Mahshid Mahmoudi Gilani v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

The appellant, a citizen of Iran, appeals against a decision of an adjudicator (W J Coley Esq) dismissing her appeal against the refusal by the Secretary of State on 17 June 1985 to vary her leave to enter so as to grant her asylum in this country. Before us the appellant was represented by Mr A Nicol of counsel instructed by Winstanley-Burgess, Solicitors of London and the Secretary of State by Mr A Gammons.

This case raises the question whether given a fear of return to a country of nationality, that fear was well-founded and whether if so, it is for a reason within the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The appellant's solicitors have submitted to the Tribunal a record of proceedings before the adjudicator as taken down by the solicitor attending the hearing. The adjudicator agreed that, in his words, it was a "fuller and accurate account" of the proceedings before him. It was agreed by the parties that the hearing before us should proceed on the basis that the proceedings before the adjudicator were as recorded in the appellant's solicitor's notes as certified by the adjudicator.

It appears that the appellant first came to this country in April 1977. She entered as a visitor and then obtained leave to remain as a student. In 1979 as her grandmother was ill, she returned to Iran. Unfortunately, her grandmother died before she got there but she was unable to return to this country as the Islamic revolution then took place. After about a year she obtained employment at S P Chemicals in Tehran and at the end of 1981, was promoted to the position of Finance Manager. She remained in that employment and in 1984 came to this country for business discussions. She was given leave to enter as a business visitor and on 10 July 1984 the appellant's solicitors applied on her behalf for asylum. She was interviewed in connection with this application on 26 November 1984 and a record of that interview both in the form of the explanatory statement and in notes taken by the appellant's solicitor was before the adjudicator.

The adjudicator heard oral evidence from the appellant and from Mrs Haleh Afshar. Mrs Afshar is a researcher in social services and a lecturer on third world and development. She has conducted research on the position of women in Iran. A number of articles written by her and others were produced in evidence before the adjudicator and are before us. The adjudicator said that Mrs Afshar's curriculum vitae "shows impressive qualifications and employment, and also an obvious deep knowledge of Iranian affairs, particularly those affecting women".

The appellant's case in essence is based on the position of women in Iran and their liability to persecution and the risk that if she returned, she would be one of those women who did suffer. The appellant's case depends on compliance with HC 169 paragraph 134 which reads:

"134. A person may apply for asylum in the United Kingdom on the ground that, if he were required to leave, he would have to go to a country to which he is unwilling to go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Any such claim is to be carefully considered in the light of all the relevant circumstances".

The wording of paragraph 134 is identical to that of Article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and it is common ground that the appellant's case depends upon the application of that Convention through HC 169. It will be seen, therefore, that not only must the appellant establish that she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted but that that fear is "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular, social group or political opinion". It is common ground that in asking the question whether the case is established, we should apply a less rigorous standard of proof than that normally applied through the criterion "balance of probability". We follow and apply the decision of Nolan J in R v IAT ex parte Jonah [1985] Imm AR 7 where, at page 11 the learned judge said:

"The likelihood of persecution contemplated by paragraph 134 is something different from proof on the balance of probabilities that persecution will occur".

The learned judge refused to say that an adjudicator expressing the question of onus as "even on balance of probabilities" had erred in law. He did, however, say that there was a value in, the distinction made between future possibilities and existing facts. We, therefore, approach the matter asking whether there is a serious risk that if returned to Iran the appellant might suffer persecution within the meaning of paragraph 134 and the Convention.

Mr Nicol has to establish four elements in order to succeed. These are that the appellant is in fear, that that fear is of being persecuted, that the persecution of which she is in fear is for reasons of "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" and finally that the fear of being persecuted for such a reason is well-founded. Mr Nicol argued his case primarily on the basis that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution because of the membership of a particular social group - that group being either women in general or Westernised middle-class Islamic women. Mr Nicol also argued that the well-founded fear of persecution was for reasons of political opinion or religion.

Mr Gammons did not contest that the appellant was afraid of returning to Iran. However, as he put it, that fear might well be a subjective fear of the discriminatory practises and the potential rigour of a fundamental Islamic regime.

