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The Turkish presence in Europe: migrant workers and new European citizens

Report

Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population

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Summary

The level of integration of Turkish residents of first, second and even third generation, has been the subject of political debate and controversy in a number of member states, particularly in the context of Turkey's prospects for accession to the European Union.

The strong social and cultural identity of Turkish migrants and European nationals of Turkish descent should not be perceived as a barrier to full integration. In this regard, a number of recommendations are put forward.

The role of Turkish migrants in fostering cultural and economic links with Turkey represents an opportunity to tie European values with the positive evolution of Turkish democracy and respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A. Draft recommendation

1. Sustained migration of Turkish workers to Europe began with the first bilateral agreement signed between Germany and Turkey in 1961. Since then, other industrial countries in Europe (namely Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) attracted Turkish workers. The features of this labour supply at the time were considerable mobility, a predominance of workers from rural areas in Turkey, and rapid population growth.

2. The Turkish migration to Western Europe continued in 1970s as a result of family reunification or political asylum. The more recent period 1989-2006 is characterised by a decline in the number of cases of family reunion, which have given way to marriages between the so-called "second generation" and Turkish spouses. The current decline of emigration flows from Turkey is also due to a considerable decrease of asylum seekers and the search for new economic opportunities in the CIS region and the Middle East.

3. The number of Turkish migrants living in the principal immigration countries in Europe remains stable or is slightly but constantly declining (case of Germany) or rapidly declining as a result of acquired citizenship (case of Belgium). New immigration countries have emerged such as Italy, Spain and Finland. In total, around 3 million Turkish migrants are currently living in Europe and around 1.2 million have acquired the nationality of the host country.

4. The level of integration of Turkish residents of first, second and even third generation, has been the subject of strong political debate and controversy in a number of member states, particularly in the context of Turkey's prospects for accession to the European Union.

5. The Assembly considers that the strong social and cultural identity of Turkish migrants and European nationals of Turkish descent should not be perceived as a barrier to full integration. Turkish migrants' role in fostering cultural and economic links with Turkey represents an opportunity and not a threat to further European integration.
6. Multiple and substantial bonds between Turkish migrants and European citizens of Turkish origin with Turkey are not only characterised by economic dynamism and cultural wealth, but also reflect the transmission of European values towards the positive evolution of Turkish democracy and respect for the rule of law and human rights. The Turkish case load at the European Court of Human Rights is a prime example, with a growing readiness and awareness of complainants of their rights under the Convention.
7. The integration is inevitably a two-way process, requiring mutual respect and sustained effort between the host society and immigrant population and their descendants to attain a common life free from tensions. While the authorities and host population must assist in migrants' reception and economic, social and cultural integration, guarding them against all forms of discrimination, the migrant population, helped by the authorities in the host country, must on the other hand make every effort to conform to social customs of the host society – learning the language, respecting customs and codes, abiding by the law and regulations.
8. Numerous inequalities in treatment have to be addressed which are often associated with casual work; irregular employment, education and professional training, retirement and social security transfers, family reunion, returns, transfer of remittances, free movement and the issue of multiple nationality.
9. The Assembly therefore recalls the basic principles and rights enshrined in the instruments of the Council of Europe - adopted with a view to ensuring economic and social development while realising and maintaining human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination with regard to *inter alia* race, color, sex, religion and political opinion. Reference in this respect is made, in particular, to the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, the Revised European Social Charter, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life on Local Level, the European Code of Social Security and the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance. It also refers to the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which has been ratified by Turkey.
10. The Assembly is concerned that national policies and practices regarding migrant workers and their families, including migrants from Turkey, remain increasingly below international legal standards.
11. In view of the above, the Parliamentary Assembly recommends to the Committee of Ministers to:
 - 11.1. strengthen the monitoring mechanisms of the Council of Europe's legal instruments, particularly the monitoring of provisions relating to the rights of migrants such as Art. 19 of the revised European Social Charter;
 - 11.2. introduce more effective sanctions for non-compliance;
 - 11.3. call on the member states
 - 11.3.1. to sign, ratify and implement, where appropriate, the relevant Council of Europe legal instruments, namely the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols, the Revised European Social Charter, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life on Local Level, the European Code of Social Security and the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance;
 - 11.3.2. to involve migrant associations in the monitoring process and to remove, where applicable, the obstacles hindering their involvement;
 - 11.3.3. and more specifically,

- 11.3.3.1. to develop proactive policies to combat discrimination and intolerance;
- 11.3.3.2. to facilitate information and access to migrant workers' rights in practice;
- 11.3.4. with regard to delivery of work permits and resident permits,
 - 11.3.4.1. to apply reasonable time limits in delivering work permits within 6 months;
 - 11.3.4.2. to limit work and residence permit fees to administrative costs not exceeding equivalent fees for issuing passports for nationals;
 - 11.3.4.3. to guarantee automatic resident status to children of holders of work or resident permits;
 - 11.3.4.4. to cease ordering immediate expulsion to the border upon expiry of work or residence permit;
 - 11.3.4.5. to guarantee automatic unlimited residence to migrant workers with legal continuous stay of more than 5 years;
- 11.3.5. with regard to social security and health insurance,
 - 11.3.5.1. to guarantee equal rights of residents to those of nationals;
 - 11.3.5.2. in case of voluntary return, to guarantee equal rights to those of nationals with regard to transfer of social security and health insurance;
- 11.3.6. with regard to education,
 - 11.3.6.1. in cooperation with the country of origin, to promote education in the mother tongue in parallel to mainstream education;
 - 11.3.6.2. to avoid segregation of migrant children in special schools;
 - 11.3.6.3. to provide equal education and career opportunities for migrant children, avoiding their seclusion in specific low skill and low pay branches of the economy;
 - 11.3.6.4. to facilitate language learning for migrant workers and their families upon arrival;
- 11.3.7. with regard to employment,
 - 11.3.7.1. to remove obstacles to equal access to employment and career advancement;
 - 11.3.7.2. to take measures to fight discrimination and exclusion at work, particularly through ore active engagement of trade unions in defending migrant workers' rights;
 - 11.3.7.3. to take measures to increase migrant workers' access to professional training;
- 11.3.8. with regard to integration,
 - 11.3.8.1 to develop policies to encourage active participation of migrants in social, cultural, economic and political life of the host country;
 - 11.3.8.2. to remove obstacles to migrants' rights of association in order to protect their social, economic and political rights, namely through active participation in associations, trade unions, political parties and elections;
 - 11.3.8.3. to allow dual nationality as a means of increasing the level of integration while ensuring cultural diversity and links with the country of origin;

11.3.8.4. to take measures encouraging respect of diverse cultures and religions as an essential factor for social stability and peace.

B. Explanatory Memorandum, by Mr Gülçiçek, Rapporteur

I. Background

1. The international migration of Turkish workers began between 1957, when the first trainees were taken on by companies in north Germany, and 1961, when the first German-Turkish bilateral agreement was signed. This migration largely took place because there was a demand for labour by German employers, who were facing problems with the country's post-war reconstruction since the industrial economy's traditional pool of labour in eastern Europe was closed off to them. The German demand for temporary migrant workers (*Gastarbeiter*, or guest workers) was met by the provision of Turkish manpower, which was relatively skilled owing to Turkey's economic and social reforms in the period 1923-1960. The features of this labour supply at the time were considerable internal mobility, a predominance of workers from rural areas, and rapid population growth. Emigration followed on closely from the rural exodus to the big Turkish cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, etc), which were undergoing a process of rapid industrialisation. In a situation close to full employment and in spite of the first warning that came in 1968 with the onset of a recession, the period 1961-1973 was characterised by an increasing willingness to employ Turkish migrant workers and by a considerable extension of the migration field (made up of all the regions in which Turkish workers and their families settled) since the whole of industrial Europe (the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom) attracted Turkish workers and workers of other nationalities.

2. The 1973 oil crisis caused a lasting recession that gradually turned into a long and serious economic crisis and led to a big increase in unemployment. However, the period 1973-1989 was characterised by a very large increase in the number of Turks in western Europe. Although many people returned home for good (a fact that studies on migration often fail to identify properly), family reunions, which are accepted under more or less the same conditions in all European countries, led to a doubling or tripling of the number of immigrants from Turkey and resulted in a larger percentage of Turkish women and young people. Finally, this period was also one of reorientation as a consequence of the flows to the Arab oil-producing countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Emirates, including Kuwait) and certain countries that benefit from oil revenues (such as Yemen), but with the fundamental difference that, unlike the European countries, these countries hardly ever allow family reunions.

3. The period 1989-2006 is characterised by a decline in the number of initial family reunions (wife and children), which have largely given way to marriages of children of the so-called "second generation" to spouses from Turkey (initially marriages between Turkish residents in Europe and Turkish spouses and subsequently marriages between European nationals of Turkish origin and Turkish spouses, who constitute the majority in today's migration flows). Other features include a considerable decrease in flows of migrants for political reasons (asylum-seekers) and the search for new openings in other parts of the world. In particular, *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and its political aftermath have led to the emergence of a new market based on services provided by Turkish construction and public works companies, bringing with them managerial staff, engineers and labourers. These activities are located in all the countries of the former Soviet Union (mainly the Russian Federation), the Balkans and central Europe and extend to building sites further afield (such as the construction of motorways and canals in Pakistan). The period also seems to be characterised by a big decline in irregular migration, with Turkey in turn becoming a country of immigration and of transit for migrants from other countries on their way to Europe.

4. The result is that current flows are primarily to western Europe in the case of family reunions ("first" and "second" generations) and then to the United States, Canada and Australia. Flows of individual construction and public works sector workers (almost exclusively men), are in the direction of the Arab countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union, with investors and traders going to the countries along the main migration routes (the Caucasus, the Balkans, central Europe). More than 70 countries are now the official destinations of workers who have emigrated from Turkey (see tables in the appendix).

II. Current figures for Turkish nationals in Europe

5. As is often the case in international migration statistics, which present the situation in terms of "stocks" (presence of foreigners and/or immigrants in a given country) and "flows" (physical entries and exits counted at borders and legal flows, such as naturalisations and acquisitions of nationality), it is in fact quite difficult to gain a coherent and indisputable picture of the presence of a specific population, especially if the people concerned are living in different countries that apply different statistical standards. The data used come from Turkey (various departments of the Ministries of Labour and Social Security, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior) but are largely based on official European statistics compiled by the labour attachés of the Turkish embassies and consulates (YIHGM, then DIYIH)¹. They also come from databases or intergovernmental reports, which are themselves based on national data (for example: Eurostat or the OECD's SOPeMI reports)².

