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# Burma: States and Divisions



# Major Ethnic Groups of Burma



# Displaced Burmese June 2007



## Eastern Burma:

IDPs (including 12,000 Mon in resettlement sites) 500,000

## Thailand:

Refugees in camp 156,000

Refugees outside camp (including Shan) 200,000+

Migrant workers 2,000,000+

# 1. Summary and appeal for funds

**Appeal:** This report describes the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) programme during the first half of 2007 and constitutes an **appeal for an additional baht 126 million** (USD 4 million or EUR 3 million) **still required to cover expenditures in 2007, and baht 1,141 million for 2008** (USD 35 million or EUR 25 million).

**Opportunities:** For the first time in 23 years, TBBC is forecasting a budget for 2008 which is lower than the previous year; 5% lower than 2007. This is partly due to refugee departures for resettlement to third countries outnumbering new arrivals, and in part to taking some refugees off the ration lists who are not currently in the camps. TBBC's feeding population dropped by 4,449 to 146,807 (3%) during the period and for budgeting purposes is assumed to fall further to 134,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time, opportunities are beginning to open up for refugees to become more self-reliant offering, for the first time, the possibility that future funding requirements will stabilise and, hopefully, decline further.

These positive prospects are the result of two years of fruitful engagement with the Royal Thai Government (RTG), a process that is summarised in the latest CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan for 2007/8. The Plan sets out funding needs to both sustain existing services and to meet 'gaps' which include new activities aimed at improving refugee education and skills training opportunities and giving them more opportunity to earn income/ gain employment. Following a UNHCR consultancy, pilot livelihood projects are already being developed for waged employment and agriculture. TBBC has been very actively engaged in these planning processes and the integration of its nutrition and agriculture activities into one Food Security programme will form a basis for developing agriculture-related livelihood activities to potentially reduce food aid-dependency.

**Challenges:** These welcome developments are, however, occurring during very volatile times both in Burma and Thailand. In Burma the final session of the National Convention is underway but there remains little expectation that this process will result in anything other than a new form of military rule. Indeed the situation for the ethnic nationalities looks extremely dire. The cease-fire groups are faced with compromising their federal aspirations or returning to arms, and the non-cessate-fire groups find themselves under increasing military pressure. The situation in Karen State, in particular, remains very unstable due to the Burmese Army's ongoing military campaign in the north and fighting between factions in the south following the break away of the 'KNU/KNLA Peace Council'.

Thailand is hoping to put its own political struggles behind her with an election this year, and there has been no change in policy towards Burma in the interim. However, the Army does appear to be taking an increasingly tough stance towards unregistered refugees and the Provincial Admissions Boards have effectively ceased functioning. There is an urgent need for a screening process to ensure that genuine new refugees are granted asylum.

Whilst resettlement is part of the solution, it also brings its own challenges since the camps are losing some of the best educated and skilled people. A consultants' study of the impact of resettlement showed that health and education services will be particularly badly affected by the loss of the most educated and experienced workers. 60% of camp residents with post-10 education were already at some stage of the resettlement process in April.

Actual, as opposed to projected, refugee numbers in 2008 will depend on whether the resettlement programme can keep pace with expectations and whether there are significant new arrivals.

**Threats:** Unfortunately, TBBC is still under-funded by baht 126 million for 2007, largely due to strengthening of the Thai currency over the past two years reducing income in Thai baht by about 15%. An emergency appeal last year was successful in covering 2006 expenses and restoring a moderate reserve, but a significant part of the response was 'one-off'. Unless additional funds can be raised this year TBBC's reserves will be completely exhausted. The core level of funding is inadequate to sustain the programme at even the lower levels projected for 2008.

**The Task Ahead:** TBBC is taking a number of measures to try to ensure the programme is as efficient and sustainable as possible and to respond to the new trends and opportunities. A capacity builder has been recruited to work with camp committees to help strengthen their role in camp management and services. New procedures are being put in place for the calculation of feeding figures which have already produced benefits, food distribution procedures are also under review and more efficient bamboo procurement processes are being investigated.

But it is imperative that NGOs, UNHCR and Donors all work together with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to respond to these challenges. Donors in the past have tended to respond piece-meal to funding needs but have now established a working group to consider a more coordinated response. To facilitate this CCSDPT/ UNHCR hope to draw up a medium term strategy in cooperation with Donors and RTG to establish a common approach. Hopefully this will keep change on track.

For TBBC to play its role, however, it is vital to resolve the current funding shortfall. If not, refugee rations will have to be reduced from 1<sup>st</sup> January and this will have immediate negative impacts and repercussions. The health and well-being of the refugees will be immediately affected and the ability to pursue improved opportunities for refugees will be seriously weakened. TBBC will review options at the Donors meeting in Copenhagen in October, but meanwhile Donors are urged to consider how they can respond and ensure that the opportunity to bring about positive changes after 23 years will not be thrown in jeopardy.



## 2. Refugee situation January to June 2007

### a) Refugee populations

**Camp populations:** A brief summary of the history of the Burmese border situation is presented in Appendix F. According to TBBC's best estimates, the population in the ten camps in Thailand (including the Shan camp at Wieng Heng) was 156,560 at the end of June, compared with 153,882 recorded at the end of December, an increase of 2,687 over the 6 month period. This increase was the net effect of 2,227 births and 288 deaths, and 3,749 refugee departures for resettlement overseas, indicating approximately 4,500 new arrivals in the camps. The population of the Mon resettlement sites reported by the Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC) fell slightly during the period from 12,019 to 11,855 (see Section 2. d) below), Internally displaced: the situation in eastern Burma, Mon State below).

Accurate camp population figures are becoming increasingly difficult to determine because camp committees remain under pressure not to report new arrivals. Most of the Provincial Admissions Boards (PAB) have effectively ceased to function having now dealt with most of the new arrivals identified at the time of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registration exercise in 2005 (see below). As a result, population figures compiled by the different agencies concerned, UNHCR, MOI and the Department of Public Administration (DOPA) are widely divergent. Official UNHCR and MOI figures generally do not acknowledge new camp entries since 2005 (although UNHCR has presented some new arrivals for PAB consideration), whilst the DOPA figures are probably a more realistic estimate of actual numbers of people residing in the camps.

There are still significant numbers of genuine asylum seekers entering the camps fleeing fighting and human rights abuses in Burma, particularly in the Mae Sariang camps opposite northern Karen State where the Burmese Army is still engaged in heavy military operations, and in Tak Province where conflicts between the Karen National Union (KNU) and a Karen splinter group has led to sporadic, but sometimes heavy, fighting since the beginning of the year (see Section 2. d), Karen State below). However, it is clear that there are also significant numbers of people, mostly from Thailand, but some coming from Burma, who are entering the camps hoping to gain access to resettlement to third countries. This is placing a huge burden on the camp committees who have limited ability to control exactly who enters the camps. The map on the facing page shows TBBC's best estimates of camp population at the end of June.

**Feeding figures:** For TBBC the more important statistics are the 'feeding' figures which have been used since 2004 for the purpose of calculating rations. These exclude refugees not currently in the camps. At the end of June, the feeding population for the ten camps in Thailand (including 604 Wieng Heng) was 146,807 as compared with a total camp population of 156,560 (94%). At the beginning of this period the feeding figure was 151,256 compared with the camp population of 153,882 (98%) That is, although the camp population has increased, the feeding figure has decreased by 4,449 (3%) during the period.


This apparent anomaly is the result of an intensive and ongoing review of population lists with the camp committees. Every attempt is being made to get an accurate picture of who is in the camps and require rations. Records are being updated to take account of new arrivals in the camps as well as those leaving for resettlement, and then working with the committees to identify the different categories of refugees who might be outside the camps at any given time, for example for temporary work, as students, or for medical care. The number in each category absent from the camp is then being determined section by section. Rules are being established on how to deal with these, removing from the feeding lists, for example, those refugees who are working outside the camps for periods longer than two weeks.

Once the principles have been established, TBBC will carry out a baseline survey against section leader's records and set up regular monitoring procedures to verify the accuracy of the monthly feeding figures. The eligibility of certain groups to receive rations will, however, need further discussion with UNHCR, RTG and Donors. For example, many of the people entering the camps to gain access to resettlement are former (registered) camp residents who crossed the border with other refugees when their villages were destroyed but have since found ways to (illegally) survive outside the camps.

Further adjustments will therefore continue to be made over the coming months, but, given all the uncertainties, TBBC feels that the current feeding figure of 146,807 is a reasonable basis for ration calculations, comparing well with the most recent available figure from DOPA of 147,648 (dated May 2007 and excluding Wieng Heng). Further issues relating to calculating and controlling feeding figures are discussed in Section 3.1 h).

**Admissions to asylum:** The 2004/5 MOI/ UNHCR re-registration of the entire border camp population recognised 101,992 persons from the original 1999 registration plus 35,867 others, a total of 137,859. The MOI had their own record of refugees who had arrived between 1999 and August 2003, and initially agreed only to consider these for processing and registration, along with any children born since August 2003, amounting to a total of 18,592 persons. These would be presented to the newly constituted PABs for consideration on a group basis with the remainder to be considered by the PABs separately at a later date. These totalled 16,275 persons in Tak and Mae Hong

## Burmese border refugee sites with population figures: June 2007



	TBBC <sup>1</sup>		Total	+/(-)²
	Female	Male		
<b>Chiangmai Province</b>				
WH Wieng Heng (Shan Refugees)	317	287	604	-
<b>Mae Hong Son Province</b>				
Site 1 Ban Kwai/Nai Soi	9,243	10,291	19,534	(7)
Site 2 Ban Mae Surin	1,807	1,903	3,710	117
K1 Mae La Oon (Site 3)	7,762	8,437	16,199	290
K2 Mae Ra Ma Luang (Site 4)	8,179	8,675	16,854	1,359
<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>26,991</b>	<b>29,306</b>	<b>56,297</b>	<b>1,759</b>
<b>Tak Province</b>				
K3 Mae La	24,378	25,418	49,796	521
K4 Umpiem Mai	9,826	10,465	20,291	734
K5 Nu Po	7,475	8,058	15,533	251
<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>41,679</b>	<b>43,941</b>	<b>85,620</b>	<b>1,506</b>
<b>Kanchanaburi Province</b>				
K6 Ban Don Yang	2,412	2,301	4,713	161
<b>Ratchaburi Province</b>				
K7 Tham Hin	4,517	4,809	9,326	(748)
<b>Total for sites in Thailand:</b>	<b>75,916</b>	<b>80,644</b>	<b>156,560</b>	<b>2,678</b>
<b>State of Origin of Registered Population</b>				
62% Karen	5% Pegu			
13% Karenni	4% Unknown			
9% Tenasserim	2% Other (Chin, Kachin, Irrawaddy, Magwe, Mandalay, Rakhine, Rangoon, Sagaing, Shan)			
5% Mon				
<b>MON - Resettlement Sites<sup>3</sup></b>				
M1 Halochanee	1,955	2,110	4,065	(113)
M2 Che-daik	528	489	1,017	(36)
M3 Bee Ree	1,894	1,904	3,798	(17)
M4 Tavoy	1,376	1,599	2,975	2
<b>Subtotal Mon sites:</b>	<b>5,753</b>	<b>6,102</b>	<b>11,855</b>	<b>(164)</b>
<b>Grand total all sites:</b>	<b>81,669</b>	<b>86,746</b>	<b>168,415</b>	<b>2,514</b>

Notes: 1. TBBC figures include new arrivals, births, & deaths since MOI/UNHCR registration.

2. Change in population since previous report.

3. MRDC June 2007 population.

Son provinces, and 1,037 persons in Tham Hin camp who had been subsequently registered by the authorities in Ratchaburi province.

As of the end of June 2007, the PABs had already approved a total of 33,512 of those arriving after the 1999 registration, including 471 in Kanchanaburi, 1,097 in Ratchaburi, 27,610 in Tak, and 4,334 in Mae Hong Son, leaving an estimated 4,500 still to be considered in Mae Hong Son province.

At the end of 2005, MOI requested that holding centres be built in the camps to process unregistered cases and any ongoing new arrivals, plus people who approached UNHCR between 31<sup>st</sup> December 2003, when they ceased offering Persons of Concern (POC) status to individual asylum seekers, and late 2005, when the PABs were re-established. The latter are now generally referred to as 'slip-holders'. In 2006 TBBC provided materials to build holding centres in six camps with a capacity of around 4,000 persons.

Altogether UNHCR recorded over 10,000 slip-holders but by 2006 the whereabouts of most of these was not known. A group of 2,500 from the Mae Sot area were moved to Umpiem Mai and Nu Po in September 2006 and have since been mainly screened in by the PABs as refugees. Another identified group of over 1,000 slip holders are still awaiting transfer to the camps and processing.

As mentioned above, having processed most of the 2004/5 registration case-load the PABs have effectively ceased meeting, but although camp commanders have been issued with directives not to accept new arrivals, there remains a steady influx of newcomers. UNHCR is in negotiation with the Thai authorities to ensure that the PABs continue to function so that genuine refugees can officially enter the camps. The holding centres built in 2005 could (if refurbished and expanded) be used to house unregistered camp residents and new arrivals pending PAB consideration.

**Persons of Concern (POC):** The majority of the final caseload of 1,500 POCs who were transferred to the camps in March 2004 following the termination of UNHCR's former status determination procedure at the end of 2003, have now left for resettlement to third countries. A total of 267 remain, most having been rejected by one or more countries.

**Resettlement to Third Countries:** During 2005 the Royal Thai Government (RTG) gave approval for Third Countries to offer resettlement to registered refugees in all camps along the border. The United States announced formally that it would take up to 9,000 refugees during 2006 and eight other countries announced their willingness to resettle refugees: Australia, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and UK. Resettlement missions began to visit the border during the second half of 2005.

Resettlement is currently available to all refugees officially registered during the 2004/5 re-registration process and those subsequently approved by the PABs. The normal procedure is for refugees to express their interest to UNHCR and then for UNHCR to pass cases to interested foreign missions for consideration although Australia, Canada and USA have separate programmes under which they consider direct applications.

The number of refugee departures during 2006 was much lower than hoped for, due mainly to legislation in the United States which banned entry to anyone who had given 'material support' to an armed opposition group. This was eventually resolved allowing processing to commence, and the first refugees began to leave for the USA in September 2006. Altogether 4,789 Burmese refugees left Thailand for resettlement in 2006.



For 2007 the USA extended the offer of resettlement to Mae La camp, setting no ceiling figure and, from the middle of the year, extended this offer further, to both Umpiem Mai and Nu Po camps. It was hoped that as many as 15,000 could leave for the United States during 2007 plus several thousand more to another nine countries which now include Ireland.

However, there have been many bureaucratic and logistical challenges to overcome in setting up these operations and as of 30<sup>th</sup> June only 3,749 had actually left Thailand for all destinations during 2007. The pace was however



picking up with a determined effort being made to move as many as possible before the end of the US fiscal year in September. Currently it is still hoped that as many as 15,000 might leave Thailand by the end of the year.

Resettlement numbers are likely to be similar in 2008, or even higher. So far UNHCR has received applications from 6,366 families representing 24,411 persons in Mae La camp, 2,697 families (9,356 persons) from Umpiem Mai and 1,687 families (5,955 persons) from Nu Po. In total UNHCR has received 61,246 requests for resettlement border wide since 2005.

Whilst welcoming the opportunity resettlement provides for many refugees to start a new life after suffering appalling human rights abuses in their home land and then years of confinement in refugee camps, non-governmental organisation (NGO) members of the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) have been concerned about the potential impact on camp management and humanitarian services for those remaining, given their high reliance on skilled refugee resources. As reported previously, UNHCR and CCSDPT hosted two workshops during 2006 to discuss this with the resettlement countries, camp community based organisations (CBOs), US resettlement NGOs and other stakeholders and it became clear that resettlement would draw disproportionately high numbers of the more skilled/ educated refugees and that this would indeed have negative impacts on community services. There was a need for NGOs/ CBOs to prepare coping strategies in cooperation with their donors.

CCSDPT subsequently commissioned a consultancy in April 2007 to study the impact of resettlement in more depth and to identify possible responses. This entailed extensive consultations with NGOs, CBOs, embassies of the resettlement countries and Thai authorities, and detailed reviews of the refugee data base with UNHCR. The consultants' report was published in July and can be found on the TBBC website at <http://www.tbcc.org/resources/2007-07-ccsdpt-resettlement-impact-study.pdf>.

The most pressing concern identified in the study was the pending departure of the refugees with the highest levels of education. UNHCR data indicated that the total number of refugees with post-10 education in the camps was only 1,979 (excluding new arrivals and other unregistered refugees), and the study concluded that the majority, 911, were currently employed in the most responsible positions of the NGO assistance programmes. However, 388 of these had already been accepted for resettlement and another 813 had expressed interest, most having already submitted their applications. That is, 1,201 (60%) were already at some stage in considering or seeking resettlement, meaning that within a very short period there will be a deficit of refugees with adequate educational levels to fill existing employment needs.

The greatest impact of resettlement will most likely be on camp education and health services. Education employs the largest number of workers in the camps, almost half of the estimated 7,000 refugees employed in service delivery, and the loss of the most experienced workers will have serious consequences for the continuity and quality of education in the camps. The recruitment of teachers has been difficult enough in the past, but with the departure of the most senior supervisors, principals, subject coordinators and teacher trainers, maintaining teaching standards will be extremely difficult. Similarly in the health sector, some of the most experienced managerial and specialist staff are leaving and these are particularly difficult to replace because training takes a long time and high levels of skill are required.

The report contains a number of recommendations to all stakeholders aimed at addressing these problems and many NGOs have already stepped up training programmes to replace departing refugees. So far resettlement departures have been relatively small but, as numbers accelerate over the coming months, the impact will be more keenly felt. It may well prove impossible to maintain services adequately with refugee staff, either resulting in a reduction of services/ standards, or requiring the use of external resources such as more Thai or expatriate staff. Such responses of course will be more expensive and put further pressure on already strained NGO budgets.

UNHCR has also conducted its own review of resettlement applicants, reaching broadly the same conclusions. In its report to the Annual Tripartite Consultation in Geneva in June UNHCR called for 'more organized and predictable departure mechanisms to allow NGOs and CBOs more flexibility to develop plans and coping strategies. The most important challenge facing the resettlement program in Thailand is the need to address the unintended consequences resettlement is having on community structures in the camps. Discussions with the various stakeholders must continue over the coming months in order to find ways to implement a viable large-scale resettlement program while ensuring that the needs of those remaining in Thailand are adequately addressed. The funding and implementation of identified solutions will be crucial to the success of any measures taken to reduce the impact of resettlement on the camps'.

UNHCR encourages the group methodology of resettlement, best practiced by the United States, in which all refugees in a particular population are eligible. Some countries select refugees according to their 'integration potential' and this has been a significant factor in the disproportionate draw on better qualified refugees from some camps. UNHCR has 'decided that referrals to States with more limited quotas will only be made in camps where group resettlement has already taken place. This is particularly important in view of the implications of the US government's "material support" provisions, which effectively bar refugees with some of the most serious protection concerns from admission to the United States. In this way, UNHCR will be able to ensure that large numbers of

refugees in need of a durable solution are given an opportunity to apply, while also making certain that those with urgent protection concerns and needs for family reunification have additional opportunities'. This will not solve the drain on skilled resources, but will allow more time to prepare responses.

CCSDPT/ UNHCR will continue to consult all stakeholders during the coming months and CCSDPT hopes that due consideration will be given to the consultants' recommendations.

**Shan refugees:** During the first half of 2007, the number of Shan refugees recorded as arriving in Fang district of Thailand has averaged about 400 per month. Most of these refugees continue to be from areas of central and southern Shan State forcibly relocated since 1996, where the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S) is active. They have fled due to ongoing forced labour, including forced planting of 'Kyet Su' (jatropha), land confiscation, extortion, and torture and killing by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military of villagers suspected of supporting the SSA-S (see also Section 2. d), Shan State below).



Other Shan refugees have crossed the border in other locations, and well over 200,000 Shan refugees are believed to have arrived in Thailand from the areas of forced relocation since 1996. These are mostly living in farms, orchards and construction sites throughout northern Thailand. There are also now five Shan internally displaced persons (IDP) camps along the northern Thai border, housing over 5,500 IDPs, all located near SSA-S resistance bases. These IDP camps mostly house refugees who have either been pushed back from Thailand, or who are too afraid to venture into Thailand in case of arrest. New arrivals at these IDP camps during the past 6 months have been mainly Lisu, Lahu and Palaung villagers, fleeing abuses not only by SPDC troops but also by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC, and which has been expanding its territories in southern Shan State.

Military offensives predicted by SPDC/ UWSA troops against SSA-S bases along the Shan-Thai border did not materialize during the 2006/7 dry season. Instead, the SPDC sent envoys to try and hold separate ceasefire talks with individual SSA-S commanders. However, as these efforts appear to have failed, it is feared that the SPDC will resort again to military tactics against the SSA-S, which will place the nearby IDP camps in jeopardy. Recent renewed pressure by the SPDC on the UWSA to disarm and to withdraw all their troops in southern Shan State back to their northern headquarters on the China border, may lead them to join the SPDC in attacking the SSA-S, which they have refrained from doing for several years.

Shan refugees are not generally acknowledged as such by the Thai authorities but TBBC continues to supply food and shelter items to over 600 refugees in one small camp in Wieng Heng district of Chiang Mai province, most of whom fled fighting in May 2002.

**Rohingya boat people:** In November 2006, three boats arrived in southern Thailand each carrying between 40 and 110 Rohingyas of Burmese origin. Over the following six months, more and more boats continued to arrive and by early May, when the monsoons began and the exodus stopped, around 80 boats had arrived with an estimated 3,300 people.

It soon became clear that these were people, mainly Rohingya young men, who had paid brokers in the belief that they would be taken to Malaysia to find work. The impetus for this was probably the Malaysian government starting

to issue work permits to Rohingya refugees in August 2006 before quickly terminating them again. The boats were leaving mostly from Bangladesh, but up to 70% of the people had come direct from Arakan State in Burma transiting only briefly in Bangladesh to board the boats.

The response of the Thai authorities was swift, and initially most of the boat people were immediately transported to Mae Sot for deportation to Burma. In a rather unlikely arrangement, most were handed over to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) where they were held in very poor, sometimes brutal conditions across the border until arrangements could be made for brokers to get them back into Thailand. Most then seem to have found a way back to the south of Thailand and into Malaysia, but significant numbers were stranded in Mae Sot where sympathetic mosques and CBOs were instructed not to provide shelter or assistance. From the end of March, deportation to Mae Sot ceased and deportations were made direct from southern Thailand, mostly from Ranong where little is known of what happens to them next.

Although the boat people are mostly Rohingya coming out of northern Arakan, they also include other Rohingyas from the refugee camps in Bangladesh and the surrounding areas, as well as a few Bangladeshis. Living conditions are desperate for Rohingyas, both in Burma and Bangladesh and these are extremely vulnerable people. Concerned NGOs have attempted to negotiate with the Thai authorities to at least provide some temporary shelter whilst other solutions are sought but, not helped by the sensitivity of the Muslim insurgency in the south of Thailand, no satisfactory arrangements could be agreed. An estimated 100 Rohingyas who remained stranded sheltering in mosques in Mae Sot were ultimately deported to the south in two groups at the beginning of August.

There is concern that another exodus will begin again after the monsoon season. UNHCR views the problem as a mixture of secondary movement and human trafficking and has also attempted to intercede. It hopes that the issue might be addressed through a multi-country approach.

#### **b) Planning initiatives and RTG policy relating to camp services**

In April 2005, UNHCR and CCSDPT began advocating with the Thai authorities for a more comprehensive approach to what had long since become a protracted refugee situation. Consideration was requested not only to allow refugees increased skills training and (higher) education opportunities, but also income generation projects and employment. It was argued that allowing refugees to work could contribute positively to the Thai economy as well as promote dignity and self-reliance for the refugees.

In order to provide a framework that all stakeholders, including Donors, could relate to, CCSDPT/ UNHCR prepared a 'Comprehensive Plan' (CP) which addressed priority gaps in protection and services including those areas advocated for policy change. This was presented to the RTG at a workshop in December 2005. The RTG participants acknowledged the need to provide refugees with more fulfilling opportunities during their asylum in Thailand whilst also emphasising the need to consider national security and control refugee movement.

Progress on the policy front since then has been encouraging. For 2006 MOI gave approval for NGOs to expand skills training with income generation possibilities and, during that year, the RTG made commitments to improve education in the camps and to explore employment possibilities through pilot projects in three camps. A firm commitment was also made to introduce Identity Cards at an early date for all registered camp residents over 12 years old, and these were distributed during the first half of 2007.

Until now, however, it has proven difficult to translate these new opportunities into substantive activities. Although there has been some expansion of NGO skills training activities and a few small income generation projects have been approved by MOI, life for most refugees has not changed and it is clear that such initiatives will take time to develop and will require more substantive technical inputs and other resources.

During the second half of 2006, UNHCR introduced its Strengthening Protection Capacity Project (SPCP) to Thailand which is also a 'gaps analysis' exercise that has been used in other countries to produce project proposals for Donor support. This was recognised as a possible tool for refining the CP to provide more specific project responses addressing gaps and opportunities for RTG approval. As part of SPCP, UNHCR hired three consultants, including two with International Labour Organisation (ILO) support, specifically assigned to research income generation/ employment opportunities in Tak and Mae Hong Son Provinces under a 'Livelihoods Project'.

NGOs were invited to participate on the Steering Committee of the Livelihoods Project and the consultants final report distributed in June set out seven project types deemed suitable for further development (the report is available on the UNHCR website at <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/43d644142.html>):

1. Agriculture in the camps: extension of existing programmes with income potential.
2. Agriculture outside the camps: to increase self-reliance, requiring approval to buy/ rent land.
3. Skills development: extension and reorientation of existing activities towards local markets.
4. Appropriate Technology: initiatives to be identified for application in camp and as micro enterprises.
5. Disabled Services: to ensure that the disabled are mainstreamed into livelihood opportunities.
6. Micro Enterprise Development: providing business training and support for existing and new enterprises.
7. Waged Employment Service: establish links with local labour market and assist job seekers.



The consultants recommended that wherever possible local Thai communities must be included in these initiatives and that all should be introduced on a pilot project basis (see Section 3.1. a) below for TBBC's planned response).

These processes of SPCP were incorporated into the 2007 comprehensive planning process and an enhanced CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan for 2007/8 was published (available on the TBBC website at <http://www.tbbc.org/resources/2007-2008-ccsdpt-unhcr-comprehensive-plan.pdf>) and presented at a Donor Forum in May. RTG National Security Council (NSC) and MOI representatives also participated in this forum. The CP estimates that currently, UNHCR and the 20 NGO members of CCSDPT provide services totalling around USD 60 million/ year, (see Table B2, Appendix B) and that the estimated cost of covering all the identified service gaps would total around another USD 6 million. Outline project descriptions and budgets are presented where available, including the Livelihoods Project projects.

Although these documents represent considerable progress in researching needs and opportunities, it seems that much work remains to be done to turn these into the desired Donor and RTG responses. More work needs to be done to turn the Livelihoods Projects into practical/ detailed projects for funding and approval. It is clear that the most promising area for progress is in agriculture and it is planned that there will be a UNHCR/ NGO Workshop on agriculture-related activities during the second half of the year so that NGOs can consider their ability to become involved and a coordinated response can be planned.

UNHCR also invited the Council of Business Leaders (COBL) to visit Thailand, a group of five international corporations, Manpower, Merck, Microsoft, Nike and Price Waterhouse Coopers who are working with UNHCR to find ways of supporting refugee programmes world-wide. The response was positive and Manpower is already actively pursuing possible training and employment at local factories for refugees in Ban Don Yang and Microsoft has expressed interest in providing internet access to the camps and making software/ training materials available.

Donors have acknowledged their own responsibility to respond in a more coordinated way and have convened a working group. They have suggested that a longer term strategy is required pursuing all possible durable solutions including resettlement to third countries. CCSDPT/ UNHCR will be addressing this challenge during the second half of 2007 and potentially this will lead to an even more comprehensive and strategic planning process, engaging not only CCSDPT and UNHCR, but also the Donors and RTG.

### **c) Migrant workers**

Thailand is host to probably more than two million migrants/ migrant workers, of whom at least 80% are thought to be from Burma. In the past, policy toward these migrant workers was *ad hoc* with no long term strategy, quotas for registration being agreed on an annual basis which regularised only a fraction of the total caseload. Since 2001 registration has been opened to all migrants in the country and much larger numbers have registered but unknown numbers are believed still not to have presented themselves because of the significant fees and bureaucracy involved.

The largest registration exercise was in 2004 when 1,284,920 migrants were recorded, including workers and dependents. 848,552 one-year work permits were issued and access granted to Thai health services. In the subsequent three years, these same migrants were asked to re-register and each year the number registering has dropped. During 2006 there was an additional issue of 208,562 migrant work permits. During the first half of 2007, there was a remaining total of 532,305 registered workers, including 485,925 Burmese.

Current Thai policy is to implement Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) signed with Cambodia, Laos and Burma during 2002/3 in which labour movement will in future be controlled through official channels. The intention is to move from the current 'regularisation-based' process in which migrants enter the country illegally and are then regularised here, to the establishment of official migration schemes in which migrants obtain permits while they are in their countries of origin. Currently about 50% of migrant workers registered from Laos and Cambodia are being processed according to the MOUs and the system is scheduled to become fully operational in the near future. Annual re-registration, however, is likely to be the only option open to Burmese migrants and this is likely to leave many outside the system. The fees involved and the *de facto* bonding to employers remain major disincentives.

Recently controls have been placed on migrants in five southern Provinces which include a night-time curfew, use of mobile phones only by permit, and travel between provinces only with special travel documents. Although this is not official government policy it is understood that other provinces are also considering similar controls.

The registration of migrant workers has direct impact and implications for refugees in Thailand: Firstly, many Burmese migrant workers probably are refugees, having left their homes due to the same human rights abuses affecting those in the camps. They are not in the camps either by choice, or because they are not from the same communities, or because there is no practical admission system open to them. Even though they remain very vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, migrant worker registration offers a degree of protection and an opportunity to earn a living.

But secondly, a more enlightened understanding of migrant issues and experience with registration could impact on refugee policy. Thailand needs a large migrant work force and the refugee population might also be a source of labour and contribute to the local economy.

**d) Internally displaced: the situation in eastern Burma**

Most new refugees arriving in Thailand have previously been internally displaced in Burma. Field surveys conducted by CBOs during 2006 estimated that at least half a million people are internally displaced in eastern Burma. This population consists of approximately 287,000 people in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, 95,000 civilians hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by humanitarian atrocities and approximately 118,000 villagers who have obeyed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. The scale, distribution and characteristics of the internally displaced population are summarised in Appendix G. The following table summarises the distribution of IDPs at the end of 2006.

**Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons in Eastern Burma in 2006**

States and Divisions	IDPs in Hiding	IDPs in Relocation Sites	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas	Total IDPs
Southern Shan State	13,300	31,300	131,000	175,600
Karenni State	9,300	6,400	63,600	79,300
Eastern Pegu Division	17,400	6,400	0	23,800
Karen State	49,100	4,300	45,900	99,300
Mon State	300	500	41,000	41,800
Tenasserim Division	5,600	69,100	5,500	80,200
<b>Overall:</b>	<b>95,000</b>	<b>118,000</b>	<b>287,000</b>	<b>500,000</b>

**Shan State:** The Burmese Army’s use of terror as a means of subjugating villagers perceived as sympathetic to the ethnic opposition movement has been widely documented. During the past 10 years, the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) has reported the summary execution of 1,885 civilians in Shan State alone. While the number of documented killings has decreased in the past couple of years, cases of extra-judicial detention, arrest, forced disappearance and inhumane punishment continue to be reported on a monthly basis from southern Shan State. In this climate of intimidation, a PaO opposition force renounced its longstanding ceasefire agreement with the military junta and resumed armed resistance in June.

**Karenni State:** While directly threatening civilian lives is the most blatant indicator of the junta’s illegitimacy, deliberately undermining livelihoods is a more common cause of vulnerability. The Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre (KSWDC) have reported state-sponsored development projects and militarisation contributing to the displacement of thousands of Karenni villagers during the first half of 2007. In the mixed administration areas of Loikaw Township, the fields of subsistence farmers have been confiscated, bulldozed and sold by the State for commercial agriculture. Similarly in Demawso, the Burmese Army forcibly evicted and relocated a village and confiscated all household possessions and livestock on the suspicion that residents were rebel supporters. In Pasaung township, logging and mining projects have encroached on forested areas where villagers were previously hiding out of fear.



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**Karen State:** The gravest humanitarian atrocities continue to be committed by the Burmese Army in the northern Karen areas. The Karen Office of Relief and Development (KORD) have reported that indiscriminate artillery shelling, the burning of settlements and the destruction or confiscation of food supplies are standard practice in con-

tested areas, where the military junta is attempting to isolate the armed opposition by targeting their civilian constituents. Even for villagers who are not forcibly displaced, road construction leads to the imposition of forced labour and restrictions on travel to fields in the short term and facilitates the expansion of militarisation in the longer term. 4,000 people in Papun Township are reported to have crossed the Yunalin river, fleeing towards Thailand since the beginning of the year. Many would-be new refugees from northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division arriving opposite Mae Sariang District are staying in an IDP camp on the Burma side of the Salween River at Ee Htu Hta which housed a population of around 3,500 at the end of June.

Instability has also increased in southern Karen state following breakaway KNU Brigadier Htain Maung's ceasefire deal with SPDC in January resulting in a violent struggle for territory between different Karen factions.

**Mon State and Mon resettlement sites:** Mon refugees were repatriated to resettlement sites on the Burmese side of the border in 1996 after the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Burmese government agreed to a military ceasefire. More than ten years later, hopes that the cease-fire would lead to a political solution for the Mon remain bleak, as indicated by NMSP downgrading its status to that of an observer at the National Convention.

The negligible impact of ceasefire agreements on the promotion of human rights in government administered areas is illustrated by the situation in the southern Mon areas, where frustrations over ongoing abuses committed by the SPDC have provoked armed resistance from Mon splinter groups. The MRDC reported that villagers have not only been extorted on a regular basis by the splinter groups, but must also contend with curfews imposed by the military junta which have prohibited overnight travel to forests, plantations and markets for income generation. State-sponsored militarisation and human rights violations are pervasive and contributing to ongoing displacement of the population. With the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) unable to access the Mon ceasefire areas for over a year, humanitarian access for the international community based in Rangoon has further diminished. This isolation has been compounded by the closure of the Three Pagodas Pass trading gate with Thailand, after two Thai security personnel were kidnapped in March by a Karen splinter group who have a ceasefire agreement with SPDC.

The MRDC reported 11,855 persons in the Mon resettlement sites at the end of June, with the outflow of people leaving to search for income as migrant labourers in Thailand slightly greater than the inflow of new arrivals during the past six months. The resettlement sites remain a relative sanctuary of protection from human rights abuses, but the lack of arable soil and livelihood options obstructs the possibility of these areas becoming sustainable for displaced villagers. TBBC's support to the resettlement sites is described in 3.1. h).

**Tenasserim Division:** the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) has reported increased restrictions on movement in and out of government designated relocation sites. This has adversely affected the accessibility and availability of food supplies and other basic commodities for internally displaced communities hiding in areas closer to their ancestral lands from which they were previously evicted by the junta. At the same time the imposition of forced labour upon people living in the relocation sites has intensified, particularly in relation to the transport of military supplies to outposts closer to the border. Villagers generally had to send one person per household for a two week period, during which they had to provide their own food and were not compensated for time spent away from their livelihoods.

Besides summarising internal displacement in eastern Burma, Appendix G also illustrates the continuing militarisation of these areas by SPDC and the adverse impact of state-sponsored development projects. To consolidate territorial gains, SPDC has doubled the deployment of battalions across eastern Burma during the last decade and, given that rations for frontline Burmese Army troops have been cut, villagers have had rice fields and fruit plantations confiscated to support this militarisation. The border development projects have done little to alleviate poverty in conflict-affected areas. Conversely, these initiatives have often undermined livelihoods and primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population.

## **e) Political developments**

To most observers' surprise, SPDC reconvened the National Convention for the eleventh – and, what it promised, final – session on 18<sup>th</sup> July, a process which started 14 weary years ago in 1993. SPDC has hinted that this session will take about six weeks and, if so, this will finally complete the first stage of their 'Road Map to Democracy' announced in 2003. The reason for this unusual urgency has been the subject of much speculation ranging from pressure from China, to SPDC simply trying to appease domestic concerns. It has, however, caused little celebration since it remains a closeted process with over 1,000, mainly hand-picked delegates, excluding the main opposition party, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, including only 12 of the 1990 election victors, and all warned not to oppose the regimes' will. The house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi was extended another year in May and she remains virtually incommunicado.

The National Convention marks just the first of seven stages in the SPDC's road map. In the second stage an as-yet unspecified body will actually prepare the Draft Constitution for presentation to a national referendum. It could yet be a very long time before the proposed General Election is held and hopes that this process will result in anything other than a new form of military rule remain slim.



Following the rejection of a resolution at the UN Security Council in January, the international community has been struggling to agree how best to continue pressure for political change in Burma. In May, Ibrahim Gambari, who visited Burma twice in 2006 in his former position as UN Secretary-General for Political Affairs was formally confirmed by new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as his special envoy to Burma. Mr. Gambari previously received a great deal of criticism for visiting Burma strictly under SPDC's terms, achieving no tangible results, and for not consulting with a wide enough constituency before hand, particularly the political and ethnic opposition. This time, however, he has embarked on a generally welcomed extensive round of consultations including visits to Burma's strongest allies, namely, China, Russia and India as well as some countries in ASEAN. It is expected that he will make another visit to Burma in the coming months.

Other UN focus on Burma resulted in Margareta Wahlstrom, Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator for UNOCHA visiting Burma in April and the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy visiting Burma in June. Also in June, the UN Human Rights Council agreed to continue the mandate for a Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burma.

ASEAN members have continued to express their frustration with SPDC's intransigence, the most recent Foreign Ministers Meeting in July again calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and the restoration of democracy. Against considerable opposition from SPDC they also agreed to set up a regional human rights body to promote respect of fundamental freedoms among the 10 member countries as part of a draft charter that will be submitted to the ASEAN leaders at their annual meeting later in the year. Surin Pitsuwan, former Thai Foreign Minister, who was known for taking a hard line against Burma's military junta will take over as ASEAN Secretary General at the end of the year.

Only time will tell if any of these initiatives bring about any improvement to the appalling human rights and humanitarian situations in Burma but, for the time being, the situation seems only to get worse. Normally the ICRC abides by confidentiality rules, but felt duty-bound to speak out in a rare statement made in June in which it condemned SPDC for the abuse of civilians affected by armed conflict along the Thai-Burma border, including the destruction of food supplies, violence, arbitrary arrest and displacement; restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid and the movement of aid workers; and the abuse of detainees forced to work for the SPDC army as porters, exposing them to armed conflict, exhaustion, malnutrition, degrading treatment and death.

Within the country civil action campaigns, often led by the NLD or the 88 Generation Students, have continued in Rangoon and around the country. Many people have been arrested for complaining about the economy or calling for better health and education services etc., and peaceful prayer vigils for Aung San Suu Kyi's release and celebrations for her 62<sup>nd</sup> birthday were violently broken up. Often thugs have been used to attack or harass peaceful demonstrators, mostly believed to be associated with the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).

But perhaps the groups under greatest pressure have been the ethnic nationalities who have cease-fire agreements with SPDC but are now facing having to comply with a draft constitution which ignores their aspirations for a genuine role in administering their own affairs. SPDC is attempting to bully them into surrendering their arms to force compliance, but several groups including the Mon and Kachin have publicly criticised the National Convention, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) announcing in July that they would present a 19-point proposal for amending the draft constitution.

SPDC meanwhile continues to wear down the remaining ethnic groups still in armed opposition, improving roads, increasing their military presence in border areas and gradually assimilating more territory. It also continues to be successful in its 'divide and rule' tactics with attempts in particular to split the main Shan and Karen opposition groups by offering deals to factions. One success was the ceasefire agreed by KNU 7<sup>th</sup> Brigade Commander, Htain Maung, in January who broke away with some of his troops to form the 'KNU/ KNLA Peace Council'. As mentioned above, this has led to further destabilisation of the southern Karen area resulting in villagers fleeing fighting to Thailand temporarily on several occasions.

Meanwhile Thailand also continues on its own path back to democracy after the military take-over last September. A national referendum on a draft constitution is set for August and new elections promised before the end the year. In the interim there appears to have been relatively little interaction with Burma and there has been no noticeable change in policy towards that country. There has recently however been an apparent tougher stance taken by the army towards new refugees from Burma with some new arrivals attempting to enter the country opposite Mae Sariang District sent back because they were not 'fleeing fighting' and some round-ups of unregistered refugees in Mae La camp. The need for an effective screening and admission procedure is increasingly urgent.

### 3. Programme January to June 2007

This section describes the main programmatic and administrative developments within TBBC during the last six months; lessons learned by staff during this period and projected activities for the next six months. The information is presented under the five core objectives which were defined in TBBC's Strategic Plan for 2005 to 2010:

- To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter and non-food items for displaced Burmese people.
- To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation, embracing equity, gender and diversity.
- To empower displaced people and their communities by supporting and strengthening their capacities.
- To advocate with and for the people of Burma to increase understanding of the nature and root causes of conflict and displacement, in order to promote appropriate responses and ensure their human rights are respected.
- To develop organisational resources to enable TBBC to be more effective in pursuing its mission.

As described in Section 2 b), since 2006 the RTG has been willing to consider allowing the refugees income-generating activities linked to skills training and a UNHCR Livelihoods Project has been exploring possibilities in two provinces. Over the next six months it is hoped to develop a coordinated NGO response and TBBC plans to revise its core objectives to include one specifically related to livelihoods. The second and third objectives relating to partnership and capacity building which have many over-lapping activities will be consolidated into one.

The TBBC Logframe is set out in Appendix E, Figure E.1. Figure E.2 presents a summary of the impact of TBBC's programme as measured by performance indicators since 2003. The results show that during this period the programme was largely meeting its operational targets, with 46 of the defined 60 indicators being achieved.

Background information on TBBC is given in Appendix A and on the relief programme in Appendix D.

#### 3.1. Supporting an adequate standard of living


*To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter and non-food items for displaced Burmese people.*

TBBC is committed to following international humanitarian best practice and delivering timely, quality services to the refugees. The overriding working philosophy at all times is to maximise refugee participation in programme design, implementation and monitoring/ feedback. All of the activities described for this first core objective therefore also relate to the second and third core objectives, 'working through partnerships', and 'building capacity'.

##### a) Food security programme: food, nutrition, and agriculture

As described in the last six-month report, TBBC has now integrated its nutrition and food security initiatives under one Food Security Programme to better reflect the connectivity of these activities in ensuring access by refugees to adequate and appropriate food. Agricultural activities are now reported under this first core objective, rather than under 3.3, capacity building, as previously.

The Food Security Programme now includes all nutrition activities such as surveillance, education, and technical support, as well as support to agriculture and related initiatives that promote self-sufficiency of refugees at the household level, such as the Community Agriculture and Nutrition Project (CAN).



The Food Security Programme team consists of a Food Security Programme Coordinator who oversees this combined sector, a technical team of nutrition and agriculture specialists, and Food Security Assistants in each field site.

During this period the UNHCR Livelihoods Project (see below) has identified the potential for expanding agriculture-related livelihood activities both inside and outside the camps. Within the technical team, agriculture responsibilities have been divided into two positions: the Agriculture and Environment Project Officer, responsible for field implementation of the CAN project and related activities, and the Agriculture and Environment Development Officer who will guide development of future agriculture and livelihoods initiatives. Most staff are now in post, with two remaining positions currently being recruited.

Food Security activities had previously been managed separately from other field activities, and therefore to ensure an integrated approach, the Food Security Assistants have now been placed in the field team under direct supervi-

sion of the Field Coordinators. Regular meetings are held within the unit to coordinate staff activities, develop plans, and iron out supervision issues.

Staff have responded very positively to this new structure. Food Security Assistants have quickly become an integral part of the field teams and the Field Coordinators have shown new interest in food security issues. This is already impacting positively on activities at the camp level.

**Livelihoods project:** As mentioned above and described in Section 2, the RTG is now willing to consider income generation projects for the refugees and, as part of the SPCP, UNHCR recruited two consultants to explore livelihood opportunities for refugees in the camps in Mae Hong Son and Tak Provinces. The consultants concluded in June that priority should be placed on developing livelihoods-related activities in agriculture which, they considered, have the greatest potential for work and income generation by refugees. They recommended that pilot projects should be implemented with this focus in mind, with activities both inside and outside the camps. These proposals were included as 'projects' under SPCP and incorporated in the CCSDP/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan for 2007/8.

Some CCSDPT members are already working on project responses but it is planned to organise a UNHCR/ CCSDPT agriculture workshop in the last quarter of 2007 in order to coordinate a strategic response by all interested agencies. TBBC discussed the opportunities/ challenges for involvement in this initiative at the Staff Retreat in May and, given already existing involvement in both agriculture and income generation through the longyi weaving and stove-making projects (see Sections 3.1 b) and 3.3 c) below), in principle agreed to revise the TBBC Strategic Plan to include livelihoods as a core objective.

TBBC will participate in the agriculture workshop and determine its role in new livelihood initiatives which might include supporting agriculture outside camps and agriculture-related skills training such as food-processing and the manufacture of agricultural tools.

**Food rations:** TBBC introduced blended food (vitamin and mineral fortified flour blend) to the refugee food basket in 2004/5, to address high levels of chronic malnutrition in the refugee population resulting from a lack of appropriate weaning foods, micronutrient deficiencies and an imbalance in the proportion of carbohydrate/ protein/ fat in their diet (see 1. a), Appendix D). After some experimentation, the original wheat/ soy blend imported from Nepal with a ration of 1.5 kgs/ person/ month was replaced during 2005/6 by 1 kg/ person/ month of a rice/ soy blended food formula called *AsiaMIX* made in Thailand, complemented with 250 g/ person/ month of sugar.

Preliminary results from a TBBC and CDC survey indicated that consumption of *AsiaMIX* has resulted in a positive nutritional impact in children (see Nutrition Surveys section below) but TBBC continues to run campaigns designed to encourage more frequent consumption by younger children. During the period, TBBC and Malteser International (MI) staff collaborated to conduct intensive child feeding campaigns in Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon camps using the Baby Food poster in Karen language designed and distributed in 2006. The demonstrations were conducted by community health workers targeting every household with children under five years of age in every section of these two camps. A Burmese version of the poster is close to being finalized and will be completed and printed during the next period.



Karen Youth Organisation (KYO), CAN trainers, and TBBC staff collaborated to conduct cooking demonstrations in Nu Po camp as part of KYO day. Households from each section were invited to participate, and a panel of judges evaluated their creations for taste, nutrition, ease of cooking. To further facilitate use of *AsiaMIX*, the Nutrition Technical Officer has taken the lead in collecting more recipes for inclusion into a recipe book, and a draft is expected to be completed before 2008.

At the end of 2006, a review of the demographic profile of the camps according to 2006 UNHCR statistics was completed. Data are now available separately on the household population and the boarding school population and have allowed further refinement of

nutritional needs for these separate groups (2,181 kcal/ person/ day for an average household and 2,440 kcal/

person/ day for adolescent students). Additionally, nutritional data for the commodities in the current ration were also updated and revised.

As the needs of boarding house students have been calculated to be significantly higher than the household population, a rapid assessment was conducted in Umpiem Mai and Mae Ra Ma Luang to determine the most appropriate commodities that could be increased in the boarding house ration. Results indicate the students can easily use an increased quantity of *AsiaMIX* and a small amount of cooking oil. The proposed increase is to 1.5 kg *AsiaMIX* and 1.2 ltr cooking oil to provide an average daily ration of 2462 kcal/ person/ day, which will meet the students' increased needs. As rations are gathered collectively, the logistics of this increase should not pose a problem, but rationale for the increase will need to be carefully explained to warehouse staff to minimise any misunderstanding by the general population.

Nutrition training for Food Security Assistants is ongoing and has included instruction via CAN Training of Trainers (ToT), nutrition survey and *AsiaMIX* education trainings, and through observation.

**Supplementary/ therapeutic feeding:** Revised supplementary/ therapeutic feeding programmes which meet international standards, including the use of objectively verifiable indicators in statistics collection, were adopted border-wide following recommendations made by ECHO in 2004. TBBC completed the revision and implementation of the statistical system for reporting on supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes during 2005.

Health agency staff change frequently, necessitating constant surveillance and technical assistance by the TBBC nutritionist to ensure that procedures and protocols are being properly observed, and to improve coverage of these programmes. A refresher training was developed and conducted for senior health agency staff during the period to review supplementary and therapeutic feeding protocols, criteria for enrolment and discharge, and guidelines. Annual refresher trainings are planned to ensure that all new and existing health agency staff are well-versed in how to implement feeding programmes. However, due also to camp staff turnover as a result of departures for resettlement, more assistance is now needed for health agencies and their staff at the field sites.

**Nutrition surveys:** TBBC has developed and implemented standard protocols for conducting annual nutrition surveys of refugee children under five years of age and the results are used to inform the TBBC and health programmes regarding both ration adequacy and supplementary feeding coverage. To ensure consistency, TBBC provides intensive training, camp-based supervision, standard measuring equipment and technical assistance to the health agencies to conduct these surveys and to analyse data obtained border-wide. Survey results are presented annually (see 1. a), Appendix D). For 2007, TBBC has thus far completed surveys with MI in Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon camps.

Preliminary results of the June 2006 follow-up survey to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta) (CDC) baseline comprehensive nutrition survey conducted in Umpiem Mai in 2004 were presented in the last six-month report. These indicated a positive nutritional impact from the introduction of *AsiaMIX* suggesting that children are eating it in quantities adequate to affect micronutrient status. In particular there had been a positive impact on the iron status of mothers and their children. CDC and the TBBC Food Security Programme Coordinator are currently collaborating on a final version of the report.

