

Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IRQ17315
Country: Iraq
Date: 26 April 2005

Keywords: Iraq – Baghdad – Faili Kurds – Baath Regime – Iran – Citizenship – State protection

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

- 1. Please provide brief background material on the Faili Kurds in Iraq, and their situation under Saddam Hussein.**
- 2. What percentage of Faili Kurds were deported to Iran by Saddam, and how many of these have now returned to Iraq?**
- 3. What is the current legal status of Faili Kurds who were stripped of their citizenship under the Baath regime?**
- 4. Please provide background material on the current situation of the Faili Kurds, particularly in the Baghdad area and in the traditional Faili Kurd area between Baghdad and the Iranian border. Is there any evidence that they are experiencing harassment, discrimination or violence as a result of their race or religion?**
- 5. How effective are the security forces in providing protection to minority groups at present?**
- 6. Is it possible to fly directly into Baghdad at present?**

RESPONSE

- 1. Please provide brief background material on the Faili Kurds in Iraq, and their situation under Saddam Hussein.**

A November 2004 report by the Norwegian Refugee Council states:

“Faili Kurds, most of whom are Shia, form a distinctive group of displaced people in Iraq, many of them twice displaced and now back in their country of origin. Unlike most Iraqi Kurds, until the early 1970s they lived mainly in central and southern Iraq, many of them in Baghdad. At that time, perhaps 130,000 Failis were deported to Iran by the government of Iraq on the pretext that they were not Iraqi citizens, though in fact it was because their loyalty was considered suspect. Most had lived in Iraq for generations, but in Ottoman times had not registered as citizens in order to avoid conscription. Since the 1970s, most of the Faili Kurds have lived in Iran. However, since

1981, some have returned to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, where they are not necessarily welcome.” (Dammers1998, p.184)

“Faili is an Arabic term, given to a group of Kurds from a region of the Zagros Mountains straddling the Iran-Iraq border. Due to the geography of their homeland, the Faili Kurds have family members on both sides of the border. Contrary to the majority of their Kurdish brethren, they are Shi’a. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many Faili Kurds began migrating westwards to Iraqi cities, primarily Baghdad, where they took on key commercial, social, and cultural roles. During the 1970s and 80s the regime in Baghdad expelled large numbers of Faili Kurds. In one instance, in the autumn of 1971, up to 40,000 Failis were expelled. In April 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein seized full powers and just before his invasion of Iran, the 480 wealthiest Baghdadis were summoned to the Chamber of Commerce building. One third of them, found to be Faili Kurds, were swiftly arrested and deported to Iran, with their families following shortly after. Further deportations continued, and the numbers of Faili Kurd refugees estimated to have gone to Iran range from 100,000 up to 300,000. It is not clear how many Faili Kurds remain in Iraq, but according to one account, as of 1997, the expulsions continued.” (Fawcett & Tanner, Oct 02, pp 14-5) (Norwegian Refugee Council 2004, ‘Profile of Internal Displacement: Iraq’, *Global IDP Database*, p.18, 24 November – Attachment 1).

A March 2005 report by the International Crisis Group, on the Iranian influence in Iraq, states that “the Faylis are Iraqi Shiite Kurds who live predominantly in Baghdad and towns eastward toward the Iranian border, such as Kut. They faced expulsion for being “Iranians” throughout Iraq’s modern history, but especially in the 1970s and again at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war”. The report adds in a footnote that:

The Faylis are Shiite Kurds who speak either the Luri or Lak dialect of Persian (some would say: of Kurdish). Historically, they were considered Persians, as they refused to join the Ottoman army. In reality, they are a cross-border group. A former UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) official in Iran said that from his experience, Fayli Kurds do not like to be referred to either as “Faylis” or as “Kurds” but as “Iraqis”. Crisis Group interview, Amman, 12 February 2005. Following their expulsion from Iraq, those Faylis who could present documentary proof of Iranian ancestry were able to obtain Iranian citizenship. Those who could not were designated refugees and treated as such (harshly). Crisis Group interview with a former Iranian UNHCR official in Iran, Amman, 16 February 2005. (International Crisis group 2005, *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Middles East Report No. 38, 21 March, p.5 – Attachment 2).