6. In 2002, the number of Turks living abroad was 3,551,544, with 3,051,535 residing in western Europe (2,959,981 in the countries of the European Union [EU-15]), 108,918 in various Middle Eastern countries, 260,000 in North America (USA, Canada), 56,261 in Oceania, 18,000 in the Russian Federation, 27,300 in the Turkish-speaking republics (Central Asia and Azerbaijan) and 22,000 in Israel. That year, 1,135,611 individuals who had emigrated from Turkey had acquired a foreign nationality, but this figure is, depending on the countries concerned, either included (such as in the case of France and the Netherlands) or not included (such as in the case of Germany and Belgium) in the numbers calculated for the distribution of Turkish emigrants living abroad (see below). These figures, which are provided either by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are detailed by country of residence in the appendix and reflect situations that differ a great deal from one another (legal status, migration policies, production of statistical data), both in the world as a whole and in western Europe. They also reflect extremely diverse developments that are bound up with both economic change and changes in the overall geopolitical or geostrategic balance. When this memorandum was being prepared, some of the data for 2004 were the same as those available in 2002. A year-by-year examination of the figures released and a comparison of the different national and international sources (Eurostat, SOPeMI, DIYIH) reveal that these data, which have in some cases been estimated and are sometimes contradictory, must be treated with the necessary caution.

Table 1: Turkish nationals present in a number of OECD countries (data in thousands)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Germany	1918.4	1965.6	2014.3	2049.1	2107.4	2110.2	2053.6	1998.5	1947.9	1912.2
Austria			311.2	314.2	314.4	315.8	319.9	322.2	322.0	320.9
Belgium	88.3	86.0	81.7	78.5	72.8	70.7	69.2	56.2	45.9	42.6
Denmark	34.7	35.0	35.7	36.8	37.5	38.1	36.6	35.2	33.4	31.9
Finland	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.1
France							208.0			
Netherlands	202.6	182.1	154.3	127.0	114.7	102.0	100.7	100.8	100.3	100.3
UK	31	44	29	42	56	63	41	38	58	52*
Sweden		22.0	20.3	18.9	18.4	17.4	16.4	15.8	13.9	12.6**
Switzerland	75.6	77.1	78.6	79.4	79.6	79.5	79.9	79.5	79.5	78.8

(*) 67,000 in 2003, (**) 12,400 in 2003. Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix

7. All things otherwise being equal, the trends observed in the last few years, especially since 1996-1997, are as follows:

- The number of Turkish emigrants in the world is continuing to rise slightly, this being due more to the larger range of countries of destination than to emigration to the main countries of residence. Today, there are Turkish nationals in at least 70 countries on all continents.

- The number of Turks living in the principal European immigration countries is stagnating (in the case of Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark) or is slightly but constantly declining (in the case of Germany) or rapidly declining (in the case of Belgium). Relative increases (France and the Netherlands) are due to double counting (Turkish nationals + naturalised nationals, including those with dual nationality) or changes in the way statistics are produced (the United Kingdom). A number of new immigration countries have emerged, such as Italy, Spain or Finland in Europe and Israel in the Middle East.

- The other regions of destination are often very unstable for political reasons, with countries having experienced very different developments and undergone an opening up process with a very rapid increase in the number of workers followed by a sharp fall: the Arab oil-producing countries or those that benefit indirectly from oil revenues (Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Yemen, etc) have had large Turkish building sites; the Turkish-speaking countries or the Russian Federation have formed an important market since 1989, but their political balance is unstable (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan); Pakistan and Malaysia, at one time very promising in terms of major infrastructure contracts, failed to offer any worthwhile employment owing to the geopolitical conditions that emerged after the crisis of 11 September 2001 (attacks in New York). Similarly, after the political crises that had occurred, the Lebanese, Kuwaiti, Iraqi and Palestinian economies did not deliver the results expected in terms of construction and civil engineering contracts for Turkish companies.

- Strangely enough, researchers know little about transoceanic migration (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan) and it is not well covered in official documents. Existing studies, however, indicate trends similar to those observed in Europe (the co-existence of flows such as migrations of skilled workers (brain drain) and low-skilled labourers from rural areas, the presence of irregular migrants, the dynamic creation of small businesses, the vitality of voluntary associations, etc). However, mention should also be made of the island of Aruba (Netherlands Antilles) which brought in over 1,400 Turkish workers to work for two years on a construction site for a tourism project assigned to a Dutch construction company, which preferred to import labour from Turkey rather than recruit it in the Netherlands or Latin America.

8. For the record, mention should be made of the presence of Turkish nationals in other countries that rarely appear in the statistics (numbers of persons from an OECD country living in another member state: 290 in Luxembourg, 222 in the Czech Republic, 30 in Slovakia, 106 in Portugal, 545 in Ireland, 696 in Hungary, 452 in Poland and between 5,200 and 7,000 temporary residents, depending on the year, in Romania. Outside Europe, 246 Turks live in Mexico, 396 in New Zealand, 29,821 in Australia, 17,810 in Canada and 90,595 in the United States, according to figures calculated by SOPeMI³.

III. Current figures for people of Turkish descent and Turkish cultural presence in Europe

9. The Turkish presence is defined as much by the social and cultural practices of people of Turkish descent as by those of Turkish immigrants who have retained their original nationality. Even if they have German, Belgian, Dutch, French or another European nationality, the population of Turkish descent (in the same way as people originating from the Maghreb, the Indian subcontinent or Africa) is often identified with its national origin owing to its social and cultural practices. It should be emphasised that these people or their families are legally full European citizens with civic and political rights, such as free movement within the Schengen area and between their country of residence and Turkey. The data available (for example, the tables provided each year by DIYIH) remain approximate since the legal rules and sets of statistics vary from country to country. Depending on the case, they include or omit cases of naturalisation and dual nationality. The tables below are an attempt to bring together the immigrant population with Turkish nationality and the European population of Turkish origin. The total represents the total cultural presence but not the legal presence.

Table 2: Figures for individuals born in Turkey and living in a number of OECD countries (data in thousands)

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
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Austria					118.8	124.5	110.1	114.0	128.0	127.3
Denmark	24.9	25.5	26.5	27.3	28.2	29.0	29.7	30.4	30.8	30.9
Finland		1.5	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	
Greece								76.6		
Norway	6.0	6.1	6.3	6.6	6.9	7.3	7.6	7.9	8.4	
Netherlands	166.0	167.5	169.3	172.7	175.5	178.0	181.9	186.2	190.5	
Sweden	29.2	29.8	30.2		31.0	31.4	31.9	32.5	33.1	34.1

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix

Table 3: Figures for immigrant populations in the main European countries of immigration who have Turkish nationality or dual nationality or have acquired the nationality of their country of residence

Country	Turkish population (2003) [*]	Nationals of Turkish origin or total number of naturalisations [**]	Total presence
Germany	1,912,169	546,576 [1972-2003]	2,458,745
France	(314,438)	44,596 [1991-2003]	359,034
Netherlands	(117,366)	224,034 [1946-2002]	341,400
Belgium	45,866	83,933 [1985-2003]	129,799
Austria	(41,969)	88,734 [1983-2003]	130,703
Sweden	33,094	26,056 [1990-2003]	59,150
Switzerland	78,256	26,328 [1990-2003]	105,584
Denmark	30,450	19,386 [1980-2002]	49,836
United Kingdom	(63,220)	36,780 [1989-2002]	100,000
Total	(2,573,608)	1,135,611 [2003]	(3,709,219)

Sources: TC Calisma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanligi, *Dis Iliskiler ve Yurtdisi Isçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Bültenleri* (2003, Yil 3, Sayi 4), *Raporlari* (2003, 2004), Ankara

10. In a number of specific cases, the Turkish immigrant population may in practice be confused with people originating from EU member states who belong to ethnic minorities whose origins go back to the Ottoman empire, such as in the United Kingdom or Germany (Turkish Cypriots in the United Kingdom, Turks from Western Thrace in Germany, some Moslems from former Yugoslavia as distinct from Bosnians, such as the Macedonian Turks). These populations, which have different nationalities, share the same ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious origins as Turkish nationals. This will also be the case with populations having Bulgarian or Romanian nationality when, as seems likely, Bulgaria and Romania join the EU.

11. This cultural rather than political fact must not be neglected since all the Turkish-speaking and Turkish-Moslem populations in Europe (including Turks from "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Tatars from Poland, Lithuania or Finland and, especially, those from the Crimea and Russia or the Caucasus) retain family and cultural ties with Turkish nationals who come from those regions and who, in recent history, were admitted to the present territory of the Republic of Turkey as refugees or repatriated there.

IV. Naturalisations and legal flows

12. A further feature of the recent period is the huge demand of Turkish workers and members of their families to be naturalised. Although mixed marriages in the strict sense (between spouses of different ethnic and/or confessional origins) are still rare, the trend is rising. The principal factors leading to the acquisition of European nationalities are the desire to be naturalised expressed by migrants who have settled and been integrated into the community for many years, the birth in the countries of residence of migrants' children, who enjoy the full right to be granted the nationality of their parents' country of birth and that of their country of residence (*jus soli*), and marriage to a spouse of Turkish origin with a European nationality.