**Nursery school lunches:** TBBC supported daily lunches for 7,763 children in nursery schools in seven sites (Tham Hin and Ban Don Yang are supported by other donors). The budget remains at three baht per child per day, which was mainly used to purchase foods to supplement rice brought from home, including fruits and vegetables, and good quality protein, such as meat, fish, eggs, soymilk, and beans. *AsiaMIX* was also included.

**CAN project and related initiatives:** TBBC has been supporting the CAN Project since 2000 (see 1. a), Appendix D). The stated goals are:

- Short-term: to improve refugees' diet in camp. To assist community members achieve sustainable increases in food production using local resources.
- Long-term: to improve coping strategies for eventual repatriation. To help develop appropriate and essential skills needed to achieve future long-term food security.

Under the new Food Security Programme structure, previously successful initiatives including seed, fence and tool distribution, and basic CAN training have continued with the focus moving toward small gardens and household uptake. Other small-scale projects during the period included support for fuel briquette and bio-gas research in Site 1, and mung (yellow) bean sprouts raising pilot projects in boarding houses in Nu Po camp.

In order to better follow up CAN training, materials distribution, and other initiatives, monitoring forms for CAN Project activities were developed and piloted in most sites during the period. Food Security Assistants are responsible for collecting information on seed, tree, fence, and tool distribution, and to follow up with households who have attended CAN training.

In addition to CAN activities, TBBC has supported other agriculture and environment-related initiatives over the last few years, some of which have been successful, others less so. Activities were somewhat *ad hoc* and significant constraints were identified, particularly limited space and water supplies, widely differing environment and social



conditions in different parts of the border, and limited human resources. For some time TBBC has recognised a need to carry out a comprehensive review of these initiatives and initially it was planned to hire a consultant to conduct an evaluation. After further consideration, it was felt that food security activities should be more closely linked to the nutritional needs of the community and that a baseline survey was required first. A consultant will be recruited to design and conduct the survey in the coming period.

CAN activities during the last six months were as follows:

**CAN training of trainers:** Since the previous CAN training in 2003, a number of CAN trainers have left the programme due to resettlement overseas, other obligations, or health issues. Because of this, TBBC supported a CAN ToT in March. The ToT was held in Site 1 for 2 weeks, and included comprehensive information and practical training in agriculture, energy, and nutrition. This year's ToT also included a section on how to train the community using simple materials, methods to engage an adult audience, and how to plan training.

Trainers for this year's ToT included 2 senior members of the Karenni Development Department (KnDD), two senior CAN trainers from Nu Po camp, a senior Community Health Educator from the Karenni Health Department (KnHD), and TBBC staff. Altogether 25 participants (including 7 women – 1 woman from each camp – were selected) from Site 1, Site 2, Mae La Oon, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po camp, attended.

**Current CAN Staffing and Partners**

Camp	Total CAN trainers/ workers	Number of women	Partner Agency
Site 1	5	1	KnDD
Site 2	4	1	KnDD
MLO	3	1	KYO
MRML	3	1	Camp Committee
ML	2 (ZOA)	1	ZOA
UMP	5	1	KYO
NP	5	1	KYO
<b>Total:</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>7 (32%)</b>	

Current CAN staffing includes 22 persons in seven sites, 32% of whom are women. New alliances and partnerships with camp-based CBOs, such as the KYO, are being forged in some sites to better support CAN trainers and implement activities more efficiently.

**CAN demonstration gardens and training in camps:** Following completion of the CAN ToT at the end of March, the CAN trainers have returned to the camps to start their own demonstration gardens and prepare for training for



camp residents. CAN trainers in Mae La have returned to work collaboratively with ZOA Refugee Care (ZOA) in agriculture vocational training, and have not yet started independent CAN projects in that site.

In coordination with other organisations, TBBC provided CAN training for a total of 40 people in two sites (Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon), including participants from one boarding house and two CBOs. Trainings in some sites have not generated as much interest as CAN trainers had hoped, indicating need for social marketing of CAN activities.

CAN trainers from Site 1 provided training and support to several Thai communities and to MOI security staff.

**Kitchen gardens:** CAN trainers and workers followed up in households that had recently received training to provide ongoing technical assistance in all participating sites (see above).

**Seeds:** Since 1992, TBBC has provided seeds to refugee communities on request. In 2004 a more formalised distribution system was established with Camp Committees and Vocational Training Centres in seven camps, and has since been expanded to include CBO offices.


During the 1<sup>st</sup> half of 2007, announcements were posted and 20 species of seeds distributed. 1,160 kg of seeds were distributed in six sites (Sites 1 & 2, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La Oon, Umpiem Mai, and Nu Po) to:

- 1,839 households, representing 12,873 people.
- 31 boarding houses and schools, representing 1,885 children and adolescents.
- and 11 community-based organisations, including the Karen Youth Organisation.

Seed distribution was lower in some camps because of the recent CAN ToT. New, less-experienced CAN trainers have spent their time preparing for new CAN projects, including setting up demonstration sites, planning training sessions, etc. Seeds were not distributed in Mae La during the period, as CAN workers are involved with ZOA's agriculture vocational training programming and training.

Seed distribution rates to households are illustrated in the following figure:

**Seed distribution: percentage of households receiving seeds by camp - January to June 2007**



**Trees:** During the 2004 wet season, TBBC began promoting edible tree species in camps to deal with the negative consequences of space restrictions on traditional methods of vegetable production. Seven multi-use, edible species were chosen according to their early harvest potential, nutritional profile, cultural familiarity and ease of cultivation. During the period, 6,975 samplings were distributed to 1,381 households and 23 boarding houses and 16 CBOs in four sites: Sites 1 & 2, Mae Ra Ma Luang, and Mae La Oon. Other sites will receive saplings in 2008.

**Fencing:** Fencing is imperative to the successful establishment of home gardens in confined camps. It helps to both demarcate land and prevent loss of crops by poultry and other livestock. TBBC formalised fencing distributions in seven camps during 2005. In the first half of 2007, 26,610 meters of fencing was distributed to 919 households and four boarding houses and 11 CBOs in four sites, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La Oon, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po camps (25-30 m/ household). Fencing will be distributed in Sites 1 & 2 following initiation of CAN trainings and by request.

A survey of how fencing was used in 2006 indicated that the majority of people use the fencing for gardens, and fewer for animal raising or other activities. All those who received fencing distributions during the period say they plan to use the fencing for kitchen gardens.

**Tools:** Community members who participate in CAN training are supported with basic tool kits including one hoe, a small spade, a bucket, a watering can, and fencing. A total of 40 tool kits were distributed to 37 households, one school, and two CBOs following the first CAN trainings in camps.

**Livestock:** TBBC has explored various ways of increasing the production efficiency of livestock-raising in order to increase animal protein in household diets, but success has been very limited due to problems with livestock illness, expertise, space and regulations.

In late 2005, TBBC initiated a pilot pig-breeding project in Mae La, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po which was successful, generating significant community interest and requests for cross-breeding. But attempts to expand to other sites were not successful, due in part to disease and lack of community follow up in this labour intensive endeavour. In 2006, TBBC sent 50 piglets to boarding schools, CBOs, IDP sections, and orphanages in Nu Po camp, and assisted in animal food support for 3 months, after which the pig raisers have taken responsibility for upkeep.

Nu Po's success results from adequate space, water, and other resources, and the initiative of camp leaders and other key persons. Although there is strong demand from the refugee community for further extension of pig-raising and the establishment of CBO pig banks with youth and women's organisations, extreme caution is required given the vulnerability of animal raising initiatives, particularly those involving poultry and pigs, in light of the threat of bird flu.

In the past six months livestock activities were restricted to:

- A special breed of 'Muay San' piglets were sent from Nu Po to Site 1 for breeding.
- Several 'Karen' pigs were sent to Sites 1 & 2 and Nu Po for bio-gas demonstration sites.
- Six boarding houses and two CBOs (DARE and KWO) in Nu Po camp were provided with 2-3 piglets with the intention of breeding. The pigs have since been consumed.


**Other support:** TBBC has provided technical input and assisted in programme development with:

- Ongoing coordination with Vocational Training Committee (VTC) programmes with ZOA, particularly in training CAN trainers for vocational training activities in Nu Po camp, and will assist with the next term in Mae La.
- KESAN, in Mae Ra Ma Luang, including training supplies and tree distribution in IDP areas.

**Related initiatives:** TBBC has continued to support small, experimental bio-gas and charcoal briquette-making projects in selected camps. A simple handbook on these topics has been prepared by the KnDD for publication and distribution and use in CAN trainings.

Previously, TBBC supported mung beans for sprouting in Tham Hin camp, but found that camp residents were not sufficiently motivated. However, during 2007, a project in Nu Po boarding houses suggests that, when implemented in a team environment, mung bean sprouting can be successful: TBBC supported a small pilot mung bean sprouting project for six boarding houses in Nu Po creating a lot of interest amongst the students who quickly improved their production rates: provided the same quantity of beans per week (22.6 kg), students saw the quantity of sprouts produced nearly double over a period of four weeks. Nutritionally, mung bean sprouts provide a good source of vitamin C in the diet (in addition to calcium and B vitamins). At the end of June, students were producing an average of 2.4 kg sprouts per child per week, which provides 158% of daily vitamin C requirement.

Total Mung Bean Sprout Production in Boarding Houses in Nu Po Camp Over 4 Week Period (June 2007)



**CAN handbook:** English and Burmese versions of the CAN Handbook have been published and distributed to CAN trainees. Both versions have incorporated a section on nutrition, that had been developed in 2000 and used for CAN ToT. There are also working drafts available in Karen and Shan and Pa-Oh languages. The Karen version will be completed for publication during the coming period.

#### Next Six Months

##### Food security programme development:

- The Food Security Programme team will be complete with the recruitment of an Agriculture and Environment Development Officer, and a Food Security Assistant for Sangklaburi.
- Food Security Programme staff and the Community Liaison Officer will explore new alliances with camp CBOs to look at potential as implementing partners for project activities.



- TBBC will attend the planned UNHCR/ CCSDPT agricultural workshop and determine its role in agriculture-related livelihoods projects both inside and outside the camps.

**Food rations:**

- *AsiaMIX* demonstrations and education will be coordinated and supported in other sites.
- The Burmese translation of the Baby Food poster will be finalized.
- The Nutrition Technical Officer will take the lead on developing and completing *AsiaMIX* recipe books.
- *AsiaMIX* and cooking oil increases will be considered for boarding houses.

**Supplementary/ therapeutic feeding:**


- Demonstrations for preparation of *AsiaMIX* for supplementary feeding programmes will be expanded to other camps.
- TBBC will consider an evaluation of supplementary feeding programme implementation.

**Nutrition surveys:**

- Supervised annual nutrition surveys will be completed in remaining camps before the end of 2007, and data will be analyzed and presented in early 2008.
- TBBC and the CDC will continue work on the follow-up survey for *AsiaMIX* in Umpiem Mai camp.

**CAN project and related initiatives:**

- CAN ToT is planned for the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2007 in Nu Po camp. Trainees will include participants from Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin camps, which previously have not started CAN Projects, as well as Mon from cease-fire areas, Shan and Karen IDPs, and camp residents. The two new Food Security Assistants will attend as participants for training in CAN and nutrition.
- CAN training for camp residents will be conducted in seven sites throughout the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2007.
- New monitoring forms for CAN activities will be revised according to feedback received from implementation during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of 2007.
- Preparations are underway to conduct a baseline survey prior to the end of the rainy season when CAN activities are most evident. The goal of the survey is to establish current activities, to determine factors to facilitate expansion, and to develop specific project objectives for ongoing monitoring. A consultant will be secured for a six month tenure during the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2007 and a survey undertaken.
- Evaluation of outcome of mung bean pilot project will be conducted and the project expanded to other sites if it is found to be successful.





### Lessons Learned

- Integration of food security initiatives into one programme has already been beneficial in coordinating activities.
- Regular coordination between TBBC relief and Food Security programmes is essential to ensure good staff management and effective implementation of programme activities.
- Extra time needs to be allotted to training new refugee staff/ partners for activities such as nutrition surveys, as many experienced staff have left for resettlement.
- Camp residents need to be better informed about CAN Project activities and more interest needs to be generated to participate in trainings.
- Mung bean sprout raising, micro-livestock, and small-scale energy projects, such as bio-gas should continue to be supported, particularly for demonstration sites and boarding schools, but should not be pursued at the household level.

### **b) Cooking fuel, stoves, utensils**

**Cooking fuel:** Although TBBC has implemented the recommendations of a 2003 consultancy which studied the supply of cooking fuel (see 1. b), Appendix E for background and details), ration feed back, comment boxes and focus groups (including boarding houses) report that refugees regularly run out of charcoal before the next distribution.

#### Next six months

TBBC will review fuel distributions and attempt to identify the cause of the gaps. Misuse, overuse, resale, and lack of cooking stoves will be assessed to determine any response.

**Cooking stoves:** Fuel-efficient 'bucket stoves' save 30% compared with fuel used in cooking by the traditional 'three stones' method and burn more cleanly, producing less air pollution in the home, reducing respiratory diseases, especially in women and children. TBBC therefore aims to ensure that all households have access to at least one fuel-efficient stove and supports joint stove-making programmes in Site 1, Site 2, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La Oon and Nu Po. However the production of these programmes is still quite small and in 2006 it was necessary to buy commercially manufactured stoves to cover the 10% of households without stoves.

During the first half of 2007 TBBC purchased stoves only in Mae Rama Luang and Mae La Oon camps from the ZOA VTC stove-making project. These stoves were given mainly to new arrivals and families that never received stoves and, on average, were baht 10 to 20 cheaper than the commercial ones. TBBC was able to use the entire production from the project amounting to 252 stoves of various sizes in Mae Rama Luang and 73 in Mae La Oon.

The ZOA VTC has gradually improved the quality of clay stoves manufactured in camp (strength and energy efficiency). Stove specifications have been adapted to needs and standardised, and the refugees now seem fairly satisfied with them. There are now several models available in the camps: small and medium size bucket stoves for household use, extra large drum stoves for boarding houses and CBOs, and a newly designed two-hole stove for bigger household and heavy duty use.

#### Next six months

TBBC will take a more active role in supporting the stove-making projects provided that they can maintain their quality standards and keep prices reasonable. A survey will be carried out before the end of the year to review coverage and determine distribution needs for 2008.

**Cooking/ eating utensils:** TBBC supplies cooking utensils, mainly pots and woks, every two years. At the beginning of 2007, 2,888 small and 2,291 large woks, and 408 small, 13,560 medium and 9,756 large pots were purchased and distributed in the nine camps. Other cooking materials requested by CBOs and NGOs, such as spoons and plates (i.e. boarding houses) were left to the discretion of each TBBC office since the quantities involved are quite small.

### **c) Soap**

Having been identified as a gap under Sphere Standards as long ago as 2000, TBBC was eventually able to start border-wide distributions of soap in April 2007, with a monthly ration of 125 g of bar bathing soap and 125 g of washing powder per person per month. Products used were chosen after consumer testing by CBOs in the camps and were launched with a 'soap information campaign' which included a feature in the TBBC newsletter.

The use of soap and level of acceptability by the refugees is being monitored. Comments collected through household monitoring and the Community Liaison Project, suggest that beneficiaries are generally satisfied with the soap bars but some (two camps) complain that the laundry powder does not produce enough suds. During the tendering process for the second annual bid in Bangkok TBBC staff carried out further tests in the office to ensure that the quality of the next consignment fully meets requirements.

The most important impact of soap distribution is expected to be improvements in refugee health but it is too early to be able to measure this. The main immediate benefit is that all refugees now have access to soap and do not have to spend part of their other rations to purchase it.

TBBC is addressing concerns that soap distributions will have negative impacts on the environment by initiating a water testing programme to compare results with Thai Surface/ Ground Water Standards<sup>1</sup>. This requires taking into account the fact that refugees have been coping with the lack of soap distributions for over 20 years by exchanging rations or buying their own. Some agencies (e.g. UNICEF, American Refugee Committee (ARC), and International Rescue Committee (IRC) have also been distributing relatively small quantities of soap as part of their health programmes. The use of soap will therefore already have impacted on the environment. The change is that there is now a systematic border-wide distribution for the first time, increasing volume and coverage of detergent use.

Health agencies have not previously measured the impact of detergent in their water testing and TBBC sought expert technical advice to agree on the necessary parameters. SGS was appointed to undertake testing for temperature, pH, Dissolved Oxygen (DO), Total Dissolve Suspended (TDS), Phosphate and Chlorophyll (Sulphate and nitrate were also tested in Mae La). SGS selected sampling points upstream and downstream of the camps and carried out tests in April/May to provide baseline data before soap distribution. 10 sampling stations were established in Site 1, 12 in Mae La, 6 in Mae Rama Luang and 4 in Mae La Oon. AMI, IRC and MI staff were involved in the tests to facilitate their participation in ongoing monitoring.

The results showed that when compared with the Thai standards for Thailand, pH, DO and nitrate levels complied with the criteria and whilst TDS, phosphate, sulphate and chlorophyll did not meet the standard, they were within a reasonable range. SGS concluded that TBBC should use these results as a baseline for future testing and continue monitoring the quality of water after each distribution.

#### Lessons learned

- TBBC does have the technical capacity to oversee water testing and needs stronger support from the health agencies. These organisations should be lobbied to share in a coordinated effort to measure the impact of soap distribution on water.
- As well as technical results, the baseline survey in the four camps gave a better understanding of the human and financial resources required for water testing.

#### Next 6 months

- In accordance with the consultants' advice, tests for chlorophyll, sulphate and TDS will be discontinued, whilst tests for water hardness will be introduced.
- A project and budget for water testing has been drafted and will be presented to major stakeholders at the CCSDPT Health and Environmental Health subcommittees.

#### **d) Shelter**

**Building materials:** TBBC started to provide annual supplies of building materials for house repairs in all camps in 2000 (see 1. c), Appendix D) Since then, rations have been standardised and steadily increased in an attempt to meet all basic needs and avoid refugees having to go out of the camps to gather supplementary supplies. Current rations (revised in 2005) are set out in the appendix.

Rations were cut quite severely last year because of TBBC's funding shortage, but during 2007 full rations were reinstated, plus additional supplies to make up for the 2006 deficit. This represented a large increase of supplies over 2006 levels which exacerbated problems previously reported in procuring building materials, particularly bamboo. The cutting of bamboo is very restricted under Thai law and tends to be available only through a small group of well-connected suppliers. Scarcity in a non-competitive and hyper-regulated environment makes transparency, price and quality control extremely challenging.

It is also difficult to determine fair building supply rations, particularly for annual repairs. These have been determined through surveys of household needs through the refugee committees but it is evident that the use of supposedly standard rations varies widely between households. Some houses have been expanded instead of being repaired and for other households bamboo has become a currency that can easily be exchanged, resulting in inadequate repairs. Consequently, from a refugee perspective, supplies are rarely adequate.

This was illustrated again by TBBC's 2008 bamboo needs assessment survey conducted in all the camps during May/June using the 'thirty by 7' cluster sampling technique (7 samples in 30 clusters). Questions were asked such as 'What is the minimum number of poles of bamboo do you think you will need to repair your house in the next 12 months if TBBC had to cut its ration?', 'How would you replace the missing bamboo if you receive less than you need?' and 'How many years can you repair your house without rebuilding it entirely?'.

The results of the survey must be interpreted cautiously due to differences in interpretation and/or delivery of questions from one camp to another and, in some cases, misreporting. However, only 14% of 1,706 refugees interviewed considered that the current ration is about right, whilst 59% said they really need more. 27% would be ready to receive less bamboo if TBBC had to cut the actual ration. The response to how refugees would cope with possi-

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<sup>1</sup> Notification of the National Environmental Quality No 8, B.E 2537 (1994) classification of surface water class 2 (medium clean fresh surface water) and ground water standards, notification of Ministry of Industry No 12 B.E. 2542 (1999).

ble ration reductions varied from camp to camp, but more than a third of those interviewed said they would have to make up the difference by borrowing, 25% by buying, 11% by re-using old poles, whilst 10% of them said they would have to cut bamboo illegally from the forest. Less than half of the surveyed population felt that they could cope with any ration reduction.



Monitoring procedures will be strengthened to observe the actual use of supplies and to better understand real needs but, in any case, TBBC's current financial situation rules out any ration increases for 2008. In fact there will again have to be cuts. Based on the survey results however, whilst bamboo supplies will be reduced, roofing supplies will be increased because refugees argue that inadequate roofing is a major reason for deterioration of bamboo used for the walls.

To address the bamboo procurement problems, TBBC commissioned professional quality control checks at Umpiem and Mae La during the 2007 bamboo delivery period and the inspection company was tasked to carry an audit on these supplies during February and March. The conclusions were that supplies in Umpiem were sub-standard and the supplier could not distribute the ordered quantity on time. The audit also concluded that the procedure for delivering and distribution of bamboo in Umpiem Mai is not transparent with refugees complaining that the size of bamboo was too small and that they received less than their entitlement.

The contractor was changed in March and distribution problems are now being discussed with the camp committee. However, the audit confirmed the difficulties involved in procuring bamboo. Further improvements will now be sought for building supplies procurement and monitoring. Legal advice is being sought to find ways of making bamboo/ building material procurement more transparent and monitoring procedures similar to those for food commodities will be put in place.

#### Lesson learned

- As the demand for building supplies has increased, control and monitoring by TBBC and the camp committees has not been adequate to cope with the pressures of procuring and delivering a scarce commodity.
- Conditions of the 'bamboo market' are the main source of difficulties encountered and must be carefully examined in order to find solutions.



#### Next six months

- Upgrade building material monitoring procedures for 2008 including post distribution surveys and improved inspections during delivery (i.e. more inspectors assigned).
- With legal advice, identifying ways of establishing a more open and transparent procurement system.

#### **e) Clothing**

Following the distribution of Lutheran World Service (LWS) used clothing during the 2006/7 cool season, for the third year running, TBBC also purchased 1,725 sets of clothing for children under five in April which were distributed border-wide according to demographics supplied by the camp committees.

It had been hoped also to address a gap in the availability of suitable clothing for 6 to 12 year olds, but this was again postponed due to budget limitations. Nonetheless, TBBC approached ZOA to study the possibilities of developing an arrangement similar to the stove-making project whereby clothes might be commissioned through their vocational training programme.

As usual, the LWS shipment also included quilts which were distributed one quilt for two persons in Mae Sariang and Mae Hong Song camps, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po, and one quilt for three persons in the remaining camps.

TBBC also continues to support a longyi-weaving project in each camp (see Section 3.3 c) below).

#### Next six months

- The Wakachiai project or 'sharing project' is a Tokyo base NGO specialised in relief and development work. They have also gathered 40,000 pieces of clothing which are about to be shipped. Import authorisation has already been obtained from MOI and the consignment should arrive in August to be distributed as follows:

Clothes	Affected Thai villages	Vulnerable Refugees	Contingency	Total
Tak camps	4,000	9,000	5,000	18,000
Mae Hong Song camps	1,500	2,500	6,000	10,000
Kanchanaburi camps	0	2,000	2,000	4,000
Mae Sariang camps	2,400	3,200	2,400	8,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>7,900</b>	<b>16,700</b>	<b>15,400</b>	<b>40,000</b>

- TBBC is extremely grateful to LWR for sustaining high quality shipments of clothing for many years and they have already confirmed delivery of ten 40-foot containers of clothes for the 2007/8 cool season. 300 bales of men's clothing, 150 bales of children's clothing, 608 bales of sweaters, 270 cartons of layettes, and 2,500 bales of quilts for a total of approximately 240,000 clothing items, should arrive in time for distribution in December.
- Further consideration will be given to a clothes-making project with ZOA for 6 to 12 year olds.

#### **f) Blankets, bednets and sleeping mats**

**Mosquito nets:** 38,250 extra-large and 37,000 double non-impregnated bed nets were distributed in March. Recommendations of the CCSDPT health subcommittee are awaited to see whether malaria transmission rates have increased to the extent that impregnated nets are again needed. These are substantially more expensive than non-impregnated nets and TBBC's ability to respond will depend on resolving current financial problems.

**Sleeping mats:** This year 35,750 extra-large sleeping mats and 36,800 double ones were delivered to the camps in March.

**Blankets:** Blankets have been procured for the annual distribution in October before the cold season. The ration is one blanket for two refugees.

#### **g) Tendering, procurement, monitoring, stocks**

**Tendering and procurement:** TBBC publicly tenders for all major supplies except bamboo and thatch which are restricted items under Thai law. Procedures are set out in a comprehensive procurement manual which complies with all major donor requirements.

The ongoing effectiveness of competitive tendering depends on TBBC being able to maintain the interest of potential suppliers and receive adequate bids. The average number of bids received in the first half of 2007 was again satisfactory: rice 6 (5 in the previous period), mung beans 6 (5), AsiaMIX 3 (3), cooking oil 6 (5), charcoal 9 (5), salt 4 (5), chillies 5 (3), fish-paste 6 (3), and firewood 1 (1).

Refugee communities continue to play a strong role in the selection of items to ensure ration items truly match needs in camps. This particularly has been evident in:

- Introduction of a blend of fish/ prawn-paste which is preferred to fish-paste in Tham Hin camp.
- CBO washing powder trials resulted in the tendering committee carrying out further tests in Bangkok.
- An increasing concern was the involvement of some authorities in the bidding processes. The companies involved have been identified and the tendering committee informed to prevent any conflicts of interest.



**Quality control:** TBBC employs professional inspection companies to carry out independent checks on supplies in accordance with major donor regulations (see 1. i), Appendix D). Sample checks are made on weight, packaging and quality. The refugee camp committees carry out a second check at the time of delivery/ distribution. The majority of professional supply inspections are carried out in the camps, as is TBBC's aim, but some are done at the supply source and in transit. From January to June 2007, except for *AsiaMIX*, 60% to 100% (average 94%) by quantity of supply inspections took place in camp warehouses. Due to the ex-factory terms where the seller's responsibility ends at source, all inspections of *AsiaMIX* are carried out at the factory.

During this period, particular attention has been given to the quality of charcoal and chillies which were a source of constant concern last year. Charcoal quality has improved, offering better heating values than last year, while the majority of samples that failed the tests were due to their composition, with high percentages of moisture, ashes and volatile matter and low fixed carbon. Chilli quality also improved with the percentage of unripe or broken berries dropping from more than 50% in 2006 to only 25%. Mung beans have now become one of the most problematic commodities with 21% of the samples showing damage, dark or yellow seeds. There is no apparent reason for suppliers not meeting contract specifications and this is being addressed with them.

Quality inspections of *AsiaMIX* showed insufficient quantities of iron and vitamin C in the 'premix'. At the moment, premix is imported and *AsiaMIX* manufacturing options in Thailand are very limited. TBBC must try to resolve these problems with the current supplier until there is a more competitive market.

Although TBBC is increasingly applying penalties for poor quality, its ability to do so is still undermined by cash flow problems. On two occasions at the beginning of the year TBBC decided to be lenient with a supplier who was shouldering considerable TBBC debt. Top-up penalties are also applied whenever possible for under-weight deliveries (the results of these inspections are also shown in appendix E. 17 and E. 18). 29 inspections so far this year reported weight problems, with chillies, rice, charcoal and fish-paste being the commodities most often offending. 16 top-up penalties were demanded to compensate for the loss whilst 12 letters of information or warning were delivered.

During this period the inspection companies have reported some difficulties in achieving the requested sample rates for quality control checks on rice, especially weight. Due to the enormous quantities of sacks involved in some camps, it has been agreed to reduce the sample rate from 10% to 5%. This should not significantly affect the confidence of the results. On a different note, TBBC has occasionally encountered some misreporting by the inspectors. A warning letter has been sent to the company and it is planned to more systematically document the work of the inspectors in order to provide feedback to the inspection companies and promote improvement. Follow-up will include important considerations such as technical competence, communication and reporting skills, punctuality etc.

Prawn-paste has been supplied to Tham Hin for many years where this is more acceptable than fish-paste. During the period, samples of prawn-paste from various sources, including some brand-name prawn-paste purchased from supermarkets, were sent for laboratory testing for lead, cadmium, and mercury content. Unfortunately, all samples measured between 2 to 5 times the maximum levels of lead specified by the FDA for this type of product, suggesting that there is no 'safe' prawn-paste available in the market.

In an effort to resolve this problem, a blended 'prawn' paste using a combination of fish (90%) and prawn (10%) was tested in order to reduce the level of lead contamination without losing the original taste. The factory used the same raw materials as currently used for fish-paste, i.e. deep ocean fish with heads and inner organs removed, which always pass the heavy metal test. The results for new product varied from almost no trace of heavy metals to a very high level of lead. The conclusion is that unlike fish-paste, the prawn-paste which is sourced from different 'markets' cannot guarantee quality standards. The TBBC procurement department is still looking for a solution with the suppliers.

#### Lessons learned

- TBBC's poor financial situation still negatively affects its ability to enforce quality standards on suppliers.
- In order to keep control over the supply line, TBBC must remain proactive in identifying who is backing local suppliers at the border.

#### Next six months

- With stockpiles secured in all camps and building supplies delivered, the second half of the year is traditionally less busy in terms of the volume of the activity in the field. This will provide more opportunity to focus on quality discussions to improving the quality control system.

**Monitoring:** 2007 is the second year using TBBC's upgraded monitoring system (see 1. i), Appendix D) and data from last year can now be used for baseline comparisons. Trained staff (mainly Field Assistants) now report monthly monitoring data to the new Programme Support Manager in charge of the data collection and analysis, and are summarised in consolidated monthly reports. These are considered regularly in management and other staff meetings providing an effective tool for assessing programme delivery and impact, promoting discussion at all levels, and facilitating improvements.

The monthly monitoring report is now translated into Burmese and sent to camp committees, refugee committees and CBOs and in the future there will be a Karen language version, and, hopefully, another in Karenni. TBBC is at the same time providing monitoring feed back to the refugee community through its newsletter, a well appreciated basic source of information available at any distribution point. Comment boxes installed in all camps have so far produced mixed results but efforts will continue to be made to improve their usage.

A summary of the results of the staff monitoring visits during the first half of 2007 are set out under Indicator (A) 2.3 in Appendix E.

Timeliness of delivery remains a concern with 33.7% of deliveries to camps late during the period. Although there has been considerable time spent discussing the problem in coordination meetings it has still not been possible to determine a specific response or strategy. Some long-standing companies are as much at fault as new ones. Although the number of orders delayed for more than a week remains extremely low and only one stock out was reported during the period, TBBC staff is putting pressure on the suppliers to abide to the terms of their contracts. If the situation prevails it is planned to introduce penalties for timeliness of delivery and put it in the contracts. The tendering process committee scrutinises relations and previous histories of the suppliers and makes the appropriate recommendations.



On a positive note, distribution efficiency remains high border wide (94.2%) and, with the exception of fish-paste in Tham Hin, the amount of commodities delivered matches those distributed, confirming the underlying strength of the supply pipe line.

One area for improvement remains the establishment of post-distribution monitoring (PDM). As implemented in most major distribution contexts all over the world, PDM offers the means to report on how commodities are used or consumed at the household level, providing valuable feed back on important issues such as adequacy of rations and food basket, household coping mechanisms, and degrees of diversion/ redistribution. In short a PDM is the only part missing in the TBBC monitoring procedures enabling bridging outcome indicators (nutrition survey results) and inputs. Based on advice from the World Food Programme WFP regional technical advisor who is still supporting TBBC and following up on recommendations made last year (*'WFP's review of TBBC's food aid to the Burma refugees at the Thailand-Burma Border' Oct 2006*), TBBC will add PDM to the monthly monitoring and upgrade some existing data sheets.

Lessons learned

- Comments boxes are still viewed as a potentially valuable source of information but will remain of limited value unless greater usage can be achieved.
- A stronger policy is required to achieve timeliness of deliveries.

Next six months

- Introduction of the household post distribution monitoring into the monthly monitoring system.
- Initiation of discussions about a penalty system for late delivery.

**Warehouses, stock management and food containers:** TBBC's funding shortfall in 2006 restricted the amount of work done on warehouses. Nevertheless, this year a significant number of camp warehouses were repaired or maintained: 2 in Tham Hin, 1 in Don Yang, 4 in Site 1, 2 in Site 2 and 4 in Mae La. In Mae Rama Luang, all warehouses underwent repairs and 10 were extended. All warehouses in Mae La Oon received minor repairs and 3 new buildings were constructed (the only new warehouses border-wide). Maintenance work for Nu Po and Umpiem are planned for the next dry season.

Further training and reinforcement has been ongoing to improve warehousing standards. Unfortunately this has yet to produce the required results. Among the 20 parameters being monitored each month, stacking is reported as a failure in all the camps while cleanliness issues are still pending in some cases. Warehouses rules are now posted at almost every warehouse. Overall, almost 80% of the warehouse inspections were positive, representing an increase of 5.1% from the last reporting period.

Some infrastructure problems persist. A significant number of warehouses lack space and commodities are not withdrawn according to 'first-in, first-out' principles. Of more concern is continuing use of silos for rice in Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon camps, rodents, moisture and insects being major causes of spoilage. This traditional



practice is hard to change in this area and must be done with the help of the community. The impact of silo warehousing on rice stock is being documented to compare it with stacking in both camps to demonstrate to the committees that this practice needs to be changed.

A new initiative using mud-bricks in Mae Ra Ma Luang opens the opportunity for an alternative to traditional building materials used in the camps, since being made of mud and husks they are also of a temporary nature. Two houses have been built this year which



are used as a warehouse in the new arrivals section and an office for the TBBC supply team in the camp. Whilst it is too early to judge whether these bricks offer a serious alternative to eucalyptus and bamboo, possibilities of expanding warehousing space using this kind of material will be explored before the dry season.



Unfortunately, some of the sealed plastic drums introduced for the delivery and storage of fish-paste and oil have been 'disappearing' and this is currently being investigated with the camp committees.

Finally, discussions are taking place on the possibility of implementing a stock card management system in the stockpile camps. While providing no real added-value in non-stockpile camps where food is distributed immediately after delivery, there is currently no document which instantaneously provides information on the state of the stock per commodity.

#### Lessons learned

- Behavioural change of warehouse staff requires regular follow-up and more warehousing space.
- Misuse of re-usable food storage containers is a challenge that requires further attention.
- Mud-bricks may be a good alternative for warehouse buildings.
- Changing rice stocking habits from silo to stacking can only be changed with the help of the community.

#### Next six months

- Preparation of a mud-brick proposal for warehouses in Mae Sariang camps.
- Reporting on 'silo versus stacking' in Mae Sariang camps and proposals for change.
- Working with camp committees and warehouse managers to avoid loss of re-usable containers.
- Mapping the needs of warehousing space for improvement.

#### **h) Feeding figures**

As described in Section 2 a), the calculation of feeding figures has become increasingly difficult in circumstances where new refugees are still arriving, others are leaving for resettlement, the PABs have effectively ceased to function and yet the refugee committees are under instruction not to report new arrivals. UNHCR, OCPD and DOPA population figures are all currently divergent. This means that it is even more important for TBBC to make sure its own estimates are as accurate as possible.

TBBC is therefore reviewing its procedures for calculating and controlling feeding figures and was able to discuss this in detail with the ECHO auditor during his visit in June. Again as described in Section 2 a), the starting point for this process has been to disaggregate population statistics by camp section and determine categories of refugees who are outside the camps for various reasons. Criteria are then being agreed on categories which should be excluded from the rations. Controlling this process will mean establishing baseline data by sampling section leader records and then updating them regularly.

Camp committees try to meet all new arrivals and determine whether they intend to remain in the camps or move on. If they wish to stay in the camps they are added to the camp records, reported to TBBC and included in feeding figures. This process normally takes about two months and prior to this, new arrivals receive food from contingency stocks or by sharing with friends or relatives in the camp. For years this system worked well, but under pressure since 2006 to comply with the MOI rules not to feed unregistered refugees, there is now some underreporting of new arrivals. In Mae La camp the Thai authorities have stated that they believe there could be as many as 5,000 un-registered residents who should not be there and have recently suggested moving them back across the border.

In Ban Don Yang camp in July, the Thai authorities tried to discourage the unregistered population by taking control of the supervision of distributions and refusing to provide food to anyone without an ID card. TBBC is working with the camp and refugee committees, the Thai authorities and the UNHCR to overcome this problem, but unless there is an effective screening mechanism put in place, the accurate inclusion of new arrivals in the feeding figures will remain problematic.

Ration cards are crucial to the control process and improvements to their design to facilitate updates will be made for 2007. Provision for adding ID card details will also be made since the imperfect distribution of ID cards during 2007 is creating new complications. ID cards were only produced for registered refugees, and only to those over 12 years of age. The distribution of cards has been inconsistent between camps with many yet to be collected, and there is no system in place for issuing cards as refugees reach the age of 12. This means that there are many refugees on TBBC's feeding figures who are not ID card holders. Adding ID card numbers to feeding lists and ration cards will help identify the scale of the problem, identify the nature of non-registered populations whilst also encouraging refugees to collect their cards.

It will be even more important to keep feeding figures up to date over the next few months as large numbers of refugees leave for resettlement. There have been reports of some trading of ration cards by those leaving and TBBC is addressing this with the camp committees. All ration cards of those leaving the camps will in future have to be returned to TBBC. Renewed attempts will also be made to ensure that refugees hold their own ration cards rather than leaving them with section leaders.

#### Lesson learned

- There is a need to establish baseline feeding figures and set up ongoing monitoring procedures to ensure these are regularly updated.
- In the absence of a formal new arrival screening mechanism, TBBC needs to be more proactive in setting up a system which can report with better accuracy on the number of new arrivals.
- Camp committees do have the detailed information necessary to improve feeding figure calculations and are willing to improve the system with TBBC assistance.
- Establishing accurate feeding figures has become more difficult as resettlement departures have increased.
- Improved ration cards can help control distributions.

#### Next 6 months

- All of the above lessons learned will be addressed over the next six months working closely with the refugee and camp committees, and the CMP.

#### **i) Preparedness, new arrivals and vulnerable groups**

TBBC maintains preparedness to respond to influxes of new arrivals and other emergencies at all times. The situation in Eastern Burma is monitored through TBBC partners, information networks and field staff so that the



organisation is usually aware of impending refugee arrivals in advance. Each field site holds emergency stocks of basic ration items and generally can deliver these to groups of new arrivals within 24 hours of being alerted to their presence (see 1. g), Appendix D).

This year TBBC responded to several emergencies and provided assistance to refugees who briefly sought protection inside Thailand. Military activity along the border was quite intense at times, temporarily forcing communities to leave their villages for short periods. In February, 178 refugees reached Umphang district, but 100 of them were held at the border. And in March, 200 refugees fleeing fighting sought assistance in Pho Phra, followed in April by a further 315 Burmese villagers to the same district. TBBC was present every time and distributed full food



rations together with some blankets, mosquito nets and mats. Occasionally, TBBC also provided short term assistance to other Burmese people in need such as migrant workers and unrecognised refugees. Thai communities and villages neighbouring the refugee camps are also occasionally subject to emergencies such as floods. In these cases TBBC offers emergency assistance such as rice, blankets or mosquito nets from the Thai community assistance budget (see Section 3.2 e) below).

Expected numbers of new arrivals are factored into wet season stockpile calculations. For planning purposes in all camps, feeding figure projections are made allowing for projected, births, deaths, new arrivals and departures for resettlement (see Section 3.1 h) above).

**Avian Influenza:** is a potential threat to refugee health and to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. CCSDPT has a working group which is coordinating NGO preparedness. TBBC is participating in this group and developing plans for its own organisation/ programme. This includes draft advice/ instructions to all staff for personal protection and also contingency plans for sustaining refugee supplies during any pandemic. This is likely to include the need to stock-pile food as soon as the threat is recognised and to adjust logistics for storage and delivery. This will require specific emergency budget provisions.

#### Next six months.

- Upgrade emergency/ contingency stocks according to TBBC guide lines (see 1. g), Appendix D).
- Finalisation of the TBBC Avian Influenza preparedness plan.

#### **j) Support to Mon resettlement sites**

TBBC has been supporting the four Mon Resettlement Sites since 1996 (see Section 2 d) above) and rice supplies for 2007 were delivered during the period. A new monitoring system is in place to check the receipt of supplies including the more isolated sites of Bee Ree and Tavoy. This system is based on the one developed for the Thai camps, but since the resettlement sites cannot easily be reached by TBBC staff, it demands greater integration with Mon support groups. The MRDC has been closely involved in implementation and training of warehouse staff and the system will require ongoing adjustment and modification as experience is gained.

TBBC continues to support the cost of medical supplies for the resettlement site clinics. IRC and BRC are also providing essential support to MNHC (Mon National Health Committee). TBBC's support is considered of an emergency nature, not a long term solution and it is hoped that a medical agency will take responsibility for these supplies and provide a more comprehensive service to the sites. One NGO began a community based malaria project

in the sites in June and have tentative plans to expand their support to encompass a more inclusive medical programme. This year has seen very high rates of malaria and dengue.

Follow-up assessments to the Mon agricultural skills training programme, which were initially planned for the last half of 2006, did not eventuate but TBBC has coordinated with MRDC to identify participants for upcoming CAN training. In addition, a Food Security Assistant will be placed in the Sangklaburi area who will be able to provide ongoing technical support to CAN trainers.

TBBC has strengthened its partnership with MRDC through regular bi-monthly meetings. These have provided greater opportunity for discussions about the direction of the program and its constraints and have resulted in greater understanding between the organizations and stronger MRDC participation in the programmes.

#### Lessons learned:

- Although the TBBC monitoring system has proven very effective in the Thai camps the system will require substantial modification for the resettlement sites.

### **3.2. Working through partnerships**

*To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation, embracing equity, gender and diversity.*

From the beginning, TBBC philosophy has been to support and encourage the refugees to participate in programme design, implementation, follow-up, and camp management. The activities described here, supporting the second core objective, mainly relate to direct enabling initiatives aimed at improving refugee community participation. These activities include capacity building components which also support the third core objective, 'building capacity'. As mentioned the beginning of the Section, these two core objectives of partnership and capacity building will be revised and combined when the strategic plan is updated later in 2007.

The other essential partnerships TBBC is engaged in are with the RTG and Thai communities, TBBC Donors, UNHCR, other international organisations, and NGOs. Considerable institutional resources are committed to these partnerships including TBBC taking leadership roles in the CCSDPT (see Appendix A), and regular events organised with donors. These activities are described elsewhere which also support the fourth and fifth core objectives, of 'strengthening advocacy' and 'developing organisational resources'.

#### **a) Camp management**

The TBBC Camp Management Project (CMP) has been fully operational since December 2004. Camp Committees are provided with budgets for camp administration costs and incentive payments for refugee committee members and workers involved in the delivery, storage and distribution of TBBC supplies and additional supplies are also provided for ceremonies and festivals, camp security, Thai relationships etc. (see 2. a), Appendix D).

The TBBC CMP Coordinator who supervised the project since its inception left at the end of March. A volunteer spent two months, meeting with staff, refugee and camp committees, reviewing all existing documentation, and produced a document detailing the background and research leading to the initial implementation of the project.

Camp management encompasses a wide range of responsibilities, including maintaining refugee statistics, coordinating services, administration of justice, social welfare, liaison with the international community and negotiations with local Thai authorities. It requires high levels of commitment, administration and negotiation skills from volunteer committee members, section leaders and other CBO staff. Although there has been some training related to the implementation of NGO programmes, relatively little attention has been given to capacity building for camp management as a whole. To address this gap, TBBC has recruited a Capacity Building Coordinator to conduct an assessment of the skills and resources required by refugee committees engaged in camp management and to design and implement a programme to ensure the CMP has the capacity and skills to support and equip camp management personnel.

This initiative has become more urgent as resettlement to third countries has begun to attract the more skilled and educated camp population and who are leaving in disproportionate numbers. Training, incentives and other resources will become even more important if essential community management and services are to be maintained and further strengthened.

At the beginning of the year the proportion of women involved in food distribution was around 35% but this has not been reviewed during this period. With the appointment of the new Capacity Building Coordinator, who is a woman, this will now be given a higher priority.

#### Lessons learned

- Lack of formalised job CMP descriptions has resulted in misunderstandings of objectives and responsibilities.

#### Next six months

- The Capacity Building Coordinator will conduct a comprehensive needs assessment of camp management capacity and resources taking into account experience already gained through the CMP and community liaison programmes.
- Work on refugee job descriptions will continue. Refugee committees will complete draft job descriptions for staff on the CMP payroll, detailing the main role and responsibilities of at least the key staff.

#### **b) Gender**

Women's organisations continue to act as a driving force in the development of gender perspectives, and as the inspiration for their implementation in CBOs and NGOs. TBBC supports women's initiatives with basic materials, for project management through the longyi weaving programme and administrative support to carry out some camp activities such as the distribution of baby kits provided by UNICEF. TBBC has partnered with Australian Volunteers International (AVI) to provide a volunteer to work with the Karen Women's Organisation (KWO) on management capacity building and this will be extended for another year.

Recognising that women's organisations are involved in many aspects of camp management, from needs of new arrivals, ensuring appropriate mechanisms are in place for victims of violence including support, counselling and safe houses, to distributions of donations of clothing, TBBC has begun discussions with KWO to consider how to contribute direct core support to their organisations, e.g. provision of stipends or in-kind payments for some positions.

Women's organisations are active in their own advocacy work and have made invaluable contributions to the ongoing discussions with NGOs and resettlement countries to ensure that refugees have sufficient information to enable them to make informed decisions throughout the resettlement process to third countries. The KWO continue to monitor the impact of resettlement on the communities, disseminate information on the process of resettlement and life in resettlement countries and they have also established a post box to enable resettled families to stay in touch with friends and relatives who remain behind in the camps.

TBBC's gender policy is set out in 2. b) Appendix D. TBBC strives for gender-balance in staff recruitment. Although the current ratio is 4 female: 3 male staff it is difficult to find women interested in field coordinator positions and women are under-represented at management levels.

#### Next six months

- Through discussions with KWO and Karenni Women's Organisation (KnWO), TBBC will further explore appropriate support for personnel within their organisations.

#### **c) Protection**

Prolonged encampment, lack of access to further education and lack of income generation or employment opportunities, have created a broad range of protection and security problems for refugees living in the camps. The CCSDPT/ UNHCR Protection Working Group (PWG) established in 2000, has been working to improve the protection environment on a range of issues, particularly the administration of justice, sexual and gender-based violence, and child protection systems.

Although Legal Assistance Centres have been established in Site 1 and Mae La under a joint IRC/ UNHCR programme, it took two years to receive formal approval for the centres and MOI has only recently approved operational programmes.

**SGBV:** A reporting system for sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) incidents was established in 2003. Since that time, reported cases have been increasing year by year. This could be at least partly attributed to a higher level of awareness amongst refugees and an enhanced reporting and referral mechanism through camp GBV committees, CBOs, NGOs and the camp committees as well as the gradual implementation of SGBV Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in 8 out of 9 camps. Reports of domestic violence particularly have significantly increased and rape targeting children is also increasing.

**Child protection:** Child Protection Committees have been established in the camps to address the many protection concerns regarding refugee children and these are coordinated through the Child protection network. Workshops are ongoing in all camps on development of a child protection referral system which will focus on serious child protection incidents such as abuse, neglect and exploitation.

There is a large and growing population of separated children in the camps most of whom are either staying in boarding houses or in foster care with other families. Follow up to the UNICEF review on alternative care options for separated children is focused on improved documentation of children in the camps and activities to retain cultural and identity memory. Specific recommendations from the survey affecting TBBC was to put in place a system of registration for children entering boarding houses and to limit the size to around 50 children. Ration books have been issued to all boarding houses which list the children in each place.

**Code of conduct:** A rapid review of CCSDPT members showed that a significant number do not have a Code of Conduct or provide orientation or training on a Code of Conduct. UNHCR and CCSDPT have posted a joint grievance note in the camps for complaints against staff but work still needs to be done on the investigation procedures.

There exists a need for the humanitarian community NGOs, UNHCR, Camp Committees and Thai authorities to work collectively to raise awareness around the UN Secretary General's Bulletin on Special Measures for protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse and to establish mechanisms consistent with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Protocols and Procedures for receiving and responding to allegations of exploitation and abuse. The Protection Working Group has agreed to focus on this issue following the model that IRC successfully developed in Kenya. This will be further extended to partners in camps and the Thai authorities.

**Child soldiers:** The UN Special Representative on Children and armed conflict made a five-day visit to Burma to explain the framework of Security Council Resolution 1612 and the requirements of its monitoring and reporting mechanism of six grave violations against children in armed conflict. Four Burmese offending parties were listed by the Security Council: Burmese army, UWSA, KNU, and KNPP. During the period, Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) both signed a deed of commitment to cease the recruitment of child soldiers. The next step is to develop a plan of action which will include setting up a system for monitoring and reporting of recruitment of child soldiers from the camps. Although recruitment from the camps is not of major concern, a monitoring system needs to be established. TBBC participates in the UN working group as a representative of the PWG.

#### Next six months

- A workshop will be held to develop an implementation plan for the IASC Guidelines for GBV Interventions in Humanitarian Settings.
- IRC will introduce the model for Prevention of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Abuse (SAE) amongst humanitarian staff. UNHCR will focus on providing technical support for trainings led by MOI on the Code of Conduct with local Thai authorities. IRC will be the focal point for the camp leadership beginning in Mae La with the camp committees and KRC to facilitate the development of their own Code of Conduct. TBBC will familiarise TBBC suppliers with the Code of Conduct.
- UNICEF will develop a framework of minimum standards of care for Boarding Houses.
- A system for monitoring and reporting of recruitment of child soldiers from the camps will be formalised.

#### **d) Safe house**

The Sangklaburi Safe House was established 14 years ago to deal with the increasing numbers of sick and mentally ill people sent to the border for deportation. These people were cared for until they were well enough to return to their families in Burma. The numbers of deportees admitted to the Safe House has declined in recent years because deportees are now handed over directly to the Burmese authorities at Three Pagodas Pass. There remains a chronic caseload for which there are no easy solutions. Most of these people are stateless, many have no idea where they are from and would be unable to survive without the support and care given by Safe House staff.