The evidence

The evidence before the adjudicator and before us is primarily based on the position of a woman such as the appellant in Iran, supported by a few incidents in which the appellant or persons known to her, and the State authorities have not been at one. Turning to the incidents affecting the appellant first, she has not engaged in any political activity in Iran. However, she did demonstrate against the compulsory wearing of the Chador. This act of demonstration became more pointed when, as the adjudicator said, "the following day an article had appeared in a newspaper containing pictures of actors masquerading as prostitutes and swearing about the women who had taken part in the demonstration". The appellant protested by telephone about this but received no response.

Secondly, it appeared that while at work she had on occasion been reprimanded by revolutionary guards for not wearing a veil and also because her clothing did not cover all her body. As the adjudicator said, the appellant on these occasions was not dressed in flagrant disregard of the requirements of dress and the complaints went to the fact that not all her face was covered or that her hair was on view. The appellant added that on one occasion when she was not wearing a veil, it was reported to her that the guards had said they would not then take action but in future "would treat her like a prostitute and take her to prison". Thirdly, the appellant recounted incidents in which women who were not wearing veils were taken away and that her own mother had been approached with this threat but she had begged for forgiveness and because of her age, no action was taken.

In evidence before the adjudicator, the appellant made it clear that she objected strongly to the mode of dress which was required in present day Iran and she indicated that anyone not dressed in the veil, thick stockings or loose trousers and a loose dress would, as the adjudicator said, "be liable to be lashed or imprisoned or otherwise persecuted, perhaps shot, hanged or stoned". According to the record of proceedings, she said that "if walked about Westernised would be shot. If a piece of hair showing - depends on person arresting".

The appellant added that if she went back to Iran, she would be pressed into an arranged marriage. It would be difficult for her to get a job as most jobs were undertaken by men.

As to the appellant's reasons for not wishing to return to Iran, she said in her interview with the immigration officer that she had suffered from a nervous breakdown as a consequence of the incident when the revolutionary guards came to the factory and that every time she went from her house to the office, she was afraid of being caught by the guards. She said that she had no trouble getting a passport in order to return to the United Kingdom for her company. When she got here she said she realised how weak she was and she was confused. She did not come to this country intending to claim asylum. Asked what would happen if she went back to Iran, she replied:

"Personally, it is not easy to answer. I would have all the same problems I've had. I think my nervous breakdown would get worse. It will hurt me a lot. I won't be able to have a social and private life. I will just be stuck in my own room or in hospital".

The appellant then elaborated on her illness saying that the nervous breakdown had led to a skin disease. When asked if there were any other reasons why she did not want to return to Iran, the appellant replied:

"I am already 30 years old. I realised in the UK that I never had a social life in Iran. I also realised about being secure. I need a new life - somewhere I can stay without fearing. It is hard to express myself. I need somewhere to stay to find myself and get myself together for quite a while".

Before the adjudicator the appellant added that:

"...I realised after going back I could not tolerate my social life and private life was unbearable and after advice from solicitors I was told I could possibly apply for political asylum".

It appears also from the evidence that the appellant's family are all in Tehran - her father, brothers and three sisters. She referred to her ex-stepmother as being a great supporter of the regime, working for the Ministry of Health and appearing on TV and talking about "how women should do the orthodox view". She said that other women agree with the regime's view and there has been demonstrations but no doubt there had been pressure on some women.

The evidence as to the treatment of women and of Westernised women in Iran is to be culled from documentary evidence placed before the adjudicator and the oral evidence of Mrs Afshar. Mr Nicol stressed particular portions of the evidence but we have taken it all into account. The evidence shows, to put it mildly, that women in Iran are not treated on the same basis as men. First, as to marriage. The evidence was that it was extremely hard for any woman to refuse marriage to a man, that the Usual upper limit for marriage is 18 and that men can have four formal wives and unlimited inform wives. Marriages are arranged by male guardians and the philosophy is that women's sexuality is seen as a threat. For this reason they should be married very young. A husband is in total control of his wife's life and women cannot be gainfully employed without their husband's registered consent. The teaching of Khomeini is that women cannot go out.