Table 4: Acquisitions of nationality by Turkish nationals in a number of OECD countries

Country	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Germany	12,915	19,590	31,578	46,294	40,396	56,994	31,694	82,861	76,573	64,631
Austria	2,688	3,379	3,209	7,499	5,068	5,683	10,350	6,732	10,068	12,649
Belgium	3,305	6,273	6,572	6,609	6,884	6,177	4,402	17,282	14,401	7,805
Denmark	560	915	797	917	1,036	1,243	3,154	2,787	3,130	2,418
France	1,515	3,197	2,143	3,447	3,977	4,530	6,018	7,209	6,586	6,149
Norway	393	752	793	836	837	705	170	523	356	412
Netherlands	18,000	23,870	33,060	30,700	21,190	13,480	5,210	4,708	5,513	5,391
Sweden		2,742	2,836	2,030	1,402	1,694	1,833	1,398	2,796	2,127
Switzerland	820	966	1,205	1,432	1,814	2,093	2,260	3,127	3,116	4,128

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix

13. However, these changes of nationality vary considerably from one country to another depending on current legislation and legal practice. While France and Sweden seem more liberal with regard to granting their nationality and Germany – sometimes mistakenly – seems reluctant to do so, it is Belgium that holds the naturalisation record, the population with Turkish nationality having declined from 119,036 in 1996 to 45,866 in 2003. Contrary to popular belief, however, it is Germany that has the largest number of citizens of Turkish origin (a total of 565,766 acquisitions of German nationality between 1990 and 2002). Recent German legislation has been moving closer towards *jus soli*, but there is still some uncertainty owing to the German demand that a person give up their previous nationality, which is liable to create legal problems today (individuals stripped of German nationality after living for several decades in Germany). The Netherlands is also a country with considerable legal integration (224,034 for the period 1946-2002) and statutorily accepts dual nationality. It is ahead of France in this respect (60,426 for the period 1946-2001), but in this particular case the figure seems to fall far short of the reality as it does not include children born to foreign parents living in France (application of *jus soli*, varying according to changes in the regulations – the so-called Chevènement, Pasqua or Sarkozy circulars, named after the Interior Ministers who issued them – and according to their degree of restrictiveness, with a declaration of intent or declaration at the age of majority). Turkish statistics do not automatically take account of these figures. For example, the Turkish DIYIH report for 2001 refers to 2,331 naturalisations but the report by the French Directorate for Population and Migration (DPM), counts 10,755 for the same year, which includes all modes of acquisition (acquisition by decree, declaration, marriage or declaration of intent)⁴.

V. Current flows

14. The beginning of the 21st century is marked by the virtual disappearance of direct flows of migrant workers. A number or a few dozen individuals are admitted every year to each country as labour migrants, usually employed by companies governed by European law set up by Turkish nationals or people of Turkish descent. Only Germany differs in this respect by signing partial accords for temporary collective agreements (building and public works sites, such as the renewal of the centre of reunified Berlin)⁵. The vast majority of flows registered are due to family reunions and are only secondarily the result of political events, which do not automatically result in people ultimately settling on a permanent basis.

Table 5: Entry of Turkish nationals into a number of OECD countries (data in thousands)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Germany	67.8	63.9	73.6	73.2	56.0	48.0	47.1	49.1	54.6	58.1
Austria						5.9	7.2	7.0	7.7	
Belgium	2.5	3.6	2.5	2.5	1.4	2.4	2.2	2.8	3.0	3.9
Denmark	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.9
Finland	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
France	6.8	4.7	3.6	3.4	5.1	6.8	5.7	6.6	6.9	8.5
Hungary	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Norway	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5
Netherlands	7.8	4.3	4.8	6.4	6.5	5.1	4.2	4.5	4.8	5.4
Poland	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6
Sweden	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8
Switzerland	4.8	3.8	3.8	3.4	2.9	2.6	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.2

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix

i. Initial family reunions

15. Initial family reunions (involving the arrival of the worker's wife and children or, less commonly, a female worker's husband) are of marginal significance today as there are far fewer workers who are recruited directly (first generation or new arrivals). Reunions may continue to take place in countries that have recently become part of the migration field (such as Norway, Italy, Spain, Finland and Hungary) or in the case of recent migrations involving small numbers of individuals (Germany or other countries that admit some workers for companies that specifically require Turkish labour). However, in some countries, the gender imbalance in favour of men shows that family reunions are still liable to fuel migratory flows. It might be thought that a rate close to 50% means the process of family reunion has come to an end (Denmark, Belgium). However, an imbalance in favour of women can lead to a reversal of the trend (Greece). This situation has already been observed in Berlin, where women employed at companies assembling electrical appliances and IT products have subsequently been joined by their husbands. Furthermore, since we are concerned here with people of Turkish nationality, this tells us nothing about the numbers of young Turkish men or women coming to marry Europeans of Turkish origin who themselves arrived as children through family reunion.

Table 6: Proportion of women in the Turkish population in a number of OECD countries (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Germany		45.80	45.88	45.99
Austria		47.68	42.18	45.95
Belgium		41.18	46.86	50.46
Denmark		49.14	48.80	48.90
Finland		22.22	25.00	28.57
France	47.25			
Greece			58.87	

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix; TC Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, *Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Bültenleri* (2003, Yıl 3, Sayı 4), *Raporları* (2003, 2004), Ankara.

ii. *Marriages of Turkish and European spouses: secondary familial reunion*

16. Migration due to the marriage of children of migrants (so-called second generation), with considerably varying proportions of individuals who hold Turkish or another European nationality but are children of Turkish immigrants, is today the main statistical heading in the case of legal entries. In France, this flow represents about 80% of the annual entries for a total flow of 8,000 to 9,000 people. This type of family reunion is likely to permanently strengthen the Turkish cultural presence, even though it is destined to form part of policies aimed at the integration of settled migrants, if only because the children born to these recently married couples are initially socialised in their Turkish mother tongue before being educated at school in the language of the host country. This social practice makes it possible to maintain a cultural and pecuniary link with the society of origin but poses both *de facto* and *de jure* a number of questions regarding the place of the individual (whether a man or a woman) in migration as a group social phenomenon.

17. While the choice of spouses at first glance meets the sociological and anthropological demands of the Turkish rural tradition, it would be wrong to confuse a marriage arranged according to the "traditional" norms with a forced marriage, which constitutes a criminal offence, just as much as it is wrong to confuse an arranged marriage with a bogus marriage that only exists on paper. This problem is destined to assume a new importance in all European countries owing to the demographic structure of the immigrant Turkish population, with the presence of a large number of young people who are old enough to marry and have children. It takes on greater importance when put in the context of the expected considerable ageing of the native European populations. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to strike a balance between the defence of women's rights and the defence of the values of the host society and the society of origin, Turkey being by no means a special case here. Young people from the Maghreb or, more generally, young Arab Moslems, Indians and Pakistanis, sub-Saharan Africans or Chinese are also confronted with the same question, once again to considerably varying degrees depending on their groups of origin, their religion or their social environment.

iii. *Students*

18. Turkey has a long tradition of educating its elites abroad, while mainly Istanbul-based foreign schools have also made a big contribution to the education of the Turkish elites (Galatasaray French-speaking lycée, Robert's College, German or Austrian high schools, etc). Some universities, such as Ortadogu Teknik Üniversitesi (Middle East Technical University), or Turkish military academies have trained Middle Eastern students who have subsequently become prominent figures in their own country⁶. European and American universities have long been hosts to groups of Turkish students who will either return to their home country or settle in the country of their studies (brain drain). A new situation, which emerged with labour migration, is the enrolment in Europe of young people who take advantage of the presence of members of their family who have emigrated. Unlike the first group mentioned, these students are more often from low-income families and either come from rural areas or are children of new town-dwellers.

iv. *Asylum-seekers and statutory refugees*

19. Leaving aside their irregular nature, these figures indicate a downward trend due to two sets of factors: European countries' increasing tendency (in connection with the Schengen Information System) to refuse to accept asylum applications (with a growing propensity to call into question the Geneva Convention) and the easing of ethnic or political tensions in Turkey. The numbers reached in the years 1980-1990 are no longer of contemporary relevance, but Turks are continuing to make asylum applications, which amounted to an annual average of 26,549 over the period 1998-2002. It is not always easy to determine the extent to which these applications are due to the democracy gap (which continues to exist in spite of the improvements recorded in the progress reports of the European Commission and independent bodies) and the strategy employed by economic migrants to circumvent the rules by seeking asylum. In Europe as a whole, the proportion of applications allowed is dwindling, with the exception of a few countries recognised as not being very safe by the entire "international community", and there has been an increase in the number of measures to remove applicants (signing of agreements to readmit illegal migrants and individuals whose asylum applications

have been turned down) or to process asylum applications outside the country. Apart from specific cases, the proportion of people given refugee status (under the Convention or territorial) is declining in all European countries.

Table 7: Entry of Turkish asylum-seekers into a number of OECD countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>
Austria	362	509	477	340	210	335	592	1,868	3,561	2,839
Belgium	601	581	713	436	403	518	838	900	970	618
France	1,282	1,653	1,205	1,548	1,621	2,219	3,735	5347	6,582	6,143
Germany	19,118	33,750	31,732	25,937	11,754	9,065	8,968	10,869	9,575	6,235
Greece						195	591	800	211	
Norway	30	35	24	44	129	279	164	204	257	240
Sweden	305	269	186	208	280	220	229	458	696	733
Switzerland	1,068	1,293	1,317	1,395	1,565	1,453	1,431	1,960	1,940	1,661
UK	2,045	1,820	1,420	1,445	2,015	2,850	3,990	3,700	2,835	1,760

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix; in the case of Greece: country notes.

v. *The return, readmission and reintegration of migrants*

20. The issue of returning migrants very often comes up against real indifference on the part of almost all countries affected by international migration. Apart from responses to a question in the census concerning the address resided at when the previous census was held and apart from an estimate by the Turkish Central Bank of the number of returnees and declarations made to the registry offices of the German municipalities or the return of migrants paid for by the authorities of the countries of immigration, it is very difficult to obtain coherent or comprehensive data. Another method, which is used in Belgium, may be to establish the actual numbers of returnees on the basis of disability pensions paid to former miners or workers after an industrial accident or recognised occupational disease. While the details of voluntary assisted returns are known, it is clear that little or none is known about the numbers of individuals who voluntarily return without financial aid. Details of deferred returns – children of migrants having found a job in their parents' country of origin – are even less clear, all the more so as those concerned are often foreign nationals of Turkish origin. However, these returns are taking place and their numbers seem to be growing as a result of Turkey's recent economic growth, which is benefiting the tourist and international transport sectors, banks and financial services and foreign investment companies. Earlier estimates speak of at least 1,500,000 returns to Turkey around 1990, ie about a third, which means that Turkey occupies an average position among all known cases. For Germany alone, the market research institute ISoPlan, which was commissioned by the federal government to monitor changes in the size of foreign populations, states that, for the period 1960-1999, there were 3,528,850 entries of Turkish nationals compared with 2,334,261 departures and 2,053,564 immigrants present in Germany at the same time⁷. In the Netherlands, the actual annual proportion of returnees is estimated at about 40%, with a consequent decline in the average rates, namely over 80% in the early years (1960s), about 50% in the 1970s and less than 30% today. In the case of France, 11,722 Turks (including 4,521 workers, 1,897 spouses, 5,304 children) received public financial assistance to return home between 1984 and 2001, so it is possible, without fear of exaggeration, to estimate the number of returnees from the various European countries at more than 3 million. The rates of return (temporary or alternating migration) are higher for the Middle East or the countries of the former USSR.

