U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 - Indonesia

Since late 2004, the Indonesian government increased counterterrorism efforts and counterterrorism cooperation with both the United States and the international community. The Indonesian National Police (INP) had several successes in breaking-up terrorist cells and arresting terrorists with links to Jemaah Islamiya (JI). INP investigations into the October 2005 suicide attacks on Bali led to numerous successes for Indonesia's counterterrorism investigators. Links among violent Islamic radicals and extremist organizations, including JI and its associates, remained a serious security threat to both Western and domestic targets in Indonesia, although no major anti-Western terrorist incident occurred. Physical security at major hotels and tourist venues in Jakarta and Bali was upgraded significantly. At year's end, the main target of Indonesian CT units remained Malaysian JI operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, suspected in nearly every major terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002.

The security situation in the previously strife-torn Maluku region improved, absent major incidents of interfaith violence. In central Sulawesi, where terrorist attacks in 2005 claimed several lives, a special taskforce led by the INP's top CT investigators identified and arrested several JI-linked terrorists responsible for the October 2005 Poso schoolgirl beheadings and other previously unresolved cases. The three main suspects arrested in April were brought to trial in Jakarta. In September, several days of street violence in Indonesia's eastern provinces followed the executions in Palu of three Christian men for their role in inciting deadly attacks against Muslims in 2000. However, the perpetrators behind the October shooting death of a Christian priest in Palu remained at large. Also at large were more than two dozen terrorist suspects in central Sulawesi who continued to evade INP investigators. The INP feared aggressive police operations would provoke the militants, and, in November, the INP unsuccessfully sought cooperation from the suspects' families to encourage the suspects to surrender.

The Indonesian attorney general's office continued to seek convictions in more than two dozen terrorism cases tried this year. Among those convicted were terrorist recruiter and trainer Subur Sugiyarto, terrorist financier Abdullah Sunata, and trained bomb maker Mohammad Cholily. In July, Indonesia's attorney general staffed the long awaited Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force, designed to oversee counterterrorism trials nationwide through a cadre of special terrorism prosecutors. Task Force members immediately began to take on over a dozen counterterrorism cases, including the three central Sulawesi cases.

Indonesia's policy of routinely granting sentence remissions to nearly all prisoners continued to benefit convicted terrorists, resulting in several early releases. JI figure Emir Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, sentenced in 2005 to 30 months in prison for his involvement in a "sinister conspiracy" to carry out the 2002 Bali attacks, was released in June after several routine sentence reductions. In December, the Indonesian Supreme Court overturned Ba'sayir's conviction based on a judicial review in which Ba'sayir's defense presented new evidence. Also released were several lesser known JI-linked figures and Rusman "Gun-gun" Gunawan, the younger brother of Indonesian-born Riduan bin Isomuddin, also known as Hambali, who was an operational leader in JI and served as the middleman between JI and al-Qaida from 2000 until his capture in 2003.¹ Hambali, a high value detainee, was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in September.

The Indonesian government continued its efforts to develop an effective anti-money laundering regime, but investigations and prosecutions in these cases continued to fall short. Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered during investigations, but the government's implementation of the sanctions regime established pursuant to UNSCR 1267 was hampered by poor interagency coordination and by human and technical capacity deficits in both government and financial institutions. The USAID is promoting capacity building through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project, a multi-year program to provide technical advisors and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and credible regime against money laundering and terrorism finance.

Indonesian counterterrorism efforts remained hindered by weak laws and enforcement, serious internal coordination problems, and systemic corruption that further limited already strained government resources. Lawmakers and other senior elected officials continued their slow pace toward needed legal reforms. A widely discussed plan to establish an official counterterrorism coordinating agency appeared to have been shelved after awaiting final presidential approval. Prospective members of the independent police commission designed to help guide police reform were identified this year, but they still need a formal presidential appointment before assuming their responsibilities. The government has not yet submitted a revision of the 2003 Counterterrorism Law to the House of Representatives. Indonesian authorities recognized that more effective prosecution of terrorism cases would require a revision of the law to include updated standards for introducing evidence in terror cases and comprehensive articles on conspiracy.

1 Hambali helped plan the first Bali bombings in 2002 that killed more than 200 persons and facilitated al-Qaida financing for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing the following year.