However, Mrs Afshar also said that women were required by law to work part-time and this caused difficulties as all children's nurseries had been closed. As far as women working for private employers are concerned vigilantes can enter any office and check on their appearance. The women must follow directions as to dress, they must dress in black or similar colour and wear very thick material. These restrictions apply both in and out of Iran. Mrs Afshar said that the vigilantes do not particularly care if working-class women do not wear proper clothes but if middle-class women do not do so, "they are subject to lashes, acid is thrown at them and there are outbursts of spontaneous action which the government endorses". She added "middle-class women are seen as a threat, rightly so, as their are historical, political reasons for this". Mrs Afshar said that the reason for the directive as to dress was that there was a fundamental fear of women. This attitude to dress and to women was resented by some women in Iran and not by others. When asked to give an estimate as to the proportion of women in Iran which would support the views held by the appellant and her, Mrs Afshar indicated that the women at risk were middle-class women who were not living in the country; who were of an age to remember the old regime of freedom of dress and rights. The young girls growing up with the present regime did not know any different way of life and older women resented the middle-age group.

Mrs Afshar also referred to the consequences which a woman was likely to face, in her view, if she went to prison. Mrs Afshar said "She is viewed as fair game for male jailers. It is accepted that a woman could not be sent to death if she is unmarried. Therefore male jailers marry the woman temporarily. The view is that if a woman is imprisoned, she is guilty. If one is a woman and in prison, it is assumed that she has lost her honour and is called and treated as a prostitute". By this, Mrs Afshar said that she meant the woman would be raped.

To indicate the circumstances of women in Iran, a copy of a translation of extracts from the Bill of Retribution passed by the Parliament of Iran was put in and Mrs Afshar commented on it. In particular, she stressed the provision that if a Muslim man wilfully murders a Muslim woman, he would be sentenced to retaliation but before that could occur the woman's guardian must pay the murderer one half of a man's blood money. Apparently the "principle" underlining this provision is that a woman's blood is worth less than a man. If a woman commits adultery said Mrs Afshar, the husband is entitled to kill her and her lover. This, it is said, has extended to a woman accused of having engaged in adultery. Further, it was said by Mrs Afshar that any woman accused of being a prostitute would be treated as one and be vulnerable to attack by vigilante groups resulting in rape, imprisonment etc.

There was considerable documentary evidence before the adjudicator -

i.          a number of articles on the status of women in Iran;

ii.          as we have indicated, a copy of extracts of the Bill of Retribution enacted by the Iranian Parliament;

iii.         a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

iv.         a copy of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 coming into force on 23 March 1976, 62 States being parties;

v.          a copy of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1953 of which 85 States have become parties;

vi.         a copy of a report of a "Sub-Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on International Protection considering, commenting and making resolutions following consideration of a Note on Refugee Women and International Protection by the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and

vii.        a copy of a report of the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on the application of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, presented to Parliament in March 1984 and later adopted by the Parliament.

The adjudicator's determination

The adjudicator reviewed the oral and documentary evidence and referred particularly to the relevant Articles of the Convention on the Status of Refugees, a paragraph in the United Nations Sub-Committee Report and in the context of the definition of a "particular social group" to a paragraph in the report from the Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In commenting on the evidence of Mrs Afshar and its relevance to the issue before him, the adjudicator said:

"I do not think it is necessary for me to dwell on Mrs Afshar's testimony in great detail. I think it is a matter of common knowledge that women of the Islamic faith are regarded to coin a phrase as second class citizens, very sub-serving to men and, have few rights, if any in general. Further that the regime in Iran is regarded with abhorrence in the West and has been roundly condemned by the United Nations. I fully accept many people in Iran have been savagely treated for minor infringements of the Islamic faith and that women in particular in many instances suffered horrendous treatment. However the question arises on the evidence is the appellant entitled to political asylum in this country".

After setting out HC 169 paragraph 134, the adjudicator continued:

"The question arises has the appellant shown she is within the provisions of paragraph 134. In my view on consideration of the probabilities and applying the lower standard of proof applicable in asylum cases, I do not consider she has shown she is within those provisions.