21. In addition, a survey carried out by the Centre for Turkish Studies in Essen (North Rhine-Westphalia) revealed that the percentage of families planning to return to Turkey is rising again and went up from 20% in 1999 to 28% in 2003. More worrying than the unfavourable economic climate is the impact of an increase in xenophobia in many European regions fuelled by the political debate on Turkey's admission to the EU.

22. Another category of returnees are rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants apprehended at border crossings or during identity checks and then readmitted to their home country and reintegrated. Although they are returned involuntarily, these people can nevertheless be given social assistance and have some of their expenses paid by the authorities of the country of destination and the country of origin (return travel expenses, a basic allowance and reintegration assistance, such as that provided for in the new readmission agreements recommended by the EU or the Council of Europe). France, for example, granted reintegration assistance for foreigners who had been invited to leave the country to 492 Turkish nationals between 1991 and 2001. Organisations such as the UNHCR or the IOM participate in the implementation of programmes for the reintegration of illegal migrants or rejected asylum-seekers. At the moment, apart from providing details of national situations it is hard to give a comprehensive assessment of these operations.

VI. Workers and socio-occupational categories

Table 8: Numbers of foreign workers of Turkish nationality in some OECD countries (data in thousands)

Country	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Germany					1039		1,008	996	1,004	974
Austria	54.5	55.6	55.7	52.2	50.1	49.3	47.7	46.6	43.7	39.1
Belgium			19.6	22.3	19.1	21.0	27.5	19.2	18.6	18.0*
Denmark	14.4	13.8	13.5	13.6	14.0	14.1	13.8	13.0	13.0	12.8
Finland								1.0	1.1	1.2
France	73.5	75.6	66.4	72.5	65.8	79.0	76.1	81.5	81.7	92.6
Norway	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	2.9	3.1	3.5	3.8
Netherlands			48.2	36.6	33.6	34.7	26.7	56.8	54.5	48.9**
Sweden	9	7	7	7	7	5	4	10	7	5
Switzerland	37.4	35.6	34.3	33.1	32.8	33.3	33.7	34.1		39.4

Source: OECD, *Trends in international migration*, SOPeMI 2004, compiled on the basis of the tables in the appendix; (*) 12,100 in 2003 ; (** 53,300 in 2003).

23. As is often the case, this table illustrates the difficulty in analysing figures that are often contradictory (incomplete sets of data, different ways of producing estimates, etc). This is mainly due to a lack of statistical harmonisation across Europe. Nevertheless, the general trend is a decline in numbers, except in France, Norway and Switzerland. Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands show considerable annual fluctuations. The problem here is the extent to which employment statistics are matched with residence permits and nationality.

VII. Job seekers and job insecurity

24. The only data that permit a nationality-based approach to the unemployment figures are the European statistics. It is clear that these figures are much higher for people from the Maghreb and Turkey than the national averages. Norway (7.3%), Liechtenstein (7.8%), the Netherlands (8.0%) and Austria (8.7%) form a first group of countries with relatively low unemployment rates; the United Kingdom (13.0%), Switzerland (13.4%), France (15.0%), Denmark (16.7%) and Sweden (17.1%) constitute a second group with an average unemployment rate; and Germany (25.3%), Belgium (32.13%) and Finland (33.0%) form a third group with a very high rate (see tables in the appendix). These rates apply just as much to the first generation of immigrants who arrived in the initial wave and are now approaching retirement age as they do to young new arrivals today (with in many cases a drop in their occupational and social status compared with their situation in Turkey before their departure) or to children of migrants who have left their country without any school qualifications or with few skills. However, the one constant found throughout Europe is that the rates observed are doubled or tripled for the immigrant Turkish population compared with the overall situation. In

general, the highest rates and, consequently, the most difficult situations of insecurity and social exclusion are recorded in the regions that are in deep crisis and undergoing changes in their industrial production capacity (mining and steel-making regions, the bulk chemical industry, engineering and car-making industries in a process of restructuring, textile production areas, etc). It is obvious that this unemployment unevenly affects particular areas of industrial cities, especially their outlying social housing districts or their run-down city centres prior to the renewal that has become more or less routine throughout Europe.

25. Another form of economic exclusion is the rapid increase throughout Europe of types of insecure employment: temporary contracts, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, temporary jobs for the young unemployed, undeclared work, informal work or underground employment, which affects young people in general and the low-skilled in particular, many of them children of Turkish migrants. For a long time considered characteristics of the Mediterranean countries moving towards economic integration, these forms of licit or illicit, formal or informal work are becoming more widespread everywhere in Europe. There is a big danger that these forms of insecure work will become the economic norm that is socially accepted by society as a whole, especially as many populations of foreign origin are culturally used to them and *de facto* find it easier to adapt to them (people from the southern and eastern Mediterranean, Iran, India and Pakistan, China, the Balkan countries, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, etc). This situation can only jeopardise the overall social balance in Europe (health and social security insurance, unemployment compensation, pension insurance and retirement schemes). The European population of Turkish origin does not seem to be an exception to this general observation.

VIII. Education and vocational training of young people

26. Young immigrants, especially boys, are directed almost everywhere to short vocational training courses. Girls are sometimes prematurely taken out of school. All too often, these young people suffer both from the education system's lack of effectiveness in the low-income districts, from the deficiencies in educational guidance and from the errors of judgment of parents ill-equipped to cope with the changes in the world of work. It is, however, hard to describe an average European situation since educational practices and measures to integrate low-skilled young people can vary so much from one country to another. There are big differences in how the European education systems operate, so the statistics available are difficult to aggregate. This section provides a country-by-country overview⁸.

- Germany (2001-2002) recorded 501,948 children at school, 174,102 of whom were receiving instruction in their language and culture of origin (LCO) and 84,782 were in vocational education; 39,866 apprentices were undergoing in-company training and there were 23,640 students in higher education (universities and technical colleges).

- The Netherlands (2001-2002) recorded 55,605 children at school, 16,017 of whom were in secondary education; 7,565 teenagers were in vocational education. 3,880 young people were enrolled at technical colleges and 1,860 at university.

- Belgium recorded 17,706 children at school. 6,100 of them were doing LCO courses. 3,459 were undergoing vocational education and 229 students were enrolled at university. It is important to make two observations about this particular country: firstly, there are two parallel systems of instruction, one using Dutch (Flemish) and the other using French (Walloon); secondly, the low figures are due to the very high naturalisation rate. Students for example, are not counted as Turks but Belgians.

- France (2001-2002) stated that there were 68,595 children at school, 3,856 of whom were in vocational education, and 1,974 students. 19,285 were doing LCO courses. 224 were on a sandwich course and 595 were apprentices, but the latter figures date from 1995. For the same reference year, the DPM report mentions 11 trainees and 311 Turkish students with a residence permit. The students who had come specially to do a higher education course thus seem to be in a minority compared with children of non-naturalised migrants, but it is difficult to interpret these statistics. The CNIL (Commission Nationale Informatique et Liberté) prohibits differentiating people by their ethnic or national origin, thus making the data available somewhat unreliable with regard to nationality and even more so with regard to cultural affiliation.

- Denmark (2003) stated that there were 16,130 children and young people at school and university, of whom 1,049 were in higher education and 1,731 were undergoing

vocational education. Aid for the LCO system has been abolished: only private initiatives (commercial or voluntary sector) can assume responsibility for this aspect of education.

- Austria (2002-2003) had 29,220 children and young people at school (of whom 3,300 were undergoing vocational education), 1,680 apprentices and 1,751 students in higher education (universities and colleges). 11,550 children were doing LCO courses.

- Switzerland (2002-2003) stated that 22,707 children and young people were in education, of whom 3,201 were undergoing vocational education and 660 were students). 3,241 children were doing LCO courses.

- Sweden said 13,198 children and young people were in education, of whom 1,177 were in higher education and 3,114 were doing LCO courses. The latter were included in the total.

- The United Kingdom lumps together Turkish and Turkish Cypriot children, producing a figure of 30,000 schoolchildren and about 3,000 students, to which must be added about 5,000 au pairs (a specifically British feature) who have come to learn or improve their knowledge of English and mostly consist of young girls. 4,000 children attend LCO courses at 50 private and state schools that provide lessons in Turkish.

27. Both education specialists and the Turkish authorities generally think that the school enrolment ratios at the various levels of education are satisfactory, including at nursery schools and crèches (in the countries where they exist). Families agree to send their children to school very early, which makes it all the easier for them to learn the language of their country of residence. However, they emphasise a number of recurring problems, such as the frequency of short courses, with girls taken out of school to marry early and boys removed to start paid work very early, which limits their initial training and qualifications, even though modern economies call for high qualifications and a considerable ability to adapt to changing conditions. The practice of directing people to short vocational courses or even facilities intended for disabled or deficient children is often criticised as it marginalises young adults in relation to the needs of the globalised economy. This has harmful consequences in terms of the employability of young people: badly affected by unemployment and job insecurity in Europe, they – unlike qualified individuals who are likely to find worthwhile jobs (good pay and responsibilities within the company) – are at a disadvantage in Turkey compared with those who have not left their country and had a normal education.

IX. Housing and home ownership by families

28. After more than forty years in Europe, families of Turkish origin who have been reunited in emigration, many of whom are now in the second or even third generation and have fully or partially acquired the nationality of their country of residence and ascended a relatively long way up the social ladder, have begun to buy private homes. Family reunion and the integration difficulties experienced in many working class areas on the periphery of the large industrial cities have induced them to buy homes in better-off neighbourhoods. The creation of businesses of all kinds is also an important aspect of social mobility that encourages home ownership. The Centre for Turkish Studies (Zentrum für Türkeistudien) in Essen estimates that at least 165,000 families (making a population thought to number about 825,000 individuals) have acquired a private dwelling in Germany. This situation can also be seen in other European countries, such as France (for example the Alsace region, where 25% of families have invested in a private home since 1999) or Belgium (where, according to a survey published in 1998, 63% of families already owned their own home at that time)⁹. The process is considered rapid by many observers, but the fact remains that families from Turkey who have come to Europe relatively recently are still often housed in blocks of flats in run-down inner city or peripheral working class neighbourhoods. The situation depends on the nature of the housing market in each country or, indeed, each town or city as well as on the local political situation, which will either facilitate or impede home ownership by families of immigrant origin, whatever their nationality.

