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ACEH / INDONESIA

IDPs and returnees still face significant recovery and reintegration needs

Five years after the Helsinki agreement put an end to a 30-year long conflict between the armed forces and Acehese separatists, tens of thousands of people have yet to return to their homes in Aceh province, Indonesia. The most recent available data suggests that there may still be as many as 146,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Aceh, and more who fled to neighbouring provinces. The majority of the IDPs are ethnic Javanese migrants who moved to Aceh before to the conflict and who have been much slower to return due to security concerns. Most are living in the four most heavily conflict-affected regencies of Aceh Utara, Pidie, Aceh Timur and Bireuen. Those hoping to return are motivated by better economic opportunities and improvements in the security situation. Others have established themselves and created new livelihoods in areas of displacements and do not wish to return. Many experience problems in integrating with local communities.

It is believed that three-quarters of the estimated 600,000 people displaced during the conflict have now returned to their homes, integrated in their area of displacement or resettled elsewhere. Most of them are in areas hard hit by the conflict, where the poor state of infrastructure, houses and land, and the limited access to social services and economic opportunities, have made it difficult for them to recover. Many also face land and property disputes, and fear and mistrust still run high. In many cases, returnees have faced greater recovery challenges and been more vulnerable than IDPs.


The assistance needs of conflict-IDPs have been largely overlooked by the government and by the international community, which has preferred to focus on people affected by the tsunami. Despite being entitled by the Helsinki agreement to reintegration and recovery assistance from the government, the overwhelming majority of the people displaced by the conflict have not received any specific assistance. While vulnerable IDPs and returnees are in need of tailored assistance to meet their specific recovery challenges, comprehensive strategies are also needed to develop community-based programmes to rebuild infrastructure, restore access to basic services, create income-generating activities, and promote communication and cooperation within and between villages. However as of September 2010 many international agencies have left Aceh, and funding prospects for humanitarian programmes are receding.

Indonesia: Conflict and displacement in Aceh



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IDMC internal displacement monitoring centre
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Source: IDMC

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Causes and background

The separatist struggle in Aceh is rooted in the impoverishment of the local population and their perception of being exploited by elites closely linked to the central government. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebel group emerged in 1976 promoting the idea of an independent Aceh state. Until the end of the 1990s, GAM posed no real security threat, but between 1989 and 1998 the national armed forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) crushed the insurgency through a disproportionate military response, described by Human Rights Watch as “ferocious and indiscriminate”. This resulted in widespread resentment against the central government and fostered popular support for the rebel movement, which evolved into the legitimate representative of the Acehnese’s aspirations (HRW, 27 August 1999).

As in other provinces of the country, transmigration programmes also had a disruptive effect in Aceh, with politicians encouraging ethnic tensions. The arrival of up to 160,000 Javanese transmigrants between 1974 and 1998 generated local resentment, as there was a common perception that the new migrants got the best jobs. They were also blamed for “un-Islamic behaviour” such as prostitution, corruption and gambling (Braithwaite, John, March 2010, p.355). As of 1999, Javanese people became the target of attacks by GAM, which viewed them as an “elemental enemy of Aceh’s nationhood” (Aspinall, Edward, 2008, p.135).

Large-scale displacement followed the intensification in 1999 of the conflict; displacement was even encouraged by the rebels to draw attention to the conflict, and organised by the government in order to remove the population during counter-insurgency operations. Between 1999 and 2004 it is estimated that up to 600,000 people were forced from their homes (MSR, December 2009, p.28). The majority were Acehnese people displaced for relatively short periods within the province; however the Javanese and the Gayo

were disproportionately affected. Both groups were opposed to GAM and joined government-sponsored militias, in particular in the central highlands where they were in majority. Up to 150,000 Javanese fled to neighbouring North Sumatra, where many remained even after the end of the conflict.

The earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh and North Sumatra provinces in December 2004 wiped out entire towns and villages along the coastline, killed at least 160,000 people and displaced half a million. The tsunami and the subsequent assistance effort nevertheless had a major influence in ending the conflict in Aceh: faced with a humanitarian crisis beyond its capacity to manage, the government was forced to allow access into Aceh to foreign humanitarian organisations whose presence had been severely restricted since 2003. Both sides came under intense pressure to cease fighting and work out a sustainable political settlement. In August 2005, eight months after the tsunami struck the province, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding known as the Helsinki agreement, putting an end to 30 years of conflict.

Challenges in post-conflict Aceh

The transition from conflict to peace has been relatively successful. GAM is represented by Aceh’s main political force “Partai Aceh” (PA), with free elections in 2006 and 2009 resulting in PA governing half of Aceh and winning nearly half of the seats in Aceh’s legislature. Considerable extra resources have been available to local governments since a 2001 decentralisation process, and billions of dollars have poured into the province to be spent on reconstruction and development since the tsunami.

However, the majority of Acehnese living in rural areas have not witnessed any major improvement of their situation. A particularly small share of the

tsunami money has reached the more remote regencies and those hardest hit by the conflict. Weak institutions within Aceh have struggled to manage and spend the extra resources, and corruption and extortion have been widespread. Former GAM members have used their political networks and threats of violence to enrich themselves and their clients through favoured access to government contracts (Braithwaite, John, March 2010, p.385). GAM has also become divided, with several groups competing for “peace dividends” and power (Asia Times, 11 June 2010).

In 2006 the Jakarta legislature passed the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA). It was contested in Aceh, because it diluted the provisions of the Helsinki agreement, in particular in relation to Aceh’s political autonomy. The implementation of LoGA has been piecemeal. Meanwhile, no mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission or a human rights court have been established to deal with past abuses (ICTJ, 26 June 2009, p. 20). The TNI, the dominant security force in Aceh, has continued to distrust the PA, viewing the former rebels as a threat to the country’s unity (ICG, 23 March 2009).

Before the April 2009 legislative elections, there was a steady increase in violent incidents (CPCRS, 17 December 2009). Much of the violence was linked to problems of reintegrating ex-combatants, with some turning to crime after the peace agreement, while the TNI was suspected of targeting PA candidates and trying to widen divisions within the party (Braithwaite, John, March 2010, p.271; CPCRS, 6 May 2010; Jakarta Post, 20 January 2009; Jakarta Post, 18 August 2008). Since the April 2009 elections, violence has sharply decreased, with the notable exception in November 2009 of three shooting incidents targeting foreigners in the city of Banda Aceh, which have again been linked to a possible network of military elements hostile to PA and foreigners (CPCRS, 6 May 2010).

Displacement patterns and IDP population figures

There are no exact figures available on the total number of people displaced by conflict in Aceh since 1999, or on the current number and locations of IDPs and returnees within or outside Aceh. It has been difficult to determine how many have remained displaced, and their movements have been largely undocumented.

As conflict directly affected a majority of inhabitants and one-third to two-thirds of people were reportedly displaced by force in the areas hardest-hit by the conflict, defining who was an IDP and who wasn’t proved a difficult challenge for humanitarian agencies (IOM, 20 June 2007, p.4). This was particularly the case after the 2005 peace agreement when many IDPs started returning and population movements were difficult to monitor. Some people who fled the conflict to seek refuge in the coastal areas were again displaced by the December 2004 tsunami.

The most credible estimate put the total number of people displaced by conflict since 1999 at somewhere around 600,000, not including those displaced outside Aceh (MSR, December 2009, p.28) This figure is based on 2006 research by the government and the World Bank in more than 5,000 villages of Aceh, which showed that over 103,000 households were reported as having been displaced as well as on data gathered in 2008 by the World Bank and American Universities researchers which suggested 585,000 people had been displaced (Barron, Patrick; Humphreys, Macartan; Paler, Laura; Tajima, Yuhki; Weinstein, Jeremy, 2009, p.45; Gol & WB, March 2007, p.42).. The majority originated from fewer than a third of Aceh’s regencies, namely Aceh Utara, Pidie, Aceh Timur, Bireuen and Aceh Besar, where the conflict had been most intense.