A March 2004 article on the Failis from the UNHCR *Refugees Magazine* recounts the fortunes of a Faili Kurd family who have been living in Azna refugee camp in Iran for 24 years. It describes the 1924 Iraqi Nationality law which “divided the population into three categories based on religion and ethnicity – effectively creating three classes of citizenship. The Shiite Kurds were systematically classified in the lowest category and repeatedly targeted by government officials who claimed that as followers of the Shia faith, they were originally from Iran where the majority of the population is Shiite”. This was used against them when the Failis were expelled. The Failis in Iran were stuck in a “legal limbo as stateless persons” since they had been stripped of their nationality. However, there were hopeful signs that the problem would eventually be resolved, as UNHCR was holding talks with the Iraqi authorities to “address the issue of statelessness and give urgent consideration to those like the Faili Kurds who had lost their nationality (Verney, Marie-Helen 2004, ‘The Road Home: The Faili Kurds’, *Refugees Magazine Issue 134 (Return)*, 1 March, <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/openssldoc.htm?tbl=MEDIA&id=410652004&page=publ> – Accessed 5 April 2005 – Attachment 3).

2. What percentage of Faili Kurds were deported to Iran by Saddam, and how many of these have now returned to Iraq?

Reports do not provide exact figures for deportation and return of Faili Kurds. Around one to two hundred thousand are thought to have been sent to Iran. Of these, about 7,000 are thought to have returned.

The Norwegian Refugee Council, already quoted above, states that estimates of deportations vary between 100,000 and 300,000 or possibly even more (Norwegian Refugee Council 2004, 'Profile of Internal Displacement: Iraq', *Global IDP Database*, p.18, 24 November – Attachment 1).

The October 2004 UK Home Office report states that “most” of the Failis were deported in the 1970s. It also states that exact numbers are not known of Faili Kurds who have now returned to Iraq (UK Home Office 2004, *Iraq Country Report*, October – Attachment 4).

Dr Charles Tripp, at a November 2004 seminar at the Tribunal, stated that the Failis were “expelled en masse by the Ba’thist regime about 20 years ago, over the border to Iran”. Please see Question 4 for further remarks by Dr Tripp on the Failis (RRT Country Research 2004, *Transcription of Dr Charles Tripp seminar on Iraq held on 24 November 2004*, 24 November – Attachment 5).

A March 2004 article on the Failis from the UNHCR *Refugees Magazine* states that “at the beginning of 2003, there were more than 200,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran, of whom 65 percent are Faili Kurds” (Verney, Marie-Helen 2004, ‘The Road Home: The Faili Kurds’, *Refugees Magazine Issue 134 (Return)*, 1 March, <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=MEDIA&id=410652004&page=publ> – Accessed 5 April 2005 – Attachment 3).

A March 2005 report by the International Crisis Group, on the Iranian influence in Iraq, mentions that “of 200,000 registered Iraqi refugees in Iran in March 2003, an estimated 108,000 have since returned, including 7,000 Fayli Kurds” (International Crisis group 2005, *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Middle East Report No. 38, 21 March, p.6 – Attachment 2).

3. What is the current legal status of Faili Kurds who were stripped of their citizenship under the Baath regime?

Reports indicate that measures are being taken to restore nationality rights to Faili Kurds who have returned. However, citizenship and property were still important election issues for Faili and Kurdish parties in the recent elections, indicating that the issue has not been fully addressed yet.

The October 2004 UK Home Office report on Iraq states:

The Netherlands general official report on Iraq dated June 2004 added that, “The new draft nationality law contains provision for reviving the nationality rights of Fayli Kurds. A number of aspects of this draft version have also been included in the TAL. During the period under review [January to May 2004] it was not clear which procedures Fayli Kurds have to follow to actually obtain Iraqi nationality. The decrees of the Revolutionary Command Council (including decree

666 of 1980) affecting the withdrawal of Iraqi citizenship have been abolished. (UK Home Office 2004, *Iraq Country Report*, October – Attachment 4).