X. Self-employed people and business starters

29. The Centre for Turkish Studies at the University of Essen, which is the only body studying the entire phenomenon of business start-ups by Turkish immigrants at European level, estimates that at least 82,300 companies (61,300 in Germany, about 5,000 in France, about 1,500 in Belgium and 12,000 in the Netherlands in 2003) and more than 411,000 jobs have

been created in Europe (350,000 in Germany, about a third of them held by non-Turks). Having initially been set up in Germany from the early 1960s onwards in order to meet a limited number of cultural and food needs (adherence to Islam and dietary requirements), these firms, which are sometimes referred to as *halal*¹⁰, have considerably diversified their activities and now represent over a hundred occupations or lines of business, ranging from the presence of itinerant traders at urban markets to a very large number of fast-food establishments – *döner kebab* houses are now located everywhere from Montreal to Sydney – and from corner shops to big industrial firms (agrifoodstuffs, ready-mix concrete plants, textiles and clothing) or service undertakings (hotels and restaurants, temporary employment agencies, industrial cleaning, the building trades, IT, tour operators and private airlines). Structured as they are on the basis of occupations or lines of business, these companies routinely seek to exploit the Turkish-European relationship in the fields of transport and international tourism, the textile industry and the food industry, sometimes producing goods in Turkey for marketing in Europe¹¹. The Turkish employers' associations (federations such as TÜSIAD or MÜSIAD or federations of transport professionals, such as UND) have taken advantage of this to set up liaison offices in Europe, some directly responsible for the accession question (TÜSIAD in Brussels) and well beyond Europe if necessary (Central Asia, Middle East, North America). The two tables below illustrate the strength of the trend over a period of a few years.

Table 9: Distribution of Turkish employers in Europe (1993)

Germany	33,000	Estimate by ZfTS (Sen)
France	5,100	1990 INSEE survey
Belgium	8/ 900	Estimate by A. Manço*
Denmark	500	Estimate by YIHGM
Netherlands	2,400	Estimate by YIHGM
United Kingdom	2,500	Estimate by ZfTS (Sen)
Switzerland	464	Sila Boekhandel**

(*) According to the Belgian Ministry of Small Firms and Traders, 1,367 holders of self-employed work permits; (**) 1,121 self-employed persons according to the guide published by the Dutch publishers Sila Boekhandel.

Table 10: Distribution of Turkish employers in Europe (1997)

Country	Companies	Investment (millions of DM)	Turnover (millions of DM)	Jobs
The "Fifteen"	62,100			
Belgium	1,500	217	882	4,600
Denmark	500	79	315	1,600
Germany	47,000	9,540	41,360	206,000
France	4,700	659	2,627	16,200
Netherlands	4,300	732	2,816	14,400
Austria	3,000	404	1,803	10,600
Sweden	300	36	165	1,000
United Kingdom	700	123	467	2,500
Others	100			

Source: Sen, Ulusoy & Öz, Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1999, Istanbul, Cumhuriyet

30. While it is actually very difficult to establish the actual turnover of companies set up in Europe by individuals from Turkey (since these companies are subject to different legal systems and it is sometimes not permitted to identify them in the sources owing to the law on protecting the rights of individuals and combating discrimination), it is certain that these companies play a prominent role in the process of social integration, the struggle against unemployment, the creation of local jobs, and bringing the Turkish economy and that of the various EU countries closer together. The shops and the local services provided play the same economic and social role as businesses set up as a result of the presence of people from the Maghreb and the Indian sub-continent in Europe or of Hispanics, Chinese or Koreans in the United States or of Italians or Jews between 1920 and 1930 in a very large number of countries. They can be considered a powerful factor for integration rather than a form of community isolation. Mention should be made of the rapid changes in these companies' customer bases, which have very quickly moved from being captive clienteles (*ethnic businesses*) to general clienteles (*ethnic marketing* to all population categories in the case of services).

XI. Migratory movements

31. Migratory movements are defined by all the forms of physical relations (transports of persons or goods) or non-material relations (financial flows, information, ideas) between Turkey, the country of origin, and the various countries in the migration field (Europe, Middle East, North America, Oceania, Russia and the New Independent States). These movements encourage the establishment of a large number of companies (transport, import-export, travel agencies tour operators) and, when all modes of transport are included, involve millions of passengers. The routes taken by migratory movements coincide with the routes of migration (legal and illegal), tourism or international trade¹². Turkey is, for example, not only strongly linked to western Europe by air, road and sea (more than rail) but also through financial services and telecommunications. The total annual passenger flows recorded at the frontiers (land, air and sea) for 2004 were 24.5 million (aggregate of entries and exits), of whom 17,516,000 were foreigners and 7,081,000 Turkish nationals, a large proportion of them living in Europe¹³.

32. Turkish migration has at its permanent disposal over 180 scheduled flights (with a capacity of more than 33,000 seats), about ten car ferries and seven shipping lines that use 24 roll-on/roll-off vessels, 1,721 international coaches (with a capacity of more than 66,000 seats), over 30,000 lorries for more than 1,000 licensed firms (fleets operated by road hauliers transporting goods), 21 international passenger trains (including motorail trains to and from Germany and Austria) and many hundreds of thousands of private vehicles belonging to emigrants living in Europe, not to mention the aircraft operated by foreign airlines operating in or flying to the countries of immigration, the boats of the Greek and Cypriot fleets on the Adriatic and Aegean routes¹⁴. The intention here is not to draw attention to the existence of some "armada" destined for the "invasion of Europe" but simply to underline the importance of a market that provides a large number of jobs not only in Turkey but also the European countries of immigration and countries of transit (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Greece, which reap such benefits from the transit traffic as the payment of motorway tolls, the purchase of fuel, the provision of hotel services and sales of tickets for Turkish and foreign shipping companies and airlines).

33. The amount of financial transfers is another effect of the presence of immigrants in Europe. While this amount has recently (since 2003) been largely declared under the heading of "income from tourism" and the origin of this money is now not so much industrialised Europe as all the countries in which Turkish construction and public works companies are operating (the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, other countries), these transfers are still very important for many families from depressed or underdeveloped areas and pay at the same time for a considerable proportion of these families' purchases abroad. Transfers have sometimes succeeded in making up for the foreign trade deficit in the balance of payments (1972, 1973) and have above all supplied the Turkish economy with hard currency over a long period and permitted investments in such sectors as housing, agriculture, local transports, trade and services (including tourism), production-scale handicrafts and, indeed, the processing industries. Between 1964 and 2003, currency inflows in the form of migrants' remittances amounted to more than US\$75.314 billion (see tables in the appendix). Germany in particular and Europe in general have long played a key role in these transfers, but with the settlement of families and the increase in their standard of living (purchases of homes and cars and entrepreneurial investments) these remittances are now small compared with those of income earned on the building sites in the Middle East and the countries of the former Soviet Union (contracts, benefits and wages).

XII. Cultural ties

34. Cultural ties are traditionally maintained by the use of a language, by artistic and cultural expression ranging from the sophisticated to the more spontaneous (e.g. from the elaborate music to regional cooking) and by religious beliefs and rites. The general availability of transport and the general spread of the use of the new information and communication technologies (NICTs) are considerably improving the ways of disseminating the cultures of the countries of origin, in spite of very strong competition from the global means of expression (especially American culture). Finally, it is not possible to ignore the role of Turkey's modern and contemporary history, which has in large part resulted from the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Ottoman Empire, either in the ethnogenesis process of the Turkish people and the establishment of cultural identities or in the Turks' ability to live in what is *de facto* a multicultural environment.

i. Voluntary activities

35. The voluntary sector responds to several needs identified long ago as far as international migration is concerned: the defence reflex of new arrivals in the first wave of immigration against their psychological and cultural isolation, the defence of their identity, the defence and promotion of their culture of origin, the protection of the rights of workers and members of their families, the defence of equal opportunities and the need to combat discrimination. The voluntary sector players are themselves a diverse group. They include national and foreign activists, NGOs and charities, trade unions and national and foreign politicians. The voluntary sector that has emerged as a result of Turkish migration is very widely autonomous today, even though many associations have relations with their Turkish equivalents. It is often organised into national or transnational federations and is made up of associations with various objectives – social, cultural, religious and economic – for the benefit of the entire population of Turkish origin at a given place or for specific categories of people on the basis of ethnic characteristics, geographical origins, religious faith, the promotion of cultural, educational, sports or commercial interests, etc. These associations or federations of associations, of which there are several hundred for each country of residence, are registered in accordance with the current regulations with either the national or the Turkish authorities (embassies and consulates) or both. They bring together thousands of active members and many more sympathisers or occasional users and all function as actual or potential bridges with the local non-Turkish voluntary sector and as teachers of democratic life and the operation of civil society. The estimates provided below are very probably too low since many associations do not always report their existence to the Turkish consular authorities.

Table 11: Numbers of organisations of Turkish immigrants in Europe

<i>Country</i>	<i>Federations</i>	<i>Associations</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Federations</i>	<i>Associations</i>
Germany		2097	Belgium	22	63
Netherlands	9	346	Switzerland	11	221
France	10	252	Austria		142
Denmark	14	100	United Kingdom	1	19
Sweden	1	25			

DİYİH, 2004 Raporu, *Yurtdışındaki Vatandaşlarımıza İlişkin Gelişme ve Sayısal Bilgiler*, Ankara 2005.

ii. Religious and cultural activities

36. The Turkish immigrant population is very largely of Muslim faith (Sunnites, together with some Alevi-Bektashi communities, Shiites of Azeri origin, Arab Nusayris on the Syrian border, etc.). It also includes other denominational groups (Armenians and Assyro-Chaldean Christians, Greek Orthodox, Jews and Yezidis). All these groups which have lived under the Turkish regime of secularism live as migrants under the various European regimes of secularism or quasi-secularism, at the very least of interdenominational tolerance. The mainstream Muslim community is itself rich in theological tendencies, whether traditional or modern.