The small influx of deportees still referred to the Safe House, often included young women and men rescued from abusive work environments. Generally the patients are Burmese or belong to ethnic groups from the border regions. The caseload remained fairly constant at 49 patients, during this six-month period there having been nine new admissions to the house whilst two patients died and a further two were discharged.

Concern was expressed last year about the growing number of orphanages in the Sangklaburi area managed by people with little or no background in child care and unregulated by the local Thai Government, and lack of consensus over how to tackle the problem. However, no one has yet been able to devote enough time to co-ordinate a meeting of those concerned. Ideally this needs to be taken up with the Social Welfare Council in Kanchanaburi.

The safe house building is in a poor state of repair and TBBC is considering some refurbishments for next year. The programme, however, continues to impress visitors and local NGO staff and is considered by some to be a model that could be applied to the refugee camps. The Safe House staff have accumulated much experience and there may be some room for interaction with the camp safe house committees.

#### Lessons learned

- Safe House staff have developed a lot of expertise through interaction with medical programmes and by having to find their own solutions in caring for a very difficult caseload. Perhaps now is the time to start documenting this experience and using its resources to empower and educate other safe house programmes along the border.

#### Next six months

- The challenge remains to help in the establishment of a forum for caregivers in the Sangklaburi area, to better co-ordinate services and hopefully to lead to better monitoring and regulation.

#### **e) Assistance to Thai communities**

TBBC continues to support requests for assistance to Thai communities (see 2. d), Appendix D for background). Much of the support goes to Thai authority personnel involved in camp security and assistance for maintaining



access roads to the camps, but TBBC also supports emergency and development project requests for communities in the vicinity of the camps, including flood relief and blankets for the cold season. During this last six-month period, baht 5,407,811 was spent on this support. Baht 3,766,686 was given to local Thai authorities, mainly in the form of rice and other food items to border personnel. Baht 9,666 was spent on emergency requests and baht 1,631,459 on development projects.

TBBC provided educational support and school lunches to 43 schools, 27 village communities, 9 boarding houses, 2 temples and 1 Thai NGO in the form of food, plus other relief items including 640 blankets, 154 bednets, 222 mats, and 690 quilts.

TBBC's policy for supporting Thai communities dates back to 1999 and is very general in nature, covering potentially huge geographic areas. It has proven difficult for field staff to control when faced with numerous requests from the local authorities. During the RTG/ NGO Workshop in December 2006, MOI asked all NGOs to submit



action plans for assistance to neighbouring Thai communities for 2007 and stated that the camp commanders had lists of target villages. This provided TBBC with an opportunity to reconsider how best to prioritise Thai assistance.

TBBC has agreed to focus local support (90%) on villages less than 30 kilometres from the refugee camps and to apportion available budget for Thai authority support between provinces in proportion to their share of the refugee population. A specific budget will also be allocated for assistance for repairs to camp access roads used by TBBC suppliers.

This policy will make more rational use of available resources and be easier for staff to control. MOI has been informed and it is already being implemented incrementally taking account of earlier commitments made. Communities TBBC has been supporting for some time quite far from the camps are being phased out during 2007.

### **3.3. Building capacity**

*To empower displaced people and their communities by strengthening their capacity for self-reliance.*

Most of the activities described under the first two core objectives support partnerships and contribute to building the capacity of partner organisations. The activities described here are capacity building initiatives supporting the third core objective aimed at improving refugee community self-reliance. Now that the RTG has given approval for income generation projects in camps (see 2. d), Appendix D), TBBC will be looking to expand and develop these activities.

As mentioned earlier, TBBC plans to combine this core objective with the previous one relating to capacity building and to create a new Livelihoods objective.

#### **a) Community liaison**

TBBC recruited a community liaison officer at the beginning of 2005 with the aim of exploring the role of different sectors of society in camp life and devising strategies to address gender, ethnic and other equity issues. As the primary way of achieving this, regular roundtable CBO meetings were initiated during 2006 in Umpiem Mai, Nu Po and Ban Don Yang and, eventually, in Site 1 during the last six months. Plans to establish the process in Site 2 is taking longer than anticipated, as the Karenni National Youth Organisation (KNYO), one of the key local providers of social welfare services in this relatively small community, was otherwise engaged in a process of internal restructuring. Gender, religious, ethnic and age diversities of camp populations have so far been adequately reflected in attendance at these meetings although youth continue to be over-represented due to the high number of youth groups in the camps.

The main focus of the meetings continues to be an examination of CBO capacities and constraints to identify ways of enhancing their individual and collective strengths. Results from meetings in the four camps so far have been similar, demonstrating the severe constraints faced by CBOs despite the influential role they play in community organising. In response, CBOs are developing annual work plans and inventories of resources required to carry these activities out effectively. Progress so far in each camp is as follows:

- *Umpiem Mai*: TBBC has agreed to support the setting up of a community centre in the camp for the various community social groups. Construction of the building is nearing completion and a management committee with rules and regulations will be establishment prior to its opening.
- *Nu Po*: 'Request for Support' document has been prepared combining all CBO work plans and needs for the coming 12 months. To encourage potential donors it will be harmonised with the gaps in service provision identified in the CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan 2007/8.
- *Ban Don Yang*: Individual CBO work plans are currently being compiled into a 'Request for Support' document similar to that developed in Nu Po.
- *Site 1*: Individual work plans are currently being developed, with associated resource needs.



As this process is reaching its natural conclusion in some camps, consideration is being given to shifting the focus of regular consultations with community groups towards more collaboration with TBBC programme-associated activities in camps. This will further help to integrate the work of community liaison into the mainstream programme through greater involvement of, and cooperation with, other field staff.

With fora established in four camps, regular visits have continued to be made to the other camps, ensuring regular networking between CBOs and TBBC in all locations, informing programmes of pertinent issues and community opinions, and paving the way for the establishment of concrete partnerships in programme. This has included CBOs being invited to offer input into choosing new non-food items such as the trialling of different soap products and providing woks as an alternative during the annual pot distribution.

TBBC has asked the KWO head office in Mae Sariang to identify ways to support its camp-based operations, both in terms of specific activities and administrative needs. Similar interventions are being considered for the KnWO and the Muslim Women's Organisation.

TBBC was approached by a textile company based in Bangkok with a proposal to develop a partnership with the KWO in a commercial income-generation venture. TBBC and KWO are keen to explore this opportunity as a response to RTG's new openness to considering livelihood initiatives for camp populations.

#### Lessons learned

- CBOs are fundamental to the effective implementation of various aspects of external service provider programmes, yet are severely limited in this role by a lack of complementary support.
- Concrete partnership with community groups in programme activities is an effective strategy in adding value to the TBBC programme.

#### Next six months

- CBO meetings directed at identifying opportunities for CBOs to collaborate in TBBC camp-based activities will be extended to all camps. Staff in all four field sites will be offered feedback and consulted to define camp-specific areas of programme for the development of potential partnerships.

- The Umpiem Mai community centre will be opened under control of a management committee.
- 'Requests for Support' will be completed for CBOs in Nu Po, Ban Don Yang and Site 1, and TBBC will consider how to respond to these.
- Discussions with stakeholders in every camp will continue to provide input into all aspects of the programme.

### b) Peace building, conflict resolution

TBBC's strategic plan makes provision for organising training and education in conflict management and two initiatives have begun in 2007.

CARITAS Switzerland in cooperation with Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) has finalised Terms of Reference for an 'Assessment on Conflict Sensitivity for the Refugee Programme'. One international and one local consultant have been contracted and they will be joined by a TBBC staff person and a member of the refugee community to make up the assessment team. This assessment will be in two phases during the second half of 2007.

In another initiative, another TBBC Member, Norwegian Church Aid assessed the awareness of their partner organisations to conflict sensitivity to identify future training and support. They concluded that while there was already an understanding of conflict sensitive programmes and considerations, there was less familiarity with Do No Harm tools. One outcome has been a ToT on Do No Harm in Oslo which was attended by one of TBBC's partners and also by the local consultant who will conduct the Swiss assessment with TBBC later this year.

#### Next 6 Months

- The CARITAS/ SDC assessment will be carried out in September and November. The first phase will be of an exploratory nature, identifying stakeholders and issues and familiarising TBBC with the assessment tools. The second phase will include workshops with selected stakeholders and setting up ongoing tools.

### c) Weaving project

TBBC has supported a *longyi*-weaving project through the KWO and KnWO since 2002 (see 3. c), Appendix D). *Longyis* are traditional clothing items worn by men and women. TBBC supplies thread and purchases the finished sarongs at 27 baht each. The objective is to provide each male and female over 12 years old with one *longyi* per person in alternate years. The following table shows the status of the project for 2007 at 30<sup>th</sup> June:

Camp	# Looms	# Weavers	Target Population	Sarongs made	Still to produce
S1	9	37	6,460	390	6,070
S2	4	8	1,400	75	1,325
Mae La	12	7	16,586	16,590	-4
Umpiem	8	5	6,495	6,880	-385
Nu Po	5	5	4,699	4,699	0
Ban Don Yang	2	7	1,442	0	1,442
Tham Hin	4	8	3,546	250	3,296
Mae Ra Ma Luang	13	26	5,751	2,083	3,668
Mae La Oon	13	22	6,086	1,719	4,367
<b>Total:</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>52,465</b>	<b>32,686</b>	<b>19,779</b>

In Site 1 and 2, the KnWO started weaving their production in June. The KWO weavers in Ban Don Yang were delayed because they received their thread too late and will start producing in July. Tak KWO produced slightly more than originally planned. There are now 70 looms in use in the camps and 125 trained refugee staff. 62% of our target has received a *longyi*.

### 3.4 Strengthening advocacy

*To advocate with and for the people of Burma to increase understanding of the nature and root causes of the conflict and displacement, in order to promote appropriate responses and ensure their human rights are respected.*

Throughout its history TBBC has played an advocacy role on behalf of displaced Burmese both with the RTG and the international community. Staff are involved in advocacy at many different levels, ranging from interventions with local authorities when problems arise affecting refugee protection or services at the border, engagement with national Thai authorities concerning policy issues, and dialogue with different components of the international community regarding root causes and durable solutions. The TBBC member agencies also advocate with their own constituencies, raising awareness and encouraging supportive action.

All advocacy activities are aimed at improving protection for refugees, assuring that essential humanitarian services are maintained, and working towards a solution which will bring an end to conflict in Burma and an opportunity for refugees to lead normal, fulfilling lives. There are a multitude of stakeholders who might eventually contribute solutions for displaced Burmese but accurate information is essential for informed decision making. A priority for TBBC is therefore to make optimum use of its presence and networks along the border by researching and documenting the situation as accurately as possible and, where possible, affording the displaced communities themselves the opportunity to voice their concerns. Regular documentation includes these six-month reports and annual



reports on the IDP situation (see Section 3.4 b) below) which are widely distributed to all stakeholders. The TBBC website is also being developed further as a resource tool.

#### **a) Advocacy activities**

Much of the TBBC's advocacy is accomplished by assuming leadership roles within CCSDPT. TBBC currently holds the chair, and facilitates both the UNHCR/ CCSDPT Protection Working Group and the Nutrition Task Force. Besides regular monthly meetings which act as a forum for coordination and information sharing, notable activities during this period were:

- Organising a CCSDPT Directors/ UNHCR Retreat in February to plan coordinated planning activities for the first half of the year.
- Accompanying TBBC members to ban Don Yang camp in March.
- The commissioning of a study of the impact of resettlement on camp management and services and presentation of results to a Donor Forum in May.
- Assisting and briefing EC heads of mission visit to the border in May including 6 ambassadors and 6 other embassies plus representatives of the RTG MOI, NSC and MOFA.
- Meeting with the UNHCR Council of Business Leaders during their visit to Thailand in May.
- Development of the CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan for 2007/8 and presentation of this to a Donor Forum in May in which both MOI and NSC participated.
- Facilitating and briefing a DFID Inquiry team visit to the border in May involving 6 British MPs plus committee staff.
- Meeting with a Donor working group considering strategic responses to the Comprehensive Plan and RTG policies.
- Participation on the UNHCR Livelihoods Project Steering Committee.
- Meeting with Margareta Wahlstrom, Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator UNOCHA, and the UN Myanmar RC to discuss coordination and information sharing from both sides of the border.
- Co-facilitating an information sharing workshop between Myanmar and Thailand-based education agencies.
- Organising and facilitating a border-wide training for senior health agency staff on supplementary feeding programs, and planned coordinated nutrition surveys for all camps.

The Executive Director made two visits to Washington DC in February to address funding continuity issues after recent changes in the US government administration. The opportunity was taken to meet other State officials, NGOs and interest groups.

#### Next six months

- At a CCSDPT Directors/ UNHCR retreat in August ongoing development of the Comprehensive Plan will be discussed and the possibility of drawing up a medium term strategy in consultation with the RTG and Donors. Follow-up of the resettlement impact study and the UNHCR Livelihoods Project will also be considered.
- Hosting of a Workshop on IDP support for Donors.
- Co-facilitating further Workshops between Burma and Bangkok-based agencies.
- The Executive Director will make three overseas visits during the period, attending various meetings but also meeting with other interest groups and addressing TBBC's critical funding situation including:
  - Attendance of an ECHO partner meeting in Brussels to discuss EC humanitarian assistance inside and outside Burma.
  - The Annual UNHCR/ NGO Consultations/ UNHCR EXCOM in Geneva in September.
  - The Burma Day and TBBC Donors Meeting/ AGM in Copenhagen in October/ November with visits also to Stockholm and Oslo.

#### **b) Internally displaced persons (IDPs)**

TBBC has been collaborating with CBOs to document the scale, characteristics and trends relating to internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2001. These reports can be accessed from [www.tbbc.org](http://www.tbbc.org). A brief summary of internal displacement, vulnerability and protection in eastern Burma from the fifth (2006) report is provided in Appendix G.

Thai and Burmese versions of the fifth annual survey were published and distributed to civil society actors and relevant authorities during the first six months of 2007. Providing access to humanitarian situation analysis in local languages is considered important for developing understanding and support from the broader Thai and Burmese society.

Work is now progressing in preparation for a 2007 report. Quantitative field surveys of the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarisation and state-sponsored development projects have been based on mapping activities with key informants in over 30 townships. This has been complemented with a cluster survey of 1,000 households spread across eastern Burma about the characteristics of vulnerability, coping strategies and

protection. Qualitative field assessments about the causes and impacts of displacement have also been conducted by CBOs.



CBOs and non-state actors are also a target audience for TBBC's advocacy work. During the first six months of 2007, workshops promoting awareness of humanitarian principles and capacities were facilitated with 40 participants. Apart from building the capacity of CBOs to conduct field assessments, these workshops were also an opportunity to raise awareness about humanitarian responsibilities amongst the affected communities.

#### Next six months

- With field assessments having been completed already, TBBC's sixth annual survey of internal displacement is on schedule for publication in October 2007. Reports from the field are currently being triangulated, merged and analysed for overall and geographic-specific trends. It is hoped that maps produced in this year's IDP survey will also be compiled into an interactive CD-Rom for public distribution.
- It was anticipated that brief updates about the situation in eastern Burma would have become a regular monthly feature on the TBBC website by June 2007. However, due in part to staffing changes, this information dissemination process has been postponed and is now a target for the coming six months.

#### **c) Website**

The TBBC website [www.tbtc.org](http://www.tbtc.org) continues to be well-used. Although time has not been found to develop it further, news items and publications are being added regularly. A small number of donations have been now been received on-line.

#### Next six months

- TBBC's IT manager has received website design training and the site will be redesigned to incorporate the new logo.

#### **d) TBBC logo**

The new TBBC 'logo' which appears on the back cover of this report is now being used on letterhead, reports and name cards.



### e) TBBC brochure

A folded, one page, brochure is still being prepared to provide basic information for those who do not have time to read TBBC's other publications.

## 3.5 Developing organisational resources

*To develop organisational resources to enable TBBC to be more effective in pursuing its mission.*

### a) Governance

The TBBC EGM was convened in Kanchanaburi after a border visit in March. The Governance Guide was completed including four key policies: 1) Board job description, 2) Board-executive relations, 3) Management standards, and 4) Ends policy.

Having now established TBBC's Governance structure and policies the challenge for the Board/ Members now, is how to effectively use this and strengthen TBBC as an organisation. Particular challenges are how to improve TBBC's financial situation, how to expand advocacy initiatives and how to expand the membership. Two potential new Members attended the meeting and it was agreed that consideration should be given to soliciting other potential members who might not be able to support TBBC financially but could do so in other ways such as through advocacy.

#### Next six months

- The first on-line Board Meeting will be convened in August. If the new technology works this might open the opportunity for more frequent meetings and discussions. High on the agenda will be approval of this six-month report and 2008 budget (which will have been done before this went to press) and addressing the current funding crisis. Preparations will also be discussed for the Donors Meeting and AGM which will be held in Copenhagen in October/ November. Consideration will be given to commissioning an evaluation of TBBC's governance.






## b) Management

**Staff numbers:** TBBC currently (August) has 53 staff (29 female, 24 male, 15 international/ 38 national) with 2 vacancies. The head office is located in Bangkok. There are 4 field offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot and Sangklaburi, with a research office in Chiang Mai. The following figure shows the number of TBBC staff in relation to the number of camps and number of refugees from 1984 to 2007.

**TBBC staff numbers, refugee caseload, and number of camps 1984 to June 2007**



**Staff training/ supervision:** Since recruiting a consultant to establish a comprehensive staff development programme in 2006, staff have individual learning and development programmes through 2007. At the end of the year another consultant conducted executive/ management training aimed at equipping supervisors to follow through on staff training and use new staff performance assessment procedures. Staff training activities so far in 2007 are listed in Appendix D 5 e).

In reality staff do not yet have the capacity to implement these plans/ procedures without specialist support and it has been clear that the recruitment of an experienced Human Resource Manager should be a priority. This has taken time, but a person has now been recruited, commencing duties in August. This will considerably strengthen TBBC's HR capabilities and allow more systematic procedures to be established throughout the organisation.

**Staff retreat:** A staff retreat was held in May bringing all staff and family together for the first time in two years. Activities included a work-session on TBBC's role in new refugee livelihood activities and staff long-service awards. These retreats are very effective team-building exercises and will be held annually, budget permitting.

**Exchange programme:** In an exchange programme funded by DanChurchAid, four TBBC staff made exchange visits with staff of the Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) working with Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. This proved a most worthwhile exercise and offered both sides first-hand insights into comparative protracted refugee settings.

*From an LWF perspective* the concept of principally self-autonomous management of the Thai camps was seen in stark contrast to the Nepalese camps, where the UNHCR has been instrumentally involved in camp management since their inception. This was seen as innovative and developmentally sound. LWF staff were keen to learn from camp committees and CBOs about the process and impact of resettlement on camp communities and their organisations. The group also drew interesting comparisons between the KWO and the Bhutanese Refugee Women's Forum, particularly in-camp production of non-food relief items including stove chimneys, soap and sarongs.

*TBBC staff were interested* in the implications of several important differences between the two situations, notably:

- Refugees are racially and linguistically similar to their host communities in Nepal and the camps are located near to population centres enabling fairly unchecked and widespread access to employment outside camp.
- Election of Bhutanese camp management staff is conducted on an annual basis and bound by an explicit 50:50 gender quota.
- All residents in the Nepalese camps, regardless of age, are given the same quantities of food basket items.
- Chimneys are utilised by most Bhutanese refugee households during stove ignition (made in-camp), and solar cookers are offered to pairs of households to mitigate reliance on firewood.
- WFP maintains an explicit 'End-Use Monitoring' system in the Nepalese camps, identifying households vulnerable to mismanagement of food rations and making daily home visits to ensure access to food.
- Camp high schools follow the national Nepali curriculum with graduation certificates being nationally accredited. 11th and 12th standard education opportunities exist in local towns for high school graduates.
- Except Caritas, most major services are offered by implementing partners of the UNHCR. NGOs are not permitted to implement projects directly in local host communities.

**TBBC and HIV/ AIDS:** The issue of sustaining awareness HIV/ AIDS throughout the organisation following the all-staff training last year is a regular item at TBBC management meetings and further activities will be planned including office discussion sessions.

**Code of Conduct:** Complaint mechanisms for violations of the Code of Conduct are in draft form.

#### Lessons learned

- Staff exchange programmes are beneficial and further opportunities should be sought.
- The time and cost involved in all- staff retreats is significant but the benefits in strengthening organisational direction and staff morale make them very worthwhile.
- Challenges to staff in trying to implement new training and performance assessment procedures confirmed the urgency of recruiting an experienced Human Resource Manager to oversee all human resource functions.

#### Next six months

- The Human Resource Manager will start work in August and will review all HR systems.
- The current two vacancies will be filled and preparations made to recruit new staff identified in the Work Plan and included in the 2007/8 budgets.
- Complaint mechanisms for violations of the Code of Conduct will be finalised.

### **c) Resource centre**

TBBC has a wealth of documentation on the border situation and related issues, gathered over the past 23 years. The Bangkok office now has a dedicated space for the resource centre, where people can access archive materials, photographs, documentaries and documents. Archiving of all photographs and slides electronically is ongoing and videos are being converted to DVD format. At present access to the archive is only available from the Bangkok office.

#### Next six months

- There is a huge amount of material to be scanned and this will be ongoing using volunteers.
- A part time archivist will be recruited to maintain the centre.

### **d) Strategic plan**

TBBC produced its first 5-year Strategic Plan in 2005 (see 5. a) Appendix D). This now informs all TBBC activities, the core objectives forming the basis for the TBBC Logframe and the structure of this report. The Plan was revisited during the staff retreat. Overall the Strategic Plan still provides a valid framework for the programme, but it was agreed that a component on livelihoods needs to be developed in the light of the UNHCR Livelihoods Project. The core objectives relating to partnership and capacity building will be reviewed and combined.

#### Next 6 months

- A livelihoods strategy will be developed in consultation with the refugee community and the Strategic Plan revised.

### **e) Cost effectiveness**

Although the TBBC programme has grown enormously in the last few years, TBBC continues to implement its programme as much as possible through refugee CBOs. It still employs only around 50 staff. (One staff person per 3,000 refugees in 2007, compared with one person per 16,000 refugees in 1985). Management expenses including all staff, office and vehicle expenses will be only 6% of expenditures in 2007. The total cost of the programme in 2007 is projected to be around baht 7,300 per refugee per year, or around 20 baht per refugee per day (US 60 cents per day at the 2007 exchange rate of baht 33/ USD).

### **f) Funding strategy**

TBBC takes on an open commitment to meet the basic food, shelter and non-food item needs of the entire border population and, until 2006, had never failed to do so. But TBBC entered 2006 facing the most serious funding crisis in its 22 year history and, for the first time ever, had to make budget cuts in non-food and shelter items. An emergency appeal to Donors resolved the situation but many of the responses were of a 'one-off' nature still leaving challenges ahead for 2007 and the future.

Until 2006, TBBC had never had a formal funding strategy, the underlying assumption being that, as elsewhere in the world, governments should accept the principal responsibility for funding basic refugee 'maintenance' costs, TBBC's core activity. This had largely been accepted by the international community as witnessed by the fact that in 2006 13 governments, plus the EC, covered around 95% of TBBC's budget.

TBBC has depended on member and partner agencies in donor countries negotiating grants from their governments and contributing their own counterpart and other private funding. This whole process has been loosely coordinated through an annual Donors meeting held in member agency countries around the world, usually in October: in Amsterdam (1996), Stockholm (1997), London (1998), New York (1999), Oslo (2000), Chiang Mai

(2001), Ottawa (2002), Brussels (2003), Chiang Mai (2004), Washington DC (2005) and Bangkok (2006). The 2007 meeting will be held in Copenhagen.

Whilst the Donors meetings have been invaluable in terms of focussing donor attention on TBBC funding needs, they have never actually raised all the funding required, nor solved the cash-flow problems. Fund-raising has always been an ongoing process with TBBC attempting to address shortfalls throughout the year. Remarkably, until 2006, all funding needs were met.

In response to the 2006 funding crisis, TBBC drew up a funding 'strategy' for the first time. Due to the scale and 'maintenance' nature of the programme, it was recognised that TBBC would unavoidably remain largely dependent of Government sources but this support needed to be better coordinated and strategically approached, whilst at the same time other funding sources should be more actively pursued.

**Government Funding:** TBBC's challenge to its Government Donors has been in the context of the Good Humanitarian Initiative (GHI), seeking to get firmer and longer term commitments on a needs basis. Generally in the past grants from individual Governments have been negotiated individually without any direct coordination with other Donors or a clear understanding of how support to TBBC contributes to the overall needs of refugees in Thailand. To address this, TBBC undertook to take a lead in developing a CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan to provide an overall context within which Donors can understand TBBC's role and budget needs. The latest and by far the most comprehensive version of this Plan was published and presented to Donors in May (see Section 2 b) above).

This initiative has begun to engage Donors more effectively and has highlighted the need for them to make a more coordinated response themselves. Lead by the EC delegation in Bangkok, with a parallel process at the Geneva level, several working meetings have taken place to discuss strategies. TBBC and UNHCR have given inputs to this process and current thinking is that some kind of longer term strategy is needed (the Comprehensive Plan looks forward only to 2008). This is problematic given the huge uncertainties about how the political/ security situation will develop in Burma, and even in Thailand, but TBBC/ UNHCR will take this to a CCSDPT/ UNHCR retreat in August for further discussion. Meanwhile it is hoped to continue improving and strengthening the Comprehensive Planning process.

TBBC does continue to encourage more countries to join those already supporting the programme and with 13, potentially 14, countries, plus the EC there can be few programmes anywhere with broader international support. Since 2006 the Czech Republic and Belgium have made their first contributions and recently a request has been submitted to Poland. Whilst all of these contributions are relatively small their involvement is extremely encouraging and adds to the collective burden sharing and advocacy in dealing with this protracted situation.

From time to time TBBC is asked why help is not sought from the WFP and this has been actively pursued, with WFP making an assessment mission to the border in 2006. WFP is not operational in Thailand and to become involved would also have to raise funds specifically for this operation. They would then need to become established and subcontract an NGO, such as TBBC, to implement their programme, i.e. adding additional costs to the current delivery model. WFP's conclusion was that TBBC is effectively delivering the food aid programme although it would be willing to offer technical advice. TBBC has been happy to respond to this offer and has an ongoing working relationship with WFP staff. WFP resources otherwise do not currently offer a solution to TBBC's funding needs under the current model.

**Other funding sources:** The other obvious potential sources of funding include corporations, foundations and other private and individual donors. The challenge with all of these is finding ways to present TBBC activities in an attractive way. With TBBC's huge budget going mainly towards maintenance items such as food and building materials, it is not attractive for smaller donors who generally want to see something more tangible for their contributions. Whilst TBBC does have some small donors and individuals who contribute anyway, to expand this kind of support significantly, TBBC feels it must first package its programme to offer Donors inputs with clear impact.

The plan is to develop a 'menu' of 'projects' with attractive descriptions which will offer potential Donors choices of support ranging from small personal contributions of say USD 20 to sizeable grants of USD 50,000 or even USD 100,000. These could be used for direct approaches to Donors but also placed on the website for general use. This concept arose from a consultancy supported by DanChurchAid in 2006 and resources are being sought to move this forward. Church World Service has offered some staff time and DCA may support another consultant to work with TBBC. Additionally SIDA, through DIAKONIA has offered TBBC a staff placement through their training programme and TBBC has requested an information officer whose duties would include presentational work of this kind. It is hoped that this position will be appointed within this year.

The 10 TBBC Member Agencies are located in eight countries and are committed to improving their role in securing TBBC funding. They could play a key role in identifying potential donors and presenting the 'menu' within their own countries. The issue of approaching corporations was discussed at the EGM. Most Members have reservations about this and several have institutional policies setting guidelines for ethical conditions which must be met before accepting corporation funds. A TBBC policy will be drawn up based on these before pursuing this as an option.



### Lessons learned

- Much more work lies ahead to convince government Donors to continue funding TBBC without any major solutions in sight.
- TBBC members face conflicts of interest in soliciting support for TBBC within their own countries whilst also raising funds for their own organisations.

### Next six months

- Ongoing development of the CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan will be discussed at a CCSDPT/ UNHCR retreat in August and the possibility of developing a medium term strategy.
- Inputs will be made to the Donors working group.
- A menu of TBBC projects will be developed.
- All TBBC donors will be approached early to try to get commitments for 2008 such that by the time of the 2007 Donors meeting in November, an accurate analysis of the funding situation will be known and any necessary actions can be taken immediately.
- Member participation in TBBC fundraising will be discussed at the AGM in November.

### **g) Programme studies and evaluations**

At the 2005 Donors meeting, donors committed to the concept of a coordinated evaluation plan for two year periods to reduce duplication and ensure that key issues were being addressed. Priorities were established for 2006/7 at the TBBC AGM and these have largely been addressed:

<b>Evaluation/ Study Topic</b>	<b>Progress</b>
1. Staff development	Completed in 2006. Individual staff learning/ development plans were produced for all staff and improved staff performance assessment procedures established. A Human Resource Manager has been recruited to oversee and maintain these and other HR processes.
2. Food security	Thinking on this changed and instead of an evaluation, a baseline survey will be carried out in the second half of 2007 (see Section 3.1 a) above).
3. ERA and IDP research	Completed.
4. Peace-building/ Conflict resolution	A Do No Harm assessment will be carried out during the second half of 2007 supported by CARITAS Switzerland/ SDC.
5. The TBBC model	Church World Service is interested in supporting this but no progress to date.

Besides these evaluations/ studies, TBBC also hired short-term consultants/ professionals during 2006 to review the staff policy manual from both legal and gender perspectives, and consultants to look at ways of packaging TBBC's programmes to be more attractive to certain types of donor.

During 2007 an overall programme evaluation was carried out in April by a consultant on behalf of NCCA Christian World Service/ AusAID and ECHO carried out an in depth audit in June. In his draft report the ECHO auditor commented 'TBBC maintains a positive approach to all exterior examinations. Indeed, in relation to its size and financial turnover, TBBC is one of the most audited, evaluated and reviewed organisations that this auditor has encountered'.

Indeed, since 1994 there have been no less than 25 evaluations/ studies of TBBC and almost all of the hundreds of recommendations made have been implemented or are being addressed. These are listed in Appendix D 5 b) and a summary of all the main conclusions, recommendations and responses can be found on the TBBC website at <http://www.tbcc.org/resources/tbcc-evaluations.pdf>.

Ongoing plans for further studies evaluations will be discussed at the TBBC Donors Meeting and AGM in November.

### Lessons Learned

- As always, the consultants, experts involved in evaluations/ studies/ audits can offer invaluable advice in identifying problems and improving TBBC responses.

### Next six months

- Suggestion for studies/ evaluations in 2008/9 will be discussed at the TBBC meetings in Copenhagen.
- The Do No Harm Assessment will take place in September and November.

## 4. Finance

The TBBC accounting records are maintained in Thai baht, and are converted to UK pounds for the statutory financial statements. TBBC conforms to the Statement of Recommended Practice for Charities (SORP2005), with both Income and Expenses reported on an accruals basis, and separation of restricted and general funding. The audited Trustees report and financial statements for the period 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2006 was audited by RSM Robson Rhodes LLP of UK and filed with both Companies House and the Charity Commission in UK in April 2007. Copies are available on request from TBBC.

Robson Rhodes LLP left the RSM network and merged with Grant Thornton on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2007. They have indicated a willingness to continue as the TBBC Auditor for 2007 Accounts and a special resolution will be required at the AGM.

QuickBooks accounting software is accessed by both Bangkok and Field Office staff to enter Purchase Orders, Goods Received Notes, supplier invoices and payments, as well as income. Expenses are analysed by item, general ledger code, cost centre and restricted funds. The detailed Statement of Financial Activities and Balance Sheet for January-June 2007 extracted from the accounting software are shown as Appendix C.

TBBC has Thai baht bank accounts with Standard Chartered Bank in Bangkok, and GBP, USD and EUR accounts at the Standard Chartered Bank in London. Account details are shown in Appendix A. 2.c.

### 4.1. Expenses

TBBC prepares detailed budgets twice per year. The latest budgets finalised in August 2007; a revised projection for 2007 and a preliminary budget for 2008, are shown and explained in the remainder of this section, together with comparisons with previous budgets and actual data. TBBC expenses depend largely upon rations, commodity prices and refugee population.

Population figures have historically increased year on year. The caseload population at June 2007 of 156,000 compares with 142,000 three years previously. During this time births have averaged approx 4,300 per annum and deaths 540 per annum. Significant resettlement began only in 2006. There has also been a continuous flow of new arrivals. To calculate supplies required TBBC uses feeding figures, revised monthly (see Section 3.1 h) above). The feeding figures differ from registered population figures by ignoring registered refugees living outside camps and including new arrivals still to be officially registered. Rations are based on achieving international standards for refugee provisions. Commodities are tendered for, normally twice per year. Budgets assume commodity costs at the most recent contract prices, with a 2.5% increase at each following tender, i.e. 5% per annum which is consistent with the average increase in the price of rice over the last ten years.

**Table 4.1a** compares the actual expenses with the Operating Budget for January-June 2007, and introduces a Revised Projection for the full year 2007, which can be compared with both the Preliminary Budget prepared a year ago and the Operating Budget published in February 2007. **Table 4.1b** compares the Revised Projection for 2007 with the Actual data for 2006 and introduces a Preliminary Budget for 2008.

#### a) 2007 January to June actual expenses

The feeding figure has fallen to 147,000 at the end of June from 151,000 at the beginning of the year.

Overall TBBC expenses incurred during January-June 2007 totalled baht 735 million compared with the operating budget of baht 768 million, 4% lower. The main variations were:

- A budgeted contingency for relocations was not required (B 10M).
- Some food and fuel costs budgeted for delivery in June were delayed until July (B 16M).
- The phasing of the budget for stockpiling allocated too much of the full year budget to Jan- June (B 15M).
- The Rice price was 6% lower than budgeted (B 10M).
- Emergency Relief costs were baht 11 million higher than budget.
- An exchange loss of baht 8 million was incurred due to the recognition of income before remittances are received whilst the Thai baht has been strengthening against most foreign currencies.

More detailed key differences (<or> 10%) were:

- **Main food items:** Overall food items were 8% below budget, largely as explained above. Fish-paste supplies to Tham Hin camp have been reduced because some camp residents are not collecting it. Sugar is below budget because distributions are taking place once every four months instead of each month, with only one four month ration being delivered in January-June. School lunch support is over budget at the half year due to timing differences in the provision of the support. The full year cost is expected to be on budget.
- **Non-food items:** Overall 3% below budget. Charcoal was under budget due to late deliveries and the phasing of the budget for stockpile. Admin charcoal is a new budget line in 2007 and proved to be under budgeted and the phasing failed to allow for the stockpiling. The budget anticipates all blankets expenditure to be incurred in the second half year when the annual distribution takes place, but some blankets were procured early, for new arri-

- vals. The Clothing budget includes an allowance to introduce clothing for 6-12 year olds, but due to funding difficulties this new initiative has been postponed. The Soap budget failed to allow for stockpile supplies.
- **Other assistance:** Overall 45% under the budget. Only baht 400 thousand of the baht 5 million contingency for emergencies was specifically used, although the difference helped fund over budget expenditure on blankets, cooking utensils etc. for new arrivals. The baht 10 million contingency for Relocations was not needed. The budget to supply cooking stoves to all households who do not have one, and containers for households to collect fish-paste have not yet been used. Controls introduced to monitor Miscellaneous Assistance of food supplies to CBOs and other NGOs working with the refugees, and to Thai Authorities and schools near the camps have proved effective in keeping expenditure within budget.
  - **Programme support:** Overall 3% over budget. An improvement in the delivery arrangements for blended food has reduced the previous need to hire additional transport from local warehouses to camps. The consultancy costs include a contribution by TBBC to the resettlement survey sanctioned by CCSDPT. Other support consists of training costs and miscellaneous assistance to CBOs, including in January-June costs of providing training for the experimental construction of buildings using mud-bricks.
  - **Emergency relief:** Overall 18% over the budget, responding to needs. The number of people in IDP camps has increased by over 600 during January-June. The Emergency rice programme has been on hold since April due to lack of funding.
  - **Administration:** Overall 6% under budget, due to delays in recruiting staff and lower than anticipated staff training and development costs. Headcount increased by one between December 2006 and June 2007:
    - A Nutrition Officer was recruited (position formerly filled by AVI volunteer, not included in Headcount).
    - A vacancy for Field Assistant was filled.
    - The Camp Management Coordinator resigned.
    - A Food Security Assistant was promoted to Agriculture and Environment Project Manager.
    - The Programme Co-ordinator and Displacement Research Assistant were replaced.
    - An Office Assistant was recruited but resigned before the end of June.
  - **Governance, costs of generating funds and other expenses:** These items are shown separately to be consistent with the financial accounting standard. The main Governance cost is an accrual for the annual audit fee. The cost of generating funds consists of travelling costs to visit donors. Other expenses is the net loss on exchange from the foreign currency conversions of accrued income, bank balances and accounts receivable, due to the continued strengthening of the Thai baht, particularly against the US dollar.

## b) 2007 revised projection

The revised projection of expenses for 2007 takes into account actual expenses for the first six months, current projections of changes in the refugee population including resettlement, and current commodity prices plus a 2.5% increase at the next contract. Overall expenses are projected to be baht 1,201 million compared with the operating budget of baht 1,202 million.

The revised projection feeding figures for the second half of 2007 assume that there will be approx 2300 births, 300 deaths, 2,500 new arrivals and 11,000 refugees resettled, reducing the feeding figure to 140,000 in December from 147,000 in June. The year end number is lower than that anticipated in the operating budget, but the average feeding population over the year is marginally higher, due to a slower start up in resettlement and the majority of new arrivals coming in the first half year.

The key differences (<or> 10%) between the 2007 revised projection and the 2007 operating budget are:

- **Main food items:** Overall the quantity of food procured is 1 to 2% higher in the revised projection than it is in the Operating budget. Food prices are overall remaining quite stable. Currently the market demand for cooking oil is high leading to some upward movement in price, but most significantly the rice price remains under the operating budget and the 2006 actual levels. The budget for Sugar erroneously failed to include the full ration.
- **Non-food items:** Overall in line with the operating budget. Admin Charcoal is a new budget line for 2007 and was initially under budgeted. The revised projection for Firewood allows two months delivery instead of one before the end of the year at the cold Umpiem Mai camp. The budgeted amount to provide clothing for 6-12 year olds will not be used.
- **Other assistance:** Overall 22% lower than budget, almost entirely due to reducing the contingencies for emergencies and relocations, not having used much in the first half year, but also to a delay in introducing household fish-paste containers.
- **Programme support:** Overall a 4% increase. Transport is down due to the improved arrangements for blended food delivery. Quality control is up due to one off costs of water testing following the introduction of bar soap and laundry detergent. The allowance for Consultants is higher due to the contribution already made to the CCSDPT survey on resettlement. CBO Management is a new budget line to support new capacity building and livelihood initiatives. Miscellaneous support is higher reflecting the expenses already incurred in January-June.
- **Emergency relief:** Overall a 12% increase. The number of displaced people at Et Thu Tha IDP camp is increasing at a rate of about 100 per month. Emergency rice has been capped at the 2006 level due to lack of funding, however the requests for assistance are higher than ever and having to be refused.



- **Administration:** Overall a 4% decrease due to the underspend in the first half. Staff headcount is projected to increase by eight between June and December 2007:
  - Replacement of the current Field Coordinator, Sangklaburi who is leaving in November.
  - Filling vacancies for a Capacity Building Manager (replacing the Camp Management Coordinator who left in March), Food Security Assistant and Office Assistant.
  - Recruitment of new positions: Human Resource Manager, Agriculture and Environment Development Manager, Food Security Assistant, Field Assistant, and part time archivist.
 Four of these positions had been filled by August 2007.
- **Governance, costs of generating funds and other expenses:** The main Governance cost is the annual audit fee. The cost of generating funds consists of travelling costs to visit donors, and the annual Donors meeting, which will be held in Copenhagen in October 2007. Other expenses is the net loss on exchange from foreign currency conversions.

### c) Preliminary budget 2008

The preliminary budget of expenses for 2008 is based on a projected reduction in the feeding caseload due to resettlement, a 5% per annum increase in commodity prices, and a return to a more normal level of building material supplies following the making up in 2007 for a funding shortage induced cut in 2006. Overall expenses are projected to be baht 1,141 million compared with the revised projection 2007 of baht 1,201 million.

The preliminary budget feeding figures for 2008 assume that there will be approx 4500 births, 500 deaths, 5,000 new arrivals and 15,000 resettled, reducing the feeding figure to 134,000 in December 2008 from 140,000 in December 2007.

The key differences between the 2008 preliminary budget and the 2007 revised projection are:

- **Main food items:** Overall the quantity of food procured in 2008 is expected to be 8% lower in 2008, and the budget allows for the price to be 5% higher. There is a nominal increase in the quantity of Admin Rice and Other Food to bring a small section of Mae La Oon camp, previously excluded, into the camp management programme.
- **Non-food items:** Overall 82% of 2007. The same assumptions as for food items apply to Charcoal, Admin Charcoal, Firewood and Soap. Mats are only fully distributed every two years, only new arrivals will receive them in 2008. An allowance has been made to start a project to provide clothing for 6-12 year olds. Building Supplies are budgeted at 70% of the 2007 level which included a make-up for cuts in 2006 forced by a funding crisis. The budget assumes that the repair ration will be changed to provide less bamboo, more thatch and a few eucalyptus poles.
- **Other assistance:** Overall 24% higher than 2007, almost entirely due to contingencies for emergencies and relocations. Food Security expenditure is budgeted to increase, but is such a small part of the overall budget yet key to capacity building and long term sustainability. The food containers budget allows for household fish-paste containers and replacement of some fish-paste delivery containers.
- **Programme support:** Overall a 6% increase. The allowance for Consultants is reduced to the 2006 level. Refugee incentives are budgeted to increase to allow for the replacement of those in camp admin and distribution positions leaving for resettlement and to improve the gender balance. CBO Management is a new budget line with expenses commencing in late 2007 to support new capacity building and livelihood initiatives.
- **Emergency relief:** Overall a 5% increase. The number of displaced people at Et Thu Tha IDP camp is expected to continue to increase. Emergency Rice has been capped at the 2006 level by a lack of funding. In reality the applications and need for this assistance is much higher. This may have to be addressed by separate fund-raising.
- **Administration:** Overall a 15% increase, due to eight additional people in the second half of 2007 and four more in 2008, all new positions: Livelihoods Coordinator, Information Officer, Community Liaison Assistant and a Displacement Research Assistant.
- **Governance, costs of generating funds and other expenses:** The main Governance cost is the annual audit fee. The cost of generating funds consists of travelling costs to visit donors, and the annual Donors meeting, which is less expensive if it is held in Thailand.

The costs of Administration and governance etc. rise from 6.2% of total costs in 2007 to 7.4% in 2008, as the direct costs fall with a reduced caseload, but the indirect costs of fulfilling TBBC's other strategic objectives increase.

### 4.2. Income

Income is recognised when the rights to a grant are acquired, it is virtually certain that it will be received and the monetary value can be sufficiently reliably measured. This means that in some cases income is recognised before cash is received, usually when a contract is signed, in which case it is accrued as a receivable until payment is made.

Over 90% of TBBC funding is backed by 14 foreign governments and the European Union, with the remainder coming from members and other partners own resources. Overall there are approximately 40 donors. Exchange

rates can have a significant impact on income received, as virtually all funding is denominated in foreign currencies, and virtually all expenses are in Thai baht.

**Table 4.2** shows the Actual and Forecast Income recognised by donor for 2006 to 2008.

#### a) 2007

The revised projected income for 2007 of baht 1,075 million compares with baht 1,156 million in 2006 and baht 1,088 million forecast at the time of the Budget in February 2007. There was a magnificent response in 2006 to an emergency funding appeal, with additional funding agreed by many donors. Some of the additional funding has since been consolidated into 2007 grants, but others were provided only on a one-off basis.

A few assumptions made 6 months ago proved to be over optimistic, but this was more than compensated by additional funds from others, notably USA PRM and Trocaire Global Gift fund. Unfortunately the net gain has been more than wiped out by a further strengthening of the Thai baht, reducing the baht value of foreign denominated grants. The Thai baht is currently trading at approximately 33 to the US dollar and 46 to the Euro. This represents an 18% movement against the dollar and 8% against the Euro in the last two years, 7% and 4% respectively in the last 6 months.

The projected income for 2007 is baht 126 million less than the projected expenses. The shortfall can be funded from Reserves, but this will reduce the Reserves to a dangerously low level, and certainly cause significant liquidity problems. Even now, some of the projected funding for 2007 has still to be confirmed, notably from Australia and Norway. Any shortfall from the projection will almost inevitably result in the need for ration cuts.

Of the total income, approximately baht 30 million represents restricted funding which it will not be possible to expend until 2008.

#### b) 2008

The current income projection for 2008 is based on an additional USD 500,000 requested from USA with most other donors holding the 2007 foreign currency amounts, except where increases are already confirmed or the 2007 funding is known to be one-off. The foreign currencies are converted to Thai baht at current rates (e.g. USD 33 and Euro 46). Thai Authorities are trying to reverse the strengthening of the baht, but it has proved to be extremely resilient.

The total forecast of baht 1,056 million is 19 million lower than 2007, and baht 99 million below 2006 income.

### 4.3. Reserves and balance sheet

The difference between income and expenses result in a net movement in funds for each period, which is added to or subtracted from the cumulative reserves at the beginning of the period.

Baht Millions	Actual 2006	Actual Jan-June 2007	Projected Full Year 2007	Forecast 2008
Income	1,155	716	1075	1056
Expenses	1,056	735	1201	1144
<b>Net Movement in Funds:</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>(19)</b>	<b>(126)</b>	<b>(85)</b>
Opening Reserve	79	178	178	52
<b>Closing Reserve:</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>(33)</b>

The reserves form part of the balance sheet of the organisation:

Baht millions	Actual Dec 2006	Actual Jun 2007	Projected Dec 2007	Forecast Dec 2008
Net fixed assets	7	8	8	10
Receivables (mainly from donors)	277	282	138	150
Payables (mainly to suppliers)	(159)	(148)	(110)	(213)
Bank balance	53	17	16	20
<b>Net assets:</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>(33)</b>
Restricted funds	26	24	30	30
Designated funds	8	8	10	15
General funds	144	127	12	(78)
<b>Total reserves:</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>(33)</b>

Net fixed assets represent the total cost of motor vehicles and other capitalised equipment less their accumulated depreciation. Only equipment with an original cost higher than baht 60,000 is capitalised. Computers are depreciated over three years, other equipment and motor vehicles over five years.

As described above, income can be recognised before cash is received in which case it is accrued as a receivable until payment is made. Some funding is remitted in instalments and some only on receipt of a report and certification of expenditure receipts. The level of funds receivable can vary enormously during the year depending on when agreements are signed and remittances made. At December 2006 the receivables included approx baht 130 million of funds which we would normally have expected to have received, the actual receivables at June 2007 and pro-

jected receivables at December 2007 and December 2008 assume that there are no undue delays in remittances; the receivable is based on contract conditions.

TBBC normal terms of payment to suppliers for deliveries to camps is 30 days from completion of delivery, but other expenses have to be settled promptly, so the average amount of credit available from suppliers is equal to about two weeks expenses, which is approximately baht 50 million. Since TBBC has no facility to borrow money, if there is a cash shortage then payments to suppliers have to be delayed. This was certainly the case at December 2006 and June 2007 with outstanding payables at baht 159 million and baht 148 million respectively, severely straining relationships with suppliers, with future deliveries put at risk and making it difficult to impose quality standards. The same problem is projected to occur again in December 2007 (baht 110 million). Suppliers would be highly unlikely to tolerate the forecast position for December 2008 (baht 213 million), it must be expected that some would stop supplies until they were paid.

**Reserves** are necessary so that TBBC is able to control the commitments it makes to future expenses against the commitments received from donors, and so it can ensure there is adequate liquidity to pay suppliers on time. Reserves consist of unspent restricted, designated and unrestricted (or general) funding, but only unrestricted reserves less the investment in fixed assets is freely available for future expenses.

Baht millions	Actual Dec 2006	Actual Jun 2006	Projected Dec 2007	Forecast Dec 2008
Total Reserves	178	159	52	(33)
Less Restricted funds	26	24	30	30
Designated funds	8	8	10	15
Fixed assets	7	8	8	10
<b>Freely available General funds:</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>(88)</b>

If the freely available general funds balance becomes negative TBBC will have committed to expenses for which it has not secured adequate funding, leaving the trustees and management in breach of their duties. Whilst TBBC has not over committed itself to date, the projection for December 2007 leaves very little margin for error. Any cost increases in excess of the projection, or income less than the projection, will have to be countered by immediate measures to reduce expenses, and the only significant way of achieving this is to cut food and fuel rations. A budget for expenses which is not covered by realistic income forecasts cannot be pursued. Unless additional income can be raised in 2008 the budgeted expenses required to carry out the programme cannot be spent.

Whilst reserves just above zero are sufficient to cover expenses, a higher level is needed to provide adequate liquidity. TBBC endeavours at all times to have a bank balance sufficient to cover any payments overdue to suppliers and one month's expenses, which is referred to as the 'liquidity target'.