The fact of the matter is the appellant from a middle-class background who has tasted the relative freedom allowed in Iran during the regime of the Shah and the equality afforded to women in the Western world, does not wish to return to Iran, where it is quite clear women in general are seriously under privileged and very much regarded as second class citizens under the domination of the male. However this is something that applies to all women in Iran, and indeed many other countries of the Islamic faith put a certain construction on the Koran...".

The adjudicator held that "women" could not be construed as a social group within the meaning of the Convention or paragraph 134 of HC 169. He referred to two extracts from the documents on Refugee Women and International Protection - first, to a passage in the Note from the High Commissioner for Refugees stating that consideration should be given to interpreting "particular social group" so as to include "women who face harsh and inhuman treatment because they are considered as having transgressed the social mores of their society". Secondly, the adjudicator referred to the Report of the Sub-Committee on the discussion of the note of the High Commissioner which recorded various views expressed by representatives.

The adjudicator concluded:

"It is noteworthy from the paragraph a number of representatives felt the matter should be the subject of further studies. Others said the matter has already been applied in their respective countries. Another view was that the matter should be left to the sovereign decision of individual States. So far as I am aware the United Kingdom in the exercise of its sovereignty has not decreed women who transgress the social mores of the society in which they live, may be considered as a social group within the meaning of article 1(a)(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. The matter is a difficult one because on the admitted evidence it is clear that a very large number of women in Iran do not agree with the emancipation of women. It seems to me one is a dangerous ground if, you attempt to interfere with a persons customs or religious beliefs and on even more dangerous ground if you do so. On a national or world wide scale.

I have considerable sympathy for the appellant, nevertheless in my view it is quite clear that she had never personally been the subject of persecution within the meaning of paragraph 134 of HC 169. The incidents she described could have happened to any women in Iran, and as the law stands in this country she cannot be regarded as a member of a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention or paragraph 134 of HC 169.

The appeal is dismissed".

The proceedings before the Tribunal

Mr Nicol argued that the adjudicator had found as a fact that the appellant had a fear of persecution and that that fear was well-founded. In our view, the adjudicator accepted both that women in general were regarded as "second-class citizens" having few rights and secondly, that in particular cases women had suffered, as he put it, "horrendous treatment". The adjudicator in considering the apprehension of the appellant seems to have linked that apprehension rather to the general position of women in that, in his view, the appellant did not wish to return to Iran because she would be a second-class citizen under the domination of the male. The adjudicator does not seem to have concluded that the appellant did not wish to return to Iran because it was likely that she would be one who suffered the horrendous treatment to which Mrs Afshar referred and which the adjudicator accepted had occurred in certain cases.

Secondly, the adjudicator held that women in general could not be considered as a social group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention and HC 169 paragraph 134. Insofar as it may be that the adjudicator came to this conclusion on the basis that Parliament or through Parliament the Secretary of State for Home Affairs has not directed that the Convention should be interpreted so as to include "women" as a particular social group, we do not think this to be a factor working against such interpretation. Lacking any legislative direction or definition it is for the adjudicator and hence, the Tribunal to interpret the meaning of the concepts and phrases of the rules (and therefore the Convention) as they stand. We agree with the adjudicator's comment that the task is difficult as the Convention seeks to apply a common concept to what are clearly nationally diverse philosophies.

The difficulties in interpretation go both to the definition of a "social group" and to the questions whether if, a collection of individuals are taken to make up such a group for the purposes of the rule and the Convention, there is evidence of "persecution" because of membership of that group and the appellant as a member of the group has a well-founded fear of that persecution.

As we have said, Mr Nicol put his case on two primary bases - that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution, either as a woman in Iran or as a Westernised woman in Iran. As a first step Mr Nicol has to establish that "women" in Iran or "Westernised women" in Iran are a social group.

"Women" as a social group in Iran

Like the adjudicator, we accept that women in Iran have a status less than men and therefore, that there is discrimination against them. Further, we accept the penalties which can be imposed for transgressing against the "social mores" of dress and behaviour can amount to persecution and indeed in Iran may amount to persecution. However, again like the adjudicator we cannot accept that a woman in Iran runs a serious risk of persecution solely because of being a woman.