Five years after the Helsinki agreement, it is believed that most people have returned to their

homes, resettled elsewhere or integrated into areas of displacement. However, a significant number of IDPs, consisting mainly of Javanese and possibly numbering up to 146,000, have not returned home and consider themselves as still displaced, having failed to resettle or integrate (MSR, December 2009, p.28). Moreover, of those who have managed to return, an unknown but significant number have not found durable solutions as they have faced great recovery and reintegration challenges with little or no assistance.

Of those identified in the government and World Bank's 2006 study, around 67,000 households were the same year believed to have returned, and almost 37,000 households, or approximately 180,000 people, were still displaced, roughly half of them outside Aceh, mostly in North Sumatra (IOM, August 2008, p.22). IDPs within Aceh were largely concentrated in just a few regencies with people often seeking refuge within the same regencies or in their vicinity (Gol & WB, March 2007, pp. 46-48, IOM, 20 June 2007, p.31). Methodological limitations – the IDP counts relied on responses by the village heads – and the fact that the data was collected at a time when many IDPs started returning home, suggest that figures may have been over-estimated; certainly they only provided a snapshot of a fluid situation.

Data collected by Harvard, Columbia and Stanford Universities between July and September 2008 suggest that between 44,000 and 146,000 people remained displaced in Aceh, excluding those who had fled to neighbouring provinces. The Aceh Reintegration and Livelihoods Surveys (ARLS) arrived at this range by counting according to each of two different IDP definitions. The lower range corresponds to the "objective" definition where IDPs are *"any individual (...) who has been displaced at any time since 1998 due to conflict and does not have a return from displacement date"*. The higher range corresponds to the "subjective" definition where IDPs are those who *"consider themselves an IDP but not a returnee"* (Barron,

Patrick; Humphreys, Macartan; Paler, Laura; Tajima, Yuhki; Weinstein, Jeremy, 2009, p.46). The majority of the "objective" and "subjective" IDPs were found in the same regencies, those hardest-hit by the conflict such as Aceh Timur, Pidie and Aceh Singkil or those likely to attract forced migrants such as Aceh Besar near the provincial capital Banda Aceh. These findings may suggest that few return movements actually took place after the end of 2006; those who intended to return did so shortly after the 2005 Helsinki agreement, while those who were too afraid to return or had nothing to return to remained displaced.

Figures on movements out of Aceh

There is little reliable information on the number and current location of people who fled Aceh between 1998 and 2004. The majority were Javanese who had come to Aceh as transmigrants. While some returned to Aceh after the 2005 peace agreement, many are believed to have integrated in the place they fled to. By the end of 2002, the Department of Labor and Transmigration reported that more than 200,000 people had fled Aceh, more than half of them moving to neighbouring North Sumatra province (JRS, June 2003, p.40). An OCHA mission conducted in North Sumatra in 2003 noted there were no reliable IDP figure due to registration problems (OCHA, 1 April 2003, p.1). It was later agreed that the most credible estimates were around 23,000 families, or roughly 115,000 people, half of them living in Langkat regency (OCHA & Bakornas, July 2003, p.17). Many also moved to Medan city.

Between 2002 and 2006 the government distributed Rp. 8.75 million (\$970) per family to most of the IDPs in North Sumatra in exchange for the termination of their IDP status (OCHA, 1 April 2003, p.3). They were then given the choice between returning to Aceh, relocating or staying in North Sumatra (PIPA, January 2009, p.2). The 2006 Aceh Village Survey showed that almost 18,000 households, or roughly 89,000 people, were still displaced outside Aceh. Receiving little assistance

and largely ignored by the 2005 Helsinki agreement, many Javanese IDPs have since reportedly struggled to find durable solutions, receiving no compensation for lost property (other than the termination fund) or other loss suffered during the conflict. Some are reported risking eviction due to their alleged encroachment on a protected forest area (Jakarta Post, 22 December 2009; PIPA, January 2009; Jakarta Post, 22 October 2007). Few have been encouraged to return to Aceh (MSR, December 2009, p.62).