To ensure the TBBC liquidity target is achieved the Reserves need to cover the funds receivable plus the fixed assets and two weeks expenses. The other two weeks, of the one month's expenses cover desired, is provided by a normal level of accounts payable. A liquidity shortfall may be partly caused by undue delays in the receipt of funds, but contractual terms dictate an unavoidable level of receivables. The table below shows the target and actual level of reserves at December 2006, June 2007, December 2007 and December 2008:

Baht millions	Actual Dec 2006	Actual Jun 2007	Projected Dec 2007	Forecast Dec 2008
Net Fixed Assets	7	8	8	10
Funds Receivable	277	282	138	150
Two weeks expenses	42	50	50	48
<b>Target Reserves</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>208</b>
Actual/ Forecast Reserves	178	159	52	(33)
<b>Liquidity Surplus/ (Shortfall)</b>	<b>(148)</b>	<b>(181)</b>	<b>(144)</b>	<b>(241)</b>
Undue delays in receipt of funds	130	-	-	-
<b>Reserves Surplus/ (Shortfall)</b>	<b>(18)</b>	<b>(181)</b>	<b>(144)</b>	<b>(241)</b>

TBBC began 2006 with a low level of reserves. A very pleasing response to an emergency funding appeal allowed the reserves to grow during 2006 so that if it had not been for unexpected delays in receipt of some funds, the liquidity shortfall would have been reduced to just baht 18 million. At the end of June 2007 TBBC had serious cash flow problems having to delay payments to suppliers, reflected in the liquidity shortfall calculation above of baht 181 million. At this time none of the funding receivable was overdue according to grant agreement conditions. The situation was resolved in July when remittances from Diakonia, ECHO, DFID and Norway became due and were received. The projected December 2007 liquidity shortfall of baht 144 million will again cause supplier payments to be delayed beyond contractual terms. The only solution to liquidity problems is to ensure an adequate level of reserves can be maintained to cover the funds receivable, and this can only be achieved by securing additional remitted income or by improving the payment terms of existing agreements. Whilst short term liquidity problems are necessarily resolved by delaying due payments to suppliers this is not a long term option, the suppliers will remove what credit they already grant and insist on payment in advance.

The long term sustainability of the TBBC programme is dependent on raising sufficient funds to cover the expenses, and maintain an adequate level of reserves to cover the funding receivable, fixed assets and two weeks

expenses. Reserves are being eroded to a dangerously low level in 2007 which will inevitably again cause serious liquidity difficulties. Additional income for 2008 must be a priority, to cover not only the 2008 expenses but also restore the reserves to a reasonable level to cover liquidity needs. Without it the programme will be seriously compromised and international standards abandoned.

#### 4.4. Monthly cash flow

Liquidity is a concern throughout the year, not just at the year end. In recent years monthly cash flow has been a major problem. Besides the normal challenge of getting donors to transfer funds early in the calendar year, in TBBC's case this problem is exacerbated because expenses are unequal through the year largely as a result of the need to stockpile supplies prior to the rainy season (62% of 2007 projected expenses were incurred in the first six months).

**Table 4.3** shows the actual and forecast monthly cash flows and liquidity surplus/ (deficit) for 2007. During 2005/6 monthly liquidity was, thanks to the GHD initiative (see Section 3.5 f) above) an improvement on previous years, because some donors were able to commit funds earlier in the year. However there has been a marked deterioration in 2007. There have been some delays in the expected receipt of funds but the main cause of the declining situation is an inadequate level of reserves. Provided remaining receipts are received as projected then further liquidity problems should be avoided until the year end.

#### 4.5. 2007 grant allocations

**Table 4.4** presents the allocation of individual donor contributions to the main expense categories in January–June 2007. Restricted Funds are separated from Designated and General Funds. Income and expense transactions of restricted funds are specifically allocated within the accounting records. Where donors do not require such detailed allocations the funds have been classified as General, even though there may be agreements with some that the allocation by expense group will be done in a certain way. The General Fund allocations to expense categories follow such agreements or in the absence of any allocation agreements donors are assumed to carry a proportionate share of the remaining expenses incurred in each category. Balances carried forward represent income recognised for which expenses have not been incurred (positive balances) or expenses allocated in anticipation of a fund being granted (negative balances).

In December 2006 expenditure commitments were added to the General Fund expense allocations in order to ensure that all the funds received were allocated to expenditure categories in the same calendar year, with the exception of the EC AUP funding, which was granted on the basis of a share of overall expenses for a period of approximately 9 months from September 2006. These commitments are reversed in the following year as the actual expenditure is incurred.

The Designated Fund represents funds set aside to meet staff severance pay liabilities if TBBC were to cease to exist. It does not cover the total liability of immediate closure because this is considered to be very unlikely in the short term. The Fund is reviewed annually.

#### 4.6. Sensitivity of assumptions

The budget presented for 2008 is extremely sensitive to the main assumptions and in particular to the rice price, feeding population, and foreign currency exchange rates. **Table 4.5** shows how TBBC costs have risen over the years but also how annual expenditures have stabilised or jumped when prices and exchange rates have stabilised or changed. It can be seen that annual expenditure increases of 50% and more have not been uncommon. The increase in 2007 is 18% and the cost of the programme has more than doubled in the last five years.

Movements in the Thai baht exchange rate have generally favoured TBBC's fund raising in the past, but have seriously reduced Thai baht income in 2006 and 2007. The average price of rice rose by approximately 27% between 2004 and 2005, but has stabilised in 2006/7. The average population has risen by 2%/ annum over the last three years. Table 4.5 shows how 2007 budget needs would change for variations in each of exchange rate, rice price and camp population. A combination of rice prices rising by 20% in 2008, of the donor currencies weakening by 10% against the baht, and a further 10% increase in the camp population would increase TBBC funding needs by EUR 7.1 million from the projected EUR 24.8 million to EUR 31.9 million, or by USD 9.8 million from USD 34.6 million to USD 44.4 million.



To emphasise the difficulty of accurately projecting TBBC expenditures, the following table shows how budget and expenditure forecasts in previous years have compared with actual expenditures.

**TBBC Budget and expenditure forecasts compared with actual expenditures**

Year	Budget (Aug)		1 <sup>st</sup> Revision (Feb)		2 <sup>nd</sup> Revision (Aug)		Actual Expenditures
	THB (m)	% actual	THB (m)	% actual	THB (m)	% Actual	THB (m)
2007	1,204		1,202		1,201		
2006	976	92	946	90	1,011	96	1,056
2005	862	88	913	94	947	97	975
2004	813	107	805	106	794	104	763
2003	727	109	707	106	699	104	670
2002	565	97	562	97	561	97	581
2001	535	109	535	109	522	106	493
2000	524	115	515	113	465	102	457
1999	542	113	522	109	476	99	481
1998	330	72	494	107	470	102	461
1997	225	77	238	82	269	92	292
1996	170	83	213	104	213	104	204
1995	96	54	124	69	161	90	179
1994	85	87	93	95	91	93	98
1993	80	93	90	105	75	87	86
1992			75	99			76
1991			50	81			62
1990			24	71			34
<b>Average since 1998</b>		10%		8%		3%	

It can be seen that in some years expenditures were seriously miscalculated because of unforeseen events, although, since 1998, on average by only 10%. The accuracy of the revised forecasts obviously improves as events unfold with 2<sup>nd</sup> revised projections being on average within 3% of actual expenditures.

**Table 4.1a**

<b>Expenses 2007</b>											
<b>Item</b>	<b>Preliminary Budget (Aug 2006)</b>		<b>Operating Budget (Feb 2007)</b>		<b>Jan-June Budget</b>	<b>Jan-June Actual Expenses</b>			<b>Revised Projection 2007 (August 2007)</b>		
	Baht	Quantity	Baht	Quantity	Baht	Baht	Quantity	% Budget	Baht	Quantity	% Budget
Rice (100kg)	301,004,617	260,381	277,205,996	250,737	181,148,614	165,719,495	151,970	91%	271,801,554	254,343	98%
Admin Rice (100kg)	18,800,336	16,164	17,737,343	16,194	11,298,151	9,685,457	8,876	86%	17,240,643	16,194	97%
<b>1. Rice</b>	<b>319,804,953</b>	<b>276,545</b>	<b>294,943,339</b>	<b>266,931</b>	<b>192,446,765</b>	<b>175,404,952</b>	<b>160,846</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>289,042,197</b>	<b>270,537</b>	<b>98%</b>
Fish Paste (kg)	24,496,969	1,125,952	23,946,338	1,103,893	16,151,253	13,796,190	644,850	85%	23,003,491	1,098,332	96%
Salt (kg)	3,308,219	645,684	3,318,131	629,258	2,150,810	1,962,555	370,405	91%	3,327,586	632,400	100%
Beans (kg)	53,706,142	1,603,860	52,471,523	1,564,402	31,658,928	28,196,188	840,532	89%	53,535,202	1,581,023	102%
Fermented Bean Cake (kg)			1,079,499	28,140	538,979	535,776	14,420	99%	1,059,073	27,976	98%
Cooking Oil (ltr)	56,910,141	1,725,129	53,491,896	1,680,517	34,652,590	32,872,262	1,033,656	95%	55,160,251	1,707,787	103%
Chillies (kg)	16,577,651	238,582	27,299,413	232,412	15,743,062	15,159,189	128,474	96%	25,720,078	228,467	94%
Sardines (kg)	7,612,635	109,451	6,985,491	103,715	6,985,491	7,494,690	111,275	107%	7,494,690	111,275	107%
Blended Food (kg)	60,168,477	1,835,244	52,829,706	1,787,784	31,386,526	29,157,957	1,010,875	93%	50,554,036	1,730,071	96%
Sugar (kg)	8,378,904	403,974	7,944,234	388,259	4,835,690	4,101,227	214,600	85%	9,057,818	459,947	114%
Admin Other Food	7,021,455		7,569,819		4,419,500	4,053,277		92%	7,672,177		101%
Supplementary Feeding	20,000,000		20,000,000		10,000,000	9,226,014		92%	18,000,000		90%
School Lunch support	4,600,000		4,750,000		2,375,000	2,759,558		116%	4,750,000		100%
Other Food	1,000,000		1,000,000		500,000	514,198		103%	1,040,000		104%
<b>2. Other Food</b>	<b>263,780,593</b>		<b>262,686,051</b>		<b>161,397,829</b>	<b>149,829,081</b>		<b>93%</b>	<b>260,374,400</b>		<b>99%</b>
Charcoal (kg)	147,162,602	14,176,713	141,548,684	13,880,670	90,957,102	80,243,228	7,881,300	88%	139,173,376	13,927,974	98%
Admin Charcoal	3,346,755		3,483,776		1,509,935	2,279,713		151%	4,234,601		122%
Firewood (m <sup>3</sup> )	2,438,805	4,719	2,553,915	4,216	1,464,431	1,394,947	2,133	95%	3,441,261	5,007	135%
Blankets	8,550,000	90,000	9,000,000	90,000	0	654,480	6,400		9,000,000	88,009	100%
Bednets	6,376,800	63,900	6,376,800	63,900	6,376,800	6,727,650	76,450	106%	6,800,000	77,272	107%
Mats	5,791,800	63,900	8,500,000	72,550	8,500,000	7,618,226	68,570	90%	8,000,000	72,006	94%
Clothing	9,000,000		9,000,000		5,000,000	4,230,991		85%	8,000,000		89%
Soap	13,485,000		15,000,000		4,500,000	6,085,901	194,255	135%	14,136,000	451,205	94%
Building Supplies	130,000,000		141,000,000		141,000,000	142,257,302		101%	142,257,302		101%
<b>3. Other Supplies</b>	<b>326,151,762</b>		<b>336,463,175</b>		<b>259,308,268</b>	<b>251,492,438</b>		<b>97%</b>	<b>335,042,540</b>		<b>100%</b>
Medical	7,284,000		7,420,000		3,710,000	3,805,309		103%	7,600,000		102%
<b>4. Medical</b>	<b>7,284,000</b>		<b>7,420,000</b>		<b>3,710,000</b>	<b>3,805,309</b>		<b>103%</b>	<b>7,600,000</b>		<b>102%</b>
Emergencies	5,000,000		5,000,000		2,500,000	432,801		17%	3,000,000		60%
Relocations	20,000,000		20,000,000		10,000,000	0		0%	10,000,000		50%
Cooking Utensils	400,000		400,000		200,000	228,508		114%	400,000		100%
Cooking Pots	4,734,190		5,000,000		5,000,000	4,667,645		93%	5,000,000		100%
Food Security	6,000,000		6,000,000		3,000,000	2,811,307		94%	6,000,000		100%
Cooking Stoves	540,000		540,000		270,000	62,500		23%	540,000		100%
Food Containers	1,000,000		1,500,000		750,000	265,545		35%	1,000,000		67%
Miscellaneous Assistance	9,000,000		9,000,000		4,500,000	3,982,926		89%	9,000,000		100%
Thai Support	8,000,000		12,150,000		6,075,000	5,407,811		89%	11,561,174		95%
<b>5. Other Assistance</b>	<b>54,674,190</b>		<b>59,590,000</b>		<b>32,295,000</b>	<b>17,859,043</b>		<b>55%</b>	<b>46,501,174</b>		<b>78%</b>
Transport	3,000,000		3,000,000		1,500,000	772,046		51%	2,000,000		67%
Quality Control	3,000,000		3,200,000		1,600,000	1,578,152		99%	4,000,000		125%
Visibility	1,200,000		1,200,000		0	277,418			1,200,000		100%
Consultants	1,000,000		1,000,000		500,000	1,077,816		216%	1,500,000		150%
Data/ Studies	1,500,000		1,300,000		650,000	653,591		101%	1,300,000		100%
Camp Administration	16,500,000		14,109,800		7,054,900	7,101,800		101%	14,200,000		101%
Refugee Incentives	14,500,000		13,537,000		6,768,500	6,784,900		100%	13,600,000		100%
CBO Management									500,000		
Other Support	500,000		800,000		400,000	763,680		191%	1,200,000		150%
<b>6. Programme support</b>	<b>41,200,000</b>		<b>38,146,800</b>		<b>18,473,400</b>	<b>19,009,403</b>		<b>103%</b>	<b>39,500,000</b>		<b>104%</b>
Emergency Rice (100kg)	70,000,000	52,751	70,000,000	52,751	35,000,000	41,946,564	27,287	120%	80,000,000	52,041	114%
Camp Rice (100kg)	26,600,000	21,615	33,000,000	26,815	16,500,000	23,456,270	18,435	142%	34,687,260	27,262	105%
Other Food	3,000,000		6,200,000		3,000,000	4,385,529		146%	9,825,000		158%
Other Support	15,820,000		16,833,333		8,433,333	4,641,205		55%	16,033,000		95%
<b>7. Emergency Relief</b>	<b>115,420,000</b>		<b>126,033,333</b>		<b>62,933,333</b>	<b>74,429,568</b>		<b>118%</b>	<b>140,545,260</b>		<b>112%</b>
Vehicles	3,756,720	26 vehicles	3,756,720	28 vehicles	1,680,720	1,791,166	24 vehicles	107%	3,800,000	28 vehicles	101%
Salaries/ Benefits	49,785,952	54 staff	51,240,275	57 staff	24,641,363	23,855,617	49 staff	97%	49,135,072	57 staff	96%
Office and Administration	15,112,003		15,112,003		7,556,002	6,430,099		85%	14,190,000		94%
Depreciation	3,584,510		3,584,510		1,890,340	1,688,726		89%	3,650,000		102%
<b>8. Management</b>	<b>72,239,185</b>		<b>73,693,508</b>		<b>35,768,425</b>	<b>33,765,608</b>		<b>94%</b>	<b>70,775,072</b>		<b>96%</b>
9. Governance	2,000,000		2,000,000		1,000,000	1,010,868		101%	2,000,000		100%
<b>10. Costs of generating funds</b>	<b>1,000,000</b>		<b>1,000,000</b>		<b>500,000</b>	<b>360,082</b>		<b>72%</b>	<b>1,400,000</b>		<b>140%</b>
11. Other Expenses						8,400,181			8,400,181		
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,203,554,683</b>		<b>1,201,976,206</b>		<b>767,833,020</b>	<b>735,366,533</b>		<b>96%</b>	<b>1,201,180,824</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 4.1b**

Annual Expenses 2006-2008								
Item	Actual 2006		Revised Projection 2007 (August 2007)			Preliminary Budget 2008 (August 2007)		
	Baht	Quantity	Baht	Quantity	% Exp 2006	Baht	Quantity	% Exp 2007
Rice (100kg)	294,085,803	258,099	271,801,554	254,343	92%	254,786,619	232,731	94%
Admin Rice (100kg)	18,457,230	16,270	17,240,643	16,194	93%	17,781,736	16,374	103%
<b>1. Rice</b>	<b>312,543,033</b>	<b>274,369</b>	<b>289,042,197</b>	<b>270,537</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>272,568,356</b>	<b>249,105</b>	<b>94%</b>
Fish Paste (kg)	23,961,547	1,179,086	23,003,491	1,098,332	96%	21,255,344	1,001,412	92%
Salt (kg)	3,246,949	643,492	3,327,586	632,400	102%	3,216,823	580,645	97%
Beans (kg)	57,367,043	1,716,420	53,535,202	1,581,023	93%	51,718,022	1,440,735	97%
Fermented Bean Cake (kg)	901,620	24,180	1,059,073	27,976	117%	1,088,457	27,381	103%
Cooking Oil (ltr)	54,795,670	1,704,592	55,160,251	1,707,787	101%	53,454,470	1,545,479	97%
Chillies (kg)	12,566,628	234,847	25,720,078	228,467	205%	24,575,362	213,736	96%
Sardines (kg)	7,226,660	108,795	7,494,690	111,275	104%	8,047,657	114,165	107%
Blended Food (kg)	60,345,491	2,021,600	50,554,036	1,730,071	84%	50,163,005	1,644,126	99%
Sugar (kg)	7,304,290	353,581	9,057,818	459,947	124%	8,658,099	408,493	96%
Admin Other Food			7,672,177			7,916,068		103%
Supplementary Feeding	18,927,182		18,000,000		95%	18,000,000		100%
School lunch support	4,495,666	1,480,964	4,750,000		106%	4,750,000		100%
Other Food	1,480,964		1,040,000		70%	1,100,000		106%
<b>2. Other Food</b>	<b>252,619,710</b>		<b>260,374,400</b>		<b>103%</b>	<b>253,943,307</b>		<b>98%</b>
Charcoal (kg)	128,230,834	14,643,660	139,173,376	13,927,974	108%	128,865,471	12,816,374	93%
Admin Charcoal			4,234,601			4,165,662		98%
Firewood (m <sup>3</sup> )	4,273,473	6,279	3,441,261	5,007	81%	3,312,026	4,592	96%
Blankets	8,674,595	92,892	9,000,000	88,009	104%	9,000,000	83,818	100%
Bednets	5,617,115	59,987	6,800,000	77,272	121%	7,000,000	75,000	103%
Mats	317,820	2,307	8,000,000	72,006	2517%	600,000	5,143	8%
Clothing	6,308,821		8,000,000		127%	9,000,000		113%
Soap			14,136,000	451,205		13,339,216	409,807	94%
Building Supplies	73,964,075		142,257,302		192%	100,000,000		70%
<b>3. Other Supplies</b>	<b>227,386,733</b>		<b>335,042,540</b>		<b>147%</b>	<b>275,282,375</b>		<b>82%</b>
Medical	7,131,212		7,600,000		107%	7,800,000		103%
<b>4. Medical</b>	<b>7,131,212</b>		<b>7,600,000</b>		<b>107%</b>	<b>7,800,000</b>		<b>103%</b>
Emergencies	16,690		3,000,000		23966%	5,000,000		167%
Relocations	1,109,260		10,000,000		902%	20,000,000		200%
Cooking Utensils			400,000			400,000		100%
Cooking Pots	1,174,102		5,000,000		426%	500,000		10%
Food Security	3,793,350		6,000,000		158%	7,500,000		125%
Cooking Stoves	476,910		540,000		113%	540,000		100%
Food Containers	2,184,684		1,000,000		46%	2,500,000		250%
Miscellaneous Assistance	9,928,568		9,000,000		91%	9,000,000		100%
Thai Support	8,143,177		11,561,174		142%	12,000,000		104%
<b>5. Other Assistance</b>	<b>26,826,741</b>		<b>46,501,174</b>		<b>177%</b>	<b>57,440,000</b>		<b>124%</b>
Transport	2,578,708		2,000,000		78%	2,000,000		100%
Quality Control	3,335,734		4,000,000		120%	4,000,000		100%
Visibility	1,158,523		1,200,000		104%	1,200,000		100%
Consultants	1,010,455		1,500,000		148%	1,000,000		67%
Data/ Studies	920,845		1,300,000		141%	1,300,000		100%
Camp Administration	13,717,630		14,200,000		104%	14,200,000		100%
Refugee Incentives	12,113,500		13,600,000		112%	15,000,000		110%
CBO Management			500,000			2,000,000		400%
Other Support	980,397		1,200,000		122%	1,200,000		100%
<b>6. Programme support</b>	<b>35,815,792</b>		<b>39,500,000</b>		<b>110%</b>	<b>41,900,000</b>		<b>106%</b>
Emergency Rice (100kg)	79,914,215	61,107	80,000,000	52,041	100%	80,000,000	49,563	100%
Camp Rice (100kg)	26,514,057	22,087	34,687,260	27,262	131%	38,100,000	28,518	110%
Other Food	4,603,904		9,825,000		213%	11,600,000		118%
Other Support	10,550,325		16,033,000		152%	18,300,000		114%
<b>7. Emergency Relief</b>	<b>121,582,501</b>		<b>140,545,260</b>		<b>116%</b>	<b>148,000,000</b>		<b>105%</b>
Vehicles	2,967,132	25 vehicles	3,800,000	28 vehicles	128%	4,455,000	30 vehicles	117%
Salaries/ Benefits	43,314,052	48 staff	49,135,072	57 staff	113%	57,089,035	61 staff	116%
Office and Administration	11,709,371		14,190,000		121%	15,748,000		111%
Depreciation	3,074,353		3,650,000		119%	3,750,000		103%
<b>8. Management</b>	<b>61,064,908</b>		<b>70,775,072</b>		<b>116%</b>	<b>81,042,035</b>		<b>115%</b>
<b>9. Governance</b>	<b>1,955,204</b>		<b>2,000,000</b>		<b>102%</b>	<b>2,000,000</b>		<b>100%</b>
<b>10. Costs of generating funds</b>	<b>364,960</b>		<b>1,400,000</b>		<b>384%</b>	<b>1,000,000</b>		<b>71%</b>
<b>11. Other Expenses</b>	<b>8,517,802</b>		<b>8,400,181</b>		<b>99%</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>0%</b>
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>1,055,808,596</b>		<b>1,201,180,824</b>		<b>114%</b>	<b>1,140,976,072</b>		<b>95%</b>

Table 4.2

## Income : 2006 - 2008

Funding Source	Currency	Actual 2006		Budget 2007		Jan-June Actual		Revised Projection 2007		Estimate 2008	
		Foreign Currency	Thai Baht 000	Foreign Currency	Thai Baht 000	Foreign Currency	Thai Baht 000	Foreign Currency	Thai Baht 000	Foreign Currency	Thai Baht 000
<b>EC and GOVERNMENT BACKED FUNDING</b>											
EC Aid to Uprooted People Fund	EUR	1,300,000	61,293								
ECHO (ICCO)	EUR	5,351,354	251,392	5,840,000	274,480	5,840,000	270,020	5,840,000	270,020	5,840,000	268,640
USA PRM (IRC)	USD	6,917,279	259,154	3,950,000	142,200			4,409,000	145,497	4,900,000	161,700
USA USAID IDP (IRC)	USD	1,938,118	69,686	1,938,118	69,772			1,938,118	63,958	1,938,118	63,958
Sweden SIDA (Diakonia)	SEK	30,887,890	159,214	37,610,000	191,811	37,600,000	193,376	37,600,000	193,376	37,600,000	184,240
Netherlands MOFA (ZOA Refugee Care)	EUR	1,420,138	68,757	1,500,000	70,500	1,456,311	68,811	1,456,311	68,811	1,456,311	66,990
UK DFID (Christian Aid)	GBP	601,939	42,888	662,433	46,370			662,433	45,045	690,000	46,920
Denmark DANIDA (DanChurchAid)	DKK	4,531,000	28,029	5,000,000	31,500	5,037,152	31,823	5,037,152	31,823	5,300,000	32,860
Norway MOFA (Norwegian Church Aid)	NOK	10,000,000	59,194	12,000,000	68,400	8,445,800	49,080	12,000,000	69,600	12,000,000	69,600
Australia AusAID (NCCA Christian World Service)	AUD	1,599,754	45,772	1,555,000	43,540			1,478,124	42,866	1,500,000	43,500
Canada CIDA (Inter-Pares)	CAD	662,000	22,491	694,575	20,837	694,575	20,907	694,575	20,907	720,000	23,040
Switzerland SDC (Caritas)	CHF	345,000	10,263	400,000	11,600	404,000	11,534	404,000	11,534	420,000	11,340
Ireland Irish Aid (Trocaire)	EUR	440,000	21,173	440,000	20,680			220,000	10,120	440,000	20,240
New Zealand (Caritas)	NZD	40,000	922	150,000	3,750	160,058	3,892	160,058	3,892	100,000	2,600
Czech Republic PNIF	CZK	3,000,000	4,991	3,600,000	6,012			300,000	480	300,000	480
Poland	EUR							14,000	644		
Belgium	EUR			200,000	9,400			200,000	9,200	200,000	9,200
<b>TOTAL EC and GOVERNMENT BACKED:</b>			<b>1,105,219</b>		<b>1,010,853</b>		<b>649,443</b>		<b>987,773</b>		<b>1,005,308</b>
<b>OTHER</b>											
ACT Netherlands/Stichting Vluchteling (ICCO)	EUR	200,000	9,279	200,000	9,400	200,000	9,260	200,000	9,260	200,000	9,200
American Baptist Churches	USD	5,000	374			5,000	172	5,000	172	5,000	165
Australian Churches of Christ	AUD	-	-				-		-		-
BMS World Mission	GBP	25,000	1,701	25,000	1,750			25,000	1,700	25,000	1,700
CAFOD	GBP	25,000	1,707	51,000	3,570	51,000	3,510	51,000	3,510	50,000	3,400
Caritas Australia	AUD	100,000	2,939	150,000	4,200	150,000	4,219	150,000	4,219	150,000	4,350
Christian Aid	GBP	160,000	11,299	160,000	11,200	160,000	11,360	160,000	11,360	160,000	10,880
Church World Service	USD	250,000	8,989	250,000	9,000			250,000	8,250	250,000	8,250
Church World Service (PC-USA)	USD	-	-				-		-		-
Church World Service (UCC-USA)	USD	20,000	763	20,000	720			20,000	660	20,000	660
DanChurchAid Xmas Appeal	DKK	115,596	745	376,343	2,371	343,970	1,977	343,970	1,977		-
Episcopal Relief & Development	USD	83,400	3,117	250,000	9,000	250,195	8,713	250,195	8,713	250,000	8,250
ICCO	EUR	80,000	3,706			80,000	3,718	80,000	3,718		-
NCCA Christian World Service	AUD	57,494	1,690	57,494	1,610	50,000	1,425	59,630	1,699	60,000	1,740
Open Society Institute	USD	30,000	1,078	20,000	720			20,000	660	20,000	660
Penney Memorial Church	USD	-	-				-		-		-
Swedish Baptist Union	SEK	229,000	1,177				-		-		-
Third World Interest Group	AUD	4,000	120			3,000	83	3,000	83		-
Tides Foundation	USD	10,000	380				-		-		-
Trocaire Global Gift Fund	EUR			500,000	23,500	460,000	21,424	623,500	29,039		-
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel	GBP	5,950	413					6,000	414	6,000	408
Other Donations		-	96				185		185		200
Income from Marketing		-	31				6		6		-
Gifts in Kind		-	5				-		-		-
Interest		-	654				374		800		800
Income from Charitable activities		-	97				250		250		-
Other Income		-	-				212		212		-
<b>TOTAL OTHER:</b>			<b>50,360</b>		<b>77,041</b>		<b>66,888</b>		<b>86,887</b>		<b>50,663</b>
<b>TOTAL INCOME</b>			<b>1,155,579</b>		<b>1,087,894</b>		<b>716,331</b>		<b>1,074,660</b>		<b>1,055,971</b>
Expenses			1,055,809		1,201,976		735,367		1,201,181		1,140,976
<b>Net Movement Current Year</b>			<b>99,770</b>		<b>(114,082)</b>		<b>(19,036)</b>		<b>(126,521)</b>		<b>(85,005)</b>
Funds Brought Forward			78,559		178,329		178,329		178,329		51,808
<b>Total Funds carried Forward</b>			<b>178,329</b>		<b>64,247</b>		<b>159,293</b>		<b>51,808</b>		<b>(33,197)</b>
Less: Restricted Funds			26,052		0		24,446		30,000		30,000
Designated Funds			7,500		10,000		7,500		10,000		10,000
Net Fixed Assets			7,232		10,000		8,335		8,000		8,000
<b>Freely available General Funds</b>			<b>137,545</b>		<b>44,247</b>		<b>119,012</b>		<b>3,808</b>		<b>(81,197)</b>



Table 4.3

## Cash Flow for 1st January to 31st December 2007

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
<b>Tha Baht 000's</b>													
<b>EC and GOVERNMENT BACKED FUNDING</b>													
EC Aid to Uprooted People									23,000				23,000
ECHO (ICCO) 2006							49,174						49,174
ECHO (ICCO) 2007	46,236	171,219											217,455
USA PRM (RC) 2006					76,023	18,206		95,535					189,764
USA PRM (RC) 2007					43,376						16,500		16,500
USA USAID (RC)-IDP 2006											16,500		16,500
USA USAID (RC)-IDP 2007			23,977										23,977
Sweden SIDA (Diakonia)				96,688									96,688
Netherlands MOFA (ZOA Refugee Care)					68,811								68,811
UK DFID (Christian Aid)					31,836		21,732			22,508			44,240
Denmark DANIDA (DanChurchAid)													31,836
Norway MOFA (Norwegian Church Aid)											20,752		20,752
Australia AusAID (NCCA Christian World Service)	18,858			3,095				8,320	21,431			21,431	69,832
Canada CIDA (Inter Pares)	10,246												61,720
Switzerland SDC (Caritas)		11,534											11,534
Ireland Irish aid (Trocaire)									10,120				10,120
New Zealand nzaid (Caritas)				2,550		1,415							3,965
Czech Republic PNIF									480				480
Poland											644		644
Belgium									9,200				9,200
<b>TOTAL EC and GOVERNMENT BACKED:</b>	<b>75,340</b>	<b>182,753</b>	<b>23,977</b>	<b>102,333</b>	<b>220,046</b>	<b>19,621</b>	<b>214,788</b>	<b>103,855</b>	<b>64,231</b>	<b>22,508</b>	<b>54,396</b>	<b>21,431</b>	<b>1,104,635</b>
<b>OTHER</b>													
ACT Netherlands/Stichting Vluchteling (ICCO)						9,228							9,228
American Baptist Churches						172							172
BMS World Mission								1,700					1,700
CAF-OD			3,510										3,510
Caritas Australia	4,219												4,219
Christian Aid	11,360												11,360
Church World Service	8,991												8,991
Church World Service (PC-USA)							660						660
Church World Service (UCC-USA)													1,977
DanChurchAid Xmas Catalogue		1,977											1,977
Episcopal Relief & Development				8,724									8,724
ICCO					3,718								3,718
NCCA Christian World Service					1,425				290				1,715
Open Society Institute	1,080												1,080
Pennine Memorial Church													1,740
Swedish Baptist Union													-
Third World Interest Group													-
Trocaire Global Fund			21,133				7,615						28,748
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel										414			414
Other Donations	141			21	21	2							185
Income from Marketing	4		1		1								6
Interest received	41	52	28	15	15	223							800
Other Income	250				206	6							462
<b>TOTAL OTHER:</b>	<b>26,086</b>	<b>2,112</b>	<b>24,672</b>	<b>8,760</b>	<b>5,386</b>	<b>9,631</b>	<b>8,275</b>	<b>1,700</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>9,336</b>	<b>96,662</b>
<b>TOTAL RECEIPTS</b>	<b>101,426</b>	<b>184,865</b>	<b>48,649</b>	<b>111,093</b>	<b>225,432</b>	<b>29,252</b>	<b>223,063</b>	<b>105,555</b>	<b>64,521</b>	<b>22,922</b>	<b>54,396</b>	<b>30,767</b>	<b>1,201,941</b>
<b>TOTAL PAYMENTS</b>	<b>79,069</b>	<b>139,928</b>	<b>158,326</b>	<b>94,496</b>	<b>181,529</b>	<b>84,172</b>	<b>197,182</b>	<b>67,703</b>	<b>62,814</b>	<b>63,353</b>	<b>84,199</b>	<b>26,274</b>	<b>1,239,045</b>
<b>NET CASH FLOW</b>	<b>22,357</b>	<b>44,937</b>	<b>(109,677)</b>	<b>16,597</b>	<b>43,903</b>	<b>(54,920)</b>	<b>25,881</b>	<b>37,852</b>	<b>1,707</b>	<b>(40,431)</b>	<b>(29,803)</b>	<b>4,493</b>	<b>(37,104)</b>
Opening Bank Balance	53,510	75,867	120,804	11,127	27,724	71,627	16,707	42,588	80,440	82,147	41,716	11,913	53,510
<b>Closing Bank Balance</b>	<b>75,867</b>	<b>120,804</b>	<b>11,127</b>	<b>27,724</b>	<b>71,627</b>	<b>16,707</b>	<b>42,588</b>	<b>80,440</b>	<b>82,147</b>	<b>41,716</b>	<b>11,913</b>	<b>16,406</b>	<b>16,406</b>
Less Overdue Accounts Payable	122,074	56,050	77,348	140,411	71,199	95,237	-	-	-	-	-	-	60,000
Cash Surplus/(Deficit)	(46,207)	64,754	(66,221)	(112,687)	428	(78,530)	42,588	80,440	82,147	41,716	11,913	(43,594)	1,201,941
One month's average expenses	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	100,165	1,239,045
<b>Liquidity Surplus/(Deficit)</b>	<b>(146,372)</b>	<b>(35,411)</b>	<b>(166,386)</b>	<b>(212,852)</b>	<b>(99,737)</b>	<b>(178,695)</b>	<b>(57,577)</b>	<b>(19,725)</b>	<b>(18,018)</b>	<b>(58,449)</b>	<b>(88,252)</b>	<b>(143,759)</b>	<b>(1,143,759)</b>
USD Exchange rate (actual)	36.69	35.33	34.90	34.68	34.53	34.42	33.00	33.00	33.00	33.00	33.00	33.00	33.00
EUR Exchange rate (actual)	46.13	46.57	46.40	47.11	46.30	46.15	46.00	46.00	46.00	46.00	46.00	46.00	46.00

**Table 4.4**

**Fund Allocations and Balances for 1 January to 30 June 2007**


Funding Source	31-12-06 Fund	Income	Rice	Other Food	Relief Supplies	Medical	Other Assistance	Programme Support	Emergency Relief	Management Expenses	Total Expenses	30-06-07 Fund
<b>RESTRICTED</b>												
Christian Aid	-	11,360,000							11,360,000		11,360,000	-
ICCO 2007	-	3,717,648								1,303,309	2,135,034	1,582,614
ICCO (ECHO) 2007	-	270,019,993						831,725			146,953,497	123,066,496
IRC (PRM) 2006	18,950,745		71,945,284	41,512,073	33,496,140						18,950,745	
IRC (PRM) 2006 amendment	-		9,515,467	6,297,834	3,049,647					87,797		
IRC (USAID) IDP 2006	6,022,246		51,002,163	29,497,215	19,703,551					(2,081,469)	100,202,929	(100,202,929)
Open Society Institute	1,078,665								8,103,715		6,022,246	
									1,078,665		1,078,665	
<b>RESTRICTED:</b>	<b>26,051,656</b>	<b>285,097,641</b>	<b>132,462,914</b>	<b>77,307,122</b>	<b>56,249,338</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>831,725</b>	<b>20,542,380</b>	<b>(690,363)</b>	<b>286,703,116</b>	<b>24,446,181</b>
<b>GENERAL</b>												
American Baptist Churches	-	172,488	4,615	4,292	31,459	239	1,104	1,361	83,105	4,281	Allocation	42,032
BMS World Mission	-										130,456	
CAFOD	-	3,509,820	93,900	87,344	640,130	4,858	22,464	27,702	1,691,030	87,119	2,654,547	855,273
Caritas Australia	-	4,218,850	112,868	104,989	769,444	5,840	27,003	33,298	2,032,640	104,718	3,190,801	1,028,049
Caritas New Zealand	-	3,892,550	104,139	96,869	709,933	5,388	24,914	30,723	1,875,429	96,619	2,944,013	948,537
Caritas Switzerland (SDC Swiss Govt)	-	11,534,200	308,579	287,037	2,103,636	15,966	73,824	91,037	5,557,172	286,295	8,723,546	2,810,654
Christian Aid (DFID)	-			5,473,098		805,063	5,610,950	4,064,056		6,652,890	22,606,057	(22,606,057)
Church World Service (PC-USA)	-											
Church World Service (UCC-USA)	-											
Czech Republic	-											
DanChurchAid (DANIDA)	-	31,823,215	4,195,727	3,885,021	3,553,157	124,885	601,756	624,082	1,991,440	935,540	15,911,608	15,911,607
DanChurchAid 2004 Xmas Catalogue	-	1,976,953	52,890	49,198	360,562	2,737	12,653	15,604	952,495	49,071	1,495,209	481,744
Diakonia (SIDA)	-	193,375,612	11,307,243	10,517,889	77,083,499	585,036	2,705,133	3,335,856	10,490,712		116,025,367	77,350,245
EC Aid to Uprooted Peoples Fund	35,772,392		5,867,259	6,533,372	18,733,110	250,680	822,970	1,224,752		2,340,250	35,772,392	
Episcopal Relief and Development	-	8,713,166		7,915,473				76,094			7,991,567	721,599
ICCO (ACT Netherlands)	-	9,259,560	247,724	230,431	1,688,782	12,817	59,265	73,084	4,461,252	229,835	7,003,190	2,256,370
Inter Pares (CIDA)	-	20,906,708		5,738,540	4,935,223	82,187	473,241	669,430	1,357,419	1,357,419	13,256,040	7,650,668
NCA (Norwegian Govt)	-	49,080,233	1,313,062	1,221,397	8,951,375	67,938	314,135	387,379	23,646,834	1,218,241	37,120,361	11,959,872
NCCA (AusAID)	-											
NCCA (Christian World Service)	-	1,425,000	38,124	35,462	259,895	1,973	9,121	11,247	686,564	35,371	1,077,756	347,244
Swedish Baptist Union	-											
Third World Interest Group	-	82,670	2,212	2,057	15,078	114	529	652	39,830	2,052	62,525	20,145
Trocaire Global Gift Fund	-	21,423,902			21,423,902						21,423,902	
Trocaire (Irish Aid)	-											
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel	-											
ZOA Refugee Care (Dutch Govt)	-	68,810,695	4,023,565	3,742,681	27,429,359	208,179	962,593	1,187,030		3,733,010	41,286,417	27,524,278
Other Donations	-	185,241	4,956	4,610	33,785	256	1,186	1,462	89,249	4,598	140,101	45,140
Interest received	-	374,217								374,217	374,217	
Income from Marketing	-	6,260								6,260	6,260	
Other Income	-	462,382								462,382	462,382	
Transfer to Designated Fund	-											
Allocated Expenses	35,772,392	431,233,722	27,676,861	45,929,761	168,722,328	2,174,155	11,722,841	11,854,849	43,107,040	28,470,880	339,658,715	127,347,399
31/12/06 commitments allocated July-Dec 06	109,004,702	-	15,265,177	26,592,198	26,520,772	1,631,154	6,136,202	6,322,829	10,780,148	15,756,222	109,004,702	-
<b>GENERAL:</b>	<b>144,777,094</b>	<b>431,233,722</b>	<b>42,942,038</b>	<b>72,521,959</b>	<b>195,243,100</b>	<b>3,805,309</b>	<b>17,859,043</b>	<b>18,177,678</b>	<b>53,887,188</b>	<b>44,227,102</b>	<b>448,663,417</b>	<b>127,347,399</b>
<b>DESIGNATED (Severance Fund):</b>	<b>7,500,000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>7,500,000</b>
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>178,328,750</b>	<b>716,331,363</b>	<b>175,404,952</b>	<b>149,829,081</b>	<b>251,492,438</b>	<b>3,805,309</b>	<b>17,859,043</b>	<b>19,009,403</b>	<b>74,429,568</b>	<b>43,536,739</b>	<b>735,366,533</b>	<b>159,293,580</b>

**Table 4.5: Cost of TBBC Programme in Thai baht, US Dollars and Euro: 1984 to 2008**


Year	TBBC Expenditures	% increase on previous year	Average Exchange Rate		TBBC Expenditures		Average Rice Price	Average population	Cost/refugee/annum		
	THB m		USD	EUR	USD m	EUR m	(THB/100kg)		THB	USD	EUR
1984	3		25		0.1			9,500	350	14	
1985	4	33%	25		0.2		390	12,800	330	13	
1986	7	75%	25		0.3		281	17,300	400	16	
1987	13	86%	25		0.5		372	19,100	690	28	
1988	19	46%	25		0.8		555	19,700	960	38	
1989	22	16%	25		0.9		595	21,200	1,050	42	
1990	34	55%	25		1.4		527	33,100	1,020	41	
1991	62	82%	25		2.5		556	49,600	1,250	50	
1992	75	21%	25		3.0		551	60,800	1,240	50	
1993	86	15%	25		3.4		496	69,300	1,240	50	
1994	98	14%	25		3.9		518	74,700	1,320	53	
1995	181	85%	25		7.2		700	84,800	2,140	86	
1996	212	17%	25		8.5		750	98,000	2,170	87	
1997	292	38%	40		7.3		798	115,000	2,530	63	
1998	461	58%	40		11.5		1,065	114,000	4,040	101	
1999	481	4%	38	40	12.7	12.0	920	114,000	4,220	111	105
2000	457	-5%	40	37	11.4	12.4	775	123,000	3,710	93	99
2001	494	8%	44	40	11.2	12.4	730	133,000	3,715	84	107
2002	581	18%	43	40	13.5	14.5	772	141,000	4,121	96	97
2003	670	15%	41	47	16.3	14.3	857	148,000	4,527	110	96
2004	763	14%	40	50	19.1	15.3	888	154,000	4,955	124	99
2005	978	28%	40	49	24.5	20.0	1,127	157,000	6,229	156	127
2006	1056	8%	38	47	27.8	22.5	1,139	161,000	6,559	173	140
2007	1202	14%	34	46	35.4	26.1	1,068	163,000	7,374	217	160
2008*	1141	-5%	33	46	34.6	24.8	1,094	160,000	7,131	216	155

\* Budget

**Expenditure & Refugees**



**Cost/Refugee/Annum & Rice Price**



**2008 Budget and Sensitivities**

Year	TBBC Expenditures	% increase on previous year	Average Exchange Rate		TBBC Expenditures		Average Rice Price	Average population	Cost/refugee/annum		
	THB m		USD	EUR	USD m	EUR m	(THB/100kg)		THB	USD	EUR
2008	1141	8%	33	46	34.6	24.8	1,094	160,000	7,131	216	155
2008 (a)	1141	8%	29.7	41.4	38.4	27.6	1,094	160,000	7,131	240	172
2008 (b)	1224	16%	33	46	37.1	26.6	1,203	160,000	7,653	232	166
2008 (c)	1255	19%	33	46	38.0	27.3	1,094	176,000	7,131	216	155

Sensitivities:

	USD m	EUR m	THB m	
(a) Exchange rates fall 10% against Thai baht	3.8	2.8	-	i.e. additional THB 120 m required
(b) Rice price increases by 20%	2.5	1.8	83	
(c) Average population increases by 10%	3.5	2.5	114	

## Appendix A

# The Thailand Burma Border Consortium

### 1. History and development

**a) 1984 Mandate/ Organisation:** In February 1984 the Ministry of Interior (MOI) invited NGOs working with Indo-chinese refugees in Thailand to provide emergency assistance to around 9,000 Karen refugees who sought refuge in Tak province. The situation was expected to be temporary and MOI stressed the need to restrict aid to essential levels only. It was emphasised that nothing should be done which might encourage refugees to come to Thailand or stay any longer than necessary. Thailand was prepared to offer these people temporary asylum on humanitarian grounds.

On 4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> March 1984, several Bangkok-based NGO representatives visited the border to assess the situation. The NGO representatives all happened to be from Christian agencies and observed that several French NGOs (MSF, MAP, MDM) were already setting up medical programmes, whilst the refugees themselves were cutting building materials from the surrounding forest to build their own houses. The immediate need was food supplies. The NGOs concluded that needs were quite small and, since it was expected that the refugees would return home at the beginning of the rainy season, it would be best to work together rather than try to divide the work up or to compete with each other. They agreed to open a bank account into which each agency would contribute funds and operate a programme under the name of the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA).

The refugees could not go back in the rainy season and the CCA became the main supplier of food and relief supplies to the refugees. It was an informal organisation and different NGOs joined and left, contributing funds and sharing in the decision making. The name was changed to the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) in 1991 to become more inclusive, accessing a broader range of donors. BBC adopted a more formal organisational structure with five recognised member agencies in 1996, but still had no legal identity other than through the legitimacy of its individual members. The name changed again to the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) in 2004 when it was incorporated in London with ten member agencies.

From the outset, CCA decided to work through the Karen Refugee Committee which the Karen authorities had established to oversee the refugee population. In order to avoid duplication and competition, a subcommittee was established under the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) to coordinate the relief programme. The CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee met for the first time in April 1984 and there have been monthly coordination meetings every since. All agencies providing assistance or interested in the situation are invited. The MOI sets policy and administrates the assistance programmes through CCSDPT.

**b) 1990 expansion/ 1991 regulations:** During 1989 the NGOs were approached by the Karenni Refugee Committee to assist Karenni refugees who had fled fighting in Karenni state to Mae Hong Son province. Early in 1990 Mon and Karen refugees also began to arrive in Kanchanaburi province from Mon state. Another relief programme was set up at the request of the Mon National Relief Committee.

Assistance to each of the new groups was provided on the same basis as that already given to the Karen, through the respective refugee committees. In August 1990 the agencies informed the MOI of these extended programmes and in November the name of the CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee was changed to the CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee.

In 1991 the NGOs sought formal permission from the Thai authorities to provide assistance to all of the ethnic groups throughout four border provinces. On 31<sup>st</sup> May 1991 the agencies were given written approval to provide assistance under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and in accordance with their guidelines which confirmed earlier informal understandings, limiting assistance to food, clothing and medicine, restricting agency staff to the minimum necessary and requiring monthly requests to be submitted through the CCSDPT.

Three NGOs provided assistance under this agreement. The Burmese Border Consortium focused on food and relief item supplies. The BBC provided around 95% of all of these items and the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR) provided most of the balance. Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) was the main medical agency working under agreement with the MOI.

**c) 1994 Regulations:** By 1992, a number of other CCSDPT member agencies were providing services on the border in coordination with approved programmes, with the tacit approval of the MOI, but without a formal mandate. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee requested formal recognition of these programmes and official approval for an extension of services to include sanitation and education. At a meeting with NGOs, international organisations and embassies on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1994, MOI confirmed that sanitation and education services would be permitted and also announced that all agencies should re-submit their programmes for formal approval via CCSDPT.

An NGO/ MOI Burma Working Group was set up and meetings were held to establish new operational procedures. NGOs were required to submit formal programme proposals, apply for border passes for authorised personnel, and



to submit quarterly reports via the provincial authorities. All of the CCSDPT member agencies with current border activities were given approval for their programmes.

The programme approvals for 1995 included sanitation projects. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee carried out a survey of educational needs in 1995/6 and the first education project proposals were approved in 1997.

**d) 1997 CCSDPT Restructuring and RTG Emergency Procedures:** With the Indochinese refugee caseload almost gone, CCSDPT was now principally engaged with Burmese refugees and was restructured for 1997. The Burma Subcommittee was now redundant and the former Burma Medical and Education Working Groups were upgraded to Subcommittee status to coordinate activities in these fields.

During 1997 refugees arrived in sensitive areas of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Provinces. NGOs were required to submit requests for monthly supplies for these areas for MOI approval in the normal way, but these now also had to be approved by the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the Royal Thai 1<sup>st</sup> Army. The 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was able to override MOI approval and on occasion exercised this prerogative.

**e) 1998/99 Role for UNHCR:** During the first half of 1998 the RTG made the decision to give UNHCR an operational role on the Burmese border for the first time and letters of agreement were exchanged in July.

The UNHCR established a presence on the border during the second half of 1998 and became fully operational in the early part of 1999 with the opening and staffing of three offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi. The UNHCR role is principally one of monitoring and protection. It has no permanent offices in the camps, which continue to be administered by the Thai authorities themselves with the assistance of the refugee committees. Since 2005 UNCR has become increasingly involved in activities relating to the resettlement of refugees from the border to third countries.

The NGOs continue to provide and coordinate relief services to the refugee camps under bilateral agreements with RTG as before, although UNHCR may provide complementary assistance especially regarding camp relocations.

The structure of the relief assistance and location of CCSDPT member agency services are shown in the diagrams.

**f) RTG Policy developments, CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plans:** During 2005 CCSDPT and UNHCR drafted a comprehensive plan for 2006 in which service 'gaps' were identified for priority consideration. This included ideas presented earlier in a letter to the RTG in April, advocating a new comprehensive approach to what had become a protracted refugee situation. In December, the MOI hosted an RTG/ NGO workshop in Chiang Mai at which all key government ministries made presentations on refugee policy and CCSDPT presented the Draft Comprehensive Plan for discussion. UNHCR, other international organisations and some donor embassies attended as observers.

In a constructive dialogue the RTG emphasised the need to consider national security priorities and to control refugee movements but there was general acceptance of the benefits of allowing refugees to develop their human potential by providing more access to skills training and education as well as income generation and employment opportunities.

For 2006 the MOI gave approval for NGOs to support income generation projects related to skills training. During the year a commitment was also made to improve education in the camps and to carry out pilot projects for refugee employment.


The CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan was updated for 2006/7 and presented at a Donor Forum in May 2006 and similarly a Comprehensive Plan for 2007/8 was drawn up and presented to another Donor Forum in May 2007. The Thai NSC and MOI participated in both fora. The latest version of the plan is more comprehensive than its predecessors, incorporating the UNHCR Strengthening Protection Capacity Project (SPCP) which provided a framework for presenting project proposals designed to address protection and service gaps identified in the plan. The intention is to update this plan annually.

## **2. Organisational structure**

**a) Structure:** The TBBC structure was informal until 1996. Various agencies joined and left over the years with current member agencies directing the programme by consensus. With the programme growing inexorably and becoming increasingly dependent on governmental funding, a need for greater transparency and accountability led to BBC adopting a formal organisational structure at the first Donors meeting in December 1996 which became operational in 1997 with five member agencies. It comprised: the Donors meeting, being the overall representative body of BBC; an advisory committee, elected from the donors at the Donors meeting, representing the Donors meeting between meetings; the BBC Board, being the five member agencies responsible for overall governance of the programme; and the BBC Director appointed by the Board and responsible for management of the programme. These arrangements were set out in new BBC 'Structure and Regulations'.

Following an evaluation of BBC's Governance Structure in early 2003 the current five BBC members invited all donors to join in a review of governance options. After a series of meetings and E-group discussions representatives of the members plus five potential members agreed at a workshop in Chiang Mai in March 2004, to recom-

## CCSDPT / UNHCR Coordination Structure




### CCSDPT Members

<b>ADRA</b>	Adventist Development & Relief Agency	<b>NCA</b>	Norwegian Church Aid
<b>AMI</b>	Aide Medical International	<b>RF</b>	Ruammit Foundation
<b>ARC</b>	American Refugee Committee	<b>RTP</b>	Right To Play
<b>COERR</b>	Catholic Office for Emergency Relief & Refugees	<b>SOL</b>	Solidarites
<b>HI</b>	Handicap International	<b>SVA</b>	Shanti Volunteer Association
<b>ICS-ASIA</b>	International Child Support- Asia	<b>TBBC</b>	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee	<b>TOPS</b>	Taipei Overseas Peace Service
<b>JRS</b>	Jesuit Refugee Service	<b>WEAVE</b>	Women's Education for Advancement & Empowerment
<b>MI</b>	Malteser International	<b>WE/C</b>	World Education/ Consortium
<b>MSF-F</b>	Medicins Sans Frontiers-France	<b>ZOA</b>	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands

## CCSDPT agency services to Burmese border camps: June 2007

UNHCR has offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi with a monitoring/protection mandate.



### Mae Hong Son Province

	Food, Shelter & Relief	Primary Health & Sanitation	Education	Gender	Protection
Site 1 Ban Kwai/Nai Soi	TBBC	COERR, HI, IRC, RF	COERR, HI, IRC, JRS, NCA, WEAVE, WE/C, ZOA	COERR, IRC, TBBC, WEAVE	IRC
Site 2 Ban Mae Surin	TBBC	COERR, HI, IRC, RF	COERR, HI, IRC, JRS, NCA, WEAVE, WE/C, ZOA	COERR, IRC, TBBC, WEAVE	IRC
K1 Mae La Oon (Site 3)	TBBC	COERR, HI, IRC, MI, RF	COERR, HI, SVA, TOPS, WE/C, ZOA	ARC, COERR, MI, TBBC	
K2 Mae Ra Ma Luang (Site 4)	TBBC	COERR, HI, IRC, MI, RF	COERR, HI, SVA, TOPS, WEAVE, WE/C, ZOA	ARC, COERR, MI, TBBC	

### Tak Province

K3 Mae La	TBBC	AMI, COERR, HI, IRC, MSF, RF, SOL, TOPS	ADRA, HI, ICS, SVA, TOPS, WEAVE, WE/C, ZOA	ARC, COERR, ICS, TBBC	IRC
K4 Umpiem Mai	TBBC	AMI, ARC, COERR, HI, IRC, RF, TOPS	HI, ICS, RTP, SVA, TOPS, WEAVE, WE/C, ZOA	AMI, ARC, COERR, ICS, TBBC	
K5 Nu Po	TBBC	AMI, ARC, COERR, HI, IRC, RF, TOPS	HI, RTP, SVA, TOPS, WE/C, ZOA	AMI, ARC, COERR, TBBC	

### Kanchanaburi Province

K6 Ban Don Yang	TBBC	ARC, COERR, HI, IRC, RF	HI, RTP, SVA, WE/C, ZOA	ARC, COERR, TBBC	
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### Ratchaburi Province

K7 Tham Hin	TBBC	COERR, HI, IRC, RF, RTP	HI, RTP, SVA, WE/C, ZOA	COERR, TBBC	
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### Mon Resettlement Sites

M1 Halochanee	TBBC				
M2 Che-daik	TBBC				
M3 Bee Ree	TBBC				
M4 Tavoy	TBBC				

ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency

AMI Aide Medicale Internationale

ARC American Refugee Committee

COERR Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees

HI Handicap International

ICS International Child Support

IRC International Rescue Committee

JRS Jesuit Refugee Service

MI Malteser International

MSF-F Medecins Sans Frontieres-France

NCA Norwegian Church Aid

RF Ruammit Foundation for Youth & Children - Drug & Alcohol Recovery & Education

RTP Right to Play

SOL Solidarites

SVA Shanti Volunteer Association

TBBC Thailand Burma Border Consortium

TOPS Taipei Overseas Peace Service

WEAVE Women's Education for Advancement and Empowerment

WE/C World Education/Consortium

ZOA ZOA Refugee Care, Netherlands

mend to their organisations that they become members of a new legal entity to be registered as a Charitable Company in England and Wales. A Mission Statement and Bylaws, Memorandum and Articles of Association were drafted. All ten agencies present subsequently agreed to join the new entity whilst the draft documents were edited and finalised. The TBBC Mission Statement is presented on the back cover of this report. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, TBBC, was incorporated in London on 11<sup>th</sup> October 2004 and was granted charitable status by the Charity Commission of England and Wales on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2005.

Under the new structure each member agency has a designated representative that attends a minimum of two general meetings each year, one annual general meeting (AGM) and one extraordinary general meeting (EGM). The first AGM was held in Chiang Mai on 29/30<sup>th</sup> October 2004 and the first EGM was held in Kanchanaburi 14<sup>th</sup>/17<sup>th</sup> March 2005.

The member representatives appoint five to eight of their number to be Directors and Trustees of TBBC to be elected annually and to meet not less than four times per annum. Five members have been elected for 2007 and the Board will convene four times. During 2006 the TBBC Board prepared a Governance Manual which was finalised at the EGM in March 2007.

TBBC shares an office with CCSDPT at 12/5 Convent Road. Current TBBC member representatives, directors/trustees and staff are listed at the beginning of this report.

A full list of all board members, advisory Committee members, member representatives and staff from 1984 to 2007 is presented in Appendix H.

For many years field coordinators worked from offices at their homes, but separate offices were opened in Mae Sot and Mae Sariang in 1998, Kanchanaburi in 2000 and Mae Hong Son in 2003. The Kanchanaburi office was relocated to Sangklaburi in 2004. TBBC also has a sub-office in Chiang Mai for Displacement Research.

**b) Funding Sources:** TBBC has received, or expects to receive, funds from the following sources in 2007:

**Figure A.1: TBBC Donors 2007**

ACT Netherlands	Government of Belgium
American Baptist Churches	Government of Czech Republic
BMS World Mission, UK	Government of Poland
Baptist Union of Sweden	ICCO(G)
CAFOD, UK	International Rescue Committee(G)
Caritas Australia	Inter-Pares, Canada(G)
Caritas New Zealand(G)	NCCA, Christian World Service, Australia (G)
Caritas Switzerland(G)	Norwegian Church Aid(G)
Christian Aid, UK(G)	Open Society Institute
Church World Service, USA	Third World Interest Group
DanChurchAid, Denmark(G)	United Churches of Christ, USA
Diakonia, Sweden(G)	United Society for Propagation of the Gospel
Episcopal Relief and Development	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands(G)

The European Union (ECHO) and the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and USA are expected to contribute over 90% of TBBC's funds. Their funds are mostly channelled through the TBBC donors marked 'G' above. Appendix B sets out details of funding received from all donors since 1984.

**c) TBBC Bank Account:** TBBC has bank accounts with Standard Chartered Bank in London in GBP, USD & EUR:

Standard Chartered Bank	Account Name: Thailand Burma Border Consortium
Clements House	
27-28 Clements Lane	GBP Account # 00 01 254441501 (12544415 in UK)
London, EC4N 7AP	EUR Account # 56 01 254441596
England	USD Account # 01 01 254441550
SWIFT BIC: SCBLGB2L	
IBAN GB52 SCBL 6091 0412 544415	
Sort Code: 60-91-04	

And in Thai Baht with Standard Chartered Bank in Bangkok:

Standard Chartered Bank	Account Name: The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (Main Savings Account)
90 North Sathorn Road	Account # 00100783813
Silom, Bangrak,	Bank code: 020
Bangkok 10500	Branch code: 101
Thailand	Branch name: Sathorn
SWIFT SCBLTHBX	

The TBBC Thailand Tax ID number is: 4-1070-5787-5

Donors are requested to check with TBBC before sending remittances, as it may be preferable in some circumstances to have funds sent direct to Bangkok.



**d) Financial statements and programme updates:** TBBC was incorporated in the UK on 11<sup>th</sup> October 2004 and charity status was granted in May 2005. Accounts for all periods prior to incorporation were audited by KPMG in Thailand and have been presented in previous six-month reports. On incorporation, RSM Robson Rhodes LLP of the UK were appointed as auditors. The Trustees report incorporating the audited financial statements for the first two accounting period after incorporation have been filed at both Companies House and the Charity Commission in the UK. Robson Rhodes LLP left the RSM network and merged with Grant Thornton on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2007. They have indicated a willingness to continue, as Grant Thornton, as the TBBC Auditor for 2007 Accounts, and this will be considered, requiring a special resolution, at the AGM.

Six-monthly Accounts are included in six-month reports, together with narrative explaining significant differences from budgets.

**e) TBBC Mission Statement, Vision, Goal, Aim, Objectives** The former BBC adopted formal aims and objectives at the first Donors meeting in December 1996, which were then subsequently revised at the Oslo Donors Meeting in 2000 and the Ottawa Donors Meeting in 2002. These were presented in former six-month reports.

A TBBC Mission Statement, Goal and Aim was prepared during the restructuring of TBBC in 2004 and are printed on the back cover of this report.

The following Objects were agreed with the Charity Commission of England and Wales at the time of registration:

- The relief of charitable needs of displaced people of Burma by the provision of humanitarian aid & assistance.
- To develop the capacity and skills of the members of the socially and economically disadvantaged community of the displaced people of Burma in such a way that they are able to participate more fully in society.
- To promote equality, diversity and racial harmony for the benefit of the public by raising awareness of the needs of and issues affecting the displaced people of Burma.
- To promote human rights (as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) in the Thailand Burma border area by monitoring and research.

During the Strategic Planning process in 2005 Core Objectives were derived from the Objects to drive all TBBC endeavours. These are currently under review and are printed at the beginning of this report (page ii).

**f) Code of Conduct, Compliance with RTG regulations** TBBC complies with:

- The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental organisations in Disaster Relief (1994).
- The Core Principles developed by the Interagency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises (2002).


and is guided by the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Relief (SPHERE) Project.

A Code of Conduct for TBBC staff is incorporated in the staff policy manual, compliance with which is an employment condition. All staff participated in a workshop on this in 2006.

TBBC collaborates closely with the Royal Thai Government and works in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

**g) Coordination with Refugee Committees** The TBBC provides all assistance in coordination with the refugee committees of each of the three main ethnic groups: the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) based in Mae Sot; the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) based in Mae Hong Son; and the Mon Relief and Development Committee (formerly the Mon National Relief Committee until 1999) based in Sangklaburi. Each of these three committees report to TBBC each month recording assistance received both from TBBC and other sources, refugee population statistics, and issues of concern. The overall organisational structure within the refugee camps is described in h) below.

**h) Refugee camp organisational structures** The organisational structure for administration of the refugee camps is illustrated in the following chart:



**Thai Authorities:** The RTG maintains ultimate authority over the Karen, Karenni and Shan refugee camps in Thailand. The MOI, through provincial and district authorities, enforces refugee policy and controls the day-to-day running of the camps in collaboration with refugee and camp committees. Various other government agencies, including the Royal Thai Army Paramilitary Rangers and the Border Patrol Police also assist in implementing policy and providing security. Usually a MOI local District Officer (*'Palat'*) is assigned as the Camp Commander in each camp, with Territorial Defence Volunteer Corps (*'Or Sor'*) personnel providing internal security under his jurisdiction.

**Community Elder's Advisory Boards (CEABs):** Community Elder's Advisory Boards are set up to provide guidance for refugee committees and camp committees in their work. They are made up of elders appointed from the local community and in theory consist of 15 members. In reality, a lot fewer than this actively make up each board. Specific aspects of their work include the organising and overseeing of refugee committee and camp committee elections, and assisting in solving conflict.

CEAB members are appointed by senior elders from the local community in which the CEAB operates. There is rarely a fixed term of office, although in some camps they are reassigned every two years. However, members can be reappointed by the senior elders.

The central Karen CEAB is based in Mae Sot, with camp-based boards present in each Karen camp made up from the local population. The central Karenni CEAB is based in Mae Hong Son, with camp-based boards in both Karenni camps. Members of these are also made up from the local population.

**Refugee Committees (RCs):** The Karen, Karenni and Shan Refugee Committees (KRC/ KnRC/ SRC) are the overall representatives for Karen, Karenni and Shan refugees living in refugee camps in Thailand. They oversee activities of all the camps through the camp committees, coordinate assistance provided by NGOs and liaise with UNHCR, the RTG and security personnel.

Refugee committees consist of an executive committee, administrative staff and heads of various subcommittees which oversee specific services and activities organised in the camps. In theory, refugee committees also consist of fifteen members' however, due to the difficult working conditions associated with such duties, often there are fewer active members.


As the main coordinating bodies of the camps, refugee committees have rules and regulations governing the selection processes of the camps' administrative committees. Some of these take the form of more general guidelines, allowing for varying interpretations in their implementation. As a result, selection procedures often differ from camp to camp. The explanations in this section are based on standard Karen Refugee Committee rules and regulations, but they share many features with those of the Karenni Refugee Committee.

Refugee committee selections occur every three years, and are organised by the central CEAB. Of the fifteen members selected, eight respected and experienced people are appointed by the CEAB and the other seven are chosen from representatives from all the camps. The process of selecting the seven camp representatives is as follows.

Each camp committee is asked to put forward a number of camp residents who would like to stand for the refugee committee selections. Members of the outgoing refugee committee together with these new camp representatives select the new eight camp representatives from amongst themselves.

The new refugee committee, consisting of the eight appointees and seven camp representatives, then selects their executive committee members from amongst themselves; first the Chair, then the Vice Chair, followed by the Secretary, the Joint Secretary and finally the Treasurer. This new executive committee then appoints duties to the remaining ten new members of the committee.

### Refugee Committee Selection Process



*Note: selection process organised by the CEAB*

The KRC is based in Mae Sot with branch offices in Mae Sariang, Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi; the KnRC is based in Mae Hong Son, and the SRC in Chiang Mai province.

**Camp Committees (CCs):** Camp Committees are the administrative and management bodies of the refugee camps. They coordinate the day-to-day running of the camp and its services in collaboration with local MOI officials, and provide the main link between the camp population, NGOs, UNHCR and local Thai authorities.

Due to their semi-autonomous nature, camp committee structures vary from camp to camp, with differences in the number of camp committee members (although the standard complement is fifteen) and the duties assigned to them. However, they generally follow a similar pattern:

Camp committees operate at the central zone (if the camp is organised so) and section level and are made up of elected representatives from within the camp population.

The central camp-level committees consist of an executive committee (five members), administrative staff, and heads of various subcommittees. These are set up to coordinate different services and activities in the camps, the most common ones being supplies, health, education, camp affairs, and security. Various camp committees also assign members to head other sub-committees, such as transportation, judiciary, etc.

The zone- (if applicable) and section-level committees emulate the central camp-level committee structure, but with a smaller executive body (usually just a zone or section leader and a secretary) and fewer subcommittee heads. In some camps, zone and section committees are comprised of the two executive heads, the remaining assigned simply as members.

Below the section-level committee are ten-household leaders. These are individuals selected by the section leader from within each group of ten houses to act as a focus point between the section leaders and the individual households. In practice, this level of administration exists in a minority of camps.

Following are the basic duties of the camp committee subcommittees and its administrative staff:

- Health: Responsible for coordinating with health NGOs and other relevant organisations in the provision of all health services, including community-based organisations (CBOs) and the health worker's unions.
- Education: Responsible for ensuring the smooth management of all camp schools and their staff, and for coordinating with education NGOs and other relevant organisations in the provision of all education services, including CBOs and education worker's unions.
- Camp Affairs: Responsible for monitoring and responding to social issues and trends, and for supervising and coordinating social activities in camp. This includes those of the women's and youth groups. Also responsible for relations with external authorities.
- Security: Responsible for coordinating and maintaining camp security in collaboration with Thai authorities and other security personnel based outside of camp, and for supervising the management of security volunteers recruited from within the camp population.
- Supplies: Responsible for managing camp warehouses and their staff, and for monitoring and distribution of all supplies in cooperation with TBBC field staff.
- Judiciary: Responsible for intervening in, reconciling, and arbitrating over conflicts through a fair and due process often based on traditional customary principles, and for collaborating with UNHCR and Thai authorities in special cases.

Karen Camp Committee selections usually occur every two years (those in Karenni camps take place every three), and are organised by an election commission set up and appointed by the outgoing camp committee. The election commission usually consists of fifteen members, but may have only five or seven in a small camp. Members of the election commission are chosen for their experience in election processes and community administration. Respected religious or education leaders may also be included. The election commission is also responsible for explaining the rules and regulations to all sections of the community prior to the camp committee selection and for monitoring the proceedings during the actual process, and is supported and guided by the Community Elder's Advisory Board.

The new camp committee members are selected by representatives from each section of the camp. Every person twenty years old and above has the right to vote for these section representatives as well as to nominate themselves as a representative. Three are chosen for every hundred people of voting age in each section (the election commission confirms the number to be chosen). The section representative selections take the form of an open vote, with all those eligible voting for their first choice first, then electing their second choice, and so forth, until the quota for the section has been reached.


Once the representatives for each section have been selected, they, together with the fifteen (or otherwise) members of the outgoing camp committee, vote for fifteen members from amongst themselves. These are listed in order from one to fifteen, from the person who received the most votes down. This group of fifteen becomes the new Camp Committee.

The fifteen new members of the camp committee then choose their five new executive committee members from amongst themselves. First, they vote for the new Camp Leader, then the Vice Camp Leader, followed by the Secretary, the Joint Secretary and finally the Treasurer. This new executive committee then allocates administrative duties and coordination positions of the camp committee's subcommittees to the remaining ten members of the new Camp Committee.

Once the new camp committee has been selected, it organises the selection of the camp's zone and section leaders. The particular process varies from camp to camp, as the refugee committees do not offer specific guidelines for the selection of these levels of camp administration. However, the processes generally follow the principles laid out in the camp committee selections and are based on the leaders being chosen from and by the residents of that particular part of the camp. The election commission also supervises the zone- and section-level selections.



### Camp Committee Election Process (CEAB-supervised)



Note: election process organised by an Election Commission set up by out-going committee and supervised by CEAB

**Women's and youth committees:** The main women and youth committees are the Karen Women's Organisation (KWO) and the Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) in the Karen camps, and the Karenni Women's Organisation (KnWO) and Karenni Youth Organisation (KnYO) in the Karenni camps. Members of other sizeable ethnic nationalities in the camps also often organise their own groups, such as the Muslim Women's Organisation; however, these are not officially part of the camp administration.

These committees are set up independently of each other in each camp and aim to represent the needs, views and aspirations of the women and youth sections of the populations, through organising various activities to raise awareness and promote issues relevant to their respective target groups. These include trainings and workshops, social services, research and documentation, advocacy, publications, competitions, celebrations, etc.

Funding for these projects is often sought by themselves through a number of NGOs working in the camps and from sympathetic groups further afield via their head offices in nearby towns, for example, the women's organisations in each camp generate income through TBBC's *longyi* project.

Structurally, the committees generally reflect the camp committee's formation, comprising an executive committee, heads of various subcommittees (related to their group's activities) and administrative staff. They are administratively accountable to the Camp Affairs Coordinator of the camp committee, who is responsible for informing it and the refugee committee of their activities. Often the Coordinator will assist in the preparation of activities.

Selections for the committee members are organised and chaired by the Camp Affairs Coordinator. Both organisations have their committee members chosen at the same time in each camp, following the camp committee selections, normally every two years. The selections are internal, with members of the organisation electing their committee members from a list of nominees. Once the new committee has been formed, its members vote amongst themselves for the executive committee members, who in turn allocate administrative duties and programme-based responsibilities to the remaining committee members, in the same way as the camp committee.


## Appendix B

### Summary of TBBC and NGO programme since 1984

**Table B1: Estimate of total TBBC & other NGO assistance 1984 to 2006**

Year	Food, Shelter Relief (THB M)		Medical, Health, Sanitation (THB M)	Education (THB M)	Total (THB M)	Year End Population
	TBBC	Other				
1984	3	2	5	-	10	9,502
1985	4	6	9	-	19	16,144
1986	7	5	9	-	21	18,428
1987	13	3	10	-	26	19,675
1988	19	4	10	-	33	19,636
1989	22	5	8	-	35	22,751
1990	33	5	10	-	48	43,500
1991	62	6	14	-	82	55,700
1992	75	6	20	-	101	65,900
1993	85	6	35	-	126	72,366
1994	98	7	64	-	169	77,107
1995	179	12	122	-	313	92,505
1996	199	12	88	-	299	101,425
1997	291	6	110	12	419	116,264
1998	447	6	118	21	592	111,813
1999	481	9	127	30	647	116,047
2000	457	9	198	56	720	127,914
2001	494	4	192	96	786	138,117
2002	581	2	188	115	886	144,358
2003	670	1	233	115	1,019	151,808
2004	763	-	177	157	1,096	155,785
2005	975	-	208	256	1,439	155,212
2006	1,056	-	248	219	1,523	165,857
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>7,014</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>2,203</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>10,409</b>	

**Note:** This table has been traditionally based on information collected only from NGO reports. It represented the best information available at the time but is probably incomplete due to varying reporting standards and definitions. In 2007 a more detailed survey was completed by all NGOs and UNHCR giving budgets for 2007 and projections for 2008 as set out in Table B2.



- Notes:**
1. This table and graph summarise total assistance provided to ethnic nationality refugees by NGOs working under agreement with MOI. It does not include assistance provided to other groups or support given directly to the refugees by others.
  2. Educational support programmes were approved for the first time in 1997. TBBC expenditures include school supplies until 1997. Other educational support provided by other NGOs before 1997 are included under Food/Shelter/Relief expenditures.


**Table B2: CCSDPT/UNHCR Budgets by Sector 2007 & 2008 (millions)**

Sector	2007 THB	% 2007	2008 THB	% 2007	2007 USD	2008 USD	2007 EUR	2008 EUR
Protection+ Community Services	196	9	130	66	6	4	4	3
Camp management	61	3	65	107	2	2	1	1
Food, shelter, non-food (TBBC)	1,064	51	1,065	100	30	30	23	23
Camp infrastructure	42	2	12	28	1	0	1	0
Water, sanitation	51	2	38	75	1	1	1	1
Health	205	10	193	94	6	6	4	4
Education	197	9	251	127	6	7	4	5
Skills training, Inc gen	52	3	67	128	1	2	1	1
Other	11	1	11	94	0	0	0	0
Administration (5)	159	8	167	105	5	5	3	4
Host Communities (6)	43	2	50	116	1	1	1	1
<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>2,082</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,048</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>45</b>
Resettlement processing	237		185		7	5	5	4
<b>Grand Total:</b>	<b>2,319</b>		<b>1,863</b>		<b>66</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49</b>


**Notes:**

1. Based on questionnaire returns from all 20 CCSDPT Member Agencies and UNHCR in February 2007.
2. Where data was given in USD or EUR, exchange rates of THB 35 and 46 were used respectively.
3. Some agencies did not separately identify administration costs and these are included in service sectors.
4. Some agencies do not operate on calendar year basis. Financial year costs were allocated to calendar years.
5. To ensure consistency, for 2008 all agencies were requested to assume that refugee numbers will remain unchanged.
6. In addition to services provided direct to host communities, many local Thai villagers use health & education facilities in the camps.

**CCSDPT/UNHCR Budgets by Sector 2007 & 2008 (baht million)**



**2007 CCSDPT/UNHCR Budgets by Sector**



Protection+ Community Services	Camp management	Food, shelter, non-food (TBBC)
Camp infrastructure	Water, sanitation	Health
Education	Skills training, Inc gen	Other
Administration (5)	Host Communities (6)	

**Table B3: TBBC donors 1984 to June 2007**

Agency	Baht	%	Agency	Baht
ACT/ICCO/Stichting Vluchteling	108,207,027	1.4%	Anglican Church of Canada	3,162,569
- European Union/ECHO	1,965,895,604	24.9%	Japanese Embassy	3,030,000
- Dutch Govt	84,782,954	1.1%	Caritas France	2,680,817
Subtotal:	2,158,885,585	27.3%	Refugees International Japan	2,539,994
Diakonia/Baptist Union Sweden/SIDA/Swedish Govt	1,372,078,790	17.4%	Australian Churches of Christ	2,350,227
International Rescue Committee/BPRM/USAID/US Govt	1,160,396,615	14.7%	Caritas Japan	2,172,021
ZOA/Dutch Govt	565,984,927	7.2%	German Embassy	1,388,100
Christian Aid	128,109,670	1.6%	Community Aid Abroad	1,325,076
- DFID/UK Govt	286,151,968	3.6%	DOEN Foundation Netherlands	1,313,455
Subtotal:	414,261,638	5.2%	Caritas Austria	915,441
Norwegian Church Aid/Norwegian Govt	382,941,397	4.8%	Baptist World Alliance	880,717
DanChurchAid	25,961,897	0.3%	Christ Church Bangkok	880,129
- DANIDA/Danish Govt	347,320,341	4.4%	Cooperative Baptist Fellowship	800,783
Subtotal:	373,282,238	4.7%	Caritas Korea	798,613
NCCA Christian World Service/AusAID/Australian Govt	309,030,982	3.9%	ADRA	563,350
European Commission (Fund for Uprooted People)	238,153,381	3.0%	World Council of Churches	543,700
Inter-Pares/CIDA/Canadian Govt	180,332,117	2.3%	Austcare	512,181
Caritas Switzerland/SDC/Swiss Govt	131,717,259	1.7%	Food for the Hungary International	500,000
Church World Service	131,223,095	1.7%	Burmese Relief Centre	436,500
Trocaire	38,617,612	0.5%	Australian Baptist World Aid	421,664
- Development Corporation/Irish Govt	71,155,387	0.9%	Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee	400,000
Subtotal:	109,772,999	1.4%	CAMA	387,327
UNHCR/EU	77,929,800	1.0%	Tides Foundation	380,000
Bread for the World	32,610,080	0.4%	Baptist Internal Ministries	375,105
Jesuit Refugee Service	20,982,458	0.3%	Caritas Hong Kong	345,135
Caritas Australia	20,185,786	0.3%	YMCA	295,086
Caritas Germany	18,796,071	0.2%	Development and Peace Canada	275,078
Swiss Aid/SDC	18,355,325	0.2%	Baptist Missionary Alliance	256,950
CAFOD	15,514,570	0.2%	Marist Mission	250,700
Episcopal Relief & Development	11,830,408	0.1%	Norwegian Embassy	248,400
Caritas New Zealand/NZAID/NZ Govt	11,793,336	0.1%	Third World Interest Group	202,230
Open Society Institute	10,297,863	0.1%	Mrs. Rosalind Lyle	200,735
BMS World Mission	8,668,345	0.1%	Lutheran Mission Missouri	198,952
World Food Programme	8,500,000	0.1%	International Church Bangkok	180,865
Misereor	8,456,101	0.1%	Canadian Baptists	177,375
World Vision Foundation Thailand	8,407,530	0.1%	Mission Ministries/Evangelical Christian	177,054
Archbishop of Sydney (AIDAB)	6,724,875	0.1%	Penney Memorial Church	159,317
Canadian Council of Churches/Canadian Govt	6,584,688	0.1%	Japan International Volunteer Centre	150,000
Catholic Relief Service	6,398,318	0.1%	Presbyterian Church of Korea	124,900
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel	5,987,635	0.1%	World Relief	114,497
People in Need Foundation/Czech Republic	5,883,799	0.1%	Bangkok Community Theatre	102,444
MHD/ECHO	5,635,273	0.1%	Glaxo Co. Ltd.	100,000
Inter Aid	5,553,400	0.1%	Thailand Baptist Mission	100,000
American Baptist Churches/International Ministries	4,783,721	0.1%	Weave	100,000
Compassion International	3,234,698	0.0%	Miscellaneous	6,536,222
International Refugee Trust	3,226,046	0.0%	Interest	13,045,034
			Total (THB):	<b>B 7,906,499,892</b>

Note: This table only includes transactions through the TBBC accounts. Prior to 2005 it does not include donations in kind via TBBC except for a donation of 8,500,000 baht worth of rice from WFP in 1999.



**Table B4: TBBC income 2003 to 2007**


Funding Source	Currency	Foreign Currency					Thai Baht (thousands)					
		2003 <sup>1</sup>	2004 <sup>2</sup>	2005 <sup>3</sup>	2006 <sup>3</sup>	2007 <sup>3,4</sup>	2003 <sup>1</sup>	2004 <sup>2</sup>	2005 <sup>3</sup>	2006 <sup>3</sup>	2007 <sup>3,4</sup>	
<b>1. Governmental Back Donors</b>												
Belgium	EUR					200,000					9,200	
Caritas/NZAID (New Zealand)	NZD/USD	200,000		\$ 79,110	40,000	160,058	4,769		2,209	922	3,892	
Caritas/SDC (Switzerland)	CHF	337,500	337,500	100,000	200,000	300,000	10,751	10,317	3,303	5,950	5,767	
Christian Aid/DFID (UK)	GBP	500,000	500,000	546,945	601,939	662,433	33,320	37,055	39,790	42,888	45,045	
DanChurchAid/DANIDA (Denmark)	DKK	3,800,000	2,828,502	4,565,715	4,531,000	5,037,152	24,093	18,096	31,095	28,029	31,823	
Diakonia/SIDA (Sweden)	SEK	24,340,000	26,830,000	26,000,000	30,887,890	37,600,000	121,719	142,928	139,666	159,214	193,376	
EC Uprooted People's Fund	EUR	950,000	1,643,136	2,606,864	1,300,000	-	45,410	85,227	126,729	61,293	-	
ICCO/Dutch Interchurch Aid/ECHO	EUR	3,455,556	3,971,560	4,583,018	5,351,354	5,840,000	164,906	198,260	230,039	251,392	270,020	
International Rescue Committee/USAID/BPRM	USD	2,562,372	3,244,546	3,499,964	6,917,279	4,409,000	106,667	132,804	144,334	259,154	145,497	
International Rescue Committee/USAID/IDP	USD				1,938,118	1,938,118				69,686	63,958	
Inter-Pares/CIDA (Canada)	CAD	681,600	611,300	630,000	662,000	694,575	20,509	18,490	21,420	22,491	20,907	
MHD/ECHO	EUR	121,138					5,635					
NCCA Christian World Service/AusAID	AUD	991,744	1,053,885	1,204,433	1,599,754	1,478,124	25,672	30,217	36,167	45,772	42,866	
Norwegian Church Aid (Norway)	NOK	6,457,628	6,046,117	7,170,000	10,000,000	12,000,000	37,377	35,692	44,962	59,194	69,600	
PNIF (Czech Republic)	CZK				3,000,000	300,000				4,991	480	
Poland	EUR					14,000					644	
Trocaire/Development Cooperation (Ireland)	EUR	152,400	186,530	194,640	440,000	220,000	6,899	9,290	10,048	21,173	10,120	
ZOA Refugee Care/DIA (Netherlands)	USD/EUR	\$ 1,344,082	\$ 1,244,660	€ 1,032,138	€ 1,420,138	€ 1,456,311	56,627	49,031	51,759	68,757	68,811	
							<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>664,354</b>	<b>767,407</b>	<b>881,521</b>	<b>1,100,906</b>	<b>982,006</b>
<b>2. NGO Donors</b>												
ACT Netherlands/Stichting Vluchteling	EUR	130,000	130,000	150,000	200,000	200,000	6,162	6,447	7,540	9,279	9,260	
American Baptist Churches/Int'l Ministries	USD	7,000			5,000	5,000	299			374	172	
Australian Churches of Christ	AUD			5,000					153			
BMS World Mission	GBP	15,000	15,000	20,000	25,000	25,000	1,001	1,077	1,509	1,701	1,700	
Bread for the World	THB	925,000					925					
CAFOD	USD/GBP	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$25,000	£ 25,000	£ 51,000	1,067	984	966	1,707	3,510	
Caritas Australia	AUD	50,000	160,500		100,000	150,000	1,192	4,473		2,939	4,219	
Caritas Austria	EUR	20,000					915					
Caritas Japan	USD	20,000					855					
Caritas Switzerland	CHF	112,500	112,500	100,000	145,000	104,000	3,584	3,439	3,303	4,313	5,767	
Christian Aid	GBP	160,000	160,000	160,000	160,000	160,000	10,904	11,470	11,730	11,299	11,360	
Church World Service	USD	260,245	150,000	269,990	270,000	270,000	9,963	5,872	11,468	9,752	8,910	
DanChurchAid	DKK			3,451,587	115,596	343,970			23,239	745	1,977	
Episcopal Relief & Development	USD				83,400	250,195				3,117	8,713	
ICCO	EUR	55,556	60,000	128,000	80,000	80,000	2,656	3,144	6,299	3,706	3,718	
International Refugee Trust	GBP	7,500					525					
NCCA Christian World Service	AUD	40,000	92,400	48,400	57,494	59,630	1,035	2,665	1,441	1,690	1,699	
Open Society Institute	USD	20,000	19,957	20,000	30,000	20,000	828	809	822	1,078	660	
Penney Memorial Church	USD			4,000					159			
Swedish Baptist Union	SEK	200,000	60,914	76,900	229,000		1,065	325	414	1,177		
Third World Interest Group	AUD				4,000	3,000				120	83	
Tides Foundation	USD				10,000					380		
Trocaire	EUR	87,600	43,470	45,360		623,500	3,966	2,165	2,342		29,039	
United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel	GBP	7,312	7,000	7,000	5,950	6,000	507	524	502	413	414	
Miscellaneous Donations	THB	49,213	233,560	72,923	96,000	185,000	49	234	73	96	185	
							<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>47,498</b>	<b>43,628</b>	<b>71,960</b>	<b>53,886</b>	<b>91,386</b>
<b>3. Other</b>												
Gifts in Kind	THB			7,700	5,000				8	5		
Income from Marketing	THB			145,143	31,000	6,000			145	31	6	
Bank Interest	THB	615,881	261,398	341,852	654,000	800,000	616	261	342	654	800	
Income from Charity Activities	THB			2,585,868	97,000	250,000			2,586	97	250	
Gains on Disposal of Assets	THB			230,000		212,000			230		212	
Gains on Exchange	THB			1,272,962					1,273			
Returns	THB	4,044,234	1,631,827				4,044	1,632				
							<b>Subtotal:</b>	<b>4,660</b>	<b>1,893</b>	<b>4,584</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>1,268</b>
							<b>Total Incoming Resources:</b>	<b>716,512</b>	<b>812,928</b>	<b>958,065</b>	<b>1,155,579</b>	<b>1,074,660</b>
							<b>Expenses:</b>			<b>975,027</b>	<b>1,055,809</b>	<b>1,194,545</b>
							<b>Net Movement Funds:</b>			<b>(16,962)</b>	<b>99,770</b>	<b>(119,885)</b>
							<b>Opening Fund:</b>			<b>95,521</b>	<b>78,559</b>	<b>178,329</b>
							<b>Closing Fund:</b>			<b>78,559</b>	<b>178,329</b>	<b>58,444</b>

**Notes:**

1. Income 2003 on Receipts Basis.
2. Income 2004 on Receipts Basis + 77,440 Receipts to Accruals Basis Adjustment.
3. Income 2005-7 on Accruals Basis.
4. Projection.


**Table B5: TBBC funding sources 1984 to June 2007<sup>1</sup>**

**By Area**




Europe	5,516,634,357	69.8%
North America	1,535,127,476	19.4%
Norway	383,189,797	4.8%
Australasia	365,690,073	4.6%
International	76,999,027	1.0%
Asia	9,529,261	0.1%
Miscellaneous <sup>2</sup>	19,329,901	0.2%
<b>Total Baht:</b>	<b>7,906,499,892</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**By Principal Donor**




EU/EC/ECHO	2,287,614,058	28.9%
Swedish Govt.	1,372,078,790	17.4%
U.S. Govt.	1,160,396,615	14.7%
Dutch Govt.	565,984,927	7.2%
Norwegian Govt.	382,941,397	4.8%
Danish Govt.	347,320,341	4.4%
Australian Govt.	309,030,982	3.9%
U.K. Govt.	286,151,968	3.6%
Canadian Govt.	180,332,117	2.3%
Swiss Govt.	131,717,259	1.7%
Church World Service	131,223,095	1.7%
Christian Aid	128,109,670	1.6%
Others	623,598,673	7.9%
<b>Total Baht:</b>	<b>7,906,499,892</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**2007 Only (First 6 Months)**



Europe	626,815,088	87.5%
Norway	49,080,233	6.9%
North America	29,792,362	4.2%
Australasia	9,619,070	1.3%
Miscellaneous <sup>2</sup>	1,024,610	0.1%
<b>Total Baht:</b>	<b>716,331,363</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**2007 Only (First 6 Months)**

















EU/EC/ECHO	270,019,993	37.7%
Swedish Govt.	193,375,612	27.0%
Dutch Govt.	68,810,695	9.6%
Norwegian Govt.	49,080,233	6.9%
Danish Govt.	31,823,215	4.4%
Trocaire	21,423,902	3.0%
Canadian Govt.	20,906,708	2.9%
ACT/ICCO/Sichting Vluch.	12,977,208	1.8%
Swiss Govt.	11,534,200	1.6%
Christian Aid	11,360,000	1.6%
Episcopal Relief/Develop.	8,713,166	1.2%
Caritas Australia	4,218,850	0.6%
Others	16,306,431	2.3%
<b>Total Baht:</b>	<b>716,331,363</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Notes:**

1. 1984-2003: Receipts Basis; 2004: Receipts Basis & Receipts to Accruals Basis Adjustment; Since 2005: Accruals Basis.
2. Miscellaneous included small donations and bank interest. Since 2005, with the change-over from cash to accrued income, it also includes Gifts in Kind, Income from Marketing, Income from Charity Activities, Gains on Disposal of Assets and Gains on Exchange.

**Table B6: Government and EC Funding 1999-2007**




Notes:  
 1. The 2007 funding from Norway, Australia, and Ireland are estimates only.  
 2. 1999-2004 Cash received, 2005-2007 Income accrued; as a percentage of Total Programme cost


**Table B7: TBBC expenditures 1984 to 2007<sup>1</sup>**

Item	1986		1990		1995		2000		2005		2007 <sup>1</sup>		1984 to 2007 <sup>1</sup>	
	B M	%	B M	%	B M	%	B M	%	B M	%	B M	%	B M	%
1 Rice	5.2	75%	26.7	78%	125.7	70%	206.8	46%	371.9	38%	394.6	33%	3,568.0	44%
2 Other Food	1.0	14%	3.2	9%	16.2	9%	99.6	22%	236.6	24%	270.9	23%	1,763.0	22%
<b>Subtotal Rice &amp; Other Food:</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>141.9</b>	<b>79%</b>	<b>306.4</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>608.5</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>665.5</b>	<b>56%</b>	<b>5,331.0</b>	<b>66%</b>
3 Shelter	-	0%	-	0%	8.0	4%	13.6	3%	107.0	11%	142.3	12%	561.3	7%
4 Non-Food	0.5	7%	3.7	11%	19.1	11%	107.4	24%	164.8	17%	265.2	22%	1,574.4	19%
5 Programme Support	-	0%	0.2	1%	4.8	3%	6.8	1%	38.6	4%	39.0	3%	223.9	3%
6 Management Expenses	0.2	3%	0.6	2%	5.3	3%	20.1	4%	56.1	6%	82.6	7%	435.8	5%
<b>Total (Baht M):</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>34.4</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>179.1</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>454.3</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>975.0</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,194.6</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>8,126.4</b>	<b>100%</b>


1986




1990




1995





2000



2007<sup>1</sup>



1984 - 2007<sup>1</sup>



**Table B8: Principal TBBC supplies 1984 to 2007\***


Year	Rice (100 kg)	Fish Paste (kg)	Salt (kg)	Blankets	Bednets	Mung <sup>1</sup> Beans (kg)	Cooking <sup>2</sup> Fuel (kg)	Mats <sup>1</sup>	Cooking <sup>1</sup> Oil (litres)	Chillies (kg)	Building <sup>1</sup> Supplies (baht)	Sardines (kg)	Blended Food (kg)	Sugar (kg)	Soap (kg)
1984	4,890	16,000	2,640	4,620	1,502	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1985	8,855	34,112	660	5,400	1,900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1986	18,660	83,632	20,878	4,470	1,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1987	26,951	177,024	40,194	6,800	8,283	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1988	26,952	130,288	28,600	7,660	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1989	26,233	171,008	43,318	8,552	5,084	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	48,100	276,800	77,000	16,300	4,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991	84,819	369,904	151,580	22,440	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1992	106,864	435,648	251,416	23,964	16,008	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1993	126,750	551,872	250,800	27,041	16,090	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	133,587	654,208	309,254	49,640	23,889	84,620	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1995	179,571	863,648	379,478	53,517	33,539	187,310	230,000	6,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1996	195,746	981,856	403,260	61,528	37,773	110,631	1,560,000	3,450	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1997	222,188	1,101,616	472,801	81,140	55,755	539,077	3,329,456	4,500	181,696	13,015	9,405,731	-	-	-	-
1998	218,931	949,881	483,723	69,816	45,715	1,734,170	5,841,073	10,415	939,676	44,318	4,953,283	-	-	-	-
1999	244,050	711,098	532,344	66,515	49,966	1,658,094	6,434,835	12,974	1,125,661	115,610	25,377,344	-	-	-	-
2000	269,979	945,947	506,192	70,586	46,100	1,495,574	8,880,581	19,468	1,182,147	106,462	13,639,882	15,078	-	-	-
2001	298,091	1,146,655	578,188	71,312	45,949	1,559,572	10,369,578	32,579	1,247,213	137,278	21,399,703	41,693	-	-	-
2002	312,650	1,288,370	624,914	76,879	63,622	1,750,516	12,312,581	12,300	1,447,208	152,641	30,864,256	94,425	-	-	-
2003	321,238	1,347,724	663,143	87,403	45,505	1,853,254	12,622,644	30,870	1,640,237	168,030	60,935,048	113,393	-	-	-
2004	302,953	1,229,894	633,933	80,000	55,650	1,689,658	14,030,605	545	1,587,933	194,271	77,268,014	148,647	811,835	-	-
2005	330,110	971,351	689,822	80,405	57,221	1,970,415	14,660,030	55,461	1,576,501	207,281	107,005,411	100,305	2,278,260	-	-
2006	357,563	1,179,086	643,492	92,892	59,987	1,716,420	16,841,310	2,307	1,704,592	234,847	73,964,075	108,795	2,021,600	353,581	-
2007*	359,523	1,098,309	635,413	88,009	79,545	1,586,708	15,730,644	72,006	1,713,472	229,254	142,257,302	111,275	1,736,117	461,964	451,205
Total:	4,225,254	16,715,931	8,423,043	1,156,889	768,583	17,936,019	122,843,337	263,375	14,346,336	1,603,007	567,070,049	733,611	6,847,812	815,545	451,205

\* Per Budget

**Notes:**

1. Distributed in small quantities in earlier years. Statistics only show regular distributions.
2. Firewood was distributed for the first time in 2001 and included under cooking fuel at the rate of 350kg/m<sup>3</sup>.

**Cost of Principal TBBC Supplies\*\***



\* Per Budget

\*\* Based on current commodity prices.



## Appendix C

### Accounts

The following tables present the TBBC accounts for the period January through June 2007

**Table C1 : Statement of finance activities: January - June 2007**

Income	Thai Baht
4000 Voluntary income	
4100 Government backed Grants	
4111 Caritas New Zealand (NZ Govt)	3,892,550
4120 DCA (DANIDA-Denmark)	31,823,215
4121 Diakonia (SIDA-Sweden)	193,375,612
4130 ICCO (ECHO)	270,019,993
4136 Inter-Pares (CIDA-Canada)	20,906,708
4140 Caritas Switzerland (Swiss Govt)	11,534,200
4154 NCA (MOFA Norway)	49,080,233
4197 ZOA Refugee Care (Dutch Govt)	68,810,695
Total 4100 Government backed Grants	649,443,206
4200 Non Government Grants	
4101 ACT Netherlands/Stichting Vluchteling	9,259,560
4102 American Baptist Churches	172,488
4110 CAFOD	3,509,820
4113 Christian Aid	11,360,000
4118 Caritas Australia	4,218,850
4119 DCA (Christmas Catalogue)	1,976,953
4129 Episcopal Relief & Development	8,713,166
4135 ICCO	3,717,648
4156 NCCA-Christian World Service	1,425,000
4175 Third World Interest Group	82,670
4180 Trocaire Global fund	21,423,902
Total 4200 Non Government Grants	65,860,057
4300 Donations	
4320 Chonrada Venin	9,000
4335 First Baptist Church of Lewisburg	6,412
4340 J.R.Lyle	3,490
4351 Marianne Jacobsen	114,771
4365 Sally Thompson - Clarendon Park	19,376
4372 Website donations	32,193
Total 4300 Donations	185,241
4400 Income from Marketing	
4402 20th anniversary book	1,560
4403 Jack Dunford Presentations	3,700
4405 Sally Thompson Presentation	1,000
Total 4400 Income from Marketing	6,260
Total 4000 Voluntary income	715,494,764
4700 Investment Income	
4710 Bank Interest	374,217
Total 4700 Investment Income	374,217
4800 Income from charity activities	
4802 DanChurchAid Exchange Visit	249,783
Total 4800 Income from charity activities	249,783
4900 Other incoming resources	
4820 Income from Office	6,077
4910 Gains on disposal of assets	206,522
Total 4900 Other incoming resources	212,599
<b>Total Income</b>	<b>716,331,363</b>

**Table C1 : Statement of finance activities: January - June 2007**

(Continued)

**Expense**

**Thai Baht**

51 RICE	
5100 Karen	140,771,786
5101 Karenni	24,081,859
5104 Admin Rice	9,685,457
5107 Other Rice	865,850
Total 51 RICE	<u>175,404,952</u>
52 OTHER FOOD	
5210 Fish Paste	13,796,190
5220 Salt	1,962,555
5230 Mung Beans	28,196,188
5231 Fermented Bean Cake -TuaNao	535,776
5240 Cooking Oil	32,872,262
5250 Chillies	15,159,189
5260 Sardines	7,494,690
5270 Blended Food	29,157,957
5280 Sugar	4,101,227
5290 Admin Other Food	4,053,277
530 Supplementary Feeding	
5310 MSF	819,034
5320 AMI	3,721,704
5330 MI	1,604,783
5340 ARC	1,113,890
5350 IRC	1,966,602
Total 530 Supplementary Feeding	<u>9,226,014</u>
5420 Other Food	514,198
550 School lunch support	2,759,558
Total 52 OTHER FOOD	<u>149,829,081</u>
60 NON FOOD ITEMS	
6100 Charcoal	80,243,228
6105 Admin Charcoal	2,279,713
6110 Firewood	1,394,947
6120 Blankets	654,480
6130 Bednets	6,727,650
6140 Mats	7,618,226
615 Soap	6,085,901
6210 Longyis	3,417,636
6220 Clothing under 5 years	813,355
630 Building Materials	142,257,302
Total 60 NON FOOD ITEMS	<u>251,492,438</u>
64 MEDICAL	
6400 Medical Referrals KRCH	282,319
6402 KRCH Food supplies	435,608
6410 Mae Sod's Clinic	2,700,000
642 Huay Malai Project	387,382
Total 64 MEDICAL	<u>3,805,309</u>
65 OTHER ASSISTANCE	
6500 Emergencies	432,801
653 Cooking Utensil	4,896,153
654 Food Security	
6541 Seeds	1,065,816
6542 Tools	933,215
6543 Training	812,276
Total 654 Food Security	<u>2,811,307</u>
6550 Food Container	265,545
6551 Cooking Stoves	62,500
656 Misc Supplies	3,982,926
660 Thai Community	
6600 Emergency	9,666
6610 Development	1,631,459
6620 Authority (Food)	2,355,512
6630 Authority (Building Mat's)	1,411,174
Total 660 Thai Community	<u>5,407,811</u>
Total 65 OTHER ASSISTANCE	<u>17,859,043</u>

**Table C1 : Statement of finance activities: January - June 2007**

(Continued)	Thai Baht
67 PROGRAMME SUPPORT	
6700 Transport	772,046
6710 Quality Control	1,578,152
6720 Visibility EC	277,418
6730 Consultant	1,077,816
6740 Data/Studies	653,591
6750 Administration cost	7,101,800
6751 Staff Stipend	6,784,900
677 Misc Support	640,977
6780 Misc Training	122,703
Total 67 PROGRAMME SUPPORT	<u>19,009,403</u>
69 EMERGENCY RELIEF (ERA)	
6911 Rice (Mon)	13,482,260
6912 Rice (Shan)	6,324,670
6913 Rice (Karen)	3,649,340
6922 Other Food (Shan)	2,902,562
6923 Other Food (Karen)	1,482,967
6924 Non-food items ERA	95,039
6950 Education (MNEC)	1,300,000
6960 Rice Emergency	41,946,564
697 Admin Support	3,196,166
6980 Rehabilitation (ERA)	50,000
Total 69 EMERGENCY RELIEF (ERA)	<u>74,429,568</u>
70 MANAGEMENT	
71 VEHICLE	
7100 Fuel	704,717
7101 Maintenance	589,717
7102 Ins / Reg / Tax	496,732
Total 71 VEHICLE	<u>1,791,166</u>
72 SALARY & BENEFITS	
7201 Staff Benefits	2,284,856
7202 House Rent	737,322
7203 House Utilities	128,620
7204 House Maintenance	800
7205 House Other	7,500
721 Payroll	20,696,519
Total 72 SALARY & BENEFITS	<u>23,855,617</u>
73 OFFICE ADMINISTRATION	
7300 Office	3,143,419
7301 Equipment	609,808
7302 Communication	592,270
7303 Travel	1,687,489
7304 Bank Charges	107,966
7305 Entertainment	41,396
7306 Miscellaneous	40,000
7307 Staff Training	207,751
Total 73 OFFICE ADMINISTRATION	<u>6,430,099</u>
76 DEPRECIATION	
7610 Vehicles	1,439,750
7620 Equipment	17,367
7630 Computers/IT	47,876
7690 Loss on disposal of assets	183,733
Total 76 DEPRECIATION	<u>1,688,726</u>
Total 70 MANAGEMENT	<u>33,765,608</u>
80 GOVERNANCE	
8110 Audit fees	935,985
8140 Member meetings	74,883
Total 80 GOVERNANCE	<u>1,010,868</u>
90 COSTS OF GENERATING FUNDS	
9100 Fundraising expenses	360,082
95 OTHER EXPENSE	
9500 Exchange Gain/Loss	8,400,181
<b>Total Expense</b>	<u><u>735,366,533</u></u>
<b>Net Movement Funds</b>	<u><u>(19,035,170)</u></u>

**Table C2: Balance Sheet: As at 31 December 2006 and 30 June 2007**

	<u>Dec 31, 2006</u>	<u>Jun 30, 2007</u>
<b>ASSETS</b>		
<b>Current Assets</b>	<b>Thai Baht</b>	<b>Thai Baht</b>
Bank/Cash		
Bank	53,385,073	16,582,143
Petty Cash	125,000	125,000
Total Bank/Cash	<u>53,510,073</u>	<u>16,707,143</u>
Accounts Receivable		
Accounts Receivable	270,009,144	277,309,440
Total Accounts Receivable	<u>270,009,144</u>	<u>277,309,440</u>
Other Current Assets		
Sundry Receivable	44,705	574,803
Advances for expenses	570,000	575,000
Accrued Income and Deferred Expense	1,653,396	1,231,482
Deposit Payments to Suppliers	2,478,247	900,000
Other Advances	1,996,600	2,066,600
House Deposits	159,750	140,000
Total Other Current Assets	<u>6,902,698</u>	<u>5,487,885</u>
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>330,421,915</b>	<b>299,504,468</b>
<b>Fixed Assets</b>		
Gross Fixed Assets	18,194,660	19,456,739
Acc. Depreciation	<u>(10,962,955)</u>	<u>(11,359,954)</u>
<b>Total Fixed Assets</b>	<b>7,231,705</b>	<b>8,096,785</b>
<b>TOTAL ASSETS</b>	<b><u>337,653,620</u></b>	<b><u>307,601,253</u></b>
<b>LIABILITIES &amp; EQUITY</b>		
Liabilities		
Accounts Payable	156,900,692	145,236,829
Payable to Staff	46,200	87,984
Deferred Income	249,783	0
Payable to Donors/Suppliers	416,659	468,700
Accrued Expenses	1,711,536	2,514,160
Total Other Current Liabilities	<u>2,424,178</u>	<u>3,070,844</u>
<b>TOTAL LIABILITIES</b>	<b><u>159,324,870</u></b>	<b><u>148,307,673</u></b>
<b>ASSETS LESS LIABILITIES</b>	<b><u>178,328,750</u></b>	<b><u>159,293,580</u></b>
<b>FUND</b>		
Opening Balance Equity	91,755,882	91,755,882
Retained Earnings	(13,197,187)	86,572,868
Net Movement Current Year	99,770,055	(19,035,170)
<b>FUND BALANCE</b>	<b><u>178,328,750</u></b>	<b><u>159,293,580</u></b>
<b>Notes: Restricted Fund</b>	26,051,656	24,446,181
Designated Fund	7,500,000	7,500,000
General Fund	144,777,094	127,347,399
<b>Total Fund</b>	<b><u>178,328,750</u></b>	<b><u>159,293,580</u></b>

## Appendix D

### The relief programme: background and description

#### Introduction

**Royal Thai government regulations:** Monthly, six weeks in advance, the TBBC requests approval from the Operations Centre for Displaced Persons (OCDP) of the MOI, for supplies to be delivered to each camp, including expected delivery dates. Copies of the requests are forwarded to the provincial and district authorities. The MOI sends approval to the TBBC and to the provincial offices, which in turn notify the district authorities.