While we agree with Mr Nicol that in construing the Convention as it applies to a particular country, we cannot simply apply the standards of that country, such standards are undoubtedly relevant to concluding whether or not there is "Persecution" because of being a member of a group in that country. While there may be discrimination as between treatment of men and women in Iran, this does not, in our view, on the evidence, amount to persecution of women as such.

Discrimination is not per se persecution. This is recognised by the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status published by the United Nations High Commissioner. Paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Handbook reads:

"54.      Differences in the treatment of various groups do indeed exist to a greater or lesser extent in many societies. Persons who receive less favourable treatment as a result of such differences are not necessarily victims of persecution. It is only in certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to practise his religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities.

55.        Where measures of discrimination are, in themselves, not of a serious character, they may nevertheless give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as regards his future existence. Whether or not such measures of discrimination in themselves amount to persecution must be determined in the light of all the circumstances. A claim to fear of persecution will of course be stronger where a person has been the victim of a number of discriminatory measures of this type and where there is thus a cumulative element involved".

Further, even if liability to persecution may be said to exist if some women act or fail to act in ways contrary to the perceived State view of propriety, this does not make women as such liable to persecution. The question for the purpose of the Convention then is, whether those doing the act or failing to act can be said to be a social group. We appreciate that if the liability to persecution flows from the inability to exercise basic human rights, then this could amount to persecution because of being a woman. It is a matter of degree and in assessing the matter, we bear in mind that many women in Iran seem content with their lot and that in Islam, men and women are not treated equally. We do not think that the evidence establishes that in Iran women as such are liable to persecution.

It follows that whether or not "women" may be a social group within the Convention, in our view, the appellant cannot make a case on the ground of the fear of persecution as a woman in Iran.

"Westernised women" as a social group in Iran

Although it may have been accepted by the Home Office in this and at least one other case that Westernised middle-class women do constitute a social group in Iran, we have to say that on the evidence before us we cannot agree. We agree that the transgression of social mores could help to create a social group based on that transgression - just as transgression of a religious belief may create such a group. The critical issue is whether the group of which the appellant is alleged to be a member exists. While we would not wish to approach the construction of the Convention in a technical legalistic sense, the right to asylum (flowing from refugee status) is not dependent on "persecution" in general but persecution because of specified reasons. "Social group" clearly indicates the principle that in this respect, it is persecution because of a membership of a group capable of being identified and having some common practice or common belief.

When certain requirements of society are opposed by some within the society, there can no doubt be a development from individuals in opposition to a social group identified both as between the members and by those outside the group on the basis of the acts done in opposition. On the evidence before us we cannot say that "Westernised women" are such an identified or identifiable group in Iran. Rather the evidence is that the opposition to the dress and other aspects of the Islamic approach adopted in Iran remains individually based and there is no evidence that there is any recognition that those opposing look upon themselves as a group distinguished from other women or that they are so viewed because of the opposition to various practices. This lack of identifiability seems to us to be underlined by the additional qualification floated before us - that the group is of "Westernised middle-class women". Such a qualification, itself uncertain, simply renders any "group" even less identifiable than that suggested of "Westernised women".

Because of our conclusion that "Westernised women" are not a social group, the question of persecution in relation to the appellant can arise only because of acts committed as an individual. Even if, therefore, the penalties for the acts said to flow from the "Westernised" approach - in this case largely opposition to dress and the kind of life women must lead - could amount to persecution, it would not be persecution within the Convention.

Religious belief and political opinion

Mr Nicol also suggested that the appellant could base her case on the fear of persecution for reasons of religion or of political opinion.

Religion

The appellant said in evidence to the adjudicator that she was not religious. It is therefore somewhat difficult to establish a fear of persecution because of religion. While it may be argued that the demands made by the Iranian State to which the appellant objects are themselves based on a religion, the appellant's opposition is not based on any religious belief. It seems clear that it is based simply on a dislike of the practises and a preference for the Westernised way of life. In our view, therefore, the appellant cannot make a case under this head.