A new report from October 2004 quotes a member of the interim National Assembly as reported in the Iraqi press. He states that although there had been “a decision under the interim constitution, the State Administration Law, which abrogated Law No 666 on revoking the citizenship of Iraqis, especially Fayli Kurds”; and although the Council of Ministers had “issued an order to restore citizenship to them”; the Interior Ministry had “so far not complied” with the decision and “had not taken any step in this respect” (‘National Assembly member says elections commission has ignored Iraqis abroad’ 2004, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, 27 October – Attachment 6).

A March 2005 report by the International Crisis Group states that “two Fayli parties ran in the Iraqi elections in January 2005, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Fayli Kurds and the Free Fayli Kurdish Organisation. The latter group’s platform included regaining Fayli rights, their Iraqi citizenship and their properties” (International Crisis group 2005, *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Middles East Report No. 38, 21 March, p.5 – Attachment 2).

A January 2005 *BBC* report from just before the Iraqi elections quotes a message from Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to the Faili Kurds. [Talabani has since been appointed President of Iraq.] In the message he praises the Failis, and states that they were among the first to be persecuted by the regime of Saddam Hussein. He pledges that if elected he will represent them along with the other Kurds, stating:

...that in my own name and on behalf of my dear brother, [the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, leader] Mas’ud Barzani, and on behalf of the Kurdistan Alliance list [for the Iraqi parliament polls] of which I have the honour of being the chairman, we have not spared and will not spare any effort or endeavour or struggle so as to return all your usurped political, legal, financial, real estate and commercial rights, to regain your properties and assets, so that you will be fairly compensated for those losses and provide you with all the rights of Iraqi citizenship (‘Iraqi Kurdish leader Talabani reassures Fayli Kurds, urges them to vote’ 2005, *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, 27 January – Attachment 7).

4. Please provide background material on the current situation of the Faili Kurds, particularly in the Baghdad area and in the traditional Faili Kurd area between Baghdad and the Iranian border. Is there any evidence that they are experiencing harassment, discrimination or violence as a result of their race or religion?

Dr Charles Tripp, at a November 2004 seminar at the Tribunal, had some comments to make about the current situation of the Faili:

QUESTION (Melbourne): How do you see the situation from the Fa’ili Kurds at the moment, especially the ones who are thinking about returning to Iraq? It seems to fall outside the mainstream Kurdish thinking.

Yes, the Fa’ili Kurds are Shia Kurds and they were expelled en masse by the Ba’thist regime about 20 years ago, over the border to Iran. Some of them made their lives in Iran and see themselves as Iranians in most important respects, but of course others have started to go back, believing that by going back they can reclaim their property, they can reintegrate or take seriously the notion that Iraq will be an Iraq for all people. Of course, they face the problem that many returning migrants face which is both that when they get there they find other people sitting in their property, because

of course their property didn't just disappear – it was reoccupied by, sometimes by Kurds and sometimes by Arabs. And so there is a whole string of potential disputes. They also find sometimes that the political leaders of the Kurds, who otherwise claim undying loyalty to a Kurdish nation and to Kurdish nationalism, look in a rather jaundiced way upon these returnees who are stirring up trouble. My own experience of talking to some of the Fa'ili Kurds is that they had a very disappointing time, to put it mildly, when they went back to Iraq – it wasn't the Iraq they expected, they weren't welcomed in the way they had expected to be welcomed. There are differences in the sense that I think that in some places, not all Fa'ili Kurds were expelled, and there is enough of a communal support network for people to go back and feel supported. But in general they've had a rather disillusioning time in the last 18 months (RRT Country Research 2004, *Transcription of Dr Charles Tripp seminar on Iraq held on 24 November 2004*, 24 November – Attachment 5).

A March 2005 report by the International Crisis Group states that many Faili Kurds “have sought to return after the war; without Iraqi papers, they often found that their properties had been confiscated. One secular Shiite with tribal links in Kut alleged that the Waset provincial council had been taken over by ‘Iranians’ in 2004. Upon further questioning, it turned out that by ‘Iranians’, he mostly meant Fayli Kurds, whom he accused of being both citizens of Iran and agents of its regime” (International Crisis group 2005, *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Middle East Report No. 38, 21 March, p.5 – Attachment 2).