Under regulations introduced in 1994 the TBBC submits the overall programme to MOI for approval annually. In December 2005 and 2006 the RTG hosted workshops with the NGOs to discuss ongoing plans before issuing the necessary approvals for 2006 and 2007. These were attended by Provincial and District Officials including camp commanders as well as representatives of other relevant government departments.

The TBBC submits quarterly programme reports to the provincial offices and six-monthly reports to the MOI. All TBBC field staff carry camp passes issued by the MOI.

**Refugee demographics:** The supplies are distributed to all camp residents. The breakdown by age and sex reported by the Karen, Mon and Karenni Refugee Committees in June 2007 was as follows:

Figure D.1: Refugee demographics June 2007

Group	Families	Adults*		Children		Under 5 years		Total
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Karenni	4,696	6,984	6,270	3,274	3,345	1,845	1,627	23,345
Karen	26,433	46,221	43,959	13,714	12,778	9,094	8,681	134,447
Mon	2,304	5,475	5,120			627	633	11,855
<b>Total</b>	<b>33,433</b>	<b>58,680</b>	<b>55,349</b>	<b>16,988</b>	<b>16,123</b>	<b>11,566</b>	<b>10,941</b>	<b>169,647</b>

\* For Mon this is over 5, for Karen it is over 12 years old, for Karenni over 14 years

In 2005 TBBC developed a Strategic Plan for 2005-2010, setting out five core objectives that now guide all activities. The relief programme is described below in accordance with the organisation's five core objectives.

#### 1. Supporting an adequate standard of living

*To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter and non-food items for displaced Burmese people.*

##### a) Food security programme: food, nutrition, and agriculture

During 2007 TBBC's nutrition and food security initiatives have been integrated into one programme with additional staff and closer coordination with other field activities.

**Food rations:** The refugee diet is traditionally rice, salt, and fish-paste, supplemented with leaves and roots gathered from the forest, plus any vegetables or livestock that can be cultivated, raised or hunted. For many years the refugees were not entirely dependent on the relief programme for food and showed commendable willingness to be self-sufficient where possible. Their political organisations still controlled territory on the Burmese side of the border, traded on the black market, and grew crops in some areas. Some refugees were also able to get low-paid seasonal work in Thailand, forage in the surrounding forest, keep small kitchen gardens and raise a limited amount of livestock in the camps. At the beginning of the relief programme in 1984, TBBC's aim was to cover only around 50 percent of the staple diet needs. At this level life in the camps remained simple and poor, but not inconsistent with standards in their former villages, or in Thai villages in the area.

Over the years the ethnic groups lost their territory to the Burmese Army and the security situation deteriorated. The refugee camps became subject to tighter controls by the Thai authorities and it became increasingly difficult for the refugees to be self-sufficient. Rations were gradually increased and by the mid-1990's it had become necessary to supply 100 percent of staple diet needs; rice, salt and fish-paste. During 1997 even stricter controls were placed on the camps for security reasons and, in some cases, it became impossible for refugees to leave the camps to forage or get work. NGOs became concerned that the refugees were no longer getting an adequate diet and in October 1997 the TBBC commissioned a rapid assessment of the nutritional adequacy of the rations.

TBBC rations were compared with the new WFP/ UNHCR guidelines that recommended providing a minimum of 2,100 Kcal per person per day based on an average family, with no differentiation for age. The conclusion was that the standard food basket should include mung beans and cooking oil to ensure the minimum average of 2,100 kcal. This was implemented during the first half of 1998.

The TBBC food basket was still designed to cover only the basic energy and protein needs of the refugees and did not ensure adequate provision of many important micronutrients. It was assumed that the refugees supplemented TBBC rations by buying, bartering, growing or foraging to make up for any other needs. But as the refugees be



# ONE MONTH'S FOOD BASKET FOR AN ADULT





came more aid-dependent TBBC recognised that some segments of the population at least, may be at risk for deficiencies.

In 2001/2 TBBC conducted food consumption/ nutrition status surveys in two camps and rapid nutrition surveys in three other camps. The results showed quite consistently that the ration provided was proportionately too high in carbohydrates at the expense of protein and fat, and low in many micronutrients. It was concluded that the refugees were not able to adequately supplement the TBBC ration with other foods to compensate and were much more dependent on the TBBC ration food than was previously assumed.

Beginning in January 2004, TBBC revised the food basket to include 1.4 kg fortified blended food/ refugee/ month (no differentiation for children <5) whilst reducing the rice ration to 15 kgs/ adult/ month. Starting in Karenni Site 1 TBBC introduced the new basket on a camp-by-camp basis through March 2005. The original wheat-based blended food was replaced by *AsiaMIX*, a rice-based product between April and December 2005.

During an evaluation of the use of *AsiaMIX* in 2005 it was concluded that acceptability and use would be improved by reducing the ration from 1.4 kg to 1 kg/ person/ month and adding 250gm of sugar/ person/ month. It was also planned to add fermented bean curd as a substitute for fish-paste in Site 1 and Tham Hin. After trials in four camps MOI gave approval and the adjusted food basket was introduced to all camps by the end of the year. The revised food basket is:

**Figure D.2: TBBC Food Rations (per person per month)**

Rice	15 kg/ adult: 7.5 kg/ child <5 years
Fortified flour ( <i>AsiaMIX</i> )	1 kg/ person
Fish-paste	0.75 kg/ person
Iodised Salt	330 g/ person
Mung Beans	1 kg/ adult: 500 gm/ child <5 years
Cooking Oil	1 ltr/ adult: 500 ml/ child <5 years
Dry Chillies	125 g/ person
Sugar	250 g/ person

There are very minor variations in the rations given to individual camps based on local preferences, but the table above demonstrates a representative ration and provides 2,210 kcal per person day. Calculations take into account the specific demographic profile of the camp residents based on UNHCR registration statistics (May 2006), and that actual needs are an average of 2,181 kcal/ person/ per day (2076 kcal/ person/ day + 105 kcal to reflect light to moderate activity levels.) Students in boarding houses, the majority of whom are adolescents ages 10 to 18 years old, have been disaggregated from the general population, and require an average of 2,440 kcal/ person/ day.

When introduced, *AsiaMIX* samples were tested in the supplier's laboratory and in camp to determine its shelf-life. Results indicated that the flour maintains its integrity during a six-month storage period although there was some degradation of micronutrients, mainly vitamins A and C, due to exposure to heat and moisture. Approximately 20% of initial amounts of vitamins A and C were lost after six months, but these amounts are now compensated for by a small increase in the premix.

In collaboration with the World Food Programme, TBBC planned to conduct a more in-depth study on the effect of cooking on micronutrients in fortified blended foods. Funds, however, have not been forthcoming and the study has yet to be undertaken.

In 2004 and 2006, the Centers for Disease Control (Atlanta) conducted a baseline and follow up survey to look at the consumption and effects of *AsiaMIX* in Umpiem Mai camp. The study showed a significant decrease in anaemia in children, indicating improved nutrition status from *AsiaMIX* consumption. A final report is in process.

Fish-paste was originally supplied at a ration of 1kg/ person/ month, but quality control checks in 2004 revealed lead and cadmium contamination well above maximum levels set by WHO and the Thai Food and Drug agency. In January 2005 TBBC sourced fish-paste from a new supplier made from cleaned sea fish that met the health standards but was about 50% more expensive than the traditional product. This was introduced to the camps at a reduced ration to 750 g/ person/ month as reflected in the above Figure. The better quality fish-paste is acceptable at the amounts provided.

During 2007 a similar problem has been found with the prawn-paste supplied as a preference in Than Hin camp and a solution is currently being sought.

**Supplementary feeding:** For many years the health agencies ran supplementary feeding programmes for five vulnerable groups: malnourished children; pregnant and lactating women; tuberculosis and HIV patients; patients with chronic conditions; and hospital in-patients. The budget for ingredients was provided by TBBC which included rice, eggs, dried fish, beans, sugar, milk powder (to severely malnourished children only), vegetable oil, fresh fruits and vegetables.

These programmes were evaluated in May 1998 and the main conclusions were that the programmes and target groups were justified and the current food items covered by TBBC were appropriate. The evaluation recommended

the health agencies to jointly review their different protocols and harmonise their programmes. It also recommended greater interchange between agencies to share experiences, tabling a suggested new format for reporting.

From late 2000, the TBBC nutritionist worked with the health agencies to follow up on the recommendations. The majority of the health agencies phased out wet feeding centres for malnourished children and integrated the programmes into their reproductive health activities. More comprehensive reporting forms and standardised entrance and exit criteria were introduced and standardised feeding protocols were encouraged according to MSF and WHO guidelines.

However, the 2003 ECHO evaluation uncovered inconsistencies in feeding protocols and implementation, and found that most agencies had not fully adopted the TBBC guidelines. The following recommendations were made:

- Feeding protocols (for women and children) needed to be revised and standardised to fully adopt international recommendations for supplementary feeding programmes.
- TBBC and health agencies should phase out current foods and introduce a blended food mix as the supplementary feeding.
- Supplementary Feeding Programmes of health agencies should report nutritional impact using objectively verifiable indicators.
- Reliable growth monitoring of children <3 needed to be set up by all health agencies.

In 2004 the TBBC nutritionist initiated a working group, the Nutrition Task Force (NTF), made up of representatives from TBBC and all health agencies. The NTF first met in July 2004 to strategise on the implementation of the ECHO recommendations. The Centres for Disease Control, Atlanta, (CDC) sent a nutritionist from their International Health Branch for four months at the beginning of 2005 to work with the TBBC nutritionist in implementing some of the changes and providing training and technical assistance to the health agencies. All agencies had fully implemented new guidelines and protocols by mid-2005. The TBBC nutritionist now conducts refresher training and ongoing technical support annually.

**Nutrition surveys:** Prior to 2000, nutrition surveys of children under five years of age were conducted sporadically and reactively by health agencies. TBBC assumed responsibility for coordinating annual nutrition surveys in all camps in 2001 and developed detailed guidelines for health agencies to do their own surveys. Since then, surveys have been conducted annually in most camps and provide data to assess indicators of overall nutrition status in the camps. Since 2005 TBBC has conducted training and supervision the surveys in order to ensure standard methodology.

**Nursery school feeding:** Some children eat less than three meals per day, and children under five years of age are most vulnerable to malnutrition. Nursery school feeding can ensure that some children in this age group get a nutritious meal during the day when parents may be busy doing community activities or working. TBBC began supporting nursery school lunches in three camps in 2003 (Sites 1 and 2, and Mae Ra Ma Luang) and during 2005 support was extended to cover four more camps (Mae La, Umpiem Mai, Nu Po, and Mae La Oon). A private donor currently supports schools in Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin.

The programmes are administered by the Karen Women's Organisation (KWO) and the Karenni Women's Organisation (KnWO) in Mae Sot, Mae Sariang, and Mae Hong Son. WEAVE and TOPS support their project management, evaluation, and proposal writing. In addition to providing meals, the programmes aim to enhance attendance in nursery school programmes and the capacity of CBOs to provide nutrition education, plan and administer programmes, and to gain knowledge on a variety of issues related to project management and childcare.

The current budget for a nursery school lunch is three baht per child per day, and is mainly used to purchase foods to supplement rice brought from home. Lunches typically include fresh foods, such as fruits and vegetables, and good quality protein foods, such as meat, fish, eggs, soymilk, and beans. Foods are purchased in the camps, helping to stimulate the local economy. Teachers and cooks have been trained by TBBC and/or by the partner agencies on basic nutrition concepts and meal planning for maximum nutrition impact at the lowest cost.

**Community agriculture and nutrition (CAN) project and related initiatives:** In 1999, members of the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) began developing appropriate farming systems based on the production of indigenous food crops using only locally sourced materials in the context of minimal access to land and water. These initiatives were formalised as the Community Agriculture and Nutrition (CAN) Project.

Following announcement of a new policy by MOI in 2000 which encouraged projects designed to increase refugee agricultural production for their own consumption, several NGOs set up training courses and small agricultural support projects in some camps. With increasing understanding of the nutritional status of the refugees, TBBC began actively supporting the CAN project as a way of supplementing TBBC rations and preventing micronutrient deficiencies.

After three years of development in the Karenni camps, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) in 2003 agreed to also adopt the CAN project as its food security and agricultural training programme. TBBC began supporting training and assistance to extend the CAN project to all camps. The stated goals of the project are:

- Short-term: To improve refugees' diet in camp: To assist community members achieve sustainable increases in food production using local resources.
- Long-term: To improve coping strategies for eventual repatriation: To help develop appropriate and essential skills needed to achieve future long-term food security.

Activities have included:

- Training: Training of Teachers (ToT) training for CBOs working in the camps, with IDPs and in some Thai villages, including teacher training for middle school students; training for camp residents.
- Infrastructure and materials distribution: Setting up demonstration sites in most camps and community food gardens in association with schools, boarding houses, orphanages, and community group concerns. Supporting community-based animal husbandry initiatives in camps such as bio-compost pig pens; distribution and training in poultry incubators for re-stocking after disease incidents; and trials of household micro-livestock. Providing CAN training participants basic tool kits to enable them to carry out small-scale domestic food production. Establishing crop-tree nurseries for distribution of trees to households. The species used are chosen on the basis of their nutritional profile, application (fencing, fuel wood etc.) and familiarity to local communities. Four community seed banks were established in villages surrounding three camps in order to both support these communities as well as avoid reliance on commercial hybrid seed stock that has the potential to damage local biodiversity. The species were selected on their nutritional profile, cultural acceptance, and ease of cultivation. Distribution of seeds is through Camp Committees, Vocational Training Committees, and CBOs. The distribution of fencing to contain domestic animals and protect kitchen gardens.
- Production is ongoing of a CAN Handbook in five languages: Burmese, Sgaw Karen, English, Shan and Pa O. The English and Burmese versions of the handbook were published in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2007.

The CAN project has now been established in seven border camps. Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin camps currently are serviced by ZOA and COERR. TBBC, nevertheless, conducted CAN evaluations in these two camps in the first half of 2006 and there are plans to train CAN trainers for those camps to begin activities in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2007.

The project aims to contribute to the nutrition of participants and their communities, and the current focus is on uptake at the household level to improve availability of fresh foods, self-sufficiency, and household food security. Although hindered in some locations by limited space and water, the project is building a comprehensive approach to both the immediate and long-term food security issues facing refugee and IDP populations.

Under the new Food Security Programme structure, a baseline survey will be carried out of agricultural activities in the camps during the second half of 2007 to inform further programme developments. TBBC will also attend a planned UNHCR/ CCSDPT Agriculture Workshop to determine possible TBBC involvement in agriculture-related livelihoods projects. Possibilities include extending agriculture activities outside the camps and related activities such as food processing and the manufacture of agricultural tools.

## **b) Cooking fuel, cooking stoves, utensils**

**Cooking fuel:** When camps started to be consolidated in 1995, TBBC was asked to supply cooking fuel to Mae La camp in order to lessen environmental damage caused by refugees gathering wood from the surrounding forest. TBBC began supplying compressed sawdust logs in September 1995. Log rations were gradually increased on an experimental basis and by the end of 1997 they had become a major expense. During 1998 TBBC tried out new forms of fuel, principally charcoal sawdust logs and bamboo charcoal. These were well received by the refugees and were more efficient to use. In Karenni Camp 3 the Karenni Refugee Committee also taught refugees to manufacture their own charcoal logs using rice husk ash and off-cut bamboo ash.

With increasing concerns for the environment and restrictions on refugee movements, more and more camps were supplied with cooking fuel each year and, since early 2000, all camps have been provided with 'full' rations. Cooking fuel became TBBC's second largest expenditure after rice. But even after 'full' rations had been introduced, the Thai authorities still complained that the refugees were destroying the local forests and asked TBBC to increase the rations by as much as 100%. TBBC decided that it needed expert advice to determine optimum rations more scientifically and to help assess the efficiency of the available products.

In 2000 the UNHCR commissioned a consultant who concluded that there was a need for increased rations, variable according to family size, but that improving fuel quality, supplying efficient cooking stoves and improving cooking techniques could reduce the overall need. He also recommended experimenting with much cheaper, commercially available firewood.

These recommendations had mostly been implemented by 2003 but refugees still complained that their rations were inadequate. TBBC therefore re-commissioned the original consultant to review the current situation in June/July 2003. This resulted in a recommendation to revise the family distribution curve, increasing the average fuel ration from 7.1 to 7.9 kg/ person/ month. This recommendation was implemented immediately. Other suggestions including the handling and inspection of charcoal have also been implemented and a penalty system for suppliers of poor quality charcoal has been introduced.

An experiment with firewood in Tham Hin camp in 2000/1 was partially successful in that about 34% of fuel costs were saved compared with supplying 100% charcoal. This resulted in TBBC increasing the firewood proportion of fuel in Tham Hin to 70:30 in 2002 at the request of MOI and extending the experiment to Umpiem Mai and Karenni Camp 3 to test the availability and acceptance of firewood in other provinces.

The extensions of this experiment were not successful. Tham Hin residents complain that the firewood component there is too high and the committees have problems in ensuring equitable distributions. There are problems with consistency and storage of supplies. The residents of Umpiem Mai complained of fire risk due to high winds experienced in that camp and the experiment in Karenni Camp 3 had to be abandoned when the camp was relocated to Camp 2 (now known as Site 1). It has been decided to limit the use of firewood for cooking fuel to Tham Hin camp, and to supply firewood to Umpiem Mai only for supplementary heating during the cold season. However, the range and quantity of charcoal in the market place continues to increase, consequently reducing the cost benefits of firewood.

**Cooking stoves:** New fuel-efficient 'bucket' cooking stoves developed in Site 1 Camp were introduced to other camps in Mae Hong Son and Tak provinces. Workshops have been set up for the refugees to manufacture these themselves in Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La Oon, Mae La, Nu Po and Umpiem Mai camps. It was originally hoped that all camps would become self-sufficient but this has proved unfeasible at least in the short term.

TBBC conducted a survey in all camps in November 2005 which established that approximately 90% of households were using bucket stoves. To address the shortfall, commercially-produced stoves were distributed during 2006 to the 10% of households identified in a survey as not having fuel-efficient stoves. The situation will be monitored. Where possible, deficiencies will be met by stoves manufactured in the camps, but where the quantity is inadequate, commercial stoves will be supplied.

**Cooking utensils:** The refugees traditionally took care of their own miscellaneous household needs but this became increasingly problematic as their ability to work and forage became more limited. By the end of 2000 it was observed that there were not enough cooking pots in the camps and many households were using very old ones. A distribution of pots was made to all households in 2001 at the rate of one pot per family with a larger size pot provided for families with more than five people. Further distributions were made in 2004 and 2007. Based on consultations with CBOs, for 2007 TBBC offered households the choice of either a pot or wok.

### c) Building materials

In the past, building materials were not generally supplied, although roofing was given when camps had to be moved out of season and the materials were difficult to find. In 1997, however, the authorities began to prohibit refugees cutting bamboo in some areas and TBBC started to provide all essential construction materials for the new sites created during camp consolidations.

Early in 2000 the Thai authorities also asked TBBC to supply materials for housing repairs in all camps since they were concerned that the refugees were still depleting the local forests. During that year bamboo and eucalyptus poles were supplied to most camps and thatch or roofing leaves to some. In 2001 TBBC increased the amount of materials supplied and extended distributions to all camps, but there were still inconsistencies and difficulties obtaining good and uniform quality materials in some areas. In response to protection workshops TBBC committed to providing sufficient materials for building new houses and repairs so that refugees should not have to leave the camps to supplement the building materials supplied, thereby exposing themselves to the risk of arrest or abuse.

TBBC introduced new standard rations for all camps in 2003 and these were reviewed in 2004, largely as a result of experience with the move of Mae Khong Kha to Mae La Oon in 2004, where supplies to build a new house were considered insufficient. Revised standard rations used since 2005 are as follows:

**Figure D.3: TBBC Building Supply Rations (2005)**

Item	Size	Specification	New House		Replacement House		Annual Repairs	
			Standard 1-5 people	Large >5 people	Standard 1-5 people	Large >5 people	Standard 1-5 people	Large >5 people
Bamboo	Small	3" x >6m 4" x >6m	250	350	125	175	25	35
	Large						25	40
	Standard						or 50	or 75
Eucalyptus	Small	4" x 6m	4	6	4	6		
	Large	5" x 6m	8	12	8	12		
Roofing	Leaves		350	450	175	225	160	300
	Grass		250	350	125	175	80	150
Nails	5"		1kg	2kg				
	4"		1kg	2kg				
	3"		1kg	2kg				

**Bamboo and eucalyptus** - circumference measured in inches, length measured in metres

In accordance with 'Sphere' standards, sufficient materials are supplied to ensure houses can provide at least 3.5 square metres of floor area per person. The building materials are those customarily used for houses in rural areas



in Burma, as well as in the Thai villages proximal to camps. Refugee communities have high levels of skills and expertise in designing and constructing houses from bamboo, wood and thatch. Refugees design, construct and repair their own houses. The community helps out those physically unable to do so, such as the elderly. Not only does this activity reinforce self-sufficiency and identity, it also keeps refugees skilled in house building and means these skills are passed onto the younger generation growing up in the confines of the refugee camps. The ability to construct shelters from local materials will be particularly important in the event of repatriation.

Building supplies are a large budget item and procurement is problematic, particularly for bamboo because of difficulties in accessing the large quantities required and restrictions on movement across provincial boundaries. A household survey was therefore carried out in the second half of 2005 to assess the validity of the current ration. The results suggested that the ration was appropriate but, due to budget constraints, the bamboo ration in 2006 had to be cut by at least 25% and almost no new houses were built excepting holding centres in various camps.

Full rations plus extra supplies to meet the 2006 shortfall were made up in 2007, resulting in a huge increase in supplies delivered to the camps. This exacerbated procurement problems making it even more difficult to ensure good prices and timely, quality deliveries. It was necessary to start independent control checks and conduct an audit in two camps. During the second half of 2007 a review will be made of controls to be put in place for 2008 and legal advice sought to try to make procurement more transparent.

Meanwhile another household survey in 2007 again suggests that most households feel they need higher rations but again there will have to be cuts in 2008 because of budget difficulties. Bamboo rations will be cut, although there will be some increase in roofing materials because a shortage in these results in exposure and deterioration of the bamboo used for walls. There will be increased monitoring to check how refugees use these supplies.

**Environmental impact:** The impact of the refugee population on the environment was minimised until the mid-1990s by keeping the camps to the size of small villages. The refugees were not allowed to plant rice although in some areas they could forage in the jungle for edible roots, vegetables and building materials. The environmental impact of the camps was significant, but relatively minor when compared with the damage caused by rampant illegal logging conducted by other parties. The creation of larger, consolidated camps since 1995 has placed greater strain on the environment. This has resulted in the need for TBBC to supply cooking fuel, fuel-efficient cooking stoves and building materials as explained above. The cooking fuel is made from waste from sawmills, bamboo and coconut by-products and, where possible, the building materials are supplied from commercially grown plots. TBBC food supplies are generally delivered in reusable containers, e.g., sacks for rice, yellow beans and salt, plastic barrels for fish-paste and drums for cooking oil. TBBC is monitoring water sources to measure any contamination following the introduction of soap distributions border-wide.

#### **d) Clothing**

Beginning in 1995, World Concern and Lutheran World Relief (LWR) started sending shipments of used clothing, sweaters and quilts and TBBC was able to give most refugees at least one item of clothing most years. As the refugees became more aid-dependent there was a growing need for clothing, especially warm clothing for the cold season, and since 2001 TBBC has tried to ensure regular distributions.

The Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA) became a major source of good quality jackets/ sweaters from Japan. In 2002 and 2003 TBBC was able to receive shipments from both SVA and LWR in time for the cold season, ensuring that each refugee received at least two pieces of clothing. (World Concern was no longer able to supply large enough quantities of used clothing to make the bureaucracy involved worthwhile). Unfortunately SVA had to discontinue this project after 2003 but LWR continue to supply used clothing annually and for 2007 the Wakachiai project, a Japanese NGO, will send a consignment of 40,000 clothing items.

Used clothing is not available for young children and since 2004 TBBC has purchased one clothing-set for all under-fives. Plans were considered to purchase sets for five to 12 year olds in 2006 but this has not been realised due to TBBC's funding shortfall. These plans, however, remain under consideration either as direct purchase of clothing-sets or as an income generation activity for refugees with in-camp production in cooperation with ZOA.

Since 2002 TBBC has supported a *longyi*-weaving project organised by the women's organisations. This is described under 3 c) below.

#### **e) Blankets, bednets and sleeping mats**

With malaria and respiratory diseases being major health problems, bednets and blankets are essential relief items. They have to be supplied and replaced on a regular basis because they wear out rapidly due to heavy use and the rough conditions in crowded bamboo houses. Major distributions are made once each year.

Insecticide-treated nets were introduced in 1997 following recommendations made by the Sho Khlo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU) and the CCSDPT Health Subcommittee. Malaria transmission rates in the camps then fell dramatically and the use of impregnated nets was phased out of Tak and Mae Hong Son camps during 2000 and 2001 and in Tham Hin and Ban Don Yang camps in 2002. All camps have since been supplied with non-





Site 1 (Photo: Trocaire)



impregnated nets. This decision is under review however and TBBC is awaiting the recommendations of the CCSDPT Health Subcommittee.

Sleeping mats were formally supplied only when requested by the Refugee Committees. During 1998 it was agreed that these mats should be distributed more methodically to ensure that all refugees use them in conjunction with the bednets. It was noted that households not using them were vulnerable to mosquitoes entering the nets through the bamboo flooring of houses. Household surveys were conducted and additional distributions undertaken. The current policy is to carry out a full distribution of sleeping mats every two years, the latest having made in 2007.

The normal distribution rate has been one blanket for every two refugees, one family size bednet and one sleeping mat per three persons. Feedback from refugee communities regarding bednets and sleeping mats suggests the current ration is not well-suited to family and household composition. In 2007, TBBC matched household needs for bednets and sleeping mats by distributing double and family size items.

#### f) Educational supplies

The refugees sustain all community activities themselves including schools from kindergarten through to high school. Until 1997 TBBC made annual donations of basic school supplies for the teachers and pupils, mostly purchased by ZOA. During 1995/6 the TBBC staff organised a survey of educational needs in the Mon, Karenni and Karen camps on behalf of the CCSDPT. The results of the survey were presented to the MOI in August 1996 setting out recommendations for extended education services for the refugees. Now there are 11 NGOs, including two TBBC Members (ZOA, IRC), providing education services and supplies in the camps.

#### g) Emergency stock

TBBC aims to have staff in the area within 24 hours of any emergency situation such as an influx of new arrivals, flood or fire damage. An assessment will then be carried out where possible (i.e., where there is no security risk) in coordination with the health agencies, a member of the refugee community, UNHCR and the local Thai authorities.

Since June 2002 an 'emergency stock' of basic non-food items has been maintained in order to be able to 'respond' quickly to any emergency. Items currently are stocked as follows:

Figure D.4: TBBC emergency stocks

Area	To Cover No. of families	Blankets	Bednets	Plastic Sheeting	Plastic Rolls	Cooking Pots 26 cm	Cooking Pots 28 cm
Mae Hong Son	100	500	200	100	25	100	100
Mae Sariang	200	1,000	500	100	25	200	200
Tak	400	2,000	750	200	50	400	400
Kanchanaburi/ Sangklaburi	100	500	100	100	25	100	100

#### h) Procurement procedures, transportation, delivery, storage, distribution, food containers


**Procurement procedures:** Traditionally, all food items were purchased in the border provinces, usually monthly, but sometimes rice was purchased in advance to secure good prices. TBBC monitored daily rice prices published in Bangkok, checked the local markets and compared the prices paid at the different locations along the border. All of the commodities TBBC used were everyday items readily available in all markets and it was relatively straightforward to informally check value for money. Formal competitive quotations were obtained only occasionally when requested by large donors. Generally these confirmed that local suppliers could offer the lowest prices and best service, mainly because frequent deliveries were required to many small camps with constantly changing road conditions and security situations.

The TBBC programme was quite small in the early years but as it grew, it became very significant by local standards. Over time the better local suppliers geared themselves up to TBBC's needs. In some cases they bought their own transportation and extended their storehouses. They got to know the local officials and became familiar with the topography. This enabled them to help solve administration blockages and to respond rapidly to frequent emergencies, getting their supplies to difficult remote areas at very short notice. In some cases the suppliers organised annual road repairs into the camps at the end of the rainy season to enable their trucks to get in. In short, some local suppliers built up their operations to meet TBBC's needs and had overwhelming advantages over other potential suppliers from a distance.

During 1999, however, mainly in response to more stringent ECHO grant conditions, the TBBC adopted formal bidding/ contract procedures for rice and mung bean supplies in Tak province. And in 2000 tendering was introduced for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and cooking fuel in all provinces. Bidding was open to all interested suppliers and it became more realistic for new suppliers to compete because, as a result of the camp consolidation exercise, there were far fewer camps to serve, with better road access. During 2001 TBBC engaged an EU-RONAIID consultant to assist in upgrading its tendering and contracting procedures to meet exacting ECHO standards, including international bidding and the opening of bids before a tendering committee.

TBBC now publicly tenders for all supplies of rice, mung beans, cooking oil, AsiaMIX, fish-paste, soybean cakes, tinned fish, chillies, salt, sugar, cooking fuel, bednets, blankets, sleeping mats, cooking pots/ woks, plastic sheeting

## Procurement and quality control procedure



and eucalyptus poles, representing around 80% of all commodity purchases. The only major items for which public tendering remains unfeasible at present are building supplies (bamboo and thatch), which are restricted items under Thai law.

The whole procurement process, including the advertising of tenders, bidding process, opening of bids, awarding of contracts and invoice/ payment procedures, has been subject to several evaluations and audits and gradually upgraded and standardised. The ECHO audit in June 2007 was the latest to recommend minor adjustments and these have already been implemented. The procedures meet all major donor requirements and is summarised in the chart. A comprehensive TBBC Procurement Manual was produced in 2005.

Most contracts are still awarded to local companies. Experience with 'outside' suppliers has often been problematic and TBBC has adopted a policy of only awarding new suppliers with relatively small contracts in the less sensitive camps as a way of testing their ability. All tendering is processed in Bangkok to protect field offices from potential pressures.

**Transportation:** Transportation costs are included in the price of all food supplies except *AsiaMIX*. In Tak province transportation is usually by ten-wheel truck with a capacity of 400 50-kg rice sacks. For the other camps which are less accessible, transportation is usually by six-wheel trucks or 4-wheel drive pick-ups. The TBBC staff organise the necessary permits from the local Thai authorities.

**Delivery/ storage:** TBBC itself does not store food. Small quantities of *AsiaMIX* were initially stored by TBBC, but this is no longer the case. The suppliers keep their own stock and delivery is made directly to warehouses in the camps. TBBC supplies building materials for the warehouses and the refugee Camp Committees are responsible for their construction and maintenance. TBBC provides guidance and technical input to foster best practice. The frequency of delivery varies by location. For Mae La camp delivery of rice is every two weeks, but for other commodities and in most of the other camps, delivery is monthly during the dry season. During the rainy season remote camps have to be stockpiled for up to eight months because they become inaccessible by delivery trucks.

TBBC staff arrange and check deliveries to camps. The Refugee Camp Committee checks weights and quality on delivery, and generally sets aside any deficient items pending further checking and/or replacement. Standard weights have been distributed to the camp stores to allow the calibration of scales prior to the checking of delivered goods and ration distributions. A goods received note (GRN) signed by warehouse managers was fully introduced during 2005 and has subsequently been upgraded based on suggestions from refugee warehouse staff. This form is TBBC's record that commodities have arrived in camp in correct quantity, weight and quality. Delivery schedules are designed to ensure that new supplies arrive before the refugees have consumed the previous deliveries, with sufficient allowance for possible delays due to road conditions, breakdowns and other factors.

Camp Committees receive training in the management of supplies and warehouse design has been reviewed. Most warehouses have been re-built or received major repairs since 2005 with technical input from the TBBC staff, and with reference to WFP guidelines. In some cases warehouses are still sub-standard and training, repairs and rebuilding is ongoing.

**Distribution:** The Refugee Camp Committees are responsible for the distribution of supplies. Food distributions were traditionally organised by men because they had to carry 100 kg sacks. However, during 2001, 50 kg sacks were introduced to all camps and women were drawn more into the unloading and distribution process. Distributions of household items, e.g., pots, bednets and clothing often are conducted with the assistance of women's organisations, teachers or health workers. Each family has a ration book stating their entitlement, and they are called to the delivery point for distribution. Whilst most are male-headed households, it is the women who usually collect the TBBC rations.

During 2004 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees made five commitments to women including their equal participation in food distribution. Throughout 2006, TBBC worked with Camp Committees to strengthen the role of women in food distribution and border-wide, women involved in food distribution increased from 11% in 2006, to 35% by early 2007.

Ration pictures are posted at each warehouse depicting ration items and amounts. Their presence is checked monthly as a component of TBBC's monitoring system. Amounts distributed are recorded on camp records and in the ration books. TBBC issues standard ration books border-wide and monitors their usage to help ensure each family retains its own ration book. The use and design of ration books is constantly under review and larger versions with more room for signatures and comment will be introduced for 2008.

Following the ECHO evaluation in 2003 greater attention has been given to the accuracy of weights and distribution measuring containers. TBBC introduced standard measures to improve distribution accuracy in the warehouses which were not weighing individual rice rations. Most camps now are either weighing only, or using a combination of standard measures and weighing. TBBC continues to encourage camps to weigh supplies during distribution.

**Food containers:** In general, distributing reusable food storage containers to households is a response to not only health but also environmental concerns. TBBC began providing refugees containers for *AsiaMIX* in 2004 and



cooking oil in 2005. Sealable plastic containers are given to each household to enable proper storage of *AsiaMIX* to safeguard it from moisture and rodents and refugees are only allowed to collect the *AsiaMIX* ration if they bring their containers with them to distribution points. Plastic oil containers with volume gradations were distributed to each household during the second half of 2005. These have proved to be durable and beneficial. Not only are they hygienic, but refugees can also check visually that their oil rations are received in full.

In the first half of 2006 sealed plastic drums were introduced for the delivery and storage of fish-paste. These have replaced the metal tins formerly used and which were recycled from other uses including holding toxic chemicals. The new plastic drums are purchased and supplied by TBBC but are the suppliers' responsibility during a contract period. Consideration now is being given to supplying households containers specifically for home storage of fish-paste.

#### i) Quality control, monitoring

**Quality control:** Since the Refugee Committees are very familiar with the expected quality of supplies, it was generally considered in the past that appearance, smell and taste were adequate to assess quality. Substandard supplies rejected by the Camp Committees were returned to the suppliers for replacement. Rice and other food samples were submitted for testing by an independent inspection company only on an occasional basis.

However, regular independent quality control inspections were introduced in 2001 and now TBBC utilises the services of professional inspection companies to carry out independent checks in accordance with major Donor regulations. Sample checks are made on weight, packaging and quality for rice, yellow beans, *AsiaMIX*, cooking oil, fish-paste, soybean cake, chillies, salt, sugar and cooking fuel. This occurs at the source of the supply, *en route* to camp, or in camps. The vast majority of inspections are now done in camps. In addition, the Refugee Committees carry out checks at the time of delivery/ distribution. Refugee warehouse staff and TBBC staff have been trained in basic checks of commodity quality and weight. Substandard supplies are subject to warnings, penalties or replacement. Despite this, inevitably quality problems continue to occur. When these happen sampling rates may be increased, further checks initiated and protocols modified if necessary.

Results of the checks during the first half of 2007 are set out in (A) 2.1 Appendix E.

**Monitoring:** TBBC staff continuously monitor refugee population numbers, and the quality, quantity, delivery, storage and distribution of supplies. A dynamic and formal monitoring system has been continually refined since 1995 based on frequent evaluations. This system involves information collection by professional inspectors and checks made on supplies (delivery, quality, weight, and distribution) through camp recording systems and staff visits to the camps. The following table summarises the monitoring process used in the first half of 2007.

**Figure D.5: Summary of TBBC monitoring process**

Operation	Information Required	Primary Source	Verification by TBBC
Calculating food required	Camp population and population structure	Camp leaders Refugee Committees MOI/ UNHCR registration	Periodic house counts and checks on new arrivals
Procurement & tendering	Bids from > 3 companies. Cost, quality and delivery conditions	Local, national and international suppliers TBBC staff	Prices monitored in Bangkok by TBBC
Delivery	Quality and quantity Delivery and distribution schedules	Camp leaders Suppliers	Checks by independent inspection companies prior to loading and/or at camp store Samples taken by TBBC staff for testing Goods Received notes and Delivery Receipt slips
Storage	State of stores Losses to pests/ rodents Warehouse management practices	Camp leaders and warehouse staff	Periodic visual inspection/ Warehouse inventory Monthly monitoring of warehouses
Distribution	Distribution schedule Amount distributed Stock in hand	Camp stock and distribution records Household ration books	Periodic inspection of records including ration books Monthly household and community group interviews Systematic monitoring at distribution points

TBBC is constantly seeking ways of improving the accuracy of camp population figures used for supply calculations. The Camp Management Project (see 2 a) below), led by the Karen and Karenni Refugee Committees in partnership with TBBC, produces 'feeding' population figures (as opposed to camp registration figures) which take account of absentees from the camps. These figures have been reviewed in all camps during June/July 2007.

The major features of the current supply monitoring system are:

'Goods received notes' (GRNs) are TBBC's major means of verification that supplies are delivered to camp as planned. A GRN is completed by Warehouse Managers on arrival of every supply truck to camp, recording:

- Information concerning the type of commodity, quantity, supplier, purchase order, time of delivery and driver.
- Comments on supplies rejected and why.
- An assessment of quantity (a 10% random sample of food items/ charcoal is weighed and recorded).

GRNs are signed by the Warehouse Manager and verified by TBBC staff. Data collected are converted to field reports on percentages of commodities passed for weight, quality and time of delivery.

**Checks at distribution points** which allow TBBC staff to transparently monitor a larger number of household rations. Furthermore, the distribution practices of warehouse staff are observed, ration book usage noted, as well as verification that appropriate information on rations is visible and available to refugees. The system requires that one percent of households is checked, for a selected supply distribution, in each camp per month. Checking criteria are itemised. The data is converted to a percentage pass.

Formal **inspections of warehouses** in camps are conducted each month by TBBC staff. 20 parameters are used to rate the state of the warehouse as a percentage.

Every month, two **community groups per camp are visited** by TBBC for feedback. Generally one group is a collection of households. The second group may be a women's organisation, religious group, boarding house or other group. Qualitative data is recorded.

Locked **comments post-boxes** are installed at warehouses and, in some camps, at CBO offices with a request for anonymous feedback on supplies.

A '**supply and distribution reconciliation**' is made monthly to detect what proportion of all supplies delivered to camp is distributed to the target population.

The Procurement Manager compiles a comprehensive **summary of quality and weight inspections** of TBBC supplies conducted by independent accredited inspection companies.

TBBC Field Assistants and Coordinators make a preliminary evaluation of data in respective field sites. The Programme Support Manager and Programme Coordinator then make a border-wide evaluation and documents these in monthly reports. Findings inform TBBC's relief programme. Feedback is given to TBBC management and other staff, refugee partners and recipients, and other relevant stakeholders.

The monitoring results for the first half of 2007 are set out under Indicator (A) 2.3, Appendix E.

## **2. Working through partnerships**

*To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation, embracing equity, gender and diversity.*

### **a) Camp management, representation**

**Camp management:** In the early years the Karen and Karenni Refugee Committees took responsibility for all camp affairs and TBBC provided no support for camp administration. As territory was lost and trading was hit, TBBC agreed to allow the committees to retain some of the used sacks and containers for resale. The proceeds were then used to support administration expenses such as stationery, photocopying, plastic sheets and torch batteries for night security patrols, funerals, commemoration days, travel costs to town, entertainment of visitors and Thai authorities, camp festivals and social welfare for vulnerable families/ individuals. As the amounts became more significant, TBBC took responsibility for selling back the rice sacks and allocated funds to the committees. By 2000 about 70% of the credit received was given to the Camp Committees for their operating expenses.

With the introduction of polypropylene sacks in 2001, which have a resale value of only about one baht compared with up to 20 baht for a jute sack, this source of revenue drastically declined. From 2002 TBBC started providing camp administrative support on a cash basis at a standard rate of 1.8 baht per refugee per month for each camp. This then appeared as a budget line item. Camp committees presented monthly reports on these accounts which were summarised in TBBC six-month reports.

By 2003 it had become clear that this allowance was inadequate to truly cover camp administration costs. A major burden on the committees was finding adequate supplies to 'pay' hundreds of volunteer workers who helped in camp administration, food storage and ration distribution. The committees were left to their own resources to meet these needs and many other demands from the surrounding communities/ authorities. One way this was achieved was by requesting food for the entire registered population and then using the balance after rations were distributed to refugees in camps. A significant number of refugees were away from the camps at any time. Small taxes were also often levied on refugees during distribution. This led to conjecture of malpractice and put pressure on Camp Committees. For some time it had been evident that a more transparent system was desirable.

ECHO consultants in 2003 recommended that feeding and other supply needs should be clearly separated for monitoring purposes. From September 2003 through May 2004 TBBC carried out a study to establish the real demands on Camp Committees, how they deal with them, and what alternative systems could be instituted. The review confirmed that Camp Committees do need additional supplies on top of the actual needs for feeding the population to cover camp security, activities, meetings, relationships with local Thai villages and Thai authorities and other miscellaneous needs. It was also found that Camp Committees have legitimate cash requirements to administer the camps, including office, logistics, travel, activities and relationship costs as well as support for the

camp committees and workers involved in food supply. The recommendation was that these additional needs should be budgeted so that accurate feeding population figures could be used for refugee supplies. In particular it was recommended that TBBC pay stipends to approximately 1,000 camp committee members and distribution workers.

Staff stipend levels were discussed with Camp Committee members, the KRC and KnRC and refugee advisory groups. An appropriate scale of support was agreed at an average payment of 900 baht/ month. Maximum stipend levels were set at a standard rate for all camps. The level of refugee incentives was also compared with other NGOs to ensure that these were not out of line with health and education sector payments. Administration needs varied by camp, but were based on an average of about 8 baht per refugee/ month plus additional rice for specified needs. The net cost of implementing these recommendations was off-set by savings realised by using more accurate feeding figures.

Feeding populations, supply figures and cash payments were negotiated and implemented camp by camp between July and December 2004. This involved additional financial support and training to KRC and KnRC so that they could take responsibility for managing the introduction of staff stipends and camp administration support in the camps.

The new system is constantly being monitored. One of its major impacts was to reduce 'the buffer' of non-rice commodities in the camps. This buffer of supplies, left over after feeding camp populations, was used to meet other needs in the camps, i.e. relationships, supporting CBOs, security and other camp activities. After further assessment of these needs, non- rice contingency support was introduced into all camps by the end of 2006. New reporting procedures were also introduced to assist in the monitoring of contingency supplies.

TBBC together with KRC and KnRC also worked with camp committees in order to increase the role of women in the distribution process in camps. For 2007 approximately 70 new positions were introduced in the warehouse and distribution sector from a total of 96 new positions for females. 19 new positions for males were also approved. KRC and KnRC camp management staff are now responsible for the logistics of stipend support for over 1,700 staff.

**Representation:** For some time, TBBC has been considering developing consumer advisory groups in each camp to ensure broader participation in the programme beyond the camp committees. During 2006 the TBBC Community Liaison Officer has established CBO meetings in the camps as one such mechanism to ensure a broader voice in TBBC programming.

UNHCR also rolled out its Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM) process in 2005 for which Thailand was used as a pilot study. TBBC field staff were engaged in the process from the initial consultations through the field work and analysis of the findings. As a result, Multi Functional Teams (MFT) have been established in each province to conduct focus group discussions in the camps to garner a wide range of opinions, concerns and opinions from all sectors/ ages of the populations to better inform programmes and to build a more protective environment.

## **b) Gender policy**

The majority of the camp populations arrived as a family unit. The ratio of male to female is approximately 51: 49 with approximately 22% female headed households. The average family size of the registered population is 4.7. Many village communities crossed the border at the same time or re-established themselves on arrival in the camps. Thus they have been able to maintain the structural support of their community and often the village head has become a section leader within the camp. It is the responsibility of the section leaders to ensure that the needs of single female headed -households are met during such times as camp relocations, house construction and general repairs.

Women in the refugee and displaced population from Burma have supported the long struggle for autonomy, carrying out traditional roles as homemakers and carers, but remaining mostly outside the main decision making bodies, including the camp committees. In the past few years, representatives from the refugee women's organisations have actively sought ways to improve women's subordinate position and work towards women's increased participation in all aspects of their society. Through education and training in human rights, income generation, capacity development and international networking, women are gradually raising awareness amongst the population that women's rights can no longer be ignored. However, their focus has mainly been through women's networks, and they need support in addressing these issues from men in the camps and more specifically from the camp authorities. TBBC's focus is to work with camp committees to strengthen the role of women in camp management and delivery of the programme. TBBC also provides some core support to women's organisations to facilitate management and administration of their projects.