37. Precisely because of their permanent settlement in Western Europe, Turkish migrants retain the beliefs of various religious groups originating from Turkey. It is therefore inescapable and logical that they should create suitable places of worship. In Europe, Sunni Muslims pursue their religious activity via the DİTİB, an association linked with the Presidency of Religious Affairs instituted in 1984. The DİTİB, based in Cologne, is a federation responsible for administering places of worship with support from local associations. The Alevi-Bektashi carry on their activities through the agency of the Federation and Confederation of Alevi Unions of Europe also based in Cologne; these co-operate with other local federations and associations in Europe.

iii. Turkish-speaking media

38. The development of the Turkish-speaking media provides an instructive example since they have benefited from the tactical rapprochement between local initiatives launched (in emigration) by private interests (immigrant traders and entrepreneurs) and activist voluntary organisations (trade unions, associations and NGOs of all political persuasions, sometimes officially recognised and backed by the Turkish authorities and sometimes supported by the political opposition) and the big national media groups (initially the written press and radio broadcasters, then television broadcasters from the late 1980s onwards). Three Turkish satellites (*Türksat 1B, Türksat 1C, Türksat 2A / EurasiaSat*) backed up by several satellites used by European or American networks enable a number of digital and analogue TV channels and FM radio programmes to be broadcast, while the written press printed in Germany (several daily newspapers and theme-based weeklies) is continuing to hold its own in spite of this competition. Many local experiments have been launched (free advertising newspapers containing practical sections), but their ultimate success is very unpredictable, although some titles have now been published for over fifteen years.

39. While local cable networks have, apart from those in Berlin or London, not been very successful, there is fierce competition between European public or private cable operators and satellite broadcasters. Immigrant families of Turkish origin, like most families of foreign origin, prefer using satellite dishes, which make it possible for them to receive the channels they have chosen from among the Turkish channels available, rather than cable, which only enables them to receive a fixed range of channels that includes few Turkish programmes and is, of course, imposed on them by the operator, which is not without its legal consequences (a large number of complaints lodged followed by provisional court orders) in view of the mistrust and lack of understanding on the part of the local authorities and social housing landlords. The right to information recognised by the Charter of Human Rights is accordingly subject to many infringements and leading to conflicts in quite a sizeable part of Europe. However, while the range of Turkish television programmes is well-known, it is very hard to measure its actual impact on the processes of social, cultural and linguistic integration owing to a lack of the right tools for this. The internet permits the parallel development of many websites operated by voluntary, political and religious organisations as well as commercial enterprises (sites of import-export companies, food trading firms, including teleshopping centres, airlines, travel agencies, etc) located both in Europe and Turkey, as well as the United States and Australia.

XIII. The European legacy and observance of the law, a major instrument in the integration of immigrant populations

40. Whatever the outcomes of the lengthy round of negotiations opened with Turkey for accession to the EU, immigrant populations from Turkey, concerning whom it has been remarked that a growing proportion of individuals and families have acquired an EU Member State nationality, already enjoy a very special legal status midway between that of an EU citizen and a third country national. European case-law tends towards full legal integration via workers' freedom of movement¹⁵. National legislation and regulations on admission and residence of foreigners and on conditions of integration for legal or illegal immigrants still vary greatly, and Turkish immigration is daily confronted with these variations. The Turkish case can be called classic having regard to the number of people concerned and also of European countries affected: Turkish nationals or European citizens of Turkish origin are universally present, sometimes in considerable strength (Germany, France, Netherlands ..., see appendix for detailed figures), forming an immense migratory field. It is fair to say that in the context of the membership negotiations this large and active Turkish presence can be instrumental as a cultural crossover and a social bond between the societies of partner countries in very many international agencies (Council of Europe, European Union / Customs Union, OECD, OSCE, NATO, etc.) and a wide variety of spheres. This function should operate at three complementary levels:

- by facilitating closer association of Turks and Europeans in the various immigration countries through a sound approach to economic, social and cultural integration, making Turkish culture a recognised and accepted European culture,
- by fostering and embedding the transmission to Turkey of the European values of representative parliamentary democracy and respect for all elements of rule of law and human rights, so that these people become acknowledged protagonists of Turkish democracy's positive evolution,
- by securing recognition, both in the various countries of immigration and in the countries of origin, of the fact that a migrant is a full-fledged and responsible economic and social player able to perform a positive role in development and co-development, particularly through the creation of enterprises as well as growth of economic and cultural exchanges between the two areas.

41. The problems pinpointed with regard to inequalities in treatment between persons of Turkish nationality and origin living in Europe and nationals of the countries of residence are non-specific. Often affecting all immigrants, they sometimes beset European citizens as much as persons from Turkey with the same level of income and qualifications. They relate to the subject areas mentioned in the memorandum:

- **Integration:** although European practices may differ markedly from one country to another, principally owing to their social and political histories as well as to their distinctive and original cultures, let us emphasise not an all-embracing theoretical definition of integration but a practical, objective definition taking proper account of the large doses of mutual respect and give-and-take involved. Integration can only be an interchange between a host society and initially foreign people who each go halfway towards attaining a common existence free from tensions. While the authorities and population of the country of immigration must assist in migrants' reception and economic, social and cultural integration (while migrants must retain a right of voluntary return), also guarding against all forms of discrimination if need be, the migrant, helped by the authorities of the country of origin, must make every effort to conform to the social customs of the society in which he has his new residence and occupational activity (learning the language, customs and codes, abiding by the law and regulations).
- **Casual work:** the patterns of employment involved bring about increasing social insecurity and economic insolvency; it would be expedient to develop a probing inquiry into labour flexibility and its socio-economic effects, likely to have a political impact in the long run.
- **Illegal employment:** a consequence of the foregoing developmental pattern in employment conditions with growing labour market flexibility, this type of employment weighs heavily on economic and social equipoise and must be steadfastly and resolutely combated. Illegal employment extensively affects populations of illegal entrants or failed asylum seekers who have not been returned, whatever the real reason, to their country of origin. The causes are not ascribable to the workers alone, and the employers must acknowledge their responsibilities.
- **School education, vocational training and qualification:** children of Turkish origin are still too often penalised by malfunctions such as deficiencies in school guidance, a truncated school career, and lack of parental support. Deficient early schooling leads to inadequate or unsuitable vocational training and disorientation in coping with the current transformations of the labour market.
- **Retirement:** the differences in treatment between persons residing in the country of immigration and residing in the country of origin, in the event of permanent return, plus questions about social security schemes and the quality of care delivered in the country of origin, dampen many migrants' desire to return. It may be presumed that the elimination of these differences, coupled with a type of migration movement akin to free movement, could *de facto* reduce the immigrant or foreign presence (oft-mentioned cases of Spain and Portugal after acceding to the Common Market).

- **Social Security:** at a more general level, harmonisation of the national social security codes on the basis of the European Social Charter would be a big step towards the disappearance of sometimes contradictory practices whose probable consequence is to artificially hold down populations deprived of security and uncertain about their future. Closer consistency between the Turkish and other European national codes, and transfer of the social entitlements acquired under immigrant status, could result, subject to testing the hypothesis, in migrants who are poorly integrated or casualised in the country of immigration being returned under decent and worthier conditions, more socially acceptable than the certification of failure that applies at present. The idea to be emphasised here is "win-win", acceptable both to the society of the country of immigration and to that of the country of origin.

- **Right to family reunion:** The very real problems (forced marriages, honour crimes, illegal restraint, excisions, etc.) experienced by girls and young women with Muslim cultural backgrounds, actually highly diversified (Turkey, Maghreb and Mashrek, Iran and Afghanistan, Indian sub-continent, Sub-Saharan Africa ...), often causing death or serious harm to some, must not hamper the right of every migrant to family reunion or to choose a partner, as defined by international conventions. It must be made possible to exercise for this right while taking steps in the countries of immigration and emigration alike to ensure that unlawful practices, crimes and serious offences against family law and human rights are genuinely combated, and that gender equality and defence of women's rights, recognised by international conventions and governments, are actually given effect.

- **Returns and worker's remittances by emigrants:** irrespective of regulatory changes or economic fluctuations, the link between an emigrant and the society of origin is governed by the freedom to make monetary and financial transfers under conditions of transparency and open competition. Return should be a voluntary act the responsibility for which is accepted both by the person concerned and by the authorities with whom it rests (country of origin, country of immigration). The public authorities' role is to assist in reaching the decision (clear and exact information, suitable transfer procedures, technical and financial assistance for migrants to create their own businesses. etc.).

- **Nationality / dual nationality:** Turkish emigration, as much as Chinese or probably Moroccan emigration (now acquiring the same features in Europe) is typified by a transnational presence and a rapid circulation of information. It would be helpful to commence an overall survey of the criteria for acceptance or non-acceptance of legal ingredients specific to "municipal" law and exercise of sovereignty, such as the acquisition of nationality, dual nationality, binationality, civic and political participation in the society of the country of residence, in so far as migratory fields have become transnational.

- **Free movement:** initially contemplated by the Ankara agreement (1.12.1964) and Article 36 of the 1973 Additional Protocol, free movement of Turkish workers was to have been achieved as at 1.12.1986. Without presenting a historical review or legal analysis of this unimplemented clause, it may be observed that the European case-law (Court of Justice of the European Communities) increasingly makes Community law (labour, residence, family welfare, right to organise, education and training, social security) applicable by transposition to Turkish nationals. The recent Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents tends in the same direction, being applicable by definition to the Turkish nationals resident in Europe not only within the Community area as such (including countries which have signed the Schengen agreement) but also between Turkey and the European area.

42. Europe, according to different forms of association, whether of an intra-European or more extensive nature (Council of Europe, European Union, EBRD, OSCE, OECD, NATO, etc.) has integrated or associated Turkey for more than half a century. It has a wealthy body of law relating specifically to the rights of migrant workers and their families, backing up the UN international instruments which comprise, *inter alia*:

- United Nations Convention concerning migrant workers,

- International Labour Organisation Convention No. 118 concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security,
- Convention No. 143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers,
- International Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (1990)...

43. Where the specific European body of law dealing with the rights of migrant workers or their situation is concerned, the following may be mentioned:

- European Convention (1977) on the legal status of migrant workers,
- European Convention on Social Security (1977),
- Revised European Code of Social Security (1990),
- European Social Charter of 1961 and protocols thereto,
- Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents...