A January 2005 piece by the Institute for War and Peace reporting describes the Faili Kurds in the lead up to the 30 January elections. It does not mention overt harassment and discrimination, but does discuss independent Faili candidates campaigning on a platform of Faili Rights:

Faili Kurds say they are determined to run as independents in the upcoming elections in Iraq, after refusing offers to join the big Shia and Kurdish coalitions.

“As Failis, we took part in helping the Kurdish movements during their struggle against the dictatorship of Saddam, and now we are gaining our own results,” said Farhad Ali, a 34-year-old Faili trader.

“For this reason we have decided to run in the election without anyone’s help.”

The Failis, Shia Kurds who live in Baghdad and the border area between Iraq and Iran, see the election as an opportunity to have a voice in government at last.

They faced severe repression under Saddam Hussein, who in the early Eighties accused them of being Iranians and deported hundreds of thousands of them, confiscating their property and identification documents.

Twenty years later, two political parties are representing the Failis in the forthcoming election. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Faili Kurds is going it alone, standing as a separate party; while the Free Faili Kurdish Organisation is running in the Justice and Future list together with the Democratic Justice and Progress Party.

Said Rajab Rahim, secretary general of the Free Faili Kurdish Organisation, said his group was approached by the United Iraqi Alliance, the top Shia list, and by the main Kurdish list which unites the two big Kurdish parties. But neither coalition offered a good enough placing on its list of candidates.

Each party vying for the 275 seats in Iraq's transitional National Assembly has drawn up a list of candidates, ranked first to last. The seats will be allocated according to the percentage that each party wins in the nationwide election.

“The Kurds asked us to join their list offering two seats for us, but we refused because that quota did not satisfy us, and we didn't know the position of the two names on the list,” said Rahim. “The parties in the United Iraqi Alliance asked us to join their list with 12 names, but we were sure that the names would be put at the bottom of the list.”

Rahim said the Faili Kurds have a strong political platform and an established movement which succeed on its own. His group's election manifesto includes gaining back Faili rights, their Iraqi nationality and property, as well as supporting a constitutional state which is democratic and ensures religious and political freedom (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2005, 'Shia Kurds go it alone', *IWPR Iraqi Crisis Report No. 100*, 25 January – Attachment 8).

5. How effective are the security forces in providing protection to minority groups at present?

Sources indicate that although much effort being directed towards building up the Iraqi police force and army, they are still far from being able to provide adequate protection to the community. Among other issues, one of the problems described in reports is the continuing allegiance to ethnic or religious groups which lessen the ability to act impartially. There is little community confidence in the police, and victims of crimes instead turn to their own support networks for help. Police and army recruits are among those most often targeted by insurgent groups.

A September 2004 UNHCR return advisory stated:

The Iraqi security bodies as well as foreign troops remain unable to provide adequate physical protection. The general lack of law and order is exacerbated by the absence of a properly functioning judicial system. As a result, many crimes are never reported to the police and disputes are often settled through tribal justice mechanisms or by persons who decide to take the law directly into their own hands (UNHCR 2004, *UNHCR return advisory regarding Iraqi asylum seekers and refugees*, September – Attachment 9).

An August 2004 report by UNHCR on conditions for returning refugees contained material on current law enforcement and political structures. It commented that particularly among former policemen who have now re-joined the new police force, one of the problems which has been encountered is “the influence of political/religious parties”. The report states that

...The general Iraqi public lacks faith in the capacity of the Iraqi Police Forces to effectively maintain law and order, an attitude which has to date been repeatedly confirmed by the numerous security incidents currently plaguing Iraq. Many crimes are therefore simply never reported to the police. In turn, perpetrators generally carry out acts of violence, vandalism and other crimes without fear of prosecution or conviction. As a result, more and more people have begun to rely on other forms of protection such as tribal links and or vigilante-type justice. (UNHCR, 2004, *Country of Origin Information – Iraq*, 12 August, pp.2-3 – Attachment 10).