Physical security and integrity

The conflict had a devastating impact. Homes, schools, infrastructure and sources of livelihoods such as farming land, plantations or small businesses were destroyed or damaged. An estimated 30,000 people were killed between 1976 and 2005, and more than 336,000 seriously injured (MSR, December 2009, p.4; IOM, August 2008, p.44). It had a great impact on the mental health of residents of affected areas, with the people forced from their homes often experiencing the highest level of violence. The high level of violence resulted in severe mental health consequences such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (IOM, 20 June 2007, p.76). Based on psychosocial needs assessments carried out in between December 2005 and November 2006, IOM estimated that a staggering 930,000 people experienced psychological trauma, or nearly one in four Acehnese (IOM, August 2008, p.44).

Nearly half of the respondents reported having had to flee their homes some time during the conflict. Those who fled were often those who experienced the most violent traumatic events including being forced to flee as a result of houses or building being burnt, being caught in a bombing or being shot at, or having property damaged or seized by armed groups. A quarter of the displaced reported also being robbed, extorted

or physically beaten. More acute forms of trauma mentioned included torture and rape. Males, particularly those under 21 at the time of the survey (2006), reportedly bore the brunt of the violence. The difficulties most commonly reported by the people displaced included not having enough food or water (77 per cent), being forced to flee because of a dangerous situation (77 per cent), not being able to choose a place to stay (72 per cent), and not being able to access medical assistance (66 per cent).

A slight difference was found between ethnic groups as Acehnese people primarily fled when they experienced or witnessed physical attacks while Javanese fled more based on rumours of attacks against people in or near the village. 45 per cent of Acehnese respondents experienced 11 or more violent traumatic events, compared to only eight per cent of Javanese (IOM, August 2008, pp. 23-24).

Despite the end of the fighting and confidence which the majority of IDPs had in the peace process, many of them continued to live in fear. According to the IOM survey, 86 per cent of people who had not returned believed that the presence of armed groups in their place of origin would pose a threat to their safety and security there (IOM, August 2008, p.25). People who had returned were more likely to still feel insecure: 28 per cent of returnees believed that their family still faced security threats in its current location, compared to only five per cent of IDPs.

Obstacle to return and sustainable livelihoods

Those still displaced are predominantly Javanese people, as this group has been slower to return than Acehnese people (MSR, December 2009, p.110). Some were displaced within their regency in Aceh, but the overwhelming majority fled to North Sumatra or other provinces such as Riau.

Their reluctance to return has both to do with their perception of safety and security and the fact that they have been displaced further and for longer periods of time. Many have started anew and secured new livelihoods in areas of displacement.

In some regencies such as Aceh Timur where the conflict was particularly intense and where many Javanese fled their homes, it was estimated that three years after the Helsinki agreement only five per cent of all Javanese had returned home. A number of reasons were suggested: they did not feel they would be safe in return areas; their house and land was destroyed or overgrown and would require too much work to repair; their land was occupied by others; they had built a new life in the area of displacement; or they had received termination funds (Grayman, Jesse, November 2009, p.97).

Data from the 2006 UNDP/IOM survey showed that safety and security for their family and themselves was the primary driver of IDPs' choice to return, integrate locally or resettle elsewhere. While high numbers of both returnees and IDPs were afraid of armed groups in their places or origin, those still displaced were far less confident that the Helsinki agreement would bring about peace. Displaced Javanese predictably showed greater mistrust towards leaders of pro-GAM groups, although almost half of displaced Acehnese did too (IOM, August 2008, pp. 24-25).