44. Numerous recommendations issued by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly concerning migrant workers and their families can be applied to the case of Europe's Turkish population, such as:

- [Recommendation 36](#) (1949) on migrant workers,
- [Recommendation 86](#) on migrant workers (revised),
- [Resolution 631](#) (1976) on Integration of migrants into society as regards education and cultural development,
- [Recommendation 712](#) (1973) on the integration of migrant workers with the society of their host countries,
- Order 338 (1973) and [Recommendation 551](#) (1973) on the integration of migrant workers with the society of their host countries,
- [Recommendation 879](#) (1979) on movement of persons between the member states of the Council of Europe,
- Order 420 (1983) and [Recommendation 968](#) (1983) on xenophobic attitudes and movements in member countries with regard to migrant workers,
- [Recommendation 1007](#) (1985) on return of migrant workers to their country of origin,
- [Recommendation 1066](#) (1987) on social protection of migrant workers and their families,
- [Recommendation 1082](#) (1988) on the right of permanent residence of migrant workers and members of their families,
- [Recommendation 1206](#) (1993) on integration of migrants and community relations,
- [Recommendation 1500](#) (2001) on participation of immigrants and foreign residents in political life in the Council of Europe member states,

- [Recommendation 1587](#) (2002) on residence, legal status and freedom of movement of migrant workers in Europe: lessons from the case of Portugal,
- [Recommendation 1596](#) (2003) on the situation of young migrants in Europe,
- [Recommendation 1625](#) (2003) on policies for the integration of immigrants in Council of Europe member states,
- Parliamentary Assembly [Recommendation 1650](#) (2004) on links between Europeans living abroad and their countries of origin.

45. Over and above the texts bearing specifically on the situation of migrant workers, other instruments can be activated (intercultural practices, prevention of racism and intolerance, education and instruction in human rights, etc.). For instance, among the achievements of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 5 on combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims may be mentioned, as the Turkish population is predominantly Islamic in its beliefs.

46. Reaffirming the existence of these principles and of the relevant legal and regulatory instruments to aid people of Turkish extraction (Turkish and European citizens) in their social inclusion and civic and cultural integration and bring them within the scope of the Council member countries' national law, are important acts that make for speedy alignment of immigrant workers' rights to those of all European where the application of fundamental rights is concerned.

XIV. Conclusions

47. The presence for five decades past of a large Turkish immigrant population in Western Europe, and the presence of far from insignificant Turkish-Muslim minorities in several regions of Eastern Europe, likely to rejoin the European Union before long, and the strong Turkish demographic growth, although the demographic transition is already far advanced, are factors with a direct or indirect influence on the question of the Turkish Republic's accession to the European Union. The arguments in favour of or against this Turkish presence in Europe and Turkish accession to the EU are often identical, though used in opposite ways depending whether the immigrant population is regarded as a bonding agent or a hindrance to accession. It is often more a matter of the image that immigration conveys than of objectively analysing social realities. The fact remains that the presence of people originating from Turkey can be considered permanent (undergoing naturalisation all over Europe), with its demographic input, economic dynamism and cultural wealth. The bonds formed between Turkey and much of Europe are multiple and substantial.

XV. APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Turkish migrants abroad: Turkish nationals, workers and job seekers (February 2004)

Country	Turkish nationals	Workers	Job seekers	Unemployment rate	Overall unemployment
A) Eastern Europe					
Germany	1,924,154	714,010	175,987	25.3	10.5
France*	341,728	87,922	24,441	15.0	9.0
Netherlands*	330,728	103,000	9,000	8.0	5.7
Austria*	130,703	42,220	10,581	8.7	2.5
Belgium	45,866	13,412	7,189	32.13	9.6
Sweden	31,894	5,700	1,200	17.1	4.4

United Kingdom	90,000	35,000	4,500	13.0	5.2
Denmark	31,978	16,699	3,263	16.7	5.2
Italy	5,284	2,780	--	--	9.0
Finland	1,981	659	330	33.0	9.1
Spain	1,289				
Luxembourg	287				2.6
Switzerland	79,470	38,974	4,975	13.4	3.8
Norway	10,915		473	7.3	3.6
Liechtenstein	809	339	49	7.8	4.0
Total	3,027,067	1,060,785	241,988		
Country	Turkish nationals	Workers	Job seekers	Unemployment rate	Overall unemployment
B) "Turkish republics"					
Azerbaijan	4,500	1,850			
Turkmenistan	5,000	4,500			
Uzbekistan	700	630			
Kazakhstan	6,000	1032			
Kyrgyzstan	3,200	543			
Tajikistan**	400	225			
Total	19,800	8,780			
Country	Turkish nationals	Workers	Job seekers	Unemployment rate	Overall unemployment
C) Middle East					
Saudi Arabia	100,000	95,000			
Libya	3,200	2,800			
Kuwait	1,922	1,600			
Jordan	1,600	255			20
Qatar	1,348	1,348			
Total	108,070	101,003			
Country	Turkish nationals	Workers	Job seekers	Unemployment rate	Overall unemployment
D) Other countries					
Russian Fed.	18,000				
Belarus	154				
Georgia	2,300				
Ukraine	550				
Moldova	1,000				

Israel	22,000				
Japan	2424				
USA*	220,000				
Canada	40,000				
Australia	56,261				
South Africa	1 100				
Total	363,789				
	Turkish nationals	Workers	Job seekers	Unemployment rate	Overall unemployment
Total general	3,518,726	1,197,964	245,478		

Note: (*) inclusion of people with dual nationality; (**) Tajikistan is not a Turkish-speaking country but is often included either for the sake of convenience or in error.

Sources: TC Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, DİYİH, *Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Bültenleri* (2003, Yıl 3, Sayı 4), *Raporları* (2003), Ankara

Appendix 2. Destinations of Turkish migrant workers (cases dealt with by the Turkish Employment Office): 1998-2004

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
USA	124	131	46	104	168	87
Afghanistan			0	--	0	1,698
Germany	1,734	2,350	2,135	2,437	3,367	3,366
Albania			0	201	120	111
Australia			4	5	11	4
Austria			1	5	2	11
Azerbaijan	276	152	214	267	668	1,049
Bahamas				1		
Bahrain			73	--	--	--
Belgium			1	1	--	--
Bermudas			1		--	--
Belarus			0	299	23	0
United Arab Emirates			21		--	--
Bulgaria	0	107	37	4	0	36
Algeria			0	--	12	160
Denmark			3	5	5	7
Ethiopia	80	16				
Morocco			0	--	69	182
Finland	--	--	--	3	--	--
France	33	25	87	202	341	422
Georgia	194	150	157	65	375	357

Croatia			72	86	91	309
Netherlands			1	2	131	431
United Kingdom	38	23	29	19	27	12
Iraq			0	37	191	601
Ireland				1		
Israel	1,819	1,485	1,322	3,917	342	422
Sweden			3	5	28	42
Switzerland			1	1	0	0
Italy			2	2	5	2
Japan	0	65	9		--	--
Canada	0	254	1	7	6	2
Qatar			0	--	34	241
Kazakhstan	3,145	1,524	1,790	1,290	1,102	1,532
Kyrgyzstan	8	88	177	34	95	34
northern Cyprus	234	254	159	22	1	126
Kosovo			0	--	2	0
Kuwait			--	--	45	26
Libya	1,032	698	385	238	1,037	2,515
Lebanon	84	0			--	--
Luxembourg			2		--	--
Malta			3	6	10	11
Egypt	--	--	--	1	--	--
Moldova	102	119	20	2	132	0
Norway			1		--	--
Pakistan	192	91	63	11	--	--
Panama			1	1	0	0
Portugal			2		0	0
Romania	462	196	0	13	12	86
Saudi Arabia	6,821	5,178	1,862	4,657	6,399	6,064
Russian Fed.	7,426	2,215	2,199	4,190	10,137	10,816
Saint Vincent				1		
Sudan			0	--	14	29
Syria			0	9	21	2
Tajikistan			0	--	0	245
Tatarstan			--	--	4	77
Taiwan				1		
Turkmenistan	563	1,576	2,184	1,327	1,068	1,603
Uzbekistan	1,326	872	176	455	423	773
Ukraine	124	93	222	90	151	89

Oman			0	--	0	4
Jordan	0	20	166	203	234	268
New Zealand			0		1	1
Yemen					0	104
Greece			7	3	0	0
Other			--	--	14	94
Total	25,817	17,652	13,465	20,231	26,916	34,151

Sources : TC Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, DİYİH, *Dış İlişkiler ve Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Bültenleri* (1998-2004), *Raporları* (1999-2003), Ankara, according to data from Türkiye İş Kurumu [Employment Office].

Appendix 3: comparison of workers' remittances and other balance of payments inflows (in millions of US\$)

Year	Workers' remittances	Receipts from tourism	Foreign capital (direct investments)	Export income
1964	8.1			411
1965	69.8			464
1966	115.3			490
1967	93			523
1968	107.3			496
1969	140.6			537
1970	273			588
1971	471.4			677
1972	740			885
1973	1,183			1,317
1974	1,425			1,532
1975	1,312			1,401
1976	982			1,960
1977	930	- 64	79	1,753
1978	983	145	50	2,288
1979	1,694	179	97	2,261
1980	2,071	212	53	2,910
1981	2,490	277	60	4,703
1982	2,187	262	55	5,746
1983	1,554	284	131	5,728
1984	1,881	271	113	7,134
1985	1,774	&	&	7,959
1986	1,634	950	125	7,457
1987	2,021	1,476	106	10,190
1988	1,776	2,355	354	11,662

1989	3,040	2,557	663	11,625
1990	3,246	3,225	700	12,960
1991	2,819	2,654	783	13,598
1992	3,008	3,639	779	14,715
1993	2,919	3,959	622	15,345
1994	2,627	4,321	559	18,106
1995	3,327	4,957	772	21,636
1996	3,542	5,650	612	23,225
1997	4,197	7,002	554	26,261
1998	5,356	7,177	573	26,973
1999	4,529	5,203	134	26,588
2000	4,560	&	&	27,485
2001	2,786	&	&	31,334
2002	1,936	&	&	36,059
2003	729	&	&	47,253

Sources : DİE İstatistik Yıllığı 1985-2000 (Ödemeler Dengesi / Balance of Payments), TC Merkez Bankası ; Central Bank of Turkey 1964-2003 (Ödemeler Dengesi / Balance of Payments) quoted by OECD (Köksal & Liebig : DELSA/ELSA/MI(2005)4

REPUBLIC		OF CYPRUS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES		

Strasbourg, 4th October 2006

Mr. Mevlut Cavusoglu,

Chairman,

Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population,
Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe,
Strasbourg.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have been prompted to address this letter to you, following the meeting of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, which took place on the 2nd October 2006, during the 4th Part Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

An item on the Committee's agenda was the presentation by Mr. Ali Riza Gulcicek, MP from Turkey, of his draft report on "The Turkish presence in Europe: migrant workers and new European citizens". In the said draft report, and more precisely in Appendix 2 under the title: "Country of destination of Turkish migrant workers", we have noticed with astonishment that under the countries listed there below there was also a reference to "Northern Cyprus".