In September 2004, a joint British-Danish fact finding mission visited Amman and Baghdad, and spoke to a range of sources including diplomats, NGOs, UN and Iraqi government sources. Of the security situation, the report states:

3.22 UN sources in Amman (1) advised that the police force was not effective enough to provide security to ordinary Iraqis. The source added that the police force was more corrupt than ever before, and that the kidnappers were very rich and so could bribe police officers. In the rural areas crime rates were lower because the tribal system oversees the community. Tribal power was not so prevalent in the cities.

3.23 A diplomatic source in Amman (2) informed the delegation that the Iraqi police had widened their influence and that the Jordanians had increased their training of Iraqi police recruits. This visible increase of police presence rather than the Multi National Force was a positive sign to regular Iraqis. However the source informed the delegation that half of the police recruits had left because they felt they were targets.

3.24 As to whether Iraqis were reporting problems to the police, the source informed the delegation that they were not for two reasons: a) they were not accustomed to it (under the Iraqi regime, an Iraqi would need to have close contacts to get an investigation from the police), and b) the Iraqi people were using alternative routes for resolution such as tribal/family/community ties. Within the rural areas, a tribal resolution was effective, however in the city this route was only marginally effective.

3.25 UN sources in Amman (2) advised that the police service was present and functioning. There was a need to re-educate the command structure however the source advised that the general population would still view the police as Ba'athists. The source advised that the police had not had human rights training during their time in Jordan, however the training and structure of the police service was improving. The source added that quite often police ignored court orders. The source added that prisoners often showed signs of trauma when they were brought to court. However the source noted that the Minister of Human Rights was a very progressive Minister and should be able to improve the situation. It was recognised that during Saddam's regime there was no rule of law whatsoever; corruption was then, and was still, considered normal. The source stated that UNAMI was involved in the training of Iraqi police.

3.26 An international humanitarian organisation working in the region advised the delegation that the police were ever present in Iraq. They organised the traffic and could be seen on the streets. Police responding to emergencies were less well organised. The source added that US soldiers were hardly ever seen now. The source stated that the Iraq Civil Defence Corps was currently trying to recruit a mix of ethnic groups; the source was unaware whether the police had a proportional distribution of ethnic recruits. However a diplomatic source in Amman (1) informed the delegation that in Kirkuk there were many different types of police forces and that, depending on which ethnic group you belonged to, would affect which type of police force came to you. The source advised that since the handover the Iraqi police were trying harder, and that they had more of a sense of responsibility. There was venal corruption using money or politics. The source advised that there was a court system and the judges were largely politically neutral however the laws could be internally contradictory due to the additional laws put in place by the CPA.

3.27 The source added that the standard of the Iraqi police force had improved due to training conducted in Jordan, and the numbers had increased substantially. The police were working hard and patrolling the streets. This was viewed positively by many Iraqis and was considered to be an improvement to foreign military forces taking care of security. However, Iraqis were not used to reporting crimes to the police and many would prefer to go to the tribe-leaders to get a problem solved. The source advised that it was still possible to approach the Multi National Forces and ask for help. Many Iraqis had in fact received assistance from the Multi National Forces in various criminal cases but sometimes the soldiers were too busy to respond to the call for assistance.

3.28 UNHCR in Amman stated that sometimes the Iraqi police could protect people and sometimes they could not. It would depend on the situation and the status of the people involved (UK Home Office, 2004, *Joint British Danish Fact Finding Mission to Baghdad and Amman on Conditions in Iraq, 1-8th September 2004*, October, http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/0/country_information/fact_finding_missions.Maincontent.0016.file.tmp/FFM2.pdf – Accessed 8 March 2005 – Attachment 11).

6. Is it possible to fly directly into Baghdad at present?

News and other reports indicate that an increasing number of airlines are now flying both passengers and freight into Baghdad. However, the airport road is regularly attacked by insurgents.