Access to work opportunities followed. After years in displacement, many have given up on any idea of return, and have sold their property in their places or origin or think it is not worth trying to return. Nearly half of IDPs did not believe they would be able to return to their previous occupation if they returned home. Securing a sustainable livelihood has often been a struggle, in particular for the majority of IDPs who have lost tenure and access to farming land, resources for fishing, businesses and homes (IOM, August 2008, pp. 26-28). As a result, many IDPs are in need of livelihood support.

Most Javanese people displaced to North Sumatra are likely to remain there as they have not been encouraged to return and have settled in areas of displacement. The 2006 IOM/UNDP survey showed that nearly 80 per cent owned land in Aceh prior to their displacement, but most reportedly chose to sell it instead of risking return (Shewfelt, Steve, August 2007, p.16; IOM, 20 June 2007, p.31).

IDPs have reportedly faced serious challenges in integrating into the communities where they are living. This appears to be particularly true in the central highlands regencies such as Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah, where most IDPs are Javanese transmigrants who are resented by local communities as an additional burden on limited resources and more likely to receive assistance from the government or international agencies (MSR, December 2009, p.111). While both IDPs and returnees showed high levels of trust in traditional leaders and community-based social cohesion mechanisms in their current location, nearly 35 per cent of them reported that village meetings were never held to discuss or resolve problems within the community (IOM, August 2008, p.26).

Those who have resettled also often struggle to integrate into new communities, acquire land, find jobs and may suffer from discrimination.

Recovery and reintegration challenges in return areas

More than half of the estimated 450,000 people who have returned or resettled within Aceh province since the beginning of the conflict have done so in the regencies most affected by the conflict (MSR, December 2009, p.28). Assessments of former conflict areas across Aceh revealed that almost all villages surveyed shared pressing needs with regard to housing, food security and access to health care. Other more long-term needs shared by the wider community included

access to capital to restart a livelihood, and new infrastructure, with sanitation and health care structures particularly damaged (WB, March 2006, pp.60-69; EC, 15 December 2005, p.5).

While all civilians living in affected areas have suffered from the effects of the conflict, returnees are generally worse off, with many of them who have had their houses and property destroyed and their livelihoods undermined by their inability to work on their land while they were displaced. Having often to start from scratch, the majority of the returnees have in the past years struggled to provide for their families, find work, restore their livelihoods, rebuild their homes, and access education, health care and markets (IOM, 20 June 2007, p.31; IOM, September 2006, p.3; IOM-GoRI, September 2004, pp.16-17).

Prior to their displacement, the majority of the displaced were farmers who owned their land. Others were labourers or fishermen. Returnees by and large managed to maintain the ownership of their homes, farming land, plantation or fishery. However, many were trapped in poverty because they failed to quickly restore their farming land, plantations or businesses and were forced to accept low-paid jobs in the meantime to provide for their families (IOM, August 2008, pp. 26-30).

In Bener Meriah regency, out of a group of 120 households who returned five years after being displaced, almost all were either coffee farmers or coffee traders. Upon return they started cultivating their abandoned plantations again, however coffee bushes need two or three years before they can be harvested. With such a delay on income, and a family to provide for, many were often forced to seek cash by working as labourers on other people's plantations (UNORC, September 2006, p.5). This left little or no time to work their own fields. As a consequence, many men decided that their families should not return until their plantations were at least partly back in shape (UNDP, July 2008, p.9).

Many returnees have continued to face real or perceived security threats linked to the presence of armed groups in areas of return or high levels of criminality there (MSR, December 2009, p.29). Many returnees belong to a minority ethnic group in their area, and were specifically targeted for their perceived association with one of the warring parties. This was the case with many Javanese or Gayonese in East Aceh, but also with Acehnese in Central Aceh (Aceh Tengah), who had to flee the activities of anti-separatist militias (WB, 16 January 2006, p.3). The return and reintegration of these groups has often been problematic as they have retained feelings of distrust towards other groups and have feared that if the conflict were to resume, they would have to flee again (Amri Yakob, Luthfi Ashari, Roslina Johari, November 2005, p.21).