Political opinion

Just as with religion, it may be argued that in Iran the rules as to dress behaviour are rooted in political opinion which in turn may well be rooted in religious beliefs. However, again as with the contention made as to religion, the appellant's opposition is on the evidence not based on any political belief. Mr Nicol argued that the phrase "political opinion" as it appeared in the Convention could well apply to the political opinion which was leading to the alleged persecution rather than the political opinion of the person who alleged persecution. However, in our view, to make sense of the provision, an individual fear persecution at the very least because of a difference in political belief between the State and the individual.

Such a view is borne out by the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (see paragraph 80). In this case there is no evidence that the appellant's objections to practices stem from any difference in political opinion rooted anywhere other than in the practises themselves. As we said above on the evidence, the appellant's case is based on a dislike of the practises and an apprehension of what may happen if she were to return to Iran and not follow these practises. In our opinion, therefore, the appellant cannot make a case under this head.

The appellant's fear

Because of our conclusions, whether or not the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution of some kind, she cannot bring her case within the provisions of Article 1A(2) of the Convention and HC 169 paragraph 134. We should say, however, that it does seem to us that the -evidence establishes, as Mr Gammons said, a fear of returning to Iran because of the life that she would have to adopt rather than persecution. It is arguable that the risk being run by a woman who refuses to follow the Iranian way of life may well amount to persecution in that the penalties which may be imposed are so disproportionate to the offence as to be said to be oppression. We do have some doubts, however, as to whether judging by her life there prior to her entry into this country the appellant was so opposed to the mode of dress that she would find it impossible to live in Iran. She was employed and she apparently did comply with many of the rules. True it is that there were at least two occasions in which the appellant found herself in opposition to the regime because of transgression of or objection to the dress requirements. It is, however, doubtful whether on the whole of the evidence it is shown that the appellant found the life demanded of her to be one with which she felt unable to comply.

Mr Nicol argued that it is quite irrelevant that an individual by choice could comply with a rule to which the individual objected. We agree that it would make nonsense of the Convention to adopt this as a general principle for it is precisely because an individual is out of line with practises in his or her State that the problem of the refugee arises. However, this does not mean that a person alleging the right to asylum must not establish that the belief on which reliance is placed is not truly held. The question of whether compliance with the practises to which objection is taken would not in an individual's case affect fundamentally his or her life is relevant to whether in reality there is a fear of returning because of likely persecution.

As to the question of whether any fear stemming from a real unwillingness or inability to comply with the demands of life in Iran, the evidence goes to show that in certain cases there were horrendous penalties administered for non-compliance with rules applicable to dress and behaviour. It might then be argued that there is a serious that any transgression would lead to such serious penalties but we are not entirely sure that the evidence comes up to this standard. There is no allegation that the demonstrators who accompanied the appellant in protesting against the dress were punished in any way except to paint them in an immoral light. There is no evidence that the appellant would be singled out as being liable to particularly severe punishment.

There is, however, evidence that the punishment is erratically administered and that at the severe end of the scale, it can lead to lashing, imprisonment and rape. On this ground, therefore, it is highly arguable that any real fear would be well-founded.

Conclusions

To sum up, in our view, the appellant cannot make a case out for asylum in accordance with the Convention. The root cause of her to return to Iran is the objection to the dress and other rules discriminating against women and the alleged fear of the consequences if she did not comply with the rules. We have our doubts that the appellant would not be prepared to comply with the rules and applying the test of balance of probabilities as qualified in Jonah, we have a serious doubt about the realistic likelihood of her persecution. Even if it can be said that the evidence establishes that because of her dislike of the dress and behaviour rules, the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution, that dislike does not stem from any of the roots specified in Article 1A(2) and in particular, in the roots on which reliance was placed - membership of a social group religious belief or political opinion.

The appeal is dismissed.

Mr Nicol asked us to consider a recommendation if we were against him on the case under the rules and the Convention. We recognise that the appellant has been in this country since 1984 but we also have to recognise that she came here as a business visitor having a firm business base in Iran and having lived in Iran for some five years. In the light of our view of the appellant's apprehension, we are content in this case simply to adopt Mr Gammons view that it would be indeed curious if an individual, particularly a woman, did not have an apprehension about returning to Iran unless that person supported the regime and the mode of life there. We are in no doubt that the appellant does have such an apprehension.