As I am sure you will recall, Mr. Chairman, I took the floor during the discussion of the said draft report and I expressed my surprise to see such a reference, as there is no such country as "Northern Cyprus". As you very correctly also stated during the said meeting, the only recognized state by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus.

You can therefore imagine my strong disappointment for your negative reaction, when I asked for this reference to be deleted from the draft report, not only because of the reference to a non-existent "state" but also because we strongly question the figures of so – called migrant workers. In fact, tens of thousands of settlers have been illegally transferred from Turkey to the occupied part of Cyprus.

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Dear Chairman,

It is a fact that our Committee which examined the said report by Mr. Gulcicek, presented to this Assembly three years ago a report on the "Colonization by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus". As I am sure you will recall, [Recommendation 1608](#) (2003) adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, stated very clearly that : "in the light of the information available, the Assembly cannot accept the claims that the majority of arriving Turkish nationals are seasonal workers or former inhabitants who had left the island before 1974.

Furthermore, [Recommendation 1608](#) (2003) called "on Turkey, as well as its Turkish Cypriot subordinate local administration in northern Cyprus, to stop the process of colonization by Turkish settlers".

It is therefore a great paradox that the same Committee which 3 years ago approved the draft report on the colonization by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, would now consent and allow such false and misleading references to appear in one of its reports, which may directly or indirectly let one to believe that the illegal entity of the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus is a recognized state, or that the colonization of this occupied is not in fact taking place.

Mr. Chairman,

In the light of all of the above, I would like to hereby ask that the said references in Appendix 2 are removed with no further delay and that this letter is brought to the attention of the members of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population. I would also like to ask that this letter is incorporated in the draft report of Mr. Ali Riza Gulcicek, MP, according to rule 49.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

Fidias Sarikas, MP

Member of the Cyprus Delegation to the PACE.

cc. Mr. Mateo Sorinas

Secretary General of the PACE.
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* * *

Reporting committee : Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population

Reference to committee: [Doc. 10358](#) rev., Ref. 3033, 23.11.2004

Draft Recommendation unanimously adopted by the Committee, on 2 October 2006

Members of the Committee: Mr Mevlüt **Çavuşoğlu** (Chairperson), Mrs Tana de Zulueta (1st Vice-Chairperson), Mr Jean-Guy **Branger** (2nd Vice-Chairperson), ZZ (3rd Vice-Chairperson), Mr Pedro Agramunt (alternate: M. Adolfo **Fernández Aguilar**), Mr Külle Arjakas, Mr Hüseyin-Kenan Aydın, Mr Ryszard **Bender**, Mr Akhmed Bilalov, Mrs Mimount **Bousakla**, Mr Márton Braun, Lord **Burlison**, Mr Christopher **Chope**, Mr Boriss Cilevičs, Mrs Minodora **Cliveti**, Mr Ivica Dačić, Mr Franco Danieli, Mr Joseph Debono Grech, Mr Taulant Dedja, Mr Nikolaos Dendias, Mr Abilio Dias Fernandes, Mr Karl Donabauer (alternate: Mr Harald **Himmer**), Mr Mats **Einarsson**, Mrs Lydie Err (alternate: Mr Norbert **Haupt**), Mr Valeriy **Fedorov**, Mrs Daniela Filipiová, Mrs Margrét Frimannsdóttir, Mrs Gunn Karin Gjul, Mrs Angelika Graf, Mr John **Greenway**, Mr Andrzej **Grzyb**, Mr Ali Riza **Gülççek**, Mr Michael Hagberg, Mr Holger Haibach, Ms Gultakin Hajiyeva, Mr Doug **Henderson**, Mr Jürgen Herrmann, Mr Ilie **Ilaşcu**, Mr Tadeusz Iwiński (alternate: Mr Piotr **Gadzinowski**), Mrs Corien W.A. Jonker (alternate: Mr Ed **van Thijn**), Mr Oleksandr Karpov, Mrs Eleonora Katseli, Mr Dimitrij Kovačič, Mr Andros Kyprianou (alternate: Mr Fidas **Sarikas**), Mr Petr Lachnit, Mr Geert Lambert (alternate: Mr Paul **Wille**), Mr Jean-Marie Le Guen, Mr Younal Loutfi, Mr Jean-Pierre Masseret, Mrs Ana Catarina **Mendonça**, Mr Morten Messerschmidt, Mr Paschal **Mooney**, Mr Giuseppe Naro, Mr Xhevdet Nasufi, Mr Gebhard **Negele**, Mr Pasquale **Nessa**, Mrs Annette Nijs (alternate: Mr Leo **Platvoet**), Mr Kalevi **Olin**, Mr İbrahim **Özal**, Mrs Maria Josefa Porteiro Garcia, Mr Cezar Florin **Preda**, Mr Alojz Pridal, Mr Dušan **Proroković**, Mr Gabino **Puche**, Mr Milorad Pupovac, Mr Martin Raguž, Mr Anatolij Rakhansky, Mr Marc **Reymann**, Mr Samad Seyidov, Mr Luzi Stamm, Mr Sergiu Stati, Mrs Terezija Stoisits, Mr Vilmos Szabó, Mrs Elene **Tevdoradze**, Mr Tigran Torosyan, Mrs Ruth-Gaby Vermot-Mangold, Mrs Iliana Yotova, Mr Akhmar Zavgayev, Mr Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (alternate: Mrs Vera **Oskina**), Mr Serhiy Zhyzhko, Mr Emanuelis Zingeris.

N.B. The names of the members who took part in the meeting are printed **in bold**.

Secretaries of the Committee: Mr Halvor Lervik, Mr Mark Neville, Ms Dana Karanjac

¹ Annual reports of the Ankara based Directorate General of Services for Expatriate Workers of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, now known as the Directorate General of External Relations and Services for Expatriate Workers of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (in Turkish: *YIHGM - Yurtdisi İşçiler Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü*, now *DIYİH - Dis İlişkiler ve Yurtdisi İşçiler Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü*).

² SOPeMI: Système d'Observation Permanente des Migrations Internationales, OECD, Paris.

³ OECD, *Trends in International Migration*, annual report 2004, Paris, 2005. The figures are averages calculated over short periods (eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). It is still difficult to identify a real trend.

⁴ *DIYİH, 2000-2001 Raporu, Yurtdisindaki Vatandaşlarımıza İlişkin Gelisme ve Sayısal Bilgiler*, Ankara 2002 et André LEBON, *Migrations et Nationalité en France in 2001*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 2003.

⁵ France also makes use of these "autorisations provisoires de travail" (APT) or provisional work permits, for such purposes as construction projects, with the participation of Turkish workers albeit in smaller numbers.

⁶ For example, General Pervez Musharraf, the current President of Pakistan, who studied in Ankara.

⁷ Figures taken from the website <http://www.isoplan.de/aid/2000-4>; 45 Jahre Arbeitsmigration nach Deutschland. Each country has relatively accurate statistics giving the breakdown by categories or occupations (results of censuses, sample surveys and assessments of immigrant or foreign labour), but according to norms that often differ too much for an average, all-Europe situation to be established.

⁸ DİYİH, *2004 Raporu, Yurtdışındaki Vatandaşlarımıza İlişkin Gelişme ve Sayısal Bilgiler*, Ankara 2005.

⁹ Centre de Relations Européennes: *Sociographie de la population turque et d'origine turque en Belgique (Quarante ans de présence en Belgique, 1960-2000)*, Brussels, 2000 (final editing by Altay Manço).

¹⁰ *Halal*: permitted according to the Koran The word is Arabic, the opposite being *haram*. The term *halal business*, which was coined by sociologists, is aimed at practising Moslems who comply with the prohibition of the consumption of alcohol and pork and supply articles or services relating to religious practices: prayer mats, women's clothing that conforms to the Islamic faith, religious writings in bookshops, sales of tickets for a pilgrimage to Mecca, etc.

¹¹ TÜSİAD : *Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği* (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), MÜSİAD : *Müslüman Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği* (Muslim Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) close to the AKP currently in power; UND : *Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği* (International Carriers' Association).

¹² Some analyses, which are often cursory and incomplete, suggest that these migration routes are the same as those used for all kinds of trafficking (for example, in human beings, illegal workers and drugs) and organised crime. This is clearly the case, as every large city naturally has a concentration of declared legal activities as well as illegal, underground activities. Migrants use the existing transport and communications corridors, but people engaged in reprehensible activities may, for obvious reasons, use the byways.

¹³ In the years 1980-1995, this proportion of Turkish residents abroad fluctuated from 70 to 85% depending on the year, with considerable variations from one country to another depending on the immigrants' status (statutory refugees naturally do not return to their home country on holiday, and low-income families rarely return. Business owners may do so very frequently in connection with their business activities.

¹⁴ TC Ulaştırma Bakanlığı, *1995-2005 Ulaştırma ve Haberleşme*, Ankara, 2005 [Transport and Communication 1995-2005] published by the Ministry of Transport.

¹⁵ Among the analyses by jurists specialising in European issues, see P. Mavridis's recent contribution (to be published) to a colloquy, *La protection sociale des Turcs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des CE*, Actes du Colloque CERI / AFEMOTI, **Le social dans les rapports entre l'Union Européenne et la Turquie**, Paris, 9 May 2006 (M. Mavridis is a Principal Administrator in the European Commission, DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. During the same colloquy, Ms C. Wihtol de Wenden described the current state of European law as a situation of "Roman-style citizenship, picking out six levels of the right to reside (a. nationals; b. Europeans; c. long-term residents; d. legal temporary residents; e. asylum-seekers; f. undocumented foreigners). See also the analysis by S. Barbou des Places (2002), *La libre circulation des travailleurs turcs dans l'UE*, in P. CHABAL & A. de RAULIN (Eds), **Les chemins de la Turquie vers l'Europe**, Arras, Artois Presses Université (Droit et Sciences Economiques), 179-205.