Many returnees have been unable to prove their ownership of their homes and livelihood resources (IOM, August 2008, p.28). A number of Acehnese IDPs returning to Gayo land in Central Aceh, where they are in a minority, have been unable to reclaim their land and property and have received little help from the local authorities. Some preferred not to report their land claims to the police because they were afraid of local militias who had allegedly beaten up one IDP representative (UNDP/Bappenas, 2007, pp.135-136). Social reintegration for conflict victims including returnees has reportedly been difficult at times, with exclusion from public services, village meetings and social activities (OCHA, November 2008, p.10).

National response

The government's failure to respond to the needs of its displaced population mirrors its similar incapacity to assist other categories of "conflict victims" which it committed to help under the Helsinki agreement. According to various stakeholders, including IDPs themselves, people displaced by the conflict together with other

groups such as widows, orphans, victims of rape have received almost no assistance at all (Amiren, Muslim & Rahmah, Siti, January 2009, p.12). The systems for identifying and supporting conflict victims have largely failed to identify and monitor the number of vulnerable people and their needs. This is mainly due to lack of leadership with no single agency designated to coordinate IDP monitoring and a lack of cooperation among the national and international agencies (IOM, August 2008, p.32). For IDPs, government bureaucracy and the difficulties in gathering the documents needed to establish one's credentials as a "conflict victim" has been reported as one of the biggest barriers to accessing assistance (Grayman, Jesse, November 2009, p.143).

In February 2006, the provincial government established the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA) as the body responsible for the coordination of post-conflict programming (WB, April 2006, pp. 4-5). IDPs were entitled to assistance on the same basis as other people in the very broad "victims of conflict" category which was further divided into 14 different categories of loss. Victims of forced displacement were entitled to Rp. 10 million (about US\$ 1,000) (HD, April 2008, p. 23). However assistance which BRA aimed at IDPs had only benefited some 2,500 IDPs, or less than 0.5 per cent, by 2009 (MSR, December 2009, p.59). Both IDPs and returnees have primarily relied on their family or friends and on their own resources to try to meet their daily needs (IOM, August 2008, p.29).

The BRA assistance programme was launched in April 2006 with groups seeking assistance asked to submit proposals. Within 3 months the BRA received 50,000 proposals covering 600,000 people. This high number of proposals proved impossible for BRA to handle and the programme was cancelled, creating frustration and anger among people who had sometimes gone into debt to submit proposals (Palmer, December 2007; ICG, 4 October 2007, p.11).

The programme was replaced by a mechanism whereby assistance was to be delivered to all affected villages through the national government and World Bank's Kecamatan Development Program. Depending on the level of damage caused by the conflict and the size of their population, the villages would receive block grants of between \$6,000 and \$17,000 (WB, December 2009, p.ii; WB, December 2006, p.4). By March 2007, the fund had been distributed to over 1,700 villages, but not without creating significant tensions among and between the various target groups (WB, December 2009, p. 68; WB, 30 April 2007, p.4). In April 2007, a new head of BRA was appointed and in June 2007 it started once again to distribute the reintegration fund through individual payments.

The largest post-conflict assistance programme managed by BRA and also the one that has reached the highest number of people is assistance to build or rehabilitate homes destroyed or damaged during the conflict; over 19,000 homes, or potentially 95,000 people, have benefited from the programme. By December 2009, 63 per cent of almost 31,000 households BRA had planned to assist had received housing assistance. It has also provided agricultural training, inputs and livestock to over 80,000 people and general livelihood assistance to 9,000. Small business development support has benefited 62,000 people. Social compensation has been paid to some 30,000 people who lost a member of their family (MSR, December 2009, p.59).

However, assessments conducted by IOM and Harvard University suggest that the true number of people who directly suffered as a result of the conflict either from psychological trauma, physical disability or the loss of a relative is considerably higher than the number of beneficiaries identified by BRA. All in all, it is estimated that up to 1.5 million people, or 39 per cent of the population, could be considered as victims of the conflict (MSR, December 2009, p.xvi). The number of wid-

ows was estimated by IOM at over 155,000, the number of orphans at 184,000 and the number of people who experienced psychological trauma at over 930,000 (IOM, August 2008, p.44).