A November 2004 news report states that Baghdad airport “has yet to see a resumption of normal traffic, partly due to attacks on aircraft in flight”. However, there are some flights from Jordan:

Iraqi Airways, returning to business after years in mothballs, and Royal Jordanian Airlines operate Iraq’s only scheduled passenger flights, between Baghdad and the Jordanian capital Amman, about an hour’s flying time away (‘Bomb found on Iraq commercial flight’ 2004, *China Daily* online edition, 23 November http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/23/content_394124.htm – Accessed 5 January 2004 – Attachment 12).

The last Iraqi bulletin of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, dated 15 October 2004, reports that apart from Royal Jordanian and Iraqi Airways, a number of other operators provide scheduled air-passenger services into Iraq (including, SkyLink, Air Serv International, and Heston/SAFAIR) (United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 2004, *UNJLC IRAQ Bulletin*, No. 9, 15 October http://www.unjlc.org/content/item.phtml?itemId=27093&nodeId=file4188d2f1b44f1&fn=UNJLC_IRAQ%20Bulletin_9%20041015.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2005 – Attachment 13).

An earlier UNJLC bulletin also reports that “contractors’ flights regularly serve Bagdad” (United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 2004, *UNJLC IRAQ Bulletin*, No. 1, 18 June http://www.unjlc.org/content/item.phtml?itemId=22140&nodeId=file40d6e8d0d08c1&fn=UNJLC_IRAQ2004_Bulletin%201_040618.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2005 – Attachment 14).

More recent reports, from February 2005, mention new flights into Baghdad by freight and charter companies (‘Taking weight off sea freight’s shoulders’ 2005, *International Freighting Weekly*, 28 February – Attachment 15); (‘Emirates and Coyne’s joint Baghdad run’ 2005, *International Freighting Weekly*, 21 February – Attachment 16).

The latest Iraqi field report from the Centurion Risk Assessment Services, dated 7 January 2005, also notes, inter alia, that:

The airport road [to Baghdad international airport] remains a dangerous place to travel even with the increase of Coalition force security. Travel to, and from the airport, is still being disrupted by numerous incidents or suspect vehicles at the airport checkpoint causing delays. Even the military hardware (armoured vehicles) are at times told not to use the route due to continuing threats from ambushes and IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices].

Most attacks along this route have been very well planned by the insurgents with the tactic of “cut-off” groups and “spotters” on the high vantage points such as buildings to give warning of intended targets such as Western or Coalition force vehicles

Yet even with attacks on a daily basis this is still the best way in and out of Iraq (Centurion Risk Assessment Services 2005, Field Report: Iraq, 7 January <http://www.centurion-riskservices.co.uk/aidsafetynet/docs/fieldreports.asp> – Accessed 13 January 2005 – Attachment 17).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Google search engine

UNHCR *REFWORLD* UNHCR Refugee Information Online

Databases:

| | | |
|-------------|----------------|---|
| Public | <i>FACTIVA</i> | Reuters Business Briefing |
| DIMIA | <i>BACIS</i> | Country Information |
| | <i>REFINFO</i> | IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) |
| RRT | <i>ISYS</i> | RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State <i>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices</i> . |
| RRT Library | <i>FIRST</i> | RRT Library Catalogue |

List of Attachments

1. Norwegian Refugee Council 2004, 'Profile of Internal Displacement: Iraq', *Global IDP Database*, 24 November.
2. International Crisis group 2005, *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Middle East Report No. 38, 21 March.
3. Verney, Marie-Helen 2004, 'The Road Home: The Faili Kurds', *Refugees Magazine Issue 134 (Return)*, 1 March, <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=MEDIA&id=410652004&page=publ> – Accessed 5 April 2005.
4. UK Home Office 2004, *Iraq Country Report*, October.
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15. 'Taking weight off sea freight's shoulders' 2005, *International Freighting Weekly*, 28 February.
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17. Centurion Risk Assessment Services 2005, Field Report: Iraq, 7 January <http://www.centurion-riskservices.co.uk/aidsafetynet/docs/fieldreports.asp> – Accessed 13 January 2005.