The role of the TBBC Community Liaison Officer is to explore existing and potential links with CBOs and to address issues related to equitable representation.

TBBC established a Gender Working Group in 2003 to ensure that the Gender Policy would remain an active document. This group met again in the first half of 2004 to discuss the role the Community Liaison Officer and staff met again in 2006 to move forward on increasing women's involvement in food distributions. The TBBC staff policy manual was reviewed at the end of 2006 and outcomes from the gender sensitivity review were incorporated. These mainly centred on use of language in the document which was made more explicit.

The following are key TBBC gender policy statements:

**Statement of principles:** In developing a gender policy TBBC

- Acknowledges that both women and men have the equal right to dignity and to self-determination.
- Recognises that the transformation of gender relations and roles is necessary to allow women and men to develop their potential and contribute fully in all aspects of their society, for the eventual benefit of their whole community.
- Believes that refugee men and women should cooperate in building and sustaining a fair and equitable society through equal representation, participation, opportunities and access to resources.
- Believes that both women and men should contribute to the empowerment of women so that women may fulfil their potential.

**Goal:** To increase understanding and practice of gender equality within TBBC's organisation and relief programme, in partnership with refugee communities.

**Objectives:**

- 1) To provide a working environment for all staff which respects women and men as equal members.
- 2) To increase knowledge of TBBC office and field staff in gender awareness.
- 3) To support women's initiatives to address their needs as identified/ prioritised by them.
- 4) To participate in initiatives by NGOs to improve gender equity in the humanitarian aid and refugee community.
- 5) To encourage TBBC staff to raise gender issues and gender awareness with men in the camp communities.

**Cultural context:** TBBC is an organisation whose staff is drawn from both Asian and Western cultures. The population of refugees supported by TBBC on this border comprises different ethnic and religious groups from Burma. It is recognised by TBBC that different traditional cultural norms regarding gender roles and relations enrich and diversify its work. TBBC recognises the need to challenge cultural norms where they deny basic human rights for both women and men.

**Process:** TBBC acknowledges that defining and implementing a gender policy will be an ongoing process. It's initial goal, and objectives are considered as realistic in the context of current gender awareness in TBBC. TBBC recognises that men and women are at different stages of gender awareness and as a result, different activities will be targeted for men and women within the refugee communities. The policy will be reviewed on a six-monthly basis, as progress is made and aims achieved. The staff policy manual was screened for gender sensitivity in 2006 and minor adjustments were made in the language to be more explicit.

### **c) Protection**

TBBC played a leading role on establishing the UNHCR/ CCSDPT Protection Working Group (PWG) in 2000 in response to UNHCR's Outreach Workshop held in Bangkok in 1999. The PWG is committed to the concept of shared responsibilities in protection which extends to the refugee communities. To further this, the PWG has been extremely active in organising joint activities for NGOs and CBOs and taking up specific protection issues both at the community level and with the Thai authorities. Workshops have been conducted within service sectors (education, health, food and shelter, etc) and on an issue basis (SGBV, repatriation, camp management) and ongoing training is seen as a key component of the collaboration.

PWG meetings are held regularly at both the Bangkok and provincial level. Focus areas with RTG have included birth registration and the administration of justice in camps. Other areas include child protection networks, reporting and referral mechanisms. Current focus with the Ministry of Justice is refugee access to justice and existing mechanisms for juvenile justice. Legal assistance centres have been opened in Site #1 and MaeLa after lengthy negotiations. There is also active ongoing UNHCR/ NGO/ Camp Committee dialogue on the civilian nature of camps and the protection implication of military elements in the camps. The TBBC Deputy Executive Director is the facilitator of the PWG. TBBC also represents the PWG in the UN working group on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC).

### **d) Assistance to Thai communities**

TBBC has always provided assistance to Thai communities in the vicinity of the refugee camps. This is in recognition of the fact that there are poor communities which do not have access to any other assistance and which may feel neglected when support is given to refugees in their area. For many years assistance given was *ad hoc*, TBBC providing educational supplies to Thai schools, distributing blankets during the cool season, and assisting many times with flood relief. The TBBC also provided compensation to local communities affected by the location of the

refugee camps in their area, and assisted local Thai authorities with the cost of repairing roads near the refugee camps.

In 1999 the TBBC established a more formal policy for responding to such requests. The policy specified potential beneficiaries for assistance including: disasters and emergencies in the border provinces; communities directly affected by the refugee populations; other border communities whose standard of living was equal or less than that of the refugees; and Thai agencies providing security or assistance which were not adequately funded by the authorities. The policy set out procedures for submitting requests, but was still very general in nature, covering potentially huge geographic areas. It proved difficult for field staff to control when faced by numerous requests through the local authorities.

During the RTG/ NGO Workshop in December 2006, MOI asked all NGOs to submit action plans for assistance to neighbouring Thai communities for 2007 and stated that the camp commanders had lists of target villages. This provided TBBC with an opportunity to reconsider how best to prioritise Thai assistance.

TBBC has agreed to focus local support (90%) on villages less than 30 kilometres from the refugee camps and to apportion available budget for Thai authority support between provinces in proportion to their share of the refugee population. A specific budget will also be allocated for assistance for repairs to camp access roads used by TBBC suppliers. TBBC has been supporting many communities quite far from the camps for some time and will be phasing these out during 2007. MOI has been informed of the policy which will make more rational use of available resources and be easier for staff to control.

### **3. Building capacity**

*To empower displaced people and their communities by strengthening their capacity for self-reliance.*

This objective will be combined with the one relating to partnership when the TBBC Strategic Plan is updated since many activities overlap.

#### **a) Community liaison**

TBBC recruited a Community Liaison Officer at the beginning of 2005 with the aim of exploring the role of different sectors of society in camp life and devising strategies to address identified gender, ethnic and other inequalities. Consultation and feedback tools for all programme recipients and partners are being developed. Regular CBO meetings were established in four camps during 2006 and 2007 leading to work plans and support requests for coordinated CBO activities including the establishment of community centres. These meetings have also informed TBBC programme responses. Programme focus is now shifting to developing closer CBO relationships with TBBC activities.

#### **b) Weaving project**

Since 2002 TBBC has supported a *longyi*-weaving project organised by the women's organisations (Burmese style wrap-around 'skirt', worn by both men and women). This is to maintain and develop traditional skills, to provide income generation and also to develop the capacity of the women's organisations in all aspects of project management. TBBC supplies thread and funds for the women's groups to make one *longyi* for every woman and man (>12 years) in alternate years beginning with one *longyi* for every woman in 2002. Production was initially in Mae La camp, but by the end of 2004 all camps were producing their own supplies. During 2006 special weaving materials were provided for Kayan women in Site 1 to weave their own traditional clothing using back-strap looms.

### **4. Strengthening advocacy**

*To advocate with and for the people of Burma to increase understanding of the nature and root causes of the conflict and displacement, in order to promote appropriate responses and ensure their human rights are respected.*

#### **a) Advocacy activities**

Throughout its history TBBC has played an advocacy role on behalf of displaced Burmese both with the RTG and the international community. There has never been a formal strategy for this but in 2005 advocacy was established as a core TBBC objective within the Strategic Plan.

TBBC staff are involved in many different kinds of advocacy ranging from interventions with local authorities when problems arise affecting refugee protection or services at the border, engagement with national Thai authorities concerning policy issues, coordinated protection initiatives with UHNCR and other NGOs, and dialogue with different constituents of the international community regarding root causes and durable solutions. The TBBC member agencies also advocate with their own constituencies, raising awareness and encouraging supportive action.

All advocacy activities are aimed at improving protection for refugees, ensuring that essential humanitarian services are maintained, and working towards a solution which will bring an end to conflict in Burma and an opportunity for refugees to lead normal fulfilling lives. There are a multitude of stakeholders who might eventually contribute solutions for the displaced Burmese but accurate information is essential for informed decision making. A priority for TBBC is therefore to maximise its presence along the border to research and document the situation as accurately



possible and, where possible, affording the displaced communities themselves the opportunity to voice their own concerns. Regular documentation includes these six month reports and annual reports on the IDP situation. The TBBC website is also being developed as a resource tool.

## 5. Developing organisational resources

*To develop organisational resources to enable TBBC to be more effective in pursuing its mission.*

### a) Strategic plan

TBBC developed its first Strategic Plan in 2005 from a consensus and commitment building process with all stakeholders. This was the first time in TBBC's 21-year history that such a comprehensive process has been undertaken. Through workshops, fieldwork, surveys and informal discussions from April through August 2005, ideas and opinions were sought from all TBBC staff, refugees in camps, partners, members and relevant external stakeholders. Previous strategic planning research and discussions were revisited. Current strategies were reviewed, endorsed and enhanced with due consideration of recommendations from all stakeholders. The draft Strategic Plan 2005-2010, was presented at the TBBC AGM in Washington in October 2005 and adopted by the Members.

This now informs all TBBC activities, the core objectives forming the basis for the TBBC Logframe and the structure of this report. The Strategic Plan is currently under review and will be updated during the second half of 2007.

### b) Programme evaluation and review

For years, TBBC has been committed to periodic programme evaluations as a tool for improving its effectiveness, and besides external evaluations, increasingly consultants have been commissioned to review particular programme or management activities. No less than 25 evaluations and reviews have been carried out to date as follows:

**Figure D.6: Evaluations and reviews of TBBC programme**

1	Mar 1994	Dutch Interchurch Aid/ EC/ Femconsult.	Overall Programme
2	Nov 1996	Dutch Interchurch Aid/ Femconsult.	Monitoring System
3	Apr 1997	ECHO	Overall Programme
4	Sept 1997	Independent	Ration Adequacy
5	Nov 1997	ECHO	Financial/ Admin
6	May 1998	Dutch Interchurch Aid/ International Agricultural Centre	Supplementary Feeding
7	Apr 2000	DanChurchAid	Sphere Standards
8	May 2000	UNHCR Consultant	Cooking Fuel
9	Mar 2003	Independent.	Management and Governance
10	Jun 2003	IRC	Procurement and Quality Control
11	Jul 2003	Independent	Cooking Fuel
12	Oct 2003	ECHO	Audit
13	Nov 2003	ECHO	Nutrition and Food Aid
14	Aug 2004	Independent	Monitoring Procedures
15	Sep 2004	Independent	Financial Control Procedures
16	Feb 2005	AIDCO for EC	Rice and building materials
17	Jul 2005	Independent	staff remuneration
18	2006	Independent	Staff Policy gender sensitivity
19	2006	Independent	Staff Policy and Thai Labour Law
20	Jul 2006	Independent	Staff Development
21	Jul 2006	DanChurchAid	Alternative packaging of TBBC programme
22	Oct 2006	WFP	Food Distribution
23	Jan 2007	Channel Research	Emergency relief programme
24	Jan 2007	NCCA/ AusAID	Overall Programme
25	Jun 2007	ECHO	Audit

TBBC is committed to implementing the key recommendations of its evaluations and almost all of the recommendations of the evaluations and reviews undertaken to date have now been implemented or are currently being addressed. A summary of all these evaluations/ studies including the main conclusions, recommendations and responses can be found on the TBBC website at <http://www.tbbc.org/resources/tbbc-evaluations.pdf>.

To reduce duplication and ensure that key issues are addressed, a coordinated evaluation plan was agreed at the 2005 TBBC Donors meeting for the two year period 2006/7. This has been mostly accomplished and new priorities for 2008/9 will be discussed at the next Donors meeting.

### c) Performance indicators

In 2000, TBBC agreed to develop Performance Indicators to assess the achievement of the programme objectives. It was recognised that producing comprehensive indicators would take some time and during the first half of 2001 a Logframe was developed to establish priority indicators related to food distribution. These became available during 2002.

The Logframe has subsequently been extended, Performance Indicators defined to include all aspects of the TBBC programme and it has been restructured in accordance with the Core Objectives defined in the TBBC Strategic Plan for 2005-2010. The Performance Indicators available for the first half of 2007 are set out in Appendix E.

#### d) Cost effectiveness

Since the very beginning, TBBC philosophy was to encourage the refugees to implement the programme themselves. Staff numbers were kept to a minimum, keeping administration costs low and making the programme very cost-effective. Even though the programme has grown enormously in the last few years and staff numbers have increased dramatically to deal with both increasing technical and donor bureaucratic demands, management expenses including all staff, office and vehicle expenses are currently only around 6% of expenditures. The 2003 TBBC Advisory Committee suggested that some costs which TBBC allocates to administration should be considered as programme costs. If so, then TBBC's true administration costs would be even lower.

#### e) Staff training

Although previously there was no systematic staff training programme TBBC organised periodic trainings and encouraged staff to attend appropriate courses run by other organisations and these were listed in previous six-month reports. In 2006 TBBC employed a consultant to help develop a comprehensive staff development programme and individual learning/ development plans were agreed upon for each staff person which are now being implemented. Training courses and capacity building events attended by staff in the first half of 2007 were:

**List of TBBC staff training under the staff development programme, January to June 2007**

Training Course	# of staff
English Language	11
Camp Management Workshop with UNHCR	4
IT & Multimedia Training	1
First Aid Training	50
Building Safer Organisations: TOT Workshop at Geneva	1
LWF Exchange Visit in Nepal, sponsored by DCA	4
Strategic Planning Follow Up Workshop and Livelihood Brainstorming	46
Sphere Training for all Field Assistants and Food Security Assistants	11
ICCO Follow Up Workshop on 'Humanitarian Assistance International Law', Jakarta	1
Social Security Fund Training	12
Financial & Purchasing Records Update	5

#### f) Programme sustainability

The programme philosophy of maximising refugee input, minimising staff and aid dependency has, with the understanding of the donors, proven sustainable for over 23 years. The refugees have been largely responsible for their own lives and their culture has generally been maintained. Unfortunately more rigid controls on the camps introduced in the mid-1990s eroded the refugees' sense of self-sufficiency, making them increasingly aid-dependent. Social problems also become more evident as the camps became more overcrowded and restricted. Regarding the TBBC programme, new demands from donors for independent control checks initially appeared as a threat to the trust built up with the Refugee Committees and their own sense of responsibility and involvement in administering the assistance programme. However, by carefully ensuring that the refugees themselves were involved in redesigning the monitoring procedures and engaged in responding to the results, the positive benefits have been recognised by all parties and greater accountability achieved.

A major objective of the philosophy has been to ensure that the refugees can return home when the situation allows it. It can be argued that even after 23 years most of the refugees would want to go home immediately if the opportunity arose. However during recent years Burmese Army campaigns have destroyed thousands of villages and there are also hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. Return, even if the security situation permits it, will be problematic. There will be the need for some strategic planning for the reconstruction and redevelopment of areas laid waste by the SPDC and the scope for this will depend on the nature of any cease-fire agreement or other settlement agreed between SPDC and the ethnic parties.

Sustainability also depends on Thai people/ authorities' tolerance of the refugees' presence. In general, the local population and the Thai authorities were always very understanding of the refugees' needs, and tolerant of their presence but, after the economic crisis in 1997, the presence of large numbers of refugees and illegal workers became a much more sensitive issue with calls for more control and pressure to reduce numbers. A series of security 'incidents' involving armed Burmese elements, beginning with the armed raid of the Burmese Embassy in October 1999 made matters even worse. These incidents increased the Thai authorities' concern about security and the problems refugees are perceived to be bringing to Thailand. Rhetoric against the refugees increased, with accusations of environmental damage, bringing in diseases, taking Thai jobs, as well as being involved in crime, prostitution and drug trafficking.

Since 2005 however, there has been a growing realisation that there is very little hope of the refugees returning home in the foreseeable future and that more could be done in the camps to prepare the refugees for the future.

During 2005 UNHCR and the NGOs began jointly advocating for increased access to skills training and education and for income generation projects/ employment to be considered. At an RTG/ NGO workshop in December 2005 there was consensus that whilst national security was still an issue and refugees must be controlled, it would be to the benefit of all stakeholders to assist refugees in more fully realising their human potential. There is also a growing realisation that Thailand needs a large migrant work force and that the refugees could contribute to the economy. With careful planning there may now be opportunities to promote a more favourable view of refugees in Thailand.

During the same period, the RTG has allowed refugees to apply for resettlement to third countries and this represents another challenge to the sustainability of the traditional camp structures and aid programmes. Whilst resettlement offers the only currently available durable solution for those refugees leaving, it is proportionately the most educated and skilled people that are leaving in greatest numbers. This is already creating problems in sustaining camp services, with the health and education sectors most seriously affected. It is possible that more external resources will have to be brought in such as Thai or expatriate staff, further eroding the model of self-reliance that has been the philosophy for assistance for so long.

Finally, perhaps one of the most critical factors affecting the sustainability of TBBC's programme is its ability to go on raising the necessary funds to cover expenditures and to receive the funds in time to pay its bills. In 2006, TBBC faced its worst funding crisis in 22 years which was resolved after launching an emergency appeal. However much of the additional funds were of a 'one-off' nature and TBBC is facing a similar crisis towards the end of 2007. With refugee numbers at least stabilising due to resettlement, hopefully falling, 2008 offers the hope a zero increase budget. But to meet this, the current crisis will have to be resolved. Should TBBC ever be forced to cut basic food rations, its ability to achieve its objectives would be seriously undermined.

### **g) Visibility**

The following visibility policy was adopted at the 2001 TBBC Donors meeting:

*'TBBC policy is not to display any publicity in the refugee camps. Its vehicles and property are unmarked and generally no Donor publicity such as stickers or signs are posted.*

*This policy has been observed since the beginning of the programme in 1984. The rationale is:*

- a) To show mutuality and promote the dignity of the refugees. The Refugee Committees are considered operational partners, sharing responsibility for providing the basic needs of the refugee communities. They are encouraged to be as self-sufficient as possible and it is not considered appropriate to make them display their dependence on outside assistance.*
- b) TBBC has around 40 donors. It considers that it would be inequitable to display publicity for one/some donors only and impractical to publicise all.*

*The TBBC wishes all donors to respect this policy. Where contractual practices necessitate publicity donors will be requested to minimise their expectations and, if possible, to accept non-field publicity.*

*Whilst other NGOs working on the Thai/ Burmese border do not maintain such a strict 'invisibility' policy, they nevertheless maintain a low-profile presence. This reflects the original Ministry of Interior mandate, which specified "no publicity".'*

Almost all of TBBC's donors accept this policy but the European Commission, currently the largest donor, legally requires visibility for ECHO and the EC Uprooted People's Fund contributions to the programme. They have required a visibility component to the programme since 2001. Visibility 'projects' have been agreed to maximise refugee benefits and these are distributed annually in October. Notice boards have been installed at each warehouse, featuring ration information and TBBC Newsletters, and committee members and warehouse workers receive T-shirts, umbrellas and notebooks. Soccer and volley balls and T-shirts are provided for sports events. All items have the EU logo/ flag printed on them and they are very popular with the refugees.

ICCO, TBBC's partner with ECHO is also committed to visibility activities in Europe.

## Appendix E

### Programme performance indicators

TBBC began to develop Performance Indicators at the end of 2000. The current Logframe covers all aspects of the programme and is structured in accordance with the Strategic Plan Core Strategies.

Figure E.1 sets out TBBC's logframe showing the Performance Indicators adopted and the proposed Means of Verification. Figure E.2 presents a summary of the performance of TBBC's programme as measured by Performance Indicators since 2003 (where available).

Many of the health indicators are dependent on the collection, compilation, and analysis of data from the CCSDPT Health Information System, a common database for all the border health agencies. Health and nutrition indicators are updated and reported annually and so many of those presented here relate to 2006.

#### **Specific Objective A:**

**To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter, cooking fuel and non-food items for displaced persons**

#### **Indicator (A) 1 a), b):**

**Mortality Rates - CMR < 7/ 1000/ year, U5MR < 8/ 1000/ year**

- Crude Mortality Rate (CMR): rate of death in the entire population (presented as deaths per 1,000 population per year): The baseline CMR for the East Asia and Pacific Region is 7 deaths/ 1,000 population/ year\*. The CMR in all camps should be maintained below this baseline. An increase in CMR to double the baseline level, i.e. to 14 deaths/ 1,000 population/ year, would indicate a significant public health emergency.
- Under Five Mortality Rate (U5MR): rate of death among children below 5 years of age in the population (presented as deaths per 1,000 population under 5 years of age per year): The baseline U5MR for the East Asia and Pacific Region is 8 deaths/ 1,000 population <5/ year\*. The U5MR in all camps should be maintained below this baseline. An increase in U5MR to double the baseline level, that is to 16 deaths/ 1,000 population <5/ year, would indicate a significant public health emergency.

*Source: UNICEF's State of the World's Children 2005.*

#### **Means of Verification**

- CCSDPT Health Information System data for Mortality rates (reported annually)

**Figure E.3: Crude and under-five mortality rates in all camps 2000 to 2006**

All Camps	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Thailand*
CMR/ 1,000population/ year	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.6	7.0
Under 5 deaths/ 1,000/ year	9.2	9.1	6.9	7.2	6.5	5.3	6.0	5.7

\* UNICEF 2005

The data show both CMR and U5MR for all camps has steadily decreased over the past five years, with the exception of a slight increase in U5MR in 2006 from 2005 (CCSDPT 2006 Annual Health Information Report). Since 2003, the rates have been maintained acceptably below the baselines for the East and Pacific Region. In addition, the CMR and U5MR in all camps compared favourably to rates for the population of Thailand.

#### **Indicator (A) 2:**

**Children under 5 years of age with wasting malnutrition are less than 5% of under-5 population**

#### **Means of Verification**

- Annual Nutrition Surveys: children <5 weight/ height measurements (WHO/ NCHS z scores).
- CCSDPT Health Information System data: children identified as malnourished from clinic visits or nutrition surveys conducted by the medical agencies (implemented during 2003).
- Other surveys, data.

Nutrition surveys were conducted by all health agencies during 2006, and results for 2003 to 2006 are presented in Figure F.4 below for acute (wasting) and chronic (stunting) malnutrition. Rates of acute malnutrition, according to WHO cut-offs, are within 'acceptable' limits at less than 5% of the under-five population. The exception is Mae Ra Ma Luang camp, which is 'poor' at 5.0%, and has a higher rate than previous years. This higher rate is due to the large group of new arrivals. The rate of acute malnutrition is 9.5% in new arrivals, 4.5% in older residents. Chronic malnutrition remains between 'moderate' (20-30%) in Site 1, 'high' (30-40%) in Mae La, Umpiem, Nu Po and Tham Hin, and 'very high' (>40%) in Site 2, Mae La Oon, Mae Ra Ma Luang, and Ban Don Yang camps.

**Figure E.1: Logical Framework of TBBC programme, August 2007**

<p><b>Principal Objective:</b> To ensure an adequate standard of living and respect for human rights of displaced people from Burma, by working in partnership with displaced communities, building capacity, strengthening self reliance and food security.</p>			
<p><b>Intervention Logic</b></p> <p><u>Specific Objective A:</u> To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter, cooking fuel and non food items for displaced persons.</p>	<p><b>Performance Indicators</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mortality rates.             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Crude mortality rate CMR &lt; 7 / 1,000 / year.</li> <li>Under 5 mortality rate U5MR &lt; 8 / 1,000 / year.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Children &lt; 5 with wasting malnutrition &lt; 5%.</li> <li>Population diagnosed with clinically apparent thiamine (vitamin B<sub>1</sub>) deficiency &lt; 10 / 1,000 / month</li> </ol>	<p><b>Means of Verification for Monitoring and Coordination</b></p> <p><b>CCSDPT Health Information System</b> Mortality rates (CMR, U5MR). Children identified as malnourished from clinic visits Clinical incidence of thiamine deficiency</p> <p><b>Annual Nutrition surveys :</b> Children &lt;5 weight / height measurements (WHO/NCHS z scores)</p>	<p><b>Assumptions and Risks</b></p> <p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RTG policy allows appropriate level of services and access.</li> <li>- Cooperation from medical agencies.</li> <li>- Medical agencies screen for malnutrition.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sudden massive influx of new arrivals.</li> <li>- Presence of epidemics.</li> <li>- Armed attacks on camps.</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather, natural disasters.</li> </ul>
<p><u>Expected Results</u></p> <p>1A. Nutritional needs of all refugees in camps are met and the nutrition of other displaced people is improved</p> <p>2A. Displaced persons receive adequate and appropriate quantity and quality of food, shelter and non-food items</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ration provides minimum av. 2,220 kcales / person.</li> <li>Adherence to TBBC Supplementary and therapeutic feeding protocols by all health agencies to adequately cover the needs of identified target groups malnourished children and adults, pregnant/lactating women, chronic/HIV/TB patients, and IPD patients</li> <li>Children &lt; 5 identified as malnourished are enrolled in supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes – 100%</li> <li>Vitamin A coverage of children &lt; 5 &gt; 95%.</li> </ol> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commodities meet the quality specifications agreed upon by TBBC and the suppliers. 95%</li> <li>Distribution points readily accessible to all recognised population recorded by camp committee and at convenient times. 100%</li> </ol> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Population receive supplies as planned. 95%</li> </ol> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eucalyptus, Bamboo and thatch provide sufficient covered space per person (3.5 – 4.5) m<sup>2</sup>/person.</li> <li>Cooking fuel meets minimum energy requirement. 190mJ/p/m.</li> <li>Households have fuel efficient Cooking Stoves – 100%</li> <li>Sufficient blankets, bednets, mats.</li> <li>Clothing distributed to everyone – &gt; 12 yr receive camp produced longyi bi-annually 1 piece warm clothing/person/yr &lt; 5 years: 1 set clothing/ yr.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Means of Verification for Monitoring and Coordination</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nutritional analysis of ration.</li> <li>Monthly supplementary and therapeutic feeding statistics CCSDPT HIS</li> <li>Children &lt; 5 enrolled in supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes (excluding new arrivals).</li> <li>CCSDPT HIS Vitamin A coverage</li> <li>Quality-Independent inspectors' reports, Acceptance by camp committee.</li> <li>Warehouse locations monitored:             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No of refugees per distribution point.</li> <li>Furthest walking distance from distribution point.</li> <li>Camp distribution schedules.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Warehouse checks -Stock and Distribution records, Distribution points -Ration received after distribution- at distribution point. Household visits - Ration books. Materials provided can build minimum: 35 m<sup>2</sup> - standard house (1-5 people) 7m/p, 54 m<sup>2</sup> – large (6+)5.4 m/p</li> <li>Laboratory test: MJoules/kg. Assessment of cooking habits.</li> <li>Household survey</li> <li>Household checks, distribution of blankets, nets and mats</li> <li>Longyi production in camps: No of looms, longyis produced. Distributions of warm clothing, &lt;5 years clothing.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- RTG allows appropriate level of services and access.</li> <li>- Sufficient commodities available in marketplace.</li> <li>- Space available in camp.</li> <li>- Donor commitment to funding.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sudden massive influx of new arrivals.</li> <li>- Presence of epidemics.</li> <li>- Armed attacks on camps.</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather, natural disasters</li> <li>- Forced repatriation</li> </ul>



<p><b>Specific Objective B:</b> To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation</p>	<p>Displaced Communities capacities and resources are utilised.</p>	<p><b>Community responsibilities</b> include</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Camp management.</li> <li>Supply chain management : maintenance of warehouses, receiving, storing, and distributing supplies.</li> <li>Conducting Training</li> </ol>	<p><b>Assumptions</b> Displaced Communities want to work with TBBC Risk</p>																		
<p><b>Expected Results:</b> 1B. Equitable community participation in all stages of project cycle 2B effective feedback mechanisms are strengthened 3B. Duplication and competition are minimised 4B. Continuous delivery of the programme by reducing the negative impacts on the Royal Thai Government and local Thai communities.</p>	<p>1.1 50% women in distribution process 50% camp committee positions held by women 1.2 Scheduled CBO meetings 2.1 Suggestion boxes functioning in 9 camps 2.2 Scheduled CBO meetings 3.1 TBBC is primary provider of food, shelter and non food items 3.2 Membership of CCSDPT Multi sectoral Networking meetings attended / month &gt;7 3.3 Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative: Coordinated evaluation plan 4.1 Timely delivery of commodities 4.2 Non interference in delivery of services by local communities</p>	<p>1.1 Camp staff lists, Camp management roles and responsibilities defined 1.2.2.2 Participants and minutes of meetings with CBOs 2.1 Standard monitoring forms recording Comments received. 3.1 Monitoring in camp 3.2 Positions held and participation in CCSDPT, Protection Working Group, Provincial and Camp coordination meetings. 3.3 Evaluation plan for 2007 3.4 Minutes of meetings 4.1,4.2 Goods Received Note - GRN</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b> 1.1 Percentage will increase annually to 50% 2.1 RTG allows boxes to be set up 3.1 all service providers have access to CCSDPT</p>																		
<p><b>Specific Objective C:</b> To strengthen Capacities of Displaced people and their communities for self reliance</p>	<p>Training integrated throughout programme delivery i.e. Camp management -CMP, Supply chain management -SCM, Food Security -FS, clothing -NFI, nutrition</p>	<p>Training conducted :</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="783 730 943 1155"> <thead> <tr> <th>Topic</th> <th>Content</th> <th>Trainees</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>CMP</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>SCM</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>FS</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>NFI</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nutrition</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Topic	Content	Trainees	CMP			SCM			FS			NFI			Nutrition			
Topic	Content	Trainees																			
CMP																					
SCM																					
FS																					
NFI																					
Nutrition																					
<p><b>Expected Results:</b> 1C. Livelihood and food security initiatives are strengthened 2C. Capabilities for project and community management are strengthened 3C. Community strategies for coping with shocks are strengthened</p>	<p>1.1 CAN Training activities in all camps . 1.2 Income generation activities in all camps 2.1 Outputs delivered with only basic materials and financial support. Longyis produced for &gt; 12yrs bi-annually 2.2 Ratio of TBBC field staff to Camp management staff ≤1: 30 3.1 Community services are uninterrupted</p>	<p>1.1 No. of Demonstration gardens. 1.2 Longyi weaving – labour cost for weavers Stove production – incentives provided 2.1 Field reports Purchase orders 2.2 TBBC staff lists, CMP records 3.1 Feedback from CBOs, NGOs 3.2 Systematic monitoring</p>																			
<p><b>Specific Objective D:</b> To increase understanding of the nature and root causes of the conflict and displacement</p>	<p><b>Ongoing donor support</b> 1.1 Non-refoulement 1.2 All Refugees are registered 2.1 Regular Meetings between displaced persons and RTG, Donors, Government representatives</p>	<p><b>Programmes fully funded</b> 1.1, 1.2 UNHCR , MOI statistics 2.1 Visits to camps, meetings and travel facilitated by TBBC Reports, Publications International meetings attended</p>																			
<p><b>Expected Results:</b> 1D. Protection and solutions for displaced persons are enhanced 2D. Stakeholders are able to develop their own advocacy strategies</p>																					

<p><b>Activities</b></p> <p><b>A</b> Issue tenders, evaluate bids for supply and delivery of rice, mung beans, oil, salt, fish paste, chillies, fortified flour, cooking fuel, eucalyptus poles, plastic sheeting, mats, bednets, blankets, cooking pots. Award contracts to Suppliers, Issue purchase orders against contracts. Purchase, bamboo, thatch, thread for longyis, clothing &lt; 5 years, materials for stoves production, stoves. Monitor delivery and distribution of supplies. Reimbursement of Supplementary feeding and nursery school lunch programmes.</p> <p><b>B</b> Camp committee (CC) receives and checks deliveries. CC undertakes storage of supplies. CC distributes rations. Field Staff meet regularly with other service providers. TBBC executive director chairs monthly coordination meeting in Bangkok. TBBC co chairs health sub committee meeting TBBC facilitates Protection Working Group. TBBC issues 6 month report.</p> <p><b>C</b> Field offices respond to local requests: distribute relief supplies, support for local Thai authorities provide school lunches and emergency relief.</p> <p><b>D</b> Provide training and education in nutrition, appropriate gardening, camp management, warehouse management, quality control. Purchase and monitor delivery and distribution of seeds, crop trees, small livestock, tools, Purchased materials for income generation activities</p> <p><b>D</b> Provide briefings, presentations at conferences, reports, publications</p>	<p><b>Means</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Personnel – field and Bangkok with relevant language skills.</li> <li>- Offices – Field, Bangkok</li> <li>- 4WD vehicles.</li> <li>- Training.</li> <li>- Warehouses in camps.</li> <li>- Documented processes – Procurement, Financial controls, Monitoring, Programme Guidelines and Staff Policy Manuals in place</li> </ul>	<p>% of purchases tendered. Average no of bids. Delivery slips/Purchase orders. Camp visits: Monthly monitoring checklist. Camp records. Claims/ payments to Medical agencies, CBOs GRN. Observation, responses to requests for materials. Observation, distribution records in camp, payroll of camp staff involved. Meeting minutes, monthly reports from all field staff. Reports from local authorities.</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme approval from RTG.</li> <li>- Donor commitment to funding.</li> <li>- Sufficient commodities available in marketplace.</li> <li>- Space available in camp.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sudden massive influx of new arrivals.</li> <li>- Armed attacks on camps.</li> <li>- Access denied due to weather.</li> <li>- Warehouses damaged by weather.</li> </ul>
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## Table E.2. Programme objectives and performance indicators

Programme Objectives and Performance Indicators		Standard	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
<i>(see also Logical Framework Fig F.1 and Appendix F)</i>							Jan-Jun	
<b>A:</b>	<b>To ensure access to adequate and appropriate food, shelter, cooking fuel and non-food items</b>							
	<b>Health</b>							
	1a	Crude mortality rate (CMR)/ 1,000/ year	<7	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.5	na
	1b	<5 Mortality Rate (U5MR)/ 1,000 <5/ year	<8	7.2	6.5	5.3	4.9	na
	2	Percentage of children <5 with wasting malnutrition	<5%	3.34%	3.62%	4.10%	2.80%	na
	3	Diagnosed Thiamine deficiency rate/ 1000/ month	<10	4.3	4.4	2.4	2	na
	<b>Nutrition</b>							
<b>1A:</b>	1.1	Average number of kCal/ person/ day	≥ 2,181	2,250	2,270	2,280	2,210	2,210
	1.2	Adherence to TBBC SFP, TFP	Yes	na	na	Yes	Yes	Yes
	1.3	Percentage of children identified as malnourished, enrolled in SFP	100%	na	na	100%	100%	100%
	1.4	Percentage of children <5 receive Vitamin A	≥95%		97.80%	94.80%	0%	0%
	<b>Commodities</b>							
<b>2A:</b>	2.1	Percentage of Commodities meeting quality specifications						
		Rice	95%	97.50%	100%	82%	89%	82%
		Mung beans	95%	100%	100%	87%	77%	60%
		Oil	95%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Charcoal	95%	46%	86%	64%	64%	55%
		Chillies	95%	n/a	100%	86%	36%	79%
		Fish paste	95%	n/a	56%	96%	97%	90%
		Salt	95%	n/a	100%	89%	74%	100%
		Fortified flour	95%		99.50%	86%	60%	51%
		Sugar	95%				100%	100%
		Soybean cake	95%				100%	100%
		Tinned fish						100%
	2.2	Accessibility of Distribution Points	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Max no. of refugees/ distribution point	< 20,000	11,470	11,100	11,631	12,566	12,213
		Average No. of refugees/ distribution point	< 10000	3,323	4,152	4,203	4,550	4,570
		Maximum walking distance to distribution point	< 5 kms	1 kms	1 kms	1.5kms	1.5	1.5
		Distribution times available in advance	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes	yes	yes
	2.3	Population receives ration as planned	95%	92%	92%	98.7	100.1%	99.2%
	<b>Shelter</b>							
	2.4	Building materials provide sufficient covered space per person	≥ 3.5 m <sup>2</sup>	7 m <sup>2</sup>	7 m <sup>2</sup>	7 m <sup>2</sup>	5.75 m <sup>2</sup>	5.2 m <sup>2</sup>
		Percentage of adequate dwellings	100%	n/a	98.2%	99%	95%	92%
	<b>Cooking Fuel</b>							
	2.5	Cooking Fuel meets Minimum energy requirement/ month	≥ 190 MJ	178 MJ	206 MJ	193	198.3	198.4
	2.6	Household have fuel efficient stoves	100%	n/a	n/a	90%	95%	98%
	2.7	Sufficient Blankets, bednets and mats	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		% Blankets distributed/ population	50%	57.5%	55.7%	51%	55.5%	dist Oct
		% Bednets distributed/ population	33%	30.4%	35.7%	38%	34%	48.5%
		% Sleeping mats distributed/ population	33%	22%	0%	39%	dist 2007	48.4%
	2.8	Everyone receives some clothing	≥ 1			1.5	1.5	
		% pop > 12 yrs received Camp produced longyi ( M/ F alternate years)	50%	50%	51%	49%	50%	31%
		% pop received warm clothing	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	dist Oct
		% < 5 years received 1 set new clothing	100%	n/a	95%	100%	100%	100%
<b>B:</b>	<b>To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation</b>							
		Displaced persons capacities and resources are utilised	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>1B:</b>	1.1	% women in distribution	50%	n/a	7%	11%	35%	35%
		% women on Camp committees	50%	n/a	22%	22%	28%	28%
	1.2	Structured meetings with CCs, CBOs - borderwide	≥ 4/mth	2	2	7	7	8
<b>2B:</b>	2.1	Suggestion boxes functioning in all camps	9 camps			9	9	9
<b>3B:</b>	3.1	TBBC primary provider of food, shelter and non food items	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	3.2	Membership of CCSDPT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Multi-sectoral networking meetings attended/ month	6			11	11	11
	3.3	Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative- annual coordinated evaluation plan	for 2006			1	0	0
<b>4B:</b>	4.1	Timely delivery of commodities	100%			87.4%	75.7%	82.4%
	4.2	Non-interference in delivery of services by local community	0			0	0	0
<b>C:</b>	<b>To strengthen capacities of displaced people and their communities for self reliance</b>							
		Training integrated throughout programme delivery	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>1C:</b>	1.1	CAN Training activities in all camps	9 camps	Yes	Yes	7	9	7
	1.2	Income generation activities in all camps	9			9	9	9
		Longyi weaving	9			9	9	9
		Stove production	9			4	4	4
<b>2C:</b>	2.1	Outputs delivered with only basic materials and financial support-longyis	52,465 for 12mths			51,160	51,730	32,686
	2.2	Percentage of TBBC staff : Camp management staff	<5%			3%	2.8%	2.7%
<b>3C:</b>	3.1	Community services are uninterrupted	yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>D:</b>	<b>To increase understanding of nature and root causes of the conflict and displacement</b>							
		Ongoing Donor Support	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>1D:</b>	1.1	Non-refoulement-registered refugees	0			0	Yes	0
	1.2	All refugees are registered	100%			76%	91%	92%
<b>2D:</b>	2.1	Meetings between displaced persons and RTG, Donors, Gov.reps.	> 1/ month			2	2	2
		<i>See Appendix F for information regarding indicators which are below standard</i>						


**Figure E.4: Acute and chronic malnutrition rates in children <5 (% <5 population) 2003 to 2006**

Camps	2003	2004	2005	2006	2003	2004	2005	2006
	Global acute malnutrition W/H: < -2SD				Global chronic malnutrition H/A: < -2SD			
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Site 1	3.4	2.0	2.6	3.2	31.9	29.8	30.0	25.5
Site 2	2.2	1.3	2.3	1.0	37.1	35.3	37.1	45.3
MLO (MKK)	2.9	5.7	3.6	3.6	43.2	39.0	48.6	49.0
Mae Ra Ma Luang	2.5	2.4	5.0	5.0	30.9	40.5	47.6	47.6
Mae La	2.9	4.5	4.0	4.0	43.2	37.8	39.5	37.6
Umpiem	3.9	3.8	3.4	2.1	48.4	42.0	38.2	32.9
Nu Po	4.1	5.0		1.6	42.7	28.5		37.9
Tham Hin		6.5	2.7	2.1		39.6	28.8	38.0
Ban Don Yang	4.3	2.9	3.9	1.6	34.1	46.7	36.6	41.8
<b>All Camps</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>36.0</b>	<b>39.6</b>

(Note: Surveys were not conducted in Tham Hin camp in 2003; 2005 data for Nu Po camp were not completed due to staffing changes in the health agency.)

Data from nutrition surveys conducted between 2001 and 2006 indicate a stable, decreasing trend in acute malnutrition rates border-wide. Border-wide, chronic malnutrition remains high and appears to show an increasing trend from the past several years (Figure E.5). Variation in chronic malnutrition trends may be due to several factors: 1) measurement variation at the camp level or sampling error; 2) efficacy of growth monitoring and surveillance, which help to prevent children becoming severely malnourished or malnourished for extended periods of time; and 3) changing demographics from resettlement. (Note: several camps were not included in the analysis in 2003 and 2005, skewing border-wide data slightly.)

**Figure E.5: Trend of Acute and Chronic Malnutrition in TBBC Camps in Children <5**




Enrolment in supplementary feeding programs has increased significantly from previous years, indicating that more children who are malnourished are being identified and treated (see Indicator (A) 2.3).

The high level of chronic malnutrition is currently being partially addressed by the introduction of fortified blended food into the camps. The blended food provided will increase the quantities and variety of micronutrients in the TBBC ration basket, and provide an easily prepared infant and weaning food at the household level. Lack of micronutrients and easily used food for child feeding has been identified as the main identified reasons for the high rates, although there remain many additional factors that contribute to chronic malnutrition. The rates will continue to be monitored, but significant changes could take nearly a generation.

Data disaggregated by sex show higher malnutrition rates in girls than in boys between 2003-2005, but a similar, and lower, rate in 2006 (Figure F.6). This issue will continue to be monitored.

**Figure E.6: Comparison of Acute Malnutrition Rates in Girls and Boys in All Camps Combined 2003 - 2006**



**Indicator (A) 3:**

**Population diagnosed with clinically apparent thiamine (vitamin B<sub>1</sub>) deficiency < 10/ 1,000/ month**

**Means of Verification**

- CCSDPT Health Information System data for clinical incidence of thiamine deficiency.

Previously, rates of Beriberi (vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency) were monitored and used as an indicator of the TBBC programme. However, the symptoms of mild Beriberi are somewhat non-specific and laboratory confirmation of cases is not possible in Thailand. Because of this, it was not possible to attribute any changes in rates specifically to TBBC programme activities, and so these data are no longer used as an indicator for programme. Instead, data and trends on vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency are reported in the annual Nutrition Situation Update to assist in surveillance and interpretation of the overall health and nutrition situation in the camps.


**Figure E.7** summarizes data collected from all camps for 2006 show the following incidence rates of vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency during the period:

**Figure E.7: Vitamin B1 Deficiency, January to December 2006**


Age Group	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Under 5 Years	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.93	0.65	0.58	0.71	0.40	0.70
All Ages	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.8	2.2	2.6	1.5	1.7	1.2

Rate = Cases/ 1000 population  
Data from CCSDPT HIS 2006

According to the Sphere Project, the nutritional needs of the population are met when ‘there are no cases of beriberi’ (vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency). Following medic training in early 2001 and revision of the Burmese Border Guidelines in 2003 to include a more clear case definition for diagnosing vitamin B<sub>1</sub> deficiency, the rates continue to decline overall, possibly indicating more accurate detection (**Figure E.8**). Because of the diet based on polished rice and other factors that inhibit vitamin B<sub>1</sub>, some cases of deficiency will be expected, and rates continue to be monitored. However, the decreasing trend may be partially attributable to the increased amount of B<sub>1</sub> in the diet from the fortified blended food.







**Expected Result 1A:**

**Nutritional needs of all refugees in camps are met and the nutrition of other displaced people is improved**

**Indicator (A) 1.1:**

**Ration provides minimum of 2,210 kcals/ person/ day**

**Means of Verification**

- Nutritional analysis of ration.

The nutritional content of TBBC's full food basket standard ration that includes the addition of AsiaMIX and sugar and the reduction in rice and yellow beans is calculated at approximately 2,210 kcals/ person/ day on average. This exceeds the WFP/ UNHCR recommendation for planning rations at 2,100 kcals/ person/ day. Calculations for the specific demographic profile of the camp residents based on UNHCR registration statistics (May 2006), show that actual needs equals an average of 2,181 kcal/ person/ per day. Ration item calculations are based on data from the Institute of Nutrition at Mahidol University, ASEAN Food Composition Tables (2000), and have been updated to accommodate recent changes in commodities. The actual ration may vary slightly between camps, but all variations meet the minimum recommendation.

**Indicator (A) 1.2:**

Adherence to TBBC supplementary and therapeutic feeding protocols by all health agencies to adequately cover the needs of identified target groups (malnourished children and adults, pregnant and lactating women, chronic/ HIV/ TB patients, and IPD patients)

and

**Indicator (A) 1.3:**

All Children < 5 identified as malnourished are enrolled in supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes

**Means of verification**

- Monthly supplementary and therapeutic feeding statistics (protocols, target groups, coverage)

TBBC has, since mid-1999, presented statistics on the number of malnourished children under five receiving supplementary or therapeutic feeding from the health NGOs at their clinics. Statistics for the first half of 2007 are as follows:

**Figure E.9: Number of Children <5 Enrolled in Supplementary and Therapeutic Feeding Programmes Jan-June 2007**

NGO	Camp	Jan-07		Feb-07		Mar-07		Apr-07		May-07		Jun-07	
		Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev
IRC	Site 1	22	0	24	0	20	0	16	0	16	0	18	0
	Site 2	8	0	6	0	5	0	1	0	7	0	9	0
MI	MaeRaMaLuang	38	3	33	3	27	4	32	5	41	5	49	3
	Mae La Oon	82	0	78	0	85	0	95	0	98	0	87	0
AMI	Mae La	54	0	54	1	59	2	65	2	68	1	67	2
AMI/ ARC	Umpiem	24	0	32	1	53	3	76	0	75	2	62	4
	Nu Po	52	0	24	1	43	4	43	2	47	2	56	3
ARC	Ban Don Yang	27	1	7	1	25	1	30	0	29	0	31	0
IRC	Tham Hin	29	0	20	0	19	1	19	0	19	1	52	1
MRDC	Halochanee/ IDC					0	0						
<b>Total:</b>		<b>336</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>13</b>


Notes: Children enrolled in Supplementary feeding programs are between -2 and -3 z-scores weight/ height; children enrolled in Therapeutic feeding are <-3 z scores weight/ height. Figures based on monthly average enrolment reported by NGOs on statistics reports to TBBC. Population figures from CCSDPT 2006 Annual Health Statistics Report.

The average enrolment for the 1st half of 2007 was 370 children or 1.7% (of the under-5 population) in the camps (**Figure E.9**). This compares with average enrolment rates of 1.9%, 2.2%, 1.7%, and 2.0% in the previous four six-month periods respectively. Only an average of 10 children per month were admitted for severe malnutrition for all camps, representing only 0.05% of the under-five population, and only 2.8% of all malnourished children. This means that few children are becoming severely malnourished, those enrolled being identified and treated before their condition becomes severe. Note: data from Halochanee camp are incomplete in this period – see below).

Feeding programmes were successfully re-established in Halochanee/ IDC area in collaboration with the Mon Relief and Development Committee in April 2006, following the departure of Medecins Sans Frontieres. However, during the period, all trained Mon medics left their posts. This has required re-training of new medics during the period, and has resulted in reduced programme implementing capacity and incomplete data collection.

Data collected from 2003 indicate that the number of malnourished children enrolled in the supplementary feeding programmes increased significantly although the rate of acute malnutrition has fallen (**Figure E.10**). The increased enrolment reflects the implementation of new supplementary feeding guidelines and protocols, which include better identification of malnourished children during growth monitoring using z-scores, enrolment based on z-scores, and screening via nutrition surveys.

**Figure E.10: Malnutrition Rates Compared to Supplementary and Therapeutic Feeding Programme Enrolment 2003-2006**



Enrolment by gender varies by camp and by month, with most camps enrolling more girls than boys. This gap has closed slightly over the past year, as the rates of malnutrition in girls and boys are comparable (**Figure E.11**).

**Figure E.11: Average Enrolment of Children < 5 Enrolled in Supplementary Feeding Programmes by Gender January through June 2007**

NGO	Camp(s)	Average Caseload/ Month Boys	Average Caseload/ Month Girls
IRC	Site 1	7	13
	Site 2	2	4
MI	Mae Ra Ma Luang	22	19
	Mae La Oon	41	46
AMI	Mae La	26	37
AMI/ ARC	Umpiem	34	21
	Nu Po	24	23
ARC	Ban Don Yang	13	38
IRC	Tham Hin	8	19
MRDC	Halochanee/ IDC		
<b>Total:</b>		<b>170</b>	<b>200</b>

Figure E.12 summarises the average case-loads for each target group and the total enrolled over the period in the supplementary feeding programmes during the first half of 2007. Pregnant and lactating women make up the largest target groups that receive supplementary feeding.