Single-headed households, victims of sexual abuses and orphans appear to be among the most vulnerable people, but fewer than 26,000 orphans, children or youth received any form of assistance from BRA. Psychosocial support has been inexistent or ineffectual (MSR, December 2009, p.27).

International response

In the wake of the tsunami disaster, the international community responded by launching one of the largest humanitarian assistance efforts in history, and pledged more than \$8.8 billion for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh and North Sumatra (ADB, February 2006, p.1). Five years later, much of what the tsunami destroyed has been rebuilt and recovery progress with regards to basic necessities, basic social services, livelihoods and infrastructure have been sometimes impressive. Almost all IDPs have returned or have been resettled, leaving as of 2009 only 3,600 IDPs out of an initial 500,000 people displaced. Nearly all houses destroyed or damaged by the tsunami have been rebuilt, access to basic services such as water, sanitation, health care, education has been restored back to pre-tsunami levels or sometimes better (UNORC, BRR, Governor of Aceh, January 2009).

While most of the international large-scale assistance and relief effort went into tsunami-affected regions of Aceh, mainly the coastal areas, the inland conflict-affected areas received far less attention despite demonstrating far greater needs. The economic cost of the conflict has been estimated at Rp. 107.4 trillion (\$10.7 billion) or almost twice the cost of the destruction and damage caused by the December 2004 tsunami. The total amount

committed directly or indirectly to post-conflict reconstruction, reintegration and peace-building however only reached Rp. 9 trillion (\$895 million), or one-seventh the amount provided for the tsunami relief and reconstruction effort (MSR, December 2009, p.xvii). Of this amount, more than half was contributed indirectly from tsunami recovery and development funds (MSR, December 2009, pp. 50-51).

Initially, restrictions imposed by the Indonesian government on donors prevented any funding from benefiting conflict-related programmes. Any assistance was strictly limited to tsunami-affected people and areas. Only in 2006 did conflict-IDPs and conflict-affected areas started receiving the support of some international organisations, namely the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Together with their local partners, they have delivered projects to support sustainable social, economic and political reintegration. Often in close cooperation with the BRA and the national development body Bapennas, they have supported activities related to peace-building, socialisation of the peace process, capacity-building of BRA, and rebuilding of livelihoods including through the provision of agricultural equipment. While a multi-donor fund (MDF) was established in 2005 to coordinate in the wake of the tsunami, no similar mechanism was set up for post-conflict assistance. As a result, post-conflict programmes have generally been implemented without proper coordination or a common strategy (MSR, December 2009, p.140).

Between 2005 and 2009, IOM received more than \$35 million in support of its post-conflict reintegration programme, which targeted former combatants, conflict victims including IDPs, and conflict-affected communities (IOM, 2010). UNDP conducted similar activities through its Strengthening Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh (SSPDA) programme, which

focused in particular on building the capacity of BRA (Shiller, Rachel, August 2008, p. 31).

In 2009, a \$5.5 million multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank was approved. Between 2010 and 2012, the programme will seek to strengthen national and local institutions, in particular BRA, to support the consolidation of peace and development in Aceh (MSR, December 2009, p. 140).

In addition to lack of coordination and strategy, IDP assistance has also been hampered by the lack of updated data on the numbers, location and needs of IDPs and returnees, which IOM attributes to “obstructive managerial bottlenecks” and insufficient inter-agency cooperation (IOM, August 2008, p.32). IDP profiling should be conducted in Aceh to generate the detailed and updated information necessary to protect and assist them and help them bring about a solution to their displacement.

Note: This is a summary of IDMC’s internal displacement profile on Aceh/Indonesia. The full profile is available online [here](#).

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About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.

Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people.

In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives.

For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at www.internal-displacement.org.

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