Figure E.12: Average Enrolment in Supplementary Feeding Programs by Target Group: Jan-Jun 2007  
Average caseload/ Camp/ Month

Average Caseload/ Camp/ Month														
NGO	Camp	Preg	Lact	Mal Preg	Mal Lact	Mod Mal		Severe Mal		GAM	Chronic/ HIV/ TB	IPD	Patient House	Formula-fed Infants
						<5	>5	<5	>5					
IRC	Site 1	324	378	0	0	19	0	0	0	19	116		1,269	9
	Site 2	50	53	0	0	6	1	0	0	6	120			8
MI	MRML	155	391	6	9	36	2	4	0	40	78			10
	MLO	156	385	4	3	88	1	1	0	89	46		21	16
AMI	Mae La	749	1,068		30	61	6	2	2	63	73	15	0	45
	Umpiem							1	1	1	45	48	56	
	Nu Poh							3	1	3	19	92	92	
ARC	Umpiem	299	279	7	5	54	1	0	0	54	0			12
	Nu Poh	329	236	37	0	44	4	0	0	44	0			21
	Don Yang	94	97	19	1	25	13	1	1	25	37			3
IRC	Tham Hin	183	247	3	9	22	3	1	0	22	150			10
MRDC	HLK					0		0		0	0			
<b>Total:</b>		2,339	3,132	76	58	354	30	12	4	366	684	154	1,437	133
<b>Total admitted to programme during period</b>														
<b>Total:</b>		14,035	18,793	457	346	2,126	179	69	26	2,195	4,101	926	8,707	799

Notes: Mal - malnutrition  
 GAM = Global Acute Malnutrition = moderate + severe malnutrition  
 Chronic = patients with chronic condition needing ongoing supplementary feeding  
 IPD = Inpatient Department (at camp clinic)  
 Patient House = caregivers at referral hospital site  
 Formula Fed Infants = infants unable to breastfeed on clinic evaluation  
 \* Data for Ban Don Yang based on 3 months (Oct – Dec not yet submitted to TBBC)

#### Indicator (A) 1.4:

##### Vitamin A coverage $\geq$ 95% for children < 5

Due to the low rates of vitamin A deficiency, and in accordance with UNICEF requirements for reporting, the indicator for vitamin A has been revised to reflect supplement coverage, rather than incidence of deficiency. Coverage should be a minimum of 65% of the target population that receives vitamin A supplements. (As proposed by 'Monitoring Vitamin A Programmes', 'The Micronutrient Initiative', and 'Controlling Vitamin A Deficiency'. UN Subcommittee of Nutrition). UNICEF/ TBBC aims to cover 95% of target group.

##### Means of Verification

- CCSDPT Health Information System data for vitamin A coverage, health agency nutrition surveys

The medical agencies routinely provide Vitamin A supplements to children <5 because they are most at risk for deficiency (which can cause permanent blindness and illness), and most agencies also provide six-monthly supplements to children ages 5-12, since sources of vitamin A in the diet are low. TBBC has assumed responsibility for coordinating vitamin A procurement (via donation from UNICEF), distribution to medical agencies, and monitoring.

No vitamin A has been supplied to the Burma border following a partial shipment in April 2006, due to problems with importing the UNICEF donation. As a result, vitamin A prevention campaigns were not conducted in the camps during the last period, and coverage rates cannot be reported. TBBC is currently trying to find a producer in Thailand to supply the health agencies with vitamin A.

##### Expected Result 2A:

**Displaced persons receive adequate and appropriate quantity and quality of food, shelter and non-food items**

#### Indicator (A) 2.1:

**95% of commodities meet the quality specifications agreed upon by TBBC and the suppliers**

##### Means of Verification

- Reports of Independent Inspectors.
- Acceptance by camp committee.
- The information gathered from the Goods Received Notes, which are completed by refugee warehouse staff, is summarised in the following table. The disaggregated data for each camp represent all supplies for respective camps, January to June 2007 inclusively.

Figure E. 13: Summary of Goods Received Notes, Jan - Jun 2007

Camp/ Site	Weight (%)	Quality (acceptability) (%)	Timing of Delivery (%)
Site 1	99.6	100.0	91.8
Site 2	99.6	100.0	95.0
Mae Ra Ma Luang	95.1	100.0	90.1
Mae La Oon	97.5	100.0	85.7
Mae La	100.4	100.0	67.7
Umpiem Mai	100.5	100.0	65.1
Nu Po	99.8	97.9	46.5
Tham Hin	100.9	100.0	73.3
Don Yang	100.7	100.0	71.0
<b>All Camps:</b>	<b>99.3</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>76.3</b>

Notes:

1. A random sample of 10% of each delivery to camp (food or fuel item) is weighed by refugee warehouse staff and recorded on GRNs. Upon completion of the delivery of a particular purchase order, TBBC Field Assistants calculate the percentage of total order actually delivered using collated sampling data from the GRNs.
2. The Camp Committee and refugee Warehouse Managers record rejected deliveries of items perceived unacceptable in terms of quality. TBBC staff quantify, as a percentage, the amount of an order accepted by each Camp Committee.
3. Percentage of the order delivered during the contract delivery period.

The recorded percentages of weight and quality of items arriving in camps over the six months were high at 99.3 and 99.8 percent respectively, comparable with findings for the second half of 2006.

The timeliness of commodity delivery was 76.3%; a 0.6% improvement over the previous period. In general delivery periods are set at least several days prior to planned distributions in camp, recognising the difficulties suppliers often confront in attempting to keep strict delivery deadlines. In almost all cases late deliveries were in time for scheduled distributions. There were however a few instances in which a stock out occurred. These incidents were followed up with suppliers immediately and, fortunately, resulted in only a short delay in distribution. Timeliness of delivery has now been flagged as a problem area and field staff are constantly working to improve it.

In several instances, underweight or substandard supplies were picked up through monitoring on delivery to camp using GRNs. This information was taken to suppliers by TBBC staff and restitution made.

The following three Figures respectively demonstrate the proportions of expected weight of delivered orders, of orders accepted by camp committees, and orders delivered during the required period for the first half of 2007. The corresponding graphs also provide a comparison with data compiled during 2006. These Tables demonstrate the usefulness of the monthly monitoring summaries which are available to inform management, staff and other stakeholders so that prompt remedial action can be taken.

Figure E.14: Proportion of Expected Weight of Orders Delivered by Camp: January to June 2007

Camp/ Site	Jan (%)	Feb (%)	Mar (%)	Apr (%)	May (%)	Jun (%)	Jul (%)	Aug (%)	Sep (%)	Oct (%)	Nov (%)	Dec (%)
Site 1	99.9	100.3	99.0	99.6	99.1	99.4						
Site 2	100.5	98.3	99.5	101.2	98.5							
Mae Ra Ma Luang	101.0	99.5	99.2	80.5								
Mae La Oon	100.1	100.3	99.6	89.8								
Mae La	100.9	100.6	100.3	100.8	99.8	100.2						
Umpiem Mai	100.1	104.1	99.9	99.9	99.6	99.3						
Nu Po	99.1	99.8	100.5	99.7	99.9	99.8						
Tham Hin	101.0	100.7	103.3	101.4	99.4	99.4						
Don Yang	99.9	96.2	100.7	107.2	99.6	100.5						
<b>All Camps:</b>	<b>100.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.2</b>	<b>97.8</b>	<b>99.4</b>	<b>99.8</b>						




Figure E.15: Proportion of Orders Accepted by Camp Committees for Quality by Camp: Jan to Jun 2007

Camp/ Site	Jan (%)	Feb (%)	Mar (%)	Apr (%)	May (%)	Jun (%)	Jul (%)	Aug (%)	Sep (%)	Oct (%)	Nov (%)	Dec (%)
Site 1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
Site 2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0							
Mae Ra Ma Luang	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0								
Mae La Oon	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0								
Mae La	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
Umpiem Mai	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
Nu Po	87.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
Tham Hin	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
Don Yang	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						
<b>All Camps:</b>	<b>98.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>						





Figure E.16: Proportion of Orders Delivered During the Required Period by Camps: Jan to Jun 2007

Camp/ Site	Jan (%)	Feb (%)	Mar (%)	Apr (%)	May (%)	Jun (%)	Jul (%)	Aug (%)	Sep (%)	Oct (%)	Nov (%)	Dec (%)
Site 1	99.8	80.4	96.9	99.9	88.7	85.1						
Site 2	100.0	91.5	100.0	96.1	87.6							
Mae Ra Ma Luang	100.0	100.0	85.8	74.7								
Mae La Oon	93.1	87.5	100.0	62.4								
Mae La	83.2	49.3	55.3	51.3	84.0	83.3						
Umpiem Mai	71.4	87.5	50.0	37.5	82.6	61.4						
Nu Po	43.7	42.9	42.9	27.7	42.9	79.1						
Tham Hin	87.5	54.2	51.9	85.7	75.0	85.7						
Don Yang	69.1	0.0	57.1	100.0	100.0	100.0						
<b>All Camps:</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>71.1</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>80.1</b>	<b>82.4</b>						



From January to June 2007, a total of 246 independent, professional inspections for quality and weight were performed on food items and charcoal for nine camps. Figure E.17 summarises the results of quality and quantity control inspections made by independent inspectors on shipments during the period.



Figure E.17: Results of Quality Control Inspections January to June 2007

Commodity	Quantity Checked <sup>1</sup>	% of all purchases in period <sup>2</sup>	% checked at camps <sup>3</sup>	% Sampled <sup>4</sup>	Quantity Check		Quality Check	
					Quantity Verified <sup>5</sup>	% <sup>6</sup>	Quantity Meeting Standard <sup>7</sup>	% <sup>8</sup>
Rice (MT)	9 928	59	97%	10	9 965	100,4%	8 140	82%
Mung Beans (MT)	578	69	100%	10	580	100,4%	348	60%
Cooking Oil (ltr)	847 358	82	100%	10	855 225	100,9%	855 225	100%
Charcoal (MT)	4 324	55	91%	10	4 381	101,3%	2 408	55%
Dried Chillies (MT)	101	79	96%	10	101	100,3%	80	79%
Fishpaste (MT)	752	117	60%	10	769	102,3%	692	90%
Salt (MT)	343	93	100%	10	343	100,2%	343	100%
AsiaMIX (MT)	635	63	0%	10	636	100,2%	323	51%
Sugar (MT)	120	56	100%	10	121	100,6%	121	100%
Soybean Cakes (MT)	4	28	100%	10	4	101,0%	4	100%
Tinned Fish (kg)	56 374	51	100%	AQL	56 374	100,0%	56 374	100%

- Quantity checked** is the total amount covered by the quality control inspections. This is determined by the number of supply containers covered by the inspections multiplied by TBBC's required net weight/ volume per container for each commodity.
- Percentage of all purchases in period** means the percentage of Quantity Checked (explained in 1) compared with the total amount of supplies that TBBC purchased during this 6 month period.
- Percentage checked at camps** is the percentage of supplies which were inspected at camps of the total Quantity Checked explained in (1).
- Percentage sampled** refers to the sampling target for gross/ net weight only. The sampling target of 10% means one in ten of containers available for inspection will be checked for weight. The sampling percentage for quality checks varies among commodities depending on the degree of difficulty in assessing and taking product samples (i.e., to open sacks/ tins/ drums). The current target for quality sampling is 10% for rice, beans, and chillies, 5% for charcoal, 2% for cooking oil, and 1% for salt and fish-paste.
- Quantity verified** is the actual net weight/ volume found by the inspectors.
- Percentage** is the percentage of the Quantity Verified (described in 5) compared with the Quantity Checked (explained in 1). The quantity verified of 100% or over means that the quantity of supplies delivered meets the contract requirements, while the quantity verified under 100% means supplies are delivered less than the contracted quantity, as determined by average net weight/ volume found by the inspectors.
- Quantity meeting standard** is the amount identified by inspectors as meeting the quality/ packaging contract standard.
- Percentage** is the percentage of the Quantity Meeting Standard in quality (explained in 7) compared to the Quantity Verified (explained in 5).

The target for inspections for all of the above commodities is 50% of all deliveries to Mae La and Umpiem Mai, and once per contract (usually six months) for all other camps. By quantity, 28% to 117% of each item was randomly checked by inspectors during this period.

The results of independent inspections show that the quantity of supplies delivered by TBBC's vendors were in accordance with the contracted amount. This was determined by net weight/ volume of supplies delivered. Overall, both the inspectors and camp committees found the weight supplies to be over 100% of expected.

TBBC aims to conduct the majority of supply inspections in the camps. From January to June 2007, 86% of supply inspections took place in camp warehouses. Due to the ex-factory terms where the seller's responsibility ends at source, all inspections of AsiaMIX are carried out at the factory.

These independent checks are in addition to quality checks done by camp committees. As indicated, these are conducted on newly delivered supplies to camp and recorded on GRNs as the 'number of containers rejected'.

Camp committees not uncommonly accept supplies which fail professional inspections. In most cases this is very reasonable. Professional inspections encompass a wide-range of parameters for each commodity. A commodity which has failed inspection usually does so due to a minor infraction of a single parameter which, in practical terms, has no adverse effect on nutrition or health and is negligible in terms of acceptability. The standards, nonetheless, are set and TBBC makes every effort to achieve these for each commodity delivered to camps.

For the first six months of the year 100% of cooking oil, salt, fish tin, soya cakes and sugar tested passed quality specifications. On the other hand, 49% of AsiaMIX, 45% of charcoal, 40% of mung beans, 21% of dried chillies, 18% of rice, and 10% of fish-paste were found to be sub-standard.

The responses to failed checks vary: no action taken; verbal or written warning to suppliers; financial or top-up penalties to suppliers; replacement of failed supplies; and occasionally discontinuance of contracts. Replacement of supplies and top-up penalties are the preferred options as these ensure refugees receive the entitled ration or equivalent of intended standard. TBBC aims that not more than 5% of failed item orders are distributed in camp. Warnings and financial penalties are issued to encourage suppliers to improve performance for subsequent deliveries.

The following table displays the number of inspections/ tests performed on each item, the number and percentage failed, and the outcomes of failed tests.

Figure E.18: Inspections and Tests on Food & Fuel Items and Outcomes of Failed Tests, January to June 2007

Commodity	Number of Tests Done	Number (%) of Failed Tests	Reason	Outcomes of Failed Tests					
				Replacement	Top-up	Financial Penalty	Warning	No Action	Other
Rice	41	5 (12%)	Presence of weevils (3) and paddy seeds (2)		1		4		
Mung Beans	29	6 (21%)	High damaged and dark yellow seeds		2	2	2		
Cooking Oil	38	0 (0%)	-						
Charcoal	37	17 (46%)	Low heating value* (6)		6		10		Retesting, waiting decision 1
Dried Chillies	35	9 (26%)	High unripe/ damaged berries High moisture		5		4		
Fish-paste	22	3 (14%)	Bacterial contamination						Not to deliver from well 3
Salt	20	0 (0%)	-						
AsiaMIX	6	4 (67%)	Low Iron +/- Low Vit C in Premix						Supplier Informed 4
Sugar	8	0 (0%)	-						
Fish tin	4	0 (0%)	-						
Soybean Cake	6	0 (0%)	-						
<b>Total:</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>44 (18%)</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>

\* +/- high ash/ moisture/ volatility

Less than a fifth of original supply orders were below standard but in most cases there was immediate restitution and/or actions aimed to effect long-term improvement. The only failed item of significant health risk was fish-paste but TBBC asked the supplier not to deliver from the production units (wells) where the samples were taken. This was detected at source and replaced with safe produce.

Charcoal quality remains a concern but compared with last year, tremendous effort has been made to get better heating value; less than two third of charcoal quality tests failed on composition only. 6 consignments failing to offer standard heating value were topped up with further quantities.

Dried chilli supplies are still substandard but results are much better than last year when there were severe market shortages. During the first half of the year severe penalties were issued to suppliers to try to resolve this.

AsiaMIX failed most of the tests due to insufficient vitamin C and Iron in the premix. The supplier will try to negotiate with the premix producers for better quality.

In conclusion, the percentage of supplies which met quality specifications during the first half of 2007 continued to be considerably below the 95% target. However, the monitoring system is picking these cases up and leading to timely responses to markedly reduce substandard supplies month by month. Furthermore, continued and consistent response through the issuance of warnings and penalties to suppliers is expected to improve quality in the long term.

#### **Indicator (A) 2.2:**

**100% distribution points are readily accessible to all recognised population recorded by camp committee and at convenient times**

##### **Means of Verification**

- Warehouse locations. Number of refugees per distribution point.
- Warehouse locations. Furthest walking distance from distribution point.
- Camp Committee distribution schedules.

The average number of refugees served by each distribution centre is 4,570, with a maximum of 12,213 in Mae La and a minimum of 1,237 in Site 2. (Sphere Project minimum standard is 1 distribution point: 20,000 people).

All **camp distribution points** are within **1.5 kilometre** walking distance of the population. (UNHCR recommends that no one should have to walk more than **five kms**).

Refugees are informed of distribution times in advance. Distribution is carried out all day by section but supplies may be collected after the allocated distribution time.

#### **Indicator (A) 2.3:**

**95% recognised population receive the rations planned**

##### **Means of Verification**

- TBBC monitoring procedures

Figure E.19 summarises findings from other monitoring activities from January to June 2007.

**Figure E.19: Other Monitoring Checks January to June 2007**

Camp	No. of monitoring Visits <sup>1</sup>	Warehouse Check (% Pass) <sup>2</sup>	Distribution Point Check <sup>3</sup>		Supply & Distribution reconciliation (%) <sup>4</sup>
			% households Checked	Distribution Efficiency (% pass)	
Site 1	103	73.7	1.37	98.1	98.8
Site 2	39	79.2	2.15	99.7	99.4
Mae Ra Ma Luang	86	70.0	1.15	95.0	100.2
Mae La Oon	71	67.9	1.07	87.5	100.2
Mae La	118	88.3	1.00	91.7	99.9
Umpiem Mai	91	82.5	1.03	94.8	100.2
Nu Po	41	84.0	1.22	98.3	100.0
Tham Hin	51	85.4	1.55	89.8	94.5
Ban Don Yang	62	88.3	1.50	93.4	99.5
<b>Total:</b>	<b>662</b>				
<b>Average/ Camp:</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>79.9</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>94.2</b>	<b>99.2</b>

1. Number of visiting TBBC staff (Field Assistants and Field Coordinators) times the number of days each camp is visited for monitoring.
2. Each TBBC Field Assistant assesses two warehouses a month according to a checklist of 20 indicators encompassing: cleanliness; state of repair; rodent protection and activity; organisation and condition of stock; and signage. The data is presented as percentage of indicators passed.
3. At least 1% of warehouse distribution to households is observed for any commodity once monthly per camp. Monitoring is performed and 'distribution efficiency' computed according to a checklist of 10 indicators involving: ration calculation, measurement and delivery; use of ration books; presence of ration posters, monitoring feedback information and of comments post-boxes.
4. Supplies distributed as a percentage of supplies delivered. Proportions below 97% are considered unacceptable.

During these six months, TBBC field staff made 662 monitoring visits to nine refugee camps. An average of 73.6 visits per camp were made for the six months, or 8.2 visits to each camp per month, with a six-month maximum of 118 (Site 1) and a minimum of 39 (Site 2).

Ambitious indicators are set in conjunction with monthly monitoring of warehouses. For this period, the percent pass indicated a 5.10% increase over the second half of 2006 (range 67.9 to 88.3%). Failed parameters continue to relate mostly to: poor stacking of sacks and external/ internal cleanliness. Warehouse rules have now been established and distributed in all camps. Renovation and or reconstruction of warehouses was completed in early 2007, this will assist in facilitating better warehouse practices. TBBC field staff in all sites have been conducting ongoing trainings with warehouse staff in camp, to reinforce best practice in warehouse management.

A satisfactory overall proportion of households each month (average 1.34%; *target*; 1%) was observed by TBBC field staff receiving a commodity during warehouse distribution. This represents a 0.66% decrease over the average figure for the second half of 2006. Distribution monitoring demonstrated a good increase in the average distribution efficiency from 90.9% to 94.2%, (range 87.5 to 99.7%).

This measure takes into account ration calculation, measurement and delivery; use of ration books; and the presence of ration posters, monitoring feedback information and comments post-boxes. It looks not only at the ration received, but also at possible causes of why a ration may not be received as planned. This includes systematic error in weighing, calculation mistakes, non-use of ration books, recipients being uninformed of the correct ration, and recipients having no means to voice distribution problems or injustices.

A TBBC monthly news sheet (*TBBC News*) focusing on supply issues, elucidated by monitoring, is being produced and posted at warehouses. This is distributed to camp committees, section leaders and major CBOs. Predominantly it is this initiative, together with comprehensive cover of ration posters at distribution points, which has raised the percentage pass for this monitoring parameter. Significant improvement has been made regarding the problem of refugees not holding their own ration books but this issue is still to be completely resolved.

The 'receipt and distribution reconciliation' average of 99.2% border-wide remains excellent, with all camps demonstrating percentages above the benchmark of 97%. Tham Hin camp, nevertheless, showed an average of 94.5%. This is largely a result of the ongoing problems surrounding a safe supply of prawn-paste to the camp. Fish-paste was initially provided as an alternative to prawn-paste, however, it was not well accepted by the camp residents and as a result large amounts were left undistributed in the warehouse. All excess stock of fish-paste has now been transported for use in other camps. Ongoing tests are being conducted to find a safe source of prawn-paste for the camp as a solution.

In addition to the above quantitative data, TBBC field staff systematically gather qualitative data in camps monthly by means of anonymous comment post-boxes at warehouses and some CBO offices, and by documented discussions with householders and community groups. This important community feedback to TBBC covered a broad range of subjects but, as stated above, refugees consistently report that they receive the ration entitlement in full. They verify this by referring to ration posters, ration books, viewing weighing of rations and distributions, and checking with friends and section leaders. Most refugees report being able to supplement the supplied food basket by growing vegetables or by purchasing food. New comments boxes are currently being installed in camps in both Tak

and Mae Hong Son Province, to replace and or supplement existing boxes in an effort to improve the effectiveness of this key feedback mechanism.

**Indicator (A) 2.4:**

**Adequate dwellings are available for all the population. Minimum standard: 3.5m<sup>2</sup>/ person**

**Means of verification**

- Materials provide sufficient covered space.
- Every family has a separate dwelling 100%.

Eucalyptus, bamboo and thatch provide minimum 35 m<sup>2</sup> (standard house < 6 people) =7 m<sup>2</sup>/ person and 54m<sup>2</sup> (large house > 5 people), family of 12 = 4.5 m<sup>2</sup>/ person.

Estimated 92% of families have a separate house. All registered refugees have a house, but most new arrivals are either sharing with other families or are staying in longhouses.

**Indicator (A) 2.5:**

**Cooking fuel provided meets minimum energy requirement. 190 MJoules/ person/ month**

**Means of Verification**

- Random samples and laboratory testing to confirm MJoules/ kg of fuel provided.
- Assessment of cooking habits.

A survey conducted in 2004 estimated that people needed an average 190 MJ/ month to cook their meals and boil water for drinking. The average ration provided for the first half of the year was 8kg/ person with an effective mean heating value of 24.8 MJ/ kg providing 198.4 MJ/ person/ month, and therefore meeting requirements. (see Indicator (A) 2.1).

**Indicator (A) 2.6:**

**All households have fuel efficient stoves**

**Means of Verification**

- Household survey.

A survey conducted late in 2005 established on average 90% of households had a fuel efficient bucket stove. Although Site 1 & 2, Nu Po, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La and Umpiem have established stove-making projects, the focus has been on the vocational training aspect of the project hence very limited production has been established. Stoves were purchased locally and delivered to all camps in the first half of 2006 to make up the shortfall. Another survey is planned for the second half of 2007.

**Indicator (A) 2.7:**

**Sufficient blankets, bednets and mats**

**Means of verification**

- Household checks for the above items are informal to ensure
  - 1 Blanket/ person
  - 1 Family size Bednet/ 3 people
  - 1 Sleeping Mat/ 3 people

75,250 bednets and 75,050 mats were distributed. The increase is due to the need to supply additional single nets to families with a child who no longer shares with their parents. Blankets are distributed in the second half of the year.

**Indicator (A) 2.8:**

**Clothing distributed to everyone.**

**Means of verification**

- Number of Longyis produced in each camp: Longyis for adults in alternate years. Target 2007: 52,465.
- Warm clothing distributed: everyone receives warm clothing.
- 1 set clothing for <5 years distributed.

70 looms in camps were used to produce 32,686 longyis i.e. 62% of target for 2007. All camps are able to produce sufficient for their populations.

In the second half of 2007, all adults will receive 1 piece of warm clothing and all children <5 years received 1 set of regular clothes. The 5 to 12 population remains uncovered due to financial constraints. It is hoped to initiate a project with ZOA later this year to bridge that gap.

Specific Objective B:

**To increase collaboration with all stakeholders through effective partnerships and inclusive participation.**

**Indicator (B):**

**Displaced Communities capacities and resources are utilised**

**Means of verification**

- Community responsibilities include:
  - Camp management
  - Supply Chain management: maintenance of warehouses, receiving, storing, distributing supplies
  - Conducting training, surveys, nutrition education

**Expected Result 1B:**

**Equitable community participation in all stages of the project cycle**

**Indicator (B) 1.1:**

**50% women involved in distribution process, 50% camp committee positions are held by women**

**Means of verification**

- Camp staff lists
- Camp management roles and responsibilities defined

In Dec 2006 the average percentage of women on camp committees was 28%. (highest: Ban Don Yang 50%, lowest: Mae La 13%) Women's involvement in distribution work rose significantly from 13% to 35% for all camps (59% MaeLaOon, 12% Site #1). There were no further elections during the period

A Payroll has been established outlining different levels of responsibilities from camp leader to section leaders and security staff for warehouses. Job descriptions are currently being formalised.

**Indicator (B) 1.2:**

**Range of scheduled CBO meetings**

**Means of verification**

- Community Liaison Officer monthly reports and participant lists

In keeping with one of the objectives of the community liaison programme to 'provide an opportunity for the diverse sectors of the refugee community to be involved in the evaluation and planning of TBBC programming and to inform advocacy', during the first half of 2007 the Community Liaison Officer conducted meetings with a diversity of CBOs in Site 1, Umpiem Mai, Nu Po and in Ban Don Yang including on youth, women's, elderly, student and religious/ cultural issues. The demographic breakdown of participants within these groups reasonably reflects diversities within the communities they represent, including gender, ethnicity, age, and socio-economic variables.

One focus of these meetings has included gathering input into various stages of TBBC's project cycle, and during this period has informed programme in terms of:

- Revising building materials rations.
- Types of soaps suitable to household consumption and management styles.
- Defining an alternative to annual pot distribution.
- Areas for improvement to the Sarong Project.
- Increasing efficiencies in comments box utilisation.
- Feedback on commodity qualities.
- Identifying appropriate function of/ circulation methods for the TBBC newsletter.
- Pertinent issues within the community impacting TBBC programme, including resettlement.
- General developments within camps informing awareness/ advocacy initiatives.

Formal meetings with CBOs will be expanded into all camps during the next 6 months. In order to further community involvement in programme and to complement their function as a platform to inform programme, will explore opportunities to build on and/ or strengthen TBBC-CBO partnerships through collaboration in specific TBBC meetings with a diversity of CBOs.



## **Expected Result 2B:**

### **Effective feedback mechanisms are strengthened**

#### **Indicator (B) 2.1:**

##### **Suggestion boxes accessible in all camps**

###### **Means of verification**

- Monitoring forms – record Comments received.

By the end of 2005, locked comments boxes had been installed at distribution points in all nine camps, and in key CBO offices in some camps. These provide an opportunity for camp residents to give TBBC anonymous feedback and comments on supplies. The boxes have pictorial and written instructions on their use.

Comments are collected by TBBC field staff and evaluated monthly as part of TBBC's monitoring system. Most were requests for increased, new or alternative supplies. Some related to supply quality. Some related to protection issues. Others were for money or paid work opportunities. The number of comments is still very low, probably mainly due to security problems of the comments boxes. New boxes have been installed in camps in both Tak and Mae Hong Son Province, to replace and or supplement existing boxes in an effort to improve effectiveness.

## **Expected Result 3B: Duplication and competition are minimised**

### **Indicator (B) 3.1: TBBC is primary provider of food, shelter and non-food items**

###### **Means of verification**

- Monitoring of supplies received in camp.

### **Indicator (B) 3.2: Multi-sectoral meetings held/ month > 5**

###### **Means of verification**

- Positions held and minutes of Multi-sectoral meetings.

At least one staff member attends CCSDPT monthly Directors Meetings, Open, and Health and Environmental Health Subcommittee meetings, Provincial Coordination meetings (NGO/ Refugee Community/ UNHCR and NGO/ Refugee Community/ UNHCR/ RTG), NGO/ IO/ UNHCR meetings. TBBC currently holds Chair of CCSDPT and is the facilitator of the Bangkok Protection Working Group.

During the first half of 2007 TBBC also played leading roles in organising a CCSDPT/ UNHCR Donor Forum (involving both RTG and Donor embassy representatives) and a CCSDPT Directors/ UNHCR Retreat.

### **Indicator (B) 3.3:**

#### **Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative**

###### **Means of verification**

- Participants and minutes of meetings.

No specific meetings this period, but GDH principles are now implicit in responses expected from Donors. Many other meetings were held with Donors relating to funding raising.

## **Expected Result 4B:**

### **Continuous delivery of the programme by reducing the negative impacts on the Royal Thai Government and local Thai communities**

#### **Indicator (B) 4.1:**

##### **Timely Delivery of Commodities**

See Fig E:16. An average of 75.5% of commodities were delivered within the specified time period. While this is an improvement from the previous six months (70%), it remains unsatisfactory.

#### **Indicator (B) 4.2:**

##### **Non-interference in delivery of services by local communities**

###### **Means of verification**

- Goods Received Note.

TBBC was able to deliver the programme throughout the period without interference by local communities.

### **Specific Objective C:**

#### **To strengthen capacities of displaced people and their communities for self reliance**

#### **Indicator (C):**

#### **Training integrated throughout programme delivery**

#### **Means of verification**

Training conducted for the period:

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Content</b>	<b>Trainees</b>
Camp Management	-	
Supply Chain Management	Warehouse management training – storage, stacking, distribution records, ration books Monitoring system	Camp committees, section and godown leaders -MaeLa, Umpiem, NuPo, MRML,MLO
Shelter	Mud-brick building construction	30 camp staff - MRML
Food Security	CAN ToT – agriculture, nutrition, and how to teach community	Site#1,#2,MRML,MLO, NGO staff and FSAs
Nutrition	Supplementary feeding Refresher – guidelines, protocols Programme implementation AsiaMIX cooking demo Chronic malnutrition-causes and prevalence	Health agency staff Mon medics/ nurses  All households MRML Health agency staff
Weaving	n/a	

#### **Expected Result 1C:**

#### **Livelihood and Food Security Initiatives are strengthened**

#### **Indicator (C) 1.1:**

#### **CAN training activities in all camps**

#### **Means of verification**

- No of demonstration gardens.

Following the CAN Training of Trainers in March, new alliances have been forged with CBOs, and newly trained CAN workers have established 8 demonstration gardens in 6 sites in following areas:

- Site 1 - 1 (TBBC and Karenni Development Department)
- Site 2 - 1 (TBBC and Karenni Development Department)
- MRML - 1 (TBBC/ Camp Committee/ KESAN)
- MLO - 1 (TBBC/ Karen Youth Organization)
- UM - 1 (TBBC/ Karen Youth Organization)
- NP - 2 (TBBC/ Karen Youth Organization)

TBBC continues to support ZOA's Vocational Agriculture projects, particularly in Mae La camp, including providing CAN trainers for VTCs. CAN demonstration gardens and community trainings have not yet started in Mae La, but will begin in 2008. CAN projects have not yet been operational in Don Yang camp and Tham Hin camps, but discussions with camp leaders have indicated interest and CAN trainers will be trained for these sites in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2007.

CAN Trainings have begun in Umpiem Mai and Nu Po camps. The total number of participants during the period were 40 and since training activities were established is 7,360.

#### **Indicator (C) 1.2:**

#### **Income generation activities in all camps: Weaving project, Stove production**

#### **Means of verification**

- Labour cost for weavers
- Incentives provided for stove makers

All camps have been producing their own longyi since 2004. Labour cost is approx 23 baht/ longyi which provided an average 6,370 baht income per weaver for the period.

Stove production as income generation is still limited to Site 1, 2, Mae Ra Ma Luang and Nu Po.

#### **Expected Result 2C:**

#### **Capabilities for project and community management are strengthened**

**Indicator (C) 2.1:**

**Output targets delivered with only basic materials and finance provided by TBBC**

**Means of verification**

- Field reports.
- Purchase orders.

**Indicator (C) 2.2:**

**Ratio of TBBC staff to camp management staff < 1:30**

**Means of verification**

- TBBC staff lists.
- CMP records.

Current ratio is 1 TBBC field staff to 37 Camp management staff

**Expected Result 3C:**

**Community strategies for coping with shocks are strengthened**

**Indicator (C) 3.1:**

**Community services are uninterrupted**

**Means of verification**

- Feedback from CBOs, NGOs.
- Systematic monitoring.

**Specific Objective D:**

**To increase understanding of the nature and root causes of the conflict and displacement**

**Indicator D: Ongoing Donor support**

**Means of verification**

- Budget requirements met.

TBBC was able to meet its obligations for the period but faces severe funding difficulties towards the end of 2007.

**Expected Result 1D:**

**Protection and solutions for displaced persons are enhanced**

**Indicator (D) 1.1:**

**Non-refoulement**

and

**Indicator (D) 1.2:**

**All refugees are registered**

**Means of verification**

- UNHCR.
- MOI statistics.

No registered refugees were sent back to Burma from the camps during the period however there have been some reports of un-registered refugees being encouraged to return and having been deported to non-SPDC controlled border points.

Currently the PABs have effectively ceased functioning and there is a growing number of unregistered people in the camps. Some consider many of these to be 'resettlement seekers' and there have been threats of round-ups and deportations of unregistered cases. There is an urgent need for an effective process to screen in genuine refugees.

**Expected Result 2D**

**Stakeholders are able to develop their own advocacy strategies**

**Indicator (D) 2.1:**

**Meetings between displaced persons and RTG, Donors, Government representatives**  
and

**Indicator (D) 2.2:**

**Presentations at international meetings**

**Means of verification**

- Visits to camps, meetings and travel facilitated by TBBC.
- International meetings attended by displaced communities.
- Campaigns.
- Publications, reports.

Border CBOs regularly brief diplomats and other visitors to the border. The KRC participated in a joint briefing for EC Heads of Mission together with TBBC, UNHCR and the RTG NSC and MOI in Mae Sot in May.

## Appendix F

### A brief history of the Thailand Burma border situation

The adjoining maps illustrate how the situation on the Thai/ Burmese border has developed since 1984.

**1984: The first refugees:** In 1984 the border was predominately under the control of the indigenous ethnic nationalities. The Burmese Government/ Army had only three main access points at Tachilek in the North, Myawaddy in the centre and Kawthaung in the South. The dark-shaded border areas had never been under the direct control of the Burmese Government or occupied by the Burmese Army. These areas were controlled by the ethnic nationalities themselves, predominantly Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon, who had established *de facto* autonomous states. The ethnic nationality resistance had influence and access over a much wider area represented diagrammatically in the pale shade. They raised taxes on substantial black market trade between Thailand and Burma and used these taxes to pay for their governing systems, their armies and some social services.

The Karen National Union (KNU) had been in rebellion for 35 years and since the mid-1970s had been increasingly being pushed back towards the Thai border. For several years dry season offensives had sent refugees temporarily into Thailand only to return in the rainy season when the Burmese Army withdrew. But in 1984 the Burmese launched a major offensive, which broke through the Karen front lines opposite Tak province, sending about 10,000 refugees into Thailand. This time the Burmese Army was able to maintain its front-line positions and did not withdraw in the rainy season. The refugees remained in Thailand.

**1984 to 1994: The border under attack:** Over the next ten years the Burmese Army launched annual dry season offensives, taking control of new areas, building supply routes and establishing new bases. As territory was lost new refugees fled to Thailand, increasing to about 80,000 by 1994.

**1988 and 1990 democracy movements:** In 1988 the people of Burma rose up against the military regime with millions taking part in mass demonstrations. Students and monks played prominent roles and Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as their charismatic leader. The uprising was crushed by the army on 18<sup>th</sup> September with thousands killed on the streets. Around 10,000 'student' activists fled to the Thailand/ Burma border and the first alliances were made between ethnic and pro-democracy movements. Offices were established at the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw and over 30 small 'student' camps were established along the border, although the number of 'students' declined to around 3,000 by 1989. In 1990 the State Law Order and Restoration Council (SLORC) conducted a General Election which was overwhelmingly won by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD was not allowed to take power and elected MPs were imprisoned or intimidated. Some fled to the border to form a Government in exile, further strengthening the ethnic/ democratic opposition alliances at Manerplaw.

**January 1995: The fall of Manerplaw:** In January 1995, with the assistance of the breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Association (DKBA), the Burmese Army attacked and overran Manerplaw, a major blow for both the KNU and all the democratic and ethnic alliances.


**1995 to 1997: The buffer falls:** As the KNU attempted to re-group, the Burmese Army overran all their other bases along the Moei River, taking control of this important central section of the border. In 1995 SLORC broke a short-lived cease-fire agreement with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and in 1996 similarly overran all of their bases. And in the same year, Khun Sa, leader of the Shan resistance made a deal with SLORC which paralysed the Shan resistance and effectively allowed the Burmese Army access to the border opposite Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. Finally, in 1997, the Burmese Army launched a huge dry season offensive, over-running the remainder of Karen controlled territory all the way south to Prachuap Khiri Kan. In three short years the Burmese army had effectively overrun the entire border which, for the first time in history, they now had tenuous access to and control over. The ethnic nationalities no longer controlled any significant territory and the number of refugees had increased to around 115,000. The remaining 'student' camps had by now all been forced to move into Thailand and most of their numbers were integrated into the ethnic refugee camps.

**Forced village relocations since 1996:** Once the Burmese Army began taking control of former ethnic territory it launched a massive village relocation plan aimed at bringing the population under military control and eliminating the ethnic resistance. The map shows vast areas where the Burmese Army has forced villagers to relocate. According to studies conducted by ethnic CBOs and compiled by TBBC, at least 3,000 ethnic villages have been destroyed since 1996 affecting over one million people. Probably more than 300,000 have fled to Thailand as refugees (the majority being Shan and not recognised by the Thai government). TBBC estimates that in 2006 there were conservatively still some 500,000 IDPs in the Eastern states and divisions of Burma bordering Thailand, including at least 95,000 in free-fire areas, 287,000 in cease-fire areas (including 11,000 in Mon Resettlement sites) and 118,000 in relocation sites (see Appendix G). Meanwhile the population in the border refugee camps has increased to around 156,000 in 2007.




# Burmese Border Situation 1984 to 2007


1: 1984: The First Refugees



2: 1984 to 1994: Border under Attack




3: 1988/1990: Democracy Movement




4: Jan 1995: The Fall of Manerplaw



5: 1995 to 1997: The Buffer Falls



6: Forced Village Relocations since 1996




## Appendix G

### Internal displacement, vulnerability and protection in eastern Burma


Since 2002 TBBC has collaborated with CBOs to document the scale, distribution and characteristics of internal displacement. This has included interviews with over 1,000 households for a vulnerability assessment in 2004 and a protection survey in 2005. Spatial analysis has been updated by detailed maps from the survey of key informants in 38 townships during 2006. The full reports are available from [www.tbbc.org](http://www.tbbc.org), but the maps and charts here highlight some of the key findings.

In the past ten years, Burma Army offensives have occupied vast tracts of customary land belonging to villagers from the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. Whereas villagers could previously retreat into areas administered by the armed opposition closer to the border, there is now nowhere safe to run. To consolidate territorial gains, the central government has doubled the deployment of battalions in eastern Burma since 1996. In 2006, at least 204 infantry and light infantry battalions were based in eastern Burma which represents approximately 40% of SPDC's frontline troops nation-wide. Given that rations for frontline Burma Army troops have been cut, villagers have had rice fields and fruit plantations confiscated to support this militarisation. But displacement has primarily been induced by the increased capacity of the Burma Army to search contested areas for civilians hiding in the forests.

Forced displacement is also increasingly related to state-sponsored development projects. By focusing on infrastructure construction and commercial agriculture, the government's Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict-affected areas. Conversely, these initiatives have often undermined livelihoods and primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population. Proposed dams along the Salween River have already forcibly displaced over 35,000 people, while the livelihoods of those remaining are threatened by forced labour for road construction and deforestation caused by logging. In 2006, the government's promotion of castor oil plantations to produce bio-diesel induced widespread land confiscation, the imposition of procurement quotas and forced labour to cultivate seedlings.




#### Development Projects Causing Human Rights Abuses, 2006





The overall rate of displacement in eastern Burma remains critical, with previous field surveys indicating that over 80,000 people have been forced to leave their homes each year since 2002. The most recent survey estimates that in the past year 82,000 people were displaced by human rights abuses or humanitarian atrocities. While the distribution of forced migration was widespread, the most significant concentration was in four townships of northern Karen state and eastern Pegu Division where counter-insurgency operations displaced over 27,000 civilians. Border-wide, 232 entire villages were displaced during the same period. When combined with the findings of previous field surveys, 3,077 separate incidents of village destruction, relocation or abandonment have been documented in eastern Burma since 1996. Over a million people are understood to have been displaced from their homes in eastern Burma during this time. This reflects the cumulative impact of the Burmese Army's expanded presence and forced relocation campaign targeting civilians in contested areas.




**Displaced Villages, 1996 - 2006**




State	Destroyed, Relocated or Abandoned Villages			
	1996-2002	2002-04	2004-2005	2005-2006
Shan State	1,478	33	17	33
Karenni State	200	52	2	2
Pegu	113	25	7	74
Karen State	534	119	4	119
Mon State	72	10	4	0
Tenasserim	139	2	34	4
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,536</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>232</b>

The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society is estimated to be at least half a million people. This population includes approximately 287,000 people in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities. A further 95,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes and humanitarian atrocities. At least another 118,000 villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. These population figures are considered conservative, as it has not been possible to survey urban areas. Similarly, internally displaced persons in mixed administration areas have not been counted because it has not been possible to verify how many have successfully reintegrated into society.



**Distribution of IDPs, 2006**







	IDPs hiding in free-fire areas	IDPs in Relocation Sites	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas	Total IDPs
Shan State	13,300	31,300	131,000	175,600
Karenni State	9,300	6,400	63,600	79,300
Pegu	17,400	6,400	0	23,800
Karen State	49,100	4,300	45,900	99,300
Mon State	300	500	41,000	41,800
Tenasserim	5,600	69,100	5,500	80,200
<b>Totals</b>	<b>95,000</b>	<b>118,000</b>	<b>287,000</b>	<b>500,000</b>


Indicators of vulnerability for the internally displaced population reflect a critical situation. Livelihoods in hiding sites are largely dependent on subsistence-oriented slash and burn agriculture, yet still they are undermined by government patrols searching for and destroying crops. Conversely, less households were documented in relocation sites than elsewhere as being involved in any type of rice farming, indicating a lack of access to land and greater restrictions on movement. The highest rates of hunting and gathering were documented in densely populated ceasefire areas, which is indicative of the livelihood constraints of resettlement into these areas.

The indicators suggest there is a public health emergency amongst internally displaced persons in eastern Burma. A third of households surveyed had not been able to access any health services during the past year, contributing to high mortality rates from infectious diseases which can be prevented and treated, such as malaria. Child mortality and malnutrition rates are more than double Burma's baseline rate and comparable to those recorded amongst internally displaced populations in Africa.


In terms of abuse and insecurity, despite the severity of threats to lives, the prevalence of threats to livelihoods is on a much greater scale. Arbitrary taxation and forced labour were the most pervasive human rights abuses recorded, with a third of households directly affected during the past year. The proportion of households affected by arbitrary taxes and forced labour was highest in government relocation sites. In contrast, the destruction of food supplies and housing was more prevalent amongst people hiding in the most militarily contested areas. These indicators reflect how soldiers from the Burma Army are the primary perpetrators of abuse and violence directed at civilians.



Although unable to stop or prevent violence and abuse, internally displaced and conflict-affected villagers have developed a range of coping strategies to resist threats and mitigate the worst consequences. The surveys found that other civilians are the main source of early warning signals about approaching troop movements. This represents the protective value of social capital within and between local communities. However, villagers also reported being ten times more likely to receive warnings of troop movements from opposition forces than government authorities. This indicates that the government is generally unable or unwilling to empower the coping strategies of civilians affected by conflict.



In terms of engaging the humanitarian responsibility to protect civilians, non-state actors acknowledged that the use of landmines was their main transgression and that their protective capacities are limited. In areas of ongoing armed conflict, the short term protection objectives of non-state actors are limited to deterring and delaying SPDC patrols, using radio communication to provide warnings to villagers, and securing access for local humanitarian agencies to provide relief aid. In ceasefire areas, non state actors may be able to offer more protection but there is a trade off with sustainable livelihoods as access to fertile land is limited.



Humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon have managed to expand their access significantly during the past decade. However, United Nations agencies reported that since the purge of the former Prime Minister and his allies in October 2004, humanitarian agencies in Burma have either been disregarded or viewed with suspicion by the government. Their experience in western Burma also suggests that increased access does not necessarily lead to an expansion of humanitarian space unless national authorities are willing to engage in policy level dialogue about protection issues.

In summary, the findings support assessments from human rights defenders that soldiers from the Burma Army are the primary perpetrators of abuse. Further, the Government of Burma appears unable or unwilling to support local coping strategies and protect civilians from harm. Given these long and short term trends, and the absence of fundamental political change, there is not much for internally displaced persons in eastern Burma to look forward to. It is difficult to conceive of any scenario in the near future other than ongoing violence, abuse and conflict causing more displacement and obstructing attempts at return and internal resettlement.

Work is now progressing in preparation for a 2007 report. Quantitative field surveys of the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarisation and state-sponsored development projects have been based on mapping activities with key informants in over 30 townships. This has been complemented with a cluster survey of 1,000 households spread across eastern Burma about the characteristics of vulnerability, coping strategies and protection. Qualitative field assessments about the causes and impacts of displacement have also been conducted by CBOs. This report will be presented to the TBBC Donors Meeting in October.

## Appendix H

### TBBC meeting schedule 2007

#### 1. TBBC Board Meetings

The TBBC Board normally meets four times annually. Dates for 2007:

January	29 <sup>th</sup> / 30 <sup>th</sup> , Bangkok
March	19 <sup>th</sup> to 23 <sup>rd</sup> (EGM), Sangklaburi
August	15 <sup>th</sup> on-line conference
November	1 <sup>st</sup> / 2 <sup>nd</sup> , AGM, Copenhagen, Denmark

In accordance with the TBBC Mission Statement and Bylaws all Members may attend Board Meetings.

#### 2. CCSDPT Meetings

The CCSDPT information and coordination meetings take place every month at the British Club, Soi 18 Silom Road, usually the second **Wednesday** of each month, the exceptions this year being January and April. The schedule for 2007 is:

January	12	July	11
February	14	August	8
March	14	September	12
April	<b>No meeting</b>	October	10
May	9	November	14
June	13	December	12

0900 – 1130 CCSDPT Meeting (NGOs, IOs, Embassies)

1300 – 1530 CCSDPT Health, Education, and Environmental Health Subcommittees

#### 3. TBBC General Meetings

Extraordinary General Meeting	19 <sup>th</sup> to 23 <sup>rd</sup> March, Sangklaburi, Thailand
Annual General Meeting	1 <sup>st</sup> / 2 <sup>nd</sup> November, Copenhagen, Denmark.

#### 4. TBBC Donors Meeting

October	31 <sup>st</sup> , Copenhagen, Denmark
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## Abbreviations

<b>ARC</b>	American Refugee Committee
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of South East Asian Nations
<b>AVI</b>	Australian volunteers International
<b>CAN</b>	Community Agriculture and Nutrition Project
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisation
<b>CCSDPT</b>	Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand
<b>CDC</b>	Centres for Disease Control, Atlanta
<b>CIDPK</b>	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
<b>CMP</b>	Camp Management Project
<b>COBL</b>	Council of Business Leaders
<b>COERR</b>	Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees
<b>CP</b>	CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan
<b>DKBA</b>	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
<b>DOPA</b>	Department of Public Administration (MOI)
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECHO</b>	European Community Humanitarian Office
<b>ERA</b>	Emergency Relief Assistance
<b>GHD</b>	Good Humanitarian Donorship
<b>GRN</b>	Goods Received Note
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee for the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>KIO</b>	Kachin Independence Organisation
<b>KnDD</b>	Karenni Development Department
<b>KnED</b>	Karenni Education Department
<b>KnHD</b>	Karenni Health Department
<b>KNPP</b>	Karenni National Progressive Party
<b>KnRC</b>	Karenni Refugee Committee
<b>KNU</b>	Karen National Union
<b>KnWO</b>	Karenni Women's Organisation
<b>KNYO</b>	Karenni National Youth Organisation
<b>KORD</b>	Karen Office of Relief and Development
<b>KRC</b>	Karen Refugee Committee
<b>KWO</b>	Karen Women's Organisation
<b>KYO</b>	Karen Youth Organisation
<b>LWR</b>	Lutheran World Relief
<b>LWF</b>	Lutheran World Foundation
<b>MI</b>	Malteser International
<b>MNHC</b>	Mon National Health Committee
<b>MOI</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>MRDC</b>	Mon Relief and Development Committee
<b>MSF</b>	Medecins Sans Frontiers
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NLD</b>	National League for Democracy
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council (RTG)
<b>NMSP</b>	New Mon State Party
<b>NTF</b>	Nutrition Task Force
<b>OCDP</b>	Operations Centre for Displaced Persons (MOI)
<b>PAB</b>	Provincial Admissions Board
<b>PDM</b>	Post Distribution Monitoring
<b>POC</b>	Person of Concern
<b>PWG</b>	Protection Working Group
<b>RTG</b>	Royal Thai Government
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Development Corporation
<b>SGVB</b>	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
<b>SHRF</b>	Shan Human Rights Foundation
<b>SPDC</b>	State Peace and Development Council
<b>SPCP</b>	UNHCR Strengthening Protection Capacity Project
<b>SRC</b>	Shan Refugee Committee
<b>SSA-S</b>	Shan State Army South
<b>SWAN</b>	Shan Women's Action Network
<b>SYNG</b>	Shan Youth Network Group
<b>ToT</b>	Training of Trainers
<b>USDA</b>	Union Solidarity and Development Association
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
<b>UWSA</b>	United Wa State Army
<b>VTC</b>	Vocational Training Committee
<b>WEAVE</b>	Women's Education for Advancement and Empowerment
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>ZOA</b>	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands

## **Thailand Burma Border Consortium**

### **Mission**

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self-reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.

### **Goal**

To support displaced people of Burma to be independent and self-reliant in a peaceful society where there is full respect for human rights.

### **Aim**

To work in partnership with displaced communities to build capacity, strengthen self-reliance and food security, ensure an adequate standard of living and human rights